How Hazardous Is the Proposed Oil Tanker Route to Kitimat?

How Hazardous is the Proposed Oil Tanker Route to Kitimat?

Written for Geography 391 – Contemporary Topics in Coastal Conservation

Hayley Linton University of Victoria Department of Geography

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 3 Global Context: Spatial and Environmental Constraints on Resource Extraction ...... 3 Geography of Douglas Channel ...... 4 Spatial characteristics of the proposed tanker routes ...... 4 Weather and Climate ...... 6 Surrounding Environment ...... 6 Oil Tanker Navigational Characteristics ...... 7 Proposed Safety Regulations for Pipeline ...... 7 The Human Error Factor ...... 8 Is the Proposed Tanker Route Acceptable? ...... 10 Conclusion ...... 12 Works Cited ...... 13

List of Figures

Figure 1 - Map of proposed oil tanker routes to Kitimat. Route in red is primary route ...... 4 Figure 2 - Diagram showing tanker classes and sizes ...... 7 Figure 3 - The side of the Cosco Busan where it hit the Bay Bridge support ...... 9

Introduction

Resource extraction and transportation is a worldwide issue. Oil tankers can be risky to navigate in coastal waters, especially in long, enclosed inlets and fjords like on the coast of British Columbia. The consequences of a tanker accident can be catastrophic to the environment, resulting in death of marine mammals, fish and birds as well as detrimentally affect human communities. Technological advancement and improvement in ship construction help to mitigate some disasters, yet accidents still occur. Currently, there is a moratorium on tanker traffic in BC‟s coastal waters, but an oil pipeline (Enbridge‟s Northern Gateway Project) has been proposed that would transport oil from the Alberta tar sands to Kitimat, so oil tankers could transport the oil to Asia. To reach the Port of Kitimat, tankers would be required to navigate their way up Douglas Channel, a fjord on the north coast of BC. This report looks at the global context of the issue (the spatial and environmental constraints on resource extraction and transportation) as well as specific issues relating to the Northern Gateway Pipeline. Important factors to consider include the spatial characteristics of the proposed tanker routes, regional climate, the environment surrounding the route, local and international regulations on shipping safety, navigational characteristics of oil tankers, safety measures proposed by Enbridge, and the human factor and its effect on navigational safety. These important factors will be analyzed in order to argue that the proposed route to Kitimat is too navigationally dangerous for oil tankers.

Global Context: Spatial and Environmental Constraints on Resource Extraction

Extracting resources can be a difficult feat. There are always factors that impede humans‟ ability to extract the resources needed for development. These factors can be both spatial and environmental. For example, forestry in British Columbia began with easily accessible forest land, such as the coastal old growth and the interior valley regions of the province. Forests that are more northern or higher up hillsides are not of high priority because they are more difficult to access and dangerous to harvest. The same theory can also apply to mining. In the 1800s, most deposits of gold or silver were found accidentally by people already in the area that were not actively looking for it (Cranstone, 2002). As the more accessible 4 deposits ran out, then it was necessary to look farther up mountainsides and in more remote places that were more difficult to reach (Cranstone, 2002). The issue of worldwide shipping is subject to both spatial and environmental constraints. Large ocean-going vessels carry vast amounts of fuel, which can spill out into the ocean if the ship should be involved in an accident. This fuel can have devastating effects on coastal areas and wildlife including fish, birds, marine mammals and all shore animals that rely on these species and marine resources. However, these vessels must often enter long, narrow channels to deliver and receive loads of consumer goods or oil to be shipped around the globe. Many areas of the world are subject to this particular dilemma; entering the channel puts the ship and environment at risk, but the local and global economy depends on worldwide shipment of goods. Coastal British Columbia is just one example; the coastal waterways of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark are a few more examples of regions that also have to deal with spatial constraints on shipping of goods due to the presence of fjords. The geographic constraints of these channels put vessels in situations that are navigationally difficult due to the spatial constraints but will have devastating effects on the environment if an accident should occur.

