Alternative Approaches to Army Transformation by Joseph N

201-345_DH41.qxd 7/13/04 1:17 PM Page 1 Defense Number 41 A publication of the Center for Technology and National HorizonsSecurity Policy JULY 2004 National Defense University Alternative Approaches to Army Transformation by Joseph N. Mait and Richard L. Kugler Overview Until the problem of slow Army deployment rates is solved, the world’s best military runs the risk of performing poorly or failing to Army transformation is an attempt to provide future forces with achieve national political objectives in future crises. Recognizing enhanced capabilities in lethality, survivability, and mobility, that the U.S. military cannot wait a decade or longer to produce new both strategic and tactical. Alternatives to achieving these goals technologies that still may not solve the rapid deployment problem, differ in emphasis on weight and reliance on technology. That is, the Army Transformation Roadmap 2003 states that the goal of transformation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as transformation is to "identify and build required capabilities opposed to weight redistribution. In one approach, platform now . while developing future force capabilities essential to pro- weight is reduced to meet mobility goals. However, shedding vide relevant, ready, responsive, and dominant land power to the weight has implications for platform survivability and lethality; Future Joint Force."1 Indeed, one aspect of Army transformation previous attempts to design a single platform that is simultane- efforts is force redesign to develop an active component capable of ously lethal, mobile, and survivable have not done so satisfacto- deploying a responsive, agile expeditionary force in the first fifteen rily. Thus, advances in materials are required to insure the sur- days of an operation.2 vivability of a lightweight platform. Advances in network Much of the tonnage now devoted to Army assets must be technology are also required to make the platform more aware of shipped by sea, because the capacity of U.S. strategic airlift is insuf- its environment. The immaturity of these technologies increases ficient. Consider that each cargo ship must be individually loaded at the risks inherent in transformation based strictly on platform ports in the continental United States, sailed thousands of miles, and characteristics. offloaded at foreign ports. Loading and offloading a single cargo ship In contrast, weight redistribution considers parameters alone can take two or three days. Shortage of cargo ships, poor other than platform weight and networks to meet Army goals. offloading facilities at foreign ports, and other problems can create Indeed, due to the weight of support assets, replacing all com- bottlenecks that considerably delay shipments. This reliance on bat platforms with 20-ton vehicles reduces only marginally the slow-moving cargo ships to transport weighty forces lies at the heart overall weight of a division and corps. An alternative approach of the Army deployment problem. to transformation restructures Army forces into small, modular How the Army achieves its transformational goal of rapid units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a time- deployment depends on its perspective on weight. That is, transfor- sequential manner. This approach, with its reduced dependency mation plans differ if the objective is weight reduction as opposed to on technology, is a practical near-term alternative and should weight redistribution. Weight reduction is primarily platform-centric be pursued in parallel with technology development. and relies on technological advances in materials and network technology to deliver a single lightweight platform capable of surviving While many lessons remain to be learned from Operation Iraqi heavy combat. Weight redistribution considers parameters other Freedom, two already are firm and clear: air power is not a cure-all, than platform weight and the ability to distribute information in net- and large, well-armed ground forces are still needed for expedi- works to meet Army goals; forces are re-structured into small, mod- tionary warfare. However, heavy Army forces that were so important ular units, pre-positioned across the globe, and deployed in a time- to success in this war still lack the capacity to deploy overseas sequential manner. Although the second approach is less dependent swiftly enough. on technology, it is possible only if Army forces are considered mal- leable in time, space, and structure. July 2004 Defense Horizons 1 201-345_DH41.qxd 7/13/04 1:17 PM Page 2 A Platform-Centric Approach large as a medium tank of World War II. Eventually, the Army aban- doned the light tank concept altogether. As a result of transformation, Army forces will be capable of Alternative versions of the light tank designed to provide fire- both strategic and tactical mobility. The Army will no longer need to power to airborne forces emphasized mobility and lethality, not mass before attacking but will mass and attack