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SETA Policy Report SETA | Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research | www.setav.org | January 2012 Turkey ın 2011 SETA POLICY REPORT TURKEY IN 2011 EDITORS TAHA ÖZHAN | HATEM ETE | SELİN M. BÖLME AUTHORS MUHİTTİN ATAMAN | SELİN M. BÖLME | ZAFER ÇELİK | YILMAZ ENSAROĞLU | HATEM ETE | YAVUZ GÜÇTÜRK | BEKİR S. GÜR | ERDAL TANAS KARAGÖL | HÜSEYİN KIRMIZI | MÜJGE KÜÇÜKKELEŞ | MURAT ÖZOĞLU | FERAY SALMAN | FURKAN TORLAK | FATMA SEL TURHAN | UFUK ULUTAŞ | HAKKI UYGUR | CEM DURAN UZUN CONTRIBUTORS SADULLAH ANKARALI | EDA BEKTAŞ | AHMET SEMİH BİNGÖL | İPEK COŞKUN | GALİP DALAY | FATOŞ EMEKDAR | SAMİ ORÇUN ERSAY | DOĞAN EŞKİNAT | ÜLKÜ İSTİKLAL MIHÇIOKUR | ZEYNEP BETÜL SARIYILDIZ | FATİH TAŞKIRAN | KADİR ÜZEN TRANSLATED BY GÜLGÜN KOZAN | DOĞAN EŞKİNAT | DOV FRIEDMAN | NUR MURPHY COPYRIGHT ©2012 SETA SETA | Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmaları Vakfı Nenehatun Caddesi No: 66 GOP Çankaya 06700 Ankara TÜRKİYE Tel:+90 312.551 21 00 | Faks :+90 312.551 21 90 | www.setav.org | [email protected] SETA | Washington D.C. Office 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1106 Washington, D.C., 20036 Tel: 202-223-9885 | Faks: 202-223-6099 | www.setadc.org | [email protected] SETA Policy Report, No. 8, January 2012 Design & Layout by Ümare Yazar | Publishing: Pelin Ofset, Ankara FOREWORD 7 CHAPTER 1 11 POLITICS CHAPTER 2 29 LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS CHAPTER 3 49 FOREIGN POLICY CHAPTER 4 71 ECONOMY CHAPTER 5 77 EDUCATION EPILOGUE 87 CONTENTS FOREWORD | 7 1. POLITICS | 11 1.1 2011 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS | 12 1.1.1 Election Period and its Aftermath |13 1.1.2 Political Parties and the Elections | 14 1.1.3 Political Indications of June 12 | 16 1.2 CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS | 18 1.2.1 Trials of Coup Plotters and Anti-Government Propaganda | 18 1.2.2 Supreme Military Council Summit of 2011 | 19 1.2.3 Normalization and Civilian Rule | 19 1.3 THE KURDISH QUESTION: EFFORTS TOWARD RESOLUTION AND THE PKK | 21 1.3.1 The KCK Trials |22 1.3.2 Resolution through Dialogue | 24 1.3.3 Intra-PKK Power Struggles and the Militant Turn | 25 2. LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS | 29 2.1 LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES | 29 2.1.1 Constitutional Amendment | 29 2.1.2 Act Granting the Council of Ministers the Authority to Issue Decrees Having the Force of Law | 30 2.1.3 The Act on Prevention of Violence and Disorder in Sporting Events |30 2.1.4 The Process of the New Constitution Making |30 2.2 JUDICIARY | 31 2.2.1 Strengthening the Judicial System | 31 2.2.2 Controversial Cases and Expectations | 32 2.3 HUMAN RIGHTS IN 2011 | 36 2.3.1 Civilian Control of Security Forces | 37 2.3.2 Compliance with International Human Rights Law | 37 2.3.3 Institutionalization of Human Rights | 40 2.3.4 Training for Public Officials 40| 2.3.5 Prisons | 40 2.3.6 Freedom of Expression | 41 2.3.7 Freedom of Religion | 41 2.3.8 Freedom of Association and Assembly | 42 2.3.9 Women’s Rights | 42 2.3.10 Children’s Rights | 43 2.3.11 Police Violence | 44 2.3.12 The Disabled |44 2.3.13 Minorities and Cultural Rights | 44 2.3.14 The Kurdish Question |45 2.3.15 2011 Parliamentary Elections | 46 2.3.16 Refugees | 46 2.4 EXPECTATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS | 47 3. FOREIGN POLICY | 49 3.1 SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON TURKEY | 49 3.1.1 Arab Spring | 49 3.1.2 Discussions on the UN system | 52 3.2 CRISIS IN FOREIGN POLICY AND BILATERAL RELATIONS | 53 3.2.1 Turkey-U.S. Relations | 53 3.2.2 Turkey-EU Relations | 56 3.2.3 Turkey-Iraq Relationship | 58 3.2.4 Turkey-Iran Relations | 60 3.2.5 Turkey-Israel Relations | 62 3.2.6 Turkey-Syria Relations | 64 3.2.7 Turkey-Balkan Relations | 66 3.2.8 Turkey-Africa Relations | 67 3.2.9 Cyprus Issue | 69 4. ECONOMY IN 2011 | 71 4.1 ECONOMIC GROWTH | 71 4.2 CURRENT ACCOUNT DEFICIT | 72 4.3 PUBLIC FINANCE | 73 4.4 MONETARY POLICIES | 74 5. EDUCATION | 77 5.1 NATIONAL EDUCATION | 77 5.1.1 Teacher Appointments | 77 5.1.2 National Teaching Strategy Workshop | 78 5.1.3 FATİH Project | 78 5.1.4 The Act on the Organization and Duties of the Ministry of National Education | 79 5.1.5 2011 Placement Tests for Secondary Education (SBS) | 79 5.2 HIGHER EDUCATION | 80 5.2.1 Student Protests | 81 5.2.2. The Right to Wear the Headscarf | 82 5.2.3 Student Amnesty and Tuition Fees | 83 5.2.4 The Restructuring of ÖSYM and the Allegations of Cheating to YGS |83 5.2.5 Supply and Demand in Higher Education | 85 5.2.6 The Reconstruction of Higher Education |85 EPILOGUE | 87 FOREWORD The year 2011 was going to be a year in which the political and social effects of the September 12, 2010 referendum for drafting of the new constitution would be felt. As Turkey bid farewell to its