Geography of Douglas Channel

Spatial characteristics of the proposed tanker routes

Two tanker routes have been proposed, the primary route being an approach from the north of Haida Gwaii (Figure 1). When approaching Haida Gwaii from the west, the first area the tankers will pass through is Dixon Entrance, just north of Haida Gwaii. The tankers would be required to pass north or south of Learmonth Bank, which is a shallow area with a depth of less than 40m and can be prone to very strong tidal currents (Royal Society of Canada, 2004). Extreme Figure 1 - Map of proposed oil tanker routes to caution is required in passing through Dixon Entrance, Kitimat. Route in red is primary route. Retrieved from http://www.livingoceans.org/maps/ particularly in bad weather (Sherwood and Waldichuk, energy.aspx 5

1978). The tankers will then have to travel South through Hecate Strait. The majority of Hecate Strait is significantly shallower than Queen Charlotte Sound with bottom depths averaging less than 100m under the surface of the water (Royal Society of Canada, 2004). There are also many reefs and shoals within Hecate Strait that are quite shallow and must be readily avoided by large ships. Some of these reefs are only 3 – 4m under the surface of the water while some are quite a bit deeper, approximately 50m below the surface (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978). Douglas Channel is located on the North coast of British Columbia. It is a glacial fjord, like the other fjords on BC‟s coast. Glacial fjords are formed by the topographic steering of glacial ice which erodes the landscape as it travels over top (Kleman, 2008). It is the largest fjord on the British Columbia‟s coast. The fjord is situated between Hecate Strait and the town of Kitimat. Douglas Channel is 100 nautical miles long, or about 180km, with its widest point being approximately 5.5km and its narrowest point being just less than 1.8km (District of Kitimat, 2009). The channel has a maximum depth of 570m and a minimum depth of 190m (District of Kitimat, 2009). For the majority of the route up the Channel, it is fairly deep and clear of obstacles. There are several shoals on the route that must be avoided. Sherwood and Waldichuk (1978) highlighted a few of the primary navigational hazards along the route to Kitimat. Just to the north end of Banks Island there is an area of shoals; there are also shoals in Principe Channel and on the west side of McCauley Island. The primary obstacle is Nanakwa Shoal in Douglas Channel. It lies in the middle of the channel at the entrance to Kitimat Arm and is only 15m under the surface. Several other major hazards of the route are the sharp turns that must be completed to navigate around the outer islands (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978). If approaching from the south and navigating around the southern point of Haida Gwaii, there are significantly less navigational hazards. To the south of Haida Gwaii there are shallow shoals about 30m below the surface that would have to be avoided (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978). There are also some hazardous shoals in Caamano Sound, but there is a fairly wide channel of several kilometres between them (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978).

Weather and Climate

The northern coast of British Columbia is notorious for poor weather and rapid deterioration in conditions. Beautiful, sunny, calm weather can quickly turn into foggy, windy and stormy seas that can easily take a ship‟s captain and crew by surprise. The Queen Charlotte Basin is subject to some of the most extreme wind and wave conditions in all of Canada (Royal Society of Canada, 2004). In the winter, storms sweep across Hecate Strait every two to three days, with waves as high as 35m and winds gusting to nearly 200km/h (Royal Society of Canada, 2004). The coast experiences the highest frequency of hurricane force winds in all of Canada (Oil Free Coast, The Ecosystem, 2005). The Royal Society of Canada (2004) gave an excellent description of the overall climate in BC‟s north coast region. In the summer, the weather is much milder than in winter with winds averaging around 30km/h. The extreme nature of winter storms in Hecate Strait and Douglas Channel is not the only cause for concern, as the rate at which the storms arise is quite rapid and can take mariners by surprise. Wave heights have been recorded to rise from a normal, relatively calm state (of about 5m or so) to a maximum of 28m in only 8 hours. Such rapid changes in weather conditions can have dangerous implications for oil tankers. Cleaning up an oil spill is a challenge in good weather, but in the Queen Charlotte Basin, if an oil tanker should run aground in inclement weather conditions, cleanup of an oil spill would be nearly impossible (Royal Society of Canada, 2004).

