The Regional Scenario and India's National Security Challenges

Centre for Public Policy Research Independent. In-depth. Insightful The Regional Scenario and India’s National Security Challenges By Admiral Arun Prakash (Retd) Transcript of the lecture delivered by former Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash, PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM at the 16th edition of CPPR Quarterly Lecture Series, on the topic ‘India’s Security Challenges’, held on 15 October, 2019 at Kochi Introduction The Indian Navy (IN) has an umbilical connection with the state of Kerala on two counts. First, since 1950, INS Venduruthy, on Willingdon Island, has been the alma mater of a very large proportion of IN personnel who receive their initial training in the ‘warfare schools’ located here. Second, thanks to the State government’s generous contribution of a large tract of land near Kannur; the grand Indian Naval Academy (INA) has been located at Ezhimala. Future generations of naval officers — not just of the Indian Navy, but also of many foreign countries — will emerge from the portals of the INA. Quite apart from the IN connection, Kerala has seen an ancient maritime tradition going back 3–4 millennia when ports like Muziris/Kodungallur saw vigorous seaborne trade with Rome, Middle East and Africa. However, due to want of written historical records, this important aspect of our maritime heritage has faded from public memory. In 1925, when the British geo-strategist Halford Mackinder declared that, ”...the leading seafaring races of antiquity came at all times from... the Aegean Sea”, it was Indian diplomat/historian, Sardar K M Panikkar who took exception and stated: “Perhaps Mackinder was thinking about the seafaring traditions of Europe. In terms of world history this statement is inaccurate. Millennia before seafaring developed in the limited Aegean waters, oceanic navigation had become common in peninsular India”. According to Panikkar, it was on account of the predictable and cyclical SW and NE monsoon winds, which saw the world’s first oceanic sailing activity in the Indian Ocean — specifically the lands washed by the Arabian Sea. Unfortunately, for various reasons, India’s 3000-year old maritime glory went into rapid decline in the 9th & 10th centuries CE and oceanic trade passed into the hands of the Arabs. 1 Centre for Strategic Studies Centre for Public Policy Research Independent. In-depth. Insightful As the 12th and 13th centuries saw Turkic and Afghan hordes pouring down our NW mountain passes into the northern plains, India was helpless before foreign invaders because we lacked unity as well as visionary leadership. The same was true in the maritime context. In 1498, when the Portuguese adventurer Vasco da Gama arrived off Kozhikode, the Sultanate of Delhi was ruled by the Afghan Lodhi Dynasty, while Southern India was divided between the Bahamini and Vijayanagaram kingdoms. None of them were blessed with a maritime vision, much less a capable navy. The Samoothri Raja (or Zamorin) of Kozhikode was probably one of the few Indian rulers who had created a naval force. Led by hereditary Admirals of the Marrakar clan, the small Malabar navy put up a gallant struggle against the Portuguese and drove them off to Goa. Although the Maratha navy did put up a token resistance, this really marked the beginning of a 500 year-long domination of Asia by Europeans, on the basis of sea power. I have made this brief foray into history to remind ourselves of two issues. First, the role of Kerala in our maritime history. Second, that if a leadership-deficit and lack of vision were the primary causes of India losing its independence, neglect of technology was a crucial contributory factor. But the question is: have we learnt from history? Not only has India fought five wars since independence, its internal situation has long remained fraught with danger, and today it continues to face a daunting external environment. It is for this reason that, notwithstanding other pressing demands on its financial resources, India has had to devote huge amounts to national defence. For many th th years, now, India’s defence budget has remained amongst the 4 or 5 largest in the world. Given these circumstances, it has been a cause for great concern that India’s politicians have, traditionally, shown indifference to national security. This came about, because, till 2019, our politicians did not see national security as a ‘vote-catching’ issue and wanted to devote their time and attention to electioneering and other issues of political survival. Two manifestations of this indifference are: (a) for over 70 years, India’s Parliament has rarely discussed matters related to security or sought a defence White 2 Centre for Strategic Studies Centre for Public Policy Research Independent. In-depth. Insightful Paper from the GoI, and (b) the extent of control over Ministry of Defence (MoD) exercised by the Bureaucracy. A Review of the Past Against this backdrop, let us revisit a few episodes in our recent history so that you can judge, for yourselves, how effective India has been in upholding its national security interests since independence. In October 1947, when Pakistani forces invaded Kashmir our nascent political and military leadership undertook no overarching analysis of the situation and gave no strategic direction other than to ‘repulse the invaders!’ After a year of sporadic, but fierce fighting, just as the Indian army was getting the upper hand, Nehru referred the issue to the UN. Consequently, the so called ‘Kashmir problem’ festered for seven decades, till it was addressed — in a manner of speaking — last month. The jury is still out on what the future holds for Kashmir. China, at the end of its Civil War, had a clear vision of becoming the dominant Asian power, and cutting India down to size was part of this agenda. Yet, we deluded ourselves with hopes of Sino-Indian camaraderie, and sought to appease China by acknowledging its suzerainty over Tibet in 1951. Poor political and military judgment led to a military confrontation, with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) overrunning our positions in NEFA and Ladakh. This debacle, while demonstrating strategic naiveté, also exposed how out of touch with reality India’s ruling elite had been. India’s finest hour, without a doubt, came in December 1971 when a historic victory over Pakistan led to the liberation of Bangladesh. Mrs Gandhi’s resolute leadership and sound military planning resulted in a swift campaign which achieved all its objectives. And yet, as a victor, India faltered on the negotiating table. We gave away the gains of a bloody and expensive war — including PsOW and territory — in return for false undertakings which Pakistan had no intention of keeping. In the strategic domain, India agonised for 24 long years, after Pokharan I, before testing its nuclear weapons — only to have Pakistan promptly catch up with it. As India’s nuclear weapon, missile and missile-defence programmes unfolded, it became obvious 3 Centre for Strategic Studies Centre for Public Policy Research Independent. In-depth. Insightful that they were guided, exclusively, by the scientific community, with the armed forces remaining on the margins. Pakistan’s nuclear programme, under the close supervision of its military, has switched from uranium to plutonium-based weapons, and its warhead stockpile, reportedly, exceeds India’s. Pakistan, by arming of its tactical and cruise-missiles with nuclear warheads, appears to be contemplating a policy of ‘flexible response’. India had, despite Pakistan’s nuclear sabre-rattling, stood firm on its ‘no first use’ undertaking. Possibly, a rethink is underway. Finally, events like the Kargil War, the 2001 military mobilisation, the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and the Doklam stand-off have all posed strategic dilemmas for our decision-makers in an environment of mutual nuclear deterrence. But are we sure that the right lessons have been learnt from them for the future? It is against this troublesome background that I will now attempt to explore some aspects of our regional scenario, starting with giant neighbour, China. China Given its growing economic and military strength, revisionist outlook and past record, China can be expected to push its influence in the region, grab territory, and rewrite the rules of international conduct to suit its own interests. A manifestation of China’s belligerence is the campaign of ‘cartographic expansion’ that it has mounted through the ‘9-dash line’ in the South China Sea (SCS) and repudiation of the 1914 McMahon line on the India–China border. Other examples of Chinese intransigence are the illegal creation and militarisation of artificial islands in the SCS and its contemptuous dismissal of the UN arbitration on these sovereignty issues. China’s strategic nexus with Pakistan and all its diplomatic moves are focused exclusively on the containment of India and its impairment as a rival. While its dominant military position on the Tibetan plateau poses a severe challenge to India from landwards, the establishment of maritime footholds in the Indian Ocean, including military bases in Djibouti and Gwadar, are meant to provide it a network of port facilities, which could support long-range maritime operations. As we contemplate these 4 Centre for Strategic Studies Centre for Public Policy Research Independent. In-depth. Insightful developments, we must remember that China’s grand strategy aims to reshape the geopolitical fundamentals of global power. Taking a page out of Mackinder’s as well as Mahan’s playbooks, China dominates the Eurasian ‘world-island’. On the one hand, the 15,000 km Economic Belt, connecting Central China to Europe, is creating a trans-continental infrastructure for the economic integration of the world-island, by an internal network of high-speed railways, FOC and energy pipelines. At the same time, the ambitious Maritime Silk Road involving 65 countries and expenditure of trillions of dollars promises to transform the economy and geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

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