©2012, AFIO’s The Intelligencer: Journal of US Intelligence Studies Association of Former Intelligence Officers Volume 19 • Number 2 • $15 single copy price Summer/Fall 2012 6723 Whittier Avenue, Suite 200, McLean, Virginia 22101 Web: www.afio.com, E- mail: [email protected]

human intelligence, claiming the Soviets were putting missiles in Cuba, led DIA’s first director, Lieutenant General Joseph Carroll, US Air Force, to call for more U-2 reconnaissance flights over Cuba. The subsequent U-2 mission on 14 October 1962—its flight path based on DIA’s analysis—photographed a convoy of Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles just before it pulled off the road under a canopy of trees. After the Cuban Missile Crisis abated and the Soviets removed their missiles and bombers, President Kennedy asked DIA to brief the nation. John Hughes, who was a special assistant to Lieutenant General Carroll, took the stage in the State Department auditorium on 6 Febru- History ary 1963. Introduced by Secretary McNamara, John Hughes used many of the slides and U-2 photos that of the President Kennedy had ordered declassified.2 Defense Intelligence Agency The war in Vietnam dominated the last half of the 1960s. DIA provided current and long-term analyses to commanders and defense policymakers by Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr. on the strength of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam- 3 [Editor’s Note: Numerous books have been written about the ese, their logistics, and air defense capabilities. DIA Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; far deployed people into the theater, including experts to fewer about their community counterpart, the Defense Intelli- gence Agency. This article in AFIO’s Guide to the Study of Intelligence translate and exploit captured enemy documents. DIA series recounts the development and evolution of the Defense also collected and analyzed intelligence on US prison- Intelligence Agency.] ers of war and military members missing in action. IA’s story begins at the height of the Cold DIA provided intelligence for the raid in 1970 to free War, when Secretary of Defense, Robert American POWs held at the Son Tay prison camp west McNamara, established the new agency on 1 of Hanoi, including information from a human source D in Hanoi who claimed two days before the raid that the October 1961. McNamara’s action instituted a long- standing recommendation originally in the 1946 Con- prisoners had been moved. The raid went forward on gressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl the chance the source was wrong or that the captives Harbor Attack that recommended the integration of all had been returned. As it turned out, the source had Army and Navy intelligence organizations. “Opera- been correct; the camp at Son Tay, flooded by monsoon tional and intelligence work required centralization rains, held no POWs. of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility,” During the same period, DIA’s long-term strate- the committee wrote.1 At the time of DIA’s creation, gic analyses focused on preventing strategic surprise which brought defense intelligence into conformance by assessing potential adversaries’ capabilities. In with the Department of Defense Reorganization Act 1965 DIA assumed responsibility for managing the of 1958, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wrote, “national new Defense Attaché System, consolidating the indi- intelligence and military intelligence are indivisible in vidual services’ attaché systems. practice.” Since its humble origins, DIA has become a In the 1970s, DIA became involved in the col- central player in both the defense and national intel- lection and production of intelligence to support ligence arenas, reflecting this judgment. strategic arms control negotiations with the Soviet DIA achieved early recognition in September Union – including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 1962, when its photo interpreters noticed in the initial U-2 imagery that surface-to-air missile sites 2. Video footage from that briefing can be viewed today on in Cuba were arranged in a pattern similar to those DIA’s public website: www.dia.millhistory/features/cuban-missile- in the Soviet Union around intercontinental ballistic crisis. missile facilities. This photo analysis, combined with 3. Estimates of enemy strength in Vietnam became controver- sial with disagreements between DIA and the CIA. See James J. Wirtz (2004), Intelligence to Please? The Order of Battle Controversy 1. Origins of the Defense Intelligence Agency. http://www.dia. During the Vietnam War. (On the web at http://www.jstor.org/ mil/history/features/origins stable/2152228.)

