Politics, Policies, Challenges and Opportunities

Master Thesis Political Science: International Relations

The EU and its Neighbours: Politics, Policies, Challenges and Opportunities

The EU and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

Eoin Watts 11695714

Supervisor: Dr. Dimitris Bouris Seconder Reader: Dr. Farid Boussaid Word Count: 24, 204 22nd June 2018

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor Dr. Dimitris Bouris for guiding, encouraging and reassuring me throughout this process. Secondly, I wish to extend my gratitude to Dr. Farid Boussaid for agreeing to be my second reader.

Also I extend my warmest thanks to all my interviewees. I will always appreciate the time and effort you offered me over the last few months. Without my family and friends this would not have been possible. Your constant unwavering support is greatly appreciated. Finally, to Jeske for advising and believing in me from the beginning.

Abstract

The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the impact that that the European Union, through the integration and accession process, has on identity in conflicts. The case studies of Northern Ireland and Cyprus are utilised as they have both experienced, and still experience, this subtle form of EU conflict resolution. In order to achieve this, this thesis incorporates two theoretical positions. Diez et al.’s (2008) conflict transformation theory is used to establish the impact that the EU has had on identity in the two conflicts. It is found that in both cases, EU integration and accession has not been the catalyst for the emergence of a shared identity which transcends the traditional conflicting identities. However, this thesis does demonstrate that EU integration has been more effective at encouraging a rapprochement between Nationalists/Catholics and Unionists/Protestants in Northern Ireland, than between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, in Cyprus. Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) conflict management theory is subsequently used to demonstrate that this is the result of a combination of internal and external factors. Firstly, Northern Ireland and Cyprus are extremely different conflicts, with one twenty years into a successful peace process and one conflict frozen in time. However, as witnessed in more conventional conflicts, internal decisions by the EU has also contributed to its ultimate success in softening the identity divide in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

Key Words: Conflict transformation, Cyprus, European Union, identity, integration and accession process, Northern Ireland

iii

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... ii Abstract ...... iii List of Abbreviations ...... vi Introduction ...... 1 Methodology ...... 2 Research Questions...... 2 Research Design ...... 3 Overview ...... 6 1. Literature Review...... 8 1.1 Conflict ...... 8 1.2 Identity ...... 9 1.3 Conflict Resolution ...... 10 1.3.1 Conflict Management ...... 11 1.3.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution ...... 12 1.3.3 Conflict Transformation ...... 13 1.4 The EU and Conflict Resolution ...... 14 1.4.1 The Integration and Accession Process and Conflict Resolution ...... 17 1.5 Analytical Framework ...... 23 1.6 Conclusion ...... 25 2. The EU’s Involvement in Northern Ireland ...... 26 2.1 Historical Background...... 26 2.1.1 The Orange State (1921-1969) ...... 26 2.1.2 The Troubles (1969- 1998) ...... 27 2.1.3 The Good Friday Agreement (1998-present) ...... 28 2.3 The EU Dimension ...... 29 2.2.1 The EU’s Indirect Involvement ...... 31 2.2.2 The EU’s Direct Involvement ...... 34 3.3 Conclusion ...... 36 3. The EU’s Involvement in Cyprus ...... 38 3.1 Historical Background...... 38 3.1.1 The Seeds of the Conflict (1571-1960) ...... 38 3.1.2 The Escalation of Conflict (1960-2000) ...... 39

3.1.3 The Annan Plan (2000-2004) ...... 40 3.2. The EU Dimension ...... 41 3.1.2 The Indirect Impact of EU Involvement ...... 44 3.2.2 The Direct Impact of EU Involvement ...... 47 3.3. Conclusion ...... 49 4. Comparison ...... 50 4.1 Conclusion ...... 57 5. Conclusions ...... 59 5.1 Empirical Findings ...... 59 5.2 Conceptual Findings ...... 63 Bibliography ...... 65

List of Abbreviations

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

EEC European Economic Community

EOKA National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston)

EU European Union

IEF Integrated Education Fund

IFI International Fund for Ireland

IRA Irish Republican Army

NILTS Northern Ireland LIFE & TIMES Survey

PEACE Special European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation

ROC Republic of Cyprus

RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary

TMT Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı)

TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UK United Kingdom

UNDP-ACT United Nations Development Programme- Action For Cooperation and Trust

UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

US United States of America

Introduction

The European Union (EU) is increasingly being acknowledged for its conflict resolution capabilities. In 2012 the EU was awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for over six decades of contribution “to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe” (Nobel Peace Prize 2012). While this award partly recognises the increasing involvement in conflicts in the European Neighbourhood through traditional conflict resolution means, it also acknowledges the more nuanced integration and accession process. The integration and accession process sees the EU impact conflicts through EU membership and the promise of this membership. In particular, EU integration is widely regarded as bridging the gap between long-time adversaries France and Germany in the wake of the Second World War (Diez et al., 2008: 28; Wallensteen, 2002: 33). Importantly, despite the EU’s adoption of more traditional and visible conflict resolution tools, it is this integration and accession process that remains the most effective tool in which the EU can impact conflicts (Blockmans, 2010: 77; Tocci, 2010: 57).

It is through this integration and accession process that the EU engages with two of the longest running conflicts on the periphery of Europe, in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. At a first glance, it may appear that the EU has little role in these conflicts. In Northern Ireland, which represents the British military’s longest ever military engagement (Operation Banner 1969-2007), it was the United Kingdom (UK) which managed the everyday aspects of the conflict (Wolff, 2002: 42). In Cyprus, the United Nations (UN) takes centre stage, through the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). The UNFICYP has manned the demilitarised Green Line on the island since 1964, making it the UN’s longest ever peacekeeping deployment (UNFICYP, 2018).

Although, the EU clearly does not take the leading role in the resolution of these conflicts, scholars have long recognised that the EU does play an important role through the integration and accession process. Demetriou (2008) and Ker-Lindsay (2007) examine the role of the EU in the resolution of the conflict in Cyprus, focusing on the short-to-medium term effects of the EU on the conflict. In Northern Ireland the importance of the EU in supporting the peace process has long been recognised (Byrne et al., 2007; Diez and Hayward, 2008; Hayward and Wiener, 2008). Tannam (2012) and Zink (2008) even present a comparative study of the EU’s role in the two conflicts.

Despite the conflicts being extensively studied in relation to the integration and accession process, the role that the EU plays in transforming identity relations in the two conflicts has long been neglected by the literature. Therefore, the EU’s impact on identity relations in Northern Ireland and Cyprus warrants further exploration. The link between the integration and accession process and conflict resolution is developed by Diez et al. (2008) who offer a useful theory explaining how the EU’s integration and accession process can act as a ‘perturbator’ for peace through four interconnected pathways; compulsory impact, enabling impact, connective impact and constructive impact. Although pioneering, this framework needs to be further built on. This is particularly the case when it comes to the fourth pathway, the constructive impact. This pathway focuses on how the EU inspires peace by “changing the identity scripts” of the conflicting parties (Diez et al, 2008: 28). Identity has long been characterised as playing a fundamental role in both the escalation of conflict and subsequently its de-escalation (Cook-Huffman, 2009; Rothman and Olson, 2001). Despite the recognition that this pathway, “if successful”, represents the “most persuasive mode of transformation”, the field has left it warranting further, in-depth, exploration (Diez et al., 2008: 28).

Methodology

Research Questions

Therefore this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by answering the following research question:

To what extent has the European Union’s integration and accession process impacted identity in the resolution of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus?

In order to answer this question a number of sub-questions are proposed:

 Has the European Union constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?  Has the European Union transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?  Has the European Union entrenched existing, conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?  If a disparity is found between the two cases, what explains this?

To clarify, for the first sub-question, the construction of a ‘shared identity’ is recognised as the emergence of an identity which transcends the old identity divides. This could be a broad European identity or a more specific local identity. The first three research questions address ‘how’ the EU, through the integration and accession process impacts identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. They can essentially be broken into three Hypotheses:

H1. The European Union has constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H2. The European Union has transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H3. The European Union has entrenched existing conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

The final question addresses ‘why’, if found, there is a disparity between EU engagement in the two cases. This question can be broken down into two hypotheses:

H4. The internal capabilities of the European Union explains the disparity between the two cases.

