Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming
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Suits Season 3 Episode 5 Polystream
Suits season 3 episode 5 polystream Harvey and Mike try to find a way to get Cameron removed as the prosecutor of Ava's case. When Stephen learns of their plan he offers to help and even bets. Harap verifikasi akun kamu!Verifikasi. Nonton Online Video Film Lucu, Unik dan Menarik, Gratis di. Watch Suits S03E05 Shadow of a Doubt Online here on Putlocker for free. Watch Suits Season 3 Episode 5: Shadow of a Doubt Online Free - Putlocker. Summary: (Shadow Of A Doubt): You can watch Suits Season 3 Episode 5 online here at Tv Show "Suits" s3e5 (Shadow Of A Doubt). Suits. Watch Suits season 3 episode 5 (S03E05) online free (NO SIGN UP) only at TVZion, largest online tv episode database. Updated everyday. Watch Online Suits Season 3 HD with Subtitles Suits Online Streaming with hd free watch Suits Season 3 online with captions suits hd free streaming europix. Episode 3 - "Unfinished Business" Episode 4 - "Conflict of Interest" Episode 5. Stream Suits S03E05 full episode on TVRaven. Stream all 16 Suits season 3 episodes TVRaven free. Watch Suits Season 3 Episode 5 Online – Free Streaming Suits S03E06 Shadow Of A Doubt Full Episode Lines involving the private as well as the. Watch Suits Season 3 Episode 5 Online. In Suits, one of Manhattan's top corporate lawyers (Gabriel Macht) sets out to recruit a new hotshot associate and hires. Suits - Season 3: The third season opens with a shift in the dynamics at the firm. Scroll down and click to choose episode/server you want to watch. -
How Ambiguity in Some States' Anti-SLAPP
ROBERT T. SHERWIN, AMBIGUITY IN ANTI-SLAPP LAW AND FRIVOLOUS LIGITATION, 40 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 431 (2017) Evidence? We Don’t Need No Stinkin’ Evidence!: How Ambiguity in Some States’ Anti-SLAPP Laws Threatens to De- Fang a Popular and Powerful Weapon Against Frivolous Litigation Robert T. Sherwin* ABSTRACT For nearly thirty years, states have been adopting laws that attempt to stop rich, sophisticated parties from using costly litigation as a weapon to punish and silence their less-affluent critics. Known as “anti-SLAPP” statutes, these measures have been incredibly effective in forcing certain plaintiffs to bring forth evidence at an early stage of litigation to show their claims have merit. Unfortunately, a troubling trend has emerged. Some states’ courts are interpreting particular language within their anti-SLAPP laws to allow plaintiffs to survive early dismissal by merely pointing to unproven and unsworn-to allegations in their pleadings. This movement is on the rise as Congress recently considered a federal anti-SLAPP bill that just so happens to feature this same ambiguous language. This Article explores how state courts are arriving at entirely opposite holdings despite sharing statutory language that is identical in form and purpose. Ultimately, I offer specific suggestions about how Congress and state legislatures can fix their laws to avoid uncertainty and fully effectuate the purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation. Abstract ................................................................................................................. 431 I. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 432 II. Upside the Head: How Anti-SLAPP Statutes Seek to Disrupt Frivolous Litigation ................................................................................................... 435 A. When Do Anti-SLAPP Statutes Apply? ............................................ 437 B. How Do Courts Decide What Lives and What Dies? ....................... -
LARC @ Cardozo Law 1998-1999
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law LARC @ Cardozo Law Student Handbooks Life @ Cardozo 1998 1998-1999 Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/student-handbooks Part of the Law Commons CARDOZO BENJAMIN N . CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW• YESHIVA UNIVERSITY Student Handbook 1998-99 This Handbook, effective September I, 1998, supersedes all previously published rules and regulations, announcements, statements, and publications with which it is inconsistent. The rules and regulations set forth in this Handbook are binding upon all students who are presently matriculated at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law (CSL), who are on leave of absence from CSL, or who are CSL students visiting at other law schools. Students are deemed to have read and understood both this Handbook and the CSL Bulletin (catalogue). Any questions concerning the contents of the Student Handbook or the CSL Bulletin should be addressed to the Office of the Dean. CSL reserves the right to change its rules and regulations, admissions and graduation requirements, course offerings, tuition, fees, and any other material set forth in its Bulletin or this Handbook at any time without prior notice. Changes become effective when posted on the official bulletin boards located on the second floor. Students should consult the designated bulletin boards at CSL for changes. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION . 1 II. CALENDARS .......................................... 2 A: 1998-99 ACADEMIC CALENDAR . 2 B. COURSE SCHEDULE ................................ 6 C. CALENDAR OF EVENTS .............................. 6 III. FACILITIES ........................................... 7 A. Brookdale Center -- 55 Fifth Avenue . .. 7 B. Residence Hall . 7 C. Yeshiva University . -
Suits Episode Scripts 1-1 수정본 N/A - Pilot
1 Suits Episode Scripts 1-1 수정본 N/A - Pilot 자료원: http://www.springfieldspringfield.co.uk/view_episode_scripts.php?tv- show=suits&episode=s01e01 (Q1) Gerald Tate's here. He wants to know what's happening to his deal. Go get Harvey. I check. Raise. 5,000. I'm all in. You can pay me later. I've got to go. Gentlemen. I'm paying you millions. And you're telling me I'm going to get screwed? Jessica, have I come at a bad time? Gerald, this is Harvey Specter. He's our best closer. Well, if you're the best closer, where the hell have you been for the last three hours? Well, Gerald, I specialize in troubled situations, and when I left here at 7:00 p.m. this deal wasn't in jeopardy. So, I'm just trying to figure out what happened in the interim. We keep offering more money. They keep rejecting it. It's last-minute bad faith bullshit. It says here that Cooper won't be staying on as honorary Vice President. That's right. I don't want him around. He wouldn't be around. It's an honorary position. I don't give a shit. 2 Well, I think you do, because that's what's changed since I left, which means it's you who's been dealing in bad faith. Well, now that you've got a grasp on what's happened in the goddamn interim, what are you going to do about it? Because he's not getting that title. -
