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CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Attacks Against Boot And
CIS 4360 Secure Computer Systems Attacks against Boot and RAM Professor Qiang Zeng Spring 2017 Previous Class • BIOS-MBR: Generation I system boot – What BIOS and MBR are? – How does it boot the system? // Jumping to MBR – How does multi-boot work? // Chain-loading • The limitations of BIOS and MBR – Disk, memory, file system, multi-booting, security, … • UEFI-GPT: Generation II system boot – What UEFI and GPT are? – How does it boot the system? // UEFI boot manager – How does multi-boot work? // separate dirs in ESP CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 2 Limitations of BIOS-MBR • MBR is very limited – Support ~2TB disk only – 4 primary partitions at most (so four OSes at most) – A MBR can store only one boot loader • BIOS is very restrictive – 16-bit processor mode; 1MB memory space (little spare space to accommodate a file system driver) – Blindly executes whatever code on MBR CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 3 UEFI vs. BIOS • Disk partitioning schemes – GPT (GUID Partition Table): part of UEFI spec.; to replace MBR – MBR supports disk size 232 x 512B = 2TB, while UEFI supports much larger disks (264 x 512B = 8,000,000,000 TB) – MBR supports 4 partitions, while GPT supports 128 • Memory space – BIOS: 20-bit addressing; UEFI: 32-bit or 64-bit • Pre-OS environment – BIOS only provides raw disk access, while UEFI supports the FAT file system (so you can use file names to read files) • Booting – BIOS supports boot through boot sectors (MBR and VBR) – UEFI provides a boot partition of hundreds of megabytes (and boot manager and secure boot) CIS 4360 – Secure Computer Systems 4 Previous Class How does dual-boo-ng of Linux and Windows work in UEFI-GPT? Each vendor has a separate directory storing its own boot loader code and configuraon files in the ESP (EFI System Par--on). -
Analysing Android's Full Disk Encryption Feature
Analysing Android’s Full Disk Encryption Feature Johannes Gotzfried¨ ∗ and Tilo Muller¨ Friedrich-Alexander-Universitat¨ Erlangen-Nurnberg,¨ Germany fjohannes.goetzfried, [email protected] Abstract Since Android 4.0, which was released in October 2011, users of Android smartphones are pro- vided with a built-in encryption feature to protect their home partitions. In the work at hand, we give a structured analysis of this software-based encryption solution. For example, software-based encryption always requires at least a small part of the disk to remain unencrypted; in Android this is the entire system partition. Unencrypted parts of a disk can be read out and are open to system manipulations. We present a tool named EvilDroid to show that with physical access to an encrypted smartphone only (i.e., without user level privileges), the Android system partition can be subverted with keylogging. Additionally, as it was exemplary shown by attacks against Galaxy Nexus devices in 2012, Android-driven ARM devices are vulnerable to cold boot attacks. Data recovery tools like FROST exploit the remanence effect of RAM to recover data from encrypted smartphones, at worst the disk encryption key. With a Linux kernel module named Armored, we demonstrate that Android’s software encryption can be improved to withstand cold boot attacks by performing AES entirely on the CPU without RAM. As a consequence, cold boot attacks on encryption keys can be defeated. We present both a detailed security and a performance analysis of Armored. Keywords: cold boot, evil maid, Android, cpu-bound encryption 1 Introduction Smartphones are long since part of the privacy sphere of their owners, and consequently, a missing smartphone that falls into the wrong hands has severe consequences for its owner. -
Digital Forensics
Advanced Security for Systems Engineering – VO 08: Digital Forensics Clemens Hlauschek, Christian Brem INSO – Industrial Software Institute of Information Systems Engineering | Faculty of Informatics | TU Wien Contents Forensics – Anti-Forensics Political/Historical Context: End-to-end Encryption Forensic Science Acquire-Analyze-Present Cryptographic Attacks and Limitations Common Attacks against Crypto Analysis of Encypted Traffic Disk encryption Advanced Security for Systems Engineering WS20 | Forensics 2 / 37 Forensics – Anti-Forensics Advanced Security for Systems Engineering WS20 | Forensics 3 / 37 End-to-end Encryption Debate ■ Australia passes Assistance & Access Act (December 2018): allows to secretly compel companies and individuals to re-engineer IT Systems for spying ■ EU Council agrees on e-Evidence proposal (December 2018): access data ■ FBI vs Apple encryption dispute (2016) ■ NSA/Snowden (2013): Dual EC DRBG backdoor, etc ■ Crypto War: Crypto export restrictions (until 1996), Clipper Chip, weak SSL keys, PGP, A5/1 Advanced Security for Systems Engineering WS20 | Forensics 4 / 37 CLEAR Proposal and Technial Discussion Secure access to encrypted storage for 3rd parties without risiking mass surveillance abuse? ■ Ray Ozzie (2018): CLEAR Proposal: Key escrow, per-device key pair for encrypting passcode, acess to device and vendor request necessary, secure hardware to ‘brick’ phone: forensic r/o lock mode. ■ Savage: Lawful Device Access without Mass Surveillance Risk (CCS’18): self-escrow of access credentials in secure time-vaulting -
Bootkeeper: Validating Software Integrity Properties on Boot Firmware Images
