Europe-Asia Studies

ISSN: 0966-8136 (Print) 1465-3427 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20

Football Fan Subculture in Russia: Aggressive Support, Readiness to Fight, and Far Right Links

Julia Glathe

To cite this article: Julia Glathe (2016) Football Fan Subculture in Russia: Aggressive Support, Readiness to Fight, and Far Right Links, Europe-Asia Studies, 68:9, 1506-1525, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2016.1244260 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1244260

Published online: 25 Nov 2016.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=ceas20 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, 2016 Vol. 68, No. 9, November 2016, 1506–1525

Football Fan Subculture in Russia: Aggressive Support, Readiness to Fight, and Far Right Links

JULIA GLATHE

Abstract This article provides a characterisation of the right-wing football fan subculture in Russia, focusing on its relationship with the far right. It explores the virtual network across fans, hooligans, and the far right scene, and it identifies common narratives between the football fan subculture and Russia’s far right. Using the technique of the Grounded Theory Method, this article attempts to explain the link between the football subculture and the Russian far right, discussing the potential to mobilise football fans for right-wing actions. A key basis for interaction between the football subculture and right-wing activists is provided by the combination of the supporters’ readiness for fights and their sense of oppression from state policies.

THE RIOT AT THE MANEZHNAYA SQUARE IN MOSCOW (11 December 2010) is just one episode revealing the mobilisation potential for right-wing action held by Russian football fans and hooligans. This gathering, which involved right-wing extremists and many football fans, was triggered by the death of Egor Sviridov, the Spartak Moscow fan who died during a street fight with people from the ‘North Caucasus’ (Verkhovsky & Kozhevnikova 2011). The 3,000 participants chanted racist and anti-police slogans, raised their hands collectively in Nazi-salutes, and repeatedly attacked individuals of ‘non-Russian’ appearance. The Centre for Information and Analysis (Verkhovsky & Kozhevnikova 2011) reported one death and 40 serious injuries while listing the riot’s total casualties. Such a huge mobilisation after a relatively common incident—at least in a metropolis like Moscow—was interpreted as an enormous success for the Russian extreme right: ‘such a mass gathering under such radical slogans have never happened before, and at this time it also took place literally under the Kremlin walls, was crowned with fairly mass violence, and not a single organiser has been held accountable’ (Verkhovsky & Kozhevnikova 2011). In September 2013, right-wing extremists and football hooligans returned to the streets, this time in Biryulyovo, and rioted side by side at an alarming gathering against ‘illegal migration’. This incident was instigated by the death of a Muscovite who had been fighting with a ‘migrant’ (SOVA 2013). Both events indicate that some segments of the Russian football fan and hooligan scene are part of the Russian far right or, at the very least, attracted to it.

ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/16/9001506–20 © 2016 University of Glasgow http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2016.1244260 Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1507

The success encountered by right-wing activists in mobilising the fan scene suggests that a dense network involving football fans and the far right may actually be operating across the Russian Federation. Although the phenomenon of racism in the context of football is not new, it remains largely unexplored in its Eastern European, and Russian more in particular, manifestations. While many authors explored the link between football fans and Russia’s far right, there are few systematic analyses of the right-wing football subculture in Russia. Little is therefore known about the network involving football fans and right-wing activists and, most significantly, the mobilisation mechanisms operating within this network. This article is therefore aimed to offer a more comprehensive study of Russia’s right-wing football fan and hooligan subculture—the members of which describe themselves as Okolofutbol’shchiki— while seeking to examine their relationship with the Russian far right. The article’s key objective is to gain a more nuanced understanding of where these spaces of right-wing ideologies are located within the football subculture, and the means through which actors endeavoured to communicate and disseminate these ideas. This is essential for identifying, explaining, and assessing the potential for the mobilisation of this subculture—a subculture that appears to be a violent political actor in a variety of contexts. These ends will be accomplished here by reconstructing the virtual network of football fans and far right actors. This article will in this sense identify spaces and actors through which right-wing ideologies have so far flourished. It will do so by selecting fan pages, including blogs, web pages, and internet forums with a clear link to far right groups, analysing qualitatively their content through the Grounded Theory approach devised by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss. The first part of the article reconstructs the virtual network of the fan and hooligan scene, locating key actors, as well as centres and edges of activity. The article’s subsequent segment will discuss those actors identified as critical contributors to the right- wing movement, introducing textual analysis aimed at linking themes and references of the Okolofutbol’shchiki and developing concepts that describe the characteristics and dimensions of this subculture. At the same time, this article will assess the right-wing character of this subculture, while evaluating its relationship to the Russian right. This article is to be understood as a first endeavour to characterise right-wing football and hooligan subculture in Russia. It represents an attempt to explain the relationships between this subculture and Russia’s far right, and the potential to mobilise football fans for right-wing actions.

Literature review Fandom and hooliganism are global phenomena that, to date, have been predominantly studied vis-à-vis the Western European context. Some fundamental ideas as to why fandom can be linked to racism have been articulated by Cornel Sandvoss, who conceptualised the role of fandom in modern culture (Sandvoss 2003, 2005; Gray et al. 2007). One of Sandvoss’s central arguments is that football fandom ‘creates a space used by fans for their articulation and reflection of self’ (Sandvoss 2003, p. 27), which includes the fans’ cultural and social position as well as their values and beliefs (Sandvoss 2003, p. 49ff). Fandom can thus be seen as an act of political communication, which can at times involve racist positions. Sandvoss’s conceptualisation of football fandom as a form of self-projection does furthermore help to explain the fans’ intensive emotional involvement (Sandvoss 2003, p. 69). Sandvoss’s analysis, however, ignores actual connections and interactions between football fans and political actors, including ultra-nationalist 1508 Julia Glathe groups. He does not, in other words, seek to provide an insight into specific political fan groups, their networks, and their potential for violence and political mobilisation. These aspects of fandom are nevertheless crucial to understand why football fans appear to be susceptible to mobilisation for the purposes of right-wing action. For this reason, a portrait of right-wing football fans is needed. Ramón Spaaij’s study on hooligan identities is particularly helpful, here. He identified six key aspects of football hooliganism as a transnational phenomenon (Spaaij 2006, p. 2),1 hence offering a more in-depth picture of hooligan identities while pointing to the political implications of this identity, with particular regard to ‘territorial identifications’. However, in Spaaij’s work, the discussion on the linkages between key aspects of hooliganism and the affinity to the far right remains peripheral. The practical consequences of right-wing fan identities for political action outside the stadium and the potential for fan mobilisation have also been largely disregarded by the prior scholarly works on football fan culture. While examining the relationship between football fan cultures and the far right in Germany and Italy, Jonas Gabler analysed the basic ‘friend–enemy distinction’ within football fan cultures, the rhetoric of territorial rivalries as well as the pleasure of provocation as key factors for right-wing attitudes (Gabler 2009, p. 138). Yet he did not consider political action by football fans outside the stadium as a problem but rather as a rare exception (Gabler 2009, p. 139). It is perhaps important to emphasise here that, ‘despite the growing public and media focus on hooligan behaviour in other parts of the world, academic research into football hooliganism still concentrates disproportionally on the British situation’ (Spaaij 2006, p. 3). This seems particularly pertinent when the situation of right-wing hooliganism in Russia is taken into account. While several researchers have diagnosed that football fans in Russia are highly responsive to right-wing mobilisation and are interconnected with the far right, research on this issue remains marginal. In the following section, I will outline the existing research on the Russian far right social movement network and highlight its limitations regarding the reflection on football fans as constituents of this network. Dennis Zuev’s study about the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (Dvizhenie protiv nelegal'noi immigratsii—DPNI) and their political communication style shows how Russia’s far right organisations frame and spread nationalist ideas by using the new media, and thereby mobilise individual ‘web-actors’ (2010). Zuev considered the right-wing social movement as a multi-nodal network consisting of small like-minded groups that ‘at times coordinate action and share information’ (Zuev 2010, p. 266). This context emphasised the effective power of the networking principle that allows flexible membership. Zuev’s study offers a good insight into one of the most relevant social movement organisations within the Russian right-wing movement, showing the importance and mechanisms of different political communication styles. However, it does not provide a framework to understand how small like-minded groups, such as hooligan groups, exactly absorb and interpret the ideologies communicated by organisations like the DPNI. It can be assumed that fan and hooligan subcultures share further ideas and frame social reality in a slightly different way. Therefore, it appears necessary to focus on those subcultures that are affected by the political communication of these social movement organisations and to examine how they are affected, together with their shared knowledge, ideas, and ideologies. 1These are: excitement and pleasurable emotional arousal; the construction of hard masculine identity; territorial identifications; the individual and collective management of reputation; solidarity and belonging; and sovereignty and autonomy. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1509

