GIBBONS, Appellant, V. OGDEN, Respondent

Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1

or steam, in navigating the waters within the territory of New-York. The injunction having been awarded, 22 U.S. 1 the answer of Gibbons was filed; in which he stated, [CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.] that the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed, to be employed in carrying on the coasting Supreme Court of the United States trade, under the act of Congress, passed the 18th of February, 1793, c. 3. entitled, ‘An act for enrolling GIBBONS, Appellant, and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in v. the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same.’ And the defendant insisted on his right, in OGDEN, Respondent. virtue of such licenses, to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown and the city of New-York, the said March 2, 1824 acts of the Legislature of the *3 State of New-York **1 *1 The acts of the Legislature of the State to the contrary notwithstanding. At the hearing, the of New-York, granting to Robert R. Livingston and Chancellor perpetuated the injunction, being of the Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters opinion, that the said acts were not repugnant to the within the jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved constitution and laws of the United States, and were by fire or steam, for a term of years, are repugnant valid. This decree was affirmed in the Court for the to that clause of the constitution of the United States, Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, which which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce, so is the highest Court of law and equity in the State, far as the said acts prohibit vessels licensed, according before which the cause could be carried, and it was to the laws of the United States, for carrying on the thereupon brought to this Court by appeal. coasting trade, from navigating the said waters by **2 Principles of interpretation. means of fire or steam. The power of regulating commerce extends to the APPEAL from the Court for the Trial of Impeachments regulation of navigation. and Correction of Errors of the State of New-York. Aaron Ogden filed his bill in the Court of Chancery The power to regulate commerce extends to every of that State, against Thomas Gibbons, setting forth species of commercial intercourse between the United the several acts of the Legislature thereof, enacted States and foreiga nations, and among the several for the purpose of securing to Robert R. Livingston States. It dees not stop at the external boundary of a and Robert Fulton, the *2 exclusive navigation of State. all the waters within the jurisdiction of that State, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of But it does not extend to a commerce which is years which has not yet expired; and authorizing the completely internal. Chancellor to award an injunction, restraining any person whatever from navigating those waters with The power to regulate commerce is general, and boats of that description. The bill stated an assignment has no limitations but such as are prescribed in the from Livingston and Fulton to one John R. Livingston, constitution itself. and from him to the complainant, Ogden, of the right to The power to regulate commerce, so far as it extends, navigate the waters between Elizabethtown, and other is exclusively vested in Congress, and no part of it can places in New-Jersey, and the city of New-York; and be exercised by a State. that Gibbons, the defendant below, was in possession of two steam boats, called the Stoudinger and the State inspection laws, health laws, and laws for Bellona, which were actually employed in running regulating the internal commerce of a State, and those between New-York and Elizabethtown, in violation of which respect turnpike roads, ferries, &c. are not the exclusive privilege conferred on the complainant, within the power granted to Congress. and praying an injunction to restrain the said Gibbons from using the said boats, or any other propelled by fire

this litigation. The use of steam boats, on the coasts, The laws of N. Y. granting to R.R.L. and R. F. the and in the bays and rivers of the country, had become exclusive right of navigating the waters of that State very general. The intercourse of its different parts with steam boarts, are in collision with the acts of essentially depended upon this mode of conveyance Congress regulating the coasting trade, which being and transportation. Rivers and bays, in many cases, made in pursuance of the constitution, are supreme, form the divisions between States; and thence it was and the State laws must yield to that supremacy, even obvious, that if the States should make regulations for though enacted in pursuance of powers acknowledged the navigation of these waters, and such regulations to remain in the States. should be repugnant and hostile, embarrassment would necessarily happen to the general intercourse of the A license under the acts of Congress for regulating the community. Such events had actually occurred, and coasting trade, gives a permission to carry on that trade. had created the existing state of things. The license is not merely intended to confer the By the law of New-York, no one can navigate the bay national character. of New-York, the North River, the Sound, the lakes, The power of regulating commerce extends to or any of the waters of that State, by steam vessels, navigation carried on by vessels exclusively employed without a license from the grantees of New-York, under in transporting passengers. penalty of forfeiture of the vessel.

The power of regulating commerce extends to vessels By the law of the neighbouring State of Connecticut, propelled by steam or fire, as well as to those navigated no one can enter her waters with a steam vessel having by the instrument ality of wind and sails. such license.

Feb. 4th, 5th, and 6th. By the law of New-Jersey, if any citizen of that State shall be restrained, under the New-York law, from Mr. Webster, for the appellant, admitted, that there was using steam boats between the ancient shores of New- a very respectable weight of authority in favour of Jersey and New-York, he shall be entitled to an action the decision, which was sought to be reversed. The for damages, in *5 New-Jersey, with treble costs laws in question, he knew, had been deliberately re- against the party who thus restrains or impedes him enacted by the Legislature of New-York; and they under the law of New-York! This act of New-Jersey had also received the sanction, at different times, of is called an act of retortion against the illegal and all her judicial tribunals, than which there were few, oppressive legislation of New-York; and seems to be if any, in the country, more justly entitled to respect defended on those grounds of public law which justify and deference. The disposition of the Court would be, reprisals between independent States. undoubtedly, to support, if it could, laws so passed and so sanctioned. He admitted, therefore, that it was justly It would hardly be contended, that all these acts expected of him that he should make out a clear case; were consistent with the laws and constitution of and unless he did so, he did not hope for a reversal. the United States. If there were no power in the It should be remembered, however, that the whole of general government, to control this extreme belligerent this branch of power, as exercised by this Court, was a legislation of the States, the powers of the government power of revision. The question must be decided by the were essentially deficient, in a most important State Courts, and decided in a particular manner, before and interesting particular. The present controversy it could be brought here at all. Such decisions alone respected the earliest of these State laws, those of New- gave the Court jurisdiction; and therefore, while they York. On those, this Court was now to pronounce; and are to be respected *4 as the judgments of learned if they should be declared to be valid and operative, he Judges, they are yet in the condition of all decisions hoped somebody would point out where the State right from which the law allows an appeal. stopped, and on what grounds the acts of other States were to be held inoperative and void. **3 It would not be a waste of time to advert to the existing state of the facts connected with the subject of It would be necessary to advert more particularly to the laws of New-York, as they were stated in the record.

The first was passed March 19th, 1787. By this act, a the plaintiff below, derives title under Livingston and sale and exclusive right was granted to John Fitch, of Fulton, to the exclusive use of part of these waters. making and using every kind of boat or vessel impelled by steam, in all creeks, rivers, bays, and waters, within The appellant being owner of a steam-boat, and being the territory and jurisdiction of New-York, for fourteen found navigating the waters between New-Jersey and years. the city of New-York, over which waters Ogden, the plaintiff below, claimed an exclusive right, under On the 27th of March, 1798, an act was passed, on the Livingston and Fulton, this bill was filed against suggestion that Fitch was dead, or had withdrawn from him by Ogden, in October, 1818, and an injunction the State, without having made *6 any attempt to use granted, restraining him from such use of his boat. This his privilege, repealing the grant to him, and conferring injunction was made perpetual, on the final hearing of similar privileges on Robert R. Liringston, for the term the cause, in the Court of Chancery; and the decree of of twenty years, on a suggestion, made by him, that he the Chancellor has been duly affirmed in the Court of was possessor of a mode of applying the steam engine Errors. The right, therefore, which the plaintiff below to propel a boat, on new and advantageous principles. asserts to have and maintain his injunction, depends On the 5th of April, 1803, another act was passed, by obviously on the general validity of the New-York which it was declared, that the rights and privileges laws, and, especially, on their force and operation as granted to R. R. Livingston, by the last act, should be against the right set up by the defendant. This right extended to him and Robert Fulton, for twenty years, he states, in his answer, to be, that he is a citizen of from the passing of this act. Then there is the act of New-Jersey, and owner of the steam-boat in question; April 11, 1808 purporting to extend the monopoly, in that the boat was a vessel of more than twenty *8 point of time, five years for every additional boat, the tons burden, duly enrolled and licensed for carrying whole duration, however, not to exceed thirty years; on the coasting trade, and intended to be employed and forbidding any and all persons to navigate the by him, in that trade, between Elizabethtown, in New- waters of the State, with any steam boat or 11, 1808, Jersey, and the city of New-York; and was actually purporting of Livingston and Fulton, under penalty of employed in navigating between those places, at the forfeiture of the boat or vessel. And, lastly, comes the time of, and until notice of the injunction from the act of April 9, 1811, for enforcing the provisions of Court of Chancery was served on him. the last mentioned act, and declaring, that the forfeiture of the boat or vessel, found navigating against the On these pleadings the substantial question is raised: provisions of the previous acts, shall be deemed to Are these laws such as the Legislature of New-York accrue on the day on which such boat or vessel should had a right to pass? If so, do they, secondly, in their navigate the waters of the State; and that Livingston operation, interfere with any right enjoyed under the and Fulton might immediately have an action for such constitution and laws of the United States, and are they, boat or vessel, in like manner as if they themselves therefore, void, as far as such interference extends? had been dispossessed thereof by force; and that on It may be well to state again their general purport and bringing any such suit, the defendant therein should effect, and the purport and effect of the other State be prohibited, by injunction, from removing the boat laws, which have been enacted by way of retaliation. or vessel out of the State, or using it within the State. There were *7 one or two other acts mentioned in A steam vessel, of any description, going to New-York, the pleadings, which principally respected the time is forefeited to the representatives of Livingston and allowed for complying with the condition of the grant, Fulton, unless she have their license. and were not material to the discussion of the case. Going from New-York, or elsewhere, to Connecticut, **4 By these acts, then, an exclusive right is given to she is prohibited from entering the waters of the State, Livingston and Fulton, to use steam navigation on all if she have such license. the waters of New-York, for thirty years from 1808. If the representatives of Livingston and Fulton, in It is not necessary to recite the several conveyances New-York, carry into effect, by judicial process, the and agreements, stated in the record, by which Ogden, provision of the New-York laws, against any citizen of

New-Jersey, they expose themselves to a statute action, respectively; so, where the power, on any one subject, in New-Jersey, for all damages, and treble costs. is given in general words, like the power to regulate commerce, the true method of construction would be, The New-York laws extend to all steam vessels; *9 to to consider of what parts the grant is composed, and steam frigates, steam ferry-boats, and all intermediate which of those, from the nature of the thing, ought to classes. be considered exclusive. The right set up in this case, under the laws of New-York, is a monopoly. Now, he They extend to public as well as private ships; and to thought it very reasonable to say, that the constitution vessels employed in foreign commerce, as well as to never intended to leave with the States the power of those employed in the coasting trade. granting monopolies, either of trade or of navigation; **5 The remedy is as summary as the grant itself and, therefore, that as to this, the commercial power is ample; for immediate confiscation, without seizure, was exclusive in Congress. trial, or judgment, is the penalty of infringement. It was in vain to look for a precise and exact definition In regard to these acts, he should contend, in the first of the powers of Congress, on several subjects. The place, that they exceeded the power of the Legislature; constitution did not undertake the task of making such and, secondly, that if they could be considered valid, exact definitions. In confering powers, it proceeded for any purpose, they were void, still, as against any in the way of enumeration, *11 stating the powers right enjoyed under the laws of the United States, with conferred, one after another, in few words; and, where which they came in collision; and that, in this case, they the power was general, or complex in its nature, the were found interfering with such rights. extent of the grant must necessarily be judged of, and limited, by its object, and by the nature of the power. He should contend, that the power of Congress to regulate commerce, was complete and entire, and, to **6 Few things were better known, than the a certain extent, necessarily exclusive; that the acts immediate causes which led to the adoption of in question were regulations of commerce, in a most the present constitution; and he thought nothing important particular; and affecting it in those respects, clearer, than that the prevailing motive was to in which it was under the exclusive authority of regulate commerce; to rescue it from the embarrassing Congress. He stated this first proposition guardedly. He and destructive consequences, resulting from the did not mean to say that all regulations which might, legislation of so many different States, and to place in their operation, affect commerce, were exclusively it under the protection of a uniform law. The great in the power of Congress; but that such power as had objects were commerce and revenue; and they were been exercised in this case, did not remain with the objects indissolubly connected. By the confederation, States. Nothing was more complex than commerce; divers restrictions had been imposed on the States; but and in such an age as this, no words embraced a these had not been found sufficient. No State, it was wider field than commercial regulation. Almost all true, could send or receive an embassy; nor make any the business and intercourse of *10 life may be treaty; nor enter into any compact with another State, connected, incidentally, more or less, with commercial or with a foreign power; nor lay duties, interfering regulations. But it was only necessary to apply to with treaties which had been entered into by Congress. this part of the constitution the well settled rules of But all these were found to be far short of what the construction. Some powers are holden to be exclusive actual condition of the country regulate The States in Congress, from the use of exclusive words in the could still, each for itself, regulate commerce, and the grant; others, from the prohibitions on the States to consequence was, a perpetual jarring and hostility of exercise similar powers; and others, again, from the commercial regulation. nature of the powers themselves. It has been by this In the history of the times, it was accordingly found, mode of reasoning that the Court has adjudicated that the great topic, urged on all occasions, as showing on many important questions; and the same mode is the necessity of a new and different government, was proper here. And, as some powers have been holden the state of trade and commerce. To. benefit and exclusive, and others not so, under the same form of improve these, was a great object in itself: and it expression, from the nature of the different powers

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 became greater when it was regarded *12 as the only and domestic trade, as still residing in the States. The means of enabling the country to pay the public debt, very object intended, more than any other, was to and to do justice to those who had most effectually take away such power. If it had not so provided, the laboured for its independence. The leading state papers constitution would not have been worth accepting. of the time are full of this topic. The New-Jersey He contended, therefore, that the people intended, resolutions1 complain, that the regulation of trade was in establishing the constitution, to transfer, from the in the power of the several States, within their separate several States to a general government, those high jurisdiction, in such a degree as to involve many and important powers over commerce, which, in their difficulties and embarrassments; and they express an exercise, were to maintain an uniform and general earnest opinion, that the sole and exclusive power system. From the very nature of the case, these of regulating trade with foreign States, ought to be powers must be exclusive; *14 that is, the higher in Congress. Mr. Witherspoon's motion in Congress, branches of commercial regulation must be exclusively in 1781, is of the same general character; and the committed to a single hand. What is it that is to be report of a committee of that body, in 1785, is still regulated? Not the commerce of the several States, more emphatic. It declares that Congress ought to respectively, but the commerce of the United States. possess the sole and exclusive power of regulating Henceforth, the commerce of the States was to be an trade, as well with foreign nations, as between the unit; and the system by which it was to exist and 2 States. The resolutions of Virginia, in January, 1786, be governed, must necessarily be complete, entire, which were the immediate cause of the convention, and uniform. Its character was to be described in put forth this same great object. Indeed, it is the only the flag which waved over it, EPLURIBUS UNUM. object stated in those resolutions. There is not another Now, how could individual States assert a right of idea in the whole document. The entire purpose for concurrent legislation, in a case of this sort, without which the delegates assembled at Annapolis, was to manifest encroachment and confusion? It should be devise means for the uniform regulation of trade. repeated, that the words used in the constitution, ‘to They found no means, but in a general government; regulate commerce,’ are so very general and extensive, and they recommended a convention to accomplish that they might be construed to cover a vast field of that purpose. Over whatever other interests of the legislation, part of which has always been occupied country this government may diffuse its benefits, and by State laws; and, therefore, the words must have its blessings, it *13 will always be true, as matter a reasonable construction, and the power should be of historical fact, that it had its immediate origin in considered as exclusively vested in Congress, so far, the necessities of commerce; and, for its immediate and so far only, as the nature of the power requires. And object, the relief of those necessities, by removing he insisted, that the nature of the case, and of the power, their causes, and by establishing a uniform and steady did imperiously require, that such important authority system. It would be easy to show, by reference to as that of granting monopolies of trade and navigation, the discussions in the several State conventions, the should not be considered as still retained by the States. prevalence of the same general topics; and if any one would look to the proceedings of several of the States, It is apparent, from the prohibitions on the power of especially to those of Massachusetts and New-York, the States, that the general concurrent power was not he would see, very plainly, by the recorded lists of supposed to be left with them. And the exception, votes, that wherever this commercial necessity was out of these prohibitions, of the inspection laws, most strongly felt, there the proposed new constitution proves this still more clearly. Which most concerns had most friends. In the New-York convention, the the commerce of this country, *15 that New-York argument arising from this consideration was strongly and Virginia should have an uncontrolled power to pressed, by the distinguished person whose name is establish their inspection for flour and tobacco, or that connected with the present question. they should have an uncontrolled power of granting either a monopoly of trade in their own ports, or a **7 We do not find, in the history of the formation and monopoly of navigation over all the waters leading adoption of the constitution, that any man speaks of a to those ports? Yet, the argument on the other side general concurrent power, in the regulation of foreign must be, that, although the constitution has sedulously

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 guarded and limited the first of these powers, it has left and every thing, in regard to commerce, till Congress the last wholly unlimited and uncontrolled. shall undo it, would suppose a state of of things, at least as bad as that which existed before the present But, although much had been said, in the discussion constitution. It is the true wisdom of these governments on former occasions, about this supposed concurrent *17 to keep their action as distinct as possible. The power in the States, he found great difficulty in general government should not seek to operate where understanding what was meant by it. It was generally the States can operate with more advantage to the qualified, by saying, that it was a power, by which community; nor should the States encroach on ground, the States could pass laws on the subjects of which the public good, as well as the constitution, commercial regulation, which would be valid, until refers to the exclusive control of Congress. Congress should pass other laws controlling them, or inconsistent with them, and that then the State laws **8 If the present state of things—these laws of must yield. What sort of concurrent powers were New-York, the laws of Connecticut, and the laws of these, which could not exist together? Indeed, the New-Jersey, had been all presented, in the convention very reading of the clause in the constitution must put of New-York, to the eminent person whose name is to flight this notion of a general concurrent power. on this record, and who acted, on that occasion, so The constitution was formed for all the States; and important a part; if he had been told, that, after all Congress was to have power to regulate commerce. he had said in favour of the new government, and Now, what is the import of this, but that Congress is of its salutary effects on commercial regulations, the to give the rule—to establish the system—to exercise time should yet come, when the North River would the control over the subject? And, can more than one be shut up by a monopoly from New York; the Sound power, in cases of this sort, give the rule, establish the interdicted by a penal law of Connecticut; reprisals system, or exercise the control? As it is not contended authorized by New-Jersey, against citizens of New- that the power of Congress is to be exercised by a York; and when one could not cross a ferry, without supervision *16 of State legislation; and, as it is transhipment; does any one suppose he would have clear, that Congress is to give the general rule, he admitted all this, as compatible with the government contended, that this power of giving the general rule which he was recommending? was transferred, by the constitution, from the States to Congress, to be exercised as that body might see This doctrine of a general concurrent power in the fit. And, consequently, that all those high exercises of States, is insidious and dangerous. If it be admitted, no power, which might be considered as giving the rule, or one can say where it will stop. The States may legislate, establishing the system, in regard to great commercial it is said, wherever Congress has not made a plenary interests, were necessarily left with Congress alone. exercise of its power. But who is to judge whether Of this character he considered monopolies of trade or Congress has made this plenary exercise of power? navigation; embargoes; the system of navigation laws; Congress has acted on this power; it has done all that the countervailing laws, as against foreign states; and it deemed wise; and are the States now to do whatever other important enactments respecting our connexion *18 Congress has left undone? Congress makes such with such states. It appeared to him a most reasonable rules as, in its judgment, the case requires; and those construction, to say, that in these respects, the power rules, whatever they are, constitute the system. of Congress is exclusive, from the nature of the power. All useful regulation does not consist in restraint; and If it be not so, where is the limit, or who shall fix a that which Congress sees fit to leave free, is a part of boundary for the exercise of the power of the States? its regulation, as much as the rest. Can a State grant a monopoly of trade? Can New- York shut her ports to all but her own citizens? Can He thought the practice under the constitution she refuse admission to ships of particular nations? sufficiently evinced, that this portion of the The argument on the other side is, and must be, that commercial power was exclusive in Congress. she might do all these things, until Congress should When, before this instance, have the States granted revoke her enactments. And this is called concurrent monopolies? When, until now, have they interfered legislation. What confusion such notions lead to, is with the navigation of the country? The pilot laws, obvious enough. A power in the States to do anything,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 the health laws, or quarantine laws; and various of the power of Congress to make it. But, generally regulations of that class, which have been recognised speaking, roads, and bridges, and ferries, though, by Congress, are no arguments to prove, even if they of course, they affect commerce and intercourse, are to be called commercial regulations, (which they do not obtain that importance and elevation, as to are not,) that other regulations, more directly and be deemed commercial regulations. A reasonable strictly commercial, are not solely within the power of construction must be given to the constitution; and Congress. There was a singular fallacy, as he humbly such construction is as necessary to the just power of ventured to think, in the argument of very learned the States, as to the authority of Congress. Quarantine and most respectable persons, on this subject. That laws, for example, may be considered as affecting argument alleges, that the States have a concurrent commerce; yet they are, in their nature, health laws. power with Congress, of regulating commerce; and its In England, we speak of the power of regulating proof of this position is, that the States have, without commerce, as in Parliament, or the King, as arbiter of any question of their right, passed acts respecting commerce; yet the city of London enacts health laws. turnpike roads, toll bridges, and ferries. These are Would any one infer from that circumstance, that the declared to be acts of commercial regulation, affecting city of London had concurrent power with Parliament not only the interior commerce of the State itself, but or the Crown to regulate commerce? or, that it might also commerce between different States. Therefore, grant a monopoly of the navigation of the Thames? *19 as all these are commercial regulations, and are While a health law is reasonable, it is a health law; but yet acknowledged to be rightfully established by the if, under colour of it, enactments should be made for States, it follows, as is supposed, that the States must other purposes, such enactments might be void. have a concurrent power to regulate commerce. In the discussion in the New-York Courts, no small **9 Now, what was the inevitable consequence reliance was placed on the law of that State Prohibiting of this mode of reasoning? Does it not admit the the importation of slaves, as an example of a power of Congress, at once, upon all these minor commercial regulation, enacted by State authority. objects of legislation? If all these be regulations of That law may or may not be constitutional and valid. commerce, within the meaning of the constitution, It has been referred to generally, but its particular then, certainly, Congress having a concurrent power provisions have not *21 been stated. When they to regulate commerce, may establish ferries, turnpikes, are more clearly seen, its character may be better bridges, &c. and provide for all this detail of interior determined. legislation. To sustain the interference of the State, in a high concern of maritime commerce, the argument It might further be argued, that the power of Congress adopts a principle which acknowledges the right of over these high branches of commerce was exclusive, Congress, over a vast scope of internal legislation, from the consideration that Congress possessed an which no one has heretofore supposed to be within exclusive admiralty jurisdiction. That it did possess its powers. But this is not all; for it is admitted, that such exclusive jurisdiction, would hardly be contested. when Congress and the States have power to legislate No State pretended to exercise any jurisdiction of over the same subject, the power of Congress, when that kind. The States had abolished their Courts of exercised, controls or extinguishes the State power; Admiralty, when the constitution went into operation. and, therefore, the consequence would seem to follow, Over these waters, therefore, or, at least, some of them, from the argument, that all State legislation, over such which are the subject of this monopoly, New-York subjects as have been mentioned, is, at all times, liable has no jurisdiction whatever. They are a part of the to the superior power of Congress; a consequence, high sea, and not within the body of any county. The which no one would admit for a moment. The truth authorities of that State could not punish for a murder, was, he thought, that all these things were, in their committed on board one of these boats, in some general character, rather regulations of police than places within the range of this exclusive grant. This of commerce, in the constitutional understanding of restraining of the States from all jurisdiction, out of the that term. A road, indeed, *20 might be a matter bodies of their own counties, shows plainly enough, of great commercial concern. In many cases it is so; that navigation on the high seas, was understood to and when it is so, he thought there was no doubt be a matter to be regulated only by Congress. It

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 is not unreasonable to say, that what are called the any derivative authority; it is professedly an act of waters of New-York, are, to purposes of navigation sovereign power. Of course, there is no limit to the and commercial regulation, the waters of the United power, to be derived from the purpose for which it States. There is no cession, indeed, of the waters is exercised. If exercised for one purpose, it may be themselves, but their use, for those purposes, seemed also for another. No one can inquire into the motives to be entrusted to the exclusive power of Congress. which influence sovereign authority. It is enough, that Several States have enacted laws, which would appear such power manifests its will. The motive alleged in to imply their conviction of the power of Congress, this case is, to remunerate the grantees for a benefit over navigable waters, to a greater extent. conferred by them on the public. But there is no necessary connexion between that benefit and this **10 *22 If there be a concurrent power of mode of rewarding it; and if the State could grant this regulating commerce on the high seas, there must be monopoly for that purpose, it could also grant it for a concurrent admiralty jurisdiction, and a concurrent any other purpose. It could make the grant for money; control of the waters. It is a common principle, that and so make the monopoly of navigation over those arms of the sea, including navigable rivers, belong waters a direct source of revenue. When this monopoly to the sovereign, so far as navigation is concerned. shall expire, in 1838, the State may continue it, for any Their use is navigation. The United States possess the pecuniary consideration which the holders may see fit general power over navigation, and, of course, ought to offer, and the State to receive. to control, in general, the use of navigable waters. If it be admitted, that for purposes of trade and navigation, If the State may grant this monopoly, it may also grant the North River, and its bay, are the river and bay of another, for other descriptions of vessels; for instance, New-York, and the Chesapeake the bay of Virginia, for all sloops. very great inconveniences and much confusion might be the result. **11 If it can grant these exclusive privileges to a few, it may grant them to many; that is, it may *24 grant It might now be well to take a nearer view of these them to all its own citizens, to the exclusion of every laws, to see more exactly what their provisions were, body else. what consequences have followed from them, and what would and might follow from other similar laws. But the waters of New-York are no more the subject of exclusive grants by that State, than the waters of The first grant to John Fitch, gave him the sole and other States are subjects of such grants by those other exclusive right of making, employing, and navigating, States. Virginia may well exercise, over the entrance all boats impelled by fire or steam, ‘in all creeks, rivers, of the Chesapeake, all the power that New-York can bays, and waters, within the territory and jurisdiction exercise over the bay of New-York, and the waters of the State.’ Any other person, navigating such boat, on the shore. The Chesapeake, therefore, upon the was to forfeit it, and to pay a penalty of a hundred principle of these laws, may be the subject of State pounds. The subsequent acts repeal this, and grant monopoly; and so may the bay of Massachusetts. But similar privileges to Livingston and Fulton: and the this is not all. It requires no greater power, to grant act of 1811 provides the extraordinary and summary a monopoly of trade, than a monopoly of navigation. remedy, which has been already stated. The river, Of course, New-York, if these acts can be maintained, the bay, and the marine league along the shore, are may give an exclusive right of entry of vessels into her all within the scope of this grant. *23 Any vessel, ports. And the other States may do the same. These are therefore, of this description, coming into any of those not extreme cases. We have only to suppose that other waters, without a license, whether from another State, States should do what New-York has already done, and or from abroad, whether it be a public or private vessel, that the power should be carried to its full extent. is instantly forfeited to the grantees of the monopoly. To all this, there is no answer to be given except this, Now, it must be remembered, that this grant is made that the concurrent power of the States, concurrent as an exercise of sovereign political power. It is not though it be, is yet subordinate to the legislation of an inspection law, nor a health law, nor passed by Congress; and that, therefore, Congress may, when

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 8 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 it pleases, annul the State legislation; but, until it although, in some of the discussions elsewhere, it had does so annul it, the State legislation is valid and been called a law of police. If it be not a regulation effectual. What is there to recommend a construction of commerce, then it follows, against the constant which leads to a result like this? Here would be a admission on the other side, that Congress, even by an perpetual hostility; one Legislature enacting laws, till express act, could not annul or control it. For if it be another Legislature should repeal them; one sovereign not a regulation of commerce, Congress has no concern power giving the rule, till another sovereign power with it. But the granting of monopolies of this kind is should *25 abrogate it; and all this under the idea of always referred to the power over commerce. It was concurrent legislation! as arbiter of commerce that the King formerly granted such monopolies.3 This is a law regulating commerce, But further; under this concurrent power, the State inasmuch as it imposes new conditions and terms on does that which Congress cannot do; that is, it gives the coasting trade, on foreign trade generally, and on preferences to the citizens of some States over those foreign trade as regulated by treaties; and inasmuch of others. I do not mean here the advantages conferred as it interferes with the free navigation of navigable by the grant on the grantees; but the disadvantages to waters. which it subjects all the other citizens of New-York. To impose an extraordinary tax on steam navigation If, then, the power of commercial regulation, possessed visiting the ports of New-York, and leaving it free by Congress, be, in regard to the great branches of every where else, is giving a preference to the citizens it, exclusive; and if this grant of New-York be a of other States over those of New-York. This Congress commercial regulation, effecting commerce, in respect could not do; and yet the State does it: so that to these great branches, then *27 the grant is void, this power, at first subordinate, then concurrent, now whether any case of actual collision had happened or becomes paramount. not.

The people of New-York have a right to be protected But, he contended, in the second place, that whether the against this monopoly. It is one of the objects for which grant were to be regarded as wholly void or not, it must, they agreed to this constitution, that they should stand at least, be inoperative, when the rights claimed under on an equality in commercial regulations; and if the it came in collision with other rights, enjoyed and government should not insure them that, the promises secured under the laws of the United States; and such made to them, in its behalf, would not be performed. collision, he maintained, clearly existed in this case. It would not be denied that the law of Congress was He contended, therefore, in conclusion on this point, paramount. The constitution has expressly provided that the power of Congress over these high branches for that. So that the only question in this part of the of commercial regulation, was shown to be exclusive, case is, whether the two rights be inconsistent with by considering what was wished and intended to each other. The appellant had a right to go from New- be done, when the convention, for forming the Jersey to New-York, in a vessel, owned by himself, of constitution, was called; by what was understood, in the proper legal description, and enrolled and licensed the State conventions, to have been accomplished by according to law. This right belonged to him as a the instrument; by the prohibitions on the States, and citizen of the United States. It was derived under the the express exception relative to inspection laws; by laws of the United States, and no act of the Legislature the nature of the *26 power itself; by the terms of New-York can deprive him of it, any more than such used, as connected with the nature of the power; by act could deprive him of the right of holding lands in the subsequent understanding and practice, both of that State, or of suing in its Courts. It appears from the Congress and the States; by the grant of exclusive record, that the boat in question was regularly enrolled, admiralty jurisdiction to the federal government; by at Perth Amboy, and properly licensed for carrying the manifest danger of the opposite doctrine, and the on the coasting trade. Under this enrolment, and with ruinous consequences to which it directly leads. this license, she was proceeding to New-York, when **12 It required little now to be said, to prove that she was stopped by the injunction of the Chancellor, this exclusive grant is a law regulating commerce; on the application of the New-York grantees. There can be no doubt that here is a collision, in fact; that

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 which the appellant claimed as a right, the respondent benefit of being used in the coasting trade. To secure resisted; and there remains nothing *28 now but to this use to certain vessels, and to deny it to others, was determine, whether the appellant had, as he contends, a precisely the purpose for which the act was passed. The right to navigate these waters; because, if he had such error, or what he humbly supposed to be the error, in the right, it must prevail. Now, this right was expressly judgment of the Court below, consisted in that Court's conferred by the laws of the United States. The first having thought, that although Congress might act, it section of the act of February, 1793, c. 8. regulating had not yet acted, in such a way as to confer a right the coasting trade and fisheries, declares, that all ships on the appellant: whereas, if a right was not given by and vessels, enrolled and licensed as that act provides, this law, it never could be given; no law could be more ‘and no others, shall be deemed ships or vessels of express. It had been admitted, that supposing there the United States, entitled to the privileges of ships or was a provision in the act of Congress, that all vessels vessels employed in the coasting trade or fisheries.’ duly licensed should be at liberty to navigate, for the The fourth section of the same declares, ‘that in order purpose of trade and commerce, over all the navigable to the licensing of any ship or vessel, for carrying on harbours, bays, rivers and lakes, within the several the coasting trade or fisheries,’ bond shall be given States, any *30 law of the States, creating particular &c. according to the provisions of the act. And the privileges as to any particular class of vessels, to the same section declares, that the owner having complied contrary notwithstanding, the only question that could with the requisites of the law, ‘it shall be the duty of arise, in such a case, would be, whether the law was the Collector to grant a license for carrying on the constitutional; and that if that was to be granted or coasting trade;’ and the act proceeds to give the form decided, it would certainly, in all Courts and places, and words of the license, which is, therefore, of course, overrule and set aside the State grant. to be received as a part of the act; and the words of the license, after the necessary recitals, are, ‘license is Now, he did not see that such supposed case could be hereby granted for the said vessel to be employed in distinguished from the present. We show a provision carrying on the coasting trade.’ in an act of Congress, that all vessels, duly licensed, may carry on the coasting trade; nobody doubts **13 Words could not make this authority more the constitutional validity of that law; and we show express. that this vessel was duly licensed according to its provisions. This is all that is essential in the case The Court below seemed to him, with great deference, supposed. The presence or absence of a non obstante to have mistaken the object and nature of the license. clause, cannot affect the extent or operation of the act It seemed to have been of opinion that the license of Congress. Congress has no power of revoking State had no other intent or effect than to ascertain the laws, as a distinct power. It legislates over subjects; ownership and character of the *29 vessel. But this and over those subjects which are within its power, was the peculiar office and object of the enrolment. its legislation is supreme, and necessarily overrules all That document ascertains that the regular proof of inconsistent or repugnant State legislation. If Congress ownership and character has been given; and the were to pass an act expressly revoking or annulling, license is given, to confer the right, to which the party in whole or in part, this New-York grant, such an act has shown himself entitled. It is the authority which the would be wholly useless and inoperative. If the New- master carries with him, to prove his right to navigate York grant be opposed to, or inconsistent with, any freely the waters of the United States, and to carry on constitutional power which Congress has exercised, the coasting trade. then, so far as the incompatibility exists, the grant is nugatory and void, necessarily, and by reason of In some of the discussions which had been had on the supremacy of the law of Congress. But if the this question, it had been said, that Congress had only grant be not inconsistent with any exercise of the provided for ascertaining the ownership and property powers of Congress, then, certainly, Congress *31 of vessels, but had not prescribed to what use they has no authority to revoke or annul it. Such an act of might be applied. But this he thought an obvious error; Congress, therefore, would be either unconstitutional the whole object of the act regulating the coasting or supererogatory. The laws of Congress need no non trade, was to declare what vessels shall enjoy the obstante clause. The constitution makes them supreme,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 when State laws come into opposition to them; so bounty towards authors and inventors, at their own that in these cases there is no question except this, discretion. But to confer reward by exclusive grants, whether there be, or be not, a repugnancy or hostility even if it were but a part of the use of the writing or between the law of Congress and the law of the invention, was not supposed to be a power properly State. Nor is it at all material, in this view, whether to be exercised by the States. Much less could they, the law of the State be a law regulating commerce, under the notion of conferring rewards in such cases, or a law of police, or by whatever other name or grant monopolies, the enjoyment of which should be character it may be designated. If its provisions be essentially incompatible with the exercise of rights inconsistent with an act of Congress, they are void, so holden under the laws *33 of the United States. He far as that inconsistency extends. The whole argument, should insist, however, the less on these points, as they therefore, is substantially and effectually given up, were open to counsel, who would come after him, on when it is admitted, that Congress might, by express the same side, and as he had said so much upon what terms, abrogate the State grant, or declare that it should appeared to him the more important and interesting not stand in the way of its own legislation; because, part of the argument. such express terms would add nothing to the effect and operation of an act of Congress. Mr. Oakley, for the respondent, stated, that there were some general principles applicable to this subject, **14 He contended, therefore, upon the whole of which might be assumed, or which had been settled this point, that a case of actual collision had been by the decisions of this Court, and which had acquired made out, in this case, between the State grant and the force of maxims of political law. Among these the act of Congress; and as the act of Congress was was the principle, that the States do not derive entirely unexceptionable, and clearly in pursuance of their independence and sovereignty from the grant or its constitutional powers, the State grant must yield. concession of the British crown, but from their own act in the declaration of independence. By this act, There were other provisions of the constitution of the they became ‘free and independent States,’ and as United States, which had more or less bearing on such, ‘have full power to levy war, conclude peace, this question: ‘No State shall, without the consent of contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all Congress, lay any duty of tonnage.’ *32 Under colour other acts and things which independent States may of of grants like this, that prohibition might be wholly right do.’ The State of New-York, having thus become evaded. This grant authorizes Messrs. Livingston and sovereign and independent, formed a constitution, by Fulton to license navigation in the waters of New-York. which the ‘supreme legislative power’ was vested in They, of course, license it on their own terms. They its Legislature: and there are no restrictions on that may require a pecuniary consideration, ascertained by power, which in any manner relate to the present the tonnage of the vessel, or in any other manner. controversy. On the other hand, the constitution of the Probably, in fact, they govern themselves, in this United States is one of limited and expressly delegated respect, by the size or tonnage of the vessels, to which powers, which can only be exercised as granted, or they grant licenses. Now, what is this but substantially in the cases enumerated.4 This principle, *34 which a tonnage duty, under the law of the State? Or does it distinguishes the national from the State governments, make any difference, whether the receipts go directly is derived from the nature of the constitution itself, to her own treasury, or to the hands of those to whom as being a delegation of power, and not a restriction she has made the grant? of power previously possessed; and from the express There was, lastly, that provision of the constitution stipulation in the 10th amendment, that ‘the powers which gives Congress power to promote the progress not delegated to the United States by the constitution, of science and the useful arts, by securing to authors nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the and inventors, for a limited time, an exclusive right States respectively, or to the people.’ The national to their own writings and discoveries. Congress had constitution must, therefore, be construed strictly, as exercised this power, and made all the provisions regards the powers expressly granted, and the objects which it deemed useful or necessary. The States might, to which those powers are to be applied. As it is a grant indeed, like munificent individuals, exercise their own of power in derogation of State sovereignty, every

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 11 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 portion of power, not granted, must remain in the State United States.’ Here the object of the power, (to borrow Legislature.5 money for the use of the United States,) and the means of executing it, (by pledging their credit,) have their **15 These principles are all founded on the doctrine, origin in the Union, and did not previously exist. So that a strict rule of construction must be applied, in as to the power ‘to establish tribunals inferior to the ascertaining the extent and object of those powers Supreme Court,’ the same remark will apply. which are expressly delegated. The powers delegated are of two classes: such as are expressly granted, Of the second class, the power ‘to establish an uniform and such as are implied, as ‘necessary and proper’ to rule of naturalization,’ is an instance. This power was carry into execution the powers expressly enumerated. originally in the States, and was extensively exercised As to these implied powers, the constitution must by them, and would now be concurrent, except for be construed liberally, as respects their nature and another provision in the constitution, that ‘citizens of extent: because the constitution implies that rule, each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and by not undertaking to enumerate these powers, and immunities of citizens in the several States.'7 It is because the grant of these powers is general and not held to be exclusive, from the use of the term unlimited. But this rule has one exception: When ‘uniform rule.’ This Court has held, that the use of the means of executing any expressly granted *35 an analogous term, ‘uniform laws,’ in respect to the power are particularly enumerated, then no other mode associated subject of bankruptcy, does not imply an of executing that power can be implied or used by exclusive power in Congress over that subject.8 The Congress, since the constitution itself determines what true reason why the power of establishing an uniform powers are ‘necessary and proper’ in that given case. rule of naturalization is exclusive, must be, that a person becoming a citizen in one State, would thereby These delegated powers, whether express or implied, become a citizen of another, perhaps even contrary to are, (1.) those which are exclusively vested in the its laws, and the power thus exercised would operate United States; and, (2.) those which are concurrent in beyond the limits of the State. the United States and the respective States. **16 As to concurrent powers: it is highly important It is perfectly settled, that an affirmative grant of power *37 to hold all powers concurrent, where it can to the United States does not, of itself, devest the be done without violating the plain letter of the 6 States of a like power. The authorities cited settle this constitution. All these powers are essential to State question, and it is no longer open for discussion in this sovereignty, and are constantly exercised for the good Court. of the State. These powers can be best exercised by the State, in relation to all its internal concerns, connected The powers vested exclusively in Congress are, (1.) with the objects of the power. All powers, therefore, Those which are granted in express terms. (2.) Those not expressly exclusive, or clearly exclusive in their which are granted to the United States, and expressly nature, ought to be deemed concurrent. All implied prohibited to the States. (3.) Those which are exclusive powers are, of course, concurrent. It has never yet in their nature. been contended, that powers implied as necessary and All powers, exclusive in their nature, may be included proper to carry into effect an exclusive power, are under two heads: (1.) Those which have their origin themselves exclusive. Such a doctrine would deprive in the constitution, and where the object of them did the States almost entirely of sovereignty, as these not exist previous to the Union. These may be called implied powers must inevitably be very numerous, strictly national powers. (2.) Those powers which, by and must embrace a wide field of legislation. So other provisions in the constitution, have an effect also, all enumerated powers are to be considered and operation, when exercised by a State, without or concurrent, unless they clearly fall under the head of beyond the territorial limits of the State. exclusive: either as being granted, in terms, exclusively to the United States, or as expressly prohibited to the *36 As examples of the first class, may be mentioned, States, or as being exclusive in their nature, as before the ‘power to borrow money on the credit of the explained.

it is granted to the Union, and prohibited in express A power exclusive in its nature, is said to be repugnant terms to the States? (4.) Whether it is exclusive in and contradictory to a like power in the States. This its nature, either as operating, when exercised by the repugnancy exists only in cases where a State cannot States, without their territorial limits, and upon other legislate, in any manner, or under any circumstances, parts of the Union; or as having its origin and creation under a given power, without conflicting with some in the Union itself; or as being so entirely repugnant, existing act of Congress, or with some provision that no exercise of it can take place by the States, of the constitution. Thus, it is laid down by the without actual conflict with the constitution of the commentators on the constitution, that ‘the power Union, in its practical operation and effects. granted to the Union is exclusive, when the existence of a similar power *38 in the States would be All concurrent powers may be divided into two classes: absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.'9 (1.) Those where, from their nature, when Congress ‘Or where an authority is granted to the Union, has acted on the subject matter, the States cannot with which a similar authority in the State would be legislate at all in any degree. (2.) Those where the States may legislate, though Congress has previously utterly incompatible.'10 And again: ‘It is not a mere legislated on the same subject matter. possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can, The first class includes those instances where any act by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre-existing of Congress covers the whole ground of legislation, right of sovereignty.'11 These strong expressions show and exhausts the subjects on which it *40 acts. that the repugnancy of power to power must be such, Such is the power to fix the standard of weights and as to produce actual interference and conflict, under measures. Here, when the standard of any particular all circumstances, and in all cases, in which the power weight or measure is fixed by Congress, the whole is exercised by the two governments: or, in other power is executed as to that particular; and so far the words, must be such that the States can pass no law on power of the States is at an end. But, until Congress the subject matter of the power, without contravening does this, it cannot be doubted that a State may act the express provisions of the constitution; or without on the subject; and if the laws of Congress apply actually interfering with the operation of some statute only to some weights and measures, all others are of Congress. These terms are used by the author of the subject to State regulation. Thus, New-York has long papers from which they are quoted, to distinguish those had a law to regulate weights and measures, which cases of absolute repugnancy from others, ‘where establishes the English standard for that State, ‘until the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be Congress shall establish the standard for the United productive of occasional interference in the polioy of States.'14 So, also, the power to regulate the value of any branch of administration, but would not imply foreign coin. An act fixing the value of any species any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of of coin, necessarily disposes of the whole power as constitutional authority.'12 The same principle has to that species. They are both instances in which, been adopted by this Court on several occasions.13 when Congress has acted at all, there immediately arises that entire and absolute repugnancy, and that **17 *39 It appears, then, that the repugnancy utter incompatibility, which exclude the States from all which makes a power exclusive, must be clear, direct, power over the subject. positive, and entire. It cannot be a matter of speculation or theory, but must be practical: not a repugnancy The second class of concurrent powers contains those that may arise in some exercise of the power by in which, from their nature, various regulations may both governments; but one that must arise, in any be made, without any actual collision in practice. exercise of such power, which is attempted by the These are, those where the power may be exercised on States. To ascertain, then, whether any given power different subjects; or on the same subject, in different be concurrent, we must inquire, (1.) Whether it was modes; or where the object of the power admits of possessed by the States, previous to the constitution, various independent regulations, which may operate as appertaining to their sovereignty? (2.) Whether it is together. In all these cases, the State may legislate, granted, in exclusive terms, to the Union? (3.) Whether though Congress *41 has legislated under the same

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 power. This results from the very nature of concurrent lay and collect excises, the same article has frequently power. Each party possessing the power, may of course been taxed by both governments. And the power to use it. Each being sovereign as to the power, may use it lay imposts, or duties on exports, and imports, and in any form, and in relation to any subject; and to guard tonnage, is also concurrent, except that no State can lay against a conflict in practice, the law of Congress is any duty on imports and exports, or duty of tonnage, made supreme. unless such as are absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. So, also, the power to provide **18 The provision, that the law of Congress shall for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and be the supreme law in such cases, is the ground of a current coin of the United States, is a power *43 conclusive inference, not only that there are concurrent which may be exercised by the States. A State may powers, but that those powers may be exercised by make it an offence to counterfeit the coin of any both governments at the same time. One law cannot be foreign country within its territory. Thus, New-York said to be superior to another, and to control it, unless it has provided for the punishment of counterfeiting ‘any acts in a manner inconsistent with and repugnant to that of the species of gold or silver coins, now current, or other. The question of supremacy, therefore, can never hereafter to be current in this State.’16 And Congress arise, unless in cases of actual conflict or interference. has provided for the punishment of counterfeiting ‘any If the mere exercise of a power by Congress takes away gold or silver coin of the United States,’ or of any all right from the State to act under that power, then ‘foreign gold or silver coins, which, by law, now are, any State law, under such a power, would be void; not or hereafter shall be made current, or be in actual use as conflicting with the supreme law of Congress, but 17 as being repugnant to the provisions of the constitution and circulation as money, within the United States.' itself, and as being passed by the State, in the first New-York has punished the counterfeiting of ‘any instance, without authority. If this doctrine were true, promissory note, for the payment of money,’ including then the provision that the laws of Congress should notes made by any body corporate;18 and under this be supreme, was entirely idle. It would have been the counterfeiting of the notes of the bank of the sufficient to have said merely, that the constitution United States is punished. Congress has punished the should be supreme.15 These positions *42 are all same offence in the law incorporating the bank of the supported by the judgments of this Court, and of other United States.19 In all these acts of Congress, relating Courts whose authority deserves to be respected. to coins and bank notes, it is provided, ‘that nothing in them contained shall be so construed as to deprive the From this mass of authority, and the reasons on which Courts of the individual States of jurisdiction, under it is founded, it results, (1.) That a State may legislate the laws of the several States, over any offence made in all cases of concurrent power, though Congress punishable by these acts.’ This shows that Congress has acted under the same power and upon the same considered the power to punish these offences as subject matter. (2.) That the question of supremacy concurrent, and that it could be exercised by the cannot arise, except in the case of actual and practical States on the *44 ground of their own inherent collision. (3.) That such collision must be direct and authority, as it is held that Congress cannot delegate positive, and the State law must operate to limit, any part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United restrict, or defeat, the effect of a statute of Congress. States to the State tribunals.20 Again: the power to (4.) That in such case, the State law yields in those provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the particulars, in which such actual collision arises, but militia, is a concurrent power, according to the same remains valid in all other respects. principles.21 But the States have been in the constant The States have, accordingly, acted upon this habit of superadding to the regulations of Congress, construction to a great extent. Thus, the power to additional provisions, suited to their own views and lay and collect taxes, is admitted on all hands to be local circumstances.22 These instances, which might concurrent. It is constantly exercised by the States, be greatly multiplied, show the practical construction in every form, and both real and personal estate put, both by Congress and the State Legislatures, upon have frequently been taxed by the national and local these concurrent powers. governments, at the same time. So, under the power to

of executing any given power are specified in the **19 The learned counsel here recapitulated the grant, Congress cannot take, by implication, any other principles laid down, and proceeded to apply them to means, as being necessary and proper to carry that the discussion of the cause, which he divided into two power into execution. This power, then, is limited: branches. (1.) The supposed repugnancy of the laws of (1.) As to the persons and the objects in regard to New-York to the power of Congress on the subject of which it may be exercised: these are, ‘authors and patents and copy-rights. (2.) Their supposed conflict inventors, writings and discoveries.’ This enumeration with the power of Congress to regulate commerce. excludes all right in Congress to legislate on the subject of any improvement, which is not an ‘invention,’ As to the first, the words of the constitution are, either domestic or foreign. It excludes also all right ‘Congress shall have power to promote the progress to legislate for the benefit of any person who is of science and the useful arts, by securing, for limited not himself the ‘inventor.’ (2.) As to the means of times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to executing the power, and the time during which those their respective writings and discoveries.’ means may be exercised. They are by ‘securing the *45 This power is concurrent, according to all the exclusive right for limited times.’ principles before laid down. It is clearly a power **20 The power, considered in itself, is supreme, appertaining to sovereignty, and, as such, vested in unlimited, and plenary. No part of any sovereign the Legislature of New-York, before the formation of power can be annihilated. Whatever portion, then, of the United States' constitution. A power to promote this power, was not granted to Congress, remains in science and the useful arts, is highly important to the States. Consequently, the States have exclusive every civilized society. It embraces all the means authority to promote science and the arts, by all of education, and all kinds of mechanical labour other modes than those specified in the constitution, and improvements. It is constantly exercised by all without limitation as to time, person, or object; and the governments, as a sovereign authority, by laws for the Legislature is the sole judge of the expediency of any promotion of education in all its branches, by bounties law on the subject. for the encouragement of discoveries and new methods of business, and by the grant of exclusive rights and But this power, though limited in Congress, *47 privileges for the same end. It has frequently been is still (as has been seen) concurrent in the States. exercised by the State of New-York, and by other It follows, then, from all the principles before laid States, before the adoption of the constitution. It is not down relative to the exercise of concurrent powers, granted exclusively to Congress. No exclusive terms that a State may exercise it by the same means, and are used. The grant is affirmative and general, like towards the same persons and objects with Congress. all the other powers. There is no express prohibition A State may, therefore, grant patents and copy-rights, upon the States against the exercise of it. Nor is it which would secure to the inventors and authors, the exclusive in its nature. It does not owe its existence or benefit of their discoveries and writings, within the creation to the Union. When exercised by a State, it limits of the State. In such cases, the citizens of other does not operate in any manner beyond the territorial States might use the invention, or publish the book jurisdiction of that State. From its nature, it admits at pleasure. But if a patent or copy-right should be of a great variety of regulations, both by local and obtained under the law of Congress, the right under the general laws, which may exist harmoniously together. State grant would cease as against that of the United Being thus a concurrent power, it follows, according States. Suppose the author or inventor does not apply to the principles already established, that the State for a patent or copy-right from the United States, or may exercise it at all times, and in every mode, until is willing to secure the exclusive right within any one an actual and practical conflict arises between a right State only, and leave the invention common in every exercised *46 under a statute of Congress, and the other part of the Union; may not that one State secure same right claimed to be exercised under the State. the right within its own territory? This question may be answered by seeing how far Congress has exercised The power, as granted in the constitution, is a limited the power. An examination of the different patent laws power. It is a clear principle, that when the means will show, that Congress has, in various particulars,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 15 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 omitted to exercise the entire power given to them by the constitution. Thus, by several of these laws, the **21 It appears, then, that the power is founded on right of obtaining a patent is confined to citizens, and, the basis of a pre-existing right of property, from the consequently, the power of granting patents to aliens, nature and origin of the right, as before stated, and is left to the States. The whole power is inoperative, from the terms in which the power itself is granted. The until Congress acts under it by legislating: and the a word ‘secure,’ implies the existence of something to patent. In every case, therefore, the power is *48 be secured. It does not purport to create or give any unexecuted until a patent is actually granted. The State new right, but only to secure and provide remedies to may consequently act in all cases. enforce a preexisting right throughout the Union. This power differs essentially from the sovereign power But Congress has confined its statutes to cases of to create and grant an exclusive right. It has been invention, as the constitution directs. Where then is adjudged, under the English stat. 21 Jac. I. c. 3. that the power to reward or encourage the introduction a grant may be made for any invention which is of useful machines or inventions from abroad? or, new in England, though known abroad.25 That statute, the establishment of any art, when invented at home, therefore, authorizes the creation of a right *50 of and the discoverer does not apply for a patent? or, property in a thing imported, in which no right of where the invention is given to the public, and great property, under the laws of England, before existed. expense must be incurred to put it into use? All these But the patent laws of the United States merely extend things appertain to sovereignty. Congress has no power to inventions actually made in the United States, and over them. The power, being sovereign, must exist not to any imported invention. The whole extent of the somewhere, and is, therefore, exclusively in the States. sovereign power, exercised by the British Parliament, If the nature of the power which is given to Congress be on this subject, was vested in the Legislature of New- examined, it will be found that it confers no authority York. A part only was given to Congress, and all the to create or grant any right or property. It is clearly residue remains in the State exclusively. founded on the presumption, that the right or property may exist, independent of the power. Thus, one of What then is the effect of a patent? It creates no new the commentators on the constitution says, ‘The copy- right. In secures the patentee, for a limited time, the right of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great exclusive right to his invention; so that he has the Britain, to be a right at common law. The right to useful same exclusive right in it, that he has in any other inventions seems, with equal reason, to belong to the kind of property. His right, however, is secured more inventor.'23 The adjudication here referred to, is that of extensively than any State law could secure it. But, within the limits of the State, a patent under the local Millar v. Taylor,24 where it was held, that the author law would be just as effectual. What is the situation of any book has the sole right of first printing and of the right, after the expiration of a patent? The right publishing it, but that the right was controlled by the under the common law of the State, may be considered provisions of the stat. 8 Ann, relative to copy-rights. as perpetual. It was so ruled by the Judges in Millar v. *49 But, the common law of England was the law of Taylor; but it was determined in the House of Lords, New-York, at the adoption of the national constitution. that the perpetuity of the right was controlled and There was no statute of New-York similar to that of limited by the statute of Ann. There is no such statute Ann, and, of course, the right existed there, without in New-York, and, therefore, the right remains as at the security for its enjoyment, provided by that statute. common law. The act of Congress cannot destroy the The right, also, was local, and confined to the territorial perpetuity of a right held under the law of New-York, jurisdiction of the State. The policy and object of the and which the act of Congress has only secured for constitution was, to secure the right co-extensively a certain time, to a greater extent, and by means of with the Union. Its exercise in any one State, might more, effectual remedies. The right, then, remains, at be affected in its operation by the pirating of books the expiration of the *51 patent, in the same condition and inventions in the adjoining States, and that evil as at its commencement, so far as regards the laws could only be corrected by the national Legislature. of New-York, and within the territorial limits of that The right, therefore, in any one State, was imperfect State, but cannot be asserted in other States. Even if only as to the security and the means of enjoyment. this were not so, and it should be considered that the

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 16 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 right becomes common, at the expiration of the patent, freight. This was done to protect the great shipping then it is like all other common rights, subject to the interest employed in the navigation of the Hudson control of the municipal laws of the State. It is of River. Would this exercise of power be affected by the essence of sovereignty to control and regulate all the obtaining of a patent? The object and effect of a common rights. The Legislature, possessing ‘supreme patent is, (as we have seen,) to secure a pre-existing legislative power,’ may destroy a common right, either right, imperfect as to its means of enjoyment and by abolishing it, and prohibiting the use of it altogether, its extent. The patentee obtains nothing by his grant, or by convering it into an exclusive right. Thus, a right except an *53 exclusive right, as it relates to the of way may be common, either by land or water, and Union, instead of a right limited to the State, together it may be shut up by law, and the use of it prohibited. with more complete and certain remedies to protect So, a right of fishery, in navigable waters, is common, and enforce that right. If, therefore, he could not use and it may be prohibited altogether, or converted into a the thing invented, against the State law, before it is several fishery. In the same manner, as to patent rights patented, neither can he thus use it after it is patented, and literary productions: if, after a patent or copy- for his grant conveys no greater right than before right has expired, the right to use or publish becomes existed. It is the undoubted attribute of all sovereignty, common, it may be controlled by law, and turned into to regulate and control the use of all property. A a private right. So that a State law may continue or thing patented, when made and put in use, is nothing extend a patent-right at pleasure. more than property; and, like all other property, is subject to the control of the sovereign power, as to **22 Thus, it follows, that whether the right of the the right to use it. There can be no doubt that it patentee remains in him, after the expiration of his may sometimes become important or necessary to the patent, at common law, or whether its use becomes welfare of society, to regulate or prohibit the use of a common to all, it is subject to the State law, in the same thing patented. Congress cannot do this, or, at least, it manner, and to the same extent, as all other rights, and has not done it. After the patent is granted, the power may, consequently, be controlled, limited, extended, or of Congress over the subject matter is exhausted. prohibited, at the pleasure of the Legislature. Patented things may be dangerous or noxious, either universally so in every part of the country, or locally; *52 But the State may control or prohibit the use of or, they may be useful at one time, and mischievous any patented thing, during the existence of the patent. If and noxious at another. Patented manufactures may an inventor do not apply for a patent for the invention, be injurious to the public health, though highly useful no other man can. The right of the inventor, in such a as manufactures; or they may be nuisances to private case, remains as at common law. Every right or kind of individuals and neighbourhoods, though extremely property, created by the laws of the State, is subject to useful to the public. Can Congress provide by its laws be controlled and regulated by the supreme legislative for the abatement of a public nuisance? or give a right power of the State. It cannot then be doubted, that of action to an individual for a private nuisance? If before a patent is obtained, the State may prohibit not, these powers must reside in the States. The right the use of the thing invented; either on the ground to use all property, must be subject to modification that it is mischievous in itself, or from motives of by municipal law. Sic *54 utere tuo ut alienum non general policy, that it is inexpedient to permit it. As, loedas, is a fundamental maxim. It belongs exclusively if it interferes with any general interest, as a labour to the local State Legislatures, to determine how a man saving machine, which might deprive great numbers may use his own, without injuring his neighbour. Can of their ordinary means of subsistence: or, if it should a patent give rights, by which a patentee may infringe effect any great change in the course of business, which the vested rights of others? Can a patented boat be used the Legislature might deem injurious, as it relates to on a ferry, the exclusive use of which has been granted the community. Of these questions of general policy, by a State law? and of the expediency of any such prohibition, the Legislature must, of course, be the sole judge. Thus, **23 This argument may be illustrated by the power in the act of New-York, to incorporate the North River to secure to authors the exclusive right to their works. Steam-boat Company, the corporation is prohibited This power is founded on the same reasons with the from using any of its boats for the purpose of carrying other, and gives the author the same rights as the

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 17 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 inventor. Can the author, by virtue of his copy-right, provision to ascertain the character of the books or publish against the prohibition of State law? A book engravings to be published, and whether they be such may be libellous, or blasphemous, or obscene. Cannot as may be safely permitted, consistently with the good the author be indicted and punished for it? May not a order of society and public morals. They grant the same citizen maintain an action for the libel? If so, it cannot right to the author, as the patent grants to the inventor. be lawful by virtue of the copy-right. If the State can In both cases, they depend on the same constitutional punish the act of publishing, it may entirely prohibit right, and only convey a right to prevent others from the publication. It may regulate and restrain the press, using or publishing without his consent, but not to so far as it is not prohibited by its own constitution. enable him to use or publish without restraint.

