Technology Law
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Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel P.O. Box 7288, Springfield, IL 62791 IDC Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3 (16.3.30) Technology Law By: Michael C. Bruck* Crisham & Kubes, Ltd. Chicago Jerry Falwell’s Ears are Burning - Gripe Sites, Domain Names, And Rejecting the Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine The ease and accessibility of the internet has made it an ideal place for people to create personal blogs, gripe sites, and rant forums. This broad-based expansion of personal communication has provided ample opportunity for internet users to share ideas and voice their opinions on an array of subjects. It also has generated substantial litigation involving same-name or similar name websites and their impact on free speech and trademark law. In late April, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to Lamparello v. Falwell, a case from the Fourth Circuit involving trademark infringement and cybersquatting that could have major implications for free speech and the impact of trademark law on the internet. 126 S. Ct. 1772 (2006). Background The Lamparello case, decided by the Fourth Circuit on August 24, 2005, centers around Reverend Jerry Falwell, “a nationally known minister who has been active as a commentator on politics and public affairs” who owns the trademarks “Jerry Falwell,” “Falwell,” “Listen America with Jerry Falwell,” and “www.falwell.com.” 420 F.3d 309, 310 (4th Cir. 2005). The plaintiff, Christopher Lamparello, created a website that responded to Falwell’s opinions about homosexuality. Id. Lamparello registered the domain name “www.fallwell.com,” which is one letter off the correct spelling of Jerry Falwell’s last name and website address. Id. Lamparello sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia for a declaration that his internet domain, “www.fallwell.com,” was not infringing trademark or cybersquatting, registering, trafficking in, or using a domain name with bad-faith intent to profit from the goodwill of a trademark belonging to someone else, “www.falwell.com.” Id. Falwell counterclaimed and alleged trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and cybersquatting. Id. at 312. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, and the district court enjoined Lamparello from using Falwell’s trademark, required Lamparello to transfer “www.fallwell.com” to Falwell, but denied Falwell’s requests for attorney’s fees and statutory damages. Id. Both parties appealed. Id. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately held that Lamparello’s website did not infringe under the Lanham Act and did not violate the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act of 1999 (“ACPA”). Id. at 309. The court reasoned that Lamparello did not infringe or falsely designate Falwell’s domain name under the Lanham Act because Lamparello’s website could not be confused with Falwell’s website. For example, Lamparello’s website contained a disclaimer and bore no resemblance to Falwell’s web design. In addition, the court concluded that Lamparello did not Page 1 of 4 Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel P.O. Box 7288, Springfield, IL 62791 IDC Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3 (16.3.30) cybersquat under the ACPA because he did not have a bad faith intent to profit using www.fallwell.com. The court also rejected Falwell’s initial interest confusion argument that Lamparello’s website lured potential customers away from www.falwell.com by passing off his goods as those of Falwell. Id. at 316. The court held that the initial interest confusion argument was inadequate because a web user would not confuse the content of www.falwell.com with www.fallwell.com. Commercial Speech Under the Lanham Act In arriving at its ruling, the court first found that Falwell had no cause of action under the Lanham Act. Id. at 314. The purpose of the Lanham Act is to prevent trademark infringement and protect product identification, provide consumer information, and encourage the production of quality goods. Id. at 313. There are two requirements to find infringement under the Lanham Act: (1) the trademark must be used commercially or in connection with the sale of goods or services; and (2) a likelihood of confusion must exist. Id. Lamparello argued that the Lanham Act must be restricted to commercial speech, which is speech proposing a commercial transaction, and not critical or ideological speech. Id. at 313. Amendments to the Lanham Act, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (“FTDA”) and the ACPA demonstrate that trademark laws were not intended to impinge on First Amendment rights of critics. Id. The FTDA only applies to “commercial use in commerce of a mark,” and a person is not a cybersquatter under ACPA if the person’s use of the mark is “bona fide noncommercial or fair use.” Id. The court