Alexander Verkhovsky (2007) delved into changes in the ideology of Russian nationalism throughout the last two decades. He presented a useful overview of the main actors of the Russian nationalist movement and emphasised ‘ethno-xenophobia’ as an ideology of growing importance, which appeals to various organisations and groups of different size and status (Verkhovsky 2007, p. 135). Verkhovsky envisaged—but did not explore in any detail—a quite complex partnership system between a very wide range of actors, including anonymous Kremlin officials and gangs of Nazi skinheads (Verkhovsky 2007, p. 135). As a consequence, there is still uncertainty about how the Russian hooligan subculture interacts with political organisations on the one hand, and the Nazi skinhead subcultures, on the other hand. The complexity of the Russian far right scene has also been captured by Mihai Varga, who suggested that definitions of this very scene ought to encompass not only far right parties and nationalist associations but also skinhead and hooligan subcultures (Varga 2008, p. 563). Varga, while noting that the links between the various layers of the far right are yet to be comprehensively explored by Western scholars (Varga 2008, p. 566), elaborated upon the relationship and cooperation between formal organisations and informal (skinhead) groups. Varga’s analysis, ultimately, offers very little information about the character and involvement of hooligan subcultures in Russia’s extreme right-wing movement. In line with Varga and Verkhovsky, Martin Laryš and Miroslav Mareš (2011) focused in greater details on extreme right violence in Russia. They examined contemporary forms of right-wing extremist violence by taking into account its traditions and overarching ideological context, as well as its contemporary social and political backgrounds. By introducing various extreme right actors who carry out organised violence, the authors expanded on neo-Nazi gangs that include football hooligans. However, they did not elaborate on the connection between football, hooliganism, violence, and extreme right ideologies or point of views. No deeper insight into this subculture is in this sense provided by Laryš and Mareš: their readership can therefore only assume the reasons for the hooligan’s violent behaviour, without really understanding the subjective meaning given to violence. Although many prominent scholars have mentioned the relevance of football hooligans within Russia’s extreme right movement and their contribution to the eruption of violence, the open literature continues to lack a profound analysis of this subculture. The works surveyed here have highlighted a set of key issues, such as ideology and traditions of the extreme right, their contemporary social and political background, main actors and the political opportunity structures of these movements, as well as forms and functions of violence. However, the works on the Russian extreme right substantially ignored the relevance of the fan and hooligan subculture. It still remains unclear how this subculture is related to the broader extreme right movement, and there is uncertainty about the exact political views, interpretations, and values shared across the subculture, and the subjective meaning it attributes to violence. Systematic research on the football hooligan movement within the context of Russia’s extreme right movement appears hence necessary, not only to fill a scholarly gap, but also due to the far right’s alarming mobilising potential.

Reconstructing the virtual network of Russia’s football fan and hooligan subculture

Methodological procedure The main objective of this article is to provide a more precise picture of Russia’s right-wing football fan and hooligan subculture, the so-called Okolofutbol’shchiki. The first analytical step 1510 Julia Glathe relates to a necessary reconstruction of the network. This analysis is focused on virtual networks because online communities provide the opportunity to examine links and communication amongst hooligans and the far right in a more convenient way, since access to the far right as a field of research is relatively challenging. In the virtual networks, connections between various actors are furthermore made transparent, at least partially, through web links. Beyond emails, websites also represent important internet data types (Gruzd & Haythornthwaite 2011, p. 169). As links between various websites explicitly show obscure connections amongst several actors (Gruzd & Haythornthwaite 2011, p. 171), their systematic examination constituted the essential analytical step taken here to reconstruct the network. While there are further ways of networking, for example using comments or references, these are less explicit and harder to compare. This latter proposition explains why links are examined here in order to reconstruct the virtual network as effectively as possible. As a starting point for the reconstruction of the network, I selected a blog where European right-wing fan groups and fan clubs are representing themselves, among them many Russian fan groups.2 The listed Russian fan pages were put into an appositely tailored matrix;3 every successive page was then investigated for further links. This was a relatively easy task, since almost every page feature a tab ‘links’ or ‘friends’ or other prominent ways of linkages. The size and the variety of the listed web pages, however, represented issues to consider while proceeding with sample selection; every informal football fan website, in any case, was included in the researched showcased in this article. Links to formal institutions (official fan clubs or associations) were ultimately not considered, and nor were websites with little or no football-related content. Interestingly, our analysis did not consider links to clothing stores, even though some of them represented typical right-wing brands, hence alluding to the ideology of the webpage. However, the stores provide only a service function and their relationship to the football fans can rather be seen as a business one than as a social one. Links to information portals about matches, or transfers, were also not considered, and nor were collections with more than hundreds of links, as the latter are not seen as a relevant or effective type of networking due to their essentially non-specific profile. The approach of considering only links between websites involves the risk of excluding important actors of the network, as it is unlikely that every actor uses this specific form of networking. By taking only explicit links into account, the study focused on informal groups rather than on individuals. This procedure, ultimately, serves to identify a basic network that includes a core and main actors. It provides in this sense the opportunity to get access to individuals, because these interact on websites via blogs and forums, and are, thus, connected to each other as well as to the organisations. This interaction can then be examined by analysing a smaller sample of websites. Network reconstruction work ended when no new links appeared anymore.