Session 8: System Security and Authentication CODASPY ’19, March 25–27, 2019, Richardson, TX, USA BootKeeper: Validating Software Integrity Properties on Boot Firmware Images Ronny Chevalier Stefano Cristalli Christophe Hauser CentraleSupélec, Inria, Univ Rennes, Università degli Studi di Milano University of Southern California CNRS, IRISA [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Yan Shoshitaishvili Ruoyu Wang Christopher Kruegel Arizona State University Arizona State University University of California, Santa [email protected] [email protected] Barbara [email protected] Giovanni Vigna Danilo Bruschi Andrea Lanzi University of California, Santa Università degli Studi di Milano Università degli Studi di Milano Barbara [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT Boot Firmware Images. In Ninth ACM Conference on Data and Application Boot firmware, like UEFI-compliant firmware, has been the target Security and Privacy (CODASPY ’19), March 25–27, 2019, Richardson, TX, USA. of numerous attacks, giving the attacker control over the entire ACM, New York, NY, USA, 11 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3292006.3300026 system while being undetected. The measured boot mechanism of a computer platform ensures its integrity by using cryptographic 1 INTRODUCTION measurements to detect such attacks. This is typically performed by relying on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Recent work, however, One of the most critical components of every computer is the shows that vendors do not respect the specifications that have been boot firmware (e.g., BIOS or UEFI-compliant firmware), which isin devised to ensure the integrity of the firmware’s loading process. charge of initializing and testing the various hardware components, As a result, attackers may bypass such measurement mechanisms and then transfer execution to the Operating System (OS). -
Trusted Systems in Untrusted Environments: Protecting Against Strong Attackers
Trusted Systems in Untrusted Environments: Protecting against Strong Attackers Vertrauenswürdige Systeme in nicht vertrauenswürdigen Umgebungen: Schutz vor starken Angreifern Der Technischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades Dr.-Ing. vorgelegt von Johannes Götzfried aus Amberg Als Dissertation genehmigt von der Technischen Fakultät der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 7. Dezember 2017 Vorsitzender des Promotionsorgans: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Reinhard Lerch Gutachter: Prof. Dr.-Ing. Felix Freiling Prof. Dr. Ir. Ingrid Verbauwhede Abstract In this thesis, we investigate possibilities of operating trusted systems within untrusted environments in the presence of strong attackers. We consider attackers with physical access to a system as well as root-level attackers which are able to execute code on the target system at the highest privilege level possible. Our proposed defense mechanisms range from hardware-based trusted computing architectures over hardware-assisted software solutions to pure software-based encryption schemes. First, we design two hardware-based trusted computing architectures for embedded devices, called Soteria and Atlas, which both protect against root-level attackers and focus on code and data confidentiality. At its heart, Soteria is a lightweight program-counter based memory access control extension which provides integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality guarantees for software modules. To guarantee the confidentiality of code at any given point in time against all software attacks, we design a scheme consisting of initially encrypted software modules and loader modules. Mutual integrity checks between software modules and the loader ensure that a software module is only decrypted if the system behaves with integrity. Atlas protects software modules with the help of an encryption unit placed between the cache and main memory. -
How to Not Be Hacked
The Motherboard Guide to Not Getting Hacked VERSION_1.0 UPDATED_11.14.17 The Motherboard Guide to Not Getting Hacked One of the questions we are asked most often at Motherboard is This guide isn’t comprehensive and it’s not personalized; there is “how can I prevent myself from getting hacked?” no such thing as “perfect security” and there are no one-size-fits all solutions. Instead, we hope this will be a jumping-off point for Because living in modern society necessitates putting an uncom- people looking to batten down the hatches on their digital lives. fortably large amount of trust in third parties, the answer is often “not a whole lot.” Take, for example, the massive Equifax hack That’s why we’ve tried to keep this guide as accessible as that affected roughly half of the American population: Few peo- possible, but if you run into any lingo you don’t know, there’s a ple voluntarily signed up for the service, and yet their information glossary at the end of this guide to help out. was stolen anyway. This guide is the work of many people on Motherboard staff both Hackers steal hundreds of millions of passwords in one swoop past and present, and has been vetted by several of our sources, and occasionally cause large-scale blackouts. The future is who we owe a great debt to. Large sections of it were written by probably not going to get better, with real-life disasters caused by Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, Joseph Cox, Sarah Jeong, and internet-connected knick-knacks, smart home robots that could Jason Koebler, but the tips within it have grown out of years of kill you, flying hacker laptops, and the dangers of hackers getting writing and research on digital security by dozens of reporters your genetic data. -