Confidential Informants in Private Litigation: Balancing Interests in Anonymity and Disclosure
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANTS IN PRIVATE LITIGATION: BALANCING INTERESTS IN ANONYMITY AND DISCLOSURE Ethan D. Wohl∗ ABSTRACT Heightened pleading standards and limits on discovery in private securities fraud actions make confidential informants crucial in many cases. While courts have widely recognized the importance of confidential informants and the need to protect them from retaliation, they have not applied consistent standards as to how informants must be identified in pleadings, and have failed to take into account substantial bodies of relevant case law when deciding whether to require the disclosure of informants’ names in discovery. This article offers a framework for deciding when and how confidential informants should be identified, taking into account the competing interests in anonymity and disclosure. It offers a refined standard for identifying informants at the pleading stage that focuses on how the employee came to have the information pleaded, rather than on the employee’s job title or duties. It also proposes use of in camera review of witness statements. At the discovery stage, this article criticizes the use of the attorney work product doctrine as a basis for protecting informant identities. It argues that courts should perform a balancing analysis that directly weighs public policy and privacy interests in favor of informant anonymity against defendants’ legitimate needs for disclosure. This approach is supported by numerous cases protecting the identities of informants and other types of witnesses under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and also finds support in the many cases construing the formal privilege applicable to government informants. Finally, this article encourages plaintiffs to seek protective orders for informants early in litigation and briefly discusses protection for witness interview notes. -
Inhibiting Patent Trolling: a New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers Molecular Templates, Inc
Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 2 2014 Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers Molecular Templates, Inc. Young Jeon e-Litecom Co., Ltd. Recommended Citation Eric Rogers and Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11, 12 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell. Prop. 291 (2014). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njtip/vol12/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 Eric Rogers & Young Jeon November 2014 VOL. 12, NO. 4 © 2014 by Northwestern University School of Law Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Copyright 2014 by Northwestern University School of Law Volume 12, Number 4 (November 2014) Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 By Eric Rogers & Young Jeon* There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly referred to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities—that make no products but file dubious patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially productive companies. High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an exploitive business model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims against numerous companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay patent trolls rather than expend even more money in litigation. -
Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming Nora Freeman Engstrom Stanford Law School
Michigan Law Review Volume 115 | Issue 5 2017 Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming Nora Freeman Engstrom Stanford Law School Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons Recommended Citation Nora Freeman Engstrom, Retaliatory RICO and the Puzzle of Fraudulent Claiming, 115 Mich. L. Rev. 639 (2017). Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol115/iss5/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RETALIATORY RICO AND THE PUZZLE OF FRAUDULENT CLAIMING Nora Freeman Engstrom* Over the past century, the allegation that the tort liability system incentivizes legal extortion and is chock-full of fraudulent claims has dominated public discussion and prompted lawmakers to ever-more-creatively curtail individu- als’ incentives and opportunities to seek redress. Unsatisfied with these con- ventional efforts, in recent years, at least a dozen corporate defendants have “discovered” a new fraud-fighting tool. They’ve started filing retaliatory RICO suits against plaintiffs and their lawyers and experts, alleging that the initia- tion of certain nonmeritorious litigation constitutes racketeering activity— while tort reform advocates have applauded these efforts and exhorted more “courageous” companies to follow suit. Curiously, though, all of this has taken place against a virtual empirical void. Is the tort liability system actually brimming with fraudulent claims? No one knows. -
Framing Frivolous Litigation: a Psychological Theory Chris Guthrie
Vanderbilt University Law School Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 2000 Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory Chris Guthrie Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons Recommended Citation Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 University of Chicago Law Review. 163 (2000) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/814 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. +(,1 2 1/,1( Citation: 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 2000 Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) Wed Jun 6 16:03:04 2012 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: https://www.copyright.com/ccc/basicSearch.do? &operation=go&searchType=0 &lastSearch=simple&all=on&titleOrStdNo=0041-9494 Retrieved from DiscoverArchive, Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository This work was originally published in Guthrie, C. Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 163 2000 Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory Chris Guthriet This Article uses an often-overlooked component of prospect theory to develop a positive theory offrivolous or low-probability litigation. -
Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions (Rev
Civil Nature of Suit Code Descriptions (Rev. 04/21) Contract Code Title Description 110 Insurance Action alleging breach of insurance contract, tort claim, or other cause related to an insurance contract, except for maritime insurance contracts. 120 Marine Action (Admiralty or Maritime) based on service, employment, insurance or other contracts relating to maritime vessels and other maritime contractual matters. 130 Miller Act Action based on performance and payment bonds agreed to by contractors on federal construction projects as required under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 3131-3134. 140 Negotiable Instrument Action relating to an agreement to pay a specific amount of money, including promissory notes, loan agreements and checks. 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement Action to recover debt owed to the United States, including Judgment enforcement of judgments, based on overpayments and restitution agreements involving matters other than Medicare benefits, student loans and veterans’ benefits. 151 Medicare Action relating to Medicare payments, including actions for payments of benefits, to recover overpayments, and for judicial review of administrative decisions. 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans Action to recover debt owed to the United States from defaulted (Excludes Veterans) student loan. 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veterans' Action relating to payments of veterans’ benefits, primarily including Benefits actions to recover overpayments. 160 Stockholders' Suits Action brought by stockholder(s) of a corporation (including -
Cumulative Faculty Bibliography Through 2009 Fordham Law School Library
Fordham Law School FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History Faculty Bibliography Law Library September 2018 Cumulative Faculty Bibliography Through 2009 Fordham Law School Library Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/fac_bib Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Fordham Law School Library, "Cumulative Faculty Bibliography Through 2009" (2018). Faculty Bibliography. 13. https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/fac_bib/13 This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Library at FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Bibliography by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The orF dham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Fordham Law School Cumulative Faculty Bibliography Through 2009 ABRAHAM ABRAMOVSKY Books (Editor) Criminal Law and the Corporate Counsel. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981. Journal Articles “Prosecuting Judges for Ethical Violations: Are Criminal Sanctions Constitutional and Prudent, or Do They Constitute a Threat to Judicial Independence?” 33 Fordham Urban Law Journal 727-773 (2006) [with Jonathan I. Edelstein] “Criminal Law Current Comment: People V. Suarez and Depraved Indifference Murder: The Court of Appeals' Incomplete Revolution.” 56 Syracuse Law Review 707-734 (2006) [with Jonathan I. Edelstein] ADepraved Indifference Murder Prosecutions in New York: Time for Substantive and Procedural Clarification.@ 55 Syracuse Law Review 455-494 (2005) (with Jonathan I. Edelstein). "The Drug War and the American Jewish Community: 1880 to 2002 and Beyond." 6 The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 1-38 (2002 ) (with Jonathan I. -
Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform Roland Christensen
BYU Law Review Volume 2016 | Issue 1 Article 9 February 2016 Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform Roland Christensen Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview Part of the Torts Commons Recommended Citation Roland Christensen, Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform, 2016 BYU L. Rev. 261 (2016). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2016/iss1/9 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 05.CHRISTENSEN.FIN05.CHRISTENSEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/1/2016 9:02 PM Behind the Curtain of Tort Reform I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................ 261 II. A CASE FOR TORT REFORM .......................................... 263 A. The Purposes and Goals of Tort Reform ....................... 263 B. Typical Tort Reform Arguments ................................... 264 C. Current Tort Reforms .................................................. 270 III. A CASE AGAINST TORT REFORM .................................. 272 A. The Functionality of the Current Tort System ............... 272 B. Pervasiveness of Tort Reform ....................................... 273 C. Tort Reform Misconceptions ........................................ 274 D. Responses to the Typical Tort Reform Arguments ........ 275 E. The Harm Caused by Damages Caps -
Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment*
ISSN 1045-6333 HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS SOLVING THE NUSIANCE-VALUE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM: MANDATORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT Randy J. Kozel David Rosenberg Discussion Paper No. 469 03/2004 Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 This paper can be downloaded without charge from: The Harvard John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/ The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=485242 JEL Classifications: K4, K13, K40, K41 SOLVING THE NUISANCE-VALUE SETTLEMENT PROBLEM: MANDATORY SUMMARY JUDGMENT* RANDY J. KOZEL & DAVID ROSENBERG The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current procedural rules are inadequate to foreclose nuisance-value strategies. Class action is commonly thought to exacerbate the nuisance-value settlement prob- lem to the systematic disadvantage of defendants. This concern has contributed to the growing support among courts and commentators for subjecting class actions to precertification merits review (PCMR), generally understood as conditioning class certification on prior screening of class claims for some threshold level of merit.