2On the blog ultrasnotred, European right-wing football fan groups can post photos of their activities and their symbols and logos. The blog is available at: http://ultrasnotred.blogspot.de/, accessed 20 October 2013. 3Due to the high number of actors examined, data were listed in a matrix (Hanneman & Riddle 2011, p. 336). The matrix’s rows and columns cited the websites: links amongst these were marked by the number 1, whereas no links were signified by 0. This procedure offered an overview of a network’s actors, and identified key characteristics including network density. It is assumed that a high number of links reveals the central actors of the network, whereas no or few links show in turn the limits of the network. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1511

TABLE 1 LEVELS OF THE NETWORK Level No. of links No. of pages Label 1 1 80 Final Point 2 2 49 Limit 3 3 23 Limit 4 4 17 Limit 5 5 14 Periphery 6 6 3 Periphery 7 7 5 Periphery 8 8 4 Periphery 9 10 2 Centrum 10 11 1 Centrum 11 12 3 Centrum 12 13 2 Centrum 13 16 1 Centrum 14 17 1 Centrum 15 19 1 Centrum 16 20 1 Core 17 25 1 Core 18 36 1 Core Source: Compiled by the author.

TABLE 2 NODAL POINTS TO THE RUSSIAN FAR RIGHT Nodal points to the far right Number of links to this page Number of links by this page http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/ 20 27 http://fans-edge.info/ 6 7 http://ultrafootballche.forum24.ru/ 3 4 http://revansh.org/ 2 3 http://rosich88.forum24.ru/ 2 4 http://2ligac.borda.ru/ 1 4 http://fcscsf.narod.ru/ 1 2 http://nc.borda.ru/ 1 11 Source: Compiled by the author.

Results: network levels The reconstructed virtual network of Russia’s fan and hooligan scene included no fewer than 210 websites and 696 links. Less than one third (80 websites) were linked only once, thus representing the network’s final point (see Table 1). The limit of the network included 89 sites that were linked more than once but no more than five times. The periphery, in turn, comprised of 26 websites that were linked as many as five times and at maximum nine times, while the 11 websites linked between ten and 19 times were regarded as the network’s centre. Finally, three websites—linked at least 20 times each—came to constitute the core of the network. The websites of interest to my research were those featuring an explicit connection to the Russian right-wing movement. The reconstructed network had eight ‘nodal points’ to the Russian far right, namely a group of websites showing links to other sites with no relation to football but which did exclusively feature racist, nationalist, and related content. Table 2 1512 Julia Glathe identifies the location of these nodal points, illustrating their placement at the network’s core as well as in its periphery, edge, and the end. Due to the various locations of these nodal points and the network’s inherent mechanisms of communication, it can be assumed that right-wing actors of the fan and hooligan subculture can be found in different places of the network. At this point, however, the aim is to consider only those eight web pages that did feature explicit links to the right-wing scene.

Analysis of the football fan and hooligan subculture

Sample and data analysis This analysis of the right-wing fan and hooligan subculture rested upon a purposive sampling strategy. First of all, I focused only on those websites that acted as nodal points for the Russian extreme right. Out of these eight cases, only four websites were analysed in detail, as the other four featured out-of-date content, as they were not in use between July 2013 and February 2014, when the research was conducted.4 A series of considerations led to a focus on the blog ‘Fans Edge’ as a case study. ‘Fans Edge’ was not only a much-linked blog and one that focused on more than one football club, it also provided a substantive amount of texts for analysis due to its high activity. A set of other three cases was used for comparison, in order to prove, and possibly modify, concepts and categories derived from the original data. The four cases are briefly outlined below.

Fans Edge Its administrators present ‘Fans Edge’ as a news portal about ‘Fans, fights, ultras and everything that is linked to Okolofutbol’.5 The blog includes different tags, according to which the articles are organised: okolofutbol’ (including regional subcategories), okolokhokkei, ultras (including regional subcategories), European Championship 2012, right-wing topics, multimedia, okolosport, football, sundries, A.C.A.B. (All Cops Are Bastards), interviews, announcements, browsing, and website. New articles are published on a daily basis. While some of them are authored by the website’s administrators, the majority of posts are guest contributions. Newspaper articles related to the above-mentioned themes are also published or hyperlinked. Initially all contributions were considered to be relevant for this study; at a second stage, the content regarded as more relevant for network analysis was that included in the following categories: okolofutbol’, ultras, right-wing topics, okolosport, and A.C.A.B, interviews. These categories were then examined for specific themes, which are known as ‘codes’ by Grounded Theory Method terminology, as long as new ones appeared. The blog was observed until February 2014.

Outlaw Firm Volgograd Out of the four sites considered, Outlaw Firm Volgograd is the most-linked one. The Outlaw Firm is a hooligan group connected to the Volgograd football club Rotor. Its website, which

4See ‘Outlaw Firm’, available at: http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/; ‘Fans Edge’, available at: http://fans-edge. info/; ‘Revansh’, available at: http://revansh.org/; ‘Lokohools’, available at: http://lokohools.narod.ru/; ‘2Ligac. borda’, available at: http://2ligac.borda.ru/, all accessed 31 July 2014. 5‘Fans Edge’, available at: http://fans-edge.info/, accessed 31 July 2014. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1513 consists of a homepage with different tabs, included a relatively small amount of content and, for this reason, was examined in its entirety.

Revansh The website Revansh, a fan blog for Spartak Moscow fans, features a most obvious right-wing character due to prominent links to neo-Nazi websites. Articles are posted by the editors and by guests; content is generally related to the Okolofutbol’shchiki subculture, as well as to the Spartak football club. Revansh also features numerous guest contributions that advertise cultural or protest events. The blog was observed until February 2014.

2ligac.borda.ru The website 2ligac.borda.ru represents a discussion forum for football fans in general and can, thus, be considered as a platform of opinions, thoughts, and experiences within the Okolofutbol’shchiki. The forum is not organised by topics, but by threads that are arranged chronologically. Every thread from 2013 to February 2014 was considered here.

Data analysis The data analysis outlined in this study followed the technique of the Grounded Theory Method as developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss (1967). As an inductive methodology, Grounded Theory is a process whereby theory is generated from empirical data. Data analysis and data collection are characterised by a continuous interplay that leads to theoretical concepts, categories, and eventually to a Grounded Theory. In the following section, I will outline how this method was used within the research project underpinning this article. Open coding represented the first step of analysis. The aim of open coding is to ‘break down’ the description of phenomena and to mark them by generic terms (codes). This is undertaken by matching abstract ideas (codes) with words, phrases, and sentences (indicators) (Bortz & Döring 2006, p. 233). Asking generative questions6 represents the method of the ‘categorial breaking up’. Subsequently, derived codes were clustered and umbrella terms (‘categories’) were developed out of it. The final stage in this process is represented by the development, through axial coding, of a ‘phenomenon related model of interrelationships’ (Strübing 2008, p. 20). Decisions concerning relevance were made in an even more restrictive manner, namely according to the methodological proceeding proposed by Strübing: ‘Not every identified phenomenon within the data is comparatively examined in a systematic way regarding their causes, conditions and consequences, but only those, from which we can assume, regarding our current status of analysis, that they are or might be relevant to answer the research question’ (Strübing 2008, p. 21).