Surrounding Environment

The coastal areas surrounding Douglas Channel are very environmentally sensitive. Canada‟s Pacific waters are more productive than tropical rainforests and contain the most biologically diverse kelp forests in the world (WWF-P, 2009). There are seven different species of salmon that spawn in the streams of BC‟s north coast and the area is home to grey whales, minke whales, humpback whales, orcas, dolphins, and porpoises (WWF-P, 2009). Seabirds like murrelets and auklets spend much of their time on the water and are particularly susceptible to oil spills, even minor ones (Oil Free Coast, The Coast of British Columbia, 2005). Thousands of species live in coastal BC and all are connected to the environment and each other, creating an 7 incredibly complex network that stretches from the deep ocean to the inland forests (WWF-P, 2009). This amazing biodiversity gives us food and medicine, shapes our climate, and helps to control pollution (WWF-P, 2006). Local and marine navigation safety regulations are meant in part to protect the ship and its crew, but also to protect these ecologically productive areas.

Oil Tanker Navigational Characteristics

There is no easy way to generalize about the navigational capabilities of oil tankers. Since each one is individually made, every tanker has different top speeds, turning rates, stopping rates and ability to withstand rough seas. The VLCCs (or Very Large Crude Carriers) can reach up to 350m in length and the ULCCs (or Ultra Large Crude Carriers) can be up to 415m long, as can be seen in Figure 3. Donderi and Smiley (1990) raised some important points regarding navigational characteristics of oil tankers. Large vessels like

VLCCs and ULCCs require precision manual Figure 2 - Diagram showing tanker classes and sizes. Retrieved from http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch5en/ ship control in order to maintain safe appl5en/tankers.html navigation and piloting. However, there is a large time lag between navigational changes on the bridge and the vessel actually responding to that change. Small, seemingly inconsequential deviations from a ship‟s specified route can quickly become large cumulative deviations that can be nearly impossible to correct in time to avoid a collision or grounding. The navigator, pilot or captain must be experienced in manoeuvring the ship in order to control it properly. The ship will handle differently depending on the channel conditions, wind, current, and vessel speed (Donderi and Smiley, 1990).

Proposed Safety Regulations for Pipeline

The following regulations have been proposed as part of the Northern Gateway Project by Enbridge Pipelines. If the Northern Gateway Pipeline is constructed, Enbridge has stated that 8 it will be operated according to “world class standards”. There will be a myriad of policies to govern the marine traffic in and out of Kitimat in order to minimize the possibility of oil spills. Enbridge requires that all vessels traveling to Kitimat be double hulled and guided by BC-based marine pilots; the tankers will also be tethered to tugs for the duration of the trip within Douglas Channel. Vessels will also have to reduce their speed to between 8 and 12 knots (between 15 and 22 km/h) while traveling through Douglas Channel. Radar will be installed along the passage to monitor marine traffic and give guidance to pilots and other vessels in the area. There will also be operational safety limits established regarding wind, visibility and sea conditions. First response stations and personnel will be situated at the terminal, and at communities along the route. While docked at the terminal, vessels will be surrounded by a floating barrier to prevent spreading if a spill should occur (Enbridge Pipelines, 2009). These regulations have been proposed by Enbridge, but since the projects is not yet a sure thing, nothing has been written into policy.

