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Bulletin n. 1/2005 - December 2005 List of contents Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Hayden Robert M. "Democracy" without a Demos? The Bosnian Constitutional Experiment and the Intentional Construction of Nonfunctioning States in East European Politics and Societies, Volume 19, Number 2, May , pp. 226-259 The social science literature on ethnically divided states is huge and varied, but suggestions for constitutional solutions are strangely uniform: "loose federations" of ethnically defined ministates, with minimal central authority that must act by consensus and thus cannot act at all on issues that are contested rather than consented. In Bosnia, the political system mandated by the international High Representative suffer the same structural flaws that were used to make the former Yugoslav federation and the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina unworkable. Similarly nonviable systems were proposed in 1994 to 1995 for Croatia and in 1998 to 1999 for Kosovo and recently for Cyprus and for Iraq. This article analyzes the paradox of mandating consensus-based politics in ethnically divided states, inclusion in which does not have the consent of most members of at least one group. -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Shivdeep Singh Grewal A cosmopolitan Europe by constitutional means? Assessing the theoretical foundations of Habermas’ political prescriptions in Journal of European Integration, Volume 27, Number 2 / June , 191-215 In recent years, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has called for the adoption of a federal constitution by the EU. As such — particularly given the impact of his thought on the social sciences more generally, and its affinities with traditional theories of European integration — a question arises: why has a specifically Habermasian theory of European integration not developed? This article argues that one is already present, albeit implicitly, in the interstices between Habermas’ journalistic and theoretical oeuvres, merely requiring delimitation, exegesis and application. It combines a sophisticated and comprehensive account of European integration and democracy with an innovative ‘hermeneutic’ dimension. The latter broadens the parameters of EU studies to encompass relevant developments in European culture. Having identified its component parts and ‘reconstructed’ this theory, the article concludes by subjecting it to a preliminary empirical test against the results of interviews with radical left and social democratic MEPs and personnel. -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation von Beyme Klaus Page 1/444 Asymmetric federalism between globalization and regionalization in Journal of European Public Policy , Volume 12, Number 3 / June , 432-447 The question ‘who speaks for the Europeans?’ involves a basic contradiction in European constitutional engineering: federalist autonomy developed against democratic representation on the basis of popular sovereignty of equal citizens. Working on a European Constitution includes the search for a fair balance between the modes of representation. This paper shows, however, that the balance remains precarious. Asymmetries in the de iure institutional settings and in de facto social and economic development permanently reshuffle the balance. Older theories of federalism in the age of classical modernism started from a rational model of symmetric states' rights. Postmodernist thinking with its patchwork scenarios developed more tolerance towards asymmetries. The neo-liberal paradigm leads away from ‘participatory federalism’ in the direction of a ‘federalism of competition’. In the early federations the poor territories in a ‘class struggle from below’ asked for subsidies from the centre. In recent federations a ‘class struggle from above’ is developing. The rich states fight for asymmetries because they feel punished if they have to subsidize the poorer areas. -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Fassbender Bardo Auswärtige Zuständigkeiten bundesstaatlicher Gliedstaaten. Die Entstehung des Prinzips der dynamischen Verweisung im Zeitalter der Gründung des Deutschen Reiches (1866-1871). Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zu einer allgemeinen Lehre des Bundesstaates europäischen Typus. in Jahrbuch des öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, Band 53, 2005 , 207-283 Nach dem Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland sind die deutschen Länder berechtigt, im Rahmen ihrer Gesetzgebungskompetenz mit auswärtigen Staaten völkerrechtliche Verträge abzuschließen (Art. 32 Abs. 3 GG). Die Bestimmung verdeutlicht, daß in der grundgesetzlichen Konstruktion des deutschen Bundesstaates die Staatlichkeit der Länder auch ihre Völkerrechtsfähigkeit umfaßt, das Grundgesetz die Länder also nicht nur in ihrem Verhältnis zueinander und zum Bund, sondern auch völkerrechtlich als Staaten auffaßt und anerkennt. Darin liegt die verfassungsrechtliche und -theoretische Bedeutung des Art. 32 Abs. 3 GG, ungeachtet der Tatsache, daß in der Praxis der Umfang der von den Ländern abgeschlossenen völkerrechtlichen Verträge gering geblieben ist. Das Vertragschließungsrecht bundesstaatlicher Gliedstaaten bildet heute einen Bestandteil gemeineuropäischen (Bundes-) Verfassungsrechts. Die durch das Vertragschließungsrecht vermittelte Völkerrechtssubjektivität der Gliedstaaten ist ein charakteristisches Kennzeichen des Bundesstaates europäischen Typus. Der vorliegenden Abhandlung liegt die These zugrunde, daß es zu diesem Rechtszustand ohne ein zentrales verfassungsgeschichtliches Ereignis nicht gekommen wäre: die Entscheidung der deutschen Reichsverfassung von 1871 für die völkerrechtliche Vertrags- und Handlungsfähigkeit der deutschen Einzelstaaten. Wie es zu dieser historischen Entscheidung kam, ist in geschlossener Form und auf der Grundlage der historischen Quellen bisher nicht dargestellt worden. Eine solche Darstellung wird hier versucht. In ihrem Mittelpunkt stehen die auswärtige Gewalt und die völkerrechtliche Stellung der deutschen Einzelstaaten als Gegenstand der Verhandlungen über die Norddeutsche Bundes- und die Reichsverfassung von 1867 und 1871 (Teil III). Anschließend werden die in diesen Verfassungen gefundenen Lösungen als Ausdruck der Bismarckschen Grundanschauung des deutschen Bundesstaates erklärt (Teil Page 2/444 IV). Bevor der Blick in die Vergangenheit gerichtet wird, geht er in die Umgebung der Gegenwart und sucht zu erkennen, welchen Prinzipien der vertikalen Verteilung auswärtiger Kompetenzen das Verfassungsrecht der europäischen Bundesstaaten (Schweiz, Belgien und Österreich) und Italiens als eines dezentralisierten (regionalisierten) Staates sowie das Recht der Europäischen Union folgt. -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Wibbels Erik Book Review: Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-Sustainable Federal Institutions in Comparative Political Studies , Vol. 38 n. 4 , 446 - 450 No abstract available -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Arceneaux Kevin Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States? in Publius: The Journal of Federalism, Vol. 35, n. 2, Spring , pp. 297-312 No abstract available -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Levinson, Daryl J. Empire-Building Government in Costitutional Law in Harvard Law Review, Volume 118 - issue n. 3/2005 , 915 - 972 No abstract available -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Campbell Andrea Louise Federalism and the Politics of Old-Age Care in Germany and the United States in Comparative Political Studies , Vol. 38 n. 8 , 887-914 Until the early 1990s, Germany and the United States had similar systems of long-term care. At that time, Germany created a new social insurance program, whereas American reform efforts stalled. As conventional explanations of social policies—rooted in objective conditions, policy legacies, interest group mobilization, and party politics—fail to explain the diverging trajectories, the authors show how differing federal structures shaped reform efforts. German federalism gives states a strong voice and encourages collective responses to fiscal problems, enabling comprehensive Page 3/444 restructuring of long-term care financing. In the United States, states lack a political mechanism to compel federal policy makers to tackle this subject. This analysis suggests reform of social welfare issues with weakly mobilized publics is unlikely without proxy actors that have institutional or political means to forcibly gain the attention of policy makers. In addition, scholars should pay more attention to "varieties of federalism" in analyses of the welfare state. -------- Section A) The theory and practise of the federal states and multi-level systems of government Subsection 1.The theory of federation Rowley Charles K. Fragmenting parchment and the winds of war: The Constitution