simultaneously. For survivability. In World War II, the Army developed the M22, which the attack to be successful, mobile Army forces must be both sur- could be carried by a glider. But the lightly armored M22 did not vivable and capable of bringing to bear sufficient firepower. The provide adequate protection against enemy tanks. When the Army trade-off between mobility, survivability, and lethality presents the tried again in the 1950s to provide firepower to airborne forces, it greatest challenge to transformation based on reducing the weight sacrificed protection completely in favor of firepower and mobility. of a single platform. The result was the M56 gun platform, which was a 90–mm gun The Army already is addressing this by developing 20-ton plat- mounted on a tracked chassis with no armor for the crew. In an forms that can be deployed rapidly. The Army is currently deliver- extreme example, the M50 sacrificed both crew protection and ing six Stryker brigade combat teams mobility in favor of firepower; it car- (BCTs) to fill an operations gap ried six 106–mm recoilless rifles and between heavy and light forces. Two the Future Combat Systems had little armor. The assumption of Stryker BCTs have been delivered, program is intended to give its developers was that the M50, one to the 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry because of its small size, might be Division (presently serving in Iraq), the Army future force the able to ambush larger enemy vehi- and the other to the 1st Brigade, 25th cles and overwhelm them with a Infantry Division (light infantry). mobility of existing airborne massive salvo from a simultaneous The Army also is developing a set of units and the firepower of discharge of several or all of its six manned and unmanned ground vehi- recoilless rifles. (Similar thinking cles and unmanned aerial vehicles existing heavy divisions has been applied to the design of the collectively referred to as the Future FCS.) Combat Systems (FCS). To facilitate rapid deployment, the Stryker In contrast to light tanks, armored infantry fighting vehicles family of vehicles and all FCS platforms are required to fit inside a (IFV) were designed to minimize weight and cost, and maximize pro- C–130. Whereas Stryker is designed to fill a current need, FCS is tection for the infantry carried inside. The first vehicle, the 1942 half- intended to replace all platforms currently employed by the Army track, was produced in great numbers during World War II only over the next thirty years. because the need to field some form of protection for mechanized In plain terms, the FCS program is intended to give the Army infantry was great and the Army had little else to offer. The half-track’s future force the mobility of existing airborne units and the fire- armor was thin and could be penetrated by .50 caliber bullets, and its power of existing heavy divisions. This dilemma—developing a front-mounted engine was vulnerable. force with the mobility of light infantry and the firepower of The Army’s first real IFV was the M44 of 1946. The M44 pro- armor—has been with the Army since World War II, when Army ord- vided adequate protection for the infantry it carried, but at 51,000 nance engineers first tried to build a light tank that could be carried lbs., its combat weight limited mobility and dramatically increased by a glider and landed with parachutists and glider-borne infantry. cost. The M75 and M59 of 1953 weighed less than the M44 and actu- Since that time, the Army has struggled to produce a mobile vehicle ally provided increased protection for infantry but were too heavy to under 20 tons in weight that is capable of delivering impressive fire- be airlifted and could not float. power while protecting its crew. Light tanks and infantry fighting The M113 finally met the needs the Army had identified in World vehicles provide examples of how this trade-off has been achieved War II. It was light, easy to produce in large numbers, mobile (air over the years (see tables 1 and 2). transportable and capable of swimming small rivers), and capable of The light tanks, tank destroyers, and gun platforms listed in protecting the infantry it carried from machine gun fire and shell table 1 were designed primarily to protect light infantry against fragments. As a result, the M113 spawned a family of vehicles for such tanks and infantry supported by tanks. Thus, emphasis was placed tasks as command and control, engineering, indirect fire support on lethality and survivability, not mobility. The data indicate that (from a mortar carried inside the vehicle), and even chemical smoke light tanks became heavier as they confronted more powerful generation. The M113 was such a success that variations of the basic threats. The reasons for this increase are two-fold: heavier munitions model are still in active service, and the newer M113A3 was even put were required to combat the more powerful threats, and more armor forward as an alternative to the Stryker wheeled vehicle.

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