Summer/Fall 2012 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 25 (SALT I, SALT II) and the anti-ballistic missile trea- Intelligence Team (CAJIT) was the first national-level ties. Later that focus expanded to provide intelligence intelligence fusion center and became a model for needed for the new nuclear deterrence strategy set similar elements within the Intelligence Community forth in President Carter’s Presidential Directive 59. in later years. This was a radical shift in US policy, from focusing on In 1986, Congress passed landmark legisla- massive retaliation to a deterrent strategy of selected tion known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which options targeting. When it came time to develop an reorganized the US military, strengthening the operational nuclear war plan, the Joint Chiefs of Staff roles of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the relied on DIA to provide the intelligence foundation combatant commands. Intended to enhance joint supporting the new US nuclear strategy. efforts across the military, the Goldwater-Nichols Act The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late also designated DIA as a “combat support agency,” December 1979 signaled a new level of Soviet adven- denoting increased responsibilities to provide timely turism, and Western operational intelli- concerns grew about gence support to the the pace and scale of unified and speci- the Soviet military fied commanders build-up. Following around the world. In President Reagan’s this capacity, DIA led election in 1980, the department-wide Secretary of Defense effort to develop joint Caspar Weinberger intelligence doc- briefed North Atlan- trine and strengthen tic Treaty Organiza- the infrastructure tion (NATO) allies on needed for timely Soviet military devel- intelligence support opments. Eager to The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) which opened in 1984 at Bolling Air Force Base of military opera- (now Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling), Washington, DC. educate their citizens tions. about Moscow’s intentions and growing capabilities, As the 1980s transitioned into the 1990s, a suc- a number of NATO ministers asked Secretary Wein- cession of crises—from the fall of the Berlin Wall, to berger if there were a way to declassify his briefing, Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama, to the 1991 col- pictures, and charts. The secretary turned to DIA, and lapse of the Soviet Union, and to Operations DESERT the resulting ten annual unclassified publications, the SHIELD and DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf — Soviet Military Power series, which chronicled Soviet required DIA often to shift its focus. DIA organized military capabilities and intentions, had enormous and led an integrated effort to provide intelligence to impact on the public in Europe and elsewhere. US and coalition forces deployed in Saudi Arabia to DIA underwent rapid change in the 1980s. In support the initial aerial campaign against Iraq and 1984 the new Defense Intelligence Analysis Center the later ground invasion.4 (DIAC) opened at Bolling Air Force Base (now called The period after DESERT SHIELD and DESERT Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling) in Washington, DC, STORM saw significant change for DIA. In 1992, DIA allowing the Agency to consolidate many of its func- was given responsibility for the Army’s Missile and tions in one location. Today an expanded DIAC build- Space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and ing serves as—and is called—the DIA headquarters. also for the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, 1985 became known as the “Year of the Terrorist” now known as the National Center for Medical Intel- with the highly publicized hijackings of the Italian ligence, at Fort Detrick, Maryland. cruise ship Achille Lauro, Trans World Airlines Flight During the mid-1990s, DIA provided intelli- 847, attacks on the airports in Rome and Vienna, and gence support during reactions to the military-led other deadly acts. DIA provided analytic and collec- coup in Haiti and to the Balkans Crisis. In 1995, tion support during these crises, and provided intel- ligence related to the conflicts in Central America, 4. The DIA website contains a detailed history of intelligence Operation EL DORADO CANYON (the 1986 retaliatory support efforts prior to, during, and after DESERT SHIELD / DESERT STORM. It illustrates the scope and complexity of the airstrike on Qaddafi’s Libya), and the nation’s growing intelligence effort to support a modern military campaign. See counter-narcotics efforts. DIA’s Central America Joint http://www.dia.mil/history/features/gulf-war/ .

Page 26 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Summer/Fall 2012 consistent with the trend for consolidating similar effort in Iraq.8 JITF-CT remains at the center of DIA’s activities within the separate services, the Defense anti-terrorism efforts today. HUMINT Service5 was established within the Agency In the months after the 9/11 attacks, the US and to oversee human source intelligence collection. In coalition partners embarked on Operation ENDURING 2008, the separate Counterintelligence Field Activity FREEDOM, toppling the Taliban regime in Afghani- (CIFA) was consolidated into the Defense HUMINT stan. Antiterrorist initiatives took place in other parts Service to form the Defense Counterintelligence and of the world as well, including in the Philippines and HUMINT Center. the Horn of Africa. In March 2003, the United States The post-Cold War environment of the 1990s and coalition forces also launched Operation IRAQI a b r u p t l y FREEDOM. In ended on each of these Organization of the September DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY operat ions, 11, 2001. DIA pro-

The impact COMMAND ELEMENT STAFF ELEMENTS vided intel- of the terror- ligence on DR DD CS EO GC IG EQUAL OPPORTUNITY GENERAL COUNSEL INSPECTOR GENERAL ist at t ack s DIRECTOR DEPUTY DIRECTOR CHIEF OF STAFF enemy troop was so sig- dispositions, CSM JFMPO NMO nificant that JOINT FOREIGN MATERIEL NATIONAL MASINT weaponry, SENIOR ENLISTED ADVISOR it is common PROGRAM OFFICE OFFICE and damage to refer to CENTERS AND DIRECTORATES assessments recent his- DA DI DJ DS from air-