The laws of Congress are framed on the supposition **24 If a State can thus control a right to use a that the power to prohibit remains in the States. By thing patented, directly, it may do it indirectly. If by a the existing statute, they have not provided that any positive law, then, through the agency of the Courts, inquiry shall be made as to the utility of the supposed by injunction or otherwise. Or, the right to prohibit the invention, when the patent is applied for. There is use of it may be delegated to individuals, either acting no authority to refuse a patent, on the ground of the as public agents, or in their own behalf, to protect some inutility of the invention, and in practice, no inquiry other right vested in them; and may forbid the use of the is ever made, and patents issue, of course, on making thing patented, or the publication of the book, the copy- the oaths and paying the fees, even for things the right of which has been secured, without their license. most *55 trifling, absurd, and injurious. There is no So that if an exclusive grant be made by a State law to provision for the repeal of a patent, on the ground an individual, with a provision that the thing granted of its noxious or useless character. The law does not shall not be used in the State, without license of the purport, in its terms, to give a right to use the thing grantee, and there be a patent under the act of Congress patented, against the provisions of any State law. The for the same thing, the consequence would be, that act provides, (s. 1.) that if any person shall present a the State grantee could not use it, because it would be petition, ‘signifying a desire of obtaining an exclusive a violation of the patent, and the patentee could not, property,’ &c. then a patent shall issue, granting to the without the license of the State grante, because the petitioner ‘the full and exclusive right and liberty of State law prohibited him. Thus, the State law would making, constructing, using, and vending to others to be inoperative, so far as it granted the exclusive right; be used,’ the thing patented. The ‘exclusive property’ but valid, so far as it prohibited the use of the thing spoken of, is only the same property that exists in patented. *57 These principles may be applied to the any thing else, and, of itself, gives no right to use law now in question, which gives an exclusive right, the thing against the State law, any more than in the and forbids any person to use the thing which is the case of any other property. The words ‘using, and subject of the right, without the license of the persons vending to others to be used,’ are inserted to make in whom it is vested. It contains a granting clause, the description of that ‘exclusive property’ complete. and a prohibiting clause. The injunction is founded The words ‘making, constructing, and vending,’ would on the prohibition, and may be enforced, though the not have constituted entire property in the thing, as grantees might not use their right. Let it be supposed one might make and vend, and all the world might that, from reasons of public policy, the laws of New- use. The patentee's right of property might thus be York had prohibited the use of steam boats entirely, and greatly invaded, and he would be left without remedy, had directed the Court of Chancery to restrain them except against the ‘maker.’ The word ‘using,’ in the by injunction, would not the prohibition have been a act, must receive this limited construction, or the law valid one? and if so, may not the State determine that of Congress goes beyond the power in the constitution. it is against the public interest, that steam boats should That was only to ‘secure’ a right, and meant nothing be built or navigated, unless under the direction, or more than that a patentee should enjoy it alone, if with the license, of an individual, who may be thought any body was permitted to enjoy it. But it was never particularly skilful in that business? It might, therefore, intended that the patentee should set the State laws be contended, that this injunction is to be sustained, at defiance. The acts relative to copy-rights, strongly whatever might become of the respondent's exclusive *56 support this position. These acts contain no right.

promote science and the arts, by all other means, and A State may prohibit the use of a thing patented, by towards all persons and objects, and for unlimited virtue of its power over the public domain. A patented times, remains exclusively in the States. That the States thing cannot be used on the private property of an may legislate, in pursuance of this concurrent power, individual, without his consent. The power of the State in all cases, and can grant exclusive rights to any thing over the public property, is, at least, equal to that of an which may be the subject of a patent, which will be individual over his own; and particularly so, as to the valid within their own territory until a patent is actually navigable rivers in the State, which are, emphatically, issued under the authority of the Union. That when the property of the people of the State, and subject to a patent issues, the State has full power to prohibit their authority, acting through the local Legislature. or control the use of it within its territory, though it cannot grant the right to use the patented thing to The question has hitherto been discussed, as if *58 others. That it may exercise the power of prohibition, the exclusive right claimed by the respondents, was the partially or totally, by direct legislative acts, or through right to an invention, for which a patent may have been, the medium of its Courts, and may delegate the right or may yet be obtained. But in truth, his right is not to to prohibit to any of its citizens. That in the present the use of any invention, or of any thing for which a case, the right of prohibition has been delegated to patent can be granted. Livingston and Fulton do not, on Livingston and Fulton; and the mode of exercising that the face of the acts granting or securing the right, claim right, is by injunction out of Chancery. That this right to be the inventors of any thing. In the act of 1798, c. of prohibition may be valid, even though the grant 55. s. 21. it is recited, that R. R. L. ‘is the possessor of of the exclusive right to use, &c., might be invalid. a mode of applying the steam engine to the propelling That the State laws are, therefore, valid, even on the of vessels, on new and advantageous principles.’ It is supposition that the right granted by them, was to not alleged or pretended, that he was the discoverer of an invention which might be patented; and that they that mode, or of the principles of its application; or that would be valid, as to their prohibitions, even were a the mode, or the principles, were secret or unknown patent issued for the same *60 object. But that, in to the rest of the world. His right, therefore, is to the truth, the right in question, has no connection with any use of an improvement, introduced (perhaps) from a thing that can be the subject of a patent; and if it has, foreign country, and, consequently, not the subject of that no patent has, in fact, issued to the appellant, nor a patent, and in respect to which Congress has no does he, in any mode, claim a right under a patent. That power to legislate at all. On the other hand, it does not the question, therefore, on this branch of the cause, is appear, that the appellant has a patent for any thing reduced to the inquiry, whether the State may legislate connected with the subject of steam boats, or for any under a power, confessedly concurrent, when Congress thing belonging to the steam engine, which can be used has not acted at all, or when no person sets up a right in navigation by steam. He can, therefore, claim no under any act of Congress. right, in this case, under the patent laws; and there is no question as to any actual conflict between the State But the laws of New-York, now in question, are right and a patent right. He is, consequently, compelled supposed to be in conflict with the constitutional power to rely upon the broad ground, that the State has no of Congress, ‘to regulate commerce with foreign power to legislate at all, for the encouragement of nations, among the several States, and with the Indian any art or science, or for any improvement connected tribes.’ therewith, because Congress has legislated under a power which is partial in its extent, both as to objects That is a concurrent power, according to all the and time. principles before laid down. It was fully possessed by the States, after the declaration of independence, **25 *59 The result of all that has been said, tends and constantly exercised. It is one of the attributes of to establish, that the power in the constitution is strictly sovereignty, specially designated in that instrument, a concurrent power. That it is also a limited power in ‘to establish commerce.’ It is not granted, in exclusive Congress to promote science and the arts, by particular terms, to Congress. It is not prohibited, generally, to means, and in regard to particular objects, and for the States. The only express restraints upon the power limited times. That all the residue of the power, to of the States, in this respect, are against laying any

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 19 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 impost or duty on imports or exports, (except for and the consent of Congress, in this instance only the execution of their own inspection laws,) or of removes the restraint. A State may not enter into any tonnage; against making any agreement or compact treaty; but, with the consent of Congress, may enter with a foreign power; and against entering into any into an agreement or compact with another State, treaty. All these prohibitions, being partial, are founded or with a foreign power. A treaty is made with a on the supposition, that the whole power resided in the view to the public welfare, either in perpetuity, or for States. They are, accordingly, all in restraint of State a considerable length of time, and binds the whole power. It is a clear *61 principle of interpretation, that Union. A compact or agreement is generally temporary where a general power is given, but not in exclusive in its nature and operation, and is executed by a single terms, and the States are restrained, in express terms, act, and binds only the State that makes it. In this sense from exercising that power in particular cases, that the constitution must be understood, when it speaks in all other cases, the power remains in the States of trcaties as distinguished from compacts. It follows, as a concurrent power. Thus, the commentators on that general and permanent commercial regulations the constitution, speaking of the taxing power, say, with foreign powers, must be made by treaty, but that ‘this restriction implies an admission that, if it were particular and temporary regulations of commerce may not inserted, the States would possess the power it be made by an agreement of a State with another, or excludes. And it implies a further admission, that, as with a foreign power, by the consent of Congress. But, to all other taxes, the authority of the States remains *63 in this case, the compact would derive all its undiminished.'26 And, again: ‘In all cases in which efficacy from the original inherent power of the State, the restriction does not apply, the States would have not from the act of consent by Congress, which would a concurrent power with the Union.’ This doctrine merely remove an existing restraint. applies precisely to the power to regulate commerce. **26 There is nothing in the nature of this power, Laying imposts or duties of tonnage, is a part of the which renders it exclusive in Congress. The power power to regulate commerce; and the making of a itself does not grow out of the Union, like the power compact or agreement with other States or nations, is ‘to borrow money on the credit of the United States.’ the only method by which a State could make any It does not operate, when exercised by a State beyond commercial regulation, which, as it regards its own its territorial limits, like the power of naturalization. citizens, would operate boyond its territorial limits. There is no necessary repugnancy between the acts These restrictions imply, that the general power to of the two governments under this power, since it regulate commerce, is concurrently in the States, and clearly admits of a great variety of regulations, which that it may be exercised by the States in all cases may operate together, without direct interference. The to which these prohibitions do not extend. But, the restraints specially imposed on the power of the State, same implication is still stronger from the nature relating to commerce, would have been unnecessary, if and terms of those prohibitory clauses. The State it were not considered as a concurrent power. may lay duties on imports and exports, to execute its inspection laws. That class of laws *62 are, or The practice of the States shows that the power has may be, essential regulations of commerce, and they always been considered as concurrent. Thus, the State derive their authority altogether from State power. of New-York has passed numerous laws, which are The existence of a power to pass them, is, therefore, regulations of commerce with foreign nations, with expressly recognised by the constitution. So, also, other States, and with the Indian tribes.1 As to that a State may lay any duty upon imports or exports, part of the power which relates to trade with the or of tonnage, with the consent of Congress. This Indian tribes, the people here referred to may be within provision implies, that the power to lay all duties the limits of a State. Thus, the commentators on the remains essentially in the States; that the exercise of constitution consider it in that light, and contrast the the power is suspended, until Congress consent; and power with that relating to the same subject in the that, when the consent is given, the State law acts *64 old confederation, which was qualified so as ‘not of itself, and by State authority alone. The States to infringe the legislative rights of any State within no where derive any powers from the constitution. 2 All its provisions are in restraint of their authority, its own limits.' Thus, Congress has legislated on that

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 20 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 basis. By the act to regulate trade and intercourse is limited, not extending to the internal trade of a State. with the Indian tribes, it is provided, s. 19, ‘that We contend, that the exclusive right claimed by the nothing contained in the act shall be so construed as to respondent is valid, considered either as a regulation of prevent any trade with Indians, on lands surrounded by intercourse and trade among the several States, or as a settlements of citizens, and being within the ordinary regulation of the internal navigation of the State. jurisdiction of any of the individual States.’ But the State of New-York has also legislated on the same Considering it then, as a regulation of trade *66 subject, and by the ‘act relative to the different tribes among the States, it becomes necessary to inquire and nations of Indians within this State,’ prohibits into the foundation of the right of intercourse among the purchase of land from any Indian, without the the States, either for the purposes of commerce, or authority of the Legislature; prohibits the sale of residence and travelling. From the declaration of various articles to any Indian or tribe; makes numerous independence, in 1776, until the establishment of other regulations, as to trade and intercourse with them, the confederation, in 1781, the States were entirely by the citizens who surround them, so as to cover the and absolutely sovereign, and foreign to each other, whole ground over which Congress has declared its act as regarded their respective rights and powers are should not extend. An examinatien of the laws of other separate societies of men. During that period, the right States, will show that many of them have legislated, of intercourse among them rested solely on the jus under every part of this power, to the same extent, and, commune of nations. By the law of nations, the right of in some cases, to a greater extent than New-York; and commerce has its foundation in the obligation resting will show the havoc which must be made in the State upon all men, mutually to assist each other, and to laws, if this power is not to be considered concurrent. contribute to the happiness of their fellow creatures. Right on one side, springs from obligation on the other. This power is not only concurrent, but is limited in The right to purchase, springs from the obligation Congress. It does not extend to the regulation of the to sell. ‘One nation has, therefore, a natural right to internal commerce of any State. This results from purchase of another the things which it wants, and the terms used in the grant of power, *65 ‘among which the other does not need.’ The law of nations the several States.’ It results also from the effects being only the application of the law of nature, as of a contrary doctrine, on the whole mass of State regulating the rights and obligations of individuals, to power. Internal commerce must be that which is wholly nations and sovereign States, this is the foundation of carried on within the limits of a State: as where the right of buying. But the right of selling does not the commencement, progress, and termination of the impose any obligation on another nation to buy, as that voyage, are wholly confined to the territory of the other may not want, and must be the sole judge of its State. This branch of power includes a vast range of own necessities.3 It follows, then, that any State has a State legislation, such as turnpike roads, toll bridges, natural right to purchase of any other the articles which exclusive rights to run stage wagons, auction licenses, it needs, and to open a commercial intercourse for that licenses to retailers, and to hawkers and pedlers, ferries purpose; but that every *67 State, being under no over navigable rivers and lakes, and all exclusive rights obligation to purchase of another, may, at its pleasure, to carry goods and passengers, by land or water. All prohibit the introduction of any foreign merchandise. such laws must necessarily affect, to a great extent, the These rights of purchasing are not perfect rights, and foreign trade, and that between the States, as well as of course connot be enforced by one nation against the trade among the citizens of the same State. But, another; and, being thus imperfect, it depends upon although these laws do thus affect trade and commerce the will of each nation, whether it will carry on any with other States, Congress cannot interfere, as its commerce with another, or upon what terms and under power does not reach the regulation of internal trade, what regulations. These imperfect rights, like all other which resides exclusively in the States. imperfect rights between nations, can become perfect only by treaty; the effect of which, is to secure to **27 It has thus been seen, that this power is a nation rights of commerce or intercourse, which concurrent; and as such, may be exercised by the it before enjoyed at the will of another. The right States, subject, like all other concurrent powers, to the of travelling, or of entering into and residing in one power of Congress, when actually exercised; and that it

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 21 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 nation by the citizens or subjects of another, depends on the same principles of international law. But the The inconveniences resulting from these powers sovereign may forbid the entrance into his territory, of the States, gave rise to the new constitution. either to foreigners in general, or in particular cases, These inconveniences consisted principally in the and under particular circumstances, or as to particular impositions and taxes levied on property imported and exported by one State through another. There individuals, and for particular purposes.4 And as he was no inconvenience as to the right of passing from may prohibit the entrance altogether, he may annex State to State, as that was secured by the articles of what conditions he pleases to the permission to enter. confederation. The constitution applied the remedy to In the absence of any treaty stipulation, and of any these evils in two ways: (1.) By express prohibitions prohibitory regulations, the natural right would exist, on the States, in those particulars in which the evils and might be exercised and enjoyed. had been most sensibly felt, preventing them from **28 This being the relation subsisting between levying any impost or duty of tonnage, without the sovereign States, it follows, that before the consent of Congress. (2.) By vesting Congress with confederation, each State enjoyed the right of a general power to regulate commerce with foreign intercourse with all the others, at the will of those nations and among the States. The constitution does others, both as respects the transit and residence not profess to give, in terms, the right of ingress and of persons, *68 and the introduction and sale of regress for commercial or any other purposes, or the property. The confederation was a treaty between right of transporting articles for trade from one State sovereign States, and ‘the better to secure and to another. It only protects the personal rights of the perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among citizens of one State, when within the jurisdiction of the people of the different States,’ stipulated, that the another, by securing to them ‘ all the privileges and free inhabitants of each State should have ‘free ingress immunities of a citizen’ of that other, which they hold and egress to and from any other State,’ and should subject to the laws of the State as its own citizens; and it enjoy in each State ‘all the privileges of trade and protects their property against any duty to be imposed commerce; subject to the same duties, impositions, on its introduction. The right, then, of intercourse with and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively: a State, by the subjects of a foreign power, or by the provided, that such restrictions shall not extend so far citizens of another State, still rests on the original right, as to prevent the removal of property imported into as derived from the law of nations. Suppose there *70 any State, to any other State, of which the owner is was no treaty with a foreign power, and no act of an inhabitant.’ This article, then, secured the right of Congress regulating intercourse with that power, but passing from one State to another, but gave no new barely a state of peace; that power would enjoy the right of commerce as to the introduction of any goods, right of trade and intercourse with New-York, by the and not even the right of removing from the State law of nations alone. But that right might be restrained, any property purchased in it. The rights of commerce, or regulated, or abolished by the law of New-York therefore, as between the States, remained as before, alone. Such was the situation of New-York before the subject to all the municipal laws of the State, except adoption of the constitution, both as to foreign nations that those laws must be general and impartial in and the other States. The constitution has not abridged their application. Under the confederation, then, the the power of the State in this respect. It has only States retained the whole power of regulating foreign subjected it to the superior power of Congress when commerce, and that between the States, except as actually exercised. stipulated in the treaty of confederation itself. Under it, **29 An examination of the acts of Congress on all the trade and intercourse between any State and any this subject will show, that, as the constitution has not foreign nation, was carried on by the law of nature and given the right of intercourse and trade, so neither has nations alone. All trade between any State and another Congress, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, State, as to the right of importation, &c., was carried on by any law, given that right. Here the learned counsel in the same manner. No State could make any freaty of entered into an elaborate examition of the statutes, for commence *69 with a foreign power, or with another the purpose of establishing this position. State.

encouragement of some public improvement. Being It would seem to follow, from this view of the passed for these legitimate objects, they are valid constitution and the acts of Congress, that the right as internal regulations, though they may incidentally of transit from State to State, by land or water, for restrict or regulate foreign trade, or that between commercial or other purposes, is founded on the jus the States. So of the laws now in question; they commune of nations; that the constitution does not were passed to introduce and promote a great public affect that right, except in specified cases; and as to improvement, clearly within the power of the State to all others, leaves the right as before, with a general encourage. They operate entirely within the limits of power in Congress to regulate and control it, so far the State. They put no restraint on the right of entry into as it may be connected with commerce; that the State the State; but they exclude from the right of navigation has the concurrent power also, to regulate and control on its waters in a particular mode, because they deem it, so far as it may be connected with commerce; that mode injurious to the public interest, unless used that the State has *71 the concurrent power also, to by particular persons. How can they be distinguished regulate and control it, in all cases where its regulations in principle, from all the other laws which have do not actually conflict with those of Congress; that been referred to? If steam boats had been pernicious Congress has made no regulations, which alter or affect in themselves, or had been deemed so as affecting the right at all, by giving any other right than was injuriously other great public interests, could Congress before enjoyed; that all the regulations of the State, have prohibited them on the waters of New-York, therefore, which operate within its own limits, are by any exercise of the power to regulate commerce? binding upon all who come within its jurisdiction; and Could not the State have done it, by virtue of its that if Congress deems such regulations to be injurious, general power, on its navigable waters? Suppose that it may control them by express provisions, operating steam boats were found to be unsafe, and destructive to directly upon the case. property or lives, unless built or navigated by persons particularly skilful, could not the State prohibit the The case has, heretofore, been considered as if the *73 use of them, unless thus built and navigated? If, steam boat laws were regulations of commerce among under any circumstances, the State may restrict the use the States, in the ordinary acceptation of those terms. of them to particular persons, it may do so in its own But is the law in question any thing more than a discretion, for reasons of which it alone is the judge. regulation of the internal navigation of the waters of the State? In terms, it applies only to the waters within the **30 All this shows that the restraint imposed by State. It does not deny the right of entry into its waters these laws, on the navigation of the waters of the State, to any vessel navigated by steam: it only forbids such is merely an internal regulation of the right of transit, or vessel, when within its waters and jurisdiction, to be passage from one part of the State to another; that it is moved by steam; but that vessel may still navigate by a regulation which, if even indispensable to the public all other means; and it leaves the people of other States, safety, Congress could not make; and that the power to or of New-York, in the full possession of the right make it must, therefore, be in the State. of navigation, by all the means known or used at the time of the passage of the law. It is, therefore, strictly The right of a State to regulate its internal trade, applies a regulation of internal trade and navigation, which as well to its navigable waters, as to its other territory. belongs to the State. This may, indeed, indirectly affect Its rivers are its territory and domain, as much as the the right of commercial intercourse between the States. land, and equally subject to its laws in all respects. The But so do all other laws regulating internal trade, or power of Congress to regulate commerce applies as the right of transit from one part to another of the same well to the land as to the water. Commerce between State; such as quarantine laws, inspection *72 laws, the States, and with foreign powers, is very extensively duties on auctions, licenses to sell goods, &c. All these carried on by land. Congress has accordingly adapted laws are acknowledged to be valid. They are passed, its revenue laws to the land, by imposing duties on not with a view or design to regulate commerce, goods imported in carriages, &c. When goods are but to promote some great object of public interest, brought into the State in a carriage or wagon, cannot within the acknowledged scope of State legislation: the State prohibit the transportation of those goods such as the public health, agriculture, revenue, or the from one part of the State to another, except in a

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 23 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 particular manner, or by a particular road, or in vehicles people of Louisiana to form a constitution, there is of a particular description? Where is the difference a provision, that the State convention shall ‘pass an between an exclusive right to navigate vessels by ordinance providing that the river Mississippi, and the steam on the water, and an exclusive right to move navigable rivers and waters leading into the same, or carriages by steam on the land? Cannot a *74 State into the gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways, grant an exclusive privilege to carry goods as well and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the as passengers, in carriages or vessels, by water or by said State, as to other citizens of the United States, land? May it not convert all its roads leading into other without any tax, duty, impost, or toll therefor, imposed States, into turnpikes, levy tolls upon them, and alter by the said State.'5 And in the act for the admission of and abolish them at pleasure? All these are regulations that State, the above provisions, as to the navigation of the internal trade of the State, but they may, and, of the Mississippi, are made one of the fundamental indeed, must affect, to a great degree, the trade between conditions of the admission.6 Similar conditions were the States. By virtue of the right of a State over also imposed upon the admission of the States of its navigable waters, it establishes ferries, which are 7 exclusive rights to use parts of navigable waters for Mississippi, Missouri, *76 and Alabama; which particular purposes and in a particular manner; and strongly imply, that the new States would have had a bridges, which interrupt, and sometimes destroy the right to control the navigation of their waters, if these navigation of rivers: It grants the land under the water provisions had not been inserted; that there is nothing at pleasure, builds public piers, erects dams and other in the constitution which could prevent them from obstructions, and diverts the course of the waters for doing so, when they should once have been admitted as any purpose whatsoever. By its power over its land equal members of the Union; and that Congress could territory, a State establishes roads and canals, regulates pass no law, under the constitution, to prevent them the carrying of goods, and the amount of tolls upon from doing it. them, grants exclusive privileges to stage wagons and **31 But the power of Congress is ‘to regulate others, for the carriage of goods and passengers, and commerce.’ The correct definition of commerce is, performs all other acts of sovereignty in regard to these the transportation and sale of commodities. It is so public highways. considered in all the regulations made by the laws of It appears, then, that a State may exercise the same Congress. They speak generally of vessels and their control in these respects, over both land and water, cargoes, and whatever rights are given by the laws within its own jurisdiction; that the right, as to both, of Congress, apply to commerce strictly and properly rests on the same foundation, that of a sovereign over speaking. Any person claiming to navigate the waters his domain; and that it has uniformly been exercised of the State of New-York against the State laws, over both in the same manner. What, then, is the under any right derived from the laws of Congress right under which the respondent claims? It is only relative to commerce, must show himself qualified an internal regulation of the use of the waters of the according to these laws, and actually exercising that State. This *75 is clearly the case, when it applies right under their provisions. Now, if the license here set to the case of the conveyance of passengers or goods, up gives any right it is to carry on the coasting trade, on the waters of the State, where the whole journey which consists in transporting goods from one State or transit is within the State, as from New-York to to another. It is not pretended that the appellant was Albany. Is it in truth any thing more than an exclusive engaged in this trade, when stopped by the injunction. right of ferry over the waters of Hudson's river? It It appears by the pleadings, that his boat was employed is, in substance and effect, an exclusive right to carry in the transportation of persons or passengers for hire, pasengers in boats navigated in a particular mode, on and it is notorious that this is a distinct business. *77 the navigable waters of the State. These waters are a It is often entirely disconnected from any commercial public highway, like any other public road on land, object, though sometimes indirectly connected with and, as such, are completely subject to the control trade. So it has been considered by some of the of the State laws. There are various acts of Congress States. New-York once laid a tax upon passengers which recognise the power of the States to control travelling in the steam boats; and Delaware taxed their navigable waters. Thus, in the act enabling the passengers travelling through that State in carriages.

But these States could have laid no tax on property far as it restrains the right of navigation between thus transported. If, then, the appellant's boat was State and State, either for commercial purposes, engaged, bona fide, in the coasting trade, the question strictly speaking, or for all purposes, including the might arise as to its rights and privileges under transportation of passengers. And it may, at the same the enrolment and license. But, when no trade is time, be valid, so far as it restrains the right of internal carried on, or intended to be carried on, under the navigation, strictly *79 speaking, either in the whole license, it is clear that the license is a fraud upon the extent of the right, or as a mere exclusive right to carry State law, if that law is in other respects valid. An passengers in steam boats. Thus, the State law may be examination of the provisions of the statutes relating suffered to operate, in whole or in part, so far as it may, to the coasting trade will show, that they all relate without actual conflict with the constitution or laws of exclusively to the coasting trade as before defined, the United States. and do not contemplate the carrying of passengers as distinguished from commerce. Every vessel engaged Mr. Emmett, on the same side, stated, that the question in it, must not only have a license, but must comply sought to be presented, was the complete invalidity with various regulations, at every departure she takes of these laws of New-York, as being repugnant to the from one district to another; and, unless it is shown that constitution of the United States. If the invalidity be such regulations have been complied with, the vessel not total and absolute, (and that might well be the case can claim no right (in any case) to navigate under the with statutes, which are often void in part, and good laws of the United States. It does not appear that the for the residue,) the appellant must further show, that appellant's boat has ever done this, or pretended to do he himself stands in that situation, which entitles him it, or, in fact, to be engaged in trade at all. to allege their partial invalidity; that his case is such, as that the part of the law which is void, is calculated, It has thus been attempted to be shown, that our if enforced, to affect or injure his rights. exclusive right is valid, even if the law granting it is to be considered as a regulation or restriction *78 of the In addition to the general prima facie presumption right of commercial intercourse between the States, on in favour of the constitutionality of every act of the ground, (1.) That the power to regulate commerce is a State Legislature, this series of laws derives a strictly a concurrent power. (2.) That the State may act peculiar claim to that presumption, from the history in any manner, in the exercise of that power, so long as of the circumstances attendant on their enactment. its laws do not interfere with any right exercised under On the 19th of March, 1787, a short time before the constitution or laws of the United States. (3.) That the meeting of the federal convention, the Legislature the appellant, in this case, has shown no right under of the State of New-York made its grant to John that constitution or these laws, and, therefore, cannot Fitch, for 14 years. From motives, of the correctness contest the validity of the exclusive grant. (4.) That of which this Court can take no cognizance, the even if the enrolment and license relied on, give a right, Legislature, on the 27th of March, 1798, thought it is not the right of intercourse for any other purpose fit to repeal that law, on the suggestion that Fitch than for the coasting trade; and the appellant does not was either dead, or had withdrawn *80 himself, show that he was carrying on, or intended to carry and that Robert R. Livingston was possessed of a on, that trade. But that the State law, in fact, is only a mode of applying the steam engine to propel boats, regulation of the internal trade and right of navigation, &c. At this time, all the laws of Congress regulating within the territorial limits of the State: that the power commerce and patents, had been for above five years to regulate this, is exclusively in the State; that the State in operation, and their provisions familiarly known. has exercised it, in the same manner, both by land and The Council of Revision, consisting of Mr. Jay, as water; and that the law is valid, although incidentally it Governor, Chief Justice Lansing, Judge Lewis, and may affect the right of intercourse between the States. Judge Benson, notwithstanding the personal regard they might well be supposed to have entertained for **32 To which it may be added, that the State law Chancellor Livingston, (who was also a member, but may be valid in part, or as enforced under particular did not sit,) thought it their duty to object to this bill, on circumstances, though it may be void under other the ground that the facts from which Fitch's forfeiture circumstances. Thus, the law may be held void, so was to arise, had not been found by some due course

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 25 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 of law. The act, however, passed the Legislature by a to examine, decide, and act upon this objection, if it constitutional majority. But he would here ask, who had sufficient force; they so nearly resembled judicial made this objection, and what were the inferences it decisions, that they might well be cited as authorities. afforded, as to the constitutionality of the law? Mr. They also showed, that the laws now objected to Jay's is a name of peculiar authority; Chief Justice had not grown out of any temporary effervescence, Lansing had been a member of the federal convention; or excitement, or party intrigues. The grant began in and both the Judges were perfectly conversant with the 1798, and had been universally ratified down to 1811. political proceedings of the day. They were adverse to this act on principle, and must be presumed to But the constitutionality of those laws had been the have presented all the objections against it which they subject of a judicial decision of the most respectable thought well founded. They not only did not think that character. The act of 1811 had a proviso, that nothing the adoption of the constitution, and the enacting by therein contained should extend to the three opposition Congress of her revenue and patent laws, had made boats actually built and launched. With regard to Fitch's privileges cease, but neither the constitution nor two of them, Livingston and Fulton filed a bill for those laws appeared to furnish any objection against a an injunction to prevent their navigating. The then similar grant to Robert R. Livingston. On the 29th of Chancellor thought the question too important to grant March, 1799, an act was passed, extending *81 the an injunction, in the first instance, and refused it; from former act for twenty years from its date, and giving that decision an appeal was made to the Court of two years for making the experiment. That passed the Errors of that State; there the constitutionality of those Council of Revision without any objection, none of laws was very ably disputed, but supported by the the judges having dreamt that it was unconstitutional. unanimous decree of that Court, and the very elaborate The time for making the experiment having run out, opinions of the Judges, which, for sound constitutional without a boat having been made, and Mr. Fulton reasoning, can scarcely be surpassed.8 having associated himself to Mr. Livingston in the investigation, on the 5th of April, 1803, the Legislature New-York is not the only State which has passed such made the grant anew to Messrs. Livingston and Fulton. laws. Massachusetts, February 7, 1815, granted to J. And that law was again approved of by the Council of L. Sullivan, a similar grant for steam tow-boats, on Revision, consisting almost entirely of new members, Connecticut river, for *83 twenty-eight years, after and differing from the first. The time granted by this the expiration of his patent, which, on February 11, law for constructing a boat, again ran out; and on 1819, was enlarged for two years. New-Hampshire, the 6th of April, 1807, it was again extended for two in June, 1816, gave him a similar privilege on the years, and that act also approved of by the Council of Merrimack. Pennsylvania, on the 26th of March, 1813, Revision. In the course of that year, the experiment was gave a similar right to James Barnes, from Wilksbarre successfully made; and on the 11th of April, 1808, the to Tioga Point, the borders of our State. Georgia, Legislature, by an act, which also passed the Council on the 14th November, 1814, gave a similar right of Revision, made a contract with Messrs. Livingston to S. Howard, for all the waters of the State, with and Fulton, by which they hoped to gain, and did gain, steam tow-boats; and by another act, 19th December, unequalled accommodations for persoss travelling in 1817, granted to a company, (probably deriving under the State. Howard,) a similar right for steam boats for twenty years. Tennessee has lately given a similar right on the **33 The success of those gentlemen awoke the Tennessee river. cupidity of others, and doubts of the constitutionality of those laws were, for the first time, raised. But, What are the provisions of the constitution alleged after these questions were first broached, and while against the validity of those laws? They are to be opposition boats were actually building, on the 9th found in the powers given to Congress, art. 1. s. 8. to of April, 1811, the Legislature passed another act, regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among which also received the sanction of the Council of the several States, and with the Indian tribes; and, Revision. These were not judicial decisions; but they also, to promote the progress of science and of the were six consecutive and deliberative *82 acts of useful arts, by securing, for limited times, to authors Judges, equally bound, by their duty and oath of office,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 26 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective referring to the journals of the Federal Convention,11 writings and discoveries. it will be found, that the sixth article of Mr. Charles Pinkney's draft has the words ‘shall have the power,’ **34 If the constitution had not contained either of &c. In the draft reported by the committee of five, the provisions referred to, the right of the States to 12 grant exclusive privileges would be unquestionable. At (art. 7th,) the definite article is still preserved. In any rate, no point could be presented to this Court, by the draft as reported by Mr. Brearly, the word ‘the’ is which it could have jurisdiction to consider the validity left out, clearly by design.13 Notwithstanding that, Mr. of their grants. In free countries, which reject the Patrick Henry and Mr. George Mason, and, indeed, the pretensions of prerogative, it is (unless constitutionally opposers of the constitution generally, thought, that by forbidden) a *84 part of the right of legislation; that instrument, as originally presented to the people, and whether wisely exercised or not, is a question all the powers given to Congress would be considered between the government and the people, with which as given to them exclusively of the States.14 Mr. this Court have nothing to do.9 Those are the only Henry said, ‘the right interpretation of the delegation provisions on the subject; for it is clear, that the 2d sec. of those *86 powers was, that when power was given, of the 4th art. (which, however, has sometimes been it was exclusively given.’ And Mr. George Mason15 mentioned,) would not have prevented the exercise of asks, ‘will powers remain to the States, which are not this right: That is only intended to secure to all citizens expressly guarded and reserved?’ This construction, of the United States, when coming into any State, the which was the general foundation of the opposition same immunities and privileges that are enjoyed by to the constitution, was strenously disavowed and the citizens of that State, and subject to the same laws reasoned against in the Federalist,16 and actually and regulations; and, unquestionably, those laws do not produced the 10th article of the amendment. The same place the citizens of other States on a different footing doctrine was, nevertheless, maintained by one of the than the citizens of the State of New-York. counsel in the case of Sturges v. Crowninshield.17 He Those provisions, before specified, cannot apply to says, ‘every power given to the constitution, unless interfere with the State laws, unless where a case is limited, is entire, exclusive and supreme.’ But the presented, the facts of which bring it within one or Court held differently; that the grant of a power to other of those provisions.10 Now, the case presented Congress does not imply a prohibition on a State to contains nothing to make either of the provisions of exercise the same right.18 And the doctrine is very the constitution applicable to it. Certainly no patent is fully enlarged upon by Mr. Justice Story, in Houston here presented touching the same subject matter, and v. Moore.19 It is also very clearly laid down in the with which the State grants are pretended to interfere. case already cited, by Thompson, J. and by Kent, Ch. On this point the appellant has no right to ask for the J.20 But the rule is more strongly, and perhaps not decision of this Court, or to claim the benefit of its less justly, laid down by Judge Tucker, in his edition jurisdiction. of Blackstone's Commentaries;21 after alluding to the Neither does the case present any ground on *85 clauses restraining the powers given, he says, ‘the sum which the application of the clause respecting of all which appears to be, that the powers delegated commerce can be made; the vessels not having to the federal government are, in all cases, to receive been engaged in trade or commerce, but in carrying the *87 most strict construction that the instrument passengers for hire. But if either of those provisions will bear, where the rights of a State, or of the people, can be applicable, what is the general rule for their either collectively or individually, may be drawn in construction, as to the extent and conclusiveness of question.’ This rule of construction must be correct; the powers they confer? In the delegation of authority for the constitution gives nothing to the States or to to Congress itself by the constitution, the phraseology the people. Their rights existed before it was formed, does not imply exclusive power. It is remarkable, that and are derived from the nature of sovereignty and even the definite article the is omitted, and it is only the principles of freedom. The constitution gives only provided that Congress shall have power, &c. And this to the general government, and so far as it operates omission was not accidental, but studiously made. By on State or popular rights, it takes away a portion,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 27 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 which it gives to the general government. In respect to extent and range, this delegation of powers ought, As Congress has no power to regulate the internal perhaps, to be liberally construed; but the States or commerce of any State, none of its regulations can the people must not be thereby excluded from the affect so much of the exclusive grant, as *89 restrains exercise of any part of the sovereign or popular rights vessels which are only used within the States; nor can held by them before the adoption of the constitution, it give to any man a permission to carry on any steam except where that instrument has given it exclusively boat navigation, which, in its beginning, and ending, to the general government. The 10th amendment of the and course, is entirely confined within the waters of the constitution was adopted to secure that construction, State: for instance, between New-York and Albany; on and it is conformable to the rules of reason and law, in Cayuga lake; on lake Ontario, and the St. Lawrence, construing every similar instrument. The truth of this from Niagara to Ogdensburg. The only questions can rule has, however, been sometimes controverted, by be, as to navigation between foreign countries, or referring to the power of naturalization as exclusive, another State and New-York; and even there, the power and reasoning from that to the others. Naturalization is of Congress could only be extended to fair cases of decided by this Court to be an exclusive power; but it trading, within the purview of the constitution, and must be so considered, not from the grant of it in the 7th not to the mere transportation of passengers; nor to article, but from the force and necessary effect of the any colourable pretence of trading, as a cover for 2d sec. of the 4th article. It is, therefore, an exception, carrying passengers, and defeating the grant. This and does not shake the general rule. distinction is, in itself, of great consequence, and peculiarly applicable to the case before the Court, **35 It is of very little importance, whether the power in which the complainant states, and the defendant *88 to regulate commerce be exclusive or concurrent admits, the vessels to have been employed in the since this State grant does not, in fact, interfere with transportation of passengers. The power given to any congressional regulation of commerce. But as the Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations, exclusive nature of that power has been always insisted and between the several States, relates to commerce, on, and used as an argument against this grant, it may in the proper acceptation of the term; ‘the exchange of be right to consider the solidity of the assertion. one thing for another; the interchange of commodities; trade or traffic.’ This is the direct subject of the power; The expression, concurrent powers, is objected to, as and by force of the auxiliary power, ‘to make all laws if it implied equality in the rights vested in Congress which shall be necessary for carrying into execution and the States. It is only a verbal criticism, that it would the foregoing powers,’ Congress has passed laws for be more correct if the term used was co-ordinate. erecting ports of entry and delivery, for the collection The term, concurrent, is adopted by the Federalist, of duties, regulation of seamen and ships employed in and has constantly been used to express those powers. foreign commerce, or that between the States. Ports, It is always understood, when so applied, that the duties, seamen *90 and ships, afford the means of exercise by the States must be subordinate, and never regulating commerce, and therefore, so far as they are can be in collision with that by Congress. It has used in such commerce, they come within the powers been said, commerce is an unit; the meaning of that of Congress. It has an incidental power, indeed, to expression does not very clearly appear, nor its force regulate navigation, but only so far as that navigation and application to the argument. If it be an unit, the is, or may be, subservient to the commerce it has a constitution has broken it into fractions, and given to direct power to regulate. It has no right to interfere with the States the exclusive control of one of the fractions. the navigation of the navigable waters of any State, or But further, the regulations relating to that unit, are even where they are common to two States, except so many and various: some acting on one part, and some far as that navigation is used for, or applicable to, the on another, and operating on it in different ways. It is purposes of the commerce it has the power to regulate; with these regulations, that this discussion has to do; and it is a proposition unequivocally false, when and the question still remains, whether some of those asserted generally, that Congress has power to interfere regulations may not, subordinately, emanate from the with or regulate the navigation of the navigable waters States. of any State or States. The proposition can only be made true, by adding the qualification, ‘in so far

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 28 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 as that navigation is used in foreign commerce, or waters within the limits of the United States, which, commerce between the States.’ It is contended, that or a corresponding act to which, it cannot do on the the navigable waters belong peculiarly to the Federal land, within the same limits. If it can, let the act be government, and not to the States within which they named. Then the navigable waters belong no more to are. This position, combined with some others, made the Federal government, and are no otherwise affected by the appellant's counsel, leads to alarming results. by the Union, than the land itself. Both are equally We have canals of which we are proud, and from their subject to the jurisdiction of the general government, tolls the State anticipates large profits; one is laying for the exercise of all powers delegated to it by out from Sharon, in Connecticut, to the Hudson; and the constitution, and both equally subject to State another contemplated through New-Jersey, from the jurisdiction, for the exercise of all powers connected Delaware to the Hudson. Those already in operation, with State sovereignty. It is said, that admiralty and run from navigable waters to navigable waters; from maritime jurisdiction belong exclusively to the Federal lake Erie or Champlain to the Hudson: those projected, government; but this Court has decided, that the grant are to be from one State to another. Their utility to the United States in the constitution, of all cases of and profits must *91 result from transporting the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, does not extend produce of Canada, or other States, to New-York, to a cession of the waters in which those cases may principally for exportation and foreign trade; and arise, or of general jurisdiction over the same; and bearing back, in return, the products of foreign that the general jurisdiction over the place, subject commerce to those places. They are, then, instruments to this grant, adheres to the territory as a portion of foreign commerce, and of that among the States; and not yet given away; and that the residuary powers mere channels of communication between navigable of legislation still remain in the State.23 Besides, waters, or different States. Now, where a power is admiralty and maritime jurisdiction depends either on given to Congress, all the means which are appropriate the place where the act is done, or the nature of *93 and plainly adapted to the execution of that power, are the act itself. The place gives no jurisdiction, where also given.22 It is contended, that it belongs exclusively the navigable waters in which the tide ebbs and flows to Congress to regulate the navigation and vessels that are within the body of a county or a State, or of two are the medium of foreign trade, and that between States.24 Accordingly, the laws giving jurisdiction of the States; this commerce is an unit, and cannot be crimes to the District and Circuit Courts, confine it to divided; the navigable waters belong to the general ‘places out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.’ government, and not to the States; no State has a right If the Admiralty Court has cognisance of any matter to collect revenue from foreign trade, or that between done on navigable waters within a State, it is derived, the States. If these positions be considered together, not from the locus, but from the causa litis, which what becomes of the State control over our canals, gives jurisdiction, though it should arise on land: for the craft on them, or the tolls from them? the pier at instance, seamen's wages, founded on shipping articles Black Rock, or the basin at Albany? If the power of made on land, have always, and charter parties and Congress over commerce be exclusive, it must also policies of insurance, have lately, been held to be of have exclusive control over the means of carrying it admiralty jurisdiction.25 on. No State, then, should be mad enough to make another canal, susceptible of being used for intercourse **37 But, it is further said, to prove the exclusive between the States, or foreign commerce. control of the general government over those navigable waters, that they are regarded and treated as the high **36 But there is no grant in the constitution seas, since this admiralty and maritime jurisdiction giving the navigable waters peculiarly to the Federal includes ‘all seizures under laws of impost, navigation government, *92 and not to the States within which or trade of the United States, where the seizures they may be; nor is it traced to any grant, but to are made on waters which are navigable from the some mystical consequence of the Union itself. The sea by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within position is entirely denied, and met by another, of their respective districts, as well as upon the high which the strictest examination is solicited. It is this: seas.’ The seizures alluded to, are for breaches of the Federal government can do no act on the navigable commercial laws, coming under the constitutional