The Human Error Factor

Technological advancement may help to mitigate some oil spills, but oil spills will occur regardless of technology. Human error will always be present no matter how technologically advanced the vessels become. There is also no guarantee that technology will always work perfectly; technology can fail and lead to tanker accidents. Collision and grounding, rather than breakdown, structural failure, fire, or explosion, are the dominant causes of tanker accidents (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978). Double hulled tankers are considered an excellent way of mitigating oil spills, and they are, but sometimes they fail. On March 25th, 2001, a double hulled tanker carrying 9.7 million gallons of oil collided with a freighter in international waters between Denmark and Germany (The Independent, 2001). This created an oil slick nearly 10 miles long and over 160 feet wide; the tanker spilled over 760,000 gallons of oil into the Baltic Sea (Mariner Group, 2004). Methods to contain the spill were employed quickly but it did not stop a bird sanctuary, home to thousands of ducks, swans and other water fowl from being adversely affected, resulting in the deaths of many marine birds (Mariner Group, 2004). 9

The use of marine pilots is also a good method of mitigating most tanker accidents because the pilots are very experienced and have long standing knowledge of the local area (Government of Canada, 1985). However, there are times when even the pilot cannot prevent an accident. The Cosco Busan, a Chinese container ship, was leaving the San Francisco Bay area when it struck a support column for the San Francisco Bay Bridge (Bulwa et al., 2007). The vessel leaked 58,000 gallons of fuel into the bay, killing hundreds of birds and closing many beaches (KTVU News, 2007). The weather at the time was quite foggy, so visibility was low and the pilot and captain had to rely on radar and electronic charts; however, the radar temporarily stopped working during the approach to the bridge (Bulwa et al., 2007). Even though the pilot had the ship aimed at the gap between support posts, the vessel nearly collided with the bridge support head on, but the side of the ship was struck instead, ripping a gash in the side of the ship (Figure 4). The bow lookout prevented the head on collision by sending an urgent warning to the bridge where the captain attempted to correct the vessel‟s Figure 3 - The side of the Cosco Busan where it hit the Bay Bridge support. Retrieved from direction (KTVU News, 2007). The bow lookout is a good http://telstarlogistics.typepad.com/ telstarlogistics/2007/11/situation-repor.html „last resort‟ in bad weather when the electronic navigational aids fail. In confined waters, tug boats are often used to give large vessels extra manoeuvrability. There is a strong belief that tugs prevent tanker accidents. However, even this method of preventing tanker accidents is not perfect. Just before Christmas 2009, the tug Pathfinder ran aground on Bligh Reef and leaked as much as 33,500 gallons of diesel fuel into Prince William Sound (Mauer and Bluemink, 2009). This tug ran aground on the exact same reef that claimed the Exxon Valdez 20 years ago, still considered one of the worst oil spills ever to occur in all of North America (Pemberton, 2009). Vessel traffic is heavily regulated in terms of on board navigational aids, pilotage requirements, captain and crew training, construction methods like double hulls, and tethered tug requirements along with many other regulations. No matter the technological advancements, mistakes are inevitable and sometimes technology fails. The technology cannot stop a tanker 10 from colliding with another ship or even with a bridge support column; nor can tugs always avoid running aground, even on infamous reefs.

Is the Proposed Tanker Route Acceptable?

Several reports issued by the government in the past few decades all determined that the moratorium should remain in place because it was too dangerous to allow tankers near the fragile BC coast. So what has changed in the 35 years since the moratorium was implemented? Has the risk to BC‟s coast been reduced? No. The climate and spatial characteristics remain the same and so the risk remains the same. Technological advancement in spill prevention may mitigate most of the spills that will occur due to the tanker traffic in the Queen Charlotte Sound, Hecate Strait and Douglas Channel but the reality of the situation is that spills will happen. Even the best pilots and mariners make mistakes, as can be demonstrated by observing contemporary accidents as reported. It is the human error factor that causes the catastrophic oil spills that are most damaging to the coast and these can only be mitigated by preventing oil tankers from coming near the coastline. Sherwood and Waldichuk (1978) assessed the relative risk of several possible oil ports on BC‟s coast was assessed. It compared the relative vulnerability of marine resources to oil spills that could occur from crude oil shipments to eleven West Coast super tanker terminals. Some of the ports assessed were Port Moody, Port Simpson, Kitimat, Ridley Island, Britannia Beach and Roberts Bank. The ports were studied based on the navigational risk, biological resources, economic resources and social resources of each area and ranked based on relative risk indices considering all factors. The report discusses in depth the navigational hazards of the proposed routes to Kitimat. Of the hazards present, there are many shallow shoals that can be marked and avoided but the greater danger is the problem of manoeuvring very large ships in relatively confined passages, particularly in an emergency situation such as a collision course with another vessel or mechanical breakdown. The navigational risk index was calculated using factors such as winds, visibility, currents, water depths, passage widths, course changes and shipping density in relation to a tanker with a draught (or hull depth) of 26 m and a width of 53 m. If considering navigational risk alone, the northern approach to Kitimat was ranked one of the most risky routes with a navigational risk index of 80/100. In contrast to the Kitimat risk, the routes to Port 11

