Brand Safety Policy
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Google Ad Tech
Yaletap University Thurman Arnold Project Digital Platform Theories of Harm Paper Series: 4 Report on Google’s Conduct in Advertising Technology May 2020 Lissa Kryska Patrick Monaghan I. Introduction Traditional advertisements appear in newspapers and magazines, on television and the radio, and on daily commutes through highway billboards and public transportation signage. Digital ads, while similar, are powerful because they are tailored to suit individual interests and go with us everywhere: the bookshelf you thought about buying two days ago can follow you through your favorite newspaper, social media feed, and your cousin’s recipe blog. Digital ads also display in internet search results, email inboxes, and video content, making them truly ubiquitous. Just as with a full-page magazine ad, publishers rely on the revenues generated by selling this ad space, and the advertiser relies on a portion of prospective customers clicking through to finally buy that bookshelf. Like any market, digital advertising requires the matching of buyers (advertisers) and sellers (publishers), and the intermediaries facilitating such matches have more to gain every year: A PwC report estimated that revenues for internet advertising totaled $57.9 billion for 2019 Q1 and Q2, up 17% over the same half-year period in 2018.1 Google is the dominant player among these intermediaries, estimated to have netted 73% of US search ad spending2 and 37% of total US digital ad spending3 in 2019. Such market concentration prompts reasonable questions about whether customers are losing out on some combination of price, quality, and innovation. This report will review the significant 1 PricewaterhouseCoopers for IAB (October 2019), Internet Advertising Revenue Report: 2019 First Six Months Results, p.2. -
Google Data Collection —NEW—
Digital Content Next January 2018 / DCN Distributed Content Revenue Benchmark Google Data Collection —NEW— August 2018 digitalcontentnext.org CONFIDENTIAL - DCN Participating Members Only 1 This research was conducted by Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Professor of Computer Science at Vanderbilt University, and his team. DCN is grateful to support Professor Schmidt in distributing it. We offer it to the public with the permission of Professor Schmidt. Google Data Collection Professor Douglas C. Schmidt, Vanderbilt University August 15, 2018 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1. Google is the world’s largest digital advertising company.1 It also provides the #1 web browser,2 the #1 mobile platform,3 and the #1 search engine4 worldwide. Google’s video platform, email service, and map application have over 1 billion monthly active users each.5 Google utilizes the tremendous reach of its products to collect detailed information about people’s online and real-world behaviors, which it then uses to target them with paid advertising. Google’s revenues increase significantly as the targeting technology and data are refined. 2. Google collects user data in a variety of ways. The most obvious are “active,” with the user directly and consciously communicating information to Google, as for example by signing in to any of its widely used applications such as YouTube, Gmail, Search etc. Less obvious ways for Google to collect data are “passive” means, whereby an application is instrumented to gather information while it’s running, possibly without the user’s knowledge. Google’s passive data gathering methods arise from platforms (e.g. Android and Chrome), applications (e.g. -
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020 Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2020 Nic Newman with Richard Fletcher, Anne Schulz, Simge Andı, and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen Supported by Surveyed by © Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism / Digital News Report 2020 4 Contents Foreword by Rasmus Kleis Nielsen 5 3.15 Netherlands 76 Methodology 6 3.16 Norway 77 Authorship and Research Acknowledgements 7 3.17 Poland 78 3.18 Portugal 79 SECTION 1 3.19 Romania 80 Executive Summary and Key Findings by Nic Newman 9 3.20 Slovakia 81 3.21 Spain 82 SECTION 2 3.22 Sweden 83 Further Analysis and International Comparison 33 3.23 Switzerland 84 2.1 How and Why People are Paying for Online News 34 3.24 Turkey 85 2.2 The Resurgence and Importance of Email Newsletters 38 AMERICAS 2.3 How Do People Want the Media to Cover Politics? 42 3.25 United States 88 2.4 Global Turmoil in the Neighbourhood: 3.26 Argentina 89 Problems Mount for Regional and Local News 47 3.27 Brazil 90 2.5 How People Access News about Climate Change 52 3.28 Canada 91 3.29 Chile 92 SECTION 3 3.30 Mexico 93 Country and Market Data 59 ASIA PACIFIC EUROPE 3.31 Australia 96 3.01 United Kingdom 62 3.32 Hong Kong 97 3.02 Austria 63 3.33 Japan 98 3.03 Belgium 64 3.34 Malaysia 99 3.04 Bulgaria 65 3.35 Philippines 100 3.05 Croatia 66 3.36 Singapore 101 3.06 Czech Republic 67 3.37 South Korea 102 3.07 Denmark 68 3.38 Taiwan 103 3.08 Finland 69 AFRICA 3.09 France 70 3.39 Kenya 106 3.10 Germany 71 3.40 South Africa 107 3.11 Greece 72 3.12 Hungary 73 SECTION 4 3.13 Ireland 74 References and Selected Publications 109 3.14 Italy 75 4 / 5 Foreword Professor Rasmus Kleis Nielsen Director, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (RISJ) The coronavirus crisis is having a profound impact not just on Our main survey this year covered respondents in 40 markets, our health and our communities, but also on the news media. -