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 29 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 powers of Congress, and the authority of the United the most strict construction that the instrument will States over the place, on that account, is equal, whether bear, where the rights of a State or of the people, either the offence *94 be committed on land or water; collectively or individually, may be drawn in question.’ and the very next sentence gives to the same District Those who contend, that navigating by steam boats Court ‘exclusive original cognisance of all seizures on between different States, falls within the powers of land, or other waters, than as aforesaid made.’ In fact, Congress, must admit that it would have the power to analogous provisions for regulating foreign commerce prohibit the carrying of goods, wares or merchandise by land, are made by the act of the 2d of March, in a steam boat from any foreign place, or different 1821, ‘further to regulate the entry of merchandise State, to another. Now, would Congress have the power imported into the United States from any adjacent to prohibit the carrying of passengers in steam boats territory.’ It directs every conductor of any carriage from Norfolk or Elizabethtown Point to New-York? or sleigh, and every other person coming from any Certainly such a power could not be contended for; and adjacent foreign territory into the United States, with why not? *96 only because the powers of Congress merchandise subject to duty, immediately on arrival have nothing to say to the carrying of passengers. within the United States, to deliver a manifest, &c. at the office of the nearest Collector, or Deputy Collector, **38 It may be urged against this train of reasoning, to be verified on oath; for noncompliance, the carriage that Congress has actually legislated on the subject or sleigh shall be forfeited. The duties to be paid or of passengers. By the act of the 2d of March, 1819, secured by bonds; and all penalties and forfeitures to regulating passenger ships and vessels, the fact is be sued for and recovered in the manner prescribed admitted; but, though the humane motives which by the general collection law. Clearly, then, Congress suggested the law; and its provisions, are laudable, has no more power over the navigable waters, than its constitutionality may well be doubted. If Congress over the land; nor over the ships, than it has over has the power to regulate the conveyance of mere the carriages and sleights engaged in the same kind passengers, coming by water from foreign countries, of commerce. It might register, enrol and license the it has an equal power to regulate those coming by latter, if it thought fit, as well as ships. Nor is there any land, or passing from one State to another. If that law greater control acquired by the general government, in be constitutional, or if a steam boat, only employed virtue of the existence of the Union, over navigable in carrying passengers between New-Jersey and New- waters or shipping, than over land and land carriages. York, can come within the jurisdiction of Congress, it The power it possesses as to ships or vessels, is only must necessarily follow, that Congress has a right (and, in so far as they are instruments of foreign commerce, indeed, according to the doctrine of our adversaries, or of that between the different States; but in so is exclusively authorized,) to regulate the number of far *95 as the employment of a ship or vessel in passengers to be received into every ordinary stage navigating the waters of any State or States, has no coach, though it does not carry the mail, and the connexion with the commerce which Congress has size, shape, description, and kind of diligence, and power to regulate; neither that employment, nor its the kind and number of horses, to be employed in regulation or prohibition, falls within the purview conveying passengers between New-Brunswick and of the federal constitution. It could not, I think, be Maine, Vermont and New-York, and through the State seriously contended, that Congress can regulate the of New-Jersey, between New-York and Philadelphia! carrying of passengers from any part of the Union, If this legislation falls under the power to regulate who are travelling to Balston, Saratoga, or any other commerce, and that power is exclusive, it must be place, for health or pleasure; and even if the object contended, that none of the States in which these of their passing were to trade, that would not legalize diligences may travel, have a right to pass any law the interference of Congress as to the mode of their respecting them! Neither this Court, nor the people conveyance from place to place. That naturally falls of the *97 United States, are, probably, prepared within the sphere of State legislation; and we must keep for the assertion of that claim. The States have in memory the rule of construction laid down by Judge always legislated on a different principle, whether the Tucker, and already cited, ‘that the powers delegated conveyance of passengers was to be by land or water. to the federal government are, in all cases, to receive Every State has, probably, made numerous provisions on this subject; but, want of time and opportunity has

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 30 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 confined research to the statutes of New-York and shall sit in this capitol; *102 if ever a numerous and Georgia.26 inland delegation shall wield the exclusive power of making regulations for our foreign commerce, without **39 *98 It is, however, contended, that the power community of interest or knowledge of our local of regulating commerce is concurrent. This position, circumstances, the Union will not stand; it cannot indeed, is by no means universally acceded *99 to. stand; it cannot be the ordinance of God or nature, that Judge Tucker, in his edition of Blackstone,27 ranks it should stand. It has been said by very high authority, among the powers exclusively granted to the federal that the power of Congress to regulate commerce, government, the power to regulate *100 commerce, ‘sweeps away the whole subject matter.’ If so, it &c. the commerce between the individuals of the same makes a wreck of State legislation, leaving only a few State being reserved to the State governments. And he standing ruins, that mark the extent of the desolation. The position, however, is not correct. A power of repeats the doctrine,28 on the very untenable ground, regulating commerce is impliedly acknowledged to be that the regulation of commerce is not susceptible of a in the States, by the 10th section of the 1st article; for concurrent exercise: a doctrine which a review of State that section makes specific limitations on its exercise laws will show to be contrary to fact and experience. by them, which would be unnecessary, if the power The opposite doctrine is strongly supported by Kent, were not possessed by them; and tacitly admits (what 29 Ch. J. in Livingston v. Van Ingen, as the only safe and is true as to all the State powers) that it is possessed in practicable rule of conduct, and the true constitutional all other matters not expressly restrained. Congress can rule, arising from the federal system. And it is the lay no tax or duty on any articles exported from any only safe *101 and practicable rule; it is one which State. If the word exports were not in the 10th section, the extent of our territory would indicate, even if the what would be the consequence? that the States, and government were despotic. In China, the Mandarins they only, could lay duties on exports; and as it is, of provinces must be intrusted with some subordinate what is the construction? that, although Congress can, authority, to make commercial regulations adapted to under no circumstances, impose a duty on exports, local circumstances. With us, the peculiar nature and any State can, with the consent of Congress, to any principles of our free and federative government, make amount; and without asking the consent of Congress, the existence of such subordinate legislation more to an amount and extent necessary for executing its prudent and politic. There must be, even in respect to inspection laws; possessing, in that respect, a power foreign commerce, local interests and details, which of regulating external commerce, which is directly cannot well be presented to the view of Congress, withheld from Congress. And *103 from whence is and can be, at least, better provided for by the State derived the power to make inspection laws, but from Legislatures, emanating from the very people to whom the existing and more extensive right of making laws they relate. This must have been perceived by the to regulate commerce? It seems, also, that the 9th framers of the constitution, and they must have felt the section of the same article, paragraph 1, in like manner, difficulty of designating the limits of what ought to be admits the power to be in the States. The importation permitted to State authority. They did not, therefore, of slaves is, and has always been, considered as a attempt the limitation, except in some plain cases, branch of commerce; and it is in that point of view which they marked by restrictions and prohibitions; only, that Congress has authority to legislate on the but they guarded against any practical abuse of the subject. When, then, that paragraph speaks of any of permission, by securing to Congress the paramount the States thinking proper to allow that importation, it and controlling power over the whole matter. This surely admits in them a right to permit or prohibit; and view of the subject is exceedingly strengthened, thus to legislate on what is undoubtedly a branch of when we contemplate the probable future increase commerce with foreign nations, or among the several and extent of this confederacy. The thirteen original States. States were a band of brothers, who suffered, fought, bled, and triumphed together; they might, perhaps, **40 Indeed, it seems susceptible of demonstration, have safely confided each his separate interest to the that Congress did not intend to ask, nor the States to general will; but if ever the day should come, when give to that body, the exclusive power of regulating representatives from beyond the Rocky Mountains foreign commerce, or that between the States. In

Colvin's edition of the Laws of the United States,30 **41 [Mr. Madison's resolution for empowering we find the proceedings, which led to the formation Congress to regulate trade.] of the General Convention. The appellant's counsel has selected, as one of these, the representation ‘Mr. Alexander White reported, according to order, a from New-Jersey, to be found in pages 22, 23. resolution agreed to by the committee of the whole art. 2d. But that can scarcely be said to have led house, on Monday last, respecting commerce,’ &c. to the convention. It was made in 1778, during the revolutionary war, and to meet objectionable ‘Whereas the relative situation of the United States parts of the old articles of confederation. At any has been found, on trial, to require uniformity in their rate, it appears from page 25, that the proposed commercial regulations, as the only effectual policy for alterations were rejected in Congress. In 1781,31 Mr. obtaining, in the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation Witherspoon *104 proposed in Congress a modified of privileges reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects change of the power of regulating commerce, which of such nations in the ports of the United States; was also negatived. None of the other States made for preventing animosities, which cannot fail to arise any proposition similar to that from New-Jersey, in among the several States, from the interference of 1778. The following, more nearly approaching the partial and separate regulations; and whereas such time of the convention, better shows the extent of uniformity can be best concerted and carried into effect what Congress asked, and the States appeared willing by the federal councils, which, having been instituted for the purpose of managing the interests of the States, to concede.32 ‘In Congress, Wednesday, July 13th, in cases which cannot so well be provided for by 1785. The committee, consisting of Mr. Monroe, Mr. measures individually pursued, ought to be invested Spaight, Mr. Houston, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. King, with authority in this case, as being within the reason to whom was referred the motion of Mr. Monroe, and policy of their institution: submit the following report: ‘That the 1st paragraph of the 9th of the articles of confederation, be altered, *106 ‘Resolved, That it is the opinion of this so as to read thus, viz. The United States in Congress committee, that the delegates representing this assembled, shall have the sole and exclusive right Commonwealth in Congress, be instructed to propose and power of determining on peace or war, except in Congress a recommendation to the States in in cases mentioned in the 6th article; of sending the Union, to authorize that assembly to regulate and receiving ambassadors; entering into treaties and their trade on the following principles, and under alliances; of regulating the trade of the States, as well the following qualifications: 1st. Giving power to with foreign nations as with each other; and of laying Congress to prohibit foreign vessels from entering any such imposts and duties upon imports and exports, as port, or to impose duties on them and their cargoes; may be necessary for the purpose. Provided, that the such duties to be uniform, and carried into the treasury citizens of the States shall, in no instance, be subjected of the State. 2d. That no State be at liberty to impose to pay higher imposts or duties than those imposed duties on any goods, wares, or merchandise imported, on the subjects of foreign powers. Provided also, by land or by water, from any other State; but may that the legislature power of the several States, shall altogether prohibit the importation from any State, not be restrained from prohibiting the importation or of any particular species or description of goods, exportation of any species of goods or commodities wares or merchandise, of which the importation is, whatsoever.’' This is what the *105 Congress itself at the same time, prohibited from all other places asked for and required. The State of Virginia was whatsoever.’ In each of those proceedings, it was among the first to meet its views; and Mr. Madison, clearly contemplated, that the individual States should in the Legislature of that State, proposed a resolution, at least retain the power of absolutely prohibiting which will be found in the same book,33 as follows: the importation of any article they thought fit, within their own respective limits. How far was this intention ‘Virginia, to wit: In the House of Delegates, subsequently departed from? Where is the power Wednesday, November 30th, 1785.’ of prohibiting the exportation or importation of any article taken from the States by the constitution?

They are indeed qualifiedly restrained from laying years'34 To which Mr. Madison, in reply, says,35 ‘We imposts or duties on exports or imports, but not from are not in a worse situation than before. That traffic entirely prohibiting their exportation or importation; is prohibited by our laws, and we may continue the and they are also restrained from laying any duty on prohibition. The Union, in general, is not in a worse tonnage; and it is, perhaps, the fair construction of situation. Under the articles of the confederation, it the instrument, that even their prohibitory legislation, might be continued for ever.’ And again,36 ‘as. to is *107 under the control of Congress, as having the restriction in the clause under consideration, it the paramount authority to regulate commerce; but was a restraint on the exercise of a power expressly valid until Congress shall have made regulations delegated to Congress, namely, that of regulating inconsistent with their laws. A review of some of commerce with foreigh nations.’ Mr. George Nicholas the laws of different States, will show that they have 37 always exercised the power of making very material also, alluding to both objections, says, ‘Virginia regulations respecting commerce. This review must be might continue the prohibition of such importation abridged; but it is of extreme importance, and if it were during the intermediate perion.’ And to obviate the possible to spread out in detail the immense mass of objection, that the restriction of Congress was a proof State laws, regulating and affecting foreign commerce, that they would have power not *109 given to them, and that among the States, it would be conclusively he remarked, ‘that they would only have had a general seen, that they have always considered themselves superintendency of trade, if the restriction had not as possessing, and have, accordingly, exercised a been inserted. But the southern States insisted on this concurrent power over both those branches of trade; exception to that general superintendency for twenty and that the power of Congress cannot be decided to years. It could not, therefore, have been a power by be exclusive, without declaring to be unconstitutional, implication, as the restriction was an exception to a an appalling body of State legislation. delegated power.’ And, finally, Governor Randolph says,38 ‘the power respecting the importation of **42 To begin with the laws respecting slaves. negroes, is an exception from the power given to The appellant's counsel has questioned their Congress to regulate commerce.’ The same doctrine constitutionality, and called them of doubtful authority. is also maintained in the Federalist.39 Let us then see That expression showed he felt their application the laws that have been made by some of the different and important bearing, if their constitationality be 40 admitted; and it has never before been called in States respecting this branch of trade. question. The constitution most clearly admits the right **43 *110 Indeed, Congress itself has recognised of the States to legislate on this subject, not merely till and acted on the power of the States to prohibit 1808, but always, unless Congress should prohibit the this trade. The constitution restrained Congress (as trade; and yet, as has been already suggested, slaves *111 has been already seen) from prohibiting the are treated in that they paragraph itself, as an article importation of negroes, & c., before 1808. But in 1803, of commerce or trade. Congress, renouncing for a it passed ‘an act to prevent the importation *112 of time the paramount right to prohibit their importation, certain persons into certain States, where, by the laws claims the right to lay a tax or duty on it. So also, 41 they *108 are treated as an article of commerce in thereof, their importation is prohibited. Proceeding the laws of Congress; for it is only under the power upon the right of the several States to prohibit, and to regulate foreign commerce, that, before 1808, they acting under its general power to regulate commerce, could forbid and make penal, the trade by our citizens it imposes additional penalties on the importing or to foreign nations, and since 1808, prohibit it entirely. landing of any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, In this point of view it was also considered, and &c., in any State which, by law, has prohibited, or the right of the States to prohibit it asserted, in the shall prohibit, their admission or importation. And it debates of the Virginia convention. On this article Mr. makes it the duty of the officers of the customs, to George Mason observed, ‘should the government be notice and be governed by the provisions of the laws amended, still this detestable kind of commerce cannot of the several States prohibiting their importation or be discontinued till after the expiration of twenty admission; and enjoins it on them vigilantly to carry into effect the said laws of such States, any law of

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 33 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 the United States to the contrary notwithstanding. How State, from 1784 to 1785, from 1785 to 1792, from could Congress do this, if the power of prohibiting the 1792 to 1799, and so down to 1810; and the 2d vol.47 trade were not unquestionably possessed by the States, contains a law passed in November, 1793, giving to in their sovereign capacity? the Governor the strongest powers on the subject. The 48 The quarantine laws further illustrate our position. The State of Virginia passed, 26th of December, 1792, ‘an appellant's counsel says, these are to be considered act reducing into one the several acts to oblige vessels merely as laws of police; they are laws of police, but coming from foreign parts, to perform quarantine;’ they are also laws of commerce; for such is the nature which act was amended on the 5th of December, of that commerce, which we are told must be regulated 1793;49 and further amended on the 19th of December, exclusively by Congress, that it enters into, and mixes 1795.50 Georgia passed her quarantine law December itself with, almost all the concerns of life. But surely 17th, 1793.51 Undoubtedly those laws derive their that furnishes an argument, showing the necessity efficacy from the sovereign authority of the States; *113 that the States should have a concurrent power and they expressly restrain, and indeed prohibit, the over it. Judge Tucker considers them as laws of entry of vessels into part of the waters and ports of 42 commerce, when he says, ‘another consequence of the States. They are all so similar, that one or two the right of regulating foreign commerce, seems to *115 may suffice as examples. The quarantine law of be, the power of compelling vessels infected with any Georgia, s. 1. prohibits the landing of persons or goods contagious disease, or arriving from places usually coming in any vessel from an infected place, without infected with them, to perform their quarantine. The permission from the proper authority; and enacts, that laws of the respective States upon this subject, were, the said vessels or boats, and the persons and goods by some persons, supposed to have been virtually coming and imported in, or going on board during repealed by the constitution of the United States:’ the time of quarantine; and all ships, vessels, boats, (and why must not that be the case, if the power and persons, receiving any persons or goods under of Congress regulating commerce be exclusive?) ‘but quarantine, shall be subject to such orders, rules and Congress have manifested a different interpretation of directions, touching quarantine, as shall be made by that instrument, and have passed several acts for giving the authority directing the same. The law of Delaware, aid and effect to the execution of the laws of the several passed the 24th of January, 1797,52 s. 1. provides, that States respecting quarantine.’ It will be recollected, ‘no master of a ship bound to any part of that State, that the first recognition by Congress of the quarantine having on board any greater number of passengers laws, was in 1796; and that only directs the officers than forty, or any person with an infectious disease, of the government to obey them; but does not pretend, or coming from a sickly port, shall bring his ship, or or attempt, to legalize them. And, indeed, it could not suffer it to be brought, nearer than one mile to any do so, if the States had no concurrent power, and the port or place of landing; nor land such persons, or their regulation of commerce was exclusively delegated to goods, till he shall have obtained a permit.’ The law of Congress; for the power which is exclusively delegated 53 to Congress, can only be exercised by Congress itself, Massachusetts, passed June 22d, 1797, s. 6. enacts, and cannot be sub-delegated by it. It is, therefore, that ‘vessels passing the castle, in Boston harbour, no reply to the force of the argument drawn from may be questioned and detained; s. 12. that vessels at those laws, to say, that they have been ratified by any other port than Boston, may be prevented from Congress. Another answer to that observation is, that coming up, and brought to anchor where the select the supposed ratification by Congress *114 did not men shall direct; s. 4. empowers the select men of any take place until 1796; and that many of those laws town, bordering on either of the neighbouring States, were in active operation several years before. For to appoint persons to attend at ferries and other proper instance, as few out of many: New Hampshire passed places, by or over which passengers *116 may pass from such infected places, which persons have power her quarantine laws first, February 3d, 1789,43 and to examine, stop and restrain such passengers from 44 again on the 25th of September, 1792. Connecticut travelling, until licensed by a Justice of the peace, or passed hers in May, 1795.45 The laws of Maryland46 the select men; and a fine of 100 pounds is enacted on show the temporary continucation of those laws in that the passenger presuming to travel onward; s. 5. gives

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 34 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 power to seize and detain suspected goods coming right to do so. On the 29th of April, 1800, Congress from any other State,’ &c. By an act of June 20th, enacted, that the light house lately erected at Clark's 1799, s. 10.54 ‘any master, &c. who shall enter the Point, &c., shall and may be supported at the expen harbour of Boston after notice of a quarantine, for all of the United States, &c. Provided, that the property vessels coming from the same place, &c., or who shall and jurisdiction of the said light house, and sufficient land, or suffer to be landed, any passenger or goods, territory for *118 the accommodation thereof, shall without permission of the board of health, is subject be fully ceded and legally vested in the United States. to fine and imprisonment.’ These are all obviously The laws of Congress on this subject, recognise, direct regulations of trade, and so is the whole of every the right of the States to maintain light houses, if quarantine system. they please. The first act, passed August 7th, 1789,57 **44 The regulation of pilots in sea ports, flows directs, that their expenses, after the 15th of August, from the power of regulating external commerce. This 1789, shall be defrayed out of the treasury of the United power, like that of making quarantine regulations, States: Provided, nevertheless, that none of the said has hitherto been exclusively exercised by the several expenses shall continue to be so defrayed by the United States; Congress having only made one law on the States, after the expiration of one year, unless such subject, and that seems explicitly to recognise the light houses shall, in the mean time, be ceded, &c. Few concurrent power of the States, and to place over States did make the requisite cession; and by the act of it the true constitutional control. By the 4th sec. of July, 1790,58 the time was extended to the 1st of July, the act of August 7th, 1789, c. 9.55 it is enacted, 1791, and so, from time to time, for five or six years, that ‘all pilots in the bays, inlets, rivers, harbours till all the States came in; during which the light houses and ports of the United States, shall continue to be in several of the States were kept up by their authority, regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the without the control of Congress. States, respectively, wherein such pilots may be; or with such laws as the States *117 may respectively **45 The inspection laws are very important hereafter enact for the purpose, until further legislative regulations of trade. Tucker says, ‘there seems to be provision shall be made by Congress.’ Now, it is a one class of laws, which respects foreign commerce, principle which cannot be too often brought into view over which the States still retain an absolute authority; or enforced, that Congress cannot delegate to State those I mean which relate to the inspection of their Legislatures, the exercise of powers which are given own produce, for the execution of which, they may to it exclusively; and the very act of referring to those even lay an impost or duty, as far as may be absolutely laws, is a recognition that the power to legislate on the necessary for that purpose. Of this necessity, it seems presumable, they are to be regarded as the sole judges.’ subject is concurrent.56 The extent *119 and importance of this system of In like manner, the laws regulating light houses, regulations does not strike the mind at the first view; buoys, &c. are all exercises of the implied powers nor do the powerful inferences it affords, to show the derived from that of regulating commerce. They have concurrent right in the States to regulate commerce. hitherto been generally left to Congress; but it does Judge Tucker has very imperfectly stated their extent. not follow from thence, that they are exclusive. Can They do, indeed, regulate, in almost every State, the it be doubted, that any State has a right to establish foreign trade, so far as it is connected with our produce a light house or buoys at its own expense, in one of to be exported; but they do not confine themselves to its harbours? That a State has such a power cannot be produce to be exported, they relate to imports also. questioned, if it be shown that individuals have. Some They act by restraining, and sometimes prohibiting, time in 1798, a number of the inhabitants of New- the exportation and importation of certain articles. Bedford, Massachusetts, raised a fund by subscription, Before examining those laws, it may be asked, from for building and maintaining a light house at Clark's whence is the right of restraining derived, but from Point, at the entrance of the harbour of New-Bedford. the more extended right of prohibiting? The difference They maintained it, and kept it regularly lighted for between regulation or restraining and interdiction, is about a year; and the act of Congress admits their only a difference of degree in the exercise of the

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 35 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 same right, and not a difference of right. The article prohibit the same navigation to row boats or sailing in the constitution, art. 1. sec. 10. impliedly allows vessels; and the extravagance of this position, it is that right to be in the several States, and the right to supposed, sufficiently refutes the assertion of a more enforce their laws by any other means than imposts limited right. First, there is an error in the statement and duties, and, therefore, by prohibitions of exports of our claim. We do not prohibit the navigation of our or imports. The right does not depend on the idea, that waters to steam boats; we only prohibit them, while the thing prohibited or restrained from being exported in our waters, from using steam as the means of their or imported, is dangerous or noxious; even if that propulsion. Every steam boat which ventures on the could, ex necessitate, create a right, and give it to the ocean, carries and uses sails; and they can, without State, instead of the congressional jurisdiction; on the difficulty, be adapted to every steam boat. Such a contrary, the rules and enactments seem arbitrary.59 vessel, therefore, may, without objection, load in a different State, or foreign port, and come, by means of **46 *120 As to trade with the Indian tribes, steam, to the verge of our waters; there is no difficulty without stopping to enter into details, it is sufficient opposed to its coming up, with its full cargo, to our to say, it must stand on the same footing as foreign custom house, entering, discharging, reloading, and commerce *121 and that among the States, as they departing, provided that, for the short space of time are all given in the same sentence. If the power of while it may be in our waters, it employs the only regulating the two latter be exclusive, so must it be things that any other vessel can employ for entering *122 with the former. And yet every State, whose and departing, and with which it is or may be amply situation places it in communication or contiguity provided—sails and oars. That is the extent of what with Indian tribes, has thought fit, and, indeed, *123 is very inconsiderately called our extravagant claim. found it necessary, by acts of their own Legislatures, Let us now examine the argument itself, and to test its to regulate their trade with the Indians, the laws soundness, let us apply it to other cases. A State has of Congress not only not exhausting, but not even no right to prohibit the use of narrow wheeled *125 adequately reaching the subject. wagons for the transportation of merchandise on any of its roads; for if it can do that, it can prohibit the use It now seems incontrovertibly established, that the of any kind of wagons, and, indeed, all transportation States have a concurrent right to legislate on matters of merchandise on any of its roads, and thus affect of foreign trade, or of that between the States; and the commerce between different States. A State has no a concurrent right to prohibit the exportation or right to regulate the assize of bread; for if it can do that, importation of articles of merchandise. If they can do it can prohibit all baking of bread, and thus starve the that, even as to the articles themselves, to which the community. Is there any one act of legislation against power of Congress expressly relates, and if the right to which the same reasoning, drawn from an excessive regulate shipping be only impliedly given to Congress, and tyrannical exercise of legislative authority, may by the general power to regulate commerce, and only not be urged? And if the argument be unsound, when so far as they are instruments of that commerce, why applied to all those instances, what makes it sound cannot a State, that has a concurrent right, within its in its application to the present question? The answer own sphere, (and that not by implication, but directly, to it is found in the rights of a free people, which and as the result of its sovereign power, unabridged and make every act of tyranny void. But, either the right unaltered by the constitution,) over all ships or vessels entirely to prohibit the use of row boats, sailing vessels, within, or coming within, its jurisdiction, prohibit and steam boats, belongs to some of the constituted the entry of any particular kind of vessels within its authorities that govern those States, or it does not. waters, subject *124 always to be controlled by the If it does not belong to any of them, then, clearly, contradictory and paramount regulations of Congress, this boasted argument falls to the ground. If it does made within the sphere of its powers. belong to some of them, to whom does it belong? Has Congress the power to make such a prohibition This leads to the consideration of an argument that of all modes of commercial intercourse, by virtue of has been frequently urged on this subject. It is said, its limited authority to regulate commerce with foreign that if a State has a right to prohibit the navigation powers, and between the different States? In answering of its waters to steam boats, it has an equal right to

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 36 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 no, the embargo laws are fully remembered, and without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor, imposed their constitutionality admitted; but it is not derived by the said State.’ The same was also done with regard from the power to regulate commerce. The embargo to the States of Mississippi and Missouri. Now, this was a measure of State policy, nearly approaching provision, so studiously introduced into all those new to war: it may sometimes be of such a character as compacts, which Congress had a right to make with *126 to derive a legitimate origin from the war new States, as the condition of their admittance into making power; but the embargo of 1807 rests for the Union, would be very singular, and very useless, its constitutionality on the power in Congress of if, by an effect of the Union itself, all navigable waters providing for the common defence and general welfare belonged exclusively to the general government; or of the United States. If, then, the power of entirely if the federal constitution, which each State adopted, prohibiting trade, as a commercial measure, exists in contained in itself an equivalent restraint on the States. some of the governing powers of those States, and does The appellant's counsel has alluded to and denied a not exist in Congress, where does it exist? Assuredly position, stated to have been used by counsel in arguing in the State Legislatures. If its exercise should ever the case of Livingston v. Van Ingen, before the Court become void, it will not be because it is contrary to of Errors, that the Legislature might, if it thought the constitution of the United States, but because it is fit, stop up the mouth of the *128 Hudson. It is oppressive to the people it affects to bind; not because of very little importance to defend what fell, on that it is unconstitutional, but because it is tyrannical. occasion from counsel, and has not been adopted by the Court; still, the learned counsel may be asked, by **47 Congress itself seems to acknowledge that what authority the State of Rhode Island has erected the constitution does not deprive the States of this a bridge over the Seakonnet branch of Taunton river, prohibitory power; for, if it did, as it binds all the essentially impairing, if not destroying, its navigation citizens of the United States, it would necessarily bind from the sea, and far below where the tide ebbs and the territorial governments, and all States admitted flows? By what authority his native State of New- into the Union subsequent to its adoption. Yet, in the Hampshire has erected a bridge from Portsmouth over ordinance of the 13th of July, 1787, for the government the Piscataqua river? By what authority his adopted of the territory of the United States north west of State of Massachusetts has built two bridges over the river Ohio,60 by art. 4th, for the government Charles river, on its tide waters, one near Boston, and of the said territory, and the States which may be the other higher up? and, by what authority the State formed therein, it is provided, among other matters, of Pennsylvania has built a dam over the Schuylkill, that ‘the navigable waters leading into the Mississippi near Philadelphia, and three miles below where the tide and St. Lawrence, and the carrying places between used previously to ebb and flow? the same, shall be common highways, and for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said territory, **48 There, however, is, in fact, no regulation *127 as to the citizens of the United States, and of commerce, made by Congress, with which this those of any other States that may be admitted into exclusive right does or can interfere. What is that the Confederacy, without any tax, impost, or duty degree or kind of interference, which is sufficient to thereon.’ It is made a fundamental provision of the invalidate a State law? different acts erecting portions of this territory into 61 States, that their constitutions shall not be repugnant to The Federalist, discussing the cases where powers this ordinance. In the act also for erecting the State of are exclusively delegated to the United States, makes Louisiana, sec. 3. it is enacted, that the convention for one of the classes, (and, perhaps, unnecessarily, if making the constitution, shall provide by an ordinance, not incorrectly,) where the constitution granted an irrevocable without the consent of the United States, authority to the Union, to which a similar authority among other things, ‘that the river Mississippi, and in the States would be, absolutely and totally, the navigable waters leading into the same, or into contradictory and repugnant; and then goes on: ‘I the gulf of Mexico, shall be common highways, and use these terms to distinguish this last case from for ever free, as well to the inhabitants of the said another, which might appear to resemble it; but which State, as to the other citizens of the United States, would, in fact, he essentially different: I mean, where the exercise of a concurrent jurisdiction might be

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 37 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 productive of occasional interferences in the policy that the States retain concurrent authority with of any branch of administration, but would not Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the 11th imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy, in point amendment of the constitution, but upon the soundest of constitutional authority.’ And again: ‘It is not, principles of general reasoning. There is this reserve, however, a mere possibility of inconvenience in the however, that in cases of concurrent authority, where exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional the laws of the States and of the Union are in direct repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and and manifest collision on the same subject, those of extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.’ the Union, being the supreme law of the land, are of paramount authority; and the State *131 laws, so far, *129 That the third class of cases, as arranged by and so far only as such incompatibility exists, must the Federalist, is unnecessary in its application to necessarily yield.’ any of the powers, and that it is derived from an erroneous notion, as to the possibility of repugnancy Although those authorities show, that nothing but a and its consequences, seems to follow, from the direct and absolute collision can produce such an principles laid down by Thompson, J. in Livingston interference as will render the State grants invalid, yet v. Van Ingen.62 ‘There are subjects upon which the a license is relied on by our adversaries, as creating this United States and the individual States must, of interference. There is a leading and fundamental error necessity, have concurrent jurisdiction; and all fears growing out of the nature and form of that instrument, and apprehensions of collision in the exercise of these and one which has induced the supposition, that a powers, which have been urged in argument, are license gives a right to trade, or a right to enter, or a unfounded. The constitution has guarded against such right to navigate the waters of the United States, to any an event, by providing that the laws of the United vessel possessing it. It, indeed, uses the words, ‘license States shall be the supreme law of the land, any is hereby granted for the said vessel to be employed thing in the constitution of any State of the contrary in carrying on the coasting trade for one year, from notwithstanding. In case of collision, therefore, the the date hereof, and no longer;’ but those words must State laws must yield to the superior authority of necessarily be understood in reference to the extent the United States.’ The same doctrine is very ably of the authority granting the permission. Equivalent words are to be found in every license to distil or to maintained by Kent, Ch. J.63 who gives, as a safe rule sell, or to do any act, the right to do which existed of construction *130 and of action, ‘that if any given prior to and independent of the authority by which power was originally vested in this State, if it has not it may be regulated; and they only mean, license is been exclusively ceded to Congress, or if the exercise granted to do the act, notwithstanding the regulations of it has not been prohibited to the States, we may made on that subject by the licensing authority, and then go on in the exercise of the power, until it comes which, without this instrument, would restrain the practically in collision with the actual exercise of some act. So far as those rights to trade, to enter, or to congressional power. When that happens to be the case, navigate, exist unmodified, they rest on the common the State authority will so far be controlled; but it will law, independent of any gift from or right conferred still be good in all those respects, in which it does not by Congress; which, in truth, has no power whereby absolutely contravene the provision of the paramount it might be enabled to make such gift, its authority law.’ being only to regulate commerce. These rights are, **49 The same doctrine is very briefly, but very all three, portions of the *132 jus commune, and so clearly laid down, by Mr. Ch. J. Marshall, in the far as the competent Legislatures have thought fit to let them remain, the right to them, and their efficacy, case of Sturges v. Crowninshield:64 ‘It is not the depend on that jus commune and the common law. The mere existence of the power, but its exercise, which right to trade is regulated by the State Legislatures is incompatible with the exercise of the same power and laws of Congress; the right to enter is modified 65 by the States.’ In Houston v. Moore, Mr. J. Story, principally by the laws of Congress; and the right to however, adopts the arrangement of the Federalist, navigate the waters, almost exclusively by the State and goes on: ‘In all other cases, not falling within the Legislatures. The license has nothing to do with any classes already mentioned, it seems unquestionable, of those rights; it only gives some privileges as to

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 38 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 payment of tonnage duties, and less frequent entries and certificate of enrolement, is to entitle unregistered at the custom houses; and it exempts the licensed vessels of twenty *134 tons and upwards, American vessel from being included within a restriction of built and property, and destined from district to district, the jus commune as to trading, by which Congress or to the fisheries, to the privileges of a ship belonging prohibits certain vessels from carrying foreign articles to the United States, employed in the coasting trade and distilled spirits from State to State: even there, not or fisheries. These I have already mentioned, to be a giving to the licensed vessel the right of doing so, but less tonnage duty, and paying it only once a year; but only exempting them from the prohibition. A review of no exclusive or peculiar right to trade any where.69 the acts of Congress on the subject, will show the truth Registered or enrolled vessels, on application to the of these positions. collector where they belonged, were entitled to receive a license to trade between the different districts in 66 **50 By the now repealed act of July 20th, 1789, the United States, or carry on the bank or whale imposing duties on tonnage, different rates were fixed: fishery for one year.70 The meaning of that license, 1st. six cents per ton on vessels built in the United notwithstanding the generality of its language, was States, &c., and belonging to a citizen or citizens of only to certify that the proper tonnage duty for that the United States; 2d. thirty cents on vessels built in year had been paid; and that the vessel was licensed, the United States, and belonging to foreigners; 3d. for that year, to trade without paying any tonnage duty. forty cents on all other ships and vessels. But it was 71 provided, that no United States built vessel, owned by That such is its object, appears from the 22d sec. a citizen, or citizens, while employed in the coasting enacting, that the master, &c. ‘shall annually procure trade, or on the fisheries, should pay tonnage more a license from the collector of the district to which than once a year; and that every *133 ship employed such vessel belongs, who is hereby authorized to give in transporting the produce and manutactures of the the same, purporting that such vessel is exempt from United States, unless United States built, and owned clearing and entering for the term of one year from by a citizen or citizens, should, on every entry, pay 50 the date thereof.’ Every vessel had a right to carry cents per ton. The only advantages, then, to American on the trade (between district and district) without a built and owned ships, were, a less tonnage duty; and, license, on paying the prescribed tonnage duties, suited if on the coasting trade, paying it only once a year; but to the case. That further appears, by a provision in the let it be well remembered, that they had no exclusive same section, (s. 23.) that if any vessel of twenty tons or peculiar right to trade any where. By the collection or *135 upwards, not having certificate of registry, or enrolment, and a license, should be found trading law of July 31, 1789,67 which established ports of entry between different districts, or be employed in the bank and delivery, it was enacted, that no ship or vessel from or whale fisheries, it should be subject to the same a foreign port, not wholly belonging to a citizen or tonnage and fees as foreign ships or vessels. citizens, should be permitted to unload at any port or place, except those there specified. **51 The act, already cited, for tonnage and duties, 72 Neither this, nor any other act, GIVES the right of was repealed by the act of July 20th, 1790; but the entering into the designated ports. It proceeds on the substituted clauses do not affect this argument. A ship supposition and the truth, that by some other code, having a license to trade between different districts, distinct from the laws of Congress, the entry into all or to carry on the fisheries, while employed therein, is places had been antecedently lawful, and then restrains only to pay the six cents per ton once a year, (i. e. on it as to all other places but those named. getting the license,) and ‘upon every ship, &c. not of the United States, which shall be entered in one district The registering, recording, and enrolling of vessels, from another, having on board goods, &c. taken in one were enacted by the act on that subject, passed district, to be delivered in another, there shall be paid September 1st, 1789.68 They were for the purpose at the rate of fifty cents per ton;'73 a duty which clearly of describing the vessel, her built, tonnage, and recognises their right to carry on that trade on those ownership; and neither they, nor their certificates, give, terms. nor purport to give, any right to trade. The enrolment,

not affect American ships not having a license, and they The former act for registering and clearing vessels, have still a right to trade coastwise, subject only to the was repealed by that passed the 18th of February, increased tonnage duty, and the necessity of making 1793. This enacted, that none but enrolled and licensed entry at every port. How, then, can it be said, that the ships, &c. (or, if under twenty tons, simply licensed,) license gives the right to carry on the coasting trade, should be deemed ships or vessels of the United States, which exists as part of the jus commune, and existed, entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed and was exercised, before the constitution, or any law in the coasting trade or fisheries. These privileges, it on the subject, was formed; and when, until March, will be again remembered, are only the paying of a less 1817, every foreign vessel had a right to carry it on; tonnage duty, and paying it but once a year; and they do and when, to this hour, every American vessel has a not comprehend any exclusive or peculiar *136 right right to carry it on, without a license or register, and to trade any where. It enacts, that before getting the only becomes subject to an increase of tonnage duty, license, the tonnage for the year must be paid; and the and the necessity of making entry at the custom-house effect and object of the license was to certify that the on every voyage? It is only a license to carry on the proper tonnage duty for that year had been paid, and coasting trade, without making entry or paying tonnage that the vessel was, therefore, licensed for that year to duties, conformably to the laws of Congress in other trade without paying tonnage. But every other vessel cases. It gives no right to enter, nor to trade, nor to had still a right to trade. By sec. 6.74 vessels of twenty navigate the waters of the United States: *138 it only tons and upwards, except registered, found trading enables the licensed vessel to do those things, in certain between district and district, or different places in the cases, on cheaper and easier terms then other vessels same district or fishery, not enrolled and licensed, &c. could, who, nevertheless, had equal rights to carry on If laden with domestic produce or manufacture, shall the same trade, though with less advantages; and now, pay the same duties as foreign ships; or, if laden with in the event of having foreign produce or manufacture, foreign produce or manufacture, or distilled spirits, or distilled spirits, on board, a license protects from a shall be forfeited. This shows that foreign ships had a forfeiture, which was not enacted for some years after right to carry on the coasting trade without a license, licenses were devised and used in their present shape. (a thing which they could not possible obtain,) on It is not, then, a license to trade, to enter, or to navigate, paying the extra tonnage duties, and making entry at but to be exempt from paying tonnage duty for a year. every port. This further and most fully appears by If, then, the position is correct, (and it undoubtedly is,) the 24th section of the same act,75 prescribing the that a license gives no right to trade, to enter a port, or duties of masters of foreign ships, bound from one to navigate its waters, no argument can be drawn from district to another, whether with a cargo or in ballast; the act of March 12, 1812, ‘respecting the enrolling and 77 and by sec. 34.76 establishing the rates of fees under licensing of steam boats.' The only object of that law that act, in which are found, ‘For granting a permit is, to enable aliens to be part owners of such vessels, for a vessel not belonging to a citizen or citizens of and to modify, as to them, the oath that the boat belongs the United States, to proceed from district to district, to a citizen or citizens of the United States. and receiving the manifest, 200 cents. For receiving **52 But, even if the right of entry, or to trade or a manifest, and *137 granting a permit to unload, navigate, were given by the acts of Congress, and for such last mentioned vessel, on her arriving in one not by the common law, as originally existing or district from another district, 200 cents.’ Indeed, until subsequently modified, this exclusive right does not the year 1817, there was no kind of prohibition on prevent the entry of any vessels into our waters, nor foreign vessels carrying on the coasting trade. On the their navigating or trading there; nor does it materially 1st of March, 1817, ‘an act concerning the navigation impede them. The only part of this exclusive grant of the United States' was passed; and by sec. 4. it was that can come under the cognizance of this Court, in enacted, ‘that no goods, wares, or merchandise, shall this case, is that on which the injunction is grounded. be imported, under penalty of forfeiture thereof, from That, and the *139 prohibition of the injunction, can one port of the United States to another port of the only be fairly considered as extending to prevent the United States, in a vessel belonging, wholly or in part, navigation of the waters by the force or agency of to a subject of any foreign power.’ This, however, does

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 40 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 steam or fire; not to prevent vessels from navigating distant States. As to those from contiguous States, and those waters, because they have a steam engine on whose trade can just as well be carried on by sails as board, and wheels at the side, if the engine and the by steam engines, it is ridiculous to say, that such a wheels be not used on our waters for propelling the regulation prohibits or interferes with their commerce. vessel, contrary to our State laws. Before the vessel Is it any part of the power intended to be delegated comes into those waters, and after it leaves them, it to Congress, to regulate as to those matters? *141 is out of the State jurisdiction, and not liable to any The utmost that can be said is, that the passage may State penalty for using the agency of steam. What, be a little longer, and may be somewhat retarded. The then, is the amount of the prohibition of entry? That doctrine of the Federalist79 applies here, that it is not the same vessel, with the same cargo and crew, may a mere possibility of inconvenience in the exercise of come up and pass through our waters, if, while in powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, our waters, she will come up and navigate under sail, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a pre- as all commercial vessels have hitherto done. In the existing right of sovereignty. Regulations for a toll- argument of this case before the Court of Errors,78 bridge may delay the mail carrier, and so far interfere one of the appellant's counsel couched his reasoning in with the execution of the power delegated to Congress, the form of a remonstrance by an English ship master of regulating the post office and post roads; but, could against those State laws. The reply can, perhaps, be he gallop over a bridge, that a State law directed should best given by turning the discussion into a dialogue. An always be crossed on a walk? English steam vessel is boarded by a pilot, outside of Sandy-Hook. ‘Captain,’ says the pilot, ‘you will have **53 But the clause in the constitution, authorizing to stop those wheels at your sides, when you get within Congress to make laws respecting patents, is our waters.’ ‘Why so?’ asks the captain. ‘Because the supposed to present another argument against the State of New-York have granted to Livingston and constitutionality of those State laws. This point, having Fulton an exclusive right of navigating in its waters by been but very slightly mentioned, and in some measure steam.’ ‘Sir,’ resumes the captain, ‘I care nothing for abandoned, by the appellant's opening counsel, would the laws *140 of New-York. I know of no laws or not be dwelt on now, if the Attorney General had not regulations of a particular State, in regard to trade and intimated an intention of insisting and relying on it. commerce. I claim the privilege of entering the harbour If the appellant had a patent of any kind, on which of New-York, under the laws of the United States, and he could rest, it might fairly be urged by us that a the treaty of amity and commerce subsisting between patent cannot give to any unpatented thing even though them and my sovereign. I insist upon my right of connected with one that is patented, the right to violate entering your waters as I please; and if your State the State law. But how does or can that question come authorities, or any one acting under them, should up in this case? There is here no allegation of a patent, prevent me, the King, my master, will know how to nor a claim of any thing entitled to be protected by enforce the rights of his subjects.’ ‘Patience, good the patent law, and the use or enjoyment of which captain, patience,’ replies the pilot; ‘let your head and has been interfered *142 with by the exclusive grant. your boiler cool; no one means to prevent your entering As the appellant claims no patent, if this power in into our waters. Only stop your machinery, and hoist Congress can furnish to him any objection against the those sails you have carried twenty times between State laws, it must be on the ground, that inasmuch this and Liverpool, and, I'll answer for it, we shall be as Congress is authorized to promote the progress of alongside the wharf as soon as you vessel, that you see science and useful arts, by securing, for limited times, bound inwards, with all her canvass spread.’ This is to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their the extent of the prohibition—the Deo dignus vindice respective writings and discoveries, every State law, nodus! When the case occurs of a vessel navigating calculated or purporting to promote the progress of across the Atlantic, without sails, the question may science and useful arts, is utterly void, merely because be discussed, whether it be a violation of the laws of that is its purport and object, even though it should Congress, that she should be required to fit herself not relate to any invention or discovery; though the to the harbour, by providing herself with a sail. The privileges it may confer should not be given on the same may be said as to coasting vessels from more score of invention or discovery, but of public policy

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 41 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 and convenience; and further, although there is no delegated to Congress, but allowed to, and constantly discovery or invention of any other person in existence, exercised by, the State governments. It is a legislative the right to which Congress could secure, and which instrument of great power, and may, therefore, be used has any relation to the State grant. That, in short, the to evil purposes; but it may be, and often has been, as in appellant, or any other person, has a right to treat the the present instance, productive of splendid benefits. It State law as a nullity, and, in violation of it, to use must reside somewhere; it does not reside in Congress; unpatented articles, and incapable of being the subject where, then, does it reside? of a patent or protection; and, that no Court or process of law has authority to restrain him from the use of Whether the power delegated to Congress be exclusive what never can come within the power of Congress; or concurrent, the power of promoting science because, peradventure, something may hereafter be and useful arts, by the introduction of imported discovered, having some relation to the subject of the improvements, and encouraging the employment of State grant, and some person may, hereafter, be entitled things not susceptible of being patented, is exclusively to claim the benefit of the constitutional protection, as in the State Legislatures. It is of great importance, an inventor. The extraordinary boldness of this position and exercised by every wise government; by England, must surprise and astonish. If the passing of the patent France, &c. It domesticates the sciences and useful law is per se competent *143 to prevent a State arts, the talents and genius of the civilized world. The granting this exclusive right, for a thing (so far as the States, in the exercise of this their exclusive power, pleadings show) not the subject of a patent, it is equally which has been employed in making those laws, are so to prevent a State granting every other exclusive not to be interfered with from any apprehension of right, and particularly if connected with science and collision in the exercise of a concurrent power, only the useful arts. If the law alone will not produce that relating to another branch of the same subject, which effect, until a patent is granted, at variance with the the State has not used, and which Congress may never exclusive right, the patent should appear, to let us see have an opportunity of using. if it be really at variance, and have that effect. I say, a concurrent power; for such is that delegated **54 If the last steam boat laws, enacted since the to Congress. One of the counsel now opposed to North River boats were in operation, had, instead of us, in his argument in the case of *145 Sturges using a general phraseology, forbid any person to use, v. Crowninshield,80 places in his third class, that is, on the waters of the State, steam boats constructed among the concurrent powers, that to promote the or made in the same manner as those then used by progress of science and useful arts; and says, very Livingston and Fulton, or in any manner before known truly, ‘from the exercise of any of these powers, the or used, or in any manner invented by a non-resident States are neither expressly, nor by any fair rule of alien, would there be any thing for the patent laws or construction, excluded.’ Judge Tucker, in his Appendix power of Congress to operate on in collision thereto? D. p. 182. 265. among the cases in which the States If not, then those State laws are so far good; and any have unquestionably concurrent, though, perhaps, one, to impeach their operation, must claim and show subordinate powers, with the federal government, that he has a boat constructed in a different manner, ranks the power to promote the progress of science and and which is patented as an invention, or, at least, is a the useful arts, by securing to the authors and inventors subject for the laws of Congress to operate upon, and the exclusive right, within the State, to their respective which he is restrained from using. writings and discoveries. In the case of Livingston v. Van Ingen,81 Thompson, J. takes for granted, that it is Has it ever been disputed that each State has a right so, and it is expressly asserted by Kent, C. J.; and in to grant exclusive privileges, where not forbidden the same case, an instance is given of its exercise, by to the Legislature by its constitution? The wisdom an act of the Legislature of New-York, in favour of Mr. and the motives of the grant, are points for which it Rumsey, passed on the 23d of February, 1789, after is responsible to the people of the State only; they the adoption of the federal constitution, and shortly can never be drawn into *144 discussion in this before the first meeting of Congress. It was entitled, Court, nor come under the control of Congress. It is a ‘for securing to James Rumsey the sole right and right inherent in the sovereignty of every country, not

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 42 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 advantage of making and employing, for a limited is founded on the common law pre-existent right of time, the several mechanical improvements by him inventors to their own discoveries, which can have lately invented.'82 I do not speak from research, but no application to the mere possessors of imported I understand that he obtained a similar patent from improvements. The constitution itself does not use the several other States. This law is a cotemporaneous word patent, and it is to be regretted that the act of exposition of the *146 constitution, and shows that Congress does; for, the use of the word implying a the State considered itself as still retaining a concurrent resemblance to the English patent, has led to a false right of legislation on the subject of inventions in view of the powers of Congress. science and the useful arts, notwithstanding the new But, in truth, according to the English acceptation constitution, and the recent transfer of similar powers of the term, Congress has no power to grant them. to Congress. It has no authority to make exclusive grants of any **55 What is the power delegated to Congress, kind; that power remains solely in the States, as a and on what principle is it founded? A confined and part of their original sovereignty, which has never partial mode of promoting the progress of science come within the purview of the federal constitution. and useful arts, viz. by securing, for a limited time, A patent, in England, and every country but this, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their implies, the creation and gift of a right, by force of the respective writings and discoveries. The Federalist , sovereign power, *148 conferring upon an individual a monopoly, in which he had no pre-existent right. This No. 43,83 says, ‘the utility of this power will scarcely can be done by the States, and only by the States. The be questioned. The copyright of authors has been power delegated to Congress, does not authorize it to solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be a right at create any right, or to give any right; it only enables common law. The right to useful inventions seems, that body to secure a pre-existent common law right, with equal reason, to belong to the inventors.’ This and for that purpose it may create and give a remedy. commentary, and the words of the constitution, show Where there is no pre-existent right to be secured, the that the power is only founded on the principle of power of Congress cannot operate. To these positions, literary property extended to inventions. It proceeds the attention of the Court is directed, as they may be upon assuming a pre-existent common law right, found important in the sequel. which, however, requires to be properly secured by adequate remedies. Its principle is entirely different **56 Although the article in the constitution is from that on which patents rest in England. They are expressed with accuracy, yet it also has employed a exclusive rights, not merely secured, but created and word, sometimes taken in different senses, and which granted; they are monopolies for things invented or has likewise contributed to a false view of the power imported, and do not suppose or act on any pre-existent of Congress: the expression is, ‘an exclusive right.’ right; but grant a right, the origin and efficacy of which The word ‘exclusive’ may well mean, as it does here, is derived from its being a gift from the *147 crown, individual, sole, or separate , in which sense, every permitted and legalized by act of Parliament. It is man's private property, to which no other man has any contended, because the English Judges have construed claim, is his exclusive property. In that sense, Judge their statute of monopolies so as to include imported Chase says, in the case of Calder et ux. v. Bull et ux.84 improvements, under the term inventions, that our ‘If any one has a right to property, such right is a perfect constitution should receive the same construction; but and exclusive right.’ But, that word, exclusive, is more there is no foundation for the position. The English frequently applied to express, that others have been Judges strained the words of their statute, contrary to excluded or shut out from the participation of what all fair construction, because they felt the importance they were previously entitled, or would, but for that of a power to encourage imported improvements, exclusion, be entitled to enjoy and use. In this sense, and saw no other way by which it could be done; the phrase, exclusive rights or privileges, is ordinarily and, besides, their interpretation went to strengthen understood. *149 But, it never was intended to give and increase the royal prerogative. But, with us, Congress any power to grant exclusive privileges; and imported improvements can be perfectly encouraged in the article of the constitution, that meaning of the by the States; and the power delegated to Congress, word would be inconsistent with the idea of securing a