6The specific questions asked regarding the data were: firstly, What? What is happening? Which phenomena are addressed?; secondly, Who? Which people or actors are involved? How are these people involved? How do they interact?; thirdly, How? Which aspects are addressed (or left out)?; fourthly, When? How long? To what extent?; fifthly, Why? Which reasoning is provided or can be derived?; sixthly, What for? With which intention? For which purpose?; and seventhly, By which means? Which tactics and strategies were applied in order to reach the aim? (Böhm 2008, p. 271). 1514 Julia Glathe

Categories This article’s main objective is to draw a more precise picture of Russia’s right-wing fan and hooligan subculture—the Okolofutbol’shchiki. The analysis of fan and hooligan blogs led to the identification of numerous concepts, which were then incorporated in three key categories: aggressive support, readiness to fight, and enemy image of the state (see Figure 1). These categories capture a series of notable features of the scene, offering valuable insights into the relation between the Okolofutbol’shchiki subculture and the Russian extreme right. The next segment of the article presents the results of the analysis and outlines its core categories, introducing, for further discussion, a set of hypotheses about the relationship between the Okolofutbol’shchiki and the Russian extreme right.

Aggressive support The aggressiveness through which members support their football club is a defining characteristic of the Okolofutbol’shchiki. The support of a club is based on an emotional relationship, which the fans call love (lyubov). A representative Okolofutbol’shchiki member, who authors a fan blog on the Fratria club (Spartak Moscow FC), describes the core of the fan movement as follows: ‘only those who stay with the team, who really love their club, and who are, furthermore, ready to give their right arm and who can’t live without all of this’.7 Turning away altogether from football and the fan movement is hence out of the question for the Okolofutbol’shchiki. As a fan on the Revansh blog puts it:

I can’t understand at all, how it is possible to turn away and forget about all what was important to you, what has emotionally touched you for a long time. That what appeared to you as legal drugs and part of yourself, of your life, the philosophy of your life, your thoughts and conclusions.8 While aggressive support brings a feeling of being high, it also creates an emotional rush that lets people forget about their daily lives and problems. This further explains why belonging to a club appeals so much to many people. One of the leaders of the fan movement of Spartak Moscow FC expresses the feeling he experiences in the stadium as follows: No other activity—neither sex nor drugs—lets you feel so ecstatic as when you are with friends, and in front of you: the enemy. The world lies at your feet. And you don’t give a shit about financial worries, family, anything, and everything. You hold up your hand, and the wonderful phrase sounds ‘we chased them away’.9

The love of the football club is inevitably underpinned by intrinsic rivalries with other clubs, locking the supporters of different clubs in a relationship that can go from competition to hostility. Enemies are mainly represented by the ‘Caucasian’, ‘Chechen’, as well as by the left-wing football clubs and fan groups. The ‘Russian’ or ‘Slavic’ clubs, in contrast, are seen as part of the national community and hence venerable competitors.10

7‘Intervyu s blogerom fratrii—Amirom’, Fans Edge, 6 February 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/ intervyu-s-blogerom-fratrii-amirom/, accessed 31 July 2014. 8‘Otoshel, NE obeshchal vernut’sya’, Revansh, 26 April 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=1824, accessed 31 July 2014. 9‘Professor: Fanatizm umer v 2005-m s poyavleniem novoi struktury sredi fanatov Spartaka’, Revansh, 14 December 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2340, accessed 31 July 2014. 10See, for example: ‘Intervyu s lyudmi v chernom—CSKA Moskva’, Fans Edge, 3 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/intervyu-s-lyudmi-v-chernom-cska-moskva/, accessed 31 July 2014. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1515 h lent io ence th ol tv trengt ents Vi gh ties th gS streng ri s vi or s l r- in ti rnam ot de fa ca nf ri

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Love, on the one hand, and rivalry, on the other, define the phenomenon of aggressive support. The ‘aggressions’ acquire different forms and include various actors, but have predominantly involved ultras and the hooligans. Although they remain separate, these groups perform a series of overlapping activities. The subculture’s structure is therefore best understood as a division into gangs and firms who feel connected to specific football clubs and support them in different ways. In its most substantial form, support involves choreographed performances organised by the ultras: these represent the most eye-catching supporters’ activity to be documented on the blog ‘Fans Edge’. Pyrotechnics, which Russian supporters design to outdo their rivals, are an essential element of these performances. A member describes as follows the CSKA ‘black bloc’: ‘we have borrowed our style from one of the best hooligan groups—we wear black clothes at the matches, because I think this makes a much more aggressive impression’.11 Aggressive support often translates into direct violence. The hooligans are the group principally involved in this kind of aggression, as confirmed, for instance, by an interview with a Fratria blogger: ‘today there is a quite strong split between the ultras and the Okolofutbol’shchiki, and the amount of those who offer serious resistance is less among the ultras than among the hooligans’.12 This view suggests that hooligans tend to support their club in a more aggressive way than the ultras, as the former regularly participate in attacks to rival fans and fan groups. Interestingly, direct violence is nowadays rarely performed in the stadia or even within the context of the matches: rather, it is organised independently by the supporters. The forms of aggressive support that take place within Russia’s stadia are imbued with right-wing messages. Here, club-based collective identities are often conflated in collective identity types relating to Russian nationalism, as confirmed by the use of the Tsarist Empire’s flag—often labelled with the ‘We are Russians’ (My Russkie) slogan13—of banners with right- wing messages—‘Prisoners of Conscience’ (Uzniki Sovesti),14 ‘We will not forget you’ (Vy ne zabyty)15—or symbols (the Celtic Cross).16 The adoption of neo-Nazi symbols by Russian supporters is, however, rather controversial. A leader of the Spartak fan club expressed his disagreement as follows: ‘Why should we hide that most of us share right-wing views? But I don’t understand why symbols of the “SS”, who killed our nation, are necessary’.17 11‘Intervyu s lyudmi v chernom—TSSKA Moskva’, Fans Edge, 3 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge. info/intervyu-s-lyudmi-v-chernom-cska-moskva/, accessed 31 July 2014. 12‘Intervyu s blogerom fratrii—Amirom’, Fans Edge, 6 February 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/ intervyu-s-blogerom-fratrii-amirom/, accessed 31 July 2014. 13For example, ‘Tolerast Tolstykh protiv Imperok’, Fans Edge, 9 September 2013, available at: http://fans- edge.info/tolerast-tolstyx-protiv-imperok/; ‘Vokrug matchei 5 tura RFPL 2013/2014’, Fans Edge, 18 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/vokrug-matchej-5-tura-rfpl-20132014/, both accessed 31 July 2014. 14Uzniki Sovesti (Prisoners of Conscience) is an expression that originates in the human rights movement but was reinterpreted by some parts of the Okolofutbol’shchiki. Its use suggests that that the right-wing Okolofutbol’shchiki consider right-wing murders as wrongfully accused freedom fighters, who ultimately combat a repressive system. 15‘Vokrug matcha Dinamo—Spartak’, Fans Edge, 27 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/vokrug- matcha-dinamo-spartak-27-07-13/, accessed 31 July 2014. 16‘The Celtic Cross is a worldwide symbol for “the supremacy of the white race” and is one of the main neo-Nazi and racist symbols. In some parts of Europe it is widely displayed within football stadiums …’ (‘Monitoring offensive and discriminatory signs in European football’, Fare network, available at: http://www. farenet.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013-FARE-signs-and-symbols-guide_screen.pdf, accessed 31 July 2014). ‘Intervyu s lyudmi v chernom—TSSKA Moskva’, Fans Edge, 3 August 2013, available at: http://fans- edge.info/intervyu-s-lyudmi-v-chernom-cska-moskva/, accessed 31 July 2014. 17‘Professor: Fanatizm umer v 2005-m s poyavleniem novoi struktury sredi fanatov Spartaka’, Revansh, 14 December 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2340#more-2340, accessed 31 July 2014. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1517

