Maintaining Institutional Independence: Funding Sustainable State Courts During Economic Crisis

PersPectives on state court LeadershiP Maintaining institutionaL indePendence: Funding sustainabLe state courts during econoMic crisis One in a series from the Executive Session for State Court Leaders in the 21st Century written by: Paul De Muniz rePort author Paul De Muniz Paul De Muniz served as Oregon’s chief justice from 2006 through 2012. As Oregon’s chief justice De Muniz was a member of the Harvard Kennedy School’s Executive Session for State Court Leaders in the 21st Century. He is currently a distinguished jurist in residence at Willamette University College of Law in Salem. introduction connected collections of locally funded county and municipal courts. Within those systems, courts of last Sustainable funding levels are a prerequisite if state resort wielded a certain degree of power as the entities judiciaries are to dispense fair and timely justice and responsible for interpreting state statutes and consti- play their constitutionally mandated role in govern- tutions; however, they commonly lacked any admin- ment. This paper argues that achieving such funding istrative authority over the courts that operated below should be a priority for the legislative and executive them. branches, as well as the judiciary. The argument is developed through the following steps. First, the pa- The last 40-50 years have seen states implement so- per describes the dramatic changes state courts have called “modern court” provisions that melded state experienced since the mid-twentieth century, along court systems with structured administrative enti- with the associated new responsibilities, new forms ties, which are often led by the state’s highest court of governance, and a new reliance on state-level fund- or its chief justice.1 Modern state courts do more to- ing. Second, the paper explains why these changes re- day than ever, and they do so in systems that have sulted in a lack of the necessary budgetary protections fully evolved as discrete branches of state government for the state courts today. Third, the paper defines the rather than as diffuse parts of a theoretical construct. concept of “sustainable funding” and differentiates it State courts now have developed—and are adminis- from the more traditional idea of “adequate funding.” tering—a growing array of specialized services that Fourth, the paper explains how a lack of sustainable range from providing mediation and arbitration ser- funding is a threat to the administration of justice, vices to solving specific community problems in non- making it difficult for courts to reengineer court pro- traditional adjudicatory forums such as drug courts, cesses or to take advantage of technical advances to family courts, mental health courts, and now—in make them more efficient and effective. Finally, the many states—veterans’ courts. paper ends on a positive note by offering court leaders practical guidelines on how they can persuade legisla- Meanwhile, states have also made wholesale changes tors and executive branch officials that providing the in the way they fund their courts by shifting fiscal re- judicial branch with sustainable branch funding is a sponsibility for the judiciary away from local govern- priority for all of state government. ments and placing it with state government;2 31 state court systems currently rely on state appropriations for most, if not all, of their budgets. Oregon is one such unified court system—a court system funded Modern state courts do more almost entirely by the state. today than ever, and they do so in systems that have fully Consequently, modern state courts—and state court evolved as discrete branches of leaders—increasingly view themselves as operating within a system collectively devoted to their state’s state government rather than constitutional purpose. In Oregon, for example, that as diffuse parts of a theoretical purpose is defined by the state constitution as the ad- construct. ministration of justice “openly and without purchase, completely and without delay[.]”3 Today, more than ever, state courts are called to pursue that particular mission—or one phrased much like it—with an en- our state courts today hanced sense of constitutional identity, administra- State courts today have changed dramatically from tive definition, and influence. those of the 19th century, when the legislative and executive branches only needed to fund judicial sala- State court leaders must pursue their mission ries, a horse, and a borrowed room. One hundred with state funding, knowing firsthand how badly years ago, state judiciaries existed primarily as loosely the administration of justice is destabilized when Maintaining institutionaL indePendence | 1 A second negative effect of state courts prioritizing the continued underfunding criminal cases over civil cases is increased difficulty of state courts will negatively in the recruitment and retention of quality lawyers to the state court bench. Not only will lawyers be affect state judicial systems in deterred from judicial service by low judicial sala- a number of ways. ries, but they will also be deterred by