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 43 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 pre-existing right. All error would have been avoided, if the adjective had been entirely omitted, or the word **57 So far, then, as relates to those State laws, individual substituted. it is impossible that their validity can be affected by the patenting of any invention or discovery made At the time of making the State grant in question, no subsequent to their enactment. But it may still be man had, and, indeed, no man yet has, any pre-existing advisable to pursue the same course of reasoning, and right to an invention, connected with the subject matter inquire how far even the existence of a patent, previous of the grant. Suppose any man, however, now to make to the passing of such acts, would *151 enable the an invention, and seek to use it without procuring patentee to use his invention in despite of them. for himself a patent, or availing himself of the power delegated to Congress, surely the law of the State The object of a patent, granted in pursuance of the would be competent to prevent his using it within its delegated power, is to perfect an imperfect right, by waters and jurisdiction. The statute law would, in that exactly ascertaining, if I may say so, its means, and instance, operate on the common law, and prevent the boundaries, and identity, and by affording an adequate common law right, pro tanto, from ever arising, in the remedy for its violation. The precise nature of the same way as in a fishery. The right of fishing, in a remedy is within the discretion of Congress; but the public navigable river, is a common right; but, suppose nature of the evil it purports to remedy, is entirely that before the birth of any given individual, a part of illustrative of the extent of the power delegated to that navigable river had, by statute, been turned into Congress. The patent law itself shows that its object is, a several fishery, surely his common right would not to turn the imperfect right into property, for it directs, entitle him to fish in that part of the navigable river that the applicant's petition shall signify a desire of which a statute had, before the commencement of his obtaining an exclusive property in his improvement. common right, turned into a separate fishery. His right And the clause giving the remedy, shows the injury to fish there never had a commencement or origin— against which Congress intended to guard, and against So with this supposed inventor. A statute, prior to the which alone it had any power, under the constitution, commencement of his common law right, so acted on to provide a guard: where any person ‘shall make, that common law itself, that a right *150 in him to devise, use, or sell’ the thing, whereof the exclusive use his invention, in the waters of the State, never had right is secured to the patentee by such patent, &c.85 a commencement or origin. Now, suppose the inventor But, no remedy is provided against preventing the to procure a patent; would that enable him to use his patentee from making, devising, using or selling the patented invention within the jurisdiction and waters thing so patented. That, if any grievance at all, is one of a State, contrary to its statutes? If it did, what would not within the purview of the act, nor within the powers be its operation? The delegated power is only to secure of Congress, and against which, therefore, no remedy a pre-existent right; it can only do that, so far as there is is there provided. a pre-existent right; where there is not, there is nothing to be secured. So far, then, as relates to any use or The object of this power, and of the law made under exercise of the invention within the State, there would it, is to give to the pre-existent but imperfect right, the be no right to be secured, and nothing for the power of security and attributes of actual *152 property. When Congress to operate upon. But further, if the inventor, the law of Congress has done that, it is functus officio; before obtaining his patent, could not legally use his and it leaves that right, which it has placed in the class invention, but, after obtaining his patent, could use it in of actual property, to be used and enjoyed like every despite of the State laws, the patent would then create other kind of actual property, conformably to the laws and give a right that did not exist before, and thus of the place where it is to be enjoyed. That which is transcend the power delegated to Congress, which does thus the object of the power and law of Congress, is not enable that body to create or give any right, but the patent-right, which it has, as it were, converted into only to create and give a remedy, for the purpose of a chattel. But the difference between the patent-right securing an existing right, which derives its origin and and the thing patented, is great and palpable, equal to force from some other law or laws than those made by the difference between a copy-right and a book. If a congress. State attempted to authorize a violation of these rights, to enable another to make use of or vend the thing

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 44 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 patented, or to print the book, or to throw open and mode of drawing lotteries, which is, unquestionably, in common, the patent-right or the copy-right, then its a great improvement, simplifying the operation, and, law would be unconstitutional. But the rights, and only by completing it in less than five minutes, preventing the rights, are the object of the power and laws of all insurances, and many of the evils attendant on the Congress; the things themselves are personal property old mode. But, could he, because his invention is an or chattels of the ordinary kind, to be enjoyed, like all improvement and patented, insist on a right to use it, other property, subject to laws over which Congress and draw lotteries in the State of New-York, contrary has no control. to its laws, and indeed, now, to the express provisions of its constitution? No. The power to prohibit the **58 If so, why has not a State a right to prohibit the use of patented things, either generally or locally, use of the thing patented within its jurisdiction? It can must reside somewhere. Can Congress prohibit the do so, as to all other kinds of property. It is no argument use of locally injurious, but patented, things, in the to say, that if one State can do it, every State can do waters, or the cities, or the populous towns of New- it. If every State wished to do it, how could they, or York? If not, because it has no power of regulation or why should they, be prevented? But, is not that the case prohibition, where does that power reside? If it reside, with every kind of property? And if they should extend as it must, exclusively in the State Legislatures, or that power over any species of unpatented property, subordinate authorities, who but their constituents can could Congress interfere? The individual States having inquire into the motives or propriety of their exercise of that power over every kind of *153 originally perfect that power, or the extent to which it should be carried? property, can it be supposed, that because Congress If the States have not that regulating and controlling was empowered to turn imperfect into perfect property, power, as Congress assuredly has it not, what is the this newly secured species should occupy a superior consequence? A patent can be got for any thing, and class, and possess privileges and exemptions that were with no previous competent authority to decide upon never attached to any other kind of property? The its utility or fitness. If it once issues from the patent power of regulating and prohibiting the use of every office, as full of evils as Pandora's box, if they be kind of property must be somewhere; it is a necessary as new as those that issued from thence, it is above part of legislative sovereignty, and must be intrusted the restraint and control of the State Legislatures—of to some constituted authority. As to all other kinds of the Legislature of the United States—of every human property, it is undoubtedly in the State Legislatures. authority! *155 I put the case of their being noxious Things patented may be dangerous or noxious; they or dangerous; but there may be a multitude of other may be generally useful, and locally injurious; such, reasons for regulating, restraining, or even prohibiting for instance, might be torpedoes in a peaceful and their use; of these Congress can take no cognizance. commercial port; fire balloons and squibs in a populous If the State governments can take no cognizance of city; though, in some places and on some occasions, them, no institution can; if they can take cognizance, they may well be useful and advantageous, or, at least, their power is exclusive, and their exercise of it cannot harmless. Among the curiosities in the patent office, be reviewed. Could Congress (incapable as it is, of there probably are some patented velocipedes. The itself, prohibiting the use of patented things,) pass a Corporation of New-York, in 1819, by an ordinance, law, in words, that a patentee shall have a right to use prohibited the use of any velocipede in the streets of his patented machine in any State, notwithstanding any that city. Had it not a right to do so; and could the owner prohibitory laws of that State? Would that be within of any of those patent velocipedes use them in the the power of Congress? How, then, can implication streets, in despite of that ordinance? The Legislature of give to the patentee the same right? If a patent can New-York has, for many years, prohibited the drawing give a right to use the thing patented, in contravention of any lotteries there, except what it has granted to of this exclusive right, it would have the same effect certain public institutions, such as Union College, and in contravention of any other exclusive right granted the College of Physicians. By virtue of the prohibition by a State. Ferries, stage-coaches, &c. all the grants to others, and the grant to those institutions, they respecting them, would be broken down by some have obtained an exclusive right of drawing lotteries. patented vehicle, for, they are all, in pari materia, similar to *154 that, the constitutionality of which is exclusive grants, from motives of public policy; and, now in controversy. Joseph Vanini has patented a new

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 45 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 having no connexion with the principle of literary inducement of its proferred reward, and by the property, which is the origin and the object of patent- subsequent liberality of its contract, has called into rights, they cannot be affected by any power given existence the noblest and most useful improvement of to Congress. A State has the same jurisdiction and the present day. Genius had contended with its inherent authority over its rivers and lakes, that it has over its difficulties, for generations before; and if some had canals. Now, if the Legislature of New-York judged it nearly reached, or some even touched, the goal, they advisable so to do, could it not prohibit any boat, using sunk exhausted, and the result of their efforts perished some patented machinery, from navigating its western in reality, and almost in name. Such would, probably, canal? If it could, why could it not make the *156 have been the end of Fulton's labours; and, neither the same prohibition as to its rivers and lakes; and if the act wealth and talents of his associate, nor the resources here should be an excess or abuse of legislation, would of his own great mind, would have saved him from the not its responsibility be exclusively to the people of the fate of others, if he had not been sustained, for years, by State? the wise and considerate encouragement of the State of New-York. She has brought into noonday splendour, **59 The State of New-York, from motives not an invaluable improvement to the intercourse and examinable here, made a contract, which is the consequent happiness of man, which, without her foundation of our right; it could only do so by a aid, would, perhaps, have scarcely dawned upon our law. The State had a right to contract, and, so far, grandchildren. She has not only rendered this service it stands on the same footing as if one individual to her own citizens, but the benefits of her policy have contracted, for a valuable consideration, with another, spread themselves over the whole Union. Where can to receive his supplies of any article from him only. In you turn your eyes, and where can you travel, *158 the case of individuals, could a man, having a patented without having your eyes delighted, and some part of improvement of the same article, insist on annulling the fatigues of your journey relieved, by the presence that contract, as interfering with his exclusive right of a steam boat? The Ohio and Mississippi, she and patent? If not, why should not a State, capable of has converted into rapid channels for communicating contracting, have the same right to make that bargain, wealth, comforts and enjoyments, from their mouths and, consequently, exclude the use of the patented to their head waters. And the happy and reflecting article in its jurisdiction and domain, as an individual inhabitants of the States they wash, may well ask has in his own house and farm? The waters of the themselves, whether, next to the constitutions under State are the domain and property of the State, subject which they live, there be a single blessing they enjoy only to the commercial regulations of Congress. Why from the art and labour of man, greater than what they should not the contract of a State, in regard to its have derived from the patronage of the State of New- domain and property, be as sacred as that of an York to Robert Fulton. But the mighty benefits that individual? Such a contract was in this, and may in have resulted from those laws, are not circumscribed, many cases, be very useful and advantageous. Who even by the vast extent of our Union. New-York may is to judge of that but the State Legislatures? Could raise her head, she may proudly raise her head, and Congress have made this contract, or acquired this cast her eyes over the whole civilized world; she there benefit for the State? Certainly not. If the State cannot, may see its countless waters bearing on their surface what power or authority can? And is it come to this, countless offsprings of her munificence and wisdom. that a contract, such as every individual in the land may She may fondly calculate on their speedy extension wisely and lawfully *157 make, for his own benefit, in every direction and through every region, from and to be enforced in his own premises, no State, and Archangel to Calcutta; and justly arrogating to herself no authority for any State, can make for its benefit, and the labours of the man she cherished, and, conscious to be enforced in its jurisdiction? of the value of her own good works, she may turn the mournful exclamation of AEneas into an expression of There are circumstances connected with those laws, triumph, and exultingly ask, sufficient to make any tribunal require the strongest arguments before it adjudged them invalid. The State **60 Quae regio in terrris, nostri non plena laboris? of New-York, by a patient and forbearing patronage of ten years, to Livingston and Fulton, by the tempting

to levy war, to make peace, to establish and regulate And it is, after all those advantages have beer acquired commerce, to encourage the arts, and generally to and realized to the world—after numerous individuals perform all other acts of sovereignty. It was also have embarked their fortunes, or *159 the faith of conceded, that the government of the United States those grants, and a ten years acquiescence in the is one of delegated powers; and the counsel for the decision by which they were sanctioned—after the respondent added, that it is one of enumerated powers. property they have created has been diffused among Yet they admitted that there were implied powers, and a multitude of possessors—after it has become the had given a different rule for the construction of the sole support of the widow and the orphan—after it two classes of powers, which was, that ‘the express has received and exhausted the accumulated savings powers are to be construed strictly, the implied powers of the laborious and industrious heads of families, that liberally.’ But the implied powers, he presumed, were a decision is required, which cannot, indeed, undo only those which are necessary and proper to carry the lasting benefits already procured to the world, the powers, expressly given, into effect—the means to but would, assuredly, undo many of those who have an end. This clause had not been generally regarded confided their wealth and means to the stability and as, in fact, giving any new powers. Congress would observance of those laws! have had them without the express declaration. *161 The clause was inserted only ex abundanti cautela. The Attorney-General , for the appellant, in reply, With this explanation, it might be conceded, that the insisted, that the laws of New-York were constitution of the United States is one of delegated and unconstitutional and void: enumerated powers; and that all powers, not delegated 1. Because they are in conflict with powers exclusively by the constitution to the national government, nor vested in Congress, which powers Congress has fully prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the exercised, by laws now subsisting and in full force. States respectively, or to the people. The peculiar rule of construction demanded for those powers, might 2. Because, if the powers be concurrent, the legislation also be conceded: that the express powers are to be of the State is in conflict with that of Congress, and is, strictly construed, the implied liberally. By which was therefore, void. understood to be meant, that Congress can do no more than they are expressly authorized to do; though the He stated, that the powers with which the laws of means of doing it are left to their discretion, under no New-York conflict, are the power ‘to promote the other limit than that they shall be necessary and proper progress of science and the useful arts, by securing, for to the end. a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and inventions,’ and **61 On the other hand, the counsel for the the power ‘to regulate commerce with foreign nations, respondent themselves admitted, that Congress, and among the several States.’ If these powers were nevertheless, has some exclusive powers; and, in exclusive in Congress, and it had exercised them by conformity with the decisions of the Court, they admit *160 subsisting laws; and if the laws of New-York that those exclusive powers exist under three heads. interfere with the laws of Congress, by obstructing, (1.) When the power is given to Congress in express impeding, retarding, burdening, or in any other manner terms of exclusion. (2.) When a power is given to controlling their operation, the laws of New-York are Congress, and a like power is expressly prhibited to void, and the judgment of the State Court, founded on the States. (3.) Where a power given to Congress, is of the assumption of their validity, must be reversed. such a nature, that the exercise of the same power by the States would be repugnant. In discussing this question, the general principles assumed, as postulates, on the other side, might be, for With regard to the degree of repugnancy, it was the most part, admitted. Thus, it might be admitted, that insisted, that the repugnancy must be manifest, by force of the declaration of independence, each State necessary, unavoidable, total, and direct. Certainly if became sovereign; that they were, then, independent of the powers be repugnant at all, they must be so with all each other, and foreign to each other; that by virtue of these qualifications. If Congress, *162 in the lawful their separate sovereignty, they had, each, full power exercise of its power, says that a thing shall be done,

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 47 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 and the State says it shall not; or, which is the same rested on the constitutional requisition, that the rule thing, if Congress says that a thing shall be done, on established under it should be uniform.86 certain terms, and the State says it shall not be done, except on certain other terms, the repugnancy has all **62 It had been objected, that this would have been a the epithets which can be lavished upon it, and the State concurrent power, but for the auxiliary provision in the law must be void for this repugnancy. constitution, that a citizen of one State shall be entitled to all the privileges of a citizen in every other State. A new test for the application of this third head of The answer was, that it is not so determined by the exclusive power, had been proposed. It was said, that Court in the case cited, and that the commentators on ‘no power can be exclusive from its own nature, the constitution place it exclusively on the nature of the except where it formed no part of State authority power as described in the grant.87 previous to the constitution, but was first created by the constitution itself.’ But why were these national *164 So also, the power of establishing uniform powers thus created by the constitution? Because they laws on the subject of bankruptcies, is clearly an look to the whole United States as their theatre of exclusive power from its nature. The Court has, indeed, action. And are not all the powers given to Congress determined, that until Congress thought fit to exercise of the same character? Under the power to regulate the power, the States might pass local bankrupt commerce, the commerce to be regulated is that of the laws, provided they did not impair the obligation of United States with foreign nations, among the several contracts; but, that as soon as Congress legislate on the States, and with the Indian tribes. No State had any subject, the power of the States is at an end.88 previous power of regulating these. The same thing might be affirmed of all the other powers enumerated But it had been said, that this doctrine takes away in the constitution. They were all created by the State power, by implication, which is contrary to constitution, because they are to be wielded by the the principles of interpretation laid down by the whole Union over the whole Union, which no State commentators on the constitution. It was not the could previously do. If any one power, created by opinion of the authors of the Federalist, that a State the constitution, may be exclusive for that reason, power could not be alienated by implication. Their then all may be exclusive, because all are originally doctrine was, that it might be alienated by implication, created. If, on the other hand, we are to consider provided the implication be inevitable; and that it is the powers enumerated in the constitution, not with inevitable wherever a direct and palpable repugnancy reference *163 to the greater arm that wields them, exists. The distinction between repugnancy and and the more extended territory over which they occasional interference, is manifest. The occasional operate, but merely in reference to the nature of the interference, alluded to in the Federalist, and admitted particular power in itself considered; then, according by this Court, in its adjudications, is not a repugnancy to this new test, all the powers given to Congress between the powers themselves: it is a mere incidental are concurrent; because there is no one power given interference in the operation of powers harmonious to it, which, considered in this light, might not have in themselves. The case put, was of a tax laid by been previously exercised by the States within their Congress, and a tax laid by the State, upon the same respective sovereignties. But this argument proved too subject, e. g. on a tract of land. The taxes operate much: for, it has been conceded, that some of the upon, and are to be satisfied out of the same subject. powers are exclusive from their nature; whereas, if the It might be inconvenient to the proprietor to pay both argument were true, none of them could be exclusive. taxes. In an *165 extreme case, the subject might On this argument, the entire class or head of exclusive be inadequate to the satisfaction of both. Then the tax powers, arising from the nature of the power, must be laid by the paramount authority must be first satisfied. abolished. But this Court had repeatedly determined, Still, this incidental interference in their operation, is that there is such a class of exclusive powers. The not an inherent repugnance in the nature of the powers power of establishing a uniform rule of naturalization, themselves. is one of the instances. Its exclusive character is It was also said, that to constitute the power an exclusive one in Congress; the repugnance must be

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 48 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 such, that the State can pass no law on the subject, off its bondage by the war of the revolution, and was which will not be repugnant to the power given to left exhausted and poor—poor in every thing but virtue Congress. and the love of country. It was still dependent on the arts of Europe, for all the comforts, and almost all the This required qualification before it could be necessaries of life. We had hardly any manufactures, admitted. Some subjects are, in their nature, extremely science, or literature of our own. Our statesmen multifarious and complex. The same subject may saw the *167 great destiny which was before the consist of a great variety of branches, each extending nation, but they saw also the necessity of exciting itself into remote, minute, and infinite ramifications. the energies of the people, of invoking the genius One branch alone, of such a subject, might be given of invention, and of creating and diffusing the lights exclusively to Congress, (and the power is exclusive of science. These were objects, in which the whole only so far as it is granted,) yet, on other branches nation was concerned, and were, therefore, naturally of the same subject, the States might act, without and properly confided to the national government. The interfering with the power exclusively granted to States, indeed, might have exercised their inherent Congress. Commerce is such a subject. It is so power of legislating on this subject; but their sphere complex, multifarious and indefinite, that it would of action was comparatively small; their regulations be extremely difficult, if not impracticable, to make would naturally have been various and conflicting. a digest of all the operations which belong to it. Discouragement and discontent would have arisen in One or more branches of this subject might be given some States, from the superior privileges conferred on exclusively to Congress; the others may be left open to the works of genius in others; contests would have the States. They may, therefore, legislate on commerce, ensued among them on the point of the originality though they cannot touch that branch which is given of inventions; and laws of retortion and reprisal exclusively to Congress. would have followed. All these difficulties would be avoided by giving the power to Congress, and giving **63 So Congress has the power to promote the it exclusively of the States. If it were wisely exerted by progress of science and the useful arts; but only in Congress, there could be no necessity for a concurrent *166 one mode, viz. by securing, for a limited time, exercise of the power by the States. to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries. This might be an The terms of the grant are, ‘Congress shall have exclusive power, and was contended to be so. Yet, there power to promote the progress of science and the are a thousand other modes in which the progress of useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors science and the useful arts may be promoted, as, by and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective establishing and endowing literary and philosophical writings and discoveries.’ This exclusive right is to be societies, and many others which might be mentioned. co-extensive with the territory of the Union. The laws Hence, notwithstanding this particular exclusive grant to be made for securing it, must be uniform, and must to Congress, of one mode of promoting the progress extend throughout the country. The exclusive nature of science and the useful arts, the States may rightfully of every power is to be tested by the character of the make many enactments on the general subject, without *168 acts which Congress is to pass. This is the case any repugnance with the peculiar grant to Congress. with the naturalization laws. The exclusiveness of the power to establish them, resulted from their character But, to come now to the question, whether these State of uniformity. So here, the exclusiveness results from laws be repugnant to this grant of power, we must the character of the right which they are to confer. It first inquire, why it was conferred on Congress? Why is to be exclusive. It is not, indeed, said, that Congress was it thought a matter of sufficient importance to shall have the exclusive power, but it is said that they confer this power upon the national government? The shall have power to do a certain act, which, when answer to this question would be found in the history done, shall be exclusive in its operation. The power of the country, in the nature of our institutions, and to do such an act, must be an exclusive power. It the great national objects which the constitution had can, in the nature of things, be performed only by in view. The country was in its infancy; its population a single hand. Is not the power of one sovereign to was small; its territory immense: it had recently thrown confer exclusive rights, on a given subject, within a

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 49 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 certain territory, inconsistent with a power in another subject. If this concurrent power would defeat the independent sovereign, to confer exclusive rights on power of Congress, by withdrawing from it the whole the same subject, in the same territory? Do not the territory on which it is to act, it would also defeat it powers clash? The right to be conferred by Congress, by giving a monopoly of all the elements with which is to exclude all other rights on the subject in the invention is to work. This has been done by these United States; New-York being one of those States. laws, as to fire and steam. Why should it not be done The right to be conferred by New-York, is to exclude equally with all the other elements, such as gravitation, all other rights on the subject within the State of New- magnetism, galvanism, electricity, and others? What is York. That one right may exclude another, is perfectly to consecrate these agents of nature, and secure them intelligible; but that two rights should reciprocally from State monopoly, more than fire or steam? If not, exclude each other, and yet both continue to subsist then is the power of Congress subject to be defeated in perfect harmony, is inconceivable. Can a concurrent by this concurrent power, first by a monopoly of all the power exist, if, from the very nature of its action, it territory on which it can act, and then by a monopoly of must take away, or render nugatory, the power given all the elements and natural agents on which invention to Congress? Supposing the power to be concurrent, can be exerted. Still it would be said, that there is Congress may secure the right for one period of time, no direct repugnance between these powers, and that and the respective States for another. Congress may the power of Congress may still act. But on what *169 secure it for the whole Union, and each State can it act? The territory is gone, and all the powers may secure it to a different claimant, for its own of invention are appropriated. There is no difference territory. Congress possesses the power of granting an whatever between a direct enactment, that the law of exclusive right to authors and inventors, within the Congress shall have no operation in New-York, and United States. New-York claims the power to grant enactments which render that operation impossible. If, such exclusive right within that State. An author or then, this process of reasoning be correct, the inevitable inventor in that State, may take a grant for a period conclusion from it is, that a power in the States to of time far longer than that allowed by the act of grant exclusive patents, is utterly inconsistent with the Congress. He may take a similar grant from every other power given to the national government to grant such State in the Union; and thus this pretended concurrent exclusive patents: and hence, that the power given to power supersedes, abrogates, and annuls the power Congress is one which is exclusive from its nature. of Congress. What would become of the power of Congress after the whole sphere of its action was taken *171 But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that away by this concurrent power of the States? Who the States have this concurrent power, yet it cannot be would apply to the power of Congress for a patent or a denied, that if the legislation of the State be repugnant copy-right, while the States held up higher privileges? to the laws of Congress, that of the State is void, so This concurrent legislation would degenerate into far as the repugnance exists. In the present case the advertisements for custom. These powers would be in repugnance is manifest. The law of Congress declares, the market, and the highest bidder would take all. Are that all inventors of useful improvements throughout not powers repugnant, when one may take from the the United States, shall be entitled to the exclusive right other the whole territory on which alone it can act? in their discoveries for fourteen years only. The law of Is not the repugnance such as to annihilate the power New-York declares, that this inventor shall be entitled of Congress, as completely as if the whole Union was to the exclusive use of his discovery for thirty years, itself annihilated? and as much longer as the State shall permit. The law of Congress, by limiting the exclusive right to fourteen **64 Something had been said of Congress repealing years, in effect declares, that after the expiration of that the laws of the State, wherever they should conflict time, the discovery shall be the common right of the with those of the Union. But where is this power whole people of the United States. The law of New- of repeal? There is no such head of power in York declares that it shall not, after fourteen years, be the constitution. Congress can act only by positive the exclusive right of the people of the United States, legislation on any subject, and this it has done in but that it shall be the exclusive right of this inventor the present instance. But this action *170 would for thirty years, and for so much longer as she, in her be in vain, if another authority can act on the same sovereign will and pleasure, may permit. If this be not

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 50 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 repugnance, direct and palpable, we must have a new with the constitution, ‘inventors;’ and the decisions vocabulary for the definition of the word. upon the construction of this statute might be referred to, in order to show that it has been considered as **65 But it was said, that the appellant had no patent embracing discoveries imported from abroad.89 But, under the United States, and therefore, could not raise even acceding to this doctrine, it might be asked the question. To this it was answered, that it was not whether the question now before the Court had any necessary that he should have a patent. The question thing to do with an art, machine, or improvement, as to the validity of the law of New-York, is raised, imported from abroad? The privilege here granted by whenever a right is asserted under that law, and is the State, is to an American citizen, who claims to be resisted by the *172 party against whom it is asserted; the inventor. The privilege is the reward of invention, and that validity is to be tested, not by comparing the not of importation, and this it is which brings it in law of New-York with a patent, but by comparing it conflict with the act of Congress. It is true, the law with the constitution and laws of the United States. does not call him the inventor; it calls him merely It was also said, that there could be no repugnance, the ‘possessor.’ But, can the constitution and laws of because it was admitted, that wherever a patent from the United States be evaded in this manner? If he the United States appears, the patent obtained under the was not the inventor, why this unjust tax which has State law must yield to it; that the patent under the State been levied upon our admiration and gratitude? When is valid only until the patent from the paramount power the validity of a law is challenged for a fraudulent appears; and that the rights derived from the different evasion of the rights of others, you are not bound sovereigns must be found practically to clash, before by its own averments, but may resort to proof *174 the law of New-York was to give way for repugnancy. aliunde to establish the facts. The word possessor is This is an insidious argument, and fraught with all the a new and unusual word to apply to such a case, and dangers which have been enumerated. For if the New- marks a studious effort to conceal the truth. He was, York patentee be the inventor, the law of New-York of necessity, either the inventor or the importer. If he is absolute, and however unconstitutional it may be, was the importer, there is no conceivable reason why there is no power of resistance. Besides, the argument he should be called by any other than that name. The is incorrect. To illustrate this, suppose a grant from Legislature of New-York, in its act in behalf of Fitch, Virginia, within the military reservation in Ohio, after passed before the adoption of the constitution, had no she had ceded the whole territory to the United States; difficulty in applying the natural and appropriate name would the party in possession, even if a mere intruder, to him. But when the final law was passed in favour be bound to show a grant from the United States, before of Livingston and Fulton, in 1798, the constitution of he could resist the unlawful grant of Virginia? But the United States, which cedes this power to Congress, there the plaintiff would be claiming under a State had been adopted, and the laws by which that power which had previously ceded away the power to make is executed had been passed. This constitution and such grants, which is precisely the case here, so that these laws used the term inventors. But the privilege there need be no repugnance arising from patents. If a was too short. The State of New-York offered better repugnance exist between the laws of New-York and terms. The only difficulty was, to give them effect the constitution and laws of the United States, any without encroaching upon that power which had been citizen of the United States has a right to act *173 as constitutionally exercised by Congress. It would not if the law of New-York were a nullity; and the question do to call them inventors, and the device was adopted of its nullity and validity arises, wherever an attempt of calling him merely the possessor, which was a is made to enforce it. manifest evasion of the law of Congress.

But it was argued that the power of Congress is **66 But it was contended, that the patent laws of limited to inventors, and that the power to encourage the United States give no right; they only secure a by patents the introduction of foreign discoveries, pre-existing right at common law. What then do these stands clear of this constitutional grant. If it were statutes accomplish? If they do nothing more than give necessary, this doctrine might be questioned. The the inventor a chattel interest in his invention, and statute of the 21st James I. c. 3. uses the same word a remedy for its violation, he had these at common

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 51 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 law. And if they only give him a mere right to of an act of Congress, by taking the power from the use his invention in the States, *175 with their National Legislature into their own hands? Can they permission, he had that before. The case of Millar prohibit the publication of an immoral book, licensed v. Taylor proves the right to have been perfect at by Congress, on the pretext of its immorality, and common law. The time of enjoyment was far greater. then give an exclusive right to publish the same book Thompson's Seasons had been published forty years themselves? Can they prohibit the use of an invention when that action was brought. If the patent and copy- on the ground of its noxiousness, and then authorize the right laws were merely intended to secure an exclusive exclusive use of the same invention by their own law? right throughout the United States, and are, in fact, a limitation on the common law right, (as was contended **67 But there is no pretext of noxiousness here. The by the respondent's counsel,) when this right has authority to enact these laws is taken up under a totally been thus secured throughout the United States, and a distinct head of State power. It is the sovereign power limitation constitutionally put upon it by Congress, can to grant exclusive privileges and create monopolies, a State interfere with this regulation? The limitation is the constitution and laws *177 of the United States not for the advantage of the inventor, but of society at to the contrary notwithstanding. This is the real power large, which is to take the benefit of the invention after under which these laws are defended; and it may the period of limitation has expired. The patentee pays perplex, although it cannot enlighten the discussion, to a duty on his patent, which is an effective source of confound it with another and a distinct head of State revenue to the United States. It is virtually a contract power. If then the power of securing to authors and between each patentee and the people of the United inventors the use of their writings and discoveries, be States, by which the time of exclusive and secure exclusively vested in Congress, the acts of New-York enjoyment is limited, and then the benefit of the are void, because they are founded on the exercise discovery results to the public. A State cannot, by its of the same power by the State. And if the power local laws, dereat this resulting interest of the whole be concurrent, these acts are still void, because they Union. interfere with the legislation of Congress on the same subject. But it was said that a State might prohibit the use of a patented machine, if it be noxious to the health of These laws were also void, because they interfere with its citizens, or of an immoral or impious book, the the power given to Congress, to regulate commerce copy-right of which had been secured. The answer with foreign nations and among the several States. This to all such arguments was, that it would be time nullity of the State laws would be supported, first, upon enough to consider such questions when they arise. the ground of the power being exclusive in Congress; The constitutional power of Congress is to patent and, secondly, that if concurrent, these laws directly useful discoveries. The *176 patent authorizes the interfered with those of Congress on the same subject. patentee to use his invention, and it is the use which That this power was exclusive, would be manifest is secured. When a discovery is deemed useful by from the fact, that the commerce to be regulated, the national government, and a patent shall issue was that of the United States; that the government authorizing the patentee to use it throughout the United by which it was to be regulated, was also that of States, and the patentee shall be obstructed by a State the United States; and that the subject itself was in the exercise of this right, on the ground that the one undivided subject. It was an entire, regular, discovery is useless and dangerous, it will be time and uniform system, which was to be carried into enough to consider the power of the States to defeat the effect, and would not admit of the participation and exercise of the right on this ground. But this is not the interference of another hand. Does not regulation, ex question before the Court. It might be admitted, that vi termini, imply harmony and uniformity of action? the State had authority to prohibit the use of a patented If this must be admitted to be the natural and proper machine on that ground, or of a book, the copy-right of force of the *178 term, let us suppose that the which had been secured, on the ground of its impiety additional term, uniform, had been introduced into the or immorality. But the laws which are now in judgment constitution, so as to provide that Congress should were not passed upon any such ground. The question have power to make uniform regulations of commerce raised by them is, can the States obstruct the operation

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 52 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 throughout the United States. Then, according to and with a strong leaning towards State pretensions, the adjudications on the power of establishing a considers the power to regulate commerce as an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws exclusive power.90 But the difference between them is of bankruptcy, throughout the United States, this rather in appearance, than in reality. It does not appear power would unquestionably have been exclusive in that the author of that number of the Federalist, did Congress. But regulation of that commerce which himself consider these police regulations as, properly pervades the Union, necessarily implies uniformity, speaking, regulations of the commerce of the Union. and the same result, therefore, follows as if the word But the objectors to the constitution had presented had been inserted. them as such, and his argument in substance is, that if *180 they are, the constitution does not affect With regard to the quarantine laws, and other them. The other commentator did not consider them regulations of police, respecting the public health in as regulations of the commerce of the United States; the several States, they do not partake of the character for if he did, he could not admit them, as he did, of regulations of the commerce of the United States. to be left in the States, and yet hold the opinion It had been said, that these local regulations were that the power to regulate commerce was exclusively recognised by Congress, which had made them a part vested in Congress. But might not a reason for these of its own system of commerce. But this recognition prohibitions be found, in the recent experience of the would have been superfluous, if they could have country, very different from that which had heretofore stood without it on the basis of State sovereignty; been assigned for them. The acts prohibited, were and so far as their adoption by Congress could be precisely those which the States had been passing, and considered as affeeting the question, the manner and which mainly led to the adoption of the constitution. purpose of the recognition operated the other way. It The section might have been inserted ex abundanti would be found that, by the commercial regulations cautela. Or the convention might have regarded the which Congress had made, a general system was previous clause, which grants the power to regulate adopted, which, if executed in every instance, would commerce, as exclusive throughout the whole subject; have carried ships and vessels into all the ports of and this section might have been inserted to qualify the several States, their local quarantine laws to the its exclusive character, so far as to permit the States contrary notwithstanding. An express regulation is, to do the things mentioned, under the superintendance therefore, introduced, requiring the collectors *179 of and with the consent of Congress. If either or both of the customs to conform the execution of their official these motives combined for inserting the clause, the duties, under the navigation and revenue laws, with the inference which had been drawn from it against the quarantine laws of the respective States. Without such exclusive power of Congress to regulate commerce, a provision, the local health laws must have given way would appear to be wholly unwarranted. to the supremacy of the navigation and revenue laws of the Union. But if these police regulations of the States are to be considered as a part of the immense mass of **68 A serious objection to the exclusive nature commercial powers, is not the subject susceptible of this power of regulating commerce, was supposed of division, and may not some portions of it be to arise from the express prohibitions on the exclusively vested in Congress? It was viewing States, contained in the 10th sec. of the 1st art. the subject in this light, that induced his learned of the constitution. It has been considered, that 91 these prohibitions imply that, as to every thing not associate *181 to assume the position which had prohibited, the power of the State was meant to be been misconceived on the other side. This proposition reserved; and the authority of the authors of the was, not that all the commercial powers are exclusive, Fedcralist, was cited in support of this interpretation. but that those powers being separated, there are some But another commentator, of hardly less imposing which are exclusive in their nature; and among them, authority, and writing, not as a polemic, for the is that power which concerns navigation, and which purpose of vindicating the constitution against popular prescribes the vehicles in which commerce shall be objections, but for the mere purpose of didactic carried on. It was, however, immaterial, so far as this instruction as a professor, with this section before him, case was concerned, whether the power of Congress

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 53 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 to regulate commerce be exclusive or concurrent. the most approved definitions of the term commerce. Supposing it to be concurrent, it could not be denied, It always *183 implies intercommunication and that where Congress has legislated concerning a intercourse. This is the sense in which the constitution subject, on which it is authorized to act, all State uses it; and the great national object was, to regulate legislation which interferes with it, is absolutely void. the terms on which intercourse between foreigners and It was not denied, that Congress has power to regulate this country, and between the different States of the the coasting trade. It was not denied that Congress Union, should be carried on. If freight be the test of had regulated it. If the vessel now in question, was commerce, this vessel was earning freight; for what is sailing under the authority of these regulations, and freight, but the compensation paid for the use of a ship? has been arrested by a law of New-York forbidding The compensation for the carrying of passengers may her sailing, the State law must, of necessity, be be insured as freight. The whole subject is regulated void. The coasting trade did, indeed, exist before the by the general commercial law; and Congress has constitution was adopted; it might safely be admitted, superadded special regulations applicable to vessels that it existed by the jus commune of nations; that it employed in transporting passengers from Europe. existed by an imperfect right; and that the States might In none of the acts regulating the navigation of the prohibit or permit it at their pleasure, imposing upon country, whether employed in the foreign or coasting it any regulations they thought fit, within the limits trade, had any allusion been made to the kind of of their respective territorial jurisdictions. But those vehicles employed, further than the general description regulations were as various as the States; continually of ships or vessels, nor to the means or agents by which conflicting, and the source of perpetual discord *182 they were propelled. and confusion. In this condition, the constitution found the coasting trade. It was not a thing which required **69 In conclusion, the Attorney-General obscrved, to be created, for it already existed. But it was a that his learned friend (Mr. Emmett) had eloquently thing which demanded regulation, and the power of personified the State of New-York, casting her eyes regulating it was given to Congress. They acted upon over the ocean, witnessing every where this triumph of it as an existing subject, and regulated it in a uniform her genius, and exclaiming, in the language of AEneas, manner throughout the Union. After this regulation, ‘Quae regio in terris, nostri non plena laboris?’ it was no longer an imperfect right, subject to the future control of the States. It became a perfect right, Sir, it was not in the moment of triumph, nor protected by the laws of Congress, with which the with feelings of triumph, that AEneas uttered that States had no authority to interfere. It was for the very exclamation. It was when, with his faithful Achates purpose of putting an end to this interference, that the by his side, he was surveying the works of art *184 power was given to Congress; and if they still have with which the palace of Carthage was adorned, and a right to act upon the subject, the power was given his attention had been caught by a representation of in vain. To say that Congress shall regulate it, and the battles of Troy. There he saw the sons of Atreus et to say that the States shall alter these regulations and Priam, and the fierce Achilles. The whole extent at pleasure, or disregard them altogether, would be to of his misfortunes—the loss and desolation of his say, in the same breath, that Congress shall regulate friends—the fall of his beloved country, rush upon his it, and shall not regulate it; to give the power with recollection. one hand, and to take it back with the other. By the acts for regulating the coasting trade, Congress had ‘Constitit, et lachrymans; Quis jam locus, inquit, defined what should be required to authorize a vessel Achate, Quae regio in terris nostri non plena laboris?’ to trade from port to port; and in this definition, not one word is said as to whether it is moved by sails or Sir, the passage may, hereafter, have a closer by fire; whether it carries passengers or merchandise. application to the cause than my eloquent and classical The license gives the authority to sail, without any of friend intended. For, if the state of things which has those qualifications. That the regulation of commerce already commenced is to go on; if the spirit of hostility, and navigation, includes the authority of regulating which already exists in three of our States, is to catch passenger vessels as well as others, would appear from by contagion, and spread among the rest, as, from the progress of the human passions, and the unavoidable

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 54 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 conflict of interests, it will too surely do, what are we to expect? Civil wars have often arisen from far West Headnotes (36) inferior causes, and have desolated some of the fairest provinces of the earth. History is full of the afflicting narratives of such wars, from causes far inferior; and it [1] Commerce Constitutional Grant of will continue to be her mournful office to record them, Power to Congress till time shall be no more. It is a momentous decision 83 Commerce which this Court is called on to make. Here are three 83I Power to Regulate in General States almost on the eve of war. It is the high province 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to of this Court to interpose its benign and mediatorial Congress influence. The framers of our admirable constitution 83k3 In general would have deserved the wreath of immortality *185 “Commerce” as the word is used in the which they have acquired, had they done nothing else constitution is a unit every part of which than to establish this guardian tribunal, to harmonize is indicated by the term. the jarring elements in our system. But, sir, if you do not interpose your friendly hand, and extirpate 2 Cases that cite this headnote the seeds of anarchy which New-York has sown, you will have civil war. The war of legislation, which [2] Commerce Constitutional Grant of has already commenced, will, according to its usual Power to Congress course, become a war of blows. Your country will be 83 Commerce shaken with civil strife. Your republican institutions 83I Power to Regulate in General will perish in the conflict. Your constitution will fall. 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to The last hope of nations will be gone. And, what Congress will be the effect upon the rest of the world? Look 83k3 In general abroad at the scenes which are now passing on our The power of congress to regulate globe, and judge of that effect. The friends of free commerce is the power to prescribe government throughout the earth, who have been the rule by which commerce is to be heretofore animated by our example, and have held governed. it up before them as their polar star, to guide them through the stormy seas of revolution, will witness our 54 Cases that cite this headnote fall with dismay and despair. The arm that is every where lifted in the cause of liberty, will drop, unnerved, [3] Commerce Constitutional Grant of by the warrior's side. Despotism will have its day of Power to Congress triumph, and will accomplish the purpose at which 83 Commerce it too certainly aims. It will cover the earth with the 83I Power to Regulate in General mantle of mourning. Then, sir, when New-York shall 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to look upon this scene of ruin, if she have the generous Congress feelings which I believe her to have, it will not be with 83k3 In general her head aloft, in the pride of conscious triumph—‘her The commerce power of congress is rapt soul sitting in her eyes;’ no, sir, no: dejected, with complete in itself, may be exercised to shame and confusion—drooping under the weight of its utmost extent and acknowledges no her *186 sorrow, with a voice suffocated with despair, limitations other than are prescribed in the well may she then exclaim, constitution.

**70 ‘Quis jam locus, Quae regio in terris nostri non 164 Cases that cite this headnote plena laboris!’

[4] Commerce Commerce with foreign March 2. nations 83 Commerce

83I Power to Regulate in General 83I Power to Regulate in General 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to Congress Congress 83k4 Commerce with foreign nations 83k7 Internal Commerce of States The power of the government to regulate 83k7(2) Activities affecting interstate commerce extends to every species commerce of commercial intercourse between the (Formerly 83k7) United States and foreign nations. The power to regulate commerce extends to every species of commercial 80 Cases that cite this headnote intercourse between the United States and foreign nations and among the several states. But it does not comprehend [5] Commerce Commerce among the commerce which is entirely internal, states which is carried on between individuals in 83 Commerce a state, or between different parts of the 83I Power to Regulate in General same state, and which does not extend to 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to Congress or affect other states. 83k5 Commerce among the states 122 Cases that cite this headnote Commerce “among” the states cannot stop at the external boundary line of each state but may be introduced into the interior, [8] Commerce In general; application the word “among” meaning intermingled of state or federal law with. 83 Commerce 83I Power to Regulate in General 20 Cases that cite this headnote 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to Congress 83k8 Exclusive or Concurrent Powers of [6] Commerce Internal Commerce of Congress and the States States 83k8(1) In general; application of state or 83 Commerce federal law 83I Power to Regulate in General No part of the power of regulating 83k2 Constitutional Grant of Power to commerce, that is vested in congress, can Congress be executed by a state; that power, so far 83k7 Internal Commerce of States as it is thus vested, belongs exclusively to 83k7(1) In general (Formerly 83k5) congress. The grant to congress of power to 26 Cases that cite this headnote regulate commerce among the states does not comprehend commerce which is completely internal and carried on [9] Commerce Local matters affecting between man and man in a state or commerce between different parts of the same state 83 Commerce and which does not extend to or affect 83I Power to Regulate in General other states. 83k11 Powers Remaining in States, and Limitations Thereon 34 Cases that cite this headnote 83k13.5 Local matters affecting commerce (Formerly 83k3) [7] Commerce Activities affecting Under the constitution the federal interstate commerce government is to be applied to all external 83 Commerce concerns of the nation and to those

internal concerns which affect the states 83II Application to Particular Subjects and generally but not to those which are Methods of Regulation completely within a particular state, do 83II(A) In General not affect other states and with which it is 83k52 Quarantine and Other Sanitary or not necessary to interfere for the purpose Health Regulations 83k52.1 In general of executing some of the general powers (Formerly 83k52, 83k48) of government. Inspection, quarantine, and health laws of 111 Cases that cite this headnote all descriptions. laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, and laws with respect to turnpike roads, ferries, [10] Commerce Subjects of Commerce etc., are not in the exercise of a power to in General regulate commerce, within the meaning of 83 Commerce the constitution of the United States. 83II Application to Particular Subjects and Methods of Regulation 91 Cases that cite this headnote 83II(A) In General 83k14.5 Subjects of Commerce in General 83k14.6 In general [13] Commerce Subjects and regulations (Formerly 83k14.5, 83k3) in general The word “commerce” within the 83 Commerce commerce clause is not restricted to 83II Application to Particular Subjects and buying and selling or interchanging Methods of Regulation commodities but includes intercourse as 83II(H) Imports and Exports well as traffic. 83k75 Subjects and regulations in general (Formerly 83k79) 52 Cases that cite this headnote The federal government has the power to impose embargoes under the commerce clause. [11] Commerce Nature and scope of regulations in general 17 Cases that cite this headnote 83 Commerce 83II Application to Particular Subjects and [14] Commerce Revenue measures in Methods of Regulation general 83II(A) In General 83k48 Nature and scope of regulations in 83 Commerce general 83II Application to Particular Subjects and Any regulation of the transportation of Methods of Regulation interstate commerce, whether it be upon 83II(H) Imports and Exports the high seas, the lakes, the rivers, or 83k76 Revenue measures in general upon railroads or other artificial channels The act of laying duties or imposts of communication, affecting commerce, on imports or exports is under the operates as a regulation of commerce constitution a branch of the taxing power itself. to regulate commerce.

19 Cases that cite this headnote 10 Cases that cite this headnote

Navigation, shipping, [12] Commerce Quarantine and Other [15] Commerce Sanitary or Health Regulations and related matters 83 Commerce 83 Commerce 83II Application to Particular Subjects and Methods of Regulation

83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and repugnant to that clause of the constitution Regulations of the United States which authorizes 83k82.30 Navigation, shipping, and congress to regulate commerce, so far related matters as the said acts prohibit vessels licensed (Formerly 83k17) according to the laws of the United States In the clause of the constitution of for carrying on the coasting trade from the United States which declares that navigating the said waters by means of fire “congress shall have power to regulate or steam. commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the 354 Cases that cite this headnote Indian tribes,” the word “commerce” comprehends navigation, and a power [18] Commerce Public highways, to regulate navigation is as expressly navigable waters, and state lands conferred as if that term had been added. 83 Commerce 257 Cases that cite this headnote 83II Application to Particular Subjects and Methods of Regulation 83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and [16] Commerce Navigation, shipping, Regulations and related matters 83k82.35 Public highways, navigable 83 Commerce waters, and state lands 83II Application to Particular Subjects and (Formerly 83k10) Methods of Regulation The act of congress adopting the states' 83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and system for regulation of pilots manifests Regulations intention to leave the subject to the states 83k82.30 Navigation, shipping, and until congress should think proper to related matters interpose. (Formerly 83k17) This power in congress extends to 15 Cases that cite this headnote navigation carried on by vessels exclusively employed in transporting [19] Licenses Construction and effect of passengers, and to vessels propelled by licenses steam or fire, as well as to other vessels. 238 Licenses 27 Cases that cite this headnote 238I For Occupations and Privileges 238k36 Construction and effect of licenses A “license” to do any particular thing is [17] Commerce Public highways, a permission or authority to do that thing navigable waters, and state lands and if granted by one having power to 83 Commerce grant it, transfers to the grantee the right 83II Application to Particular Subjects and to do whatever it purports to authorize. Methods of Regulation 83II(K) Miscellaneous Subjects and 5 Cases that cite this headnote Regulations 83k82.35 Public highways, navigable waters, and state lands [20] Internal Revenue Power to tax and (Formerly 83k53) regulate in general The statutes of New York granting to 220 Internal Revenue Livingston and Fulton the exclusive 220I Nature and Extent of Taxing Power navigation of the waters within the in General jurisdiction of that state, with boats moved 220I(A) In General with fire or steam, for a term of years, are

220k3003 Power to tax and regulate in (Formerly 92k12) general In construing constitutional grant of (Formerly 371k16) power, the object for which the power Congress is not empowered to tax for was given should have great influence, those purposes which are within the especially where the objects are expressed exclusive province of the state. in the instrument.

7 Cases that cite this headnote 12 Cases that cite this headnote

[21] Constitutional Law United States [24] Constitutional Law Plain, ordinary, Constitution or common meaning 92 Constitutional Law 92 Constitutional Law 92V Construction and Operation of 92V Construction and Operation of Constitutional Provisions Constitutional Provisions 92V(D) Construction as Grant or 92V(A) General Rules of Construction Limitation of Powers; Retained Rights 92k590 Meaning of Language in General 92k636 United States Constitution 92k592 Plain, ordinary, or common 92k637 In general meaning (Formerly 92k12) (Formerly 92k14) The exceptions from a power granted by The framers of the constitution and the the constitution mark its extent. people who adopted it must be understood to have employed words in their natural 10 Cases that cite this headnote sense and to have intended that which was said. [22] Constitutional Law United States Constitution 144 Cases that cite this headnote 92 Constitutional Law 92V Construction and Operation of [25] Constitutional Law Plenary power Constitutional Provisions 92 Constitutional Law 92V(D) Construction as Grant or 92XX Separation of Powers Limitation of Powers; Retained Rights 92XX(B) Legislative Powers and 92k636 United States Constitution Functions 92k637 In general 92XX(B)1 In General (Formerly 92k12) 92k2341 Plenary power The powers expressly granted by the (Formerly 92k27) people to the government in the The sovereignty of congress although constitution are not to be construed limited to specified objects is plenary as strictly. to those objects.