H5. The external context of the conflicts explains the disparity between the two cases.

Research Design

In the pursuit of the answers to the above questions a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative techniques, will be employed. This method allows an approach to the research question which includes “creative possibilities” (Brannen, 2005: 6), distinguishing this work from previous endeavours. There is a theme in studies concerning identity in conflicts for scholars to rely too heavily on quantitative means, such as censuses, polls and surveys, for measuring identity shifts. For instance, this trend is witnessed in a number of studies involving identity in both Cyprus (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016; Sirin, 2012) and Northern Ireland (Garry and McNicholl, 2015).

Although these studies are extremely useful in understanding identity in the conflicts, in reality identity is more complex than can be expressed by a simple tick of a box in a census, election or survey. Therefore, while incorporating these existing quantitative studies

3 into the framework of this thesis, the core of the analysis will be drawn from qualitative, semi-structured interviews with individuals who have first-hand expertise and insight into the respective conflicts. The flexible nature of semi-structured interviews is useful as it encourages interviewees to speak more freely of their experiences of identity in the conflicts (Tansey, 2007: 266). Similarly, “the open-ended, discursive nature of the interviews permitted an iterative process of refinement” where ideas proposed by earlier interviewees could be presented in following ones (Beardsworth and Keil in Bryman, 2012: 472). However, with the conflicts being so broad, unstructured interviews have been discounted, as some form of guide is essential to keep the interviewees on topic. Tables 1 and 2 introduce the interviewees selected to address the research question.

Table 1: Northern Ireland Interviewees

Interviewee Position Colette FitzGerald (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of the European Commission Office in Northern Ireland. Louise Warde-Hunter (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of Housing, Urban Regeneration and Local Government at Department for Communities at Northern Ireland Civil Service. Samuel Fitzsimmons (Field Visit- Belfast) Head of Communications at Integrated Education Fund (IEF). Bronagh Hinds (Field Visit- Belfast) Participated in the 1996-98 Good Friday Agreement negotiations for the Women’s Coalition. Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Equality Commission for N Ireland (1999- 2003). Stood on PEACE programme monitoring committee. Claire Hackett (Field Visit- Belfast) Senior member of Falls Road Community Council. Coordinated EU funded projects such as the Oral History Archive. Dr. Jonathan Tonge (Field Visit- Manchester) Professor of Politics, Department of Politics at the University of Liverpool.

Table 2: Cyprus Interviewees

Interviewee Position EU Official (Phone Interview) Political Officer at the EU Commission Office in Cyprus. Marios Epaminondas (Phone Interview) Officer for European and International Affairs at Ministry of Education and Culture (Republic of Cyprus). Founder of ‘Nicosia Walks’, a cross- community peacebuilding project. Turkish Cypriot Official (Field Visit- Political Officer at Turkish Cypriot Brussels) Representation in Brussels. Antigoni Michael (Skype Interview) Founder of ‘Nicosia Photo Walks’, a cross- community peacebuilding project. Contributor to Cyprus Community Media Centre. Dr. James Ker-Lindsay (Skype Interview) Senior Visiting Fellow, European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science. Former advisor to the United Nations Development Programme in Cyprus.

These interviewees were selected as they offered expert and diverse, not readily available in the literature. The European Commission officials in Belfast and Nicosia, offered a unique top-down insight into the perspective of the EU on the conflict. Government officials, in sensitive departments such as housing (Warde-Hunter) and education (Epaminondas) allowed for an understanding of how governments approach everyday identity issues. Similarly, Fitzsimmons, of the IEF, had first-hand experience dealing with the controversial issue of shared education in a divided society. Crucially, local peacebuilders present a more grass roots understanding of identity and the EU’s involvement. For Northern Ireland it was ensured that individuals with experience of the PEACE programme would be targeted. In this case Hinds, Hackett and Warde-Hunter (in a previous capacity) had all been recipients of such funds. In Cyprus, Michael has contributed to the partly funded Cypriot Community Media Centre (CCMC) and worked on projects which exist without EU funding.

The academics Ker-Lindsay and Tonge were chosen not just for their academic pedigree, but because of their on the ground experience. Ker-Lindsay has worked as an advisor for the UN and the UK government on the Cypriot conflict and Tonge is a regular voice for the BBC on Northern Ireland issues.

Although these interviews clearly underpin this thesis, they cannot be used in isolation to completely and comprehensively answer questions concerning identity. As Soss (2006: 132) points out interviewees “might interpret a single interview question in different ways and that a single phrase might mean different things when spoken by different people”. Therefore, this thesis will also be utilizing a number of primary official documents from the EU, the UN and state governments. Moreover, existing academic literature on the EU’s involvement in the conflicts will be used to supplement this, along with general literature on the conflicts themselves. When merged together these methods can alleviate a significant portion of their individual shortcomings. Ultimately, Webb (1966) sums this up perfectly stating that “the most fertile search for validity comes from a combined series of measures, each with its own idiosyncratic weaknesses” (in Davies, 2001: 75).

Overview

In this introduction a research problem has clearly been identified. Despite the widespread recognition of the importance of identity to conflicts and their peaceful resolution, there exists a substantial gap between studies of EU conflict resolution and the impact of identity. In chapter 1 this gap in the literature will be examined further. Furthermore, in this chapter the conceptual and theoretical frameworks that will be adopted in this study will be established. This will see the conceptualisation of the terms conflict and identity. Similarly, the broad field of conflict resolution will be explored and the relevant tradition will be decided on. In chapter 2 the case study of Northern Ireland will be explored in more depth and the impact of the EU’s involvement in relation to identity will be analysed. In chapter 3, the same will be completed for Cyprus. These two chapters, will address the first three hypotheses. In order to do this, EU involvement will be separated into direct and indirect measures. In chapter 4, comparisons between the two cases will be drawn, addressing both external factors and internal capabilities, to determine ‘why’ the EU is more successful at transforming identity in certain conflicts. In the final chapter, the empirical evidence gathered

6 will be discussed and the hypotheses conclusively answered. Furthermore, the implications of these findings will be indicated.

1. Literature Review

In this chapter, the literature surrounding the vast field of conflict resolution will be examined. As will be displayed there exists a substantial portion of literature examining the EU’s increasing role in the resolution of conflicts. However, this literature largely focuses on conflicts in the European Neighbourhood, neglecting conflicts closer to home. This gap is particularly prevalent when it comes to understanding the effect that the EU’s integration and accession process has on identity. This literature review will establish the theoretical and conceptual framework underpinning the overall discussion. Before moving on, it is important to note that this thesis subscribes to the idea that conflict resolution is a broad theory, incorporating a number of more specific and nuanced traditions. As Beriker notes “conflict resolution is not a homogeneous field in terms of its assumptions issues, and methodologies” (2009: 266). Therefore, this chapter will discuss the various traditions of this theory. With the ultimate aim of applying which one best explains the role of the EU’s integration and accession process in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Despite conflict resolution’s reputation as a conceptual minefield, there tends to be a shared constructivist sense of how to define key concepts. Therefore, prior to explaining which strand of conflict resolution will be utilised to pursue the research question, the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘identity’ will be conceptualised.

1.1 Conflict

Conflict is synonymous with traditional International Relations theory. Realists (Hobbes, 1651), Liberals (Kant, 1991) and even Marxists (Marx, 1847) accept conflict as natural to, at least, the current world order. In the same sense, conflict resolution scholars recognize that “conflict is a normal and continuous dynamic within human relationships” (Lederach 2003: 15). Thus echoing classical realist assumptions on human nature (Hobbes, 1651; Morgenthau, 1947). However, despite some similarities, conflict resolution scholars tend to define conflict as a much more complex and diverse phenomenon.

