St. James Investment Company Updated: 15-December-16

V.F. C ORP ORATION (VFC)

COMPANY DESCRIPTION

VF Corp. operates as an apparel company which engages in the manufacture of fashion clothes, , and other related products. VF’s brands include Jansport, Kipling, , Lucy, Majestic, Nautica, Reef, , Timberland, Vans, , Lee, Rock & Republic, Bulwark, Horace Small, Red Kap, and Wrangler Workwear. The company was founded in 1899 and is headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina.

INVESTMENT THESIS

VF has established a broad and growing array of leading lifestyle brands, selected to enhance its presence in high-growth categories and for synergies within existing operating units. We think the company can take advantage of three market trends:

1) The outdoor and action sports market is a large and quickly growing opportunity, with active wear apparel now often worn in place of casual attire--represents a $46 billion opportunity with a focus higher-margin performance and comfort products. The North Face line is already a leader in the $25 billion global outdoor market and provides high-performance sports apparel, an increasingly popular category thanks to the fitness craze. Management expects this category to be a key growth driver for VF and that further acquisitions will be made to increase exposure. Management states that it could grow organically to over 65% of revenue from the current 60% penetration over the next five years. 2) VF leverages its large global supply chain to support additional international sales. Management believes that international markets can grow from 30% of revenue to 45% of sales in five years. 3) Direct-to-consumer sales growing to 30% of sales from the current 27% penetration, with e-commerce being the fastest-growing, most profitable channel.

We expect the company’s near-term performance to face headwinds given retailer bankruptcies and weak apparel consumer demand; however, VF maintains an attractive business model that continues to gain market share and we see it as an attractive investment. VF’s competitive advantage hinges on the company’s pricing power through its intangible brand assets. Management’s ability to cull declining brands, nurture growing brands, and acquire strong brands support an attractive portfolio.

We think that the markets will eventually recognize VF’s shareholder value through a combination of a large share buyback program, a future acquisition, outsized growth of the direct-to-consumer channel, or possible further divestitures of underperforming businesses. Backed by a strong management team, solid execution and the ability to drive cost synergies, along with a vetting process to acquire strong brands with slightly broken operations, we believe that VF currently offers an attractive entry point for long-term investors.

COMPANY HISTORY

The began in the year 1899, when eight men formed the Reading Glove and Mitten Manufacturing Company in Reading, , and began producing and selling knitted and silk gloves. Of the founders, two men had previous experience in the garment industry as hosiery manufacturing executives, while a third, John Barbey, was a brewer and banker

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and controlled the company's financial operations. After twelve years of slow growth, Barbey purchased his partners' interests in the company in 1911. The following year, Barbey's son John Edward (“J.E.”) joined the company and in 1913 the company's name was changed to Schuylkill Silk Mills.

In 1914 the company expanded into the manufacture of silk , and after three years of successful sales, the Barbeys decided to conduct a contest to find a brand name for their lingerie line. The winner received a $25 prize for the name "Vanity Fair." With hopes of establishing a national reputation for the company's merchandise, the Barbeys launched an extensive advertising campaign that emphasized the superior quality and style of Vanity Fair lingerie. This direct-to-the-consumer approach was considered innovative in that time period, because most other lingerie was of mediocre quality and was sold without brand names primarily through jobbers, a term used to describe a wholesaler who operates on a small scale and only sells to retailers and institutions. The Barbeys' campaign proved quite successful and the Vanity Fair brand grew in recognition.

By the early 1920s, the rising success of the lingerie product line prompted Vanity Fair to discontinue its glove manufacturing operation and devote itself exclusively to the business of making lingerie. J.E. Barbey was named general manager of the company in 1931 in addition to his position as vice-president. Union organizing activities in the Reading area in the 1930s prompted Vanity Fair to open a new factory in 1937 in Monroeville, Alabama, in the union-unfriendly South. J.E. Barbey was known for his antiunion views and did not want to run a unionized factory. The Reading plant remained in operation though not unionized, but after a new wave of organizing actions arose following the end of World War II and two unsuccessful attempts were made to unionize the plant, it was closed for good in 1948.