17 Cases that cite this headnote 12 Cases that cite this headnote

[23] Constitutional Law United States [26] Constitutional Constitution Law Constitutionality of Statutory 92 Constitutional Law Provisions 92V Construction and Operation of 92 Constitutional Law Constitutional Provisions 92V Construction and Operation of 92V(D) Construction as Grant or Constitutional Provisions Limitation of Powers; Retained Rights 92V(F) Constitutionality of Statutory 92k636 United States Constitution Provisions 92k637 In general 92k655 In general

(Formerly 92k38) Under provision of constitution that the 16 Cases that cite this headnote constitution is the supreme law of the land a statute which is inconsistent with the [30] Shipping Enrollment and license constitution is a nullity. 354 Shipping 354I Regulation in General 30 Cases that cite this headnote 354k6 Enrollment and license A federal license granted a steamboat to [27] Shipping Power to control and carry on coasting trade did not have sole regulate effect of conferring American character 354 Shipping on steamboat since American character 354I Regulation in General was conferred by enrollment rather than 354k3 Power to control and regulate by license under statute. An act applying the power of congress to regulate commerce to vessels generally 7 Cases that cite this headnote must be construed as comprehending all vessels if none appear to be excluded by [31] Shipping Enrollment and license the language of the act. 354 Shipping 354I Regulation in General 3 Cases that cite this headnote 354k6 Enrollment and license Under federal license granted steamboat [28] Shipping Enrollment and license to be employed in carrying on coasting 354 Shipping trade for one year, a voyage from one state 354I Regulation in General to another was authorized. 354k6 Enrollment and license A federal license granted a steamboat 2 Cases that cite this headnote to be employed in carrying on coasting trade for one year constituted legislative [32] Shipping Regulation of vessels in authority to the steamboat to be employed domestic commerce in carrying on coasting trade for one year. 354 Shipping 354I Regulation in General 7 Cases that cite this headnote 354k14 Regulation of vessels in domestic commerce [29] Shipping Enrollment and license The provision of the act for enrolling or 354 Shipping licensing ships or vessels to be employed 354I Regulation in General in the coasting trade, that vessels enrolled 354k6 Enrollment and license by virtue of a previous law and certain The act for enrolling and licensing other vessels enrolled as described in the of steamboats authorizing a steamboat act and having a license in force shall employed or intended to be employed be deemed ships or vessels of the United only in a river or bay of the United States entitled to the privileges of ships States owned wholly or in part by an alien or vessels employed in the coasting trade resident within the United States to be contains a positive enactment that the enrolled and licensed as if it belonged to described vessel shall be entitled to the citizen of United States manifests intent of privileges of ships or vessels employed in congress that steamboats may be enrolled the coasting trade. and licensed in common with vessels using sails. 11 Cases that cite this headnote

83II(H) Imports and Exports [33] States Police power 83k77 State Revenue Measures 360 States 83k77.10 Imports 360II Government and Officers 83k77.10(1) In general 360k21 Government Powers (Formerly 83k77) 360k21(2) Police power 83 Commerce (Formerly 360k21) 83II Application to Particular Subjects and A state has the power to regulate its Methods of Regulation police and domestic trade and to govern 83II(H) Imports and Exports its citizens. 83k77 State Revenue Measures 83k77.15 Exports 5 Cases that cite this headnote 83k77.15(1) In general (Formerly 83k77) The act of laying duties or imposts [34] Statutes Adoption of or reference to on imports or exports is under the previously enacted statute; incorporation constitution a branch of the taxing 361 Statutes power and not of the power to regulate 361II Enactment commerce. 361k1050 Reenactment 361k1052 Adoption of or reference to 15 Cases that cite this headnote previously enacted statute; incorporation (Formerly 361k51) Although congress cannot enable a state to legislate, congress may adopt the Opinion provisions of a state on any subject. Mr. Chief Justice MARSHALL delivered the opinion 60 Cases that cite this headnote of the Court, and, after stating the case, proceeded as follows: [35] Statutes Presumptions, inferences, and burden of proof **71 The appellant contends that this decree is erroneous, because the laws which purport to give the 361 Statutes exclusive privilege it sustains, are repugnant to the 361IV Operation and Effect 361k1402 Construction in View of constitution and laws of the United States. Effects, Consequences, or Results They are said to be repugnant—— 361k1406 Presumptions, inferences, and burden of proof 1st. To that clause in the constitution which authorizes (Formerly 361k185) Congress to regulate commerce. When a legislature attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the exercise 2d. To that which authorizes Congress to promote the of a right over which its control is progress of science and useful arts. absolute, the law must imply a power to exercise the right. The State of New-York maintains the constitutionality of these laws; and their Legislature, their Council of 9 Cases that cite this headnote Revision, and their Judges, have repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is supported by great names—by [36] Commerce Imports names which have all the titles to consideration that virtue, intelligence, and office, can bestow. No tribunal Commerce Exports can approach the decision of this question, without 83 Commerce feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which 83II Application to Particular Subjects and is sustained by such authority; but it is the province of Methods of Regulation this Court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly;

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 61 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 and the Judges must exercise, in the examination of instrument; for that narrow construction, which would the subject, that understanding which Providence has cripple the government, and render it unequal to the bestowed upon them, with that independence which object for which it is declared to be instituted, and to the people of the United *187 States expect from this which the powers given, as fairly understood, render department of the government. it competent; then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which As preliminary to the very able discussions of the the constitution is to be expounded. As men, whose constitution, which we have heard from the bar, and intentions require no concealment, generally employ as having some influence on its construction, reference the words which most directly and aptly express the has been made to the political situation of these States, ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots anterior to its formation. It has been said, that they were who framed our constitution, and the people who sovereign, were completely independent, and were adopted it, must be understood to have employed connected with each other only by a league. This is words in their natural sense, and to have intended what true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their they have said. If, from the imperfection of human league into a government, when they converted their language, there should be serious doubts respecting the Congress of Ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule, that their common concerns, and to recommend measures the objects *189 for which it was given, especially of general utility, into a Legislature, empowered to when those ob jects are expressed in the instrument enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole itself, should have great influence in the construction. character in which the States appear, underwent a We know of no reason for excluding this rule from change, the extent of which must be determined by the present case. The grant does not convey power a fair consideration of the instrument by which that which might be beneficial to the grantor, if retained change was effected. by himself, or which can enure solely to the benefit of the grantee; but is an investment of power for the This instrument contains an enumeration of powers general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for expressly granted by the people to their government. It that purpose; which power can never be exercised by has been said, that these powers ought to be construed the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for there one sentence in the constitution which gives construing the extent of such powers, other than is countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated given by the language of the instrument which confers powers, that which grants, expressly, the means them, taken in connexion with the purposes for which for carrying all others into execution, Congress is they were conferred. authorized ‘to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper’ for the purpose. But this limitation on **72 The words are, ‘Congress shall have power to the means which may be used, is not extended to the regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’ in *188 the constitution, which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the do gentlemen mean, by a strict construction? If they extent of the power, it becomes necessary to settle the contend only against that enlarged construction, which meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would extend words beyond their natural and obvious would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or import, we might question the application of the term, the interchange of commodities, and do not admit but should not controvert the principle. If they contend that it comprehends navigation. This would restrict a for that narrow construction which, in support or some general term, applicable to many objects, to one of its theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but to the government those powers which the words of it is something more: it is intercourse. It describes the the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are commercial *190 intercourse between nations, and consistent with the general views and objects of the parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 62 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. those of another.’ This clause cannot be understood as The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating applicable to those laws only which are passed for the commerce between nations, which shall exclude all purposes of revenue, because it is expressly applied laws concerning navigation, which shall be silent on to commercial regulations; and the most obvious the admission of the vessels of the one nation into preference which can be given to one port over another, the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing in regulating commerce, relates to navigation. But the rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual subsequent part of the sentence is still more exphicit. employment of buying and selling, or of barter. It is, ‘nor shall vessels bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties, in another.’ These If commerce does not include navigation, the words have a direct reference to navigation. government of the Union has no direct power over that subject, and can make no law prescribing what The universally acknowledged power of the shall constitute American vessels, or requiring that government to impose embargoes, must also be they shall be navigated by American seamen. Yet this considered as showing, that all America is united power has been exercised from the commencement of *192 in that construction which comprehends the government, has been exercised with the consent navigation in the word commerce. Gentlemen have of all, and has been understood by all to be a said, in argument, that this is a branch of the war- commercial regulation. All America understands, and making power, and that an embargo is an instrument of has uniformly understood, the word ‘commerce,’ to war, not a regulation of trade. comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must have been so understood, when the constitution That it may be, and often is, used as an instrument was framed. The power over commerce, including of war, cannot be denied. An embargo may be navigation, was one of the primary objects for which imposed for the purpose of facilitating the equipment the people of America adopted their government, or manning of a fleet, or for the purpose of concealing and must have been contemplated in forming it. The the progress of an expedition preparing to sail from a convention must have used the word in that sense, particular port. In these, and in similar cases, it is a because all have understood it in that sense; and the military instrument, and partakes of the nature of war. attempt to restrict it comes too late. But all embargoes are not of this description. They are sometimes resorted to without a view to war, and with If the opinion that ‘commerce,’ as the word is used in a single view to commerce. In such case, an embargo the constitution, comprehends navigation *191 also, is no more a war measure, than a merchantman is a requires any additional confirmation, that additional ship of war, because both are vessels which navigate confirmation is, we think, furnished by the words of the ocean with sails and seamen. the instrument itself. When Congress imposed that embargo which, for It is a rule of construction, acknowledged by all, that a time, engaged the attention of every man in the the exceptions from a power mark its extent; for it United States, the avowed object of the law was, the would be absurd, as well as useless, to except from protection of commerce, and the avoiding of war. a granted power, that which was not granted—that By its friends and its enemies it was treated as a which the words of the grant could not comprehend. commercial, not as a war measure. The persevering If, then, there are in the constitution plain exceptions earnestness and zeal with which it was opposed, in a from the power over navigation, plain inhibitions to the part of our country which supposed its interests to be exercise of that power in a particular way, it is a proof vitally affected by the act, cannot be forgotten. A want that those who made these exceptions, and prescribed of acuteness in discovering objections to a measure these inhibitions, understood the power to which they to which they felt the most deep rooted hostility, applied as being granted. will not be imputed to those who were arrayed in opposition *193 to this. Yet they never suspected that **73 The 9th section of the 1st article declares, that navigation was no branch of trade, and was, therefore, ‘no preference shall be given, by any regulation of not comprehended in the power to regulate commerce. commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over They did, indeed, contest the constitutionality of the

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 63 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 act, but, on a principle which admits the construction different parts of the same State, and which does not for which the appellant contends. They denied that extend to or affect other States. Such a power would be the particular law in question was made in pursuance inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. of the constitution, not because the power could not act directly on vessels, but because a perpetual Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may embargo was the annihilation, and not the regulation very properly be restricted to that commerce which of commerce. In terms, they admitted the applicability concerns more States than one. The phrase is not one of the words used in the constitution to vessels; and which would probably have been selected to indicate that, in a case which produced a degree and an extent the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is of excitement, calculated to draw forth every principle not an apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration on which legitimate resistance could be sustained. No of the particular classes of commerce, to which the example could more strongly illustrate the universal power was to be extended, would not have been made, understanding of the American people on this subject. had the intention *195 been to extend the power to every description. The enumeration presupposes **74 The word used in the constitution, then, something not enumerated; and that something, if we comprehends, and has been always understood to regard the language or the subject of the sentence, comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a must be the exclusively internal commerce of a State. power to regulate navigation, is as expressly granted, The genius and character of the whole government as if that term had been added to the word ‘commerce.’ seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal To what commerce does this power extend? The concerns which affect the States generally; but not to constitution informs us, to commerce ‘with foreign those which are completely within a particular State, nations, and among the several States, and with the which do not affect other States, and with which it is Indian tribes.’ not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government. The It has, we believe, been universally admitted, that completely internal commerce of a State, then, may be these words comprehend every species of commercial considered as reserved for the State itself. intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. No sort of trade can be *194 carried on But, in regulating commerce with foreign nations, the between this country and any other, to which this power of Congress does not stop at the jurisdictional power does not extend. It has been truly said, that lines of the several States. It would be a very useless commerce, as the word is used in the constitution, is a power, if it could not pass those lines. The commerce unit, every part of which is indicated by the term. of the United States with foreign nations, is that of the whole United States. Every district has a right to If this be the admitted meaning of the word, in its participate in it. The deep streams which penetrate our application to foreign nations, it must carry the same country in every direction, pass through the interior of meaning throughout the sentence, and remain a unit, almost every State in the Union, and furnish the means unless there be some plain intelligible cause which of exercising this right. If Congress has the power to alters it. regulate it, that power must be exercised whenever the The subject to which the power is next applied, is subject exists. If it exists within the States, if a foreign to commerce ‘among the several States.’ The word voyage may commence or terminate at a port within ‘among’ means intermingled with. A thing which is a State, then the power of Congress may be exercised among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce within a State. among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary **75 This principle is, if possible, still more clear, line of each State, but may be introduced into the when *196 applied to commerce ‘among the several interior. States.’ They either join each other, in which case It is not intended to say that these words comprehend they are separated by a mathematical line, or they that commerce, which is completely internal, which is are remote from each other, in which case other carried on between man and man in a State, or between States lie between them. What is commerce ‘among’

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 64 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 them; and how is it to be conducted? Can a trading among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’ expedition between two adjoining States, commence It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of and terminate outside of each? And if the trading New-York, and act upon the very waters to which the intercourse be between two States remote from each prohibition now under consideration applies. other, must it not commence in one, terminate in the other, and probably pass through a third? Commerce But it has been urged with great earnestness, that, among the States must, of necessity, be commerce although the power of Congress to regulate commerce with the States. In the regulation of trade with the with foreign nations, and among the several States, Indian tribes, the action of the law, especially when be co-extensive with the subject itself, and have no the constitution was made, was chiefly within a State. other limits than are prescribed in the constitution, The power of Congress, then, whatever it may be, must yet the States may severally *198 exercise the same be exercised within the territorial jurisdiction of the power, within their respective jurisdictions. In support several States. The sense of the nation on this subject, of this argument, it is said, that they possessed it is unequivocally manifested by the provisions made as an inseparable attribute of sovereignty, before the in the laws for transporting goods, by land, between formation of the constitution, and still retain it, except Baltimore and Providence, between New-York and so far as they have surrendered it by that instrument; Philadelphia, and between Philadelphia and Baltimore. that this principle results from the nature of the government, and is secured by the tenth amendment; We are now arrived at the inquiry—What is this that an affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, power? unless in its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent It is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the with the grant, and that this is not of that description. rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete **76 The appellant, conceding these postulates, in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and except the last, contends, that full power to regulate a acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed particular subject, implies the whole power, and leaves in the constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, no residuum; that a grant of the whole is incompatible and do not affect the *197 questions which arise in with the existence of a right in another to any part of it. this case, or which have been discussed at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty Both parties have appealed to the constitution, to of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is legislative acts, and judicial decisions; and have drawn plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce arguments from all these sources, to support and with foreign nations, and among the several States, is illustrate the propositions they respectively maintain. vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a The grant of the power to lay and collect taxes is, single government, having in its constitution the same like the power to regulate commerce, made in general restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found terms, and has never been understood to interfere with in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom the exercise of the same power by the State; and and the discretion of Congress, their identity with hence has been drawn an argument which has been the people, and the influence which their constituents applied to the question under consideration. But the possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other two grants are not, it is conceived, similar in their terms instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the or their nature. Although many of the powers formerly sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure *199 exercised by the States, are transferred to the them from its abuse. They are the restraints on which government of the Union, yet the State governments the people must often rely solely, in all representative remain, and constitute a most important part of our governments. system. The power of taxation is indispensable to their The power of Congress, then, comprehends existence, and is a power which, in its own nature, is navigation, within the limits of every State in the capable of residing in, and being exercised by, different Union; so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, authorities at the same time. We are accustomed connected with ‘commerce with foreign nations, or to see it placed, for different purposes, in different

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 65 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 hands. Taxation is the simple operation of taking small portions from a perpetually accumulating mass, That this restriction shows the opinion of the susceptible of almost infinite division; and a power Convention, that a State might impose duties on in one to take what is necessary for certain purposes, exports and imports, if not expressly forbidden, will is not, in its nature, incompatible with a power in be conceded; but that it follows as a consequence, another to take what is necessary for other purposes. *201 from this concession, that a State may regulate Congress is authorized to lay and collect taxes, &c. to commerce with foreign nations and among the States, pay the debts, and provide for the common defence cannot be admitted. and general welfare of the United States. This does not We must first determine whether the act of laying interfere with the power of the States to tax for the ‘duties or imposts on imports or exports,’ is considered support of their own governments; nor is the exercise in the constitution as a branch of the taxing power, or of of that power by the States, an exercise of any portion the power to regulate commerce. We think it very clear, of the power that is granted to the United States. that it is considered as a branch of the taxing power. In imposing taxes for State purposes, they are not It is so treated in the first clause of the 8th section: doing what Congress is empowered to do. Congress ‘Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are duties, imposts, and excises;’ and, before commerce is within the exclusive province of the States. When, mentioned, the rule by which the exercise of this power then, each government exercises the power of taxation, must be governed, is declared. It is, that all duties, neither is exercising the power of the other. But, when imposts, and excises, shall be uniform. In a separate a State proceeds to regulate commerce with foreign clause of the enumeration, the power to regulate nations, or among the several States, it is exercising the commerce is given, as being entirely distinct from the very power that is granted to Congress, *200 and is right to levy taxes and imposts, and as being a new doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to power, not before conferred. The constitution, then, do. There is no analogy, then, between the power of considers these powers as substantive, and distinct taxation and the power of regulating commerce. from each other; and so places them in the enumeration In discussing the question, whether this power is still it contains. The power of imposing duties on imports is in the States, in the case under consideration, we may classed with the power to levy taxes, and that seems to dismiss from it the inquiry, whether it is surrendered be its natural place. But the power to levy taxes could by the mere grant to Congress, or is retained until never be considered as abridging the right of the States Congress shall exercise the power. We may dismiss on that subject; and they might, consequently, have that inquiry, because it has been exercised, and the exercised it by levying duties on imports or exports, regulations which Congress deemed it proper to make, had the constitution contained no prohibition on this are now in full operation. The sole question is, can subject. This prohibition, then, is an exception from the a State regulate commerce with foreign nations and acknowledged power of the States *202 to levy taxes, among the States, while Congress is regulating it? not from the questionable power to regulate commerce.

**77 The counsel for the respondent answer this ‘A duty of tonnage’ is as much a tax, as a duty on question in the affirmative, and rely very much on imports or exports; and the reason which induced the the restrictions in the 10th section, as supporting their prohibition of those taxes, extends to this also. This opinion. They say, very truly, that limitations of a tax may be imposed by a State, with the consent power, furnish a strong argument in favour of the of Congress; and it may be admitted, that Congress existence of that power, and that the section which cannot give a right to a State, in virtue of its own prohibits the States from laying duties on imports powers. But a duty of tonnage being part of the power or exports, proves that this power might have been of imposing taxes, its prohibition may certainly be exercised, had it not been expressly forbidden; and, made to depend on Congress, without affording any consequently, that any other commercial regulation, implication respecting a power to regulate commerce. not expressly forbidden, to which the original power of It is true, that duties may often be, and in fact often the State was competent, may still be made. are, imposed on tonnage, with a view to the regulation of commerce; but they may be also imposed with

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 66 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 a view to revenue; and it was, therefore, a prudent for a special purpose, or is clearly incidental to some precaution, to prohibit the States from exercising power which is expressly given. It is obvious, that the this power. The idea that the same measure might, government of the Union, in the exercise of its express according to circumstances, be arranged with different powers, that, for example, of regulating commerce classes of power, was no novelty to the framers with foreign nations and among the States, may use of our constitution. Those illustrious statesmen and means that may also be employed by a State, in patriots had been, many of them, deeply engaged in the the exercise of its acknowledged powers; that, for discussions which preceded the war of our revolution, example, of regulating commerce within the State. and all of them were well read in those discussions. The If Congress license vessels to sail from one port to right to regulate commerce, even by the imposition of another, in the same State, the act is supposed to be, duties, was not controverted; but the right to impose necessarily, incidental to the power expressly granted a duty for the purpose of revenue, produced a war as to Congress, and implies no claim of a direct power important, perhaps, in its consequences to the human to regulate the purely internal commerce of a State, race, as any the world has ever witnessed. or to act directly on its system of police. So, if a State, in passing laws on subjects acknowledged to be **78 These restrictions, then, are on the taxing within its control, and with a view to those subjects, power, *203 not on that to regulate commerce; and shall adopt a measure of the same character with one presuppose the existence of that which they restrain, which Congress may adopt, it does not derive its not of that which they do not purport to restrain. authority from the particular power which has been granted, but from some other, which remains with the But, the inspection laws are said to be regulations State, and may be executed by the same means. All of commerce, and are certainly recognised in the experience shows, that the same measures, or measures constitution, as being passed in the exercise of a power scarcely distinguishable from each other, may flow remaining with the States. from distinct powers; but this does not prove that the That inspection laws may have a remote and powers themselves are identical. Although the means considerable influence on commerce, will not be used in their execution may sometimes approach each denied; but that a power to regulate commerce is the other so nearly as to be confounded, there are other source from which the right to pass them is derived, situations in which they are sufficiently distinct to cannot be admitted. The object of inspection laws, establish their individuality. is to improve the quality of articles produced by the **79 In our complex system, presenting the rare labour of a country; to fit them for exportation; or, it and difficult scheme of one general government, may be, for domestic use. They act upon the subject whose *205 action extends over the whole, but before it becomes an article of foreign commerce, or which possesses only certain enumerated powers; and of commerce among the States, and prepare it for that of numerous State governments, which retain and purpose. They form a portion of that immense mass exercise all powers not delegated to the Union, contests of legislation, which embraces every thing within the respecting power must arise. Were it even otherwise, territory of a State, not surrendered to the general the measures taken by the respective governments government: all which can be most advantageously to execute their acknowledged powers, would often exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws, be of the same description, and might, sometimes, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as interfere. This, however, does not prove that the one well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a is exercising, or has a right to exercise, the powers of State, and those which respect turnpike roads, ferries, the other. &c., are component parts of this mass. 92 No direct general power over these objects is granted The acts of Congress, passed in 1796 and 1799, to Congress; and, consequently, they remain subject to empowering and directing the officers of the general State legislation. If the legislative power of the Union government to conform to, and assist in the execution can reach them, it must be for national purposes; it of the quarantine and health laws of a State, proceed, it must be where the *204 power is expressly given is said, upon the idea that these laws are constitutional. It is undoubtedly true, that they do proceed upon that

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 67 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 idea; and the constitutionality of such laws has never, whole object of the exception is, to preserve the power so far as we are informed, been denied. But they do not to those States which might be disposed to exercise it; imply an acknowledgment that a State may rightfully and its language seems to the Court to convey this idea regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the unequivocally. The possession of this particular power, States; for they do not imply that such laws are an then, during the time limited in the constitution, cannot exercise of that power, or enacted with a view to it. On be admitted to prove the possession of any other similar the contrary, they are treated as quarantine and health power. laws, are so denominated in the acts of Congress, and are considered as flowing from the acknowledged It has been said, that the act of August 7, 1789, power of a State, to provide for the health of its citizens. acknowledges a concurrent power in the States to But, as it was apparent that some of the provisions regulate the conduct of pilots, and hence is inferred an made for this purpose, and in virtue of this power, admission of their concurrent right with Congress to might *206 interfere with, and be affected by the regulate commerce with foreign nations, and amongst laws of the United States, made for the regulation of the States. But this inference is not, we think, justified commerce, Congress, in that spirit of harmony and by the fact. concilitation, which ought always to characterize the Although Congress cannot enable a State to legislate, conduct of governments standing in the relation which Congress may adopt the provisions of a State on that of the Union and those of the States bear to each any subject. When the government of the Union was other, has directed its officers to aid in the execution brought into existence, it found a system for the of these laws; and has, in some measure, adapted its regulation of its pilots in full force in every State. The own legislation to this object, by making provisions act which has been mentioned, adopts this system, and in aid of those of the States. But, in making these gives it the same validity as if its provisions had been provisions, the opinion is unequivocally manifested, specially made by Congress. But the act, it may be said, that Congress may control the State laws, so far as it is prospective also, and the adoption of laws to be made may be necessary to control them, for the regulation of *208 in future, presupposes the right in the maker to commerce. legislate on the subject. 93 The act passed in 1803, prohibiting the importation The act unquestionably manifests an intention to leave of slaves into any State which shall itself prohibit their this subject entirely to the States, until Congress should importation, implies, it is said, an admission that the think proper to interpose; but the very enactment of States possessed the power to exclude or admit them; such a law indicates an opinion that it was necessary; from which it is inferred, that they possess the same that the existing system would not be applicable to power with respect to other articles. the new state of things, unless expressly applied to it by Congress. But this section is confined to pilots **80 If this inference were correct; if this power within the ‘bays, inlets, rivers, harbours, and ports of was exercised, not under any particular clause in the the United States,’ which are, of course, in whole or in constitution, but in virtue of a general right over part, also within the limits of some particular state. The the subject of commerce, to exist as long as the acknowledged power of a State to regulate its police, constitution itself, it might now be exercised. Any State its domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens, may might now import African slaves into its own territory. enable it to legislate on this subject, to a considerable But it is obvious, that the power of the States over extent; and the adoption of its system by Congress, and this subject, previous to the year 1808, constitutes an the application of it to the whole subject of commerce, exception to the power of *207 Congress to regulate does not seem to the Court to imply a right in the commerce, and the exception is expressed in such States so to apply it of their own authority. But the words, as to manifest clearly the intention to continue adoption of the State system being temporary, being the pre-existing right of the States to admit or exclude, only ‘until further legislative provision shall be made for a limited period. The words are, ‘the migration by Congress,’ shows, conclusively, an opinion that or importation of such persons as any of the States, Congress could control the whole subject, and might now existing, shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year 1808. The

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 68 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 adopt the system of the States, or provide one of its which that act entitles him. Should this collision exist, own. it will be immaterial whether those laws were passed in virtue of a concurrent power ‘to regulate commerce **81 A State, it is said, or even a private citizen, with foreign nations and among the several States,’ or, may construct light houses. But gentlemen must be in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic trade and aware, that if this proves a power in a State to regulate police. In one case and the other, the acts of New-York commerce, it proves that the same power is in the must yield to the law of Congress; and the decision citizen. States, or individuals who own lands, may, sustaining the privilege they confer, against a right if not forbidden by law, *209 erect on those lands given by a law of the Union, must be erroneous. what buildings they please; but this power is entirely distinct from that of regulating commerce, and may, we This opinion has been frequently expressed in this presume, be restrained, if exercised so as to produce a Court, and is founded, as well on the nature of the public mischief. government as on the words of the constitution. In argument, however, it has been contended, that if a law These acts were cited at the bar for the purpose passed by a State, in the exercise of its acknowledged of showing an opinion in Congress, that the States sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed possess, concurrently with the Legislature of the by Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they Union, the power to regulate commerce with foreign affect the subject, and each other, like equal opposing nations and among the States. Upon reviewing them, powers. we think they do not establish the proposition they were intended to prove. They show the opinion, that **82 But the framers of our constitution foresaw this the States retain powers enabling them to pass the state of things, and provided for it, by declaring the laws to which allusion has been made, not that those supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made laws proceed from the particular power which has been in pursuance of it. The nullity of any act, law. The delegated to Congress. appropriate *211 inconsistent with the constitution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution is It has been contended by the counsel for the appellant, the supreme law. The appropriate application of that that, as the word ‘to regulate’ implies in its nature, part of the clause which confers the same supremacy full power over the thing to be regulated, it excludes, on laws and treaties, is to such acts of the State necessarily, the action of all others that would perform Legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but, the same operation on the same thing. That regulation though enacted in the execution of acknowledged State is designed for the entire result, applying to those parts powers, interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of which remain as they were, as well as to those which Congress, made in pursuance of the constitution, or are altered. It produces a uniform whole, which is as some treaty made under the authority of the United much disturbed and deranged by changing what the States. In every such case, the act of Congress, or the regulating power designs to leave untouched, as that treaty, is supreme; and the law of the State, though on which it has operated. enacted in the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it. There is great force in this argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted. In pursuing this inquiry at the bar, it has been said, that the constitution does not confer the right of intercourse Since, however, in exercising the power of regulating between State and State. That right derives its source their own purely internal affairs, whether *210 of from those laws whose authority is acknowledged by trading or police, the States may sometimes enact laws, civilized man throughout the world. This is true. The the validity of which depends on their interfering with, constitution found it an existing right, and agve to and being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in Congress the power to regulate it. In the exercise of pursuance of the constitution, the Court will enter this power, Congress has passed ‘an act for enrolling upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New-York, as or licensing ships or vessels to be employed in the expounded by the highest tribunal of that State, have, in coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the their application to this case, come into collision with same.’ The counsel for the respondent contend, that an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 69 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 this act does not give the right to sail from port to port, trade, would be, we think, to disregard the apparent but confines itself to regulating a pre-existing right, so intent of the act. far only as to confer certain privileges on enrolled and licensed vessels in its exercise. The fourth section directs the proper officer to grant to a vessel qualified to receive it, ‘a license for carrying It will at once occur, that, when a Legislature *212 on the coasting trade;’ and prescribes its form. After attaches certain privileges and exemptions to the reciting the compliance of the applicant with the exercise of a right over which its control is absolute, previous requisites of the law, the operative words of the law must imply a power to exercise the right. The the instrument are, ‘license is hereby granted for the privileges are gone, if the right itself be annihilated. said steam-boat, Bellona, to be employed in carrying It would be contrary to all reason, and to the course on the coasting trade for one year from the date hereof, of human affairs, to say that a State is unable to strip and no longer.’ a vessel of the particular privileges attendant on the exercise of a right, and yet may annul the right itself; These are not the words of the officer; they are the that the State of New-York cannot prevent an enrolled words of the legislature; and convey as explicitly the and licensed vessel, proceeding from Elizabethtown, authority the act intended to give, and operate as in New-Jersey, to New-York, from enjoying, in her effectually, as if they had been inserted in any other course, and on her entrance into port, all the privileges part of the act, than in the license itself. conferred by the act of Congress; but can shut her up The word ‘license,’ means permission, or authority; in her own port, and prohibit altogether her entering and a license to do any particular thing, is a permission the waters and ports of another State. To the Court or authority to do that thing; and if granted by a person it seems very clear, that the whole act on the subject having power to grant it, transfers to the grantee the of the coasting trade, according to those principles right to do whatever it purports to authorize. It certainly which govern the construction of statutes, implies, transfers to *214 him all the right which the grantor unequivocally, an authority to licensed vessels to carry can transfer, to do what is within the terms of the on the coasting trade. license. But we will proceed briefly to notice those sections Would the validity or effect of such an instrument be which bear more directly on the subject. questioned by the respondent, if executed by persons **83 The first section declares, that vessels enrolled claiming regularly under the laws of New-York? by virtue of a previous law, and certain other vessels, The license must be understood to be what it purports enrolled as described in that act, and having alicense in to be, a legislative authority to the steamboat Bellona, force, as is by the act required, ‘and no others, shall be ‘to be employed in carrying on the coasting trade, for deemed ships or vessels of the United States, entitled one year from this date.’ to the privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade.’ It has been denied that these words authorize a voyage from New-Jersey to New-York. It is true, that no ports This section seems to the Court to contain a positive are specified; but it is equally true, that the words used enactment, the the vessels it describes shall *213 be are perfectly intelligible, and do confer such authority entitled to the privileges of ships or vessels employed as unquestionably, as if the ports had been mentioned. in the coasting trade. Thesé privileges cannot be The coasting trade is a term well understood. The law separated from the trade, and cannot be enjoyed, unless has defined it; and all know its meaning perfectly. the trade may be prosecuted. The grant of the privilege The act describes, with great minuteness, the various is an idle, empty form, conveying nothing, unless it operations of a vessel engaged in it; and it cannot, we convey the right to which the privilege is attached, and think, be doubted, that a voyage from New-Jersey to in the exercise of which its whole value consists. To New-York, is one of those operations. construe these words otherwise than as entitling the ships or vessels described, to carry on the coasting **84 Notwithstanding the decided language of the license, it has also been maintained, that it gives no

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 70 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 right to trade; and that its sole purpose is to confer the should not be placed in the same hands. The argument American character. urged at the bar, rests on the foundation, that the power of Congress does not extend to navigation, as a branch The answer given to this argument, that the American of commerce, and can only be applied to that subject character is conferred by the enrolment, and not by the incidentally and occasionally. But if that foundation license, is, we think, founded too clearly in the words be removed, we must show some plain, intelligible of the law, to require the support of any additional distinction, supported by the constitution, or by reason, observations. The enrolment of vessels designed for for discriminating between the power of Congress over the coasting trade, corresponds precisely with the vessels employed in navigating the same seas. We can registration of vessels *215 designed for the foreign perceive no such distinetion. trade, and requires every circumstance which can constitute the American character. The license can be **85 If we refer to the constitution, the inference granted only to vessels already enrolled, if they be of to be drawn from it is rather against the distinction. the burthen of twenty tons and upwards; and requires The section which restrains Congress from prohibiting no circumstance essential to the American character. the migration or importation of such persons as any The object of the license, then, Cannot be to ascertain of the States may think proper to admit, until the year the character of the vessel, but to do what it professes 1808, has always been considered as an exception from to do—that is, to give permission to a vessel already the power to regulate commerce, and certainly seems proved by her enrolment to be American, to carry on to class migration with importation. Migration applies the coasting trade. as appropriately to voluntary, as importation does to involuntary, arrivals; and, so far as an exception from But, if the license be a permit to carry on the a power proves its existence, this section proves that coasting trade, the respondent denies that these boats the power to regulate commerce applies equally *217 were engaged in that trade, or that the decree under to the regulation of vessels employed in transporting consideration has restrained them from prosecuting it. men, who pass from place to place voluntarily, and to The boats of the appellant were, we are told, employed those who pass involuntarily. in the transportation of passengers; and this is no part of that commerce which Congress may regulate. If the power reside in Congress, as a portion of the general grant to regulate commerce, then acts applying If, as our whole course of legislation on this subject that power to vessels generally, must be construed shows, the power of Congress has been universally as comprehending all vessels. If none appear to be understood in America, to comprehend navigation, it excluded by the language of the act, none can be is a very persuasive, if not a conclusive argument, excluded by construction. Vessels have always been to prove that the construction is correct; and, if it be employed to a greater or less extent in the transporation correct, no clear distinction is perceived between the of passengers, and have never been supposed to be, on power to regulate vessels employed in transporting that account, withdrawn from the control or protection men for hire, and property for hire. The subject is of Congress. Packets which ply along the coast, as transferred to Congress, and no exception to the grant well as those which make voyages between Europe and can be admitted, which is not proved by the words or America, consider the transportation of passengers as the nature of the thing. A coasting vessel employed in an important part of their business. Yet it has never the transportation of passengers, is as much a portion been suspected that the general laws of navigation did of the American marine, as one employed *216 not apply to them. in the transportation of a cargo; and no reason is perceived why such vessel should be withdrawn from The duty act, sections 23 and 46, contains provisions the regulating power of that government, which has respecting passengers, and shows, that vessels which been thought best fitted for the purpose generally. transport them, have the same rights, and must perform The provisions of the law respecting native seamen, the same duties, with other vessels. They are governed and respecting ownership, are as applicable to vessels by the general laws of navigation. carrying men, as to vessels carrying manufactures; and no reason is perceived why the power over the subject

the transportation of passengers, or otherwise.’ The In the progress of things, this seems to have grown answer avers, only, that they were employed in the into a particular employment, and to have attracted the coasting trade, and insists on the right to carry on particular attention of government. Congress was no any trade authorized by the license. No testimony is longer satisfied with comprehending vessels engaged taken, and the writ of injunction and decree restrain specially in this business, within those provisions these licensed vessels, not from carrying passengers, which were intended for vessels generally; and, on the but from being moved through the waters of New-York 2d of March, 1819, passed ‘an act regulating passenger by steam, for any purpose whatever. ships and *218 vessels.’ This wise and humane law provides for the safety and comfort of passengers, and **86 The questions, then, whether the conveyance for the communication of every thing concerning them of passengers be a part of the coasting trade, and which may interest the government, to the Department whether a vessel can be protected in that occupation by of State, but makes no provision concerning the entry a coasting license, are not, and cannot be, raised in this of the vessel, or her conduct in the waters of the United case. The real and sole question seems to be, whether States. This, we think, shows conclusively the sense a steam machine, in actual use, deprives a vessel of the of Congress, (if, indeed, any evidence to that point privileges conferred by a license. could be required,) that the pre-existing regulations comprehended passenger ships among others; and, in In considering this question, the first idea which prescribing the same duties, the Legislature must have presents itself, is, that the laws of Congress for the considered them as possessing the same rights. regulation of commerce, do not look to the *220 principle by which vessels are moved. That subject If, then, it were even true, that the Bellona and is left entirely to individual discretion; and, in that the Stoudinger were employed exclusively in the vast and complex system of legislative enactment conveyance of passengers between New-York and concerning it, which embraces every thing that the New-Jersey, it would not follow that this occupation Legislature thought it necessary to notice, there is did not constitute a part of the coasting trade of the not, we believe, one word respecting the peculiar United States, and was not protected by the license principle by which vessels are propelled through the annexed to the answer. But we cannot perceive how water, except what may be found in a single act, the occupation of these vessels can be drawn into granting a particular privilege to steam boats. With question, in the case before the Court. The laws this exception, every act, either prescribing duties, or of New-York, which grant the exclusive privilege granting privileges, applies to every vessel, whether set up by the respondent, take no notice of the nayigated by the instrumentality of wind or fire, of employment of vessels, and relate only to the principle sails or machinery. The whole weight of proof, then, is by which they are propelled. Those laws do not inquire thrown upon him who would introduce a distinction to whether vessels are engaged in transporting men or which the words of the law give no countenance. merchandise, but whether they are moved by steam or wind. If by the former, the waters of New-York are If a real difference could be admitted to exist between closed against them, though their cargoes be dutiable vessels carrying passengers and others, it has already goods, which the laws of the *219 United States been observed, that there is no fact in this case which permit them to enter and deliver in New-York. If by the can bring up that question. And, if the occupation latter, those waters are free to them, though they should of steam boats be a matter of such general notoriety, carry passengers only. In conformity with the law, is that the Court may be presumed to know it, although the bill of the plaintiff in the State Court. The bill does not specially informed by the record, then we deny not complain that the Bellona and the Stoudinger carry that the transportation of passengers is their exclusive passengers, but that they are moved by steam. This is occupation. It is a matter of general history, that, in the injury of which he complains, and is the sole injury our western waters, their principal employment is the against the continuance of which he asks relief. The transportation of merchandise; and all know, that in the bill does not even allege, specially, that those vessels waters of the Atlantic they are frequently so employed. were employed in the transportation of passengers, but says, generally, that they were employed ‘in

original powers of the States are retained, if any But all inquiry into this subject seems to the Court to possible construction will retain them, may, by a be put completely at rest, by the act already *221 course of well digested, but refined and metaphysical mentioned, entitled, ‘An act for the enrolling and reasoning, founded on these premises, explain away licensing of steam boats.’ the constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to look at, but totally This act authorizes a steam boat employed, or intended unfit for use. They may so entangle and perplex the to be employed, only in a river or bay of the United understanding, as to obscure principles, which were States, owned wholly or in part by an alien, resident before thought quite plain, and induce doubts where, within the United States, to be enrolled and licensed as if the mind were to pursue its own course, none would if the same belonged to a citizen of the United States. be perceived. In such a case, it is peculiarly necessary This act demonstrates the opinion of Congress, that to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain steam boats may be enrolled and licensed, in common those principles, and when sustained, to make them the with vessels using sails. They are, of course, entitled tests of the arguments to be examined. to the same privileges, and can no more be restrained Mr. Justice JOHNSON. from navigating waters, and entering ports which are free to such vessels, than if they were wafted on The judgment entered by the Court in this cause, their voyage by the winds, instead of being propelled has my entire approbation; but having adopted my by the agency of fire. The one element may be as conclusions on views *223 of the subject materially legitimately used as the other, for every commercial different from those of my brethren, I feel it incumbent purpose authorized by the laws of the Union; and the on me to exhibit those views. I have, also, another act of a State inhibiting the use of either to any vessel inducement: in questions of great importance and great having a license under the act of Congress, comes, we delicacy, I feel my duty to the public best discharged, think, in direct collision with that act. by an effort to maintain my opinions in my own way.

**87 As this decides the cause, it is unnecessary to In attempts to construe the constitution, I have never enter in an examination of that part of the constitution found much benefit resulting from the inquiry, whether which empowers Congress to promote the progress of the whole, or any part of it, is to be construed science and the useful arts. strictly, or literally. The simple, classical, precise, yet comprehensive language, in which it is couched, The Court is aware that, in stating the train of reasoning leaves, at most, but very little latitude for construction; by which we have been conducted to this result, much and when its intent and meaning is discovered, nothing time has been consumed in the attempt to demonstrate remains but to execute the will of those who made it, propositions which may have been thought axioms. in the best manner to effect the purposes intended. The It is felt that the tediousness inseparable from the great and paramount purpose, was to unite this mass of endeavour to prove that which is already clear, is wealth and power, for the protection of the humblest imputable to *222 a considerable part of this opinion. individual; his rights, civil and political, his interests But it was unavoidable. The conclusion to which we and prosperity, are the sole end; the rest are nothing have come, depends on a chain of principles which but the means. But the principal of those means, one it was necessary to preserve unbroken; and, although so essential as to approach nearer the characteristics some of them were thought nearly selfevident, the of an end, was the independence and harmony of the magnitude of the question, the weight of character States, that they may the better subserve the purposes belonging to those from whose judgment we dissent, of cherishing and protecting the respective families of and the argument at the bar, demanded that we should this great republic. assume nothing. **88 The strong sympathies, rather than the feeble Powerful and ingenious minds, taking, as postulates, government, which bound the States together during that the powers expressly granted to the government a common war, dissolved on the return of peace; of the Union, are to be contracted by construction, and the very principles which gave rise to the into the narrowest possible compass, and that the

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 73 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 war of the revolution, began to threaten the *224 situation of the United States has been found, on trial, confederacy with anarchy and ruin. The States had to require uniformity in their commercial regulations, resisted a tax imposed by the parent State, and now as the only effectual policy for obtaining, in the reluctantly submitted to, or altogether rejected, the ports of foreign nations, a stipulation of privileges moderate demands of the confederation. Every one reciprocal to those enjoyed by the subjects of such recollects the painful and threatening discussions, nations in the ports of the United States, for preventing which arose on the subject of the five per cent. duty. animosities, which cannot fail to arise among the Some States rejected it altogether; others insisted several States, from the interference of partial and on collecting it themselves; scarcely any acquiesced separate regulations,’ & c. ‘therefore, resolved,’ &c. without reservations, which deprived it altogether of the character of a national measure; and at length, some **89 The history of the times will, therefore, sustain repealed the laws by which they had signified their the opinion, that the grant of power over commerce, if acquiescence. intended to be commensurate with the evils existing, and the purpose of remedying those *226 evils, could For a century the States had submitted, with murmurs, be only commensurate with the power of the States to the commercial restrictions imposed by the parent over the subject. And this opinion is supported by a State; and now, finding themselves in the unlimited very remarkable evidence of the general understanding possession of those powers over their own commerce, of the whole American people, when the grant was which they had so long been deprived of, and so made. earnestly coveted, that selfish principle which, well controlled, is so salutary, and which, unrestricted, is There was not a State in the Union, in which so unjust and tyrannical, guided by inexperience and there did not, at that time, exist a variety of jealousy, began to show itself in iniquitous laws and commercial regulations; concerning which it is too impolitic measures, from which grew up a conflict much to suppose, that the whole ground covered by of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony those regulations was immediately assumed by actual of the States, and fatal to their commercial interests legislation, under the authority of the Union. But where abroad. was the existing statute on this subject, that a State attempted to execute? or by what State was it ever This was the immediate cause, that led to the forming thought necessary to repeal those statutes? By common of a convention. consent, those laws dropped lifeless from their statute books, for want of the sustaining power, that had been As early as 1778, the subject had been pressed upon relinquished to Congress. the attention of Congress, by a memorial from the State of New-Jersey; and in 1781, we find a resolution And the plain and direct import of the words of the presented to that body, by one of *225 the most grant, is consistent with this general understanding. enlightened men of his day,94 affirming, that ‘it is The words of the constitution are, ‘Congress shall have indispensably necessary, that the United States, in power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and Congress assembled, should bevested with a right of among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’ superintending the commercial regulations of every State, that none may take place that shall be partial It is not material, in my view of the subject, to inquire or contrary to the common interests.’ The resolution whether the article a or the should be prefixed to the of Virginia,95 appointing her commissioners, to word ‘power.’ Either, or neither, will produce the same meet commissioners from other States, expresses result: if either, it is clear that the article the would be their purpose to be, ‘to take into consideration the the proper one, since the next preceding grant of power trade of the United States, to consider how far an is certainly exclusive, to wit: ‘to borrow money on the uniform system in their commercial regulations, may credit *227 of the United States.’ But mere verbal be necessary to their common interests and their criticism I reject. permanent harmony.’ And Mr. Madison's resolution, which led to that measure, is introduced by a preamble My opinion is founded on the application of the words entirely explicit to this point: ‘Whereas, the relative of the grant to the subject of it.

directly to the same conclusion. Power to regulate The ‘power to regulate commerce,’ here meant to be foreign commerce, is given in the same words, and granted, was that power to regulate commerce which in the same breath, as it were, with that over the previously existed in the States. But what was that commerce of the States and with the Indian tribes. But power? The States were, unquestionably, supreme; the power to regulate foreign commerce is necessarily and each possessed that power over commerce, which exclusive. The States are unknown to foreign nations; is acknowledged to reside in every sovereign State. their sovereignty exists only with relation to each other The definition and limits of that power are to be and the general government. Whatever regulations sought among the features of international law; and, foreign commerce should be subjected to in the ports as it was not only admitted, but insisted on by both of the Union, the general government would be *229 parties, in argument, that, ‘unaffected by a state of held responsible for them; and all other regulations, but war, by treaties, or by municipal regulations, all those which Congress had imposed, would be regarded commerce among independent States was legitimate,’ by foreign nations as trespasses and violations of there is no necessity to appeal to the oracles of the national faith and comity. jus commune for the correctness of that doctrine. The law of nations, regarding man as a social animal, But the language which grants the power as to one pronounces all commerce legitimate in a state of description of commerce, grants it as to all; and, in peace, until prohibited by positive law. The power of fact, if ever the exercise of a right, or acquiescence in a a sovereign state over commerce, therefore, amounts construction, could be inferred from contemporaneous to nothing more than a power to limit and restrain and continued assent, it is that of the exclusive effect it at pleasure. And since the power to prescribe the of this grant. limits to its freedom, necessarily implies the power to determine what shall remain unrestrained, it follows, A right over the subject has never been pretended to that the power must be exclusive; it can reside but in any instance, except as incidental to the exercise of in one potentate; and hence, the grant of this power some other unquestionable power. carries with it the whole subject, leaving nothing for The present is an instance of the assertion of that the State to act upon. kind, as incidental to a municipal power; that of **90 And such has been the practical construction superintending the internal concerns of a State, and of *228 the act. Were every law on the subject of particularly of extending protection and patronage, in commerce repealed to-morrow, all commerce would the shape of a monopoly, to genius and enterprise. be lawful; and, in practice, merchants never inquire The grant to Livingston and Fulton, interferes with what is permitted, but what is forbidden commerce. the freedom of intercourse and on this principle its Of all the endless variety of branches of foreign constitutionality is contested. commerce, now carried on to every quarter of the world, I know of no one that is permitted by act of When speaking of the power of Congress over Congress, any otherwise than by not being forbidden. navigation, I do not regard it as a power incidental to No statute of the United States, that I know of, was ever that of regulating commerce; I consider it as the thing passed to permit a commerce, unless in consequence itself; inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital of its having been prohibited by some previous statute. existence.

I speak not here of the treaty making power, for that is Commerce, in its simplest signification, means an not exercised under the grant now under consideration. exchange of goods; but in the advancement of society, I confine my observation to laws properly so called. labour, transportation, intelligence, care, and various And even where freedom of commercial intercourse mediums of exchange, become commodities, and enter is made a subject of stipulation in a treaty, it is into commerce; the subject, *230 the vehicle, the generally with a view to the removal of some previous agent, and their various operations, become the objects restriction; or the introduction of some new privilege, of commercial regulation. Ship building, the carrying most frequently, is identified with the return to a trade, and propagation of seamen, are such vital agents state of peace. But another view of the subject leads of commercial prosperity, that the nation which could

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 75 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 not legislate over these subjects, would not possess of the effect of the coasting license in this cause. I power to regulate commerce. do not regard it as the foundation of the right set up in behalf of the appellant. If there was any one **91 That such was the understanding of the framers object riding over every other in the adoption of the of the constitution, is conspicuous from provisions constitution, it was to keep the commercial intercourse contained in that instrument. among the States free from all invidious and partial restraints. And I cannot overcome the conviction, The first clause of the 9th section, not only considers that if the licensing act was repealed to-morrow, the the right of controlling personal ingress or migration, rights of the appellant to a reversal of the decision as implied in the powers previously vested in Congress complained of, would be as *232 strong as it is over commerce, but acknowledges it as a legitimate under this license. One half the doubts in life arise subject of revenue. And, although the leading object from the defects of language, and if this instrument of this section undoubtedly was the importation of had been called an exemption instead of a license, slaves, yet the words are obviously calculated to it would have given a better idea of its character. comprise persons of all descriptions, and to recognise Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally in Congress a power to prohibit, where the States restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming permit, although they cannot permit when the States houses, retailers of spiritous liquors, &c. The act, prohibit. The treaty making power undoubtedly goes in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and further. So the fifth clause of the same section furnishes forms part of an extensive system, the object of an exposition of the sense of the Convention as to the which is to encourage American shipping, and place power of Congress over navigation: ‘nor shall vessels them on an equal footing with the shipping of other bound to or from one State, be obliged to enter, clear, nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to or pay duties in another.’ its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; But, it is almost labouring to prove a self-evident and a countervailing privilege in favour of American proposition, since the sense of mankind, the practice shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of of the world, the contemporaneous assumption, and the United States on this subject. It is not to give continued exercise of the power, and universal the vessel an American character, that the license acquiescence, have so clearly established *231 is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed the right of Congress over navigation, and the to the act of her enrolment. But it is to confer on transportation of both men and their goods, as not only her American privileges, as contradistinguished from incidental to, but actually of the essence of, the power foreign; and to preserve the government from fraud by to regulate commerce. As to the transportation of foreigners, in surreptitiously intruding themselves into passengers, and passengers in a steam boat, I consider the American commercial marine, as well as frauds it as having been solemnly recognised by the State of upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this New-York, as a subject both of commercial regulation whole system is projected. Many duties and formalities and of revenue. She has imposed a transit duty upon are necessarily imposed upon the American foreign steam boat passengers arriving at Albany, and unless commerce, which would be burdensome in the active this be done in the exercise of her control over personal coasting trade of the States, and can be dispensed intercourse, as incident to internal commerce, I know with. A higher rate of tonnage also is imposed, and not on what principle the individual has been subjected this license entitles the vessels that take it, to those to this tax. The subsequent imposition upon the steam exemptions, but to nothing more. *233 A common boat itself, appears to be but a commutation, and register, equally entitles vessels to carry on the coasting operates as an indirect instead of a direct tax upon the trade, although it does not exempt them from the same subject. The passenger pays it at last. forms of foreign commerce, or from compliance with the 16th and 17th sections of the enrolling act. And It is impossible, with the views which I entertain of even a foreign vessel may be employed coastwise, the principle on which the commercial privileges of upon complying with the requisitions of the 24th the people of of United States, among themselves, section. I consider the license, therefore, as nothing rests, to concur in the view which this Court takes more than what it purports to be, according to the

1st section of this act, conferring on the licensed only to remark, that in both those characters, she is vessel certain privileges in that trade, not conferred expressly recognised as an object of the provisions on other vessels; but the abstract right of commercial which relate to licenses. intercourse, stripped of those privileges, is common to all. The 12th section of the act of 1793, has these words: ‘That when the master of any ship or vessel, ferry **92 Yet there is one view, in which the license may boats excepted, shall be changed,’ &c. And the act be allowed considerable influence in sustaining the which exempts licensed steam boats *235 from the decision of this Court. provisions against alien interests, shows such boats to be both objects of the licensing act, and objects of that It has been contended, that the grants of power to the act, when employed exclusively within our bays and United States over any subject, do not, necessarily, rivers. paralyze the arm of the States, or deprive them of the capacity to act on the same subject. The this can be But the principal objections to these opinions arise, 1st. the effect only of prohibitory provisions in their own From the unavoidable action of some of the municipal constitutions, or in that of the general government. powers of the States, upon commercial subjects. The vis vitae of power is still existing in the States, if not extinguished by the constitution of the United 2d. From passages in the constitution, which are States. That, although as to all those grants of power supposed to imply a concurrent power in the States in which may be called aboriginal, with relation to the regulating commerce. government, brought into existence by the constitution, **93 It is no objection to the existence of distinct, they, of course, are out of the reach of State power; substantive powers, that, in their application, they bear yet, as to all concessions of powers which previously upon the same subject. The same bale of goods, the existed in the States, it was otherwise. The practice of same cask of provisions, or the same ship, that may our government certainly *234 has been, on many be the subject of commercial regulation, may also subjects, to occupy so much only of the field opened be the vehicle of disease. And the health laws that to them, as they think the public interests require. require them to be stopped and ventilated, are no Witness the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts, limited more intended as regulations on commerce, than the both as to cases and as to amount; and various other laws which permit their importation, are intended to instances that might to cited. But the license furnishes innoculate the community with disease. Their different a full answer to this objection; for, although one purposes mark the distinction between the powers grant of power over commerce, should not be deemed brought into action; and while frankly exercised, a total relinquishment of power over the subject, they can produce no serious collision. As to laws but amounting only to a power to assume, still the affecting ferries, turnpike roads, and other subjects of power of the States must be at an end, so far as the the same class, so far from meriting the epithet of United States have, by their legislative act, taken the commercial regulations, they are, in fact, commercial subject under their immediate superintendence. So far facilities, for which, by the consent of mankind, a as relates to the commerce coastwise, the act under compensation is paid, upon the same principle that the which this license is granted, contains a full expression whole commercial world submit to pay light money of Congress on this subject. Vessels, from five tons to the Danes. Inspection laws are of a more equivocal upwards, carrying on the coasting trade, are made nature, and it is obvious, that *236 the constitution the subject of regulation by that act. And this license has viewed that subject with much solicitude. But proves, that this vessel has complied with that act, so far from sustaining an inference in favour of the and been regularly ingrafted into one class of the power of the States over commerce, I cannot but commercial marine of the country. think that the guarded provisions of the 10th section, It remains, to consider the objections to this opinion, on this subject, furnish a strong argument against as presented by the counsel for the appellee. On those that inference. It was obvious, that inspection laws which had relation to the particular character of this must combine municipal with commercial regulations; boat, whether as a steam boat or a ferry boat, I have and, while the power over the subject is yielded to

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 77 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 the States, for obvious reasons, an absolute control is neither necessary nor consistent with the general is given over State legislation on the subject, as far purpose of the clause. as that legislation may be exercised, so as to affect the commerce of the country. The inferences, to be **94 But instances have been insisted on, with correctly drawn, from this whole article, appear to me much confidence, in argument, in which, by municipal to be altogether in favour of the exclusive grants to *238 laws, particular regulations respecting their Congress of power over commerce, and the reverse of cargoes have been imposed upon shipping in the ports that which the appellee contends for. of the United States; and one, in which forfeiture was made the penalty of disobedience. This section contains the positive restrictions imposed by the constitution upon State power. The first clause Until such laws have been tested by exceptions to of it, specifies those powers which the States are their constitutionality, the argument certainly wants precluded from exercising, even though the Congress much of the force attributed to it; but admitting their were to permit them. The second, those which the constitutionality, they present only the familiar case States may exercise with the consent of Congress. of punishment inflicted by both governments upon the And here the sedulous attention to the subject of State same individual. He who robs the mail, may also steal exclusion from commercial power, is strongly marked. the horse that carries it, and would, unquestionably, be Not satisfied with the express grant to the United States subject to punishment, at the same time, under the laws of the power over commerce, this clause negatives the of the State in which the crime is committed, and under exercise of that power to the States, as to the only those of the United States. And these punishments may two objects which could ever tempt them to assume interfere, and one render it impossible to inflict the the exercise of that power, to wit, the collection of other, and yet the two governments would be acting a revenue from imposts and duties on imports and under powers that have no claim to identity. exports; or from a tonnage duty. As *237 to imposts It would be in vain to deny the possibility of a on imports or exports, such a revenue might have been clashing and collision between the measures of the aimed at directly, by express legislation, or indirectly, two governments. The line cannot be drawn with in the form of inspection laws; and it became necessary sufficient distinctness between the municipal powers to guard against both. Hence, first, the consent of of the one, and the commercial powers of the other. Congress to such imposts or duties, is made necessary; In some points they meet and blend so as scarcely to and as to inspection laws, it is limited to the minimum admit of separation. Hitherto the only remedy has been of expenses. Then, the money so raised shall be paid applied which the case admits of; that of a frank and into the treasury of the United States, or may be sued candid co-operation for the general good. Witness the for. since it is declared to be for their use. And lastly, laws of Congress requiring its officers to respect the all such laws may be modified, or repealed, by an act inspection laws of the States, and to aid in enforcing of Congress. It is impossible for a right to be more their health laws; that which surrenders to the States guarded. As to a tonnage duty, that could be recovered the superintendence of pilotage, and the *239 many in but one way; and a sum so raised, being obviously laws passed to permit a tonnage duty to be levied for necessary for the execution of health laws, and other the use of their ports. Other instances could be cited, unavoidable port expenses, it was intended that it abundantly to prove that collision must be sought to be should go into the State treasuries; and nothing more produced; and when it does arise, the question must be was required, therefore, than the consent of Congress. decided how far the powers of Congress are adequate But this whole clause, as to these two subjects, appears to put it down. Wherever the powers of the respective to have been introduced ex abundanti cautela, to governments are frankly exercised, with a distinct view remove every temptation to an attempt to-interfere to the ends of such powers, they may act upon the same with the powers of Congress over commerce, and to object, or use the same means, and yet the powers be show how far Congress might consent to permit the kept perfectly distinct. A resort to the same means, States to exercise that power. Beyond those limits, even therefore, is no argument to prove the identity of their by the consent of Congress, they could not exercise respective powers. it. And thus, we have the whole effect of the clause. The inference which counsel would deduce from it,

I have not touched upon the right of the States to grant coasting trade, any law of the State of New-York patents for inventions or improvements, generally, to the contrary notwithstanding; and that so much because it does not necessarily arise in this cause. It of the several laws of the State of New-York, as is enough for all the purposes of this decision, if they prohibits vessels, licensed according to the laws of cannot exercise it so as to restrain a free intercourse the United States, from navigating the waters of the among the States. State of New-York, by means of fire or steam, is repugnant to the said constitution, and void. This DECREE. This cause came on to be heard on the Court is, therefore, of opinion, that the decree of the transcript of the record of the Court for the Trial Court of New-York for the Trial of Impeachments and of Impeachments and Correction of Errors of the the Correction of Errors, affirming the decree of the State of New-York, and was argued by counsel. On Chancellor of that State, which perpetually enjoins the consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that said Thomas Gibbons, the appellant, from navigating the several licenses to the steam boats the Stoudinger the waters of the State of New-York with the steam and the Bellona, to carry on the coasting trade, which boats the Stoudinger and the Bellona, by steam or fire, are set up by the appellant, Thomas Gibbons, in his is erroneous, and ought to be reversed, and the same answer to the bill of the respondent, Aaron Ogden, is hereby reversed and annulled: and this Court doth filed in the Court of Chancery for the State of New- further DIRECT, ORDER, and DECREE, that the bill York, which were granted under an act of Congress, of the said Aaron Ogden be dismissed, and the same is passed in pursuance of the constitution of the *240 hereby dismissed accordingly. United States, gave full authority to those vessels to navigate the waters of the United States, by steam All Citations or otherwise, for the purpose of carrying on the 22 U.S. 1, 1824 WL 2697, 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1

Footnotes 1 1 Laws U. S. p. 28. 2 Id. 50. 3 1 Bl. Com. 273. 4 Bl. Com. 160. 4 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. Rep. 405. Per Marshall, C.J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 48. Per Story, J. 5 The Federalist, No. 82. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 48. Per Story, J. 6 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 193. Per Marshall, C. J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 15. 17. Per Washington, J. Id. 45. Per Johnson, J. Id. 48. Per Story, J. 7 Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. Rep. 268, 269. 8 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 193. 9 The Federalist, No. 32. 10 Id. No. 82. 11 Id. No. 32. 12 Id. No. 32. 13 M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. Rep. 425. Per Marshall, C.J. Huston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 49. Per Story, J. 14 1 R. L. c. 30. s. 36. 15 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 195, 196. Per Marshall, C. J. Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 34. 45. Per Johnson, J. Id. 49, 50. 55. Per Story, J. Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 575, 576. Per Thompson, J. 16 1 R. L. p. 406. s. 5. 6. 17 4L. U. S. 67. 18 1 R. L. 404. 19 4 L. U. S. 91. 6 Id. 47.

