K-12 Education Reform in Qatar1
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RAND reprints have been formally reviewed in accordance with the publisher’s editorial policy, and are compliant with RAND’s rigorous quality assurance standards for quality and objectivity. Dr. Gail L. Zellman, Dr. Louay Constant, Dr. Charles A. Goldman K-12 Education Reform in Qatar1 I Introduction and supplies. Teachers’ salaries were low com- pared with those of other nations. Several previous In 2001, the leadership of the State of Qatar asked studies had highlighted the very same problems. the RAND Corporation to undertake a broad-based But these earlier reports had been consigned to ex- examination of the nation’s kindergarten through ecutive bookshelves because they offered no di- grade 12 (K-12) education system and propose a rection for change. RAND’s work was unique in strategy for reform. This request was motivated by that it offered multiple reform options and a clear concerns that, in general, the 71,000 students path to implementing the chosen option. RAND’s served by the system in 220 single-gender schools report concluded that the extensive concerns about were not being served well: students were leaving the Ministry system and the past failures to reform Ministry of Education schools without the academic it incrementally argued for a system-changing re- proficiency necessary to achieve success in post- form. RAND recommended that the basic educa- secondary education or in the rapidly expanding tional elements of a standards-based system had Qatari labor market. to be put in place. These included the development of clear curriculum standards that would define the RAND’s analysis identified key system strengths desired outcomes of schooling: what students were and weaknesses, most of which were already well- expected to know and be able to do at each grade known. A key problem was the rigidity of the level. These standards would be aligned with cur- Ministry of Education, whose insular, bureaucratic riculum, assessments, and professional develop- structure discouraged innovation and limited com- ment. To promote continuous improvement, the munication both within the Ministry and with stake- reform should call for education data to be col- holders. School-level administrators had little lected, analyzed and disseminated to the public in authority. The Ministry assigned teachers to the form of student assessment results and school schools without consulting principals. Teachers report cards. with poor performance reviews were often “de- moted” to lower grades, and teachers were often RAND offered Qatari leadership three governance assigned to teach subjects for which they had little reform options: or no training. 1) modifying the centralized Ministry structure to Qatari teachers had few options for professional make it more responsive, development, and expatriate teachers had none. Ministry inspectors regularly visited classrooms, 2) adopting a decentralized charter school-like sys- but their job was to ensure compliance with the tem, mandated curriculum; they provided no support to teachers. The Ministry provided texts linked to a or 3) providing vouchers for families to enroll their single, nationally mandated curriculum that was re- children in private schools. vised at the rate of one grade level per year. As a result, much material was out of date. Both cur- The Emir chose the second option, which was riculum and instruction emphasized rote memo- named the Independent School (IS) Model, but ex- rization and adhered to a rigid schedule that pressed a long-term preference for the voucher ap- permitted no alterations to accommodate student proach.The reform emphasized four principles that progress or need for additional instructional time had little precedent in government education sys- around certain topics. tems in the region. Some of these principles would be implemented immediately; some would become At the system level, no accountability mechanism operational over time: for school or student performance existed. Sub- stantial education resources were concentrated in • Autonomy. The new, Independent the Ministry to support a large central Ministry staff, schools operate autonomously, subject to leaving limited funds for infrastructure. Many the conditions specified in a time-limited school buildings were old, and many classrooms contract granted by the state. were overcrowded and lacked modern equipment 1 Most of the material in this paper is derived from two sources: Brewer, D., Augustine, C., Zellman, G. L., Ryan, G., Gold- man, C. A., Stasz, C., Constant, L., Education for a New Era: Design and Implementation of K-12 Education Reform in Qatar. Santa Monica, CA: RAND-Qatar Policy Institute, 2007, and Zellman, G. L., Ryan, G., Karam, R., Constant, L., Salem, H., Gonzalez, G., Orr, N., Goldman, C. A., Al-Thani, H., Al-Obaidli, K., Implementation of the K-12 Educa- tion Reform in Qatar’s Schools, Santa Monica, CA: RAND-Qatar Policy Institute, 2009. Most of the discussion of the reform plan and the pre-reform context may be found in Brewer et al, 2007; information on the reform’s early perform- ance may be found in Zellman et al., 2009. Since these two sources dominate the text, they are not cited again; other sources are cited as appropriate. ORIENT I / 2011 55 Dr. Gail L. Zellman, Dr. Louay Constant, Dr. Charles A. Goldman • Accountability. Independent schools are dures for operating an IS, and would provide a held accountable to the government structure for applications to open a new school. IS through regular audits and reporting, operators could specify grade levels, age range stakeholder feedback, and national stu- and gender and student behavior policies; they dent assessments aligned with new were free to organize student learning and as- internationally-benchmarked curriculum sessment according to the school’s mission and standards. goals. Requirements for operators were few: • Variety. Interested parties (not neces- • Participate in the nationwide student as- sarily educators) may apply to operate In- sessments dependent schools, and diverse • Comply with all financial regulations schooling options are to be offered. • Produce an annual report • Cooperate with and participate in other In- • Choice. Parents are allowed to select the stitute data collection activities school that best fits their child’s needs. However, choice would be very minimal Unlike the Ministry schools, where virtually every at first because only a small number of In- aspect of school finance was handled centrally, In- dependent schools would open each dependent schools developed their own budget, year. were given funds from the Education Institute on a per-pupil basis, and were permitted to spend these RAND developed a detailed plan for implementing funds subject only to general financial regulations. the chosen reform model that included three new government institutions: The curriculum standards development process produced standards in Arabic, English, mathemat- • The Supreme Education Council, rep- ics, and science comparable to the highest in the resenting the “end users” of the education world. Of particular note are the new Arabic stan- system (such as employers and higher dards, which stress practical language skills using education) and responsible for setting na- a variety of materials, e.g., recipes and newspapers. tional education policy. In 2004, the Evaluation Institute tested every stu- • The Education Institute, responsible for dent in the Ministry schools to document achieve- overseeing and resourcing the new, Inde- ment levels before the reform’s ISs began to open. pendent schools; developing national cur- It also surveyed all principals, teachers, and par- riculum standards in Arabic, English, ents and most students in these schools. These mathematics, and science; and develop- tests and surveys were then upgraded and re- ing teacher training programs aligned to peated in 2005 and 2006. The tests are the first ob- the new standards. jective, independent measures of student learning available in the Arabic language. • The Evaluation Institute, responsible for monitoring student and school perform- The first generation of twelve Independent schools ance in both Ministry and Independent opened in 2004; a remarkable accomplishment. schools; designing and administering na- Each year the number of ISs increased; by fall of tional tests and surveys of students, 2006, 46 Independent schools were in operation teachers, parents, and principals; pro- alongside the more-traditional Ministry of Educa- ducing annual “school report cards;” and tion schools. operating a new national education data system. II. Evaluating the Progress