Upon his father's death in 1939, J.E. Barbey assumed the presidency of Vanity Fair, a position that he held for the next quarter century. During that time, he led the company through turbulent times, such as the economic changes that came with World War II. In 1941 the war brought about an embargo on silk, and the company began using rayon in the production of its lingerie. Throughout the rest of the 1940s, Vanity Fair perfected the use of other new types of lingerie fabrics and subsequently introduced products made from a nylon tricot material in 1948. These innovations changed the face of the lingerie industry. Nylon tricot was soon considered to be an ideal lingerie fabric because of its strength, wearing power, elasticity, and ease-of-care features. Its use also enabled the company to produce lingerie with a variety of fashionable features and in many popular colors.

In 1951 Barbey, who owned nearly all of the company's common stock, decided to take the company public. About one-third of Barbey's shares were sold via an initial public offering. The stock traded over the counter until 1966, when a secondary stock offering of shares held by the J.E. Barbey Estate and Trusts was completed. The offering represented one quarter of the outstanding shares and left the Barbey trusts with a twenty-five percent stake in Vanity Fair Mills. The offering enabled the company to gain a listing on the New York Stock Exchange.

BUSINESS OVERVIEW

VF Corporation is one of the world's largest publicly owned fashion apparel manufacturers, designing and producing a diverse array of products for both the U.S. and international markets. The company owns a portfolio of well-known brands in several categories that are sold through a variety of retail sales channels, including department, specialty, mass-merchant, and discount stores. VF is the leading maker of in the , holding about one-quarter of the market with such brands as Wrangler, Lee, Rustler, and Riders. Approximately half of the company's revenues come from the sale of

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jeanswear. Intimate apparel, which includes the Vanity Fair, Lily of France, Vassarette, and Bestform brands, generates about 16% of sales. Another 10% comes from marketing occupational apparel under the Red Kap, Penn State Textile, and Bulwark brands. VF also sells children's playwear under the Healthtex and Lee brands, North Face outdoor apparel and equipment, and JanSport and daypacks and bookbags. The company's knitwear apparel business designs, manufactures, and markets imprinted sports clothing under licenses from Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, the National Football League, the National Hockey League, major universities and colleges, and top NASCAR drivers. Other operations include a chain of about fifty VF retail outlet stores located across the United States, selling a wide range of company products. More than 80% of company revenues are derived domestically; the remainder primarily originates in Europe, with South America and Asia contributing small portions of overall sales.

To understand VF is to understand brand management. The purpose of building a brand is to differentiate one’s product so that one can charge a premium price. Customers will pay more because they trust a brand to deliver a quality product. For example, while a generic bottle of bleach and a bottle of Clorox are chemically identical, Clorox manages to charge about 60% more than the no-name brand. In other cases, the brand is the entire product. Customers will buy clothing solely to display the label. Every business wants to have the power of a strong brand but developing a brand is difficult and expensive. One either needs to provide a high-quality product for many years or budget millions of dollars on marketing to make any headway in a saturated market competing for consumer attention. Therefore, most attempts to build a new brand fail; however, once a company establishes a trusted brand, the company can now sell more products at higher margins than their competitors.

VF Corporation owns some of the best brands in the retail sector. Although many consumers may not know the company’s name, they certainly know the company’s brands. Today, this single company combines the earnings power of JanSport backpacks, Lee jeans, Nautica clothing, Reef surf wear, North Face outdoor apparel, Timberland boots and clothing, Vans , and Wrangler jeans. VF does not create brands from scratch, an expensive and difficult process, but rather VF employs a disciplined and skillful process to buy pre-existing brands and then revitalize them. For example, North Face started making outdoor wear in the 1960s. Over time, North Face developed a solid following among serious winter athletes. Although the brand name had recognition, North Face faced bankruptcy in 2000. VF stepped in and purchased North Face for $25.4 million. With annual sales of $240 million in 2000, VF paid an amount equal to 10% of North Face’s 2000 revenue. Following the acquisition, VF improved North Face's product line and its technology. North Face now generates $2.4 billion in revenue in a single year, ten times more than in 2000.