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 79 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 20 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 69. Per Story, J. 21 Id. 51. 22 1 R. L. of N. Y. 216. Laws of Georgia, 468. 6 Laws of Pennsylvania, 320. 23 The Federalist, No. 43. 24 4 Burr. 2408. 25 3 Wheat. Rep. App. p. 15. 26 The Federalist, No. 32. 1 These laws will be found specifically enumerated and stated in a note to Mr. Emmett's argument. 2 The Federalist, No. 12. 3 Vattel, Droit des Gens, liv. 1, c. 8. 1. 2. c. 2. 4 Vattel, 1. 2. c. 8. s. 180. 5 Ingersoll's Dig. 586. 6 Id. 583. 7 Ingersoll's Dig. 506. 612. 617. 8 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 507. 9 6 Johns. Rep. 559, 560. Per Yates, J. 563. Per Thompson, J. 573, 574. Per Kent, Ch. J. 10 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. Rep. 1. Per Johnson, J. p. 33. 11 p. 75. 12 p. 222. 13 p. 323, 324. 14 Virginia Debates, 300. 15 Virginia Debates, 313. 16 Nos. 32. 82. 17 4 Wheat. Rep. 124. 18 Id. 193. 19 5 Wheat. Rep. 48. 54. 20 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 565, 571. 21 Tucker's Bl. Comm. Part 1. App. D. p. 154. 22 United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. Rep. 316. 23 United States v. Bevans, 3 Wheat. Rep. 336. 24 4 Inst. 137, 138, 139, 140. 12 Co. 129. Moor, 122. 891, 892. 25 De Lorio v. Boit, 2 Gallis. Ren. 308. 26 In those States, 1st, as to ferries and bridges: In the laws of New-York, (3d vol. Webster's ed. p. 321.) an act passed 19th March, 1803, grants to John Ransom the exclusive right, for ten years, to keep a ferry across Lake Champlain, from his landing, at Cumberland Head, to Grand Isle, in Vermont, with a prohibition and penalty against any other person's keeping a ferry, or transporting any persons, goods or chattels, for hire or pay, across the lake, between the point of Cumberland Head and the north point, called Gravelly, Point, on said Cumberland Head. An act passed May 16th, 1810, (6th vol. Websters & Skinner's ed. p. 16.) makes the same grant for ten years more, with the same prohibition and penalties, to Russel Ransom. An act passed May 26th, 1812, (Id. 394.) grants, in the same way, to Peter Deall, and his assigns, to keep a ferry across Lake Champlain, from Ticonderoga to the town of Shoreham, in Vermont, for sixteen years, with a like prohibition and penalties for carrying, &c. from any place on the west shore, within half a mile north or south of Deall's dwelling house. An act, passed March 28, 1805, (4th vol. same ed. 66.) gives to David Mayo the same right, from his landing, in the said town of Champlain, to Windmill Point, in Vermont, for ten years, with a like prohibition and penalty. An act, passed February 20, 1807, (5th vol. same ed. p. 11.) gives to Peter Steenberg the same right to keep, &c. a ferry between the south west point of Carlton Island and the outlet of Lake Ontario, (the high road to Canada,) with the same prohibition and penalty. In Georgia, by an act of the 14th December, 1809, an exclusive right is given to Joseph Hill, &c. for one hundred years, to erect three toll bridges across the Savannah and its branches, (dividing South Carolina and Georgia,) a little above the city of Savannah, on the road between it and Charleston; and it prohibits any person's erecting a toll bridge across the said river Savannah, up or down it, within five miles of the city. An

act of December 6, 1813, authorized John Hill to establish a ferry from Savannah to Proctor's Point, till he has built his bridges. An act of 15th of December, 1809, gives to William Garritt and Le Roy Hammond a right to make a toll bridge, and exact toll, across the Savannah river, from a place on the Georgia side, opposite Campbletown; and to Walter Leigh and Edward Rowell a similar bridge, &c. over the Savannah river, at Augusta. An act of December 5, 1800, gives to commissioners the right to establish a ferry over the river Savannah, at Augusta; the tolls to be for the benefit of the academy of Richmond county; which, perhaps, the appellant's counsel may think at variance with his position, that no State has a right to derive revenue by tolls on the trade or intercourse between two States. The same law prohibits any other ferry or bridge between Williams' ferry, opposite Fort Moore's bluff, and Ray's ferry, opposite Campbletown. An act of 6th of December, 1813, gives a ferry across the Savannah, to Ezekiel Dubze; and another is given to Zachariah Bowman and Daniel Tucker. An act, passed 9th of November, 1814, on the express ground of facilitating intercourse with South Carolina, gives to John M'Kinne and Henry Shultz, for twenty years, an exclusive right to a toll bridge over the Savannah, from Augusta, or within four miles thereof; and prohibits the establishing of any other toll bridge over the Savannah, from Augusta, or within four miles above or below the city. 2. As to stages. In the laws of New-York, an act, passed March 30, 1798, (4th vol. Loring & Andrews' ed. p. 399.) grants to Alexander J. Turner and Adonijah Skinner, an exclusive right for five years, of running stages between Lansingburgh and the town of Hampton, in the county of Washington, (i. e. to Vermont, or the road through it to Canada.) An act, passed February 26, 1803, (3d vol. Webster's ed. p. 322.) grants to T. Donally and others, the exclusive right, for seven years, of the same kind, from the city of Albany to the north boundary line of the State of New-Jersey. An act, passed April 6, 1807, (5th vol. Websters & Skinner's ed. p. 186.) grants to John Metcalf the exclusive right, for seven years, of running stage wagons between the village of Canandaigua and the village of Buffalo, (i. e. the road by lake Erie to Pennsylvania, Ohio and Michigan.) In Georgia, an act of November 25, 1802, gives to Nathaniel Twining, &c. for ten years, the sole and exclusive right of running a line of stage carriages between the city of Savannah and town of St. Marys, (on the borders of Florida.) Sec. 2, gives to him an exclusive right of conveying passengers and their baggage, by water, between Darien and St. Marys, (a coasting trade between two ports of entry, if carrying passengers be a branch of trade,) till a post road is established. An act of December 7th, 1812, gives to William Dunham the right of running stage carriages as above. Add to these, the decision of Perrins v. Sikes, in 1802, (Day's Connect. Rep. in Err. p. 19.) that a grant by the General Assembly, of an exclusive privilege to carry passengers by the stage, on the post road leading to Boston, as far as the Massachusetts line, was valid, which may be added as another legal decision on the constitutionality of those laws. Indeed, as to the regulation of passengers arriving in ships from foreign parts, some of the States have exercised, at least, a concurrent power. Of that kind is the act of the State of New-York, (2 N. R. L. 440.) and New-Jersey has passed a similar law on 10th of February, 1819. (Justice's ed. N. J. Laws, 655.) So also in Massachusetts, (2 Mass. Laws, 629.) by an act of February, 1794, masters of vessels coming from abroad, are required to report passengers, &c. And in Delaware, (2 Laws of Del. ed. 1797, by S. & J. Adams, c. 134. p. 1354.) an act to prevent infectious diseases, passed 24th of January, 1797, (sec. 5.) enacts, that no master, & c. of any ship bound to any port of that State, shall bring or import any greater number of passengers and servants than shall be well provided and supplied with good and wholesome meat, drink, and other necessaries, particularly vinegar, as well to wash and cleanse the vessel, as for the use of the persons on board, during the voyage; and it directs the size of each birth, &c.; and that if any master shall offend, &c. he shall forfeit 600 dollars for every such offence. Sec. 7, enacts, that every master, &c. shall pay to the physician who boards his ship, six cents for every person he shall import or land in that State, which he is thereby authorized to recover from such passengers and servants respectively; and the physician shall pay over the moneys so received, to the treasurer of the trustees of the poor in his county. Here is another instance inconsistent with the position of the appellant's counsel, (if carrying passengers be trading,) that a State has no right to raise a tax or revenue by foreign trade. By another act of that State, passed February 3, 1802, the master or owner is required to give bond, that the person so imported and landed, shall not become chargeable. If the regulation of passengers belong to commerce, and that exclusively, (as it must, if the power to regulate commerce be exclusive,) by what authority can a State Court issue a ne exeat against a trader or merchant about to leave the State? 27 Vol. 1. Part 1. App. D. p. 180. 28 p. 309.

© 2021 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 81 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) 6 L.Ed. 23, 9 Wheat. 1 29 9 Johns. Rep. 577, 578. 30 1st vol. 31 Ib. p. 28. 32 1 L. U. S. p. 49, 50. 33 p. 53. 34 p. 321. 35 p. 322. 36 p. 323. 37 p. 324. 38 p. 330. 39 No. 42. 40 New-York, as well as many other States, prohibited the importation and exporation of slaves before the adoption of the constitution. The first law was passed in February, 1788; (2 Greenleaf, 85.) it prohibits the selling of an imported slave, and the buying of a slave with intent to export him: and subsequent laws have confirmed and increased the prohibition of exporting and importing slaves. It may be proper here to observe, as applicable to this, as well as to many other laws of the States respecting commerce, that if, after the adoption of the constitution, the individual States have not a right to make them, they, and all other previously made similar laws, would, by force of that disqualification, have become inoperative. In 1792, the State of Virginia passed a law prohibiting the importation or selling of imported slaves. (1 Pleasants & Pace's ed. p. 186, sec. 13.) In Delaware, (Laws of Del. ed. of 1797, by S. & J. Adams, p. 942.) an act passed February 3, 1789, enacts, that if any owner, master, &c. shall fit out, equip, man, or otherwise prepare any ship or vessel, within any port or place in that State, or shall cause any vessel to sail from any port or place in that State, for the purpose of carrying on a trade or traffic in slaves, to, or from, or between Europe, Asia, Africa, or America, or any places or countries whatsoever, or of transporting slaves to or from one port or place to another, in any part of the world, such ship, &c. her tackle, &c. shall be forefeited to the State, and shall be liable to be seized and prosecuted by any afficer of the customs, by information, &c. And, moreover, every person so fitting out, &c. shall severally forfeit and pay the sum of 500 pounds, one half to the use of the State, the other half to the informer. It further enacts, that if any person shall export, or sell, with intention to export or carry out for sale, any negro or mulatto slave, from that State to Marland, Virginia, either of the Carolinas, Georgia, or the West Indies, without license or permit of five Justices, & c. he shall pay, for every slave so exported, 100 pounds, and for every attempt so to do, 20 pounds, one half to the use of the State, and one half to the informer. Here is a State law minutely controlling a branch of foreign trade, and of that between the States, and operating explicitly by the officers of the customs. It was passed, indeed, a few weeks before the present constitution went into operation, but long after it had been accepted by Delaware; at all events, it is referred to, and confirmed, by an act, passed June 24, 1793, (c. 22. p. 1094.) requiring bail as to those offences. In Pennsylvania, (Bioren's ed. vol. 2. p. 443.) an act was passed, March, 1788, also prohibiting the trade; but, before examining it, let it be remembered, that the first law Congress passed on that subject, was in 1794, and that Pennsylvania had accepted the constitution in December, 1787, which, at the time of passing this act, she had recently studied and discussed. Her legislation, then, was not founded on, and did not rely on, any law of Congress in pari materid. She not only prohibited the exportation and importation of slaves, but, by sec. 5. of that act, prohibits the building, fitting out, &c. of any vessel for the slave trade, or to sail from the port for that trade, under the penalty of forfeiture of the vessel, &c. and 1000 pounds by qui tam. At that time, Congress absolutely permitted the slave trade; but, would not that law have been valid to prohibit it from that port? New-Jersey passed a law to the same purport, in March, 1798, (Patterson's ed. p. 307. Justice's ed. p. 371, 372, 373.) when Congress had only prohibited, and could only prohibit, the trade as a foreign trade. Sec. 12, 13. prohibit the importation of slaves for sale. Sec. 17, 18, 19. prohibit the slave trade, and the fitting out of vessels, for the purpose of transporting slaves from one place to another, clearly including from one State to another, which Congress then could not do. Connecticut, in October, 1788, after she and nine States had ratified the constitution, (Hudson & Goodwin's ed. p. 626.) forbade any citizen or inhabitant of that State, either as master, factor, supercargo, owner, or

hirer of any vessel, directly or indirectly, to transport, or buy, or sell, or receive on board his vessel, with intent to cause to be transported or imported, any of the inhabitants of Africa, as slaves, with qui tam penalties; and made all insurances on them void. And, in 1792, (p. 628.) let it be still remembered, when Congress had no such power, she enacted, that no citizen or inhabitant of that State should transport out of the State, for the purpose of selling into any other State, country or kingdom, or buy or sell, with intent to transport out of that State, or should sell, if transported, &c. In Massachusetts, (1 Laws of Mass. 407, 408.) an act, passed March 26, 1788, reciting the evils of the African, trade, enacts, that no citizens of that Commonwealth, or other person residing within the same, shall, for himself or any other person, as master, factor, supercargo, owner or hirer, in whole or in part, of any vessel, directly or indirectly, import or transport, or buy, or sell, or receive on board his or their vessels, with intent to cause to be imported or transported, any of the inhabitants of any state or kingdom, in that part of the world called Africa, as slaves, &c. under a penalty for every vessel fitted out with such intent, and actually employed, &c. Doubtless, the laws of other States might be produced to the same purpose, if the means of examination had been convenient; those already cited, however, are sufficient to show, that the individual States regulated the slave trade, as a trade, both with foreign nations, and between the States, by virtue of their own sovereign authority, after the adoption of the constitution; but before Congress did, and before they could do it: 41 3 U. S. L. p. 520. 42 Tuck. Black. part 1st. Appen. D. p. 251. 43 Melcher's ed. p. 302. 44 p. 304. 45 p. 611. 46 1 vol. p. 270. 47 p. 200. 48 1 vol. p. 244. 49 p. 313. 50 p. 349. 51 Marbury & Crawford's Dig. p. 393. 52 2 Del. Laws, ed. 1797, cap. 134, p. 1354. 53 2 Mass. Laws, p. 788. 54 p. 872. 55 2 U. S. L. p. 34. 56 3 U. S. L. p. 366, c. 193, s. 3. 57 2 U. S. L. p. 34. 58 2 U. S. L. p. 121. 59 For instance, as to the number of hoops on, and size of barrels or casks, (2 N. R. L. of N. Y. p. 321. s. 5. p. 325. s. 3. p. 330. s. 3, 4.1 Laws of Maryland, Maxey's ed. 218. 1 Vir. Laws, Pace & Pleasant's ed. p. 352. s. 3. p. 350. s. 3. Laws of Conn. Hudson & Goodwin's ed. p. 394. s. 1, 2. 5, 6. 8, 9.) as to quantity as well as quality or kind, of their contents. What pieces of beef or pork, (2 N. R. L. of N. Y. p. 326. s. 4. p. 326. s. 5. 9. p. 327. s. 11.) or quantity and size of nails should be in one cask, (Laws of N. H. Melcher's ed. 386. Laws of Conn. p. 394. s. 2. p. 256. s. 2.) or the length, breadth, and thickness of staves and heading, lumber, boards, shingles, &c. (2 N. R. L. of N. Y. p. 336. s. 1. 1 Laws of Vir. 237. Laws of Conn. p. 397. s. 21.) These regulations have no object but to improve our foreign trade, and raise the character and reputation of the articles in a foreign market; and if the States have no right to pass laws prohibiting exportation, what can prevent a person having an inferior article, from exporting it, in its uninspected state, and taking his chance for the price it might bring in a foreign market? These laws are much too numerous and complicated to be detailed; but a very slight examination of some of them will show the very extensive powers for regulating commerce, possessed by the Legislatures from which they emanate. Some operate by the forfeiture of the uninspected article, as in the New-York act for inspecting pot and pearl ashes. (2 N. R. L. p. 335. s. 8.) It gives the liberty of entering on board of any ship, &c. to search for any pot or pearl ashes, shipped or shipping for exportation; and, if any unbranded be discovered, it is forfeited, and the captain subject to a pecuniary fine. A similar forfeiture is given in the same State, (p. 339. s. 8.) and a penalty on the master. (p. 339, 340. s. 10.) In Kentucky, a similar forfeiture

is given, for attempting to export unbranded flour. (Ky. Laws, Toulman's ed. 440.) In New-Hampshire, a like forfeiture is given of unpacked beef or pork shipped fro exportation. (Naws of N. H. p. 387, 388.) And in Connecticut, a forfeiture is given of unbranded nails. (Laws of Conn. p. 527. s. 5.) Virginia has enacted a forfeiture of unbranded fish, and a penalty on the master. (1 Laws of Va. p. 353. s. 6.) She has not only done the same in respect to lumber, but she has gone much farther, and acted on the collector and officers of the customs. (1 Laws of Va. p. 238. s. 4.) The collector, or other proper officer of the customs, is thereby charged and directed not to suffer any vessel to clear from his office, unless the master, &c. shall produce inspection notes or certificates, &c. and make oath that he has no lumber on board, but what is entered on his manifest. To this exercise of power, equal to that of Congress itself, I probably shall be told, that Congress has, in the collection laws, directed the collectors to pay regard to the inspection laws of the respective States. That is at least an admission that they are rightfully made; but the answer is entirely insufficient; for the first act of the United States, directing this, was passed the 2d of March, 1799, and the act of Virginia, that I have last referred to, was passed the 26th of December, 1792. In like manner, the laws of the same State give a forfeiture of uninspected tobacco, about to be exported, and similar duties are imposed on the master and collector. (1 Laws of Va. p. 263. s. 27. p. 269. s. 45. p. 271. s. 49.) This law was also passed in November, 1792. Connecticut, too, gives a forfeiture of unsurveyed tobacco; (1 Laws of Conn. p. 395. s. 13.) and, as to provisions, it also enacts a penalty against the master, and imposes a duty on the collector. (p. 397. s. 20. p. 303. s. 11. p. 407. s. 3.) Several of those inspection acts regulate as to the importation of articles, equally with their exportation. The New-York act, relative to the inspection of sole leather, expressly says, ‘Whether such leather be manufactured within the same, or imported or brought into it from any place whatsoever.’ (2 N. R. L. p. 340. s. 2.) In Maryland, the act for the inspection of salted provisions, exported and imported from and to Baltimore, relates to beef, pork and fish ‘imported into the said town, from any part of this State, or any one of the United States, or from any foreign port whatever.’ (2 Laws of Maryland, p. 3. s. 5.) Sec. 6 relates to the size, quality, and make of all imported beef and pork barrels. This act, it is true, was passed in 1786, before the adoption of the constitution. If the power of Congress, however, was exclusive, it should then have ceased to operate. But the argument does not stop there. In 1796, it was extended to Havre de Grace, (p. 335. s. 9.) and in 1797 to Chester. (p. 369. s. 9.) The act of the same State, for the gauge of barrels for pork, beef, pitch, tar and turpentine, and tare of barrels for flour and bread, continued by several statutes down to 1810, and probably to the present time, prohibits the importation, by land or water, of those articles, except in barrels of certain dimensions and contents. In Virginia, the act for the inspection of fish, passed in December, 1795, sec. 6. provides for the inspection of imported fish, as well as of that packed for exportation; and it also enacts a forfeiture of the article, and a penalty on the master. (1 Laws of Va. p. 352. s. 3.) In Pennsylvania, the act providing for the inspection of gunpowder, relates to the inspection of imported as well as manufactured; and gives a forfeiture of the article for selling imported gunpowder without inspection. (3 Laws of Penn. p. 240.) And an antecedent law of March, 1787, directs the captain of every vessel, importing gunpowder into the port of Philadelphia, under a penalty and forfeiture of the article, if it be his own property, to deliver it at a magazine, and directs the health officer to give strangers notice of the act, and also enjoins the custom-house and naval officers, and their deputies, to do the same.' (2 Laws of Penn. p. 402. s. 3.) In New-Hampshire, (Laws of N. H. ed. of 1815. p. 460.) by the act relating to gunpowder, sec. 2. it is enacted, that every master of any merchant vessel bringing gunpowder into Portsmouth, shall, within forty-eight hours, deposit it in a magazine, and, on neglect, shall pay a fine of 30 pounds to the poor of Portsmouth. Sec. 13. directs a keeper of the magazine to be chosen, who shall be entitled to a fee on all he shall receive and deliver out; another instance of what the appellant's counsel has declared to be unconstitutional, the raising of revenue by a State law from foreign commerce. In dassachusetts, (2 Mass. Laws, p. 37.) the act of June 19, 1801, sec. 1. directs imported gunpowder, landed at the port of Boston, to be deposited in a magazine. And by sec. 3. no gunpowder shall be kept on board any ship or other vessel, lying to or grounded at any wharf in Boston, under pain of confiscation and pecuniary penalty. More extensive examinations would produce a much greater variety of regulations of foreign commerce, and that between the States, made by State Legislatures; but only one more instance need be added, not indeed coming under any of the preceding heads. In Virginia, the act laying taxes for the support of government, passed in January, 1799, prohibits unlicensed merchants from selling, by wholesale or retail, goods of foreign

growth or manufacture, on land, or on board of any vessel. (1 Laws of Va. p. 386. s. 2.) The same law has been renewed, from time to time, and it probably exists at this day. 60 1 L. U. S. p. 475. ed. 1815. 61 The Federalist, No. 32. 62 9 Johns. Rep. p. 568. 63 9 Johns. Rep. p. 575, 576. 64 4 Wheat. Rep. 196. 65 5 Wheat. Rep. 49. 66 2 U. S. L. p. 6. 67 2 U. S. L. p. 7. 68 Ib. p. 35. 42. 69 2 U. S. L. p. 6. 70 Ib. p. 43. s. 23. 71 Ib. p. 42, 43. 72 2 U. S. L. p. 119, 120. 73 Ib. p. 332. 74 2 U. S. L. p. 335. 75 Id. p. 343. 76 Id. p. 346. 77 4 U. S. L. p. 393. 78 17 Johns. Rep. p. 488. 79 The Federalist, No. 32. 80 4 Wheat. Rep. 168. 81 9 Johns. Rep. 567, 568. 82 2 Greenleaf's ed. of the Laws, p. 271. 83 p. 269. 84 3 Dallas' Rep. 394. 85 Act of Feb. 21, 1793, s. 1. 86 Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. Rep. 269. 87 The Federalist, No. 42. 88 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 122. 89 17 Vin. 211. 90 Tucker's Bl. Com. part 1. Appx. 180. 91 Mr. Webster. 92 2 U. S. L. p. 545. 3 U. S. L. p. 126. 93 3 U. S. L. p. 529. 94 Dr. Witherspoon. 95 January 21, 1786.

Negative Treatment

Negative Citing References (7) The KeyCited document has been negatively referenced by the following events or decisions in other litigation or proceedings:

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Declined to May 15, 2000 Case 1. U.S. v. Morrison — Extend by

120 S.Ct. 1740 , U.S.Va. CIVIL RIGHTS - Gender. Civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act held unconstitutional.

Distinguished 2. Standard Oil Co of N J v. U S June 09, Case — by 1941 120 F.2d 340 , Cust. & Pat.App. Appeal from United States Customs Court. Action by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey against the United States to recover tax paid. From a judgment for the United States,...

Distinguished 3. Bass River Associates v. Mayor, Tp. Com'r, Planning Aug. 31, Case — by Bd. of Bass River Tp. 1984

743 F.2d 159 , 3rd Cir.(N.J.) Action was brought challenging validity of a New Jersey township's prohibition of ''floating homes.'' The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, John W.... Distinguished Dec. 10, Case 4. Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon — by 1999

78 F.Supp.2d 828 , N.D.Ind. GOVERNMENT - Liquor. Indiana statute regulating alcoholic beverages violated Commerce Clause.

Distinguished 5. Gonzales v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation Dist. Aug. 24, Case — by 2000 2000 WL 1201899 , Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) Paul D. Gonzales (''Paul'') and Kenneth A. Gonzales (''Kenneth'') (collectively, the ''Gonzaleses'') appeal a take-nothing summary judgment entered in favor of the Brazos River... Distinguished Aug. 05, Case 6. Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly — by 2004

17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180 , Cal. GOVERNMENT - Liquor. Statute restricting use on wine labels of geographic brand names not preempted by federal law.

Limitation 7. Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. City of South Dec. 29, Case — of Holding Portland 2017 Recognized by 288 F.Supp.3d 321 , D.Me. ENERGY AND UTILITIES — Oil and Gas. City ordinance that prohibited pipeline operator from loading crude oil onto tankers in city harbor was not preempted by federal law.

History (3)

Direct History (3) 1. Ogden v. Gibbons 4 Johns.Ch. 150 , N.Y.Ch. , 1819

Affirmed by

2. Gibbons v. Ogden 17 Johns. 488 , N.Y. , 1820

Reversed by

3. Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 , U.S.N.Y. , Mar. 02, 1824

C Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 | Mar 02, 1824 U.S.N.Y.

Reversing B U.S. Supreme Court U.S.Supreme

B Gibbons v. Ogden 17 Johns. 488 | Jan 01, 1820 N.Y. State High Court High State Affirming A Court Intermediate A Ogden v. Gibbons 4 Johns.Ch. 150 | Jan 01, 1819 N.Y.Ch. Trial Court Trial

Citing References (500)

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Declined to May 15, 2000 Case 1. U.S. v. Morrison — Extend by 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1753+ , U.S.Va. CIVIL RIGHTS - Gender. Civil remedy provision of Violence Against Women Act held unconstitutional.

Distinguished 2. Bass River Associates v. Mayor, Tp. Com'r, Aug. 31, 1984 Case — by Planning Bd. of Bass River Tp. 743 F.2d 159, 163+ , 3rd Cir.(N.J.) Action was brought challenging validity of a New Jersey township's prohibition of ''floating homes.'' The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, John W....

Examined by 3. State of N.J. v. State of N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997 Case — 1997 WL 291594, *17+ , U.S. My conclusions in this Report draw support from Central Railroad Co. v. Mayor of Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473 (1908). Because that case interpreted the Compact at the time Ellis... Examined by Apr. 26, 1995 Case 4. U.S. v. Lopez — 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1627+ , U.S.Tex. Weapons. Gun-Free School Zones Act, which forbids possession of firearm within school zone, exceeded Congress' commerce clause authority. Examined by May 23, 1977 Case 5. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc. — 97 S.Ct. 1740, 1742+ , U.S.Va. Holders of licenses under the federal enrollment and licensing law brought suit challenging validity of Virginia statute prohibiting federally licensed vessels owned by... Examined by Mar. 14, 1904 Case 6. Northern Securities Co. v. U.S. — 24 S.Ct. 436, 441+ , U.S.Minn. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota to review a decree enforcing, as against the defendants, the provisions of the antitrust act... Examined by Feb. 23, 1903 Case 7. Champion v. Ames — 23 S.Ct. 321, 323+ , U.S.Ill. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review an order dismissing a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into a detention under a... Examined by Jan. 21, 1895 Case 8. U.S. v. E. C. Knight Co. — 15 S.Ct. 249, 253+ , U.S.Pa. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Examined by Oct Term Case 9. Hall v. De Cuir — 1877 1877 WL 18666, *3+ , U.S.La. The Supreme Court of Louisiana having decided that an act of the General Assembly, approved Feb. 23, 1869, entitled 'An Act to enforce the thirteenth article of the Constitution of... Examined by Dec. 01, 1872 Case 10. In re State Freight Tax — 1872 WL 15389, *7+ , U.S.Pa. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; the case being thus: On the 25th of August, 1864, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed an act entitled 'An act to provide additional... Examined by Dec Term Case 11. Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port — 1851 of Philadelphia, to Use of Soc for Relief of Distressed Pilots, Their Widows and Children 1851 WL 6615, *5+ , U.S.Pa. A law of the state of Pennsylvania, that a vessel which neglects or refuses to take a pilot shall forfeit and pay to the master warden of the pilots, for the use of the Society for...

Examined by 12. Smith v. Turner Jan Term Case — 1849 WL 6405, *6+ , U.S.N.Y. 1849 THESE were kindred cases, and were argued together. They were both brought up to this court by writs of error issued under the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act; the case... Examined by Jan Term Case 13. Thurlow v. Com. of Mass. — 1847 1847 WL 5992, *10+ , U.S.Mass. Laws of Massachusetts, providing that no person shall presume to be a retailer or seller of wine, brandy, rum or other spirituous liquors, in a less quantity than twenty-eight...

Examined by 14. Groves v. Slaughter Jan Term Case — 1841 WL 5033, *11+ , U.S.La. 1841 Illegal contracts.—Inter-state slave-trade.— Constitutional law. An action was instituted in the circuit court of Louisiana, on a promissory note given in the state of Mississippi,... Examined by 1837 Case 15. Mayor, Aldermen and Commonalty of — City of New York v. Miln 1837 WL 3554, *1+ , U.S.N.Y. The act of the legislature of New York provides, in the first section, that the master of any ship or vessel arriving in the port of New York from any country of the United States,...

Examined by 16. U S v. New Bedford Bridge Apr. 15, 1847 Case — 27 F.Cas. 91, 96+ , C.C.D.Mass. This was an indictment, found by the grand jury at the last term, and to which the respondents pleaded not guilty. The indictment alleged, that there was a river in the state of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Examined by June 12, 1997 Case 17. U.S. v. Bailey — 115 F.3d 1222, 1225+ , 5th Cir.(Tex.) Defendant was charged with failure to pay child support under Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA). The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Samuel Fred...

Examined by 18. United States v. Durham Aug. 29, 2018 Case — 902 F.3d 1180, 1199+ , 10th Cir.(Okla.) CRIMINAL JUSTICE — Sex Offenses. Statute barring travel in foreign commerce and engaging in illicit sexual conduct fell within scope of Congress's Foreign Commerce Clause... Examined by Aug. 12, 2011 Case 19. Florida ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. U.S. Dept. of — Health and Human Services 648 F.3d 1235, 1269+ , 11th Cir.(Fla.) HEALTH - Industry Regulations. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's individual mandate exceeded boundaries of Congress's enumerated power under Commerce Clause. Examined by July 23, 1999 Case 20. Made in the USA Foundation v. U.S. — 56 F.Supp.2d 1226, 1317+ , N.D.Ala. Voters and union plaintiffs brought action challenging the constitutionality of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and NAFTA Implementation Act. Upon defendant's motion to...

Examined by 21. Kao v. Abbott Laboratories Inc. Nov. 13, 2017 Case — 2017 WL 5257041, *5+ , N.D.Cal. Before the Court is Defendant Abbott Laboratories Inc.’s (“Abbott Laboratories” or “Abbott”) Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 21. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant... Examined by Nov. 23, 2011 Case 22. Briseno v. Conagra Foods, Inc. — 2011 WL 13128869, *2+ , C.D.Cal. Robert Briseno filed this putative class action against ConAgra Foods, Inc. on June 28, 2011 On August 24, 2011, ConAgra moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the... Examined by Jan. 31, 2011 Case 23. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of — Health and Human Services 780 F.Supp.2d 1256, 1274+ , N.D.Fla. INSURANCE - Health. Individual mandate provision of health care act was unconstitutional and nonseverable. Examined by Dec. 09, 2008 Case 24. U.S. v. Myers — 591 F.Supp.2d 1312, 1318+ , S.D.Fla. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Sex Offenders. SORNA's registration provision exceeded Congress's power under Commerce Clause.

Examined by 25. The James Morrison Mar 1846 Case — 26 F.Cas. 579, 580+ , D.Mo. In admiralty.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Examined by Sep. 20, 1984 Case 26. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. — 593 F.Supp. 1146, 1150+ , D.N.J. Cigarette smoker suffering from lung cancer brought state common-law products liability suit against cigarette companies alleging that they were responsible for her condition on...

Examined by 27. United States v. DeLeon Jan. 21, 2020 Case — 2020 WL 353856, *68+ , D.N.M. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) Defendant Billy Garcia's Motion to Produce Post- Conviction Discovery and for In Camera Review, filed October 15, 2018 (Doc. 2416)(“B....

Examined by 28. U.S. v. Nichols May 31, 1996 Case — 928 F.Supp. 302, 306+ , S.D.N.Y. Defendant was charged with violation of Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), for failing to pay support obligation for child who resided in other state, and defendant moved to...

Examined by 29. Board of Trustees of University of Ill. v. U.S. June 20, 1932 Case —

1932 WL 2212, *4+ , Cust. & Pat.App. Appeal from United States Customs Court, T. D. 44758 [Affirmed.] Examined by June 30, 1914 Case 30. Southern Express Co. v. State — 66 So. 115, 120+ , Ala. Appeal from Law and Equity Court, Morgan County; Thomas W. Wert, Judge. Suit by the State, by its solicitor, against the Southern Express Company to enjoin the maintenance of a...

Examined by 31. Clarke v. Philadelphia, W. & B.R. Co. Jun Term Case — 4 Houst. 158, 158+ , Del.Err. & App. 1870 An Act of the Legislature imposing on every person, corporation, or association or company of persons not a corporation, engaged, or engaging in the business of carrying passengers...

Examined by 32. Fuller v. Chicago & N.W.R. Co. Apr. 05, 1871 Case — 31 Iowa 187, 193+ , Iowa Section 2, chapter 169, acts of the ninth general assembly is in the following words: ''In the month of September, annually, each railroad company shall fix its rates of fare for...

Examined by 33. City of Newport v. Taylor's Ex'rs Feb. 08, 1856 Case — 16 B.Mon. 699, 699+ , Ky. In 1785, a patent was granted by the commonwealth of Virginia, to James Taylor, for 1,500 acres of land, at the junction of the Licking and Ohio rivers, lying on both rivers, and...

Examined by 34. State v. Kennedy Jun 1867 Case — 19 La.Ann. 397, 402+ , La. Appeal from the Sixth District Court of New Orleans, Duplantier, J.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Examined by 35. Crow v. State Mar Term Case — 14 Mo. 237, 239+ , Mo. 1851 Crow and others, defendants, were jointly indicted by the grand jury of St. Louis county for dealing as merchants without a license as required by law. The indictment contains six...

Examined by 36. North River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston 1825 Case — 3 Cow. 182, 721+ , N.Y. The acts of the legislature of this state, granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters within its jurisdiction, with boats moved... Examined by 1869 Case 37. Commonwealth v. Erie Ry. Co. — 62 Pa. 286, 290+ , Pa. 1. In a question whether a state law is against the Constitution of the United States, a simple doubt should determine it in favor of the state. 2. The Act of April 25th 1864, § 1...

— 38. Australian National Airways Pty Ltd v Dec. 14, 1945 Case — — Commonwealth 1945 WL 23310, *1+ , HCA Demurrers to statements of claim in three actions instituted by air transport companies against the Commonwealth of Australia, the Treasurer of the Commonwealth, the Minister of...

Distinguished 39. Standard Oil Co of N J v. U S June 09, 1941 Case — by 120 F.2d 340, 341+ , Cust. & Pat.App. Appeal from United States Customs Court. Action by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey against the United States to recover tax paid. From a judgment for the United States,... Discussed by May 18, 2015 Case 40. Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. — Wynne 135 S.Ct. 1787, 1794+ , U.S.Md. TAXATION - Income. Maryland's personal income tax scheme violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Discussed by June 28, 2012 Case 41. National Federation of Independent — Business v. Sebelius 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577+ , U.S. HEALTH - Health Care Reform. Individual mandate in health care reform law was a constitutionally permissible tax. Discussed by Jan. 15, 2003 Case 42. Eldred v. Ashcroft — 123 S.Ct. 769, 790+ , U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - Copyright Practice. Statute extending term for new and existing copyrights was constitutional.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by May 19, 1997 Case 43. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. — Town of Harrison, Me. 117 S.Ct. 1590, 1592+ , U.S.Me. TAXES - Real Property. Property tax exemption that favored charitable institutions serving state residents violated commerce clause. Discussed by Mar. 02, 1983 Case 44. EEOC v. Wyoming — 103 S.Ct. 1054, 1065+ , U.S.Wyo. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit against the state of Wyoming and various officials thereof, challenging, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the... Discussed by June 24, 1976 Case 45. National League of Cities v. Usery — 96 S.Ct. 2465, 2469+ , U.S.Dist.Col. Cities, states and intergovernmental organizations brought an action challenging the validity of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which extended its minimum wage... Discussed by Feb. 21, 1966 Case 46. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas — City 86 S.Ct. 684, 688+ , U.S.Mo. In a patent infringement action, the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 216 F.Supp. 272, entered judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants appealed.... Discussed by Dec. 14, 1964 Case 47. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U. S. — 85 S.Ct. 348, 354+ , U.S.Ga. Action by a motel operator for declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of the public accommodations provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and for injunctive relief. ... Discussed by Apr. 04, 1949 Case 48. H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond — 69 S.Ct. 657, 663+ , U.S.N.Y. Proceeding in the matter of the application of H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc., to review determination of C. Chester DuMond, as Commissioner of Agriculture and Markets of the State of New... Discussed by June 05, 1944 Case 49. U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters — Ass'n 64 S.Ct. 1162, 1166+ , U.S.Ga. The South-Eastern Underwriters Association and others were indicted by the United States of America for a conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce by fixing and... Discussed by Nov. 09, 1942 Case 50. Wickard v. Filburn — 63 S.Ct. 82, 87+ , U.S.Ohio Action for injunction and for declaratory judgment by Roscoe C. Filburn against Claude R. Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture of the United States and others. From a judgment, 43...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Feb. 03, 1941 Case 51. U.S. v. Darby — 61 S.Ct. 451, 456+ , U.S.Ga. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia. Fred W. Darby was indicted for alleged violations of section 15(a) (1, 2, 5) of the Fair... Discussed by Mar. 20, 1933 Case 52. Board of Trustees of University of — Illinois v. U.S. 53 S.Ct. 509, 509+ , U.S.Cust. & Pat.App. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. Proceeding by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, which had paid, under protest,... Discussed by June 09, 1913 Case 53. Simpson v. Shepard (U.S. Reports Title: — Minnesota Rate Cases) 33 S.Ct. 729, 739+ , U.S.Minn. THREE APPEALS from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota to review decrees enjoining the enforcement of intrastate rates of interstate carriers as... Discussed by Jan. 06, 1908 Case 54. Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. — 28 S.Ct. 141, 143+ , U.S.Tenn. TWO WRITS of error directed respectively to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee and to the Circuit Court of the United States for the... Discussed by Feb. 23, 1904 Case 55. St. Clair County v. Interstate Sand & Car — Transfer Co. 24 S.Ct. 300, 301+ , U.S.Ill. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Illinois to review a judgment dismissing, on general demurrer, a complaint in an action to recover... Discussed by Nov. 19, 1900 Case 56. Austin v. State of Tennessee — 21 S.Ct. 132, 142+ , U.S.Tenn. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee to review a decision affirming a judgment of conviction for sale of cigarettes in violation of statute. Affirmed. See same...

Discussed by 57. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. State of Ohio Feb. 20, 1899 Case — 19 S.Ct. 465, 470+ , U.S.Ohio In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio.

Discussed by 58. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Haber Mar. 14, 1898 Case — 18 S.Ct. 488, 493+ , U.S.Kan. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. Discussed by Apr. 28, 1890 Case 59. Leisy v. Hardin — 10 S.Ct. 681, 683+ , U.S.Iowa In error to the supreme court of the state of Iowa.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Mar. 19, 1888 Case 60. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co. — 8 S.Ct. 689, 700+ , U.S.Ill. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. WAITE, C. J., and HARLAN and GRAY, JJ., dissenting. Discussed by Apr. 30, 1883 Case 61. Parkersburg & O.R. Transp. Co. v. City — of Parkersburg 2 S.Ct. 732, 743+ , U.S.W.Va. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of West Virginia.

Discussed by 62. Turner v. State of Maryland Feb. 05, 1883 Case — 2 S.Ct. 44, 54+ , U.S.Md. In Error to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland. Discussed by Oct Term Case 63. Patterson v. State of Kentucky — 1878 1878 WL 18393, *3+ , U.S.Ky. ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. @1. Where, by the application of the invention or discovery for which...

Discussed by 64. Wheeling, P. & C. Transp. Co. v. City of Oct Term Case — Wheeling 1878 1878 WL 18244, *2+ , U.S.W.Va. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of West Virginia. This was an action of assumpsit brought for the recovery of the tax paid under protest to the city of Wheeling,...

Discussed by 65. Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co. Oct Term Case — 1877 1877 WL 18436, *4+ , U.S.Fla. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida. In 1859, an association of persons, known as the Pensacola Telegraph Company, erected a... Discussed by Oct Term Case 66. Hannibal & St. J.R. Co. v. Husen — 1877 1877 WL 18667, *2+ , U.S.Mo. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. An act of the legislature of Missouri, approved Jan. 23, 1872, 1 Wagner's Stat. 251, provides as follows:-- 'SECTION 1. No... Discussed by Oct. 01, 1875 Case 67. U.S. v. Cruikshank — 1875 WL 17550, *3+ , U.S.La. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana. This was an indictment for conspiracy under the sixth section of the act of May 30, 1870, known as...

Discussed by 68. Henderson v. Mayor of City of New York Oct Term Case — 1875 WL 17763, *2+ , U.S.N.Y. 1875 THESE cases come here by appeal,—the former from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, the latter from the Circuit Court of the United...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Dec 1872 Case 69. Morgan v. Parham — 1872 WL 15296, *3+ , U.S.Ala. 1. When a vessel is regularly registered in the port to which she belongs, that is to say, 'in the port nearest to which her owner, husband, or acting and managing owner usually... Discussed by Dec. 01, 1870 Case 70. Legal Tender Cases — 1870 WL 12742, *58+ , U.S.Tex. 1. A purchase of the property of a loyal citizen of the United States under a confiscation and sale made pursuant to statutes of the late rebel confederacy, passed in aid of their...

Discussed by 71. Gilman v. City of Philadelphia Dec Term Case — 1865 WL 10773, *11+ , U.S.Pa. 1865 THE Constitution gives to Congress power to 'regulate commerce between the States;' and this case was one relating to the respective jurisdiction of a State and of the United... Discussed by Dec. 01, 1861 Case 72. Conway v. Taylor's Ex'r — 1861 WL 7718, *7+ , U.S.Ky. 1. A ferry franchise on the Ohio is grantable, under the laws of Kenkucky, to a citizen of that State who is a riparian owner on the Kentucky side; and it is not necessary to the... Discussed by Dec. 01, 1851 Case 73. Com. of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & — Belmont Bridge Co. 1851 WL 6676, *1+ , U.S.Pa. THIS was a case upon the equity side of this court, in the exercise of original jurisdiction. It is noticed in 9 Howard, 647, and again in 11 Howard, 528. In 9 Howard, a statement... Discussed by Jan Term Case 74. Nathan v. State of Louisiana — 1850 1850 WL 6841, *1+ , U.S.La. A tax imposed by a state upon all money or exchange brokers is not void for repugnance to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce. Foreign bills of exchange are...

Discussed by 75. Holmes v. Jennison 1840 Case — 1840 WL 6278, *3+ , U.S. Concurring most fully and cordially in the opinions delivered by those of my brethren, who are opposed to any action by this Court on this case, I have nothing to add to the... Discussed by Aug. 27, 2009 Case 76. U.S. v. Ray — 578 F.3d 184, 194+ , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Speedy Trial. A 15-year delay in the defendant's resentencing violated her right to due process, but not her right to a speedy trial.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by July 27, 2001 Case 77. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida- — Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority 261 F.3d 245, 253+ , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) GOVERNMENT - Waste Disposal. Counties' flow control ordinances did not violate dormant Commerce Clause. Discussed by Aug. 12, 1996 Case 78. U.S. v. Sage — 92 F.3d 101, 104+ , 2nd Cir.(Conn.) Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, Dominic J. Squatrito, J., 906 F.Supp. 84. Pursuant to conditional guilty plea to... Discussed by Sep. 07, 2011 Case 79. U.S. v. Pendleton — 658 F.3d 299, 305+ , 3rd Cir.(Del.) CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Sex Offenses. Statute criminalizing sexual contact with minor in foreign place was valid under Foreign Commerce Clause. Discussed by Apr. 13, 2018 Case 80. Association for Accessible Medicines v. — Frosh 887 F.3d 664, 681+ , 4th Cir.(Md.) HEALTH — Drugs. Maryland statute prohibiting prescription drug manufacturers and wholesalers from engaging in price gouging violated dormant Commerce Clause. Discussed by Feb. 15, 2018 Case 81. International Refugee Assistance Project — v. Trump 883 F.3d 233, 290+ , 4th Cir.(Md.) IMMIGRATION — Injunction. Preliminary injunction against enforcement of Proclamation barring entry by nationals from six predominantly Muslim countries was warranted. Discussed by Aug. 19, 2015 Case 82. U.S. v. Bollinger — 798 F.3d 201, 213+ , 4th Cir.(N.C.) CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Sex Offenses. Statute prohibiting non-commercial sexual abuse of children by Americans abroad was constitutional under the foreign commerce clause. Discussed by May 19, 2003 Case 83. International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe — des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Estrangers a Monaco 329 F.3d 359, 365+ , 4th Cir.(Va.) INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY - Computers and Online Services. Foreign casino operator's trademark was protected from cybersquatting. Discussed by Mar. 05, 1999 Case 84. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic — Institute and State University 169 F.3d 820, 899+ , 4th Cir.(Va.) Woman brought action under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) against man who allegedly raped her. Motion to dismiss the VAWA claims was granted by the United States District...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Sep. 15, 1993 Case 85. U.S. v. Lopez — 2 F.3d 1342, 1360+ , 5th Cir.(Tex.) Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, H.F. Garcia, J., of possessing firearm in school zone in violation of Gun-Free School...