Rather than merely peering at conflict from an inter-state perspective (Mearsheimer, 1990), they interpret conflict in a much broader sense (Beriker, 2009; Galtung, 1996). Beriker states that “the field is interested in conflicts at all levels of human interaction… with the understanding that conflicts are subjective phenomena” (2009: 266). As Lederach notes the effects of conflict are felt on a personal, relational, structural and from a cultural viewpoint

(2003: 24-6). As conflict resolution possesses a much deeper understanding of conflict than traditional state-centric theories it explores conflicts which are regularly diminished and overlooked in International Relations. Essentially, attempting to understand internal, ethnic and protracted conflicts where no “quick military fix” is readily available (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 5-6). This is important in a world where there has been a “shift of conflict from the interstate realm to the intrastate”, as can be seen in Northern Ireland and Cyprus (Ben- Yehuda and Sandler, 2002: 1).

For all intents and purposes, conflict resolution scholars hold a more fluid and constructivist definition of conflict, embracing the assumption that “all conflicts can be reframed given that the perceptions of parties can change” (Beriker, 2009: 266). Nonetheless, “conflict resolution is not the elimination of conflict” (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 30). As Galtung notes conflict is an “ever-changing, ever dynamic” concept (1996: 88), where “[T]he way is the Goal” (Galtung and Vidyapith’s, 1992).

1.2 Identity

Another key concept underpinning this thesis is identity. It is regularly asserted that “in conflict, identity matters” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 25). This is particularly true of intrastate conflicts, which are notoriously “entangled in webs of identity” (Rothman and Olson, 2001: 289). Unsurprisingly then, in Northern Ireland and Cyprus issues of identity have long found themselves attached to the conflicts narrative. I will examine these identities in depth in the following chapters. In this sub-section, the concept ‘identity’ will be defined, along with how it relates to conflict and ultimately its resolution.

Essentially, “identity refers to a sense of a self, a way individuals know and understand themselves” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 19-20). In society, social groups are formed by individuals sharing “a common social identification” (Stets and Burke, 2000: 225), and exist only through “the imposition of otherness” (Hogg and Abrams, 1988; Walker, 1988: 85). Importantly, individuals possess “deep value commitments” to these social groups (Bilgrami, 2004: 183), and they will “act together to preserve, defend and enhance their common identity” (Bloom, 1990: 26). Huntington’s renowned work ‘The Clash of Civilisations’ is based on this hypothesis, with civilisations representing the highest form of identity groupings (1993: 24).

However, as witnessed with conflict, identity is not a simple or static concept. All agents, at various points, possess a number of identities (Levi, 2007; Sen, 2006). There is an “immense richness” in the “multiple identities that human beings have, given their diversity of affiliations, attachments and affinities” (Sen 2008: 6; Stets and Burke, 2000: 225). For instance, one can be Dutch, of Indonesian origin, heterosexual, Libertarian, a fan of Ajax etc. all at the same time, “without any contradiction” (Sen, 2008: 7). This conceptualisation of identity contrasts with Huntington’s clash of civilisations theory, as this conceptualisation is much more fluid and dynamic than the identity he proposes. This is not to say Huntington does not recognise identity as a multi-level concept (1993: 24). However, in his inescapable clash of civilisations, civilizational identities trumps all else. This assumption is rejected by this thesis, as this is a too entrenched conceptualization of identity. In reality as expressed above, “identity is not a rigid, static phenomenon” (Lederach, 2003: 55). Therefore, the idea that there exists an all-encompassing identity is incompatible with this more nuanced interpretation.

However, although identity is defined here as largely a constructed concept (Cerulo, 1997), it does not mean that “issues of identity are not at the root of most conflicts” (Lederach, 2003: 55; Walsh, 2016: 286). While the fatalist clash of civilisation stance is rejected in this thesis, one can still recognise that “identity plays a vital role in conflict” (Cook-Huffman, 2009: 19). For instance, Sen a vocal critic of Huntington’s work, still finds “that reductionist cultivation of singular identities has indeed been responsible for a good deal of what we can be call ‘engineered bloodshed’ across the world” (2008: 7). Essentially just because identity is in essence fluid and dynamic, it does not mean that in the heat of conflict it is not experienced as a very real and rigid social marker. Correspondingly, in conflict, it is regularly these more national, religious and ethnic social markers which determine “what we value and how we behave” (Sen, 2006: 20). Therefore this conceptual framework dismisses Huntington’s static and hierarchical understanding of identity, while upholding the assumption that conflicts are overwhelmingly defined by issues related to identity.

1.3 Conflict Resolution

As was made clear at the beginning of this chapter conflict resolution is an umbrella theory. Within this field there exists a common understanding of terms, such as identity and conflict.

However, the field can be divided into a number of distinct traditions. These traditions are mainly distinguishable by the types of conflicts in which they examine. Moreover, the various scholars present a host of different methods in which they suggest that conflict resolution should be best pursued. In this sub-section these cleavages will be examined. This task can be difficult as “considerable confusion exists within the field over how to describe these approaches” (Persson, 2009: 3), where “different authors have used each term to embrace the others” (Miall, 2007: 3). Yet, after consideration the main traditions are: conflict management, interactive conflict resolution and conflict transformation. I have purposely left out conflict prevention because although it is a significant tradition, it aims “to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur” (UN, 2011: 2), whereas this thesis is exclusively examining cases where violent conflict has already broke-out. Subsequently, I will propose the reasons why conflict transformation, through its long-term and comprehensive nature, represents the best tradition to examine the impact that the EU’s integration and accession process has had on identity in Cyprus and Northern Ireland.

1.3.1 Conflict Management

Conflict management constitutes the oldest form of conflict resolution (Paffenholz, 2009: 3). It is inherently short-term in nature, focusing exclusively with stemming the violence associated with conflict. These short-term missions neglect the structural and social foundations of violent conflict. As Ramsbotham et al. emphasises “the root causes of conflict may persist without either war or a peace settlement doing anything to address them” (2005: 159). It is often termed ‘crisis management’ (Juncos and Gross, 2011), but this is an inaccurate comparison. As in reality crisis management represents an even shorter-term endeavour than conflict management. As Amesi and Amaewhule point out, “the word crisis could be seen as an unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending” (2015: 6). Blockmans and Weasel note that “in the international context, the word ‘crisis’ is widely understood as an acute situation in which armed force is (likely to be) used”, whereas ‘conflict’ is much “broader… where there is a threat or breach to priority values, interests and goals” (2009: 5). Although, still short-term in nature, conflict management, in relative terms, involves deeper and longer involvements from the third party, such as peacekeeping (Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 13).

This crude form of conflict resolution sees mediators rely on “traditional foreign policy tools”, such as military, economic and diplomatic action (Colombo and Huber, 2016: 12; Ramsbotham et al., 2005: 13). Conflict management, utilizes these more traditional tools “to influence the attitude and behaviour of other actors” (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014: 27- 28). Ultimately, these more traditional tools reserve conflict management as almost exclusively a top-down affair (Paffenholz, 2009: 3). In this regard, the EU’s role in Afghanistan is best understood from this perspective (Blockmans and Wessel, 2009; Gross, 2011). However, the inherent short-term nature of conflict management makes it incompatible with the role that the EU’s integration and accession process has played in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Although there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this “instant coffee approach” (Volkan, 1997: 226), the EU’s involvement is in reality much longer term in nature. Moreover, as will be explained below, the mechanisms utilised by the EU in these two cases, are fundamentally more diverse than the elitist/top-down tools that conflict management is built around.

1.3.2 Interactive Conflict Resolution

Interactive conflict resolution, on the other hand, recognises the need for a bottom-up and long-term approach to solve the underlying identity issues related to conflict. As Paffenholz states interactive conflict resolution aims to “solve the underlying causes of conflict and rebuild destroyed relationships between parties” (2009: 4). Interactive conflict resolution is very much centred on the belief that imposed, top-down solutions to conflicts fail to address the underlying issues surrounding conflicts (Francis, 2002). Therefore in the long-term, conflicts which are only managed are always susceptible to backslide back into violent conflict. Essentially, there is a recognition that “while walls can be knocked down as quickly as they are constructed, so too doors can be slammed shut as easily as they are opened” (Newman, 2003: 19). In this regard, if a conflict is to be resolved there needs to exist a more inclusive and grassroots peace process. As Richmond notes this tradition has “attempted to bring the individual… back into the realm of the significant when it came to understanding and ending conflict” (2001: Para 1).