Telemarketing Guide Contents
Telemarketing guide Contents Acknowledgements 5 Introduction 6 Business practice Compliance 8 Regulation, compliance and standards 8 Regulatory enforcement 8 Industry standards 8 Verification 8 Verifiers 9 Quality assurance 10 Quality assurance tools 10 Corporate and social responsibility 12 Customer satisfaction 12 Complaints procedure 13 Complaints policy 13 Complaints process 14 Complaints reporting 14 Complaints analysis 15 Complaint-handling training 15 Customer behaviour 17 Inclusivity and vulnerable consumers 17 Human resources 19 Key principles 19 Roles 19 Recruitment 19 Contracts 20 Remuneration 21 Training 22 Supervision and support of agents 26 Ongoing competency 26 Note for agents 26 Supplier–client relationships 27 Responsibilities 27 2 Contents Campaign creation Campaign objectives 29 Questions to consider: 29 Campaign strategy 29 Key principles 29 Add value to your customer and brand 30 Conversion rates 30 Campaign planning 31 Brief your front-line staff 31 Call and after-call process 32 1. Disclosure 32 2. Structure 32 3. Summary 33 4. Post-call process 33 Data 34 Sourcing data 34 Handling data 35 Using data 38 Campaign delivery Call scheduling 41 Key considerations 41 Reasonable hours 41 Ring time 42 Call retrying 43 Retry handling 43 Nuisance calls 43 Call-backs 44 Call abandonment 45 Abandoned call handling 45 Abandoned call information message 45 Technology and testing 46 Dialler operations 46 Predictive dialling 47 Answer machine detection (AMD) 50 3 Contents Campaign response Results and ROI 53 Campaign monitoring -
Brand Credibility to Mitigate Brand Boycott Preventive Strategy of Brand Globalness and Brand Endorsement: Theoretical Perspective
Journal of Economics, Business and Management, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 2015 Brand Credibility to Mitigate Brand Boycott Preventive Strategy of Brand Globalness and Brand Endorsement: Theoretical Perspective Hesham Fazel organizers that hindered product distribution [3], boycotts Abstract—Boycott effectiveness is highly reliant upon are undesirable perceptions for marketers and managers, consumer willingness to engage or disengage in the boycott who must therefore do everything in their power to develop activities. Little research investigates possible strategies that can be applied to positively influence individuals’ perspectives and implement all possible tactics that will prevent or about the boycotted brands and perhaps increase their reduce the loss in market-share that can result from such willingness to disengage in boycott activities. This paper social actions by consumers. theoretically discusses a main relationship between brand For the most part, prior research studies on consumer credibility and willingness to dis/engagement in brand boycott boycotts have been conceptual or descriptive, with a focus movements. I propose that when consumers perceive a brand at higher level of credibility, they are less inclined to engage in on boycott organizers and targets as well as consumer boycott activities against that brand. Furthermore, this paper motivations for participating in boycott activities [4]. No discusses the idea that brand endorsement of local events and previous studies have investigated beyond the common consumers’ perception of brand globalness may moderate the relationship between firms and boycotters’ participation relationship between brand credibility and consumer willingness to dis/engage in boycotts. motivation. Little research has investigated the strategies that brands may apply protect their firm’s image and Index Terms—Brand, boycott, globalness, endorsement. -
GOOGLE ADVERTISING TOOLS (FORMERLY DOUBLECLICK) OVERVIEW Last Updated October 1, 2019
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
The Long-Term Effect of Marketing Strategy on Brand Sales