The transformation of the fan community into a national(ist) community can also be observed when fans remember those who were killed in fights with ‘non-Russian’ football fans. Some threats are directed at the ‘non-Russians’, using slogans as ‘We don’t forget. We don’t forgive’ (Ne zabudem. Ne prostim).18 In extreme cases, this exclusion is expressed by very violent attacks on people of ‘non-Russian’ appearance. During match days, people of ‘non-Russian’ appearance are often attacked on public transport under the slogan ‘white coaches’ (belye vagony). In this sense, right-wing fans ‘jargonise the “ethnic cleansing” of train coaches of people from the Caucasus’.19 The celebrations for the anniversary of the hooligan group ‘Saint Hammers’ ultimately reveal the inextricable links between fandom and nationalist/neo-Nazi sentiments. In the words of an Okolofutbol’shchiki member: ‘I think, a defender is not the person who wears boots, but a person who stands up for “Rus”!!! and for his club’.20 Another member writes in relation to this occasion: ‘I wish you, who have been supporting the Second League 2005–2009, the total radical right-wing Sieg!’.21

Readiness to fight Originating in a shared passion for violence and fighting, the supporters’ readiness to fight is another key characteristic of the Okolofutbol’shchiki. Regular and extensive documentation of riots inside and outside Russia’s stadia showed the enormous extent to which Okolofutbol’shchiki members are attracted to violence. The movement, in particular, regards its largest and most violent fights as important milestones:

I was in at this day. Everything started in the early morning, Moscow appeared as dangerous for every random person on the streets or in the metro. So many memories. I won’t describe everything, those, who were in the movement, back then, know anyway. The most unforgettable derby on 31 March 2001 for the next hundred years probably.22 Reported attacks and pogroms23 involved nationalists and neo-Nazis; violence was generally directed against ‘non-Russians’, especially against ‘illegal immigrants’,24 ‘Jews’,25 ‘Gypsies’,26 18‘“Maresh”: Landskrona: Aktualnyi kommentarij po delu Zheni Maresha’, Fans Edge, 16 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/landskrona-aktualnyj-kommentarij-po-delu-zheni-maresha/, accessed 31 July 2014. 19Portal Credo.ru, available at: http://www.portal-credo.ru/site/?act=authority&id=1535, accessed 31 July 2014. 20See post by ‘Angel’, 2Ligac.borda, 23 February 2013, 10:10, available at: http://2ligac.borda.ru/?0-0-0, accessed 31 July 2014. 21See post by ‘Djon’, 2Ligac.borda, 20 August 2013, 23:07, available at: http://2ligac.borda.ru/?0-0-0, accessed 31 July 2014. 22‘Maxismuss87’ about the riots in the context of the match CSKA–Spartak on 31 March 2001, see ‘Oldskul: Spartak Moskva–TSSKA Moskva’, Fans Edge, 22 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/oldskul- spartak-moskva-cska-moskva-31-03-2001/, accessed 31 July 2014. 23‘Kogda pogromy byli bolshimi’, Fans Edge, 15 April 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/kogda- pogromy-byli-bolshimi/, accessed 31 July 2014. 24‘Azerbaidzhanskie SMI nedovolny “fashistvuyushchie molodchiki” ne dayut torgovat’ okkupantam na rynkakh Peterburga’, Fans Edge, 2 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/azerbajdzhanskie-smi- nedovolny-fashistvuyushhie-molodchiki-ne-dayut-torgovat-okkupantam-na-rynkax-peterburga/, accessed 31 July 2014. 25‘Vo L’vove poyavilos bolshoe antievreiskoe grafitti’, Fans Edge, 16 August 2013, available at: http://fans- edge.info/vo-lvove-poyavilos-bolshoe-antievrejskoe-graffiti/, accessed 31 July 2014. 26‘Ocherednaya antitsyganskaya demonstratsiya v Chekhii’, Fans Edge, 11 June 2013, available at: http:// fans-edge.info/ocherednaya-anticyganskaya-demonstraciya-v-chexii/, accessed 31 July 2014. 1518 Julia Glathe

‘Chechens’,27 ‘Caucasians’,28 and ‘Islamists’.29 As part of their fascination for violence, movement members also participate in fights and riots inside and outside of the stadium. A former member of the hooligan group Wikinger (Lokomotive Moscow) remembers with some nostalgia a particularly violent period of the Okolofutbol’shchiki: Overall, the period of the war against the Pedo [derivative name for fans of the football club Torpedo], was full of fights, riots, activities, and batteries, triggered by one or the other side; today matches are lacking these rivalries and passion. The confrontations extremely pushed the movement as a whole and gave it a massive experience.30

Furthermore, the organisation of fights involving hooligan groups, firms, and gangs, an essential part of the Okolofutbol’shchiki fan culture, show their readiness to fight. For the Okolofutbol’shchiki, fighting is a serious sport, which requires training. Fights are documented on the Outlaw Firm website, which reports the dates, the teams involved, numbers of participants, the duration, and the winner. The participating teams are further divided by age. The Outlaw Firm even provides a ranking of fight clubs, and it selects the most successful firm every year.31 Reports including video clips of fights between rival firms can be found in the forum 2ligac. borda.ru. Fights that took place outside the stadia are however discussed in a controversial way, highlighting the absurdity of fights between Russians: ‘The OF [Okolofutbol’shchiki ] is no longer the movement that it used to be. What a silliness, people gather in gangs, go to other cities and just “fuck up” Russian guys, mainly without any idea …’.32 Segments of the Okolofutbol’shchiki movement are interested in fight tournaments and training in fight clubs: the tag ‘okolosport’ on Fans Edge advertises Russian-wide fight tournaments, which serve as training rather than competitions. The tournament ‘Path of War’ (Put’ Voina), which is conducted at a fight club in Moscow, specialises in knife fighting and other fight techniques, psychological trainings, as well as seminars on motivation, masculinity, and sense of purpose.33 These tournaments incarnate a desire for a ‘real fight’, as also confirmed by their names: ‘Path of War’, ‘Spirit of the War’ (Dukh Voina), ‘We are ready’ (My gotovy), ‘No fear’ (Strakha net). Preparation for war is the apparent objective of these events. While it is not explicitly clear whom the war might be waged against, the fact that advertisements for these tournaments show radical right-wing symbols and that the tournaments are funded by right-wing labels suggest quite unequivocally who the enemy might ultimately be. In the Okolofutbol’shchiki context, fighting is seen as a positive antipole to alcohol consumption and its connected lifestyle: ‘When it came to the peak—to sports, to fanaticism. Why boozing?