Discussed by 86. U.S. v. Faasse Sep. 14, 2001 Case — 265 F.3d 475, 480+ , 6th Cir.(Mich.) FAMILY LAW - Child Support. Subjecting defendant to criminal liability under CSRA was appropriate exercise of Congress's commerce clause power. Discussed by Oct. 01, 1996 Case 87. U.S. v. McHenry — 97 F.3d 125, 129+ , 6th Cir.(Ohio) Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, David D. Dowd, Jr., J., of carjacking, using or carrying firearm in relation to crime... Discussed by Mar. 22, 1971 Case 88. Stevens v. U.S. — 440 F.2d 144, 150+ , 6th Cir.(Ky.) Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, Bernard T. Moynahan, Jr., J., of possession of firearm after conviction of felony,... Discussed by Feb. 12, 1901 Case 89. Reilley v. U. S. — 106 F. 896, 901+ , C.C.A.6 (Ohio) In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. Discussed by Sep. 03, 1997 Case 90. U.S. v. Black — 125 F.3d 454, 459+ , 7th Cir.(Ind.) Defendants were convicted, respectively, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, Rudy Lozano, J., and the United States District Court for the...

Discussed by 91. Kelley v. Great Northern Ry. Co. Mar. 11, 1907 Case — 152 F. 211, 217+ , C.C.D.Minn. The act of Congress of June 11, 1906, 34 Stat. 232, c. 3073, commonly called the 'Federal Employers' Liability Act,' is a regulation of commerce between the states or with foreign...

Discussed by 92. In re Clinton Bridge Oct Term Case — 5 F.Cas. 1060, 1064+ , C.C.D.Iowa 1867 This was a bill in equity, filed by [Richard C.] Gray on the 2d day of March, 1861 [against the Chicago, Iowa and Nebraska Railroad Company and others], complaining of a bridge...

Discussed by 93. Marilley v. Bonham Dec. 21, 2016 Case — 844 F.3d 841, 856+ , 9th Cir.(Cal.) CIVIL RIGHTS — Privileges and Immunities. California's higher fees charged to nonresident commercial fishers did not violate Privileges and Immunities Clause.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by July 30, 2015 Case 94. Novak v. U.S. — 795 F.3d 1012, 1021+ , 9th Cir.(Hawai'i) TRANSPORTATION - Shipping. Jones Act's cabotage provisions, prohibiting foreign competition in domestic shipping market, did not violate Commerce Clause. Discussed by Jan. 25, 2006 Case 95. U.S. v. Clark — 435 F.3d 1100, 1113+ , 9th Cir.(Wash.) FAMILY LAW - Child Protection. Enactment of PROTECT Act was a valid exercise of Congressional authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. Discussed by Aug. 25, 2003 Case 96. Young v. Coloma-Agaran — 340 F.3d 1053, 1056+ , 9th Cir.(Hawai'i) MARITIME LAW - Navigation. Hawai"i's regulatory ban on tour boat operators in Hanalei Bay was preempted by federal law. Discussed by Aug. 20, 2002 Case 97. Conservation Force, Inc. v. Manning — 301 F.3d 985, 990+ , 9th Cir.(Ariz.) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Game. Restriction on non-resident hunting required showing of absence of less discriminatory means.

Discussed by 98. Moon v. Freeman May 25, 1967 Case — 379 F.2d 382, 389+ , 9th Cir.(Wash.) Proceeding to review decision of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, Northern Division, Charles L. Powell, Chief Judge, 251 F.Supp. 941,...

Discussed by 99. U.S. v. Wishkah Boom Co. Feb. 06, 1905 Case — 136 F. 42, 44+ , C.C.A.9 (Wash.) Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern Division of the District of Washington. Discussed by May 15, 2013 Case 100. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida — v. U.S. 716 F.3d 535, 538+ , 11th Cir.(Fla.) GOVERNMENT - Dismissal. Allegation that Florida flood control project moved too much water onto tribal lands failed to state due process claim. Discussed by Jan. 10, 2005 Case 101. U.S. v. Ballinger — 395 F.3d 1218, 1232+ , 11th Cir.(Ga.) CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Hate Crimes. Interstate church arson spree met “in commerce” requirement of federal religious property damage law. Discussed by Dec. 07, 1979 Case 102. National Wildlife Federation v. — Alexander 613 F.2d 1054, 1057+ , D.C.Cir. Action was instituted for declaratory and injunctive relief against planned construction of a drainage channel by North Dakota State Water Commission. The United States District...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 103. Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Sep. 30, 1968 Case — Line, Inc. 404 F.2d 804, 812+ , D.C.Cir. Suit charging a conspiracy among defendant American shipping lines and the two conferences to which they belonged to destroy plaintiffs' business of carrying AID-financed cement... Discussed by Sep. 28, 2011 Case 104. U.S. v. Alabama — 813 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1300+ , N.D.Ala. IMMIGRATION - Employment. District court preliminarily enjoins enforcement of portions of Alabama's immigration statute. Discussed by May 20, 1996 Case 105. U.S. v. Olin Corp. — 927 F.Supp. 1502, 1522+ , S.D.Ala. United States brought action against chemical manufacturer under Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), seeking to recover cleanup costs. ...

Discussed by 106. Zumba Fitness, LLC v. ABF Logistics, Inc. Nov. 02, 2016 Case — 2016 WL 11478172, *2+ , W.D.Ark. The Case Management Order in this matter set an early dispositive motion deadline for what the parties identified as a threshold issue in this case; namely, the applicability of...

Discussed by 107. Spain v. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. Mar. 13, 1907 Case — 151 F. 522, 523+ , C.C.E.D.Ark. The presumption that statutes are constitutional will be indulged in until the contrary is clearly shown. (Ed. Note.— For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 10, Constitutional...

Discussed by 108. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Board of R.R. Feb. 05, 1901 Case — Com'rs of Ark. 106 F. 353, 356+ , C.C.E.D.Ark. In Equity. Suit for injunction. On demurrer to bill.

Discussed by 109. Hernandez v. Monsanto Company July 12, 2016 Case — 2016 WL 6822311, *2+ , C.D.Cal. On March 23, 2016, Plaintiffs Ines Hernandez and Maria Hernandez filed this action against Monsanto Company. [Doc. # 1.] The complaint alleges claims for strict products liability... Discussed by Mar. 04, 2016 Case 110. Cheverez v. Plains All American — Pipeline, LP 2016 WL 4771883, *5+ , C.D.Cal. Before the Court is Defendants Plains All American Pipeline, LP and Plains Pipeline, LP's (together, “Defendants”) motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh,...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 111. In re 5-hour ENERGY Marketing and Sales Sep. 04, 2014 Case — Practices Litigation 2014 WL 5311272, *12+ , C.D.Cal. Wendy K. Hernandez Deputy Clerk Court Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (''CAC''). Dkt. # 33. The Court held a...

Discussed by 112. Chattopadhyay v. Aeroflot Russian Airlines Aug. 17, 2011 Case —

2011 WL 13220279, *3+ , C.D.Cal. Somnath Chattopadhyay commenced this action in Los Angeles Superior Court on December 15, 2010. Defendant Aeroflot Russian Airlines removed the action to this court on January 14,... Discussed by June 30, 2011 Case 113. In re Ferrero Litigation — 794 F.Supp.2d 1107, 1113+ , S.D.Cal. COMMERCIAL LAW - Advertising. State-law claim that food producer deceptively omitted its product “contain[ed] artificial flavoring” was preempted.

Discussed by 114. In re Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases Oct. 08, 2009 Case — 663 F.Supp.2d 922, 932+ , E.D.Cal. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Endangered Species. Application of ESA to require agencies to evaluate effects of project on intrastate species did not violate Commerce Clause.

Discussed by 115. Gonzalez v. ITT Corporation Aug. 10, 2009 Case — 2009 WL 10700307, *4+ , C.D.Cal. On April 22, 2009, Plaintiff Sara Gonzalez filed suit against Defendants ITT Corporation, Greg Bee and Jerry Jones in state court. Thereafter, Defendant ITT removed the action to... Discussed by Nov. 30, 2000 Case 116. National Audubon Society v. Davis — 144 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1181+ , N.D.Cal. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Endangered Species. Statute which banned use of certain traps to capture wildlife was preempted by Endangered Species Act.

Discussed by 117. U.S. v. Edwards Apr. 04, 1936 Case — 14 F.Supp. 384, 388+ , S.D.Cal. In Equity. Action by the United States of America against Hugh David Edwards, individually and doing business under the firm name and style of Edwards Fruit Company.... Discussed by Mar. 29, 2018 Case 118. Williams v. Murphy — 2018 WL 2016850, *7+ , D.Conn. In 2016, a federal jury found that a Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”) employee maliciously violated the Eighth Amendment rights of inmate Rashad Williams and awarded...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Feb. 22, 2011 Case 119. Mead v. Holder — 766 F.Supp.2d 16, 28+ , D.D.C. INSURANCE - Health. Individual insurance mandate of Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not contravene Commerce Clause.

Discussed by 120. Consumer Mail Order Ass'n of America v. Nov. 30, 1950 Case — McGrath 94 F.Supp. 705, 709+ , D.D.C Consumer Mail Order Association of America, and others, brought an action against J. Howard McGrath, individually and as Attorney General of the United States, for a declaratory...

Discussed by 121. In re Federal-Mogul Global Mar. 24, 2009 Case — 402 B.R. 625, 631+ , D.Del. BANKRUPTCY - Plans. Bankruptcy statute dealing with implementation of Chapter 11 plan preempted anti-assignment clause in debtor's insurance. Discussed by Dec. 27, 2001 Case 122. Young v. Coloma-Agaran — 2001 WL 1677259, *6+ , D.Hawai'i MARITIME LAW - Tour boats. Ban on tour boats in bay violated Supremacy and Commerce Clauses. Discussed by June 23, 1997 Case 123. Doe v. Hartz — 970 F.Supp. 1375, 1414+ , N.D.Iowa Parishioner brought action against priest, bishop, diocese, and church for violation of Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) and related state law claims. Defendants moved to...

Discussed by 124. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Siler Jan. 09, 1911 Case — 186 F. 176, 200+ , C.C.E.D.Ky. In Equity. Suit by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company against Adam T. Siler, Lawrence B. Finn, and Lew P. Tarlton, individually and as constituting the Railroad... Discussed by 1907 Case 125. U.S. v. Adair — 152 F. 737, 744+ , E.D.Ky. This case is before me on demurrer to the indictment. It was found under section 10 of the Act of June 1, 1898, c. 370, 30 Stat. 428 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3211) entitled ‘An... Discussed by July 08, 2014 Case 126. Zogenix, Inc. v. Patrick — 2014 WL 3339610, *4+ , D.Mass. The issue is whether two Massachusetts regulations limiting the prescribing and handling of Zohydro™ ER (''Zohydro''), a Food and Drug Administration- approved opioid analgesic,...

Discussed by 127. U.S. v. Mills July 12, 1934 Case — 7 F.Supp. 547, 554+ , D.Md. In Equity. Suit by the United States of America against Herman L. Mills. Order dismissing the bill.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by July 22, 1992 Case 128. Michigan Protection and Advocacy — Service, Inc. v. Babin 799 F.Supp. 695, 733+ , E.D.Mich. Advocacy group brought action on behalf of developmentally disabled plaintiffs, alleging violations of Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and state law in sale of home. On cross...

Discussed by 129. The William Pope Mar 1852 Case — 28 F.Cas. 629, 630+ , D.Mo. In admiralty. Discussed by Apr. 01, 1996 Case 130. Hoffman v. Hunt — 923 F.Supp. 791, 807+ , W.D.N.C. Antiabortion activists brought action seeking declaratory judgment that North Carolina statute prohibiting obstruction of health care facilities violated their First Amendment...

Discussed by 131. Rousseau v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury Feb. 05, 2010 Case — 2010 WL 457702, *8+ , D.N.J. GOVERNMENT - Immunity. Sovereign immunity barred States' claims against the United States Treasury to recover the proceeds of fully matured, unredeemed United States savings bonds.

Discussed by 132. United States v. DeLeon Aug. 28, 2018 Case — 2018 WL 4100949, *2+ , D.N.M. THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendant Arturo Arnulfo Garcia's oral motion, under rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss Count 3 of the Second...

Discussed by 133. Aqua Harvesters, Inc. v. New York State July 11, 2019 Case — Department of Environmental Conservation 399 F.Supp.3d 15, 42+ , E.D.N.Y. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW — Coastal Areas. Federal fishery endorsements did not per se preempt any reasonable conservation scheme that completely excluded vessel from engaging in state...

Discussed by 134. Dayan v. Swiss-American Products, Inc. Jan. 03, 2017 Case — 2017 WL 9485702, *3+ , E.D.N.Y. Plaintiff Eli Dayan (the “Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant Swiss-American Products, Inc. (the “Defendant”), alleging violations of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act... Discussed by Jan. 31, 2014 Case 135. Koenig v. Boulder Brands, Inc. — 995 F.Supp.2d 274, 282+ , S.D.N.Y. COMMERCIAL LAW - Consumer Protection. Consumers' state law claims arising from allegedly deceptive labeling of milk products as “fat free” were not preempted.

Discussed by 136. Wimmer v. Lumber Liquidators, Inc. May 26, 2011 Case — 2011 WL 13382898, *3+ , S.D.N.Y. Plaintiff's former counsel, Richard Pu (“Pu”), has moved for an order fixing a charging lien upon Plaintiff's cause of action pursuant to N.Y. Jud. Law § 475. (Docket No. 112)....

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by June 20, 1997 Case 137. American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki — 969 F.Supp. 160, 169+ , S.D.N.Y. Organizations that use the Internet to communicate brought action challenging constitutionality of New York statute making it a crime to use a computer to disseminate obscene... Discussed by Aug. 28, 1934 Case 138. U.S. v. Schechter — 8 F.Supp. 136, 146+ , E.D.N.Y. Joseph Schechter and others were indicted for violating the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Code of Fair Competition for the Live Poultry Industry, and they demurred to...

Discussed by 139. Silliman v. Troy & W.T. Bridge Co. Aug. 16, 1873 Case — 22 F.Cas. 128, 131+ , C.C.N.D.N.Y. This was a bill in equity by Charles A. Silliman against the Troy and West Troy Bridge Company and others. Motion for a preliminary injunction, to restrain the defendants from...

Discussed by 140. Silliman v. Hudson River Bridge Co. Oct 1859 Case — 22 F.Cas. 120, 123+ , C.C.N.D.N.Y. These were bills in equity by Robert D. Silliman and Frederick W. Coleman against the Hudson River Bridge Company. These are the same cases reported [in Case No. 12,851], in which...

Discussed by 141. U.S. v. Jackson Nov. 30, 1841 Case — 26 F.Cas. 559, 561+ , S.D.N.Y. This was an action of debt, for a penalty, against Daniel Jackson. Discussed by Apr. 08, 1999 Case 142. Culberson v. Doan — 65 F.Supp.2d 701, 707+ , S.D.Ohio Family of victim of domestic abuse, presumed dead, sued defendant convicted of her murder, police department which allegedly failed to respond to abuse complaints, and... Discussed by Sep. 10, 1908 Case 143. U S v. Delaware & Hudson Co — 164 F. 215, 227+ , C.C.E.D.Pa. Bills in equity and petitions for mandamus on behalf of the United States against the Delaware & Hudson Company, the Erie Railroad Company, the Central Railroad of New Jersey, the...

Discussed by 144. Sinclair and Associates of Greenville, LLC Jan. 02, 2018 Case — v. CresCom Bank 2018 WL 263813, *4+ , D.S.C. This matter is before the court on defendants Antler Road LLC, Crescent Homes SC, LLC, Park Investors, LLC, and Edward M. Terry's (“defendants”) motion for partial summary...

Discussed by 145. Howard v. Illinois Cent. R. Co. 1907 Case — 148 F. 997, 999+ , C.C.W.D.Tenn. At Law. On demurrer to declaration.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 146. Sawrie v. State of Tenn. Sep. 30, 1897 Case — 82 F. 615, 618+ , C.C.M.D.Tenn. This was a Petition by W. S. Sawrie for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.

Discussed by 147. Memphis & L. R. R. Co. v. Nolan Sep. 09, 1882 Case — 14 F. 532, 534+ , C.C.W.D.Tenn. In Equity.

Discussed by 148. Williams v. Harris County Housing Sep. 02, 2016 Case — Authority 2016 WL 8730315, *9+ , S.D.Tex. Pending before the court is Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 49). The court has considered the motion, all other relevant filings, and the applicable law. For the...

Discussed by 149. Friske v. ALZA Corporation Apr. 29, 2011 Case — 2011 WL 13233327, *2+ , N.D.Tex. BEFORE THE COURT is a Motion for Partial Dismissal filed by Defendants ALZA Corporation and Sandoz, Inc. on February 25, 2011 (Docket No. 8). Plaintiffs filed a Response on March... Discussed by June 17, 1987 Case 150. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad — Com'n of Texas 671 F.Supp. 466, 469+ , W.D.Tex. Railroads brought action against Railroad Commission of Texas challenging regulation requiring caboose on most trains operating in Texas. The District Court, Nowlin, J., held...

Discussed by 151. Century Arms, Inc. v. Kennedy Feb. 26, 1971 Case — 323 F.Supp. 1002, 1014+ , D.Vt. Action by gun importer for declaratory relief and for writ in nature of mandamus to compel Secretary of Treasury to grant necessary licenses to import surplus military firearms. ...

Discussed by 152. Casper v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co. Nov. 02, 1992 Case — 806 F.Supp. 903, 905+ , E.D.Wash. Farmer brought actions against manufacturer of herbicide and company that applied herbicide to farmer's alfalfa fields, alleging failure to warn and inadequate labeling and breach...

Discussed by 153. U.S. v. Hoffmeyer Jan. 25, 2001 Case — 2001 WL 34372871, *7+ , W.D.Wis. Defendant Andrew P. Hoffmeyer is charged with possessing firearms at Hudson High School in violation of the federal Gun–Free School Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). Hoffmeyer... Discussed by Mar. 16, 1995 Case 154. U.S. v. Wilson — 880 F.Supp. 621, 624+ , E.D.Wis. Defendants were indicted under Freedom of Access to Clinics Entrances Act (FACE) section prohibiting nonviolent physical obstruction of entrances to reproductive health services...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 155. Ex parte Eaglesfield June 03, 1910 Case — 180 F. 558, 559+ , E.D.Wis. Taxation of interstate commerce by state, see note to Board of Assessors v. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 8 C.C.A. 492.) Application by Elizabeth Eaglesfield for a writ of habeas...

Discussed by 156. Woodson v. Mirandy Nov. 03, 2016 Case — 2016 WL 7366956, *5+ , S.D.W.Va. Pending before the Court is Respondent's “Motion to Dismiss the Petition as Untimely” (Document No. 14), filed on March 31, 2016. By Standing Order, this matter was referred to... Discussed by Sep. 18, 1980 Case 157. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Municipality — of San Juan 505 F.Supp. 533, 542+ , D.Puerto Rico Ocean transport company brought action seeking to enjoin municipalities from assessing and collecting license taxes. The District Court, Pesquera, Chief Judge, held that: (1)... Discussed by Feb. 23, 1994 Case 158. In re SPM Mfg. Corp. — 163 B.R. 411, 420+ , Bkrtcy.D.Mass. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION. redemption claim of close corporation's stockholder would be equitably subordinated to all other unsecured debt. Discussed by July 08, 1974 Case 159. Yoshida Intern., Inc. v. U. S. — 378 F.Supp. 1155, 1170+ , Cust.Ct. Action challenging validity of presidential proclamation imposing surcharge in form of supplemental duty in amount of ten percent ad valorem upon most articles imported into the... Discussed by Mar. 11, 1913 Case 160. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. v. U.S. — 204 F. 798, 807+ , Com.Ct. Separate petitions by the Prairie Oil & Gas Company, by the Uncle Sam Oil Company, by Robert D. Benson and others, by the Ohio Oil Company, by the Standard Oil Company, and by the...

Discussed by 161. McConnell Automotive Corp. v. Jackson Nov. 01, 2002 Case — 849 So.2d 159, 168+ , Ala. COMMERCIAL LAW - Arbitration. Used car purchase did not have substantial effect on interstate commerce.

Discussed by 162. Brookfield Const. Co. v. Van Wezel June 28, 2002 Case — 841 So.2d 220, 224+ , Ala. REAL PROPERTY - Contractors and Developers. Homeowners' contract and tort claims against builder were not subject to arbitration. Discussed by Feb. 08, 2002 Case 163. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Douglas — 826 So.2d 806, 813+ , Ala. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Arbitration. Employer was not entitled to arbitration of employee's claim pursuant to FAA.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by Aug. 03, 2001 Case 164. Selma Medical Center, Inc. v. Fontenot —

824 So.2d 668, 676+ , Ala. COMMERCIAL LAW - Arbitration. Federal Arbitration Act governed arbitration provisions of physicians' relocation agreements.

Discussed by 165. Lick v. Faulkner Jul Term 1864 Case — 25 Cal. 404, 411+ , Cal. This case involves the constitutionality of the Act of the Congress of the United States, passed on the 25th day of February, 1862, entitled “An Act to authorize the issue of...

Discussed by 166. Lin Sing v. Washburn Jul Term 1862 Case — 20 Cal. 534, 541+ , Cal. THE Act of April 26, 1862, entitled “an act to protect free white labor against competition with Chinese coolie labor, and discourage the immigration of the Chinese into the State...

Discussed by 167. City and County of San Francisco v. Oct Term Case — California Steam Nav. Co. 1858 10 Cal. 504, 507+ , Cal. The Acts relied on by respondent impose these dues on all vessels plying coastwise and entering the harbor of San Francisco; and the only question raised on the record is, whether...

Discussed by 168. Mitchell v. Steelman Oct Term Case — 8 Cal. 363, 372+ , Cal. 1857 The complaint alleges the execution of the note and mortgage, both of which are set out in full, and also the recording of the mortgage. There is no allegation in the complaint,...

Discussed by 169. Kilroy v. Superior Court Apr. 28, 1997 Case — 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 399+ , Cal.App. 2 Dist. FAMILY LAW - Child Support. Under Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, California courts had no jurisdiction to modify Georgia child support order.

Discussed by 170. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Apr. 04, 1969 Case — Contra Costa County 77 Cal.Rptr. 570, 591+ , Cal.App. 1 Dist. Action by taxpayer smelter-refiner against county and its officials charged with levy, assessment, collection and cancellation of property taxes for peremptory writ of mandate...

Discussed by 171. People v. Marine Products Co. Jan. 17, 1947 Case — 177 P.2d 67, 69+ , Cal.Super.A.D. Appeal from Municipal Court, City and County of San Diego; Philip Smith, Judge. The Marine Products Company, a corporation, and L. Small, were convicted of violating section of...

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Discussed by 172. Thames Bank v. Lovell July 01, 1847 Case — 18 Conn. 500, 508+ , Conn. The leading principle involved in this case, was also involved and decided, by this court, in the case of Kellogg v. The Union Company, 12 Conn. R. 7. and it is admitted, that the...

Discussed by 173. Washington Bridge Co. v. State June 01, 1846 Case — 18 Conn. 53, 61+ , Conn. This information or writ of quo warranto, presented by the state's attorney against the Washington Bridge Company, is not prosecuted on the ground that the defendants' bridge is a...

Discussed by 174. Kellogg v. Union Co. June 01, 1837 Case — 12 Conn. 7, 16+ , Conn. The several questions presented by this record, and reserved for our advice, are now to be considered. It was conceded, on the trial, that no recovery could be had for the...

Discussed by 175. Peterson v. Israel July 22, 1998 Case — 1998 WL 457919, *8+ , Conn.Super. This is an appeal from a decision of the Family Court Magistrate. For the purpose of clarity, this court will set forth the facts and history of this case. In 1980 the plaintiff,...

Discussed by 176. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of East St. Louis Mar. 29, 1882 Case —

102 Ill. 560, 563+ , Ill. The General Assembly, on the 11th day of February, 1853, adopted an act incorporating the Wiggins Ferry Company, at East St. Louis. The charter conferred various powers, and...

Discussed by 177. LEISY & CO. v. HARDIN. Apr. 28, 1890 Case — 12 Ky.L.Rptr. 123, 127+ , Ky. The power vested in Congress ''to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes,'' is the power to prescribe the rule by which...

Discussed by 178. Morgan's L. & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Board of May 1884 Case — Health 36 La.Ann. 666, 666+ , La. Appeal from the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Monroe, J.

Discussed by 179. State v. Nathan Dec 1845 Case — 12 Rob. (LA) 332, 332+ , La. Appeal from the District Court of the First District, Buchanan, J.

Discussed by 180. Worsley v. Second Municipality Dec 1844 Case — 9 Rob. (LA) 324, 331+ , La. Appeal from the Commercial Court of New-Orleans, Watts, J. The petition alleges that the plaintiffs had paid to the Second Municipality of New-Orleans, between the 11th July, 1842,...

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Discussed by 181. State v. Fullerton Apr. 1844 Case — 7 Rob. (LA) 210, 212+ , La. Appeal from the District Court of the First District, Buchanan, J.

Discussed by 182. Commonwealth v. Nickerson Sep. 17, 1920 Case — 128 N.E. 273, 276+ , Mass. Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Hugo A. Dubuque, Judge. Florence Nickerson was convicted in the municipal court of the city of Boston of selling intoxicating liquors...

Discussed by 183. Turner v. State Jan. 21, 1881 Case — 55 Md. 240, 253+ , Md. The appellant was indicted for violating the Tobacco Inspection Laws of this State. The first count in the indictment charges, that the appellant being a grower of tobacco, packed... Discussed by July 02, 1869 Case 184. Ward v. State — 31 Md. 279, 280+ , Md. The appellant was indicted for that, not being a permanent resident of this State, he did, on December 4th, 1868, sell, by sample, within the limits of Baltimore City, certain...

Discussed by 185. Howell v. State Jun Term Case — 3 Gill 14, 19+ , Md. 1845 By the act of the extra session of 1841, ch. 23, the interest or proportion in all ships or other vessels, whether in port or out of port, owned by persons resident of the State,...

Discussed by 186. Moor v. Veazie 1850 Case — 32 Me. 343, 349+ , Me. When all the legal and beneficial interest in the subject-matter of a suit in equity has become vested in the plaintiffs, by assignment or otherwise, it is not necessary that...

Discussed by 187. Chilvers v. People Nov. 18, 1862 Case — 11 Mich. 43, 45+ , Mich. Chilvers, the plaintiff in error, was prosecuted in the Recorder's Court of the city of Detroit, under a city ordinance, for keeping a ferry over Detroit river, between the city...

Discussed by 188. Michigan Transp. Co. v. Secretary of State July 03, 1972 Case —

201 N.W.2d 83, 93+ , Mich.App. Action by motor carriers seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief with respect to their duties under section of motor vehicle registration fee statute relating to road... Discussed by Apr Term Case 189. Marshall v. Grimes — 1866 41 Miss. 27, 27+ , Miss.Err. & App. 1. STATUTES: CONSTRUCTION OF.-General words in a statute are not to be so construed as to give it an effect beyond the legislative power, and thereby render the statute...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Discussed by 190. Lewis v. Miller Jan Term Case — 13 Smedes & M. 110, 110+ , Miss.Err. & App. 1849 An appeal does not lie from a mere refusal of the chancellor to dissolve an injunction on motion, there being no answer or demurrer to the bill. Such refusal is not an...

Discussed by 191. State v. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. Jan. 02, 1912 Case — 143 S.W. 785, 817+ , Mo. In Banc. Appeal from Circuit Court, Worth County; Wm. C. Ellison, Judge. The Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company was convicted of a violation of the act of March 19,...

Discussed by 192. State v. Clarke Oct Term Case — 54 Mo. 17, 18+ , Mo. 1873 This was an indictment under the general statutes against defendant for keeping a bawdy house. The defendant pleaded a license from the city authorities under an ordinance, Chap.... Discussed by 1865 Case 193. Ex parte Crandall — 1 Nev. 294, 309+ , Nev. It is provided by the ninetieth section of the revenue act of 1865, that ''there shall be levied and collected a capitation tax of one dollar upon every person leaving this state...

Discussed by 194. Burke v. Concord R.R. 1881 Case — 61 N.H. 160, 204+ , N.H. The interpretation of a railroad charter, like the interpretation of any other grant, statutory, contractual, or testamentary, is the ascertainment of intention, and the question... Discussed by Feb Term Case 195. State v. Delaware, Lackawanna & — 1864 Western Railroad Co. 30 N.J.L. 473, 479+ , N.J.Sup. 1. A law laying a special tax on the business of foreign corporations, regularly doing business in this state, transporting passengers and merchandise across the state, from and to...

Discussed by 196. People v. Hudson River Connecting R. Mar. 02, 1920 Case — Corporation 126 N.E. 801, 805+ , N.Y. Action by the People of the State of New York against the Hudson River Connecting Railroad Corporation. A final judgment, overruling plaintiff's demurrer to the first and second...

Discussed by 197. Newell v. People ex rel. Phelps 1852 Case — 3 Seld. 9, 9+ , N.Y. The ''Act to provide for the completion of the Erie Canal enlargement and the Genesee valley and Black river canals,'' passed July 10, 1851, was in violation of the seventh article...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Discussed by 1812 Case 198. Livingston v. Van Ingen — 9 Johns. 507, 507+ , N.Y. The several acts of the legislature of the 27th March, 1798, (sess. 21, c. 55,) of the 5th April, 1803, (sess. 26, c. 94,) of the 6th April, 1807, (sess. 30, c. 165,) of the 11th...

Discussed by 199. People v. Rensselaer & S.R. Co. 1836 Case — 15 Wend. 113, 121+ , N.Y.Sup. It is competent to a state government to authorize the erection of a bridge across a navigable river, at a point below where the coasting trade is carried on by licensed vessels,...

Discussed by 200. People v. Sperry 1867 Case — 50 Barb. 170, 174+ , N.Y.Sup.Gen.Term The defendant was convicted in the court of sessions of Queens county of a misdemeanor in towing a vessel in violation of section 3 of chapter 115 of the Laws of 1865. This statute...

Discussed by 201. People ex rel. United States & Brazil 1866 Case — Steamship Co. v. Commissioners of Taxes and Assessments of City and County of New York 48 Barb. 157, 158+ , N.Y.Sup.Gen.Term I am at a loss to see how the taxation of this company can in any sense be deemed an interference with the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. It imposes no rules or...

Discussed by 202. City of Cincinnati v. Bryson Dec Term Case — 1846 WL 140, *3+ , Ohio 1846 The city council of Cincinnati has power to license and regulate draymen; and may require a reasonable sum, by way of excise, on the special employment. The right to license and... Discussed by June 11, 2004 Case 203. Holliday v. Department of Revenue — 2004 WL 1386231, *9+ , Or.Tax Regular Div. This matter is before the court on stipulation of facts and cross motions for summary judgment. At the request of the parties this matter was heard in conjunction with Julian v.... Discussed by June 11, 2004 Case 204. Julian v. Department of Revenue — 2004 WL 1386946, *9+ , Or.Tax Regular Div. This matter is before the court on stipulation of facts and cross motions for summary judgment. At the request of the parties this matter was heard in conjunction with Holliday v....

Discussed by 205. McNeely & Price Co. v. Philadelphia Piers Jan. 24, 1938 Case —

196 A. 846, 851+ , Pa. Original Jurisdiction No. 270, January term, 1937. Original bill in equity by the McNeely & Price Company against Philadelphia Piers, Inc., and others for a preliminary injunction...

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Discussed by 206. Com. v. King 1836 Case — 1 Whart. 448, 453+ , Pa. A miller in New Jersey having contracted to deliver a certain quantity of flour in New York, sent it to A. a carrier in Easton in Pennsylvania to be forwarded to New York. The...

Discussed by 207. Biddle v. Commonwealth 1825 Case — 1825 WL 2034, *2+ , Pa. This is an action of debt, for the sum of eleven dollars, brought by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania against Charles Biddle. The defendant demurred to the declaration; and the... Discussed by Oct. 13, 1995 Case 208. Heiple v. C.R. Motors, Inc. — 666 A.2d 1066, 1085+ , Pa.Super. Airbags. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act does not expressly preempt state common- law causes of action, including airbag claims, and implied preemption analysis is...

Discussed by 209. In re Farmers Co-op. Ass'n Mar. 18, 1943 Case — 8 N.W.2d 557, 560+ , S.D. Appeal from Circuit Court, Gregory County; J. R. Cash, Judge. Proceeding in the matter of the investigation of the activities and status of the Farmers Cooperative Association of...

Discussed by 210. WESTERN CAROLINA REGIONAL SEWER Sep. 22, 1999 Administrative — AUTHORITY, THE CITY OF ANDERSON, Decision COMBINED UTILITIES SYSTEM OF EASLEY AND GREENWOOD METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, PETITIONERS v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, FRIE 1999 WL 1016064 (S.C.Admin.Law.Judge.Div.), *29+ This matter comes before the Division on cross-motions seeking final disposition of two consolidated contested cases brought by Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority...

Discussed by 211. WESTERN CAROLINA REGIONAL SEWER Sep. 22, 1999 Administrative — AUTHORITY, THE CITY OF ANDERSON, Decision COMBINED UTILITIES SYSTEM OF EASLEY AND GREENWOOD METROPOLITAN DISTRICT, PETITIONERS v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL, FRIE 1999 WL 1016082 (S.C.Admin.Law.Judge.Div.), *29+ This matter comes before the Division on cross-motions seeking final disposition of two consolidated contested cases brought by Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority... Discussed by Aug. 16, 1951 Administrative 212. IN THE MATTER OF PHILLIPS — Decision PETROLEUM CO. 10 F.P.C. 246, 287+ , F.P.C. DRAPER, Commissioner, concurring in the result. BUCHANAN, Commissioner, dissenting.

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Discussed by 213. SECRETARY OF LABOR, COMPLAINANT Jan. 04, 1974 Administrative — v. GEO. W. ROGERS CONSTRUCTION Decision CORPORATION, RESPONDENT 6 OSAHRC 106, 106+ , O.S.H.R.C.A.L.J. This is a proceeding under Section 10(c) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. 651 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') to review a Citation issued...

Discussed by 214. STATE INTERVENTION/STATE ACTION - A Oct. 24, 2003 Administrative — U.S. PERSPECTIVE Decision 2003 WL 22507756 (F.T.C.), *14+ Last December, in discussing the ''positive agenda'' of the Federal Trade Commission (''FTC'') for competition policy, I identified four general principles: 1. play an active role...

Discussed by 215. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Apr. 21, 2020 Federal — Definition of “Waters of the United States” Register 85 FR 22250-01+ The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army are publishing a final rule defining the scope of waters federally regulated under the Clean Water Act. The...

Discussed by 216. Definition of “Waters of the United Oct. 22, 2019 Federal — States”—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules Register 84 FR 56626-01+ The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of the Army (''the agencies'') are publishing a final rule to repeal the 2015 Clean Water Rule: Definition of ''Waters...

Discussed by 217. Revised Definition of “Waters of the United Feb. 14, 2019 Federal — States” Register 84 FR 4154-01+ The Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Army (''the agencies'') are publishing for public comment a proposed rule defining the scope of waters federally...

Referred to by 218. Bank of New South Wales v Aug. 11, 1948 Case — — Commonwealth 1948 WL 28486, *1+ , HCA In these five actions referred for trial to the Full Court the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Banking Act 1947, enacted by the Commonwealth Parliament. The Act does not...

— 219. Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v State of New Apr. 16, 1953 Case — — South Wales 1953 WL 40581, *1+ , HCA The facts are few upon which the plaintiff company is content to rest the right it asserts in this action to relief by way of declaration of right and injunction, and a brief...

— 220. Hospital Provident Fund Pty Ltd v Victoria Mar. 11, 1953 Case — — 1953 WL 40168, *1+ , HCA In each of the two actions now before us on demurrer to the respective statements of claim the foundation for the relief claimed must be discovered in the operation of s. 92 of the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

— 221. Australian Steamships Limited v Malcolm Nov. 30, 1914 Case — — 1914 WL 14866, *1+ , HCA The question raised in this appeal is whether the Seamen's Compensation Act (No. 13 of 1911) is within the competence of the Commonwealth Parliament. The Act is, in substance, but...

— 222. Re Federated Saw Mill, etc, Employees' June 25, 1909 Case — — Association of A/asia; Re James Moore & Sons Pty Ltd 1909 WL 12877, *1+ , HCA This case, which occupied the Court for nine days, comes before us as a case stated by the President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration for the opinion of...

— 223. The King v Barger. The Commonwealth v June 26, 1908 Case — — McKay 1908 WL 11695, *1+ , HCA The question for decision in these two cases is, shortly, whether the Act No. 16 of 1906, intituled ''An Act relating to Duties of Excise,'' and having for its short title the... Distinguished Aug. 05, 2004 Case 224. Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly — by 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 221 , Cal. GOVERNMENT - Liquor. Statute restricting use on wine labels of geographic brand names not preempted by federal law.

Distinguished 225. Gonzales v. Brazos River Harbor Aug. 24, 2000 Case — by Navigation Dist. 2000 WL 1201899, *2+ , Tex.App.-Hous. (14 Dist.) Paul D. Gonzales (''Paul'') and Kenneth A. Gonzales (''Kenneth'') (collectively, the ''Gonzaleses'') appeal a take-nothing summary judgment entered in favor of the Brazos River... Distinguished Dec. 10, 1999 Case 226. Bridenbaugh v. O'Bannon — by 78 F.Supp.2d 828, 831 , N.D.Ind. GOVERNMENT - Liquor. Indiana statute regulating alcoholic beverages violated Commerce Clause.

Limitation 227. Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. City of Dec. 29, 2017 Case — of Holding South Portland Recognized by 288 F.Supp.3d 321, 448+ , D.Me. ENERGY AND UTILITIES — Oil and Gas. City ordinance that prohibited pipeline operator from loading crude oil onto tankers in city harbor was not preempted by federal law. Cited by June 26, 2019 Case 228. Tennessee Wine and Spirits Retailers — Association v. Thomas 139 S.Ct. 2449, 2459 , U.S. GOVERNMENT — Liquor. Tennessee's two-year residency requirement for retail liquor store license applicants violates the Commerce Clause and is not saved by the Twenty-first...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 21, 2018 Case 229. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. — 138 S.Ct. 2080, 2090+ , U.S.S.D. TAXATION - Sales and Use. Out-of-state seller's physical presence in taxing state is not necessary for state to require seller to collect and remit its sales tax. Cited by May 29, 2018 Case 230. Collins v. Virginia — 138 S.Ct. 1663, 1679 , U.S.Va. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Searches and Seizures. Automobile exception to search warrant requirement did not justify invasion of home's curtilage. Cited by Mar. 31, 2015 Case 231. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, — Inc. 135 S.Ct. 1378, 1381+ , U.S. HEALTH - Medical Assistance. States' obligation to provide sufficient Medicaid reimbursement rates cannot be privately enforced through injunctive relief. Cited by June 02, 2014 Case 232. Bond v. U.S. — 134 S.Ct. 2077, 2099 , U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Weapons. Statute implementing chemical weapons treaty did not reach unremarkable local offense of attempt by jilted wife to injure her husband's lover.

Cited by 233. U.S. v. Kebodeaux June 24, 2013 Case — 133 S.Ct. 2496, 2502+ , U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Sex Offenders. Application of SORNA's registration requirements to defendant released from federal custody was authorized under Necessary and Proper Clause.

Cited by 234. Alderman v. U.S. Jan. 10, 2011 Case — 131 S.Ct. 700, 701 , U.S. The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. Cited by June 28, 2010 Case 235. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill. — 130 S.Ct. 3020, 3066+ , U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS - Right to Bear Arms. Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is fully applicable to the States by virtue of Fourteenth Amendment. Cited by June 15, 2009 Case 236. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, — Alaska 129 S.Ct. 2277, 2282+ , U.S.Alaska TAXATION - Personal Property. City's ad valorem property tax on large vessels docking at ports violated Tonnage Clause. Cited by Mar. 04, 2009 Case 237. Wyeth v. Levine — 129 S.Ct. 1187, 1229 , U.S.Vt. PRODUCTS LIABILITY - Warnings. Drug user's state law failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturer were not preempted by federal law.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 26, 2008 Case 238. District of Columbia v. Heller — 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2788+ , U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS - Right to Bear Arms. District of Columbia gun restrictions were unconstitutional given individual rights conferred by Second Amendment. Cited by May 19, 2008 Case 239. Department of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis — 128 S.Ct. 1801, 1808+ , U.S.Ky. TAXATION - Dormant Commerce Clause. Exempting interest on state's bonds, but not other states', from state income tax did not violate dormant Commerce Clause. Cited by Apr. 30, 2007 Case 240. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida- — Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority 127 S.Ct. 1786, 1797+ , U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Solid Waste. County flow control ordinances that favored public benefit corporation did not violate dormant Commerce Clause. Cited by June 06, 2005 Case 241. Gonzales v. Raich — 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2205+ , U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Drugs. Application of Controlled Substances Act to intrastate users of marijuana for medical purposes did not violate Commerce Clause. Cited by May 17, 2004 Case 242. Sabri v. U.S. — 124 S.Ct. 1941, 1949 , U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE - Bribery. Statute prohibiting bribery involving federal funds did not require nexus between criminal activity and federal funds. Cited by June 20, 2002 Case 243. Utah v. Evans — 122 S.Ct. 2191, 2213 , U.S. GOVERNMENT - United States. Census methodology of “hotdeck imputation” does not violate the Census Clause. Cited by Mar. 06, 2000 Case 244. U.S. v. Locke — 120 S.Ct. 1135, 1143 , U.S.Wash. MARITIME LAW - Pollution. Washington oil tanker regulations preempted by federal law. Cited by May 20, 1996 Case 245. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore — 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1597+ , U.S.Ala. TORTS - Punitive Damages. Award of $2 million in punitive damages for failure to disclose repainting of automobile was grossly excessive and violated due process clause.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan. 13, 1993 Case 246. Nixon v. U.S. — 113 S.Ct. 732, 745 , U.S.Dist.Col. IMPEACHMENT - Procedures. Senate has sole discretion to determine procedures used to impeach district judge, including discretion appoint committee to conduct hearing and take... Cited by June 12, 1992 Case 247. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife — 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2146 , U.S.Minn. Environmental groups brought action challenging regulation of the Secretary of the Interior which required other agencies to confer with him under the Endangered Species Act only... Cited by May 26, 1992 Case 248. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota By and — Through Heitkamp 112 S.Ct. 1904, 1911 , U.S.N.D. State brought declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that out-of-state retailer was required to collect and remit applicable state use tax. Retailer's motion for summary... Cited by Feb. 26, 1992 Case 249. Arkansas v. Oklahoma — 112 S.Ct. 1046, 1052 , U.S. Consolidated appeals were taken from the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issuance to Arkansas city of discharge permit pursuant to National Pollutant Discharge Elimination... Cited by June 21, 1991 Case 250. Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier —

111 S.Ct. 2476, 2481 , U.S.Wis. Property owner who had applied for permit from town for aerial spraying of pesticides on portion of his land brought declaratory judgment action claiming that town ordinance... Cited by Feb. 20, 1991 Case 251. Dennis v. Higgins — 111 S.Ct. 865, 870 , U.S.Neb. Motor carrier filed suit alleging that vehicle taxes were unconstitutional and claiming that Nebraska officials were liable under § 1983. The District Court for Lancaster County,... Cited by May 21, 1990 Case 252. North Dakota v. U.S. — 110 S.Ct. 1986, 1994 , U.S.N.D. The federal Government challenged North Dakota laws regulating liquor sold to military bases within the state. On cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District... Cited by Dec. 05, 1989 Case 253. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of — Los Angeles 110 S.Ct. 444, 452 , U.S.Cal. Applicant for renewal of taxicab franchise brought action against franchisor city alleging that city's conduct in interfering with applicant's labor dispute was preempted by the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 15, 1989 Case 254. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. — 109 S.Ct. 2273, 2285 , U.S.Pa. United States brought action against operator of coal gasification plant to recover amounts it had reimbursed state for cleanup of hazardous waste seepage from operator's former... Cited by June 25, 1987 Case 255. Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways and — Public Transp. 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2969 , U.S.Tex. An employee of the Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation filed suit against the Department and the state under the Jones Act, seeking to recover for injuries she... Cited by June 23, 1987 Case 256. Tyler Pipe Industries, Inc. v. — Washington State Dept. of Revenue 107 S.Ct. 2810, 2826+ , U.S.Wash. Suits were brought challenging constitutionality of Washington business and occupation tax. The Superior Court, Thurston County, Washington, Carol A. Fuller, J., and Orris L....

Cited by 257. U.S. v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma Mar. 31, 1987 Case — 107 S.Ct. 1487, 1489 , U.S.Okla. An Indian nation brought suit, alleging that Government was liable for taking of private property and was required to pay just compensation. The United States District Court for... Cited by June 03, 1985 Case 258. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated — Medical Laboratories, Inc. 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375 , U.S.Fla. Action was brought challenging constitutionality of local ordinances governing collection of blood plasma from paid donors. The United States District Court for the Middle... Cited by Apr. 16, 1985 Case 259. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck — 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1909 , U.S.Wis. Employee brought state law tort action against employer and insurer which administered nonoccupational disability insurance plan included in collective bargaining agreement,... Cited by June 12, 1984 Case 260. Hayfield Northern R. Co., Inc. v. — Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. 104 S.Ct. 2610, 2614 , U.S.Minn. Rail carrier formed by shippers along abandoned rail line brought action against railroad seeking to condemn the line under Minnesota condemnation statute. After plaintiff obtained... Cited by Jan. 23, 1984 Case 261. Southland Corp. v. Keating — 104 S.Ct. 852, 859+ , U.S.Cal. Individual actions and class action by convenience store franchisees were brought against franchisor alleging, among other things, fraud, breach of contract and violation of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 01, 1982 Case 262. F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi — 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2134 , U.S.Miss. State of Mississippi Public Service Commission sought declaratory judgment that Titles I and III and section 210 of Title II of Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act were... Cited by Mar. 24, 1982 Case 263. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R. — Co. 102 S.Ct. 1349, 1356 , U.S.N.Y. Union representing employees of state-owned railroad engaged in interstate commerce brought action against the railroad seeking declaratory judgment that relationship between the... Cited by Jan. 25, 1982 Case 264. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe — 102 S.Ct. 894, 901 , U.S.N.M. Non-Indian lessees who produced oil and gas from within tribe's reservation pursuant to leases granted them under auspices of Secretary of Interior brought two suits, consolidated... Cited by June 15, 1981 Case 265. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. and — Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360+ , U.S.Va. Association of coal producers brought preenforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. The United States District Court for...