the lack of a diverse docket of interesting and challenging work. How many talented legal minds will be interested in legislatively imposed budget reductions resulting a judicial career in which the daily workload consists from recessionary cycles force state court functions to of criminal cases—mostly pleas and sentencing—and be routinely turned off and on. Presently, most states cases involving self-represented litigants? are facing, or will soon face, severe revenue shortfalls in their current and future fiscal year budgets, with As a result of budget reductions, most state judiciaries revenue gaps predicted to last through the decade.4 As have emptied their cupboards, swept the spare change responsible partners in government, state courts must from under their cushions, and thinned their soup. In accept their obligation to share in the fiscal reduc- a speech delivered in February 2008 to the American tions necessary to balance a state’s budget. However, Bar Association House of Delegates, Margaret Mar- revenue shortfalls in many states are so great that pro- shall, then Chief Justice of Supreme Judicial Court posed cuts to judicial budgets can imperil the judicia- of Massachusetts and President of the Conference of ry’s constitutional responsibility to administer justice Chief Justices, noted that “each year at least 95 per- impartially, completely, and without delay. cent of all litigation in the United States takes place in state courts” and that, as a result, “as justice in our The continued underfunding of state courts will state courts goes, so goes justice in our nation.” Chief negatively affect state judicial systems in a number Justice Marshall continued, “our state courts are in of ways. For example, continued underfunding will crisis. A perfect storm of circumstances threatens force courts to prioritize case processing by focusing much that we know, or think we know, about our 5 on criminal cases at the expense of civil cases. This American system of justice.” will eventually cause severe and unacceptable delay in processing civil cases, ultimately driving many civil litigants from our courtrooms to alternatives such as arbitration, mediation, and reference (pro tempore) the Judiciary as an judges. This would effectively create two systems of institution requiring justice: one for those who can afford alternative dis- budgetary Protections pute resolution methods and one for those who can- is a recent concePt not. Such a division undermines the important role that a state’s highest court plays in regulating business To gain some understanding of how the state courts and consumer interests, especially when many of to- came to be in such dire circumstances, it is helpful day’s governmental regulatory bodies routinely fail to to examine the growth of the American judiciary in keep pace with contemporary discovery and innova- the context of the separation of powers doctrine. Of tion in science and technology. Disputes over issues particular relevance is why, despite a rich history in arising in those areas are increasingly determined in this country of embracing the theory of divided gov- court, and they should be. Alternative dispute meth- ernment, state judiciaries are not more insulated from ods simply do not offer the kind of regulatory author- funding decisions made by the other two branches of ity established by case law and the kind of planning government. and risk analysis that economic litigation facilitates for business communities throughout the states—a At the heart of the separation of powers doctrine is 6 loss at a time when it is needed most. a mistrust of human nature. Montesquieu, who is 2 | PersPectives on state court LeaDershiP series widely credited with first articulating the divided unconstitutional law were displaced, and others sub- government theory,7 wrote, “[w]hen the legislative stituted, by the Legislatures who would be willing in- and executive powers are united in the same person, struments of the wicked [and] arbitrary plans of their or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no masters.”17 Madison subsequently lobbied for the ju- liberty.”8 diciary to be a co-equal branch of government18 and was joined by Patrick Henry and John Marshall, who The solution, according to John Locke and James also pushed for an independent judiciary that would Harrington, was to divide government into differ- be an able guard against the extra-constitutional ac- ent branches.9 However, those early models of gov- tions of other branches of government.19 ernment did not include a judicial branch.10 Mon- tesquieu, Locke, and Harrington all conceptualized More recently, Michael Buenger, former president of tripartite divisions of power, yet none of the three the Conference of State Court Administrators, of- philosophers posited that the judiciary should be a fered this apt summary: “The Framers…rejected a co-equal branch of government.11 judiciary whose…judgment—was dangerously sub- ject to unwarranted intrusions by the executive and The judiciary, however, gained new prominence un- legislative branches, particularly with regards to the der the U.S.

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