27‘Russkii bunt v gorode Pugacheve’, Fans Edge, 8 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/russkij- bunt-v-gorode-pugachyove/, accessed 31 July 2014. 28‘V Astrakhani sozhgli 12 avto s kavkazskimi nomerami’, Fans Edge, 26 June 2013, available at: http:// fans-edge.info/v-astraxani-sozhgli-12-avto-s-kavkazskimi-nomerami/, accessed 31 July 2014. 29‘“Zolotoi Rassvet”: My mobilizuem protiv islamistskikh prestupnikov’, Fans Edge, 25 May 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/zolotoj-rassvet-my-mobilizuem-protiv-islamistskix-prestupnikov-100-tysyach-chelovek/, accessed 31 July 2014. 30‘Intervyu so starym Vikingom—Mityaem’, Fans Edge, 13 February 2013, available at: http://fans-edge. info/intervyu-so-starym-vikingom-mityaem/, accessed 31 July 2014. 31‘Reiting firm Yuga 2011 g.’, Outlaw Firm, 23 February 2013, available at: http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/blog/ rejting_firm_juga_2011_g/2013-02-28-9, accessed 31 July 2014. 32Post by ‘Djon’, 2Ligac.borda, 20 August 2013, available at: http://2ligac.borda.ru, accessed 31 July 2014. 33‘Proekt: Put’ Voina’, Fans Edge, 1 June 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/proekt-put-voina/, accessed 31 July 2014. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1519

Let us rather train our muscles’.34 Next to physical strength, the Okolofutbol’shchiki also demands psychological strength, relying on military rules and codes. The Outlaw Firm demands an unconditional will to fight and win through their slogan ‘No Retreat, No Surrender’. Beyond the imperative to win, the fighting spirit seems to be of great importance for the Okolofutbol’shchiki movement. As noted by the Outlaw Firm: ‘You can lose a lot: a fight, a performance at the stands, a team can lose a match. Only one thing you should not lose—your honour’.35 In this context, even the retreat from the state security forces is seen as weakness, as confirmed by a blog entry on Revansh: ‘People drifted apart within 20 seconds, around 400 people, and they left behind their banner about “National Socialism” and “White Race”. They pissed off, as it was shot on them! Guys, if you are NS, an elite, people with honour, don’t behave like fools’.36 Right-wing militant tendencies are trained at tournaments like ‘Spirit of the War’,37 which is organised under the neo-Nazi symbol 14 and regularly advertised on Fans Edge.38 The tournament takes place in various Russian cities and is funded by the neo-Nazi label White Rex, which argues for the ‘white nations of Europe’ to rediscover their ‘fighting spirit’ (Zillmer 2013). Here, no training is provided, but fights take place with the underlying idea ‘to embed sports within the healthy part of the European youth’ and to support ‘the fighting spirit in our nation’ (Zillmer 2013).

Adversarial perception of the Russian state The hooligans’ adversarial perception of the Russian state, which varies suspicion to hostility, is a further common element of the Okolofutbol’shchiki. The hooligans perceived as opponents, and are therefore required to fight, the police, and especially Russia’s special forces (Special Purpose Police Unit, Otryad Mobil’nyj Osobogo Naznacheniya—OMON). Fans Edge included documentation on police violence under the A.C.A.B. tag, referring not only to the Russian police force but also to international incidents. Numerous videos and photographs included in this tag show fights with the police at match days. Adversarial perceptions of the state are particularly visible in the Okolofutbol’shchiki discourse on legislation, which is seen as largely repressive. Stadium bans and controls are regarded by Okolofutbol’shchiki members as state attempts to further restrict freedom and to criminalise the fan scene. The law ‘On the fans’,39 which was enacted in June 2013, attracted particularly harsh criticism from Okolofutbol’shchiki members.40

34Founding member of the hooligan group Gladiators about the development of the Okolofutbol’shchiki: ‘Intervyu s Volodej Indeitsem’, Fans Edge, 17 March 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/intervyu-s- volodej-indejcem/, accessed 31 July 2014. 35Outlaw Firm, available at: http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/, accessed 31 July 2014. 36‘Ekho begushchei tolpy’, Revansh, 5 November 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2215, accessed 31 July 2014. 37For example: ‘Dukh Voina—15 v Permi’, Fans Edge, 19 November 2012, http://fans-edge.info/dux-voina- 15-v-permi/, accessed 31 July 2014. 38The number 14 is a code for the so called ‘Fourteen words’ and stands for the racist slogan ‘We must secure the existence of our people and a future for White children’, which was formulated by US white separatist David Lane. 39‘O vnesenii izmenenii v otdel’nye zakonodatel’nye akty Rossiskoi Federatsii v svyazi s obespecheniem obshchestvennogo poryadka i obshchest’vennoi bezopasnosti pri provedenii ofitsial’nikh sportivnykh sorevnovanii’, Federal’nii Zakon ot 23 yulya 2013, g. Moskva, available at: http://pravo.gov.ru/ipsdata/?doc_ itself=&backlink=1&nd=102167011&page=1&rdk=0#I0, accessed 31 July 2014. 40‘FanZona o zakone o Bolel’shikakh. Polnyi tekst’, Fans Edge, 25 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge. info/fanzona-o-zakone-o-bolelshhikax-polnyj-tekst/, accessed 31 July 2014. 1520 Julia Glathe

The actions of state forces are generally perceived as arbitrary. One Fans Edge article argued that, during a match between FC Khimki and FC Spartak (on 10 August 2013), fans with black shirts were arrested with no specific reason or evidence and were held in custody for several days.41 In general, fans think that the police, especially during match days, are allowed to break the law.42 The Okolofutbol’shchiki also questions the legitimacy and legality of convictions and, by extension, the wider Russian judiciary. Further weight to this latter proposition is lent by a quick look at the ‘Mikhail Rekudanov’ case,43 which was often featured on the Fans Edge website. Various articles asserted the innocence of the former defender of Torpedo, requesting legal aid in his trial. The Rekudanov case is used to question the general fairness of Russian trials: ‘Because not even 1% of the sentences are legal in the Russian Federation’.44 The same discourse underlines the absurdity of unquestioned obedience to the law, remarking that the criminal code often contradicts Russian national values:

The whole curiosity of the Russian Federation (I cannot be bothered to call this country Russia) matches in the unquestioned obedience to the law, among others to the criminal code. Reality has shown that the criminal code of the RF [Russian Federation] is given a higher weight than all other moral norms, justice, and even the bible.45 The state’s actions against neo-Nazism and racism are widely discussed and harshly criticised,46 as in the case of the bill toughening penalties for right-wing extremism,47 which the State Duma introduced on 22 June 2013. As the state is seen as an oppressor, the Okolofutbol’shchiki consider protest and resistance as necessary. Through explicit slogans, including Fanaty–ne prestupniki (Football fans are not criminals) and Stadion–ne tyurma (The stadium is not a prison), the fans have collectively protested against stricter regulations enforced in Russia’s stadia. The Outlaw Firm states on its homepage ‘Pyrotechnique is not a crime’ (Pirotechnika ne prestuplenie), and makes frequent reference to the unjust criminalisation of the ultras.48 In the face of increasing criminalisation, the Okolofutbol’shchiki feels that it is necessary to collectively fight back as a fan scene: ‘especially at these moments we should unite and show