Cited by 266. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & June 15, 1981 Case — Reclamation Ass'n, Inc. 101 S.Ct. 2389, 2390 , U.S.Va. On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. For opinions of the Court, see 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2376. Cited by May 18, 1981 Case 267. Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. — 101 S.Ct. 1895, 1905 , U.S.N.J. Retirees brought action claiming that state law prohibiting workers' compensation benefits from being used to offset pension benefits was being violated by their former employers.... Cited by Mar. 09, 1981 Case 268. Chicago and N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo — Brick & Tile Co. 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1130 , U.S.Iowa Shipper brought action against railroad to recover under Iowa law for failure to provide adequate rail service. The state District Court dismissed and shipper appealed. The... Cited by June 19, 1980 Case 269. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake — 100 S.Ct. 2271, 2283 , U.S.S.D. Wyoming ready-mix concrete distributor sued South Dakota Cement Commission challenging, as violative of commerce clause, the state's policy, as applied in time of shortage, of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Dec. 04, 1979 Case 270. Kaiser Aetna v. U. S. — 100 S.Ct. 383, 389+ , U.S.Hawai'i United States brought action against owners of marina seeking to resolve dispute as to whether owners were required to obtain authorization from Corps of Engineers before making... Cited by Apr. 30, 1979 Case 271. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County — 99 S.Ct. 1813, 1822 , U.S.Cal. The California Supreme Court, 20 Cal.3d 180, 141 Cal.Rptr. 905, 571 P.2d 254, upheld an ad valorem property tax as applied to cargo containers owned by certain Japanese shipping... Cited by Apr. 24, 1979 Case 272. Hughes v. Oklahoma — 99 S.Ct. 1727, 1731 , U.S.Okla. Defendant was convicted in an Oklahoma state court of unlawfully transporting for sale outside the state minnows which were seined or procured within the waters of Oklahoma. ... Cited by Jan. 12, 1977 Case 273. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax — Commission 97 S.Ct. 599, 606 , U.S.N.Y. Action was brought by stock exchanges located outside New York alleging that amendment to statute imposing transfer tax on securities transactions unconstitutionally discriminated... Cited by June 18, 1973 Case 274. Goldstein v. California — 93 S.Ct. 2303, 2308 , U.S.Cal. Petitioners were convicted under a California statute making it a criminal offense to 'pirate' recordings produced by others, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme... Cited by June 01, 1971 Case 275. Perez v. Campbell — 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711 , U.S.Ariz. Action for judgment declaring provision of Arizona Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act unconstitutional and for injunctive relief. The United States District Court for the... Cited by Apr. 26, 1971 Case 276. Perez v. U.S. — 91 S.Ct. 1357, 1360 , U.S.N.Y. Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York of the use of extortionate means to collect extensions of credit. The Court of... Cited by June 10, 1968 Case 277. Maryland v. Wirtz — 88 S.Ct. 2017, 2024 , U.S.Md. Action by State of Maryland, in which 27 other states and one school district intervened, seeking declaration that 1966 amendments to Fair Labor Standards Act, insofar as they...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 10, 1968 Case 278. Flast v. Cohen — 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1965 , U.S.N.Y. Action by federal taxpayers to enjoin expenditure of federal funds for purchase of textbooks and other instructional materials for use in parochial schools. A three-judge panel of... Cited by Mar. 07, 1966 Case 279. South Carolina v. Katzenbach — 86 S.Ct. 803, 818 , U.S.S.C. Bill in equity for determination of validity of selected provisions of Voting Rights Act of 1965 and for injunction against enforcement of provisions by United States Attorney... Cited by Nov. 22, 1965 Case 280. Swift & Co. v. Wickham — 86 S.Ct. 258, 263 , U.S.N.Y. Action to enjoin commissioner of agriculture and markets of New York from enforcing New York's labeling provisions in respect to frozen stuffed turkeys. The Three-Judge United... Cited by Dec. 14, 1964 Case 281. Katzenbach v. McClung — 85 S.Ct. 377, 383 , U.S.Ala. Action to enjoin enforcement of Civil Rights Act. The three-judge United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, 233 F.Supp. 815, granted injunctive relief, and... Cited by May 18, 1964 Case 282. Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Alabama — State Docks Dept. 84 S.Ct. 1207, 1212 , U.S.Ala. Federal Employers' Liability Act actions brought by citizens of Alabama against railroad owned by state of Alabama. The United States District Court for the Southern District of... Cited by Feb. 17, 1964 Case 283. Wesberry v. Sanders — 84 S.Ct. 526, 529 , U.S.Ga. Action, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, by qualified voters to strike down Georgia statute prescribing congressional districts. The... Cited by Jan. 13, 1964 Case 284. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of — Medical Examiners 84 S.Ct. 461, 473 , U.S.La. Action for injunction and declaratory relief. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, 194 F.Supp. 521, dismissed the action, and the plaintiffs... Cited by May 27, 1963 Case 285. Sperry v. State of Fla. ex rel. Florida — Bar 83 S.Ct. 1322, 1325+ , U.S.Fla. The Florida Bar instituted proceedings in the Supreme Court of Florida to enjoin certain conduct on the ground that it constituted the unauthorized practice of law. The Supreme...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by May 13, 1963 Case 286. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. — v. Paul 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1231+ , U.S.Cal. Action by Florida avocado growers to enjoin enforcement of California statute, which gauges maturity of avocados by oil content, against Florida avocados certified as mature under... Cited by May 21, 1962 Case 287. Free v. Bland — 82 S.Ct. 1089, 1092 , U.S.Tex. Action by surviving husband against beneficiary under wife's will and wife's executor, to determine rights in United States savings bonds. The District Court, Upshur County,... Cited by Dec. 11, 1961 Case 288. Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Board — of County Com'rs of Kiowa County, State of Kan. 82 S.Ct. 282, 288 , U.S.Kan. Action by a federal land bank to enjoin the collection of personal property taxes on its interest in an oil and gas lease. The District Court of Kiowa County, Kansas, denied... Cited by Apr. 25, 1960 Case 289. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of — Detroit, Mich. 80 S.Ct. 813, 815+ , U.S.Mich. Shipowner's action to enjoin city and others from prosecuting complaints against owner under city smoke abatement ordinance. The Circuit Court, Wayne County, in Chancery, entered... Cited by Feb. 24, 1959 Case 290. Northwestern States Portland Cement — Co. v. State of Minn. 79 S.Ct. 357, 362 , U.S. The State of Minnesota brought action against foreign corporation to collect income taxes. The District Court, Hennepin County, entered judgment for the State of Minnesota, and... Cited by June 23, 1958 Case 291. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma — 78 S.Ct. 1209, 1217 , U.S.Wash. Action by city against taxpayers of city and against director of game and fisheries of state for judgment declaring plaintiff's right to issue and sell revenue bonds to finance... Cited by June 01, 1954 Case 292. Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd. — of Equalization and Assessment 74 S.Ct. 757, 761 , U.S.Neb. Action by airline for declaratory judgment of invalidity of Nebraska statutes authorizing assessment, levy and collection of ad valorem personal property tax on flight equipment of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Apr. 12, 1954 Case 293. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing — 74 S.Ct. 608, 619 , U.S.La. Consolidated action against liability insurers of tugboat owner and charterer, and against another, for death of five seamen who were drowned when tugboat sank. The United States... Cited by Mar. 03, 1952 Case 294. Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner v. — Stone 72 S.Ct. 424, 428 , U.S.Miss. Suit by Memphis Steam Laundry Cleaner, Inc., against A. H Stone, Chairman, State Tax Commission of the State of Mississippi, for refund of Mississippi tax paid upon privilege of... Cited by Apr. 25, 1949 Case 295. People of State of Cal. v. Zook — 69 S.Ct. 841, 873 , U.S.Cal. Berl B. Zook and Wilmer K. Craig were convicted of selling interstate transportation of persons over state highways by a carrier not holding a permit from the Interstate Commerce... Cited by Mar. 10, 1947 Case 296. Joseph v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring — Co. 67 S.Ct. 815, 817 , U.S.N.Y. Proceeding in the matter of the application of Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Company against Joseph D. McGoldrick, Comptroller of the City of New York and another to review a... Cited by Dec. 16, 1946 Case 297. Freeman v. Hewit — 67 S.Ct. 274, 282 , U.S.Ind. Action by Almira G. Freeman, as successor, trustee under the will and of the estate of Henry C. Starr, deceased, against Gilbert K. Hewit, Director of Gross Income Tax Division,... Cited by Nov. 25, 1946 Case 298. American Power & Light Co. v. — Securities and Exchange Commission 67 S.Ct. 133, 140 , U.S. Proceeding by Securities and Exchange Commission against the American Power & Light Company, and Electric Power & Light Corporation, wherein orders were entered requiring the... Cited by June 03, 1946 Case 299. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin — 66 S.Ct. 1142, 1146+ , U.S.S.C. Original action before the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina by the Prudential Insurance Company against L. George Benjamin, as Insurance Commissioner of the State of... Cited by Apr. 29, 1946 Case 300. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. Federal — Power Commission 66 S.Ct. 906, 916 , U.S.Dist.Col. Petition by the First Iowa Hydro-Electrict Co- operative for review of an order of the Federal Power Commission dismissing petitioner's application for a license to construct a...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Apr. 01, 1946 Case 301. North Am. Co. v. Securities and — Exchange Commission 66 S.Ct. 785, 791+ , U.S. Petitions by the North American Company to review two orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission entered in a proceeding initiated by the commission under Section 11(b)(1) of... Cited by June 18, 1945 Case 302. Southern Pac. Co. v. State of Ariz. ex — rel. Sullivan 65 S.Ct. 1515, 1519 , U.S.Ariz. Action by the State of Arizona, on the relation of John L. Sullivan, Attorney General of the State of Arizona, against the Southern Pacific Company to recover from defendant... Cited by Jan. 08, 1945 Case 303. Western Union Telegraph Co. v. — Lenroot 65 S.Ct. 335, 345 , U.S.N.Y. Action by Katharine F. Lenroot, Chief of the Children's Bureau, United States Department of Labor, against the Western Union Telegraph Company to enjoin the defendant from... Cited by May 15, 1944 Case 304. Northwest Airlines v. State of — Minnesota 64 S.Ct. 950, 955+ , U.S.Minn. Proceedings by the State of Minnesota against Northwest Airlines, Inc., to enforce payment of delinquent personal property taxes for 1939, imposed against the defendant. A judgment... Cited by May 24, 1943 Case 305. Standard Dredging Corporation v. — Murphy 63 S.Ct. 1067, 1068 , U.S.N.Y. On Appeals from the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department. Proceedings in the matter of the claim of Mike Cassaretakis, claimant, opposed by the Standard... Cited by Feb. 02, 1942 Case 306. U.S. v. Wrightwood Dairy Co. — 62 S.Ct. 523, 526 , U.S.Ill. On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Action by the United States of America against the Wrightwood Dairy Company to enforce... Cited by Jan. 20, 1941 Case 307. Hines v. Davidowitz — 61 S.Ct. 399, 405 , U.S.Pa. On Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Action by Bernard Davidowitz, as a resident, citizen, and taxpayer of and to the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Dec. 16, 1940 Case 308. U.S. v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co. — 61 S.Ct. 291, 298+ , U.S.Va. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Action by the United States of America against the Appalachian Electric Power Company to... Cited by May 27, 1940 Case 309. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader — 60 S.Ct. 982, 1004 , U.S.Pa. Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES, Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS and Mr. Justice ROBERTS, dissenting. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.... Cited by May 20, 1940 Case 310. Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins — 60 S.Ct. 907, 913 , U.S.Ark. Action by the Sunshine Anthracite Coal Company against Homer M. Adkins, as Collector of Internal Revenue for the District of Arkansas, for injunction against collection of tax upon... Cited by Mar. 25, 1940 Case 311. McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp. — 60 S.Ct. 664, 669 , U.S.N.Y. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Proceeding by the Gulf Oil Corporation against Joseph D. McGoldrick, Comptroller of the City of New York, to... Cited by Jan. 29, 1940 Case 312. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal — Mining Co. 60 S.Ct. 388, 391+ , U.S.N.Y. Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES, Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, and Mr. Justice ROBERTS, dissenting. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Proceeding in the matter... Cited by June 05, 1939 Case 313. U.S. v. Rock Royal Co-op. — 59 S.Ct. 993, 1011 , U.S.N.Y. Consolidated suits by the United States of America against the Rock Royal Cooperative, Incorporated, and others for a mandatory injunction to compel compliance with an order issued... Cited by Apr. 17, 1939 Case 314. N.L.R.B. v. Fainblatt — 59 S.Ct. 668, 671+ , U.S. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Proceeding by the National Labor Relations Board, petitioner, against Benjamin Fainblatt... Cited by Jan. 30, 1939 Case 315. Currin v. Wallace — 59 S.Ct. 379, 386 , U.S.N.C. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Suit by D. T. Currin and others doing business as Fleming Warehouse, Oxford, N.C., and...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan. 03, 1939 Case 316. Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford — 59 S.Ct. 325, 333 , U.S.Wash. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Action by Gwin, White & Prince, Incorporated, against Harold H. Henneford and others, constituting the State of Washington...

Cited by 317. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co. v. Territory of Dec. 05, 1938 Case — Hawaii, by Public Utilities Commission of Hawaii 59 S.Ct. 202, 206 , U.S.Hawai'i On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Action by the Territory of Hawaii, by the Public Utilities Commission of the Territory of... Cited by May 16, 1938 Case 318. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen — 58 S.Ct. 913, 919 , U.S.Ind. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Indiana. Action for a declaratory judgment by the J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company against William Storen, as chief administrative... Cited by Apr. 25, 1938 Case 319. U.S. v. Carolene Products Co. — 58 S.Ct. 778, 781+ , U.S.Ill. The Carolene Products Company was indicted for shipping in interstate commerce a compound of condensed skimmed milk and coconut oil made in imitation or semblance of condensed milk... Cited by Feb. 14, 1938 Case 320. South Carolina State Highway — Department v. Barnwell Bros. 58 S.Ct. 510, 514 , U.S.S.C. Suit by Barnwell Bros., Inc., against the South Carolina State Highway Department and others to enjoin the defendants from enforcing a statute imposing restrictions on the use of... Cited by Nov. 08, 1937 Case 321. Kelly v. State of Washington ex rel. — Foss Co. 58 S.Ct. 87, 89 , U.S.Wash. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Action for a writ of prohibition by the State of Washington, on the relation of Foss Company, Inc., against... Cited by Apr. 12, 1937 Case 322. Associated Press v. National Labor — Relations Board 57 S.Ct. 650, 654 , U.S.N.Y. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Petition by the National Labor Relations Board to enforce an order of the Board issued...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan. 04, 1937 Case 323. Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois — Cent. R. Co. 57 S.Ct. 277, 279 , U.S.Ky. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Suit by the Kentucky Whip & Collar Company against the Illinois Central Railroad Company.... Cited by May 18, 1936 Case 324. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. — 56 S.Ct. 855, 867+ , U.S.Dist.Col. Mr. Chief Justice HUGHES dissenting in part, and Mr. Justice CARDOZO, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice STONE dissenting. On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Court of... Cited by Mar. 30, 1936 Case 325. Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax — Commission of State of Washington 56 S.Ct. 608, 609 , U.S.Wash. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Suit by Fisher's Blend Station, Incorporated, against the Tax Commission of the State of Washington, and others. From a... Cited by Feb. 17, 1936 Case 326. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley — Authority 56 S.Ct. 466, 474 , U.S.Ala. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, dissenting. On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Suit by George Ashwander and others against the... Cited by Jan. 06, 1936 Case 327. U.S. v. Butler — 56 S.Ct. 312, 321 , U.S.Mass. Mr. Justice STONE, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CARDOZO, dissenting. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.... Cited by May 06, 1935 Case 328. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. — Co. 55 S.Ct. 758, 761+ , U.S.Dist.Col. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Suit by the Alton Railroad Company and others against the Railroad Retirement Board and... Cited by Mar. 05, 1934 Case 329. Nebbia v. People of New York — 54 S.Ct. 505, 510 , U.S.N.Y. Leo Nebbia was convicted for violating an order of the New York Milk Control Board fixing the selling price of milk, and the conviction having been affirmed by the Court of Appeals...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by May 08, 1933 Case 330. Mintz v. Baldwin — 53 S.Ct. 611, 613 , U.S.N.Y. In Equity. Suit by Aaron Mintz and another, copartners doing business under the firm name and style of Mintz & Mintz, against Charies H. Baldwin, individually and as Commissioner...

Cited by 331. Louisiana Public Service Commission v. Nov. 23, 1931 Case — Texas & N.O.R. Co. 52 S.Ct. 74, 76 , U.S.La. Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Two separate suits, one by the Texas & New Orleans Railroad Company and others against...

Cited by 332. Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission of May 19, 1930 Case — Ohio 50 S.Ct. 374, 377 , U.S.Ohio On Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. Suit by J. P. Grubb against the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio and others. From a... Cited by Jan. 06, 1930 Case 333. Henry Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre — Co. 50 S.Ct. 140, 141 , U.S.N.Y. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. Action by the Little Falls Fibre Company and others against Henry Ford & Son, Inc. The New York Court of...

Cited by 334. London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Apr. 08, 1929 Case — Industrial Accident Commission of California 49 S.Ct. 296, 300+ , U.S.Cal. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the State of California. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Sarah Jane Brooke and another for... Cited by Nov. 19, 1928 Case 335. Jordan v. K. Tashiro — 49 S.Ct. 47, 48 , U.S.Cal. On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of California. Proceeding by K. Tashiro, M. D., and others, for mandamus to be directed to Frank C. Jordan, Secretary of... Cited by Oct. 25, 1926 Case 336. Myers v. U.S. — 47 S.Ct. 21, 47 , U.S.Ct.Cl. Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting. Appeal from Court of Claims. Suit by Lois P. Myers, administratrix of the estate of Frank S.... Cited by Mar. 01, 1926 Case 337. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. — State of Washington 46 S.Ct. 279, 281+ , U.S.Wash. Mr. Justice McReynolds and Mr. Justice Sutherland dissenting. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Washington. Action by the State of Washington against the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by June 01, 1925 Case 338. Frick v. Com. of Pennsylvania — 45 S.Ct. 603, 608 , U.S.Pa. On Writs of Error to the Supreme Court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. In the matter of the estate of Henry C. Frick, deceased. Judgments of the orphans' court of...

Cited by 339. State of Rhode Island v. Palmer June 07, 1920 Case — 40 S.Ct. 588, 588 , U.S. Dissenting opinion. For majority opinion, see 253 U. S. 350, 40 Sup. Ct. 486, 64 L. Ed.

Cited by 340. State of Rhode Island v. Palmer June 07, 1920 Case — 40 S.Ct. 486, 493 , U.S.N.J. No. 696: Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. No. 752: Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western... Cited by May 17, 1920 Case 341. Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart — 40 S.Ct. 438, 443+ , U.S.N.Y. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department. Proceeding by Lillian E. Stewart for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law...

Cited by 342. U.S. v. Simpson Apr. 19, 1920 Case — 40 S.Ct. 364, 365 , U.S.Colo. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Colorado. Everett L. Simpson was indicted for an offense, and a demurrer to the indictment was sustained... Cited by Apr. 19, 1920 Case 343. Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency — v. Curtis Pub. Co. 40 S.Ct. 385, 387 , U.S.Ill. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois. Suit by the Blumenstock Bros. Advertising Agency against the Curtis Publishing Company.... Cited by Jan. 13, 1919 Case 344. U.S. v. Hill — 39 S.Ct. 143, 144 , U.S.W.Va. In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of West Virginia. Demurrer to and motion to quash an indictment against Dan Hill for transportation of... Cited by June 03, 1918 Case 345. Hammer v. Dagenhart — 38 S.Ct. 529, 530+ , U.S.N.C. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of North Carolina. Bill by Roland H. Dagenhart and Reuben Dagenhart and John Dagenhart, minors, by...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by May 21, 1917 Case 346. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen — 37 S.Ct. 524, 533+ , U.S.N.Y. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, of the State of New York, to review a judgment, affirmed by the Court of Appeals of that state, approving an...

Cited by 347. Wilson v. New Mar. 19, 1917 Case — 37 S.Ct. 298, 308+ , U.S.Mo. APPEAL from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri to review a decree which enjoined the enforcement of a statute fixing an eight-hour workday... Cited by Jan. 15, 1917 Case 348. Caminetti v. U.S. — 37 S.Ct. 192, 197 , U.S.Okla. TWO WRITS of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review judgments which affirmed convictions in the District Court of the United... Cited by June 14, 1915 Case 349. Adams Exp. Co. v. Commonwealth of — Kentucky 35 S.Ct. 824, 826 , U.S.Ky. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of Whitley County in the State of Kentucky to review a conviction of an express company for bringing into and delivering in that county an interstate...

Cited by 350. Brolan v. U.S. Feb. 23, 1915 Case — 35 S.Ct. 285, 286 , U.S.Cal. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California to review a conviction of knowingly concealing or moving opium which had been wrongfully... Cited by June 08, 1914 Case 351. Port Richmond & Bergen Point Ferry — Co. v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County 34 S.Ct. 821, 824+ , U.S.N.J. IN ERROR to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey, to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court of the state, sustaining, on certiorari,... Cited by June 08, 1914 Case 352. Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. U.S. — 34 S.Ct. 833, 836 , U.S.Com.Ct. TWO APPEALS from the United States Commerce Court to review judgments dismissing the petitions in suits to set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission regulating...

Cited by 353. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co. v. Board of Feb. 24, 1913 Case — Chosen Freeholders of Hudson County 33 S.Ct. 269, 271 , U.S.N.J. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey to review a decree entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Errors and Appeals of that state, which had reversed a...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Apr. 01, 1912 Case 354. Interstate Commerce Commission v. — Goodrich Transit Co. 32 S.Ct. 436, 441 , U.S.Com.Ct. FOUR APPEALS from the United States Commerce Court to review decrees enjoining in part the enforcement of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission prescribing a uniform system... Cited by Mar. 04, 1912 Case 355. Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson — 32 S.Ct. 340, 350 , U.S.Dist.Col. APPEAL from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia to review a decree affirming a decree of the Supreme Court of the District, sustaining a demurrer to a bill to set... Cited by Feb. 20, 1911 Case 356. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of — Ark. 31 S.Ct. 275, 278 , U.S.Ark. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas to review a judgment which affirmed judgments of the Pulaski Circuit Court of that state, penalizing the operation of a...

Cited by 357. Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Feb. 20, 1911 Case — 31 S.Ct. 272, 275 , U.S.Ill. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review a decree enjoining a carrier from issuing interstate transportation in exchange... Cited by Feb. 20, 1911 Case 358. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley — 31 S.Ct. 265, 269 , U.S.Ky. IN ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the Warren Circuit Court, in that state, for the specific performance of an... Cited by Jan. 03, 1911 Case 359. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside — Mills 31 S.Ct. 164, 168 , U.S.Ga. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia to review a judgment holding an initial carrier in an interstate shipment liable to the... Cited by May 02, 1910 Case 360. Weems v. U.S. — 30 S.Ct. 544, 552 , U.S.Phil.Islands IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Island to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the Court of First Instance for the City of Manila of the falsification... Cited by Apr. 04, 1910 Case 361. International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg — 30 S.Ct. 481, 484 , U.S.Kan. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Shawnee County, in that state, affirming a judgment of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan. 10, 1910 Case 362. Interstate Commerce Commission v. — Illinois Cent. R. Co. 30 S.Ct. 155, 162 , U.S.Ill. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review a decree restraining the enforcement of an order of the Interstate Commerce... Cited by Apr. 05, 1909 Case 363. Keller v. U.S. — 29 S.Ct. 470, 472+ , U.S.Ill. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review convictions for keeping an alien woman for the purpose of prostitution. Reversed... Cited by Jan. 11, 1909 Case 364. Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Larabee Flour — Mills Co. 29 S.Ct. 214, 219 , U.S.Kan. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas to review a judgment compelling a carrier by mandamus to resume the transfer and return of cars loaded and unloaded from the...

Cited by 365. Asbell v. State of Kansas Mar. 23, 1908 Case — 28 S.Ct. 485, 486+ , U.S.Kan. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the District Court of Labette County, in that state, for violating a...

Cited by 366. Phillips v. City of Mobile Feb. 24, 1908 Case — 28 S.Ct. 370, 372 , U.S.Ala. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the City Court of Mobile, in that state, in favor of defendant in an action... Cited by Jan. 27, 1908 Case 367. Adair v. U.S. — 28 S.Ct. 277, 282+ , U.S.Ky. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky to review a conviction of an agent of an interstate carrier for discharging an employee... Cited by Feb. 25, 1907 Case 368. Union Bridge Co. v. U S — 27 S.Ct. 367, 374 , U.S.Pa. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania to review a conviction for failing to make the alterations in a bridge over an... Cited by May 28, 1906 Case 369. Hodges v. U.S. — 27 S.Ct. 6, 8 , U.S.Ark. IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas to review a judgment convicting individual citizens of compelling negro citizens, by force...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Mar. 05, 1906 Case 370. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. People of — State of Illinois 26 S.Ct. 341, 346 , U.S.Ill. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the Circuit Court of Kendall County, in that state, awarding mandamus in... Cited by Dec. 04, 1905 Case 371. State of South Carolina v. U.S. — 26 S.Ct. 110, 111 , U.S.S.C. APPEAL from the Court of Claims to review a judgment denying the right of the state of South Carolina to recover the amounts exacted under the Federal internal revenue laws from...

Cited by 372. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Crenshaw Apr. 17, 1905 Case — 25 S.Ct. 552, 559 , U.S.Mo. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri to review a decree dismissing a bill to enjoin the collection of an inspection fee upon beer... Cited by Apr. 17, 1905 Case 373. Lochner v. New York — 25 S.Ct. 539, 551 , U.S.N.Y. IN ERROR to the County Court of Oneida County, State of New York, to review a judgment entered pursuant to the mandate of the Court of Appeals of that state affirming the judgment... Cited by Feb. 20, 1905 Case 374. Jacobson v. Commonwealth of — Massachusetts 25 S.Ct. 358, 361+ , U.S.Mass. IN ERROR to the Superior Court of the State of Massachusetts for the County of Middlesex to review a judgment entered on a verdict of guilty in a prosecution under the compulsory... Cited by Nov. 14, 1904 Case 375. Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles — 25 S.Ct. 18, 21 , U.S.Cal. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of California to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Superior ¶2. See Injunction, vol. 27, Cent. Dig. §§ 173, 179. Court...

Cited by 376. McCray v. U.S. May 31, 1904 Case — 24 S.Ct. 769, 776+ , U.S.Ohio IN ERROR to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio to review a judgment in favor of the United States in an action to recover the statutory... Cited by May 18, 1903 Case 377. Montgomery v. City of Portland — 23 S.Ct. 735, 736 , U.S.Or. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the Circuit Court of Multnomah County dismissing a bill in a suit to prevent...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Feb. 23, 1903 Case 378. Cummings v. City of Chicago — 23 S.Ct. 472, 477 , U.S.Ill. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to, and dismissing for want of equity, a bill to...

Cited by 379. Reid v. People of State of Colorado Dec. 01, 1902 Case — 23 S.Ct. 92, 96+ , U.S.Colo. IN ERROR to the supreme Court of the State of Colorado to review a judgment which affirmed a conviction in the District Court of Arapahoe County for a violation of a statute of...

Cited by 380. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a June 02, 1902 Case — Vapeur v. Board of Health of State of Louisiana 22 S.Ct. 811, 815 , U.S.La. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana to review a judgment affirming a judgment of the trial court which dismissed a suit to recover damages from the state board... Cited by Mar. 10, 1902 Case 381. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. — 22 S.Ct. 431, 439 , U.S.Ill. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois to review a decision in favor of the plaintiff in an action for the purchase price of goods... Cited by May 27, 1901 Case 382. Downes v. Bidwell — 21 S.Ct. 770, 784 , U.S.N.Y. IN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to a complaint in an action to recover back... Cited by Nov. 12, 1900 Case 383. Scranton v. Wheeler — 21 S.Ct. 48, 55 , U.S.Mich. IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan to review a decision against the claim of a riparian owner to compensation for the destruction of his right of access to... Cited by Dec. 04, 1899 Case 384. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. U. S. — 20 S.Ct. 96, 102+ , U.S.Tenn. APPEAL from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversing a decision of the Circuit Court which dismissed a petition under the antitrust act of... Cited by May 31, 1898 Case 385. Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board of — Agriculture of North Carolina 18 S.Ct. 862, 866 , U.S.N.C. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina. Cited by May 23, 1898 Case 386. Schollenberger v. Com. of Pa. — 18 S.Ct. 757, 765 , U.S.Pa. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Cited by 387. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. v. People of the Mar. 01, 1897 Case — State of New York 17 S.Ct. 418, 420+ , U.S.N.Y. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

Cited by 388. Hennington v. State of Ga. May 18, 1896 Case — 16 S.Ct. 1086, 1089+ , U.S.Ga. In Error to the Supreme Court of Georgia. Chief Justice Fuller and Mr. Justice White dissenting. 17 S. E. 1009, affirmed. Cited by Mar. 02, 1896 Case 389. Geer v. State of Conn. — 16 S.Ct. 600, 605+ , U.S.Conn. In Error to the Supreme Court of Errors of the State of Connecticut. Cited by May 27, 1895 Case 390. In re Debs — 15 S.Ct. 900, 908 , U.S.Ill. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. Cited by May 20, 1895 Case 391. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. — 15 S.Ct. 912, 913 , U.S.N.Y. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The following opinions were filed upon the reargument of the above-entitled cases. The... Cited by Dec. 10, 1894 Case 392. Plumley v. Com. of Mass. — 15 S.Ct. 154, 161 , U.S.Mass. In Error to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Petition by Benjamin A. Plumley to the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts for a writ of habeas... Cited by May 26, 1894 Case 393. Interstate Commerce Commission v. — Brimson 14 S.Ct. 1125, 1130+ , U.S.Ill. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of Illinois. This was a petition by the Interstate Commerce Commission for an order requiring W. G.... Cited by May 26, 1894 Case 394. Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. — Commonwealth of Kentucky 14 S.Ct. 1087, 1089+ , U.S.Ky. In error to the court of appeals of the state of Kentucky. Cited by Apr. 30, 1894 Case 395. Brennan v. City of Titusville — 14 S.Ct. 829, 832 , U.S.Pa. In error to the supreme court of the state of Pennsylvania. Cited by Dec. 18, 1893 Case 396. Belden v. Chase — 14 S.Ct. 264, 271 , U.S.N.Y. In error to the court of appeals of the state of New York. Reversed.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan. 23, 1893 Case 397. Harmon v. City of Chicago — 13 S.Ct. 306, 309+ , U.S.Ill. In error to the supreme court of the state of Illinois. Cited by May 02, 1892 Case 398. Lehigh Valley R Co v. Com. of — Pennsylvania 12 S.Ct. 806, 807 , U.S.Pa. In error to the supreme court of the state of Pennsylvania. STATEMENT BY MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER. Cited by May 25, 1891 Case 399. Wilkerson v. Rahrer — 11 S.Ct. 865, 867+ , U.S.Kan. Appeal from the circuit court of the United States for the district of Kansas. Cited by May 25, 1891 Case 400. Voight v. Wright — 11 S.Ct. 855, 856 , U.S.Va. In error to the corporation court of the city of Norfolk, state of Virginia.

Cited by 401. Kidd v. Pearson Oct. 22, 1888 Case — 9 S.Ct. 6, 8+ , U.S.Iowa In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. Cited by Dec. 05, 1887 Case 402. Mugler v. Kansas — 8 S.Ct. 273, 296 , U.S.Kan. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Kansas. Cited by Mar. 07, 1887 Case 403. Robbins v. Taxing Dist. of Shelby — County, Tenn. 7 S.Ct. 592, 593+ , U.S.Tenn. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee. WAITE, C. J., FIELD and GRAY, JJ., dissenting. Cited by Oct. 25, 1886 Case 404. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. State of — Illinois 7 S.Ct. 4, 11+ , U.S.Ill. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

Cited by 405. Morgan's Louisiana & T. R. & S. S. Co. v. May 10, 1886 Case — Board of Health of State of Louisiana 6 S.Ct. 1114, 1119 , U.S.La. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Cited by Jan. 18, 1886 Case 406. Walling v. People — 6 S.Ct. 454, 457 , U.S.Mich. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan. Cited by Jan. 04, 1886 Case 407. Presser v. People of State of Ill. — 6 S.Ct. 580, 586 , U.S.Ill. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Dec. 07, 1885 Case 408. New Orleans Gas-light Co. v. Louisiana — Light & Heat Producing & Manufacturing Co. 6 S.Ct. 252, 258 , U.S.La. Appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana. Cited by May 04, 1885 Case 409. Brown v. Houston — 5 S.Ct. 1091, 1096 , U.S.La. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Cited by Apr. 13, 1885 Case 410. Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Com. of — Pennsylvania 5 S.Ct. 826, 832 , U.S.Pa. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. Cited by Nov. 03, 1884 Case 411. Moran v. City of New Orleans — 5 S.Ct. 38, 39 , U.S.La. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. Cited by Mar. 05, 1883 Case 412. Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of East St. — Louis 2 S.Ct. 257, 264+ , U.S.Ill. This was an action of debt brought in the city court of East St. Louis, St. Claire county, Illinois, by the city of East St. Louis against a corporation of the State of Illinois,...

Cited by 413. People of State of New York v. Compagnie Feb. 05, 1883 Case — Generale Transatlantique 2 S.Ct. 87, 89 , U.S.N.Y. In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Cited by Oct Term Case 414. Newport & C. Bridge Co. v. U. S. — 1881 1881 WL 19833, *14 , U.S.Ohio The first question which presents itself is, whether, on the face of the several acts of Congress, any liability rests on the United States to pay the bridge company the cost of... Cited by Oct Term Case 415. Mobile County v. Kimball — 1880 1880 WL 18848, *6 , U.S.Ala. The several positions taken by the appellant for the reversal of the decree of the Circuit Court may be resolved into these four: 1st, That the act of the legislature of Alabama... Cited by Oct Term Case 416. Lord v. Goodall, Nelson & Perkins S.S. — 1880 Co. 1880 WL 18842, *2+ , U.S.Cal. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. Sects. 4283 and 4289 of the Revised Statutes are as follows:-- 'SECT. 4283. The liability of the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Cited by 417. Wilson v. McNamee Oct Term Case — 1880 WL 18787, *2 , U.S.N.Y. 1880 The only point argued here was the validity of the pilot law of New York with reference to the Constitution of the United States. At the close of the opening argument of the... Cited by Oct. 01, 1879 Case 418. In re Trade-Mark Cases — 1879 WL 16583, *7 , U.S.N.Y. THE first two cases were brought here on certificates of division in opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The... Cited by Dec Term Case 419. Keokuk Northern Line Packet Co. v. — 1877 City of Keokuk 1877 WL 18622, *3 , U.S.Iowa ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Iowa. The act of the legislature of Iowa creating the city of Keokuk a municipal corporation gave to the city council power to establish... Cited by Oct Term Case 420. State of Wisconsin v. City of Duluth — 1877 1877 WL 18466, *7 , U.S.Wis. Where Congress has, in the exercise of its lawful authority, inaugurated or adopted a system for the improvement of a harbor, and is, by appropriating the public moneys, carrying...

Cited by 421. Foster v. Master & Wardens of Port of New Oct Term Case — Orleans 1876 1876 WL 19518, *2 , U.S.La. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. The act of the legislature of Louisiana, approved March 6, 1869, in relation... Cited by Oct Term Case 422. Inman S.S. Co. v. Tinker — 1876 1876 WL 19558, *3+ , U.S.N.Y. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. This was a bill in equity filed by the appellant for an injunction to restrain the...

Cited by 423. Arthur v. Cumming Oct Term Case — 1875 WL 17862, *3 , U.S.N.Y. 1875 ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. 1. The term 'burlaps,' used in the revenue statutes, does not in commercial usage, by which...

Cited by 424. Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v. Fuller Oct Term Case — 1873 WL 15912, *5+ , U.S.Iowa 1873 ERROR to the Circuit Court for the District of Iowa; the case being thus: A statute of Iowa 'in relation to the duties of railroad companies,' passed in 1862, thus enacts: A State...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Oct Term Case 425. Peete v. Morgan — 1873 1873 WL 16047, *1+ , U.S.Tex. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Texas. The Constitution ordains as follows: 'No State shall without the consent of Congress lay any duty on tonnage.... Cited by Dec. 01, 1872 Case 426. Slaughter-House Cases — 1872 WL 15386, *13+ , U.S.La. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. The three cases—the parties to which as plaintiffs and defendants in error, are given specifically as a sub- title, at the head of this...

Cited by 427. Tyler v. Magwire Dec Term Case — 1872 WL 15335, *23 , U.S.Mo. 1872 The Supreme Court of the State of Missouri, on appeal, dismissed a petition which sought to have the title to lands held by the defendant, under a patent from the United States,... Cited by Dec Term Case 428. In re State Tonnage Tax Cases — 1870 1870 WL 12754, *8+ , U.S.Ala. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Alabama. These were two cases, which, though coming in different forms, involved one and the same point only; and at the bar-where the counsel... Cited by Dec. 01, 1870 Case 429. Ward v. State — 1870 WL 12887, *7 , U.S.Md. ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Maryland; the case being this: The Constitution of the United States, in one place, thus ordains: 'ARTICLE IV. Sec. 2. The citizens of... Cited by Dec. 01, 1870 Case 430. The Daniel Ball — 1870 WL 12737, *6 , U.S.Mich. APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Western District of Michigan, the case being thus: The act of July 7th, 1838, provides, in its second section, that it shall not be lawful... Cited by Dec. 01, 1868 Case 431. Woodruff v. Parham — 1868 WL 11062, *4 , U.S.Ala. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The case being thus: The Constitution thus ordains: 'Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the... Cited by Dec Term Case 432. The Belfast — 1868 1868 WL 11126, *5 , U.S.Ala. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Alabama. The case was thus: The Constitution ordains that the judicial power of the United States shall extend 'to all cases of admiralty and maritime...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by 1868 Case 433. Paul v. State of Virginia — 1868 WL 11123, *4+ , U.S.Va. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia. The case was thus: An act of the legislature of Virginia, passed on the 3d of February, 1866, provided that no... Cited by Dec. 01, 1867 Case 434. Crandall v. State of Nevada — 1867 WL 11151, *3+ , U.S.Nev. ERROR to the Supreme Court of Nevada. In 1865, the legislature of Nevada enacted that 'there shall be levied and collected a capitation tax of one dollar upon every person leaving... Cited by Dec Term Case 435. The Mohawk — 1865 1865 WL 10769, *4 , U.S.Mich. 1. The act of December 23, 1852, authorizing foreign vessels wrecked and repaired in the United States, to be registered or enrolled, is to be taken as a part of our system of... Cited by Dec. 01, 1860 Case 436. Com. of Kentucky v. Dennison — 1860 WL 9971, *14 , U.S.Ky. A MOTION was made in behalf of the State of Kentucky, by the direction and in the name of the Governor of the State, for a rule on the Governor of Ohio to show cause why a mandamus...

Cited by 437. Moore v. American Transp. Co. Dec Term Case — 1860 WL 9985, *24+ , U.S.Mich. 1860 THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act; the construction of a clause of a...

Cited by 438. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Philadelphia Term 1859 Case — & Havre de Grace Steam Towboat Co. 1859 WL 10669, *4 , U.S.Md. THIS was an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Maryland, sitting in admiralty. It was a libel filed by one corporation against another... Cited by Dec Term Case 439. The Goliah — 1858 1858 WL 9387, *2 , U.S.Cal. THIS case was brought up by appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of California. It was a case in admiralty, which arose in this way: C. K. & William... Cited by Mar. 06, 1857 Case 440. Dred Scott v. Sandford — 1856 WL 8721, *149+ , U.S.Mo. THIS case was brought up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Missouri. It was an action of trespass vi et armis instituted in the...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s)

Cited by 441. Poydras de la Lande's Widow & Heirs v. Dec Term Case — Treasurer of Louisiana 1855 1855 WL 8280, *2 , U.S.La. THIS case was brought up from the supreme court of Louisiana, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the judiciary act. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.... Cited by Dec Term Case 442. The Volant — 1855 1855 WL 8275, *4 , U.S.Md. THIS case was brought up by writ of error from the circuit court of the second judicial circuit of the State of Maryland, in and for Anne Arundel county. The case is stated in the... Cited by 1855 Case 443. State of Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & — Belmont Bridge Co. 1855 WL 8149, *6 , U.S.Pa. THIS case was one of original jurisdiction in this court, upon the equity side; and may be said to be a continuation of the suit between the same parties reported in 13 How. 518.... Cited by Dec Term Case 444. Cross v. Harrison — 1853 1853 WL 7678, *6+ , U.S.N.Y. THIS case came up, by writ of error, from the Circuit Court of the United States, for the Southern District of New York. Cross, Hobson, & Co., brought an action of assumpsit to...

Cited by 445. Veazie v. Moor Dec Term Case — 1852 WL 6754, *3+ , U.S.Me. 1852 THIS case was brought up from the Supreme Judicial Court of the State of Maine, by a writ of error issued under the 25th section of the Judiciary Act. The facts in the case are... Cited by Jan Term Case 446. West River Bridge Co. v. Dix — 1848 1848 WL 6456, *8 , U.S.Vt. A bridge, held by an incorporated company, under a charter from a State, may be condemned and taken as part of a public road, under the laws of that State. This charter was a...

Cited by 447. Aspden v. Nixon Jan Term Case — 1846 WL 5706, *13 , U.S.Pa. 1846 THIS case came up, by appeal, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of East Pennsylvania, sitting as a court of equity. The circumstances of the case are set... Cited by 1845 Case 448. Pollard v. Hagan — 1845 WL 6003, *18 , U.S.Ala. The stipulation contained in the 6th section of the act of Congress, passed on the 2d of March, 1819, for the admission of the state of Alabama into the union, viz.: 'that all...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by 1842 Case 449. Prigg v. Com. of Pennsylvania — 1842 WL 5728, *32+ , U.S.Pa. Constitutional law.—Fugitives from labor.—Powers of the states. Edward Prigg, a citizen of the state of Maryland, was indicted for kidnapping, in the court of oyer and terminer of... Cited by Jan Term Case 450. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie — 1842 County 1842 WL 5748, *5 , U.S.Pa. Taxation. A captain of the United States revenue- cutter, on the Erie station, in Pennsylvania, was rated and assessed for county taxes, as an officer of the United States, for his... Cited by Term 1838 Case 451. Kendall v. U.S. ex rel. Stokes — 1838 WL 3946, *15 , U.S.Dist.Col. IN error to the circuit court of the United States in the District of Columbia, for the county of Washington. On the twenty-sixty day of May, 1837, William B. Stokes, Richard C....

Cited by 452. U.S. v. Coombs Jan Term Case — 1838 WL 3932, *6 , U.S.N.Y. 1838 THIS case came before the Court on a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of the circuit court for the southern district of New York. Lawrence Coombs was...

Cited by 453. Poole v. Fleeger's Lessee Jan Term Case — 1837 WL 3559, *24 , U.S.Tenn. 1837 The original title of the plaintiffs in the circuit court, was a Virginia military warrant, No. 2685, dated 3d of March 1784, for 6000 acres of land, in favor of John Montgomery;... Cited by Jan Term Case 454. Elliott v. Swartwout — 1836 1836 WL 3732, *3 , U.S.N.Y. ON a certificate of division from the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New York. The suit was originally instituted in the superior court of the city... Cited by 1832 Case 455. Worcester v. State of Ga. — 1832 WL 3389, *11 , U.S.Ga. THIS was a writ of error to the superior court for the county of Gwinnett, in the state of Georgia. On the 22d December 1830, the legislature of the state of Georgia passed the... Cited by 1831 Case 456. Cherokee Nation v. State of Ga. — 1831 WL 3974, *30 , U.S.Ga. THIS case came before the court on a motion on behalf of the Cherokee nation of Indians for a subpoena, and for an injunction, to restrain the state of Georgia, the governor,...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Jan Term Case 457. Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. — 1829 1829 WL 3183, *4+ , U.S.Del. This Court has frequently decided, that to sustain its jurisdiction in appeals and writs of error, it is not necessary to state, in terms, upon the record, that the constitution,...

Cited by 458. Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo Jan Term Case — 1828 WL 3005, *5 , U.S.Ga. 1828 THESE cases were brought before this Court, from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Georgia, under the following circumstances. The schooner Isabelita, a...

Cited by 459. Ross v. Doe ex dem. Barland Jan Term Case — 1828 WL 3029, *5 , U.S.Miss. 1828 ERROR to the Supreme Court of the state of Mississippi. This action of ejectment was originally instituted by the lessee of the defendants in error, in the Circuit Court of the... Cited by Dec. 30, 2014 Case 460. Tobin v. Federal Exp. Corp. — 775 F.3d 448, 452 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) TRANSPORTATION - Carriers. Airline Deregulation Act preempted recipient of an incorrectly delivered package's common law claims against package delivery company. Cited by Oct. 02, 2013 Case 461. Bower v. Egyptair Airlines Co. — 731 F.3d 85, 92 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) FAMILY LAW - Jurisdiction. Mother was domiciled in Egypt for diversity jurisdiction purposes, in father's suit arising from abduction of children. Cited by July 09, 2013 Case 462. Brown v. United Airlines, Inc. — 720 F.3d 60, 63 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Transportation Workers. Airline Deregulation Act preempted skycaps' claims of tortious interference and unjust enrichment. Cited by Jan. 17, 2012 Case 463. Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuno — 670 F.3d 310, 323 , 1st Cir.(Puerto Rico) COMMERCIAL LAW - Industry Regulation. Puerto Rico could not violate dormant Foreign Commerce Clause by enforcing its statutes if it acted as market participant. Cited by Oct. 23, 2009 Case 464. Rhode Island Fishermen's Alliance, — Inc. v. Rhode Island Dept. Of Environmental Management 585 F.3d 42, 50 , 1st Cir.(R.I.) LITIGATION - Jurisdiction. Embedded federal question was basis for federal court jurisdiction over lobstermen's challenge to state regulation.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Aug. 06, 2001 Case 465. Laro v. New Hampshire — 259 F.3d 1, 8 , 1st Cir.(N.H.) LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Leaves. Creation of FMLA cause of action against states did not validly abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. Cited by Feb. 07, 1997 Case 466. U.S. v. Bongiorno — 106 F.3d 1027, 1031 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) Following father's conviction for violating Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), he was ordered to pay restitution and was sentenced to five years of probation, condition of which... Cited by Sep. 14, 1993 Case 467. Antonio Garcia v. Island Program — Designer, Inc. 4 F.3d 57, 61 , 1st Cir.(Puerto Rico) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) intervened in Commonwealth court insurance insolvency proceeding, asserting first priority for untimely claim, and removed the case to federal court.... Cited by Jan. 14, 1993 Case 468. Ellenwood v. Exxon Shipping Co. — 984 F.2d 1270, 1273 , 1st Cir.(Me.) Chief engineer of oil tanker, who was removed from his position when employer adopted new policy barring any employee who had ever participated in alcohol rehabilitation program... Cited by Aug. 06, 1992 Case 469. Greenwood Trust Co. v. Com. of Mass. —

971 F.2d 818, 822+ , 1st Cir.(Mass.) Bank appealed from order of the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, William G. Young, J., 776 F.Supp. 21, which found that state statute prohibiting... Cited by Aug. 13, 1991 Case 470. Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co. — 942 F.2d 48, 50 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) Worker filed action against chemical manufacturer to recover damages for injuries arising from respiratory ailments he allegedly developed from workplace exposure to... Cited by Feb. 04, 1988 Case 471. Hyde Park Partners, L.P. v. Connolly — 839 F.2d 837, 843 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) After offeror brought action in federal court seeking declaratory injunctive relief against enforcement of Massachusetts takeover statute, target company filed action in state...

Cited by 472. James v. Watt Aug. 24, 1983 Case — 716 F.2d 71, 73 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) Individual Indians brought action challenging past transfers of Indian lands by their tribe and by individual tribe members. The United States District Court for the District of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Mar. 17, 1980 Case 473. City of Boston v. Harris — 619 F.2d 87, 96 , 1st Cir.(Mass.) The City of Boston and others brought suit against the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development seeking injunctive and declaratory relief against operation of...

Cited by 474. U.S. v. Carlson Sep. 13, 1977 Case — 561 F.2d 105, 108 , 1st Cir.(Me.) The United States District Court for the District of Maine, Edward Thaxter Gignoux, J., convicted defendant of transporting explosives, and defendant appealed. The Court of... Cited by June 08, 1956 Case 475. Guerrido v. Alcoa Steamship Co. — 234 F.2d 349, 359 , 1st Cir.(Puerto Rico) Proceeding upon libel by which longshoreman sought to recover from vessel and her owners for injuries sustained while unloading vessel in Puerto Rican waters. The District Court,...

Cited by 476. Ballard Oil Terminal Corp. v. Mexican Aug. 27, 1928 Case — Petroleum Corp. 28 F.2d 91, 99 , C.C.A.1 (Mass.) In Error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts; James M. Morton, Judge. Separate actions by the Ballard Oil Terminal Corporation and by...

Cited by 477. U.S. v. Patterson Feb. 28, 1893 Case — 55 F. 605, 612+ , C.C.D.Mass. At Law. Indictment in 18 counts against John H. Patterson and others for violating the act of July 2, 1890, entitled ‘An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful...

Cited by 478. Sweatt v. Boston, H. & E.R. Co. Sep. 07, 1871 Case — 23 F.Cas. 530, 533+ , C.C.D.Mass. Proceedings in bankruptcy were instituted against the Boston, Hartford & Erie Railroad Company in the district court of this district, October 21, 1870, on the petition of Seth...

Cited by 479. The Martha Washington Sep Term Case — 3 F.Cas. 629, 633 , C.C.D.Me. 1860 Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Maine. This was an admiralty appeal. The libel [by Alfred Blanchard and others] was filed to try the title...

Cited by 480. The Chusan Oct Term Case — 5 F.Cas. 680, 683+ , C.C.D.Mass. 1843 Appeal from the district court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts. In admiralty. Libel for materials for repairs of the barque Chusan, belonging to the port of...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Feb. 26, 2018 Case 481. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc. — 883 F.3d 100, 164 , 2nd Cir. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT - Discrimination. Gay former employee was entitled to bring Title VII claim against employer for discrimination based on sexual orientation. Cited by Mar. 26, 1999 Case 482. Ace Auto Body & Towing, Ltd. v. City of — New York 171 F.3d 765, 771 , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) Members and affiliates of New York City tow truck industry sued city, challenging a city ordinance regulating towing, on ground of preemption by federal law. Summary judgment... Cited by Sep. 19, 1995 Case 483. SSC Corp. v. Town of Smithtown — 66 F.3d 502, 509 , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) Garbage hauler which had contracted with town brought action pursuant to § 1983, alleging that contract and flow control ordinance addressing disposal of garbage violated commerce... Cited by Mar. 17, 1987 Case 484. Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft — Div., United Technologies Corp. 814 F.2d 102, 104 , 2nd Cir.(Conn.) Employee's action under Connecticut law for wrongful discharge in retaliation for filing of workers' compensation claim was removed from state court by employer. The United... Cited by Jan. 25, 1984 Case 485. Suffolk County v. Long Island Lighting — Co. 728 F.2d 52, 57 , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) County, as ratepayer on behalf of itself and all of the ratepayers of utility, brought action seeking common law, legal and equitable relief for utility's and others' alleged... Cited by Dec. 22, 1983 Case 486. U.S. v. Travisano — 724 F.2d 341, 347 , 2nd Cir.(Conn.) Defendant, who was indicted on two counts of possession of firearm in violation of federal statutes, filed motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss second count of indictment. ... Cited by Jan. 09, 1981 Case 487. U.S. v. Mennuti — 639 F.2d 107, 110 , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) An order of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, 487 F.Supp. 539, George C. Pratt, J., dismissed an indictment under the Organized Crime Control...

Cited by 488. U. S. Postal Service v. Brennan Apr. 13, 1978 Case — 574 F.2d 712, 714 , 2nd Cir.(N.Y.) United States Postal Service brought action seeking permanent injunctive relief prohibiting private parties from continued violations of the private express statutes. The United...

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Mar. 03, 1944 Case 489. Lenroot v. Western Union Telegraph — Co. 141 F.2d 400, 403 , C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Action by Katharine F. Lenroot, chief of the Children's Bureau, United States Department...

Cited by 490. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Aug. 13, 1935 Case — Commissioner of Internal Revenue 79 F.2d 245, 246 , C.C.A.2 Appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals. Petition by the Guaranty Trust Company of New York, as executor of the estate of James Benson Kennedy, deceased, to review a decision of the...

Cited by 491. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Ten Apr. 01, 1935 Case — Eyck 76 F.2d 515, 518 , C.C.A.2 Appeal from the Board of Tax Appeals. Petition by Peter G. Ten Eyck to review an order of the Board of Tax Appeals redetermining a deficiency in the tax imposed by the Commissioner... Cited by Apr. 01, 1935 Case 492. U.S. v. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry — Corporation 76 F.2d 617, 620 , C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) Prosecution by the United States against the A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corporation and others for conspiracy to commit offense against the United States (18 USCA § 88), and for...

Cited by 493. Spencer Kellogg & Sons v. U.S. July 05, 1927 Case — 20 F.2d 459, 461 , C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York. Spencer Kellogg & Sons, Inc., was convicted (12 F.(2d) 612) of giving a rebate or...

Cited by 494. U.S. Light & Heat Corporation v. Safety Car Nov. 18, 1919 Case — Heating & Lighting Co. 261 F. 915, 918 , C.C.A.2 (N.Y.) Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Suit by the United States Light & Heat Corporation against the Safety Car Heating &...

Cited by 495. The Wave 1831 Case — 29 F.Cas. 464, 467+ , C.C.D.N.Y. This case came up on appeal from the district court of the United States for the Southern district of New York. It was argued at the May term of this court, and lay over for...

Cited by 496. Milne v. New York 1828 Case — 17 F.Cas. 406, 407 , C.C.D.N.Y. This was a suit by the mayor, aldermen, and commonalty of the city of New York against George Milne.

Treatment Title Date Type Depth Headnote(s) Cited by Sep. 11, 2019 Case 497. Singh v. Uber Technologies Inc. — 939 F.3d 210, 230+ , 3rd Cir.(N.J.) LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT — Arbitration. FAA exclusion for “workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” applied to transportation workers who transported passengers.

Cited by 498. Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Authority of Oct. 01, 2015 Case — New York and New Jersey 805 F.3d 98, 114+ , 3rd Cir.(N.J.) MARITIME LAW - Wharves. Marine terminal operator fell outside Tonnage Clause's zone of interest and could not bring claim for violation of clause against Port Authority. Cited by July 06, 2015 Case 499. American Farm Bureau Federation v. — U.S. E.P.A. 792 F.3d 281, 304+ , 3rd Cir.(Pa.) ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Clean Water. Term “total maximum daily loads” in CWA was ambiguous and term “total” was susceptible to multiple meanings. Cited by Sep. 11, 2014 Case 500. PPL Energyplus, LLC v. Solomon — 766 F.3d 241, 250+ , 3rd Cir.(N.J.) ENERGY AND UTILITIES - Electricity. New Jersey Long-Term Capacity Pilot Project (LCAPP) was filed preempted.

Table of Authorities (6)

Treatment Referenced Title Type Depth Quoted Page Number Cited 1. Clifford v. Denver, S.P. & P.R. Co. Case 36 20 P. 333, Colo., 1888 Appeal from district court, Arapahoe county. Action for damages by Henry Clifford against the Denver, South Park & Pacific Railroad Company. This is an appeal from an order of the... Reversed Case 52 2. Gibbons v. Ogden 17 Johns. 488, N.Y., 1820 The several acts of the legislature of this state, granting and securing to certain persons, the sole and exclusive right of using and navigating boats or vessels, by steam or... Cited 3. James v. McKernon Case 34 6 Johns. 543, N.Y.Sup., 1810 Where a bill in chancery was filed for an account, and the defendant, in his answer, set up an agreement under seal between the parties, in defence, it was held, that the... Examined Case 18+ 4. Livingston v. Van Ingen 9 Johns. 507, N.Y., 1812 The several acts of the legislature of the 27th March, 1798, (sess. 21, c. 55,) of the 5th April, 1803, (sess. 26, c. 94,) of the 6th April, 1807, (sess. 30, c. 165,) of the 11th... Cited 5. Read v. Cummings Case 42 2 Greenl. 82, Me., 1822 Where one seised of an equity of redemption in land, gave a bond to a stranger, conditioned to convey to him a part of the land in fee with general warranty, on the payment of... Cited Case 35 6. U.S. v. Fisher 1805 WL 1072, U.S.Pa., 1805 In all cases of insolvency or bankruptcy of a debtor of the United States, they are entitled to priority of payment out of his effects. Error from the circuit court of the district...

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