Simpson and Ridley Island were given a risk index of only 20/100 and 21/100. The northern route to the Port of Kitimat was among the few most dangerous oil ports assessed in terms of navigational hazards (Sherwood and Waldichuk, 1978). After the Exxon Valdez spill, the Canadian federal government appointed the Brander- Smith Panel to write the Public Review Panel on Tanker Safety and Marine Spills Response Capability. This report concluded if there were approximately 320 tankers in port per year (the Enbridge project predicts less), a catastrophic marine oil spill (of over 10,000 tonnes) can be expected once every 15 years with one major spill (of 100-10,000 tones), 10 moderate spills, and 100 small spills expected every year (Brander-Smith et al., 1990). According to marine navigational standards such as the Canada Shipping Act, the International Convention for Safety of Life at Seas, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, and the Pilotage Act, it is perfectly safe to allow oil tankers into coastal BC waters. These regulations focus on outfitting the vessels for general crew safety such as navigational aids, emergency equipment and some general operating instructions and as long as vessels meet these standards then they are safe. But there is more to the issue than just these factors. None of the policy documents directly and specifically address oil tanker navigation in terms of navigational risk or where oil tankers can and cannot go as compared with other vessel types. The proposed route to Kitimat, through Dixon Entrance, Hecate Strait, and then up Douglas Channel has a navigational risk index that is far too high to be considered acceptable, even with the assistance of computer navigational aids, super-tugs, and various local and international marine regulations. Underlying causes of marine accidents have not been effectively addressed by shipping companies or marine safety authorities (National Academy of Science, 1994). Risk management in the marine operating environment depends to a great extent on personal judgment and perception of risk (National Academy of Science, 1994). Operational decisions are primarily left up to the captain and pilot, but even the most experienced captains and pilots can make mistakes that lead to catastrophic oil spills. The factor of human error along with the danger of navigating the proposed tanker route makes it unacceptable to allow oil tankers to travel up Douglas Channel to Kitimat.

Conclusion

The spatial context of the proposed tanker route is hazardous in terms of navigation. The rules and regulations governing marine navigation are not adequate in terms of explicit navigational situations, for example, there are no limits on how wide channels must be in order for vessels of certain size or type to enter. The proposed regulations for the Northern Gateway Project are impressive in theory, but in practicality, human error tends to override technological advancement. Oil tankers should not be allowed to follow the proposed route to the Port of Kitimat or enter Douglas Channel at all. No tankers should be allowed near the coast of BC and the moratorium on oil tankers should be maintained and explicitly written into federal law to remove any doubt of its existence. Coastal British Columbia is still relatively untouched by development. Allowing oil tankers to travel through BC‟s coastal waters is a recipe for disaster. A navigational risk index of 80/100 is too high and allowing tankers to navigate these waters would be irresponsible. Captains and pilots are familiar with risk, predominantly in terms of threats to safety that must be accommodated or avoided. Mariners are continuously dealing with threats, but they do not always deal with them effectively (National Academy of Science, 1994). The marine environment is incredibly complex and not well understood even by those who operate within it on a daily basis (National Academy of Science, 1994). British Columbians have a global responsibility to protect the coast from habitat destruction, pollution and damage from development.

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