DIRECTOR FOR DIRECTORATE FOR DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT tory in terms MISSION SERVICES ANALYSIS COORDINATION CENTER AND CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER strikes. The of “pre-9/11” agency also DT DX HC J2 and “post- DIRECTORATE FOR MASINT DEFENSE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE FOR DIRECTORATE FOR helped locate 9/11” eras. AND TECHNICAL COLLECTION AND HUMINT CENTER HUMAN CAPITAL INTELLIGENCE, JOINT STAFF h ig h va lue P r i o r SPECIAL OFFICES targets and to the 11 assessed AE CP FE IE MC

September OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF CONGRESSIONAL OFFICE OF THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL DEFENSE i n s u r g e n t attacks, DIA ACQUISITION EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE ENGAGEMENT INTELLIGENCE COLLEGE capabilities, h a d t a k e n intentions, steps to ramp DIA Organization Chart as of 2011-2012 and potential. up its coun- DIA produced terterrorism efforts. After the al-Qaida suicide fine-grain tactical and operational intelligence for bombers’ attack on the USS Cole in October 2000, combat forces as well as strategic estimates for policy DIA reorganized its counterterrorism office into the and decision makers. The agency also supported the Joint Terrorism Analysis Center (JTAC). After the 11 Iraq Survey Group (ISG), an interagency body tasked September attacks, the JTAC mission was expanded with searching Iraq for weapons of mass destruction.9 and sharpened, and the organization was christened DIA’s work is not limited to antiterrorism and the Joint Intelligence Task Force-Combating Terrorism counterinsurgency. In addition to its protracted com- (JITF-CT).6 JITF-CT has provided enhanced analysis mitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the and production to support worldwide efforts to coun- agency monitors North Korean missile launches and ter terrorism. JITF-CT analysts produced daily assess- tracks the development of Iran’s nuclear program. It is ments of possible terrorist threats to defense person- also heavily engaged in supporting efforts to counter nel, facilities, and interests.7 The JITF-CT Weapons the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Branch is recognized for starting the counter-IED interdict narcotics trafficking, conduct global infor- mation operations (cyber), and assess foreign military capabilities in space and cyber-space. In 2004 and 5. HUMINT stands for human source intelligence, which includes overt human collectors, such as Defense Attachés, and covert sources, including controlled agents and cooperating 8. IED stands for “improvised explosive device,” – a homemade foreign military intelligence liaison services. bomb. (Stephen Philips, “The Birth of the Combined Explosives 6. http://www.dia.mil/history/ Exploitation Cell,” Small Wars Journal, see www.smallwarsjournal. 7. https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann_ com/mag/docs-temp/52-phillips.pdf.) Rpt_2001/smo.html 9. http://www.dia.mil/history/