41‘Fanat—Ne prestupnik, Stadion—Ne tyurma’, Fans Edge, 10 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge. info/fanat-ne-prestupnik-stadion-ne-tyurma/, accessed 31 July 2014. 42‘Professor: Fanatizm umer v 2005-m s poyavleniem novoi struktury sredi fanatov Spartaka’, Revansh, 14 December 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2340, accessed 31 July 2014. 43Mikhail Rekudanov is a former Russian professional football player who, in December 2013, was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for the murder of a citizen of Kyrgyzstan, whom he stabbed to death in June 2013. In contrast to other witness reports, Rekudanov declared his deed as self-defence (see for instance Golovin 2013). This case is often used by Russian nationalist fan groups to argue that Russian people are not allowed to defend themselves against criminal foreigners and, in case they do so, they are sentenced by what are essentially arbitrary courts. 44‘Pravda za Rikisha’, Fans Edge, 27 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/pravda-za-rikisha-2/, accessed 31 July 2014. 45‘Pravda za Rikisha’, Fans Edge, 27 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/pravda-za-rikisha-2/, accessed 31 July 2014. 46For example, ‘Sud likvidiroval “Klub bolel’shchikov FK “Dinamo” Kirov” za ekstremistskie deistviya ego chlenov’, Fans Edge, 6 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/sud-likvidiroval-klub-bolelshhikov- fk-dinamo-kirov-za-ekstremistskie-dejstviya-ego-chlenov/, accessed 31 July 2014. 47‘Novyi zakonoproekt: Deistvie preslovutoi 282 stat’i budet rasshireno prakticheski do beskonechnosti’, Fans Edge, 25 June 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/novyj-zakonoproekt-dejstvie-preslovutoj-282- stati-budet-rasshireno-prakticheski-do-beskonechnosti/, accessed 31 July 2014. 48Outlaw Firm, available at: http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/, accessed 31 July 2014. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1521 that we are powerful’.49 One Fratria blogger sees the strengthening of the fan movement as a potential consequence of state repression: After the football manager and delegates have understood that their ‘law on the fans’ does not work, there will be another law, which will then, I am repeating, include custodial sentences. And then, when it becomes clear that such a law will be passed, the fans at the stands will resist. Then it will come to an intense push of the national fan movement.50

The far-reaching importance of the fans’ resistance is underlined in the comments of a Spartak fan leader, who considered fans that resist against perceived arbitrary and illegitimate state authority as the future of Russia, equating those people who do not reject these injustices to ‘slaves’ (raba).51 In the context of resistance, the Okolofutbol’shchiki has extended explicit solidarity to Russia’s extreme right or even neo-Nazi scene, and more specifically to right-wing political prisoners who committed murder and terrorist attacks. The Outlaw Firm, for instance, holds fundraising events for right-wing prisoners. These events intend to honour ‘Prisoners of Conscience’ and are advertised through slogans such as ‘We don’t forget you’.52 Revansh also reports on fundraising activities for the ‘Prisoners of Conscience’.53 Fans Edge published an interview54 with the right-wing prisoner Petr Dubrovin, who was sentenced to 12 years in prison for founding the Moscow branch of the extremist organisation ‘Slavic Union’ (‘Slavyanskii Soyuz’), murdering a Kyrgyz citizen, and for crimes connected to the instigation to ethnic hate. In the interview (in which he is presented as a hero), the prisoner elaborates upon the potential of Russia’s national-socialist movement. Beyond positive references to the ‘Uzniki Sovesti’, the Okolofutbol’shchiki do also collect donations to provide legal representation to those accused of right-wing activities. A post entitled ‘Help our mates from Kazan’ appeared under the tag right-wing topics on 21 August 2013.55 The authors of the post asked for financial help for two Russian men who, in the views of the fans, are wrongly accused of assault, rioting, as well as of ideological hate and the foundation of an extremist organisation. It is together with nationalist identities and ideas that antagonism against the state has to be seen as the basis of common activities between Russia’s right-wing activists and the Okolofutbol’shchiki. Extreme right organisations are aware of this connection, as demonstrated by the numerous calls for mobilisation that appeared on the Okolofutbol’shchiki websites. On

49‘Fanat—Ne prestupnik, Stadion—Ne tyurma’, Fans Edge, 10 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge. info/fanat-ne-prestupnik-stadion-ne-tyurma/, accessed 31 July 2014. 50‘Intervyu s blogerom fratrii—Amirom’, Fans Edge, 6 February 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/ intervyu-s-blogerom-fratrii-amirom/, accessed 31 July 2014. 51‘Professor: Fanatizm umer v 2005-m s poyavleniem novoi struktury sredi fanatov Spartaka’, Revansh, 14 December 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2340, accessed 31 July 2014. 52‘Turnir po edinoborstvam posvyashchennyi uznikam sovesti’, Outlaw Firm, 30 April 2012, available at: http://of-volgograd.3dn.ru/news/turnir_po_edinoborstvam_posvjashhennyj_uznikam_sovesti/2012-04-30-184, accessed 31 July 2014. 53‘P.O.W. Chast’ chetvertaya’, Revansh, 12 April 2012, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=1793, accessed 31 July 2014. 54‘Intervyu s NS uznikom sovesti—Petrom Dubrovinym’, Fans Edge, 8 September 2013, available at: http:// fans-edge.info/intervyu-s-ns-uznikom-sovesti-petrom-dubrovinym/, accessed 12 September 2016. 55‘Pomogi sarotnikam iz Kazani’, Fans Edge, 21 August 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/pomogi- soratnikam-iz-kazani/, accessed 31 July 2014. 1522 Julia Glathe

23 January 2013, Revansh published a call for mobilisation of ‘national-resistance’, calling for ‘National-Socialists’ to invoke a common fight with their Ukrainian brothers against the state authorities in Ukraine:

The editors of the Russian right-wing news resource ‘National Resistance’ announced sincere support for our Ukrainian brothers, who fight back the criminal oligarch clan in the shape of the President Yanukovich, Prime Minister Asarov, and the ruling Party of the Regions. We address your readership and activists of the Russian movement with a cry for help, to provide our Ukrainian comrades as much financial and informational support as possible and, if feasible, physical support for our brothers of blood in the fight.56

Grounded theory approach to the right-wing Okolofutbol'shchiki movement This analysis of Russia’s right-wing fan and hooligan movement identified three categories that sit at the core of this specific subculture: generally aggressive forms of support, the members’ readiness to fight, and the adversarial perception of the Russian state. The detailed description of these three categories suggested that, ultimately, the Russia fan scene can be seen as an extreme right subculture. Aggressive support of football clubs can be considered both the Okolofutbol’shchiki’s key linking element and its primary aim. This support is based on emotions, which are referred to as ‘love’ by the fan base, and appear to be unconditional. The support is aggressive insofar as it is designed to support the group’s team while beating the opposing fan base in aggressive actions. The aggressive support of a football club by the Okolofutbol’shchiki and the rivalry with other clubs must also be interpreted in the context of nationalist positions. While ‘Russian’ clubs and fans are considered and accepted as opponents within a general community, the ‘non-Russian’ teams and supporters are seen as enemies in more absolute terms. The readiness to fight of the Okolofutbol’shchiki stems from their fascination for violence, their shared perception of what being ‘strong’ means, as well as their collective understanding of fights. The members’ identification with military codes is furthermore combined with a self-understanding and representation as an army, which prepares for ‘war’, and is therefore organised into legions with leaders. This context leads to the emergence of sympathies and interactions with the extreme right movement. These are based on common references to violence and fights, which are usually directed against specific enemies: people from ‘the Caucasus’, ‘Chechens’, and ‘illegal migrants’. Okolofutbol’shchiki’s relationship with the extreme right is forged through common participation at fight tournaments, which are organised and financed by extremists and neo- Nazi actors. It is also the fans’ complex relationship with the state, which spans from suspicion to hate, that unites the Okolofutbol’shchiki and the Russian extreme right. This fundamental antagonism, which centres on the fans’ negative assessment of measures regulating fandom, leads to a critique of the state that, in extreme cases, becomes openly hostile to the political system. Furthermore, Okolofutbol’shchiki members consider themselves to be victims and, therefore, members of resistance. It is in this sense that the Okolofutbol’shchiki has come to consider the extreme right movement as a victim of the state: fans and right-wing extremists