Although VF revitalized the North Face brand in the eyes of consumers, most of VF's advantage comes from behind the scenes. North Face produced good products, including the simple fleece jacket that has become so ubiquitous, but VF was able to make the company more profitable. VF employed its manufacturing and distributions network to manufacture products at lower costs and get them in more stores. VF would rather buy and improve rather than build a brand name, manufacturing, and distribution from scratch. That strategy is what provides VF a competitive, and we believe, sustainable advantage.

Next, consider Timberland, the maker of the famous tan work boot and other outdoor apparel. Timberland became trendy in the late 1990s and early 2000s but sales peaked at $1.5 billion per year in 2006. Since then, sales at Timberland declined. In 2011, VF bought Timberland for $2 billion. VF subsequently conducted interviews with more than 18,000 customers to determine how to refocus the brand. With VF’s plan in place, Timberland's

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sales have grown from $1.5 billion at the time of the acquisition to $1.8 billion today. VF's management expects the brand to hit $3.1 billion in sales by 2019.

VF's portfolio of brands is a healthy mix of established and growing brands that spans different markets and different socioeconomic classes. For reporting purposes, VF separates its brands into four large groups.

OUTDOOR & ACTION: $7.4 BILLION - 60% OF REVENUE

 North Face – By selling winter jackets, tents, sleeping bags, and anything for the outdoors or cold weather, North Face has become the biggest brand at VF.  Vans – Vans offers casual sneakers and clothing that appeal to younger fans of action sports. The brand has more than 300 retail stores and a place in fashion as a producer of several "classic" styles.  Timberland – Biggest project for VF's growth.  Kipling – Mostly a brand for women; makes handbags, luggage, and other accessories. New handbags retail for around $100.  Napapijri – Outdoor-inspired casual clothes that charges a premium price—the bulk of its business comes from Europe and Asia.  JanSport –The JanSport backpack has been a fixture on high school and college campuses for the past forty years. It's simple, but it's beloved. Design and culture magazine Complex named the JanSport backpack one of the fifty most iconic designs of everyday objects.  Eastpak – Eastpak extends the backpack product line down market. This brand makes backpacks and luggage that sell at budget prices.  Reef – A wide selection of Reef-brand sandals, , and swimwear are found in most surf shops. This brand charges a premium price. A pair of simple leather sandals from Reef often retails for more than $50.  SmartWool – Socks designed for comfort and warmth. And at $20 a pair, VF has built another solid brand name.  lucy – Trying to replicate the success of companies like and lululemon. The lucy brand competes with these other companies, making activewear for women who practice yoga or to the gym.  Eagle Creek – Targets hikers; Eagle Creek makes heavy-duty, high-performance backpacks, duffels, and luggage for your gear.

JEANSWEAR: $2.7 BILLION - 23% OF REVENUE

 Wrangler, Lee, Riders, Rustler, and Rock & Republic – These companies all do essentially the same thing: make jeans. Many of these brands have been around a long time. These aren't premium, high-fashion jeans but rather, these are affordable everyday jeans that sell in big retailers like Wal-Mart, JC Penney, and Kohl's. VF ventured into high-priced jeans with its 7 For All Mankind brand but recently sold that business. Wrangler and Lee lines carry enough cachet as American brands that they sell for higher prices and in fancier stories in Europe and Asia.

IMAGEWEAR: $1.0 BILLION - 9% OF REVENUE

 Red Kap – Manufactures premium work wear for the construction or automotive industries.  Bulwark – Bulwark makes flame-resistant and protective clothing typically worn by those in the oil, utility, and mining industries. In this case, brand loyalty not only encompasses fashion, but safety and trust as well.  Horace Small – For police and other uniformed officers, Horace Small provides uniforms, outerwear, and protective gear. Approximately 70% of sales from these three work brands come from suppliers and distributors that provide uniforms to customers. This revenue stream gives VF more loyalty and a stronger brand "lock in" than a typical customer who chooses what he wears.  Majestic Athletic – In a divergence from the rest of its Imagewear segment, Majestic makes licensed sports gear emblazoned with logos from Major League Baseball teams, the National Football League teams, and other sports teams. When a sports team wins a championship, Majestic quickly produces the merchandise. VF has considered selling this division; probably worth $500 million.