Marketing Science Institute Special Report 09-213 The Long-term Effect of Marketing Strategy on Brand Sales Berk Ataman, Harald van Heerde, and Carl Mela Copyright 2009 Berk Ataman, Harald van Heerde, and Carl Mela MSI special reports are in draft form and are distributed online only for the benefit of MSI corporate and academic members. Reports are not to be reproduced or published, in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, without written permission. 1 The Long-term Effect of Marketing Strategy on Brand Sales M. Berk Ataman Assistant Professor of Marketing Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR, Rotterdam, Netherlands Phone: +31-10-408-2612 Fax: +31-10-408-9011 [email protected] Harald J. van Heerde Professor of Marketing Waikato Management School, University of Waikato Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, New Zealand Phone: +64-7-838-4089 [email protected] Carl F. Mela* Professor of Marketing Fuqua School of Business, Duke University 1 Towerview Drive, Durham, NC 27708 Phone: +1-919-660-7767 Fax: +1-919-660-7790 [email protected] * The authors would like to thank IRI and TNS Media Intelligence for providing the data, Marketing Science Institute and Zyman Institute for Brand Science for research support. Ataman and Van Heerde would like to thank Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research for research support. Earlier versions of this paper benefited from valuable comments of seminar participants at Northwestern University, Yale School of Management, Erasmus University Rotterdam, University of Groningen, Catholic University Leuven, Free University Amsterdam, and Tilburg University. 2 The Long-term Effect of Marketing Strategy on Brand Sales Report Summary Few studies consider the relative role of the entire marketing mix on long-term performance of mature brands –instead emphasizing advertising and price promotion. -
Understanding In-App Header Bidding: the Essentials
UNDERSTANDING IN-APP HEADER BIDDING THE ESSENTIALS INTRODUCTION Consumers downloaded 204 billion apps in 2019,1 as users around the world shifted to mobile-first browsing behaviors. This shift in user behavior has driven advertisers to follow their customers into app environments, creating a booming opportunity for app developers. Three key trends have impacted how advertisers have changed their investing strategies to give mobile publishers a unique opportunity: 1 MOBILE AD SPEND IS ON THE RISE Digital ad spend was expected to surpass traditional media, including TV, for the first time in 2019,2 with the majority of digital ad spend going to mobile devices (including both mobile web and in-app). 2 BRANDS PREFER TO BUY APPS PROGRAMMATICALLY Programmatic strategies tend to get a larger portion of in-app advertising budgets. On average, 66% of in-app budgets go to programmatic direct or open exchange strategies as compared to 34% for direct buy.3 As a result, mobile advertising now accounts for the majority of global programmatic ad spend, with over 80% of all programmatic display dollars in the US and UK going to mobile.4 3 PROGRAMMATIC IN-APP BUDGETS ARE GROWING As buyers shift their spend to mobile channels, programmatic in-app is experiencing some of the biggest opportunities. Recent research found that 30% of buyers planned to grow their programmatic direct in-app budgets by more than 10% the following year.5 As mobile advertising continues to grow, app publishers who want to scale effectively and get a slice of growing brand dollars will embrace programmatic selling through header bidding. -
Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation
Why Google Dominates Advertising Markets Competition Policy Should Lean on the Principles of Financial Market Regulation Dina Srinivasan* * Since leaving the industry, and authoring The Antitrust Case Against Face- book, I continue to research and write about the high-tech industry and competition, now as a fellow with Yale University’s antitrust initiative, the Thurman Arnold Pro- ject. Separately, I have advised and consulted on antitrust matters, including for news publishers whose interests are in conflict with Google’s. This Article is not squarely about antitrust, though it is about Google’s conduct in advertising markets, and the idea for writing a piece like this first germinated in 2014. At that time, Wall Street was up in arms about a book called FLASH BOYS by Wall Street chronicler Michael Lewis about speed, data, and alleged manipulation in financial markets. The controversy put high speed trading in the news, giving many of us in advertising pause to appre- ciate the parallels between our market and trading in financial markets. Since then, I have noted how problems related to speed and data can distort competition in other electronic trading markets, how lawmakers have monitored these markets for con- duct they frown upon in equities trading, but how advertising has largely remained off the same radar. This Article elaborates on these observations and curiosities. I am indebted to and thank the many journalists that painstakingly reported on industry conduct, the researchers and scholars whose work I cite, Fiona Scott Morton and Aus- tin Frerick at the Thurman Arnold Project for academic support, as well as Tom Fer- guson and the Institute for New Economic Thinking for helping to fund the research this project entailed. -
Google/ Doubleclick REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 8(1)
