The Sino-Russian Trade and the Role of the Lifanyuan, 17Th–18Th Centuries

chapter 8 The Sino-Russian Trade and the Role of the Lifanyuan, 17th–18th Centuries Ye Baichuan and Yuan Jian In the discussion of Sino-Russian relations, scholars have long been either focusing on historical documentation1 or on the discussion of the tributary system and the closed-door policy.2 Taking the Lifanyuan regulation practices for the Sino-Russian trade in the 17th to 18th centuries as a point of depar- ture, this chapter will add a new perspective. In particular, it will be discussed how the Qing government combined treaty diplomacy with tributary diplomatic thinking to realize a series of political objectives in its relationship with Russia.3 1 Zhang Weihua and Sun Xi, Qing qianqi zhong’e guanxi (Jinan: Shandong Education Press, 1997); Tong Dong, Sha’e yu dongbei (Changchun: Jilin Literature and History Press, 1985); Sha’e qinghuashi, ed. Yu Shengwu et al. (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1978–1990); Yiliubajiunian de zhong’e nibuchu tiaoyue 1689, ed. Dai Yi et al. (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1977); Wang Xilong, Zhong’e guanxishilue (Lanzhou: Gansu Culture Press, 1995); Liu Yuantu, Zaoqi zhong’e dongduan bianjie yanjiu (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 1993); Jiang Changbin, Zhonge guojiedongduan de yanbian (Beijing: Central Literary Contributions Publishing Bureau, 2007); Zhongsu maoyishi ziliao, ed. Meng Xianzhang (Beijing: China’s Foreign Trade and Economic Publishing House, 1991); Meng Xianzhang, Zhongsu jingji maoyishi (Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Publishing House, 1992); Li Mingbin, Zhongguo yu esu wenhuajiaoliuzhi (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 1998); Li Sheng, Xinjiang dui esu maoyishi (Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, 1993); Lin Yongkuang and Wang Xi, Qingdai xibei minzu maoyishi (Beijing: The Central University for Nationalities Publishing House, 1991); Mi Zhenbo, Qingdai xibeibianjingdiqu zhong’emaoyi: cong daoguang chao dao xuantong chao (Tianjin: Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences Press, 2005); Jianming qingshi, ed. Dai Yi (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1984). 2 The Cambridge History of China, vol. 11: Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, part 2, ed. John King Fairbank et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), Jianqiao zhongguo wanqingshi, trans. The Compiling Room of the Institute of History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2007), 29–33. Dai Yi, Shiba shiji de zhongguo yu shijie (Shenyang: Liaohai Press, 1999), 100–11. 3 Mikhail Iosifovich Sladkovskij, Istoriya torgovo-ekonomicheskikh otnoshenij narodov Rossii s Kitaem (do 1917 g.) (Moskva: Nauka, 1974). Evgenij Pantelejmonovich Silin, Kyakhta v XVIII v.: iz istorii russko-kitajskoj torgovli (Irkutsk: Irkutskoe oblastnoe izdatel’stvo, 1947). Khristofor © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ��7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335004_0�0 The Sino-russian Trade And The Role Of The Lifanyuan 255 The foreign relations of the Qing dynasty are usually divided into the tributary and the treaty system,4 the former of which is recognized as a main char- acteristic of the Qing government until the Opium Wars (1839–42, 1856–60). As a matter of fact, however, Russia was an exception in diplomatic practice. As early as in 1656, Fëdor Isakovich Bajkov, the representative of Tsar Aleksej Mikhailovich, came to Beijing and established formal diplomatic relationships between the two empires. In the wake of many border conflicts and in the face of domestic troubles and foreign invasion, the Qing sought to regulate their relations with Russia for the first time and signed the treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689.5 This treaty, which was followed by the 1728 treaty of Kyakhta, provided the basic framework for bilateral political, trading, cultural, and religious oper- ations until the Opium War, thus paving the way for a new, modern period of foreign relations between Russia and China. At the same time, however, some practices of tributary diplomacy were continued. Taking advantage of the Russian desire for trading profits, the Qing government pursued various political goals, such as control over the migration of the Zünghars and Khalkha Mongols and the delimitation of border areas, by bestowing trade rights in China. Qing political ambitions obviously ben- efited from the leverage exerted through trade control, and the importance the government attached to the Sino-Russian trade by far exceeded common economic interests. Trade relations between China and Russia were actually considered an extension of the political and diplomatic relations between the Ivanovich Trusevich, Posol’skie i torgovye snosheniya Rossii s Kitaem do XIX veka (Moskva: Tipografiya T. Malinskogo, 1882). Aleksandr Kazimirovich Korsak, Istoriko-statisticheskoe obozrenie torgovykh snoshenij Rossii s Kitaem (Kazan’: Izdanie Ivana Dubrovina, 1857). Natal’ya Fedorovna Demidova and Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, Pervye russkie diplomaty v Kitae: Rospis’ I. Petlina i statejnyj spisok F.I. Bajkova (Moskva: Nauka, 1966). Nina Pavlovna Shastina, Russko-mongol’skie posol’skie otnosheniya v XVII veke (Moskva: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoj Literatury, 1958). Granitsy Kitaya: istoriya formirovaniya, ed. Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov et al. (Moskva: Pamyatniki istoricheskoj mysli, 2001). Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, Imperiya Tsin i Russkoe gosudarstvo v XVII v. (Moskva: Nauka, 1980). Oleg Efimovich Nepomnin, Istoriya Kitaya: epokha Tsin, XVII—nachalo XX veka (Moskva: Vostochnaya literature, 2005). 4 Sometimes also referred to as the ‘Canton (Guangzhou) System’; for detailed information see Wu Yixiong, “Yapianzhanzheng qian zaihuaxiren yu duihuazhanzhengyulun de xingcheng,” in Jindai zhongguo: zhengzhi yu waijiao, ed. Wang Jianlang et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Documentation Publishing House, 2010), 13. 5 Some scholars believe that the treaty of Nerchinsk signalled the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, see Zhao Huasheng, “Zhong’e guanxi de moshi,” in Zhonge guanxi de lishi yu xianshi, ed. Guan guihai et al. (Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2009), 40. 256 Ye and Yuan two countries. As a whole, this strategy proved to be successful in the early Qing period given the military and political strength of its governance, which was broad enough to counterbalance Russia’s expansion into the Far East and her desire for trade profits in that region. Although Russia had never given up the idea of enlarging the empire by expanding into new territories, her interest in trade profits had always dominated her policy towards China in the 17th and 18th centuries, and it was this very factor that gave the Qing government the opportunity to play out its diplomatic means. This strategy was realized by a unique institution, the Lifanyuan, which was originally an office that handled Non-Chinese and especially Mongolian affairs; with the beginning of Sino-Russian negotiations, however, it became also responsible for dealing with the relationship between China and Russia. Since one of its main functions was to supervise and manage the trade between the two countries, the Lifanyuan began to play an important role in Sino-Russian relations. This widening of political responsibility has often raised questions as to its compatibility and effectiveness. Why, for instance, should an office in charge of managing internal and Inner Asian affairs also engage with a European power? What were the principles of the Lifanyuan’s supervision and management of Sino-Russian trade, and by what means could trade supervision strengthen the Qing’s political position? Finally, how did the Qing gain full control over the Khalkha Mongolian territories that lie between the two empires? These questions have as yet been hardly explored, at least in China.6 With regard to Russia, the Lifanyuan was both an executive and an important consulting body. Its supervision of the Sino-Russian trade reflected a specific mode of operation and thus helps us to understand the course of the bilateral relations and the distinctive features of Qing Dynasty diplomacy in the 17th and 18th centuries. Nevertheless, Chinese and foreign scholars have been focusing mostly on the Lifanyuan as a governmental agency responsible for administrating the newly acquired territories in Inner Asia. Even Zhao Yuntian, a specialist in Lifanyuan studies, has given only a brief introduction on the Lifanyuan’s supervision and management of Russian affairs. 6 To our knowledge, the role of the Lifanyuan in the Sino-Russian trade has as yet been in the focus of only two scholars, see: Zhao Yuntian, Qingdai zhili bianchui de shuniu lifanyuan (Urumqi: Xinjiang People’s Publishing House, 1995); Idem, “Qing chao lifanyuan yu zhong’e guanxi,” Qiqiha’er shifanxueyuanxuebao 1 (1981), and Vladimir Stepanovich Myasnikov, “Lifanyuan yu eqing guanxi (17–18shiji),” trans. Ye Baichuan et al., Mingqing luncong 12 (2012). The Sino-russian Trade And The Role Of The Lifanyuan 257 1 The Lifanyuan’s Functions in Sino-Russian Relations: Tribute or Not? The diplomatic practice of the Lifanyuan lasted until the establishment of the Zongli geguo shiwu yamen in 1861, and it was responsible for the affairs of foreign countries west and north of China that could be reached overland, including Russia. Ever since negotiations had started, it was the Lifanyuan that was responsible for Russian affairs although its original range of author- ity was much more limited: it was “responsible for governmental decrees to the minorities, defining the ranks and salaries of their nobility, regulating the homage paid

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