SPORTSWEAR: $635 MILLION - 5% OF REVENUE

 Nautica – Targets slightly more-upscale customers with apparel that often has a sailing or nautical theme. Brand has been around for more than thirty years and has nearly 400 stores.  VF recently disposed of its contemporary brands coalition. This group made expensive jeans and premium apparel under the names 7 For All Mankind, Splendid, and Ella Moss. These brands generated $344 million in 2015 but with extremely low margins. VF received $120 million for the sale of its contemporary brands.

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VF is a management case study of an exemplary business, literally. MBA students study the company’s logistics and manufacturing, how it makes acquisitions, and how the company rebuilds brands. CEO Eric Wiseman has been with the company since 1995 and leading the company since 2008. He has been named one of the 100 best-performing CEOs by the Harvard Business Review for seven years running. One of the great insights of VF's structure is to pool all of its distribution and manufacturing expertise and spread it across different brands. Why? Because trends can be fickle. Crocs were once the trendy shoe. When these plastic foam clogs first hit the scene, many like us thought that they were a joke. We were wrong, initially. Crocs’ stock price went from $12 to $75. Eventually, the market realized that plastic foam clogs were another passing fad. The price eventually plummeted as one would expect. The point is that this is simply not going to happen with VF Corporation.

First, VF does not buy fads. North Face, Vans, Timberland, and other acquisitions were around for decades before VF bought them. Others, like Wrangler and Lee jeans or JanSport backpacks, have already been a part of VF for decades. Second, VF has wonderful diversification among its brands. Each year, clothing companies have to predict what products consumers will want for the next season – production calendars often require designs twelve to eighteen months before the items reach retail store shelves. If one VF brand experiences a down year, another brand may have an up year. Third, we also see diversity between sales channels, or the means of selling a product. VF books 72% of sales through its wholesale division that sells products to other retailers. This includes big-volume accounts like Wrangler jeans in Wal-Mart stores and a growing business with Amazon. The company also books 27% of its sales from its direct-to-consumer channels through its websites and 1,400 branded stores.

VF CORPORATION YEAR OVER YEAR SALES GROWTH

40.0%

30.0%

20.0%

10.0%

0.0%

-10.0%

-20.0%

Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16

Sep-07 Sep-08 Sep-09 Sep-10 Sep-11 Sep-12 Sep-13 Sep-14 Sep-15 Sep-16

May-09 May-10 May-11 May-12 May-13 May-14 May-15 May-16 May-08

With a stable of 23 brands and multiple ways to sell these brands, one would expect results from year to year and quarter to quarter to exhibit less volatility than with a single-brand business. As seen in the chart, sales dropped only 10% after the 2008 credit crisis—those were the worst numbers for VF in twenty years. Outside that, we see average growth of 5.3% with a few big upside surprises attributed to acquisitions of billion-dollar brands like Vans and Timberland.

In addition to diversity of brands and revenue streams, VF obsesses over margins. In a competitive industry like apparel, margin discipline is paramount in order to achieve long- term success. On this front, VF distinguishes itself. Gross margin measures consider the cost of production and the final selling price. For example, if Timberland sells a pair of boots

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for $100 and they cost $50 to make, the gross margin is 50%. VF has a gross margin around 45%-50% every year--better than the margins it posted a decade ago, as well as better than the margins of most of its competitors. After considering all additional costs like designers and marketing, VF's profit margin comes to about 9%--a number that is fairly consistent from year to year.

Price-to- Debt-to- 5-Year Market Return on Profit Gross Dividend Name Symbol P/E Ratio Sales Equity Dividend Cap* Equity Margin Margin Yield Ratio Ratio Growth New ell Brands NWL $24.40 22.6 2.0 5% 6% 39% 168% 1.50% 23.90% VF Corp VFC $20.80 16.0 1.9 23% 12% 48% 35% 3.30% 18.60% LVMH LVMUY $82.82 20.0 2.1 15% 10% 65% 32% 3.00% 5.80% PVH Corp PVH $8.60 14.8 1.1 15% 7% 52% 71% 0.10% 0.00% L Brands LB $20.60 17.9 1.7 n/a 10% 43% n/a 3.40% -2.00% Prestige Brands PBH $2.50 20.8 3.0 10% 12% 58% 218% none none

Last year, VF sold off three brands that the company referred to as its "Contemporary" group—the margins of the group were consistently one-tenth the margins of the rest of the company. VF correctly decided to reallocate its capital to assets with higher returns. When a company pairs steady growth with steady margins, an investor can potentially enjoy long- term returns. An investor in VF who reinvested dividends earned 1,226% (13% annually) over the last 20 years. By comparison, the S&P 500 returned 357%, or about 8% annually.