EN This text is made available for information purposes only. A summary of this decision is published in all Community languages in the Official Journal of the European Union. Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick Only the English text is authentic. REGULATION (EC) No 139/2004 MERGER PROCEDURE Article 8(1) Date: 11-03-2008 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 11/03/2008 C(2008) 927 final PUBLIC VERSION COMMISSION DECISION of 11/03/2008 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick) (Only the English text is authentic) Table of contents 1 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................4 2 THE PARTIES...........................................................................................................5 3 THE CONCENTRATION.........................................................................................6 4 COMMUNITY DIMENSION ...................................................................................6 5 MARKET DESCRIPTION......................................................................................6 6 RELEVANT MARKETS.........................................................................................17 6.1. Relevant product markets ............................................................................17 6.1.1. Provision of online advertising space.............................................17 6.1.2. Intermediation in -
G Suite for Education Notice to Parents and Guardians
Quileute Tribal School 2019-2020 G Suite for Education Notice to Parents and Guardians At Quileute Tribal School, we use G Suite for Education, and we are seeking your permission to provide and manage a G Suite for Education account for your child. G Suite for Education is a set of education productivity tools from Google including Gmail, Calendar, Docs, Classroom, and more used by tens of millions of students and teachers around the world. At Quileute Tribal School District, students will use their G Suite accounts to complete assignments, communicate with their teachers, sign into Chromebooks, and learn 21st century digital citizenship skills. The notice below provides answers to common questions about what Google can and can’t do with your child’s personal information, including: What personal information does Google collect? How does Google use this information? Will Google disclose my child’s personal information? Does Google use student personal information for users in K-12 schools to target advertising? Can my child share information with others using the G Suite for Education account? Please read it carefully, let us know of any questions, and then sign below to indicate that you’ve read the notice and give your consent. If you don’t provide your consent, we will not create a G Suite for Education account for your child. Students who cannot use Google services may need to use other software to complete assignments or collaborate with peers. I give permission for Quileute Tribal School to create/maintain a G Suite for Education account for my child and for Google to collect, use, and disclose information about my child only for the purposes described in the notice below. -
Brand and Advertising Awareness: a Replication and Extension of a Known Empirical Generalisation
Brand and Advertising Awareness Brand and Advertising Awareness: A Replication and Extension of a Known Empirical Generalisation Jenni Romaniuk, Byron Sharp, Samantha Paech & Carl Driesener Abstract From analysis of over 39 categories Laurent, Kapferer and Roussel (1995) found that top of mind, spontaneous and aided brand awareness measures have the same underlying structure. The difference in scores appears due to the difficulty of the measure. We have successfully replicated this work and extended it to similarly structured advertising awareness measures. However, additional analyses then revealed that while there is a good category level fit, modelling a single brand over time is less successful. Indeed, Laurent et al.’s excellent cross-sectional fit appears due to substantially different levels of salience between larger and smaller brands. This suggests that while the different types of awareness tend to vary with a brand’s overall level of salience, this does not mean that the different measures simply reflect a single underlying construct. Further, our finding challenges the previous authors’ claim that knowing the score for one measure allows the estimation of the score for another measure. Instead, the model provides useful norms against which to compare actual scores. Keywords: Brand awareness, Advertising awareness, Empirical generalisation 1. Introduction product category cue, was one of the first brand Awareness measures are used extensively in research as awareness measures to receive attention, emerging as a gauge of brand performance and marketing one of the best ‘predictors’ of choice in Axelrod’s (1968) effectiveness. The most commonly used are those longitudinal study comparing different measures. relating to brand and advertising awareness.