old political habits with the September 12 ref- erendum, a public debate on how new political structures were going to be built began. The focus of the debate was “innovation”. As the public debate was gearing towards an exhaustive examination of the new political patterns, the wave of revo- lution and transformation that began in Tunisia and spread over the entire region took the public discourse hostage. Turkey’s discussions of ‘innovation’ were ab- sorbed in the wave of transformation. Turkey faced the Arab Spring as a country that has demonstrated significant developments in its own political transforma- tion. Political actors, who had not contributed to the ongoing efforts of democra- tization in Turkey satisfactorily, especially in the context of the Kurdish question, tried, to no avail, cast themselves in important roles in the uprisings in the region. In 2011, the incumbent Justice and Development Party (AK Party) was going to campaign for its third term in power after having won the vote of confidence in the referendum on September 12, with a high margin of 58 percent. In the after- math of the referendum, the main opposition CHP (Republican People’s Party) after its contentious change of leadership; BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) after its decision to boycott the referendum and the democratic initiative; and MHP (National Movement Party) after its constituents’ reaction to its stance on the Kurdish initiative reflected to the poles in the referendum, embarked on the electoral process with ambitions of their own. Contrary to the attitudes of the op- position, the interim elections resulted in AK Party’s landslide victory. 7 SETA POLICY REPORT: TURKEY IN 2011 The elections of June 12th, which can be considered the most important event of the year 2011, affected the opposition parties in different ways. Internal strife in the main opposition party CHP stretched through the entire year. CHP had still not stabilized after its contentious change of leadership when it entered the elec- toral process. The new party leader, Kemal Kılıcdaroglu joined the “new Turkey” discourse with his vision of a “new CHP”. Kılıcdaroglu’s vision for the party satis- fied neither its lifetime constituents, nor those who expected an AK Party like per- formance from CHP. This inevitably caused factions within the party. In the fall of 2011, after Prime Minister Erdogan apologized for Dersim events in the name of the state, CHP found itself paying for the sins committed during the single party regime. It became clear for the new vision of CHP to take hold, it needed a clean break from its treacherous past. The MHP campaign kicked off under pressure for having witnessed that the party’s strong opposition against sensitive issues such as the Kurdish Initiative, the Kurdish Question’s peaceful resolution, and the September 2010 referendum did not attract popular support. Notwithstanding its internal bickering, MHP during this year failed to demonstrate a definitive line or stance, and the main political target of the party became achieving the 10 percent national threshold required to qualify for the parliament. Finally, the pro-Kurdish BDP entered the race with heated discussions and a wind of change. Applying their previously-agreed ‘umbrella party’ concept through their endorsement of independent candidates from different backgrounds within the Kurdish political movement, the party achieved considerable success in the elections. The Turkish government’s transition from a security-oriented approach to a democratization paradigm, embodied by the Kurdish Initiative, helped create a BDP experience that varied greatly from that of the party’s predecessors: The accompanying of an ongoing trend of democratic reforms by economic develop- ment naturally provided the BDP with an instant appeal, while it remains to be seen whether or not the party will be able to extend its popularity over the longer term. The primary obstacle en route to this goal appears to be their exclusive focus on the Kurdish Question that makes it impossible for the party to escape the vi- cious circle of PKK tutelage. As such, the outdated leftist language that imposes the BDP-PKK line as the sole legitimate territory for peaceful resolution interferes with the party’s potential to develop an all-encompassing political view for Turkey and its Kurds. PKK—with its opposing stance towards the democratic initiatives of the 2010 and violent attacks on the tail of Middle Eastern uprisings—trapped itself into a cor- 8 FOREWORD ner. The leaked communication between MIT (National Intelligence Agency) and PKK revealed attempts to persuade PKK in more peaceful methods than it was as- sumed in the public discourse. In the light of these events, it became apparent that PKK situated itself not as part of the solution, but rather the problem.