VF provides a solid investment opportunity for investors. The company has only $1.4 billion in long-term debt and a debt-to-equity ratio of 34%. The median company in the S&P 500 is more than twice as leveraged at 81%. The focus on margins positions VF to return 22% a year on its shareholder equity. VF 3.3% yield is higher than the current average yield of the S&P 500 Index. For the last five years, the dividend has grown 18% a year and VF has increased its dividend every year for the last 43 years.

VALUATION

We model 2017 revenue to grow 1% organically, slightly below our 3% growth that we model years two and three. We model future revenue growth based on the following segment assumptions: 3% growth in the outdoor and action sports category, 1% jeanswear growth, a 1% decline in Imagewear, and a 12% decline in . We believe international penetration should generate high-single-digit constant currency growth and direct-to-consumer channel with further support constant currency growth in the double- digit range. Our models assume that operating margin approximate 14.2%.

For years four through ten, we think that VF can increase revenue and earnings per share at a compound annual growth rate of 7% and 10%, respectively, which factor lower near-term demand estimates. We see the jeanswear coalition as mature but still capable of delivering 3% compound annual growth due to innovation and international expansion. We think operating margins can expand from 14.6% in 2015 to 15.7% in 2020. Expansion should be driven by product mix shifts as well as a recovery in foreign exchange rates.

We employ several valuation models: discounted cash flow, discounted economic profit which focuses on VF’s returns on invested capital compared with its cost of capital, and finally two versions of a dividend discount model to validate that our DCF and ROIC models. We weight the models but give particular attention to our analysis of a company’s returns on invested capital. We believe it is critically important that companies generate returns in excess of their cost of capital. When companies marry this ability along with a competitive

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advantage that is able to sustain mid-single digit revenue growth, then we believe that we have a very attractive potential investment.

DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026

Cash flow from operations 1,249 1,327 1,410 1,498 1,591 1,690 1,796 1,908 2,027 2,154 less: Capital Expenditures (249) (259) (269) (280) (291) (302) (314) (327) (340) (353) Free cash flow 1,000 1,068 1,141 1,218 1,300 1,388 1,482 1,581 1,687 1,800

Terminal Multiple (LT growth rate) 30.8x Terminal value 55,371

Discount rate 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% 10.0% Discount factor 0.9091 0.8264 0.7513 0.6830 0.6209 0.5645 0.5132 0.4665 0.4241 0.3855

Discounted free cash flows 909 883 857 832 808 784 760 738 716 22,042 PV of discounted free cash flows 29,328

plus: Cash 738 FCF less: Debt (2,347) Growth Rate 10-Year 6.7% 5-Year 6.7% Equity Valuation 27,719 3-Year 6.7% Shares outstanding 418.2 Estimated Intrinsic Value $ 66

We currently believe that fair value for VF Corporation approximates $72 per share. Because of the inherent uncertainties when determining a company’s intrinsic value, we assign a margin of safety to our estimate in order to determine an ideal entry price. Regarding, VF Corporation, we assign a medium level of risk to our estimate of future cash flows and therefore assign a 25% margin of safety needed for our investment. Therefore, we desire to currently purchase our VFC shares below $54 per share.

DISCOUNTED ECONOMIC PROFIT 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 Invested Capital Invested Capital 7,661 7,995 8,344 8,708 9,087 9,483 9,897 10,328 10,778 11,248

Net Operating Profit After-Tax (NOPAT) Operating income 1,686 1,782 1,884 1,992 2,106 2,227 2,355 2,490 2,632 2,783 Less: Income tax expense (378) (399) (422) (446) (472) (499) (528) (558) (590) (624) NOPAT 1,308 1,383 1,462 1,546 1,634 1,728 1,827 1,932 2,043 2,160