56‘Obrashchenie russkikh NS po tekushchei situatsii v Ukraine’, Revansh, 23 January 2014, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2395, accessed 31 July 2015. Russian Football Fans and the Far Right 1523 are integrated into the group through solidarity, which is expressed by the necessity to defend from a common enemy. The Okolofutbol’shchiki movement represents a stable community based on a lifetime affiliation through emotional ties. It provides a fundamental basis for a ‘faithful army’, due to its mix of aggressive support and nationalist disposition, while its xenophobic stereotypes facilitate the movement’s mobilisation for right-wing action. The members’ fascination for violence shapes the readiness to fight that underpins the movement’s agenda. A certain part of the Okolofutbol’shchiki appears to be well trained and skilled, morally ready to serve, and waiting for ‘higher tasks’. The willingness to participate in right-wing activities and pogroms can hence be understood as the net result of the characterisation described above. Based on the interpretation of the research data showcased in this article, the Okolofutbol’shchiki has to be seen as an army which Russia’s extreme right movement can potentially recruit and mobilise. Many factors underpinned this conclusion. A series of interests and attitudes, to begin with, are overlapping across the extreme right and the Okolofutbol’shchiki. The Okolofutbol’shchiki is hence a faithful, nationalist, and fight-affine subculture, which is already organised in legions, crews and firms, and trains for regular fights. Passion for violence is expressed through fights between the firms, and in riots that erupt both within and outside Russia’s stadia. A collective self-image with military undertones seems to reflect, at least in part, the Okolofutbol’shchiki wish to have real opponents that need to be defeated in order to save Russia. The extreme right seems to be aware of this potential, which is indicated by the numerous posts on the blogs Fans Edge and Revansh, including advertisements for concerts and cultural events, announcements for demonstrations, and ‘national-socialist’ manifestos.57 Links to extreme right websites show the Okolofutbol’shchiki’s interest and its openness to right-wing ideology and activities. The relationship between the Okolofutbol’shchiki and the extreme right does not however have to be seen as unproblematic. One interview on Fans Edge shows a neo-Nazi critique of some Okolofutbol’shchiki members, which are called ‘parasites’ (‘parazity’) that need to be exterminated. This rejection is based on specific views that regard the hooligans as damaging, rather than serving, Russia’s national community, due to the rivalries they entrenched through the years.58 Revansh also published a guest contribution that criticised the Okolofutbol’shchiki for being conformist, degrading their attitudes as cheap talk rather than serious identification with nationalism: ‘These guys officially enact nationalism, but at the same time remain distant to politics. Why? The answer is easy: there is a reciprocal friendship between the power and the leaders of the subculture, which has been developing since the first half of the 2000s’.59

57For example, ‘SturmRise—Zavtra!’, Revansh, 12 November 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2261; ‘Maksim Bazylev. Skromnyi Geroi’, Revansh, 24 October 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=2178; ‘Informatsiya k razmyshleniyu’, Revansh, available at: http://revansh.org/wp-content/uploads/Informatsia.pdf; ‘Jugend Unity’, Fans Edge, 28 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/jugend-unity/; ‘Stat‘ya pablika “Rassvet” pro antinarodnyi rezhim v RF’, Fans Edge, 14 July 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/statya- pablika-rassvet-pro-antinarodnyj-rezhim-v-rf/; ‘Manifest Natsional-Sotsialistov Rusi’, Fans Edge, 28 June 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/manifest-nacional-socialistov-rusi/; ‘NS kolonna na Pervomae’, Fans Edge, 1 June 2013, available at: http://fans-edge.info/ns-kolonna-na-pervomae/, all accessed 31 July 2014. 58‘Mnenie Slavyanskoj Voli o futbolnom fanatizme’, Fans Edge, 5 April 2012, available at: http://fans-edge. info/mnenie-slavyanskoj-voli-o-futbolnom-fanatizme/, accessed 31 July 2014. 59‘Maksim Sobeskii predrekaet krakh “uvazhaemykh avtoritetov i tsentrovykh firm”’, Revansh, 23 July 2013, available at: http://revansh.org/?p=1977, accessed 31 July 2014. 1524 Julia Glathe

In sum, the Okolofutbol’shchiki is not really to be considered as part of the Russian extreme right movement in accordance with the above mentioned definition, because their collective identity and their central objectives and actions are based on a different foundation. They do not aim at participating in right-wing activities above all else. Instead, they focus on football and fighting. Xenophobia is located in their daily lives and it is in those daily contexts that it has been shaped and developed. Hostile stereotypes shared by the far right and the Okolofutbol’shchiki have however created sympathies and in part emotions of solidarity. Yet, it would be imprecise to characterise the entire Okolofutbol’shchiki subculture as part of the right-wing movement, as the relationship between the Okolofutbol’shchiki and the far right seems to be rather complex. Nevertheless, the Okolofutbol’shchiki features an enormous potential for mobilisation by the extreme right. Especially the interplay of readiness for fights and violence together with the perceived oppression by the state provide a basis for interaction and coalition between the extreme right and the Okolofutbol’shchiki. A comparison between the Russian fan subculture and the one established in Western Europe reveals significant commonalities. Masculinity, aggressiveness, militarism, and hierarchy are values that the Okolofutbol’shchiki shares with the Italian fan culture, and all relate to far right positions (Gabler 2009, p. 51). Football-inherent friend–enemy distinctions also facilitated violent conflicts between fan communities in Western Europe, and are akin to the Russian xenophobic discourse on the basis of the rhetoric employed in these territorial fights. In Western Europe, however, political action and interaction between far right groups and fans are mainly limited to the football stadium, and fan groups are only seldom mobilised for political action. The German movement HoGeSa (Hooligans Against Salafists),60 which first gained public attention in autumn 2014, appears to be an exception, embodying a new trend that is similar to the one currently consolidating in Russia. It thus seems that a comparison between explicitly political fan and hooligan groups active in Germany and Russia would represent a telling project to further examine conditions and mechanisms of the successful mobilisation of and interaction between fans and the far right.

JULIA GLATHE, Leibniz-Institut für Länderkunde, Schongauerstraße 9, 04328 Leipzig, Germany. Email: [email protected].

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