Uefisecure Boot in Modern Computer Security Solutions
UEFI SECURE BOOT IN MODERN COMPUTER SECURITY SOLUTIONS September 2013 Revised: August 2019 Authors: Richard Wilkins, Ph.D. Phoenix Technologies, Ltd. [email protected] Brian Richardson Intel Corporation [email protected] OVERVIEW What is the UEFI Forum? The Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) Forum is a world-class non-profit industry standards body that works in partnership to enable the evolution of platform technologies. The UEFI Forum champions firmware innovation through industry collaboration and the advocacy of a standardized interface that simplifies and secures platform initialization and firmware bootstrap operations. Both developed and supported by representatives from more than 350 industry-leading technology companies, UEFI specifications promote business and technological efficiency, improve performance and security, facilitate interoperability between devices, platforms and systems, and comply with next-generation technologies. What is UEFI Secure Boot, and how did it originate? UEFI Secure Boot was created to enhance security in the pre-boot environment. UEFI Forum members developed the UEFI specification, an interface framework that affords firmware, operating system and hardware providers a defense against potential malware attacks. Without UEFI Secure Boot, malware developers can more easily take advantage of several pre-boot attack points, including the system-embedded firmware itself, as well as the interval between the firmware initiation and the loading of the operating system. Malware inserted at this point can provide an environment in which an operating system—no matter how secure—cannot run safely. Secure Boot helps firmware, operating system and hardware providers cooperate to thwart the efforts of malware developers. Additional background on the intent of UEFI Secure Boot can be found in "UEFI Networking and Pre-OS Security," published in the Intel Technology Journal [1]. -
Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging 1 Introduction
Stark Tamperproof Authentication to Resist Keylogging Tilo M¨uller,Hans Spath, Richard M¨ackl, and Felix C. Freiling Department of Computer Science Friedrich-Alexander-University, Erlangen, Germany Abstract. The weakest link in software-based full disk encryption is the authentication procedure. Since the master boot record must be present unencrypted in order to launch the decryption of remaining system parts, it can easily be manipulated and infiltrated by bootkits that perform keystroke logging; consequently password-based authentication schemes become attackable. The current technological response, as enforced by BitLocker, verifies the integrity of the boot process by use of the trusted platform module. But, as we show, this countermeasure is insufficient in practice. We present Stark, the first tamperproof authentication scheme that mutually authenticates the computer and the user in order to resist keylogging during boot. To achieve this, Stark combines two ideas in a novel way: (1) Stark implements trust bootstrapping from a secure token (a USB flash drive) to the whole PC. (2) In Stark, users can securely verify the authenticity of the PC before entering their password by using one-time boot prompts, that are updated upon successful boot. Keywords: Disk Encryption, Evil Maid Attacks, Authentication, TPM 1 Introduction Full disk encryption (FDE) protects sensitive data against unauthorized access in the event that a device is physically lost or stolen. The risk of data exposure is reduced by rendering disks unreadable to unauthorized users through encryption technologies like AES [11]. Unlike file encryption, FDE encrypts whole disks automatically on operating system level, without the need to take action for single files. -
Security of Hard Disk Encryption
Security of Hard Disk Encryption USMAN YOUSUF Degree project in Information and Communiation Systems Security Stockholm, Sweden 2013 TRITA-ICT-EX-2013:92 SECURITY OF HARD DISK ENCRYPTION Abstract| Abstract In order to provide confidentiality to digital information and safety to computer hard disk, encryption is considered to be best solutions. Now a day, several hard disks encryption software’s with a range of different features are commercially available. Majority of the software uses that encryption algorithm, whose cryptanalyses are already known. Now the vital question is that how much these encryption software’s provide security to the data. Any implementation and design flaw leave loop hole or backdoors in these softwares. Either by take the advantage of user unawareness or by using any external hardware, software’s security can be defeated by using smart and easy methods. This thesis will provide possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities of commercially available hard disk encryption software, who offering complete security to the hard disk data. This thesis will also access the real world performance of hard disk encryption softwares. i SECURITY OF HARD DISK ENCRYPTION Acknowledgement| Acknowledgement First of all, I wish to thank ALMIGHTLY GOD for providing me strength and courage to continuously hunt which is so called knowledge. I am most grateful to Prof. Sead Muftic supervising and guiding this thesis. Last, but not the least thanks to all my friends and families for their support, encouragement and love throughout my work.