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC) 17.1% 17.3% 17.5% 17.8% 18.0% 18.2% 18.5% 18.7% 18.9% 19.2% Cost of Investment Capital 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 10% Economic Profit 678 725 776 829 887 948 1,013 1,082 1,156 1,234 Terminal Value 49,457 Discount Factor 0.9091 0.8264 0.7513 0.6830 0.6209 0.5645 0.5132 0.4665 0.4241 0.3855 Present Value 616 599 583 567 551 535 520 505 490 476 Sum of Present Value 5,441 18.0% Terminal Value 19,068 63.1% Invested Capital 7,341 24.3% Excess Cash 738 2.4% Total Debt, Leases & Obligations (2,347) -7.8% Total 30,241 100.0% Shares Outstanding 418.2 Estimated Intrinsic Value $ 72

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DIVIDEND DISCOUNT MODEL VALUATION

Period ending FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015 FY 2016 Dividend per share ($) $ 0.61 $ 0.65 $ 0.76 $ 0.92 $ 1.11 $ 1.33 $ 1.48 Dividend per share growth rate 7% 16% 21% 21% 20% 11%

Two-Stage Dividend Discount Model Assumptions: Required rate of return 10.0% Long-term dividend growth rate 15.0% Average historical dividend growth rate 16.1%

Period ending FY 2016 FY 2017E FY 2018E FY 2019E FY 2020E FY 2021E Terminal Discount factor 1 2 3 4 5 Dividend per share ($) $ 1.48 $ 1.70 $ 1.96 $ 2.25 $ 2.59 $ 2.98 $ 3.42 Dividend growth rate 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% Present value of dividend $1.55 $ 1.62 $ 1.69 $ 1.77 $ 1.85 $68.08

Value per share $ 77

Dividend Yield Period ending FY 2016 FY 2017E FY 2018E FY 2019E FY 2020E FY 2021E Dividend per share ($) $ 1.48 $ 1.70 $ 1.96 $ 2.25 $ 2.59 $ 2.98 Implied dividend yield to current stock price 3.0% 3.4% 3.9% 4.5% 5.2% 6.0%

Gordon Growth Model Assumptions: Dividend, t+1 $1.70 Required rate of return 10.0% Growth rate in dividends 15.0%

Period ending FY 2015 FY 2016E FY 2017E FY 2018E FY 2019E FY 2020E Dividend per share ($) $1.48 $1.70 $1.96 $2.25 $2.59 $2.98 Dividend growth rate 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%

Value per share $ 68

RISK TO INVESTMENT

As a manufacturer and seller of fashion and core fashion merchandise, VF is exposed to the cyclical nature of its category; thereby making it difficult to forecast cash flows over the near term. Weak employment, increasing consumer uncertainty, international macroeconomic pressures, or lower-than-expected wage inflation would all affect the company’s financial performance.

Additionally, VF is exposed to changes in raw material prices, labor, and distribution expenses including shipping costs. Any change in these categories could have a noticeable impact on margins. We view VF’s brand portfolio as its most valuable asset. Any declines in brand value could negatively affect volume and pricing, as well as result in a write down of goodwill and other intangible assets carried on the company’s balance sheet. With both worldwide sales and sourcing, VF is affected by weather as well as political and economic situations in a broad array of countries. Also, any challenges in finding suitable acquisition targets at an attractive price could pressure long term growth rates. Finally, VF’s ten largest customers account for 22% of sales; any adverse changes with these customers could have a significant impact on the company’s revenue and earnings.

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ST. JAMES INVESTMENT COMPANY

We founded St. James Investment Company in 1999, managing wealth from our family and friends in the hamlet of St. James. We are privileged that our neighbors and friends have trusted us for over a decade to invest alongside our own capital.

The St. James Investment Company is an independent, fee-only, SEC- Registered Investment Advisory firm, providing customized portfolio management to individuals, retirement plans and private companies.

I M P O R T A N T D ISCLAIMER

Information contained herein was obtained from sources believed reliable but is not necessarily complete and accuracy is not guaranteed. Any securities mentioned in this issue are not to be construed as investment or trading recommendations specifically for you. You must consult your advisor for investment or trading advice. The publisher of this report and one or more of its affiliated persons and entities may have positions in the securities or sectors recommended in this report and may therefore have a conflict of interest in making the recommendation herein. 4834-9369-8309, v. 1

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