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The Bermuda Agreement 1945 City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Collins, R. (2012). The Bermuda Agreement on Telecommunications 1945. Media History, 18(2), pp. 191-205. doi: 10.1080/13688804.2012.663869 This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/3891/ Link to published version: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13688804.2012.663869 Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. Reuse: Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ [email protected] The Bermuda Agreement on telecommunications 1945. Richard Collins. Published in Media History. 18:2, 191-205 (2012). 1 Abstract. The end of the Second World War saw global telecommunications governance renegotiated. The dominant British Imperial (later Commonwealth) network experienced multiple changes: the tightly integrated and collaborative imperial governance system fell away as the governing partners increasingly pursued their own, rather than a collective agendas and as the “imperial” company, Cable and Wireless’, dominance gave way to a competition and interconnection based regime as American firms and their networks entered markets hitherto closed to them. Though key elements of the Bermuda Telecommunications Agreement 1945 were soon to be renegotiated, the Bermuda Conference, at which the imperial partners and the new hegemonic power, the USA, bargained, was the fulcrum transitional event. Drawing on archival sources (notably in Canada and the UK) the author tells of the tensions within the fragmenting Imperial partnership, of an American mix of interest and idealism and of this episode in telecommunications liberalisation foreshadowing later changes. Keywords. Telecommunications, British Empire, United States, Post WWII, liberalisation, governance. 2 The Bermuda Agreement 1945. In spite of the differences of philosophies – with the United States of America nailing its flag to private enterprise and the British Commonwealth to public ownership – it has been possible to reach a very solid and practical measure of agreement and understanding…. I hope it will be a good omen for our co- operation in other fieldsi. Introduction: the legacy of war. As the end of WWII came in sight, the negotiations on the post-war world began, meetings at Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945) determined the macro-political shape of Europe; the United Nations Conference on International Organization (San Francisco, April-June 1945) agreed the UN Charter and in telecommunications the fulcrum event was the Bermuda Conference of November 21st to December 4th 1945. At Bermuda, the world’s two dominant systems of international communications, the UK’s (and its Commonwealth partners Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand and South Africa) and the USA’s negotiated how the world’s two most important communications systems henceforth would be co- ordinated. The new regime, negotiated by yesterday’s global power the British Empire, and tomorrow’s the USA, was cemented in the Bermuda Agreement (UN 1947). Bermuda came about both because users and (at least some of) the UK’s partners in the imperial system (notably Australia) were looking for change and because the 3 USA, exiting WWII with augmented power, refused to be excluded from access to the world’s major telecommunication network. But change to post WWII global communications was not quite as Hills (2002) constructed it – a neo-mercantilist tale of growing United States and private sector hegemony as a notable “tool of Empire” (Headrick 1981) slipped from Britain’s palsied grip into Uncle Sam’s firmer hand. Rather Bermuda tracks a narrative of the UK (with its imperial/Commonwealth partners) bargaining with the USA and together shaping the new global communications regime of joint hegemony. This new regime both included the USA and, on the imperial side, was characterised by a change in governance with private ownership falling away as the “British nations” (Menzies 1956) nationalised their global telecommunication assets. The imperial communications system and its decline. The imperial “legacy” system was operationally based on the Cable and Wireless companyii and overseen by a supervisory body, first named the Imperial Communications Advisory Committee (ICAC), 1928-44, then the Commonwealth Communications Council (CCC), 1944- 1949, and later the Commonwealth Telecommunications Board (CTB), 1949-1968iii. These bodies were dominated by what Menziesiv (1956) called the “old Commonwealth”. Cable and Wireless’ v network was, as the company name states, based on two distinct technologies - wireless and cable. Development of wireless telegraphy (particularly the Marconi “beam” system in the 1920s) made possible a bypassing the legacy “all red” cable system linking the imperial centres. Moreover, when atmospheric conditions permittedvi, wireless was considerably cheaper than cable. The cable system had been 4 built (and was maintained) at great cost and the combination of the interests of the operating company (though incorporating wireless telegraphy, as the name “Cables and Wireless” adopted in 1929 testifies, was dominated by the cable interest), the perceived superior security of cable over wireless and the preponderance of a cable interest in policy and supervisory institutions meant that wireless had, prior to the second World War, not developed as rapidly as its proponents hoped. Chief among wireless’ sponsors was the Australian government which saw in wireless both a way to advance its native national champion, the AWA – Amalgamated Wireless Australasia - company, (in which the Australian Government had a significant shareholding) and to reduce the price of telegraphic communication, notably with Australia’s main trading partner - the UK. Wireless’ importance grew with America’s entry into WWII (at the end of 1941) as the USA rapidly built a significant wireless infrastructure – not least in Australia which became a major base for the Pacific campaigns dominated by the United States’ forces. The end of the war posed the question of what to do with the wireless infrastructure built during hostilities – absurd to decommission and waste it – this, coupled with the United States’ increased political weight meant that the “all red” system could no longer resist American (and Australian) pressure to establish new circuits interconnecting the legacy imperial and emergent US global networks. From the UK’s (and Cable and Wireless’) point of view, radio circuits made possible both bypassing the integrated, cable based, legacy system and cherry picking the most profitable traffic to the detriment of the legacy system as a whole. Whereas for the USA, and Australia, radio offered entry to a market which had, hitherto, been largely closed, 5 realisation of value from the infrastructure it had constructed during hostilities and opening up of access to communications thus benefitting people across the globe. America’s post-war dominance certainly stimulated change in the imperial, legacy, system but no less important was the Dominions’ (and India’s) aspirations to autonomy in the management and organisation of their international communications. As Frederic Soward, viia member of Canada’s delegation to the 1945 London Conference and the de facto leader of Canada’s Bermuda delegation (who chaired the key Bermuda Rates and Circuits Committee), wrote, in the late 1940s, Canada and the other Dominions enacted “in telecommunications” a shift congruent with that “in foreign policy and defence, the same tendency towards greater decentralization and voluntary co-operation” (Soward 1950: 237). The USA: interest and idealism. The United States’ objectives in post-war telecommunications were, as Hills (2002, 2007) and others have represented it, to obtain entry for American businesses to the global electronic communications market but also to reshape global communications in the image of American liberal values. The latter objective has been somewhat underplayed in the dominant contemporary neo-mercantilist real politik narrative which Hills has so much influenced but was far from negligible. In 1944viii Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) from 1939- 1944, James Fly stated that the US policy objective was “complete freedom for all peoples of the world to communicate directly with each other”ix. To be sure, Fly’s 6 gloss on this aspiration defined the UK’s exclusion of US business from its networks as a principal obstacle in the way of unfettered global intercommunication - “England now is able to dictate the terms and conditions upon which American communications with important points in its empire can now take place”x Fly’s diagnosis was supported by a US carrier’s, Mackay Radioxi, failure to secure the UK’s permission for new wireless services between the USA and Burma and the USA and the Malay States. Fly’s arguments were formally
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