This grassroots approach sees “the role of an impartial third party” as reserved to organising and facilitating “small-group, problem-solving discussions between members of the conflicting party” (Fisher, 1993: 123). This is derived from the belief that, the conflicting parties themselves are the “only parties that can effectively resolve their dispute” (Pearson,

2009: 331), through creating “mutually acceptable solutions” (Fisher, 1993: 124). This “controlled communication” (Burton, 1996), brings together conflicting parties in “problem- solving workshops” (Kelman, 1992: 65). These workshops bring “those two parties whose relationships are most affected into a facilitated interactive situation in which relationships are analyzed in depth” (Burton, 1996: 24).

This may seem more conducive to the longer-term, more indirect role that the EU plays through the integration and accession process. However, interactive conflict resolution has its shortfalls. This tradition is inherently too narrow and self-constricted in its focus on the grassroots to adequately and wholly explain the various approaches the EU utilizes through the integration and accession process. Although, the integration and accession process can work through the grassroots, it is also more diverse and complicated than this. Working through member states and local elites.

1.3.3 Conflict Transformation

Comparable to interactive conflict resolution, conflict transformation is by its very nature a long-term process. It is based on the assumption that in order to “prevent a recurrence of violence, root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation” (Jeong, 2005: 4). However, unlike interactive conflict resolution, it accepts that conflicts can be resolved through a number of diverse measures. Lederach, the father of the tradition, proposes three lenses in which to view conflicts. One looks at the immediate situation, one the underlying patterns and context and the third brings them together (2003: 11). In the shorter-term, much like conflict management, third parties can “provide adaptive responses to the immediate and future repetition of conflict episodes” and in the longer-term they “address the deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns that produce violent, destructive expressions of conflict” (ibid: 47). Intrinsically, these lenses “not only promote short-term solutions, but also build platforms capable of promoting long-term social change” (Lederach and Maiese, 2009: 7). Ultimately, this three lens approach captures the EU’s integration and accession process in a more complete manner.

Miall, another strong advocate of this tradition, emphasises that conflict transformation does not simply seek the end of conflict, but a “change in the fundamental relationships, social structures and contextual conditions that gave rise to the conflict in the first place” (2007: 3). Miall also argues that to achieve this, conflict transformation accounts

13 for the fact that a “variety of actors may play important roles” in the resolution of conflicts (2004: 4). Thus the individualistic and grassroots interactive conflict resolution can be incorporated, along with the more traditional and elite conflict management actors, allowing for a deeper explanation of the “deep-rooted structural factors behind conflicts” (Persson, 2009: 4).

There has been much debate as to whether conflict transformation, should be defined within the confines of conflict resolution or whether it represents its own breakaway theory. Lederach insists that this tradition justifies its own theory (2003). Conflict transformation scholars are particularly concerned with the term ‘resolution’ which, they argue, implies that there is a fixed end-point in conflicts (Lederach, 2003: 29; Miall, 2007: 3-4). Lederach maintains that the term ‘transformation’ more coherently describes the long-term process that parties engaged in conflict must go through in order to improve relations (2003: 30). Although this thesis accepts the framework offered by Lederach as the most conducive for understanding how identity relates to conflict and its resolution, the notion that conflict transformation is a stand-alone theory is rejected. Conflict transformation certainly “aims for deep and profound changes in conflict situations that go beyond the limitations of traditional approaches” (Ryan, 2009: 304). Nevertheless, the transformation of conflicts is still ultimately based on the “resolution of the underlying causes of conflict” (Paffenholz, 2009: 4). In this sense conflict transformation is “the deepest level of the conflict resolution tradition” (Ramsbotham, 2005: 8-9). Ultimately, it would be unhelpful and unavailing to break up the umbrella theory of conflict resolution, which Lederach admits himself is the “well known and widely accepted term in both practitioner and research communities” (2003: 29).

1.4 The EU and Conflict Resolution

In this section the EU’s role as a conflict resolver will be examined in more depth. The EU has a long and unconventional history of involvement in the resolution of conflicts. It has been widely accepted that the EU is, by its very essence, a peace organisation (Birchfield et al., 2017; Diez et al., 2008: 13). Which was born out of a vision to prevent another deadly war breaking out in Europe, after the continent had been ravaged by such wars for the first half of the twentieth century. As French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman stated, when proposing the European Coal and Steal Community, that the resulting “solidarity in

14 production” would make war between France and Germany “not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (European Union, May 1950).

However, it is only more recently that the EU has stepped up its conflict resolution activity (Amora Dias, 2013: 341). The Maastricht (1992) and Lisbon (2007)Treaties, for the first time established the idea that the “promotion of peace” was “a key priority” for the EU’s foreign policy objectives (Tocci, 2010: 55). Since the conception of the Common Foreign and Defence Policy (2003) the EU has deployed thirty missions, both civilian and military, across three continents (European External Action Service, 2018: 1). Gross and Juncos put this exponential growth, in conflict resolution activity, down to the end of the Cold War and the “growing transatlantic pressures for the EU taking on a greater role in civilian crisis management [uses this term as conflict management] in pursuit of more equitable transatlantic burden-sharing.” (2011: 4). Blockmans and Wessel add that the failure of Europe to stand up during “the hour of Europe” as Yugoslavia crumbled, shamed Europe into improving its short-term conflict management capacity and activity (2009: 266 & 271). There is no absence of academic works chronicling both the role and capabilities of the EU in the resolution of conflicts (Blockmans et al., 2010; Diez et al., 2008; Tocci, 2007; Whitman and Wolff, 2012). Much of these works focus explicitly on the role of the EU as a traditional conflict manager (Blockmans et al., 2010), rather than analysing the longer impact that the EU can have on the structural issues surrounding conflicts. However, they can still be useful to my thesis.

These works have helped establish the idea that, conflict resolution can prove to be a controversial endeavour. As has been well stated the EU is far from a unitary actor (Diez et al., 2008: 23; Keohane, 2011: 203). This makes the rapid responses associated with the short- term needs of conflicts difficult and contested, and the EU’s response often “cut down to the lowest common denominator” (Colombo and Huber, 2016: 12). As Diez and Pace state “some member states may quite possibly have an active interest in supporting one conflict party rather than another” (2011: 213). Here, a “zero-sum” relationship between member states and the EU develops (Hill, 1993: 319). EU action is also affected by internal “turf wars” between competing institutions (Juncos and Gross, 2011: 15). This again, negatively impacts how the EU manages conflicts. Although, this examination of internal factors has been developed by scholars examining conflict and crisis management (Colombo and Huber, 2016; Whitman and Wolff, 2012), it has largely been neglected by conflict transformation scholars.

Whitman and Wolff (2012), present a vital work chronicling the EU’s involvement in the short-to-medium term management of conflicts. Although much of the empirical analysis conducted in their book covers the management of conflicts and therefore falls outside the scope of this thesis, their theoretical approach transcends this division. They propose that the success of the EU’s involvement in conflicts can be observed from two main positions. The first of these positions is defined as the internal capabilities of the Union, i.e. the “capabilities that the EU must possess in order to succeed in conflict management” (ibid: 11). These internal capabilities can be broken down into the following, overlapping, sub-sections: capabilities to act, capabilities to fund and capabilities to cooperate and coordinate. Essentially, capabilities to act is reliant on “political will”, amongst member states and the EU as a whole, to get involved in the conflict (ibid: 11-12). If there are “horizontal” cooperation issues (between member states) and/or “vertical” cooperation issues (between member states and institutions) then the overall coordination will be limited (ibid: 13). Ultimately, this ‘will’, translates to the extent in which the EU is willing to apply financial and political support for various mechanisms to deal with the conflict (ibid: 12-13). Although Whitman and Wolff present this from a short-term conflict management perspective, for instance examining tools such as the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (ibid), EU involvement in conflicts through the integration and accession process is subject to the same overall constraints.