noted, however, that the Lanham Act does not use the term noncommercial. Id. at 314. Instead, the Lanham Act applies to the use of a mark “in connection with any goods or services,” which can include non- commercial public and civic benefits. Id. The court did not decide what type of speech the Lanham Act protected; however, the court highlighted that Lamparello’s website did not sell or promote any goods and services and existed solely to promote Lamparello’s views on homosexuality. The Fourth Circuit further ruled that Lamparello was not liable for trademark infringement and false designation under the Lanham Act because there was no likelihood of confusion. Id. Seven factors establish whether there is a likelihood of confusion, but “not all these factors are always relevant or equally emphasized in each case.” The factors are “(a) the strength or distinctiveness of the mark; (b) the similarity of the two marks; (c) the similarity of the goods/services the marks identify; (d) the similarity of the facilities the two parties use in their businesses; (e) the similarity of the advertising used by the two parties; (f) the defendant’s intent; and (g) actual confusion.” Id. at 315. Lamparello’s website did not create confusion because it did not offer goods or services, did not attempt to imitate Falwell’s website, and was not a facility for advertising. Id. The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine In addition to holding that Lamparello’s website caused no likelihood of confusion, the court rejected Falwell’s argument that Lamparello violated the initial interest confusion doctrine. Id. at 316. Initial interest confusion “forbids a competitor from luring potential customers away from a producer by initially passing off its goods as those of the producer’s, even if confusion as to the source of the goods is dispelled by the time any sales are consummated.” Id. This doctrine is used sporadically in conjunction with the “actual confusion” factor to assess the likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act. For example, typosquatting or URL hijacking, a type of cybersquatting which relies on typographical errors made by internet users when inputing a website address, can be used to create initial confusion. If the misspelled website is made in a similar style as the producer’s website and tries to sell similar items, the typosquatter would create initial interest confusion. Here, Falwell argued that Lamparello’s website, www.fallwell.com, is a misspelled version of www.falwell.com, and the Page 2 of 4 Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel P.O. Box 7288, Springfield, IL 62791 IDC Quarterly Vol. 16, No. 3 (16.3.30) website had a link to a website selling literature that related to Lamparello’s message. However, Lamparello’s website does not sell any goods and states “[t]his website is not affiliated with Rev. Dr. Jerry Falwell or his ministry. If you would like to visit Rev. Falwell’s website, you may click here.” Id. at 311. If Lamparello’s website looked similar to Falwell’s website or sold any products, the court probably would have determined he had violated the Lanham Act. The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that it has not adopted the initial interest confusion doctrine. Id. at 316. Instead, the court found what constituted confusion under the Lanham Act by analyzing the use of the mark in the context in which it was seen by the ordinary customer and not by comparing marks out of context or looking at domain names apart from their underlying content. Id. In addition, even if the court used the initial interest doctrine, Lamparello was not liable because he ran a gripe site that did not use Falwell’s mark for business or financial gain. Id. The Fourth Circuit’s ruling undermines its 2001 opinion in PETA v. Doughney, and appears to reverse its stance on initial interest confusion. In PETA, the court held that Doughney’s use of the domain name “www.peta.org,” which linked to commercial sites and contained information antithetical to PETA’s purpose, constituted trademark infringement. The court reasoned that Doughney’s use of “www.peta.org” did not create a successful parody of PETA. 263 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2001). For a parody to be successful, it “must convey two simultaneous and contradictory messages; that it is the original, but also that it is not the original and is instead a parody.” Id. at 366. The court concluded that the domain name was not a parody and, therefore, did not contain two simultaneous and contradictory messages. Id. The Lamparello court claims that PETA did not adopt the initial interest confusion doctrine. 420 F.3d at 316. PETA’s holding demonstrated, however, that the court actually ruled that Doughney was liable for initial interest confusion because his domain name would make internet users initially interested in the website because of the belief it was related to PETA. 263 F.3d at 366.