Summer/Fall 2012 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Page 27 2005, DIA also provided an unprec- ing 24/7 wherever US forces are edented level of support to foreign Multiple engaged and at every echelon of and domestic humanitarian mis- Responsibilities the chain of command, providing sions, especially the Indian Ocean In addition to overseeing the daily intelligence updates for tsunami and Hurricane Katrina. DIA’s operations, the Director, the unified and specified combat- While DIA deployed person- Defense Intelligence Agency ant commands, the Secretary of nel forward during Vietnam, also has a number of other Defense and the Chairman of the DESERT STORM, and Haiti, the responsibilities, including: Joint Chiefs of Staff. DIA analysts Agency’s deployments in the post- ••Program manager for the General also write for the President’s Daily Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), 9/11 era have increased by an which funds important intelligence Brief, prepare target packages for order of magnitude. Since DIA activities at the nine combatant national-level special operations commands and the Military Services absorbed the civilian intelligence units conducting raids against ••Program manager for all Depart- professionals at the nine combat- ment of Defense human intelligence high-value targets, and provide ant commands, the majority of ••Director of the Defense Attaché strategic assessments for com- DIA employees now work outside System manders in combat zones. The of the Washington area. Some ••Program manager for Department story of DIA’s evolution is one of Defense counterintelligence have observed that DIA has gone ••Functional manager for all mea- that finds the agency serving as from a Washington-based agency surement and signature intelligence the hub of the defense intelligence with small numbers of deployed (MASINT) wheel and simultaneously as the ••Oversight of all-source analysis personnel to a forward-deployed conducted throughout the Depart- engine integrating national and agency, supported by a head- ment of Defense, including work military intelligence. quarters in Washington. This conducted at the combatant com- mands, the Military Services, and is a significant change in DIA’s their Service centers: the Army culture. Today DIA, with 16,500 National Ground Intelligence Center, READINGS the Office of Naval Intelligence, the civilian and military personnel, is Marine Corps Intelligence Activity, FOR INSTRUCTORS approximately twice the size it was and the Air Force National Air and Space Intelligence Center before 9/11. Approximately 800 The following titles are rec- personnel are forward deployed ommended for a more in-depth temporarily to Afghanistan and understanding of intelligence elsewhere worldwide. Hundreds more reside at the successes and failures, lessons on leadership and combatant commands, and others are stationed at organizational change, and optimizing performance: overseas regional support centers that operate and maintain classified networks. Still others are assigned Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, Eds. (2005): Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael to liaison offices in Ottawa, London, Canberra, Auck- I. Handel. London: Frank Cass. This collection of essays land, and elsewhere. covers a variety of salient topics, including intelligence Today DIA’s responsibilities are focused on four and combat leadership, intelligence failure, surprise, core operational capabilities: all-source analysis, and politicization of intelligence. human intelligence (HUMINT), counterintelli- Cynthia M. Grabo (2004), Anticipating Surprise: Analysis of Stra- gence, and measurement and signature intelligence tegic Warning. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. This is a seminal study of the warning discipline from a (MASINT). In addition, DIA manages the nation’s pre- leading practitioner. mier worldwide top secret communications network Ephraim Kam (1988), Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, – the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University. Kam’s book has been called System (JWICS). DIA also is the executive agent for a definitive examination of strategic surprise. The author a number of Director of National Intelligence (DNI) delves into the psychological factors that may contrib- centers and activities that serve the entire intelligence ute to an inability to assess accurately indications and warning of an impending attack. community. These include the Underground Facility Analysis Center (UFAC), the National Center for Medi- John A. Nagl (2002), Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Coun- terinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Westport, cal Intelligence (NCMI), the National Media Exploita- CT: Praeger. This book focuses on counterinsurgency tion Center (NMEC), the Prisoner of War-Missing in lessons from the 1950s war in Malaya and from the Action (POW-MIA) Analytic Cell, and the National Vietnam War, and addresses how institutions learn when Intelligence University (NIU). confronted with change. Today DIA is truly a global agency, operat- Robert Jervis (2010), Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the

Page 28 Intelligencer: Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies Summer/Fall 2012 Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War. New York: Cornell Uni- versity Press. This is an unblinking look at intelligence failure leading up to the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) debacle. Simon Sinek (2009), Start with Why: How Great Leaders Inspire Everyone to Take Action. London: Penguin. All too often, individuals and organizations focus first on WHAT and do not have a clear WHY. The author finds that great leaders lead with WHY and personify a sense of purpose that inspires peers, subordinates, and seniors alike. Peter F. Drucker (1997), The Five Most Important Questions You Will Ever Ask About Your Organization. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. This book will challenge readers to take a close look at the very heart of their organizations and what drives them. It provides a simple tool for self- assessment and transformation. Michael Useem (2003), Leading Up: How to Lead Your Boss So You Both Win. New York: Crown Business. This book effectively uses historical examples to discuss how leaders have built successful organizations. It discusses organizational communications and leadership chal- lenges related to building a common purpose within a group that everyone then works to achieve.

DIA maintains an extensive website (www.dia.mil) useful for further information about DIA. Of particu- lar interest is the 2012-2017 DIA Strategic Plan at www. dia.mil/about/strategic-plan, DIA’s history at http://www. dia.mil/history/, and articles at http://www.dia.mil/history/ features/. Also worth exploring are the websites for the DIA-hosted National Intelligence University (www.ni-u. edu) and its associated press (www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/ press.html), which has many on-line resources. H

LTG Ronald L. Burgess, Jr., US Army, is the 17th director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, appointed in March 2009. He has served previ- ously as Director of Intelli- gence, J-2, Joint Special Oper- ations Command (JSOC), Director of Intelligence, J-2, US Southern Command, and Director for Intelligence, J-2, The Joint Staff. From August 2005 to February 2009 Lieutenant General Burgess was the Deputy Director of National Intel- ligence for Customer Outcomes later transitioning to Director of the Intelligence Staff. During this period he twice served as the Acting Principal Deputy Direc- tor of National Intelligence.

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