Second, according to Whitman and Wolff EU involvement is effected by the context of the conflict (ibid: 15). This context can be observed from four levels of analysis (ibid: 17), expanding on the two (national and regional) proposed by Brown (1996). Therefore fitting in well with the lenses Lederach offers (2003: 11). The first level of analysis, the local, inspects the sub-state factors which “are likely to have an impact” on the success of EU involvement (Whitman and Wolff, 2012: 15). These local actors include elites, rebel forces, NGOs and can equally be applied to people in general. The second level of analysis, the state, examines national factors, such as “the political, social, economic and cultural dynamics at the state level” (ibid: 16). In the case of conflict transformation this could be used to assess how receptive national governments are to the EU. Regional factors are described as the third level of analysis. Here they recognise the significance of neighbouring states with a stake in the conflict (ibid). For instance, the impact of the EU in Afghanistan cannot be comprehended without an understanding of the role of the neighbouring state, Pakistan (Gross, 2011). The final level of analysis is the global. This global level of analysis looks at

16 the impact that interaction with international powerful states, other international organisations, such as the United Nations or African Union, and diaspora groups has on the EU’s role in conflicts (Whitman and Wolff, 2012: 16). For instance, EU involvement in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict cannot be analysed in a vacuum, which ignores the influence of the United States of America (US). As Bouris and Brown (2014: Para 1) state “Europe can at best only support American efforts” when it comes to the Middle Eastern peace process. As will explained in the analytical framework, the theory presented by Whitman and Wolff, although not intended to, can fill a gap in the conflict transformation literature. Which has proved incapable of explaining ‘why’ the EU experiences disparities in its involvement in conflicts.

1.4.1 The Integration and Accession Process and Conflict Resolution

The integration and accession process differentiates significantly from the traditional conflict management role the EU plays. As Diez and Pace find, through the integration and accession process “the EU plays a role both as a classical third-party actor and as an institutional context” in its pursuit of “conflict transformation” (2011: 212).The EU integration and accession process can be divided into two separate processes. The accession process can be defined as the relationship between the EU and states with membership prospects and has been the subject of a number of studies (Keil and Arkan, 2014; Sedelmeier, 2015). Throughout the accession process the EU uses the ‘carrot’ of membership (positive) or the ‘stick’ of sanctions (negative), to influence prospective members. This is coined conditionality, with prospective members having to meet certain conditions or “hurdles on the way to integration” (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003: 5). Although as Stivachtis notes “conditionality has been an essential feature of the EEC enlargement since the 1960s” (2018: 95), it is only since the 1993 European Council in Copenhagen that this criteria was enshrined in writing. The Copenhagen Criteria now ensures that prospective members have to fulfil the EU’s Acquis Communautaire, i.e. prove that they have:

achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union (European Council, 1993: Chap 7, Point 3)

It is widely believed, as former Commissioner Chris Patten (2003) states, that “over the past decade, the Union’s most successful foreign policy instrument has undeniably been the promise of EU membership” (in Adler and Crawford, 2006: 31). On the other hand, the integration process occurs post-accession, once the state has achieved membership status. It is inherently based on liberal (Kant, 1991; Oneal et al., 1996) and neofunctionalist (Haas, 1958) ideas that integration can lead to interdependence and ultimately political transformation. This integration began as a relatively modest movement to integrate the economies of post- war Europe (Alter and Steinberg, 2007: 2; Peterson, 2008: 202). But as the years have progressed this integration has deepened and inherently became more political (Shore, 2001; Staiger, 2009). As Kouri finds, this has led to the promotion of a common European identity, with the EU attempting “to promote the integration of member states on cultural grounds, rather than by solely depending on economic, trade, and labor cooperations” (2014: 218). Theil argues that the integration of European states into a “intricate network of common trade, social, cultural, and other policies, represents one of the most important geopolitical events of the twentieth century” (2011: 1).

However, despite Diez et al. noting that “integration and association provide the EU with potentially powerful means to influence border conflicts” (2008: 12), the link between the integration and accession process and conflict resolution remains a much underdeveloped phenomenon. Although Blockmans recognises that “a peacebuilding process an sich, EU enlargement has been dubbed the most successful of the Union’s foreign policies, one of immense transformative power” (2010: 77), this book is limited to examining the role of the EU through a conflict management level of analysis. For instance, in this book Blockmans et al. (2010) focus on these more traditional conflict management missions that the EU has conducted in the Congo, Chad and the Western Balkans.

Tocci (2007) goes into more depth to establish this link between EU enlargement and conflict resolution. She proposes that the EU impacts conflicts in states with membership aspirations through three main strands: conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement. Here conditionality is used as it is non-conflict scenarios, i.e. it “represents a deliberate effort to determine an outcome through external pressure” (Stivachtis, 2018: 95), with the EU “offering resources and legitimacy to some actors while constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals” (Dobbels, 2009: 14). Tocci points out that “unless the candidates settled their most salient disputes, they would be prevented from opening accession negotiations” (2007: 13). Tocci uses the example of the border dispute between

Slovakia and Hungary in 1990s as an example of the EU using conditionality as a conflict resolution tool (ibid). More recently, this conditionality is being used to force an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, where the EU has long made clear that before either achieve accession there must be a “normalisation of relations” (European Union, 2013: Title III; European Council, 2014).

Whereas conditionality is quintessentially short-term in nature, with “unchanged identities and interests” (Tocci, 2007: 16), social learning is less of a “cost-benefit calculus… as domestic actors voluntarily internalize the norms and logic underpinning the EU system” (ibid: 15). Checkel terms this ‘complex learning’ as through interaction with the EU, actors “acquire new values and interests” (1999: 15). This form of EU influence fits in more coherently with the long-term orientation of conflict transformation, as it strides for the “re- articulation” of identities (Diez, 2002b: 6-7). Whereas conditionality is defined by its “one- way method of condition setting” (Anastasakis and Bechev, 2003: 15), social learning is a more symmetrical process with potential member states and their citizens exhibiting more agency. As Checkel notes, it is through “learning and social interaction, rather than political pressure and individual choice” that “lead to agent compliance with normative prescriptions” (2001: 559). Similarly, Risse and Sikkink term this ‘socialization’, and argue that this process sees states “internalize norms”, without “external pressure” (2001: 11). Ultimately, “domestic change occurs through a transformation of perceived interests” (Tocci, 2007: 15).

According to Tocci the final way that the EU influences conflicts is through passive enforcement. Tocci describes this as “rule bound cooperation” which in practice works “through inbuilt incentives” (ibid: 17). Rather than a cost-benefit calculation, as witnessed with conditionality, the rules associated with passive enforcement “must not be viewed by third parties as a cost, or it must be considered a necessary price that comes with EU engagement” (ibid). Tocci finds that “passive enforcement cannot be easily used for conditions that the EU simply considers politically desirable but have no legal standing” (2010: 70). For instance, when it comes to minority rights, “the EU has in fact promoted norms which lack a basis in EU law” and a lack of consensus between existing member states, therefore it is challenging for the EU to diffuse rules in this area (ibid; Sasse, 2005: 1). Whereas, with human rights, the European Convention of Human Rights grants the EU the necessary “legally-binding acquis” (Tocci, 2010: 70). Similarly, the change associated with passive enforcement is “based on a party’s own experience of respecting a rule, and experiencing that its attributed cost is much lower than expected” (ibid: 18). Olsen terms this

‘rule application’, and explains how through this, “the dynamics of change take the form of mutual adaptation among co-evolving institutions at different levels and sectors of governance” (2002: 941). Importantly, in order for this mechanism to be successful, it “requires that the third party feels a sense of belonging to Europe” (Tocci, 2007: 17).

Tocci offers a distinguished account of how the EU uses the accession process to influence conflicts, both directly and indirectly. However, Tocci’s theory is ultimately limited by its neglect of the continued influence on conflicts that the EU can have post-accession. For instance, Tocci analyses EU involvement in Cyprus but prematurely ends her analysis after the accession of Cyprus in 2004 (2007). Therefore, although Tocci offers an important understanding of the link between the EU accession process and conflict resolution, her theory is incapable of accounting wholly for the impact post-accession integration, into the EU, has on conflicts.

Whereas the above scholars fall short of offering a satisfactory framework for understanding the EU’s integration and accession process impact on conflicts, Diez et al. (2008) present an account which fills this academic gap. They propose four pathways in which the EU stimulates peace (Ibid: 26). These four, interconnected, pathways are compulsory impact, enabling impact, connective impact and constructive impact. Again, Diez et al.’s framework fits in well with Lederach’s conflict transformation school as they address the various levels of analysis that Lederach proposes (2003: 11), therefore covering the “holistic and multi-faceted approach” that is needed to resolve conflicts (Duke and Courtier, 2010: 17). The framework offered by Diez et al. is seen as the go to text for scholars interested in the role of the EU’s integration and accession process in the resolution of conflicts (Colombo and Huber, 2016; Hayward, 2006). The first pathway, compulsory impact, covers the three distinct mechanisms proposed by Tocci above. Diez et al. particularly highlight the ways in which the EU can influence conflicting, non-member state, parties using “carrots and sticks” (Ibid). Interestingly Diez et al. note, as does Tocci (2007: 11), that the EU is in general reluctant to use sticks and “its most important stick is in the withholding of carrots” (2008: 27). The next three pathways cover the influence the EU can have on conflicts post-accession.

The second pathway, enabling impact, is ultimately an elitist/top-down conflict resolution mechanism utilized by the EU. Here local “political leaders use the EU framework to push through policies against the preferences of their electorate” (Diez et al. 2008: 27). In

20 this regard the EU adds a new dynamic and fresh impetus to the resolution of conflicts. This new dynamic can be a catalyst for the resolution of conflict as it can “justify desecuritising moves that may otherwise have not been considered legitimate” (ibid). Essentially, the EU assists actors, looking for an end to conflict, to ‘sell the peace’ to their grassroots. Connective impact, Diez et al.’s third pathway, advances a bottom-up approach in which the EU can transform conflicts. The EU helps to connect the various conflicting parties through “direct financial support of common activities” (ibid: 28). This pathway is heavily reliant on a flexible and responsive civil society, which can facilitate these relations. Much of this connective impact falls under the field of interactive conflict resolution, with the projects financed by the EU resembling Kelman’s “problem-solving workshops” (1992: 65), where the EU keeps at an arm’s length. This pathway is unreservedly long-term. Where it is envisioned that by connecting communities, with a striking trust deficit, eventually there will be a “broader societal effect in the form of social networks across conflict parties” (Diez et al. 2008: 28).

Diez et al.’s first three pathways have been extensively covered in the literature. In the following chapters of Diez et al.’s book, Hayward and Wiener, and Demetriou offer distinguished overviews of how the EU works through these three pathways in Northern Ireland and Cyprus respectively. However, the same cannot be argued for the fourth pathway; constructive impact. Despite being labelled the “most persuasive mode of transformation” (Diez et al., 2008: 28), this pathway has largely been overlooked. This neglect can largely be attributed to the fact that it constitutes the most “indirect” of the four pathways (ibid), making it difficult to grasp, never mind measure. Before delving further into this gap in the literature, it is important to define this pathway. Constructive impact, is largely inspired by the peaceful transformation of Europe after the Second World War and “‘aims’ at changing the underlying identity-scripts of conflicts, thus supporting a (re-)construction of identities that permanently sustains peaceful relations between conflict parties” (ibid). Unsurprisingly, this is derived from the idea examined earlier, that although identity plays a significant role in conflict it is adaptable and subject to change. As stated above, the four pathways are inherently interconnected, with EU mechanisms making an impact in a variety of pathways. In this regard, many connective impact programs have the potential to also “facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact” (ibid). This pathway’s focus on identity makes it the most relevant to the EU’s integration and accession processes relationship to the transformation of identity in Northern Ireland Cyprus.

1.5 Analytical Framework

In this section, it will be explained more concisely how the above frameworks will be applied to this thesis. The research questions can essentially be divided into two distinct camps, the ‘how’ and the ‘why’. Scholars tend to look at these two separately, therefore in order to answer both of these questions this thesis needs to draw from two separate theories. Diez et al.’s framework is invaluable for measuring ‘how’ the EU has impacted identity through the integration and accession process. Their pathway model covers effectively the various levels of impact that the EU has on conflicts. Constructive impact, which remains the least developed of the four pathways, is particularly relevant to this thesis. The connection between the EU’s integration and accession process remains underexplored and thus this thesis will address this gap in the literature, examining coherently the impact, if any, the EU has had on identity.

To answer, this three sub-questions have been proposed:

 Has the European Union constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

 Has the European Union entrenched existing conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus?

The first will look narrowly at whether the EU has constructed an identity in Northern Ireland and Cyprus which transcends the old divides and has ultimately led to a transformation of the conflict. The second is more broad. Here the extent to which the EU has transformed existing identities to become less conflictual will be measured. Though the final sub-question will be looked at while answering the first two, it feels necessary to present it as its own sub-question, as it is important to highlight that not all EU involvement is positive (Noutcheva et al. 2004: 25). As Diez et al. note “the EU’s attempts in conflict resolution can have both intended and unintended consequences, not all of them beneficial” (2008: 4).

Although the framework offered by Diez et al. (2008) is ideal for answering the first three questions. It has shortcomings when it comes to analysing, in depth, ‘why’ there are

23 disparities between the cases. They simply accept that the “success” of the integration and accession process “is often dependent on events outside the EU’s control and on local actors making use of the integration process in ways that are conflict-diminishing” (Diez et al., 2008: 3), without offering a framework or explanation as to what these “events outside the EU’s control” consist of. Therefore Diez et al’s framework cannot be used to address my final research sub-question:

 If a disparity is found between the two cases, what explains this?

While it may seem counter-intuitive, this thesis approaches this question from a conflict management stance. Essentially, Whitman and Wolff (2012), offer a more conclusive framework which can address, more appropriately, ‘why’ the integration and accession process can have more success in certain conflicts. As explained above, they look at the EU’s internal capabilities, such as capabilities to act, fund and cooperate. Crucially they also, address the “events outside the EU’s control”. Examining these ‘events’ from four different levels of analysis- the local, the national, the regional and the global. This sub-question will look at the context of both of the conflicts and establish the reasons why, if found, there is a disparity between the two cases.

It is important to note the “diversity” of conflicts when answering these research questions (Diez et al., 2008: 10). Therefore, it would be misleading to look at these conflicts, Northern Ireland and Cyprus, from the same starting point. In this regard, it could be found that while one conflict has seen a deeper transformation, when it comes to identity, the EU’s integration and accession process may not necessarily be responsible for this. Importantly, Whitman and Wolff’s recognition of both external context and internal capabilities accounts for this. In addition, “conflict resolution very often does not lead to the disappearance of a conflict, but, at least as a first step, to its regulation through non-violent means” (Diez et al, 2008: 14). Therefore to be deemed a success, EU involvement does not have to end in the disappearance of conflict (Diez and Pace, 2011: 212). It is simply, looking at the impact that the EU has had on identity in the two cases. In order to be deemed to have a positive impact on identity, evidence must be found which shows that the EU has made “a contribution to the transformation of the very communication that constructs a conflict in the first place” (ibid: 7). In regards to identity, a “changing” in “the underlying identity-scripts” must be witnessed (ibid: 28).

1.6 Conclusion

In this chapter the frameworks (conceptual, theoretical and analytical) that will provide the foundations for my research have been established. As has been made clear conflict resolution is a broad field which incorporates a number of traditions. These distinct traditions largely subscribe to the constructivist notion that conflict and identity are fluid and dynamic concepts. However, as has been presented they possess some vital differences in their application. Conflict management, defined by its short-termism and top-down tools, inadequately explains how the EU, through the integration and accession process approaches conflicts. Interactive conflict resolution, on the other hand, appears to meet much of the criteria essential to the integration and accession process, i.e. it is fundamentally long-term and bottom-up in nature. However, upon further inspection Fisher (1993) and Burton’s (1969 & 1996) work is too restricted to appropriately cover the broad measures the EU undertakes through the integration and accession process. Ultimately, conflict transformation is the most suitable sub-faction of conflict resolution. Lederach and Miall sufficiently account for the long-term change that the EU strives for, while recognising that this long-term approach comes in a number of packages. However, when applying just a conflict transformation theory, such as Diez et al.’s, to the EU’s integration and accession process it is found that there is a need to borrow substantial ideas from the conflict management field. Especially when comparing the success of the EU in the transformation of conflicts. Therefore in the analytical framework it has been established that in order to address my fourth sub-question Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) framework will be applied.

2. The EU’s Involvement in Northern Ireland

In the following two chapters the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, will be examined. These chapters will follow an identical structure. Beginning by giving a brief outline of these conflicts, on the periphery of the EU, which for many years looked intractable. As will be explained, the role of identity, particularly national identity, lies at the very core of these conflicts. Therefore in order to be effectively transformed away from violent conflict, these identity issues must be addressed. Finally, the role of the EU in these conflicts will be discussed. It will be demonstrated that this role is best framed through a conflict transformation perspective and can be divided into indirect and direct measures.

2.1 Historical Background

Northern Ireland was first established in 1921, through the Government of Ireland Act (1920), which also established the independence of the Irish Free State (from 1949 The Republic of Ireland). As Northern Ireland’s centurion approaches, it would be hard not to argue that its existence has been marred by identity conflict. Northern Ireland was formed against the backdrop of the Irish War of independence, where between 1920 and 1922, 267 Catholics and 185 Protestants were killed in violence across the city of Belfast alone (White, 1997: 30). However, it is important to note that this conflict between, Irish and British; Nationalist and Unionist, precedes the birth of Northern Ireland. Fundamentally, since Norman/English forces invaded Ireland in the 12th Century, conflict has been present between so called ‘natives’ and ‘settlers’ (White, 1997: 24).

2.1.1 The Orange State (1921-1969)

Besides from a low-scale, unpopular and ineffective Irish Republican Army (IRA) border campaign (1956-1962), the first fifty years of Northern Ireland’s existence remained largely free of violent conflict (Bruce, 2001: 28). However, it was in this period that the foundations for the intercommunal violence, that was to follow, were set. Harold Wilson (British Prime Minister at the time) stated that the violence witnessed in Derry/Londonderry was “the culmination of nearly fifty years of the unimaginable intertia and repression of successive and unchallenged… Ulster Unionist government” (in Rose, 1999: 150). In this period, Unionists consolidated the state and built their nation (English, 2002; Reid, 2008: 420). In 1934 the

26 then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Sir James Craig, infamously declared “All I boast is that we are a Protestant Parliament and Protestant State” (in Bardon, 1992: 538-8).

Catholics were almost totally excluded from the higher positions of public employment, and in general were two and half times more likely to be unemployed than Protestants (Cameron, 1969: Para 138; Stevenson et al., 2007: 106; Whyte, 1983: Para 10 & 52). Similarly, in areas where Catholics were in the majority, gerrymandering was rife (Whyte, 1983: Para 17). This Unionist supremacy is enshrined in one piece of legislation in particular- the Special Powers Act (1922). This act allowed the civil authority in Northern Ireland to “take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving the peace and maintaining order” (Article I, Para I).

Nonetheless, by the end of the 1960s, the Orange State had begun to crumble as the “international culture of protest” swept through Northern Ireland (Mansergh, 2006: 24). These civil rights demonstrations began peacefully, but after “heavy-handed reactions by the police touched off a spiral of violence”, which engulfed the province over the coming 30 years (Zink, 2008: 593). Essentially, in this period the identity division, which undoubtedly already existed, was exasperated further and set the tone for the coming violence.

2.1.2 The Troubles (1969- 1998)

By 1969 the British army had been deployed to deal with the intercommunal unrest and paramilitaries from both sides began to form and heavily arm. By 1971 internment, i.e. mass detention without trial, was introduced. This internment “happened to be almost exclusively” the preserve of “Nationalists” which escalated the conflict further (Wolff, 2002: 45). This led to the most violent year of the conflict, 1972, where nearly 500 people died, with atrocities committed by all sides, such as Bloody Sunday and Bloody Friday (McKittrick and McVea, 2000: 76; Wolff, 2002: 70).

There is a heated discussion on how to frame the conflict which claimed the lives of over 3,600 people, of which most were civilians (Tonge et al., 2011: 2). Bruce (1997) argues that the conflict is primarily a tit-for-tat sectarian killing campaign between Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries, which has its roots in the intractable identity struggle between Catholics and Protestants. As former British Home Secretary, Reginald Maudling, stated “[T]he history of their struggles is a long one, and they tend to cherish every moment of hatred in it”, where this hatred “had been handed down faithfully from generation to

27 generation” (in White, 1997: 21). However, this thinking is rejected by White (1997) who argues this largely diminishes the significance of the constitutional question in Northern Ireland, i.e. that Nationalists desire the reunification of an independent Irish Republic and Unionists strive to preserve the Union with Britain. As Wolff states Northern Ireland is a “conflict about fundamentally different political aspirations” (2002: 41).

In reality, there is a middle ground to this. Although, the main aim of the IRA was clearly to achieve a United Ireland (Tonge et al., 2011: 4), the fact remains that “Irish nationalism is overwhelmingly Catholic and unionism is overwhelmingly Protestant and the violent factions of each are more so” (Bruce, 1997: 57). More importantly, their methods displayed a “wilful blindness to the sectarian effects of their violence.” (Patterson, 2010: 338). However, either way, the point remains that the issue of identity, lies at the heart of this conflict. Where, ultimately, any successful transformation of the conflict must address the underlying issue of identity.

2.1.3 The Good Friday Agreement (1998-present)

It was always going to be difficult for a peace agreement to develop which satisfied all sides in Northern Ireland. As Manergh suggests:

[T]he peace process has to resolve much more than the Troubles of the last twenty- five years: it has to address the whole legacy of history and the many unresolved problems inherited from the past (2006: 24).

Nevertheless, on the 22nd May 1998, four years after the IRA called a ceasefire, the people of Ireland (both North and South) voted in a referendum to accept the Good Friday Agreement (Ark Elections, 2018). In essence, however, this agreement wasn’t revolutionary. Many of the proposals, in its Three Strands, were not so dissimilar from previous proposals, made through the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985). This led Sean Mallon, deputy leader of the moderate Nationalist party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, to infamously declare that the Good Friday Agreement was simply “Sunningdale for slow learners” (in Tonge, 2000: 39).

2.3 The EU Dimension

Although Northern Ireland has long been a part of the European Union, an EU dimension to the conflict is a relatively new one. On the 1st January 1973 the UK, on the third attempt, and the Republic of Ireland joined the European Economic Community (EEC) (Wallace, 2012: 532). Despite the conflict in Northern Ireland just emerging out of its most violent year, the province’s situation was seen as an internal matter for the UK and therefore not an accession issue. This reflects the accession process at the time, which was a lot less stringent than the one in place today. Therefore, the actual accession process did not impact the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Similarly, the initial accession of the UK and Ireland was not accompanied by a direct EU involvement in the conflict. Nonetheless, the indirect effect of this membership is regarded by many to have begun in these years (Hayward, 2006: 262; Hayward and Wiener, 2008: 61; Murphy, 2016: 9). Current Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of the Republic of Ireland, Leo Varadkar, argues in a speech to the European Parliament that “it is hard to imagine the Good Friday Agreement being made without our shared membership of the European Union and the single market” (Varadkar, 2018: Para 18). This argument traditional looks at the top- down indirect impact that the EU had on the relationship between the parent states, of the UK and Ireland. For instance, Hayward and Wiener, use former Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, statement that the peace process was strengthened by the “great personal relationship” built between John Major and himself in the Council of Ministers (2009: 41). The role of the EU was enshrined in the Good Friday Agreement, which stated that “[W]ishing to develop still further the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the European Union” (HM Government, 1998: preamble). Similarly, the principles and institutions (such as the North-South Ministerial Council) created in this Agreement, are regularly viewed as embodying a “EUropean dimension” (Diez and Hayward, 2008: 55; Tannam, 2012: 58). The impact of the indirect effects of EU integration on identity will be examined in more depth below.

By the 1980s, Wolff finds that the “international context” had become more significant to the conflict in Northern Ireland, ranging from “international connections of paramilitary groups, the influence of diasporas, and the consequences of European integration” (Wolff, 2002: 42). The 1984 Haagerup Report marked the beginning of the EU

29 showing any real interest in the conflict. This parliamentary report asserted that “there is no escaping the responsibilities of the European Community” towards Northern Ireland (1984: 75). This report marked the beginning of a more active role for the EU in Northern Ireland. In 1986 the EU joined the US, Australia and New Zealand in the creation of the International Fund for Ireland (IFI), which as of 2017 has contributed almost €1 billion to both the North and South of Ireland in an “important expression of international support for… peace, stability, dialogue and reconciliation” (Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1986: 2; IFI, 2017). Nonetheless, the impact of this involvement remained basically obsolete. By the mid- 1990s, as the peace process started to make some headway and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) gave the EU added confidence, EU involvement intensified. Following the calling of the paramilitary ceasefire, in 1994, the EU increased its contributions to the IFI and surpassed the US to become the largest contributor to the Fund (Teague, 1996: 550).

The most recognized and analysed form of direct EU involvement into the conflict in Northern Ireland undoubtedly comes through the Special European Union Programme for Peace and Reconciliation, commonly known as the PEACE programme (Byrne et al., 2008; Diez and Hayward, 2008; Murphy, 2016). Although the impact of the PEACE programme on identity in Northern Ireland, will be elaborated on in the following chapters, it is important here to outline what this programme constitutes. PEACE was first established in 1995 to “maintain the momentum for peace” (European Commission, 1997: 5), and was unique in the sense that the funds bypassed central government and went directly to peacebuilding projects (Hayward and Wiener, 2008: 44). It has since been renewed three times and to date is responsible for the expenditure of more than €1.5 Billion into reconciliation programmes in Northern Ireland and in border counties in the Republic (Special EU Programmes Body, 2016: 2). PEACE IV (2014-2020) is currently being implemented and with a budget of €270 Million aims to build positive relations in Northern Ireland, financing projects with a focus on shared education; support for children and young people and increasing the amount of shared space and services (Special EU Programmes Body, 2015: 3-4).

Moreover, EU funding to Northern Ireland, is also applied through the INTERREG programme. This cross-border programme targets infrastructure projects in Northern Ireland, the six Southern border counties and from 2007 also included the Western regions of Scotland (Special EU Programmes Body, 2018). Since its introduction in 1991, the programme has pumped over €1 billion into the areas of health, transport, environmental issues and enterprise development (ibid: Para 1). Although, this initiative may seem non-

30 conflict related it helps “integrate the economic space of the Community as a whole and to address the negative legacy of border areas” (Diez and Hayward, 2008: 55). Essentially, EU direct funding into Northern Ireland has clearly been substantial and extremely well- coordinated between different programmes.

Crucially, this economic involvement or “sweetening the deal” (Diez and Hayward, 2008: 55), represents the extent to which the EU has become directly involved in the conflict. Ultimately, the more everyday aspects of the conflict, and its resolution is left to the UK, which is responsible for the management of the conflict (Wolff, 2002: 42). For instance, it was British troops on the ground, it was British politicians and, to an extent, Irish politicians at the negotiation tables. EU officials made sure to explicitly state that their role was limited. As Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission, maintained “we are ready to help but not to be a substitute for those responsible for the province” (in Hayward and Murphy, 2012: 444).

As has been expressed above, this EU involvement can be divided into two areas. The first is in relation to the indirect ways in which the EU facilitates peace. The second is the direct effects of EU involvement, e.g. PEACE. Therefore in the following two sections, the impact of the EU on changing identity scripts in Northern Ireland will be analysed through these two distinct lenses.

2.2.1 The EU’s Indirect Involvement

Despite the heralded peacebuilder John Hume crediting the shared nature of a European identity for bringing peace to Northern Ireland(Hume, 1996), it is quite clear that a common European identity has not emerged. This is not to say that Fitzsimmons is not correct in stating that “there are a number of, particularly the younger generation, which would see themselves in a broader European context and consider themselves to want to be more European than Irish or British” (Author’s interview: 2018). However, this “number” is comparably insignificant compared to the traditional national identities in Northern Ireland. Although, a recent Lucid Talks poll shows that 56.7% of respondents either ‘fairly strongly’ or ‘very strongly’ identified as European (2018: 14), in terms of primary identity, affiliation with this European identity remarkably disintegrates. The most recent Northern Ireland General Election Survey makes this abundantly clear, with less than 1% of respondents identifying, primarily, European (2017: E1).

On the other hand, considerably more quantitative evidence suggests that a more local, potentially shared, Northern Irish identity is emerging. The 2015 Northern Ireland LIFE & TIMES Survey (NILTS) illustrates that 28% of respondents identified themselves as Northern Irish (NILTS, 2015). Thus supporting the 2011 Census which surprised many showing that 21% of the population viewed themselves as Northern Irish (Census, 2011). A national identity, which Moxon-Brown (1991) suggests is more inclusive than British/Unionist or Irish/Nationalist and one that during the Troubles was noticeably absent (Tonge and Gomez, 2015: 278). Importantly, Garry and McNicholl use Election Study surveys (from 2007-2011) to find that this identity is “inclusive of both Protestants and Catholics”, with 27% of Catholics and 29% of Protestants identifying as Northern Irish (2015: 2 & 5).

However, these statistics can be misleading. When examined in more depth it becomes clear that “still the predominant identities are Irish or British” (Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018; Muldoon et al., 2007: 90). Significantly, although this identity may appear to transcend old divisions, in practice this identity, means different things to Catholics and Protestants (McKeown, 2014; Tonge and Gomez, 2015: 278). With many Catholics who identify as Northern Irish, viewing it as the northern region of the island of Ireland and many Protestants viewing it as a way to express their belonging to a part of the UK (ibid). Therefore, it would be premature to argue that a shared identity has emerged in Northern Ireland, as a result of the indirect ways in which the EU facilities peace. Northern Ireland has, nevertheless, witnessed increasingly positive strides in community relations. For instance, a massive 67% of parents would support the integration of their child’s school (Integrated Education Fund, 2018: 4). Significantly, although identity issues still prevail in Northern Ireland, Nationalists and Unionists conduct the debate in a less violent and hostile environment (Farrington, 2006: 277). This improvement can be related to the EU in a number of areas.

One of the key ways in which the EU indirectly led to the peace process in Northern Ireland was through the facilitation of better relations between the parent states, of the UK and the Republic of Ireland (Gillespie, 1996; Meehan, 2000). Tonge goes as far state that you can “trace the thawing [in the relations between the UK and Ireland] to that day in 1973” (Author’s interview, 2018). Although underappreciated in academic work, this relationship has trickle down effects on the two communities in Northern Ireland. The Haagerup Report recognised that in order for an inclusive peace process to develop in Northern Ireland the two

32 parent states must “use their influence with the two communities” (1984: 13). Warde-Hunter, of the Northern Ireland civil service, recognises that this relationship “sets the tenor” with Nationalists looking towards the Republic and Unionists looking to the UK government “to see where they are in framing the conversation” (Author’s interview: 2018). Essentially, the cordial relationship between British and Irish governments, developed in an EU framework, set the tone and “everyone else had to adjust to that” (Hinds, Author’s interview: 2018).

The more contemporary issue of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU has highlighted this trend more starkly. Though, the final outcome of Brexit is clearly unknown the two parent states have already been forced into a position where they have to protect their own, seemingly competing, interests. In the past you got the sense that these kin states “acted as somewhat embarrassed and bewildered parents of their client communities” (Tonge and Gomez, 2015: 280). Whereas, now the dynamic has shifted and there is “a lack of sensitivity” from the parent states towards the conflict (Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018). This is particularly evident in the political sphere. Although, relations between Unionist political parties and Irish Governments have long been positive, in recent months Unionist leaders have hit-out at the Republic for interfering in Northern Irish issues (Connelly, New Statesman: 2018). Arlene Foster, leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the largest party in Northern Ireland, declared that “the Irish government are actually using the negotiations in Europe to put forward their views on what they believe the island of Ireland should look like in the future” (in Weaver, The Guardian: 2017). This filter down effect is certainly evident outside of the political sphere. The implications of this decision are forcing both communities back to the trenches, with the constitutional issue coming to the fore once again. As Hackett recalls being told by a seventeen year old school girl “Brexit makes me feel more Irish” (Author’s interview, 2018).

Moreover, the effects of EU membership on the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland have placed Unionists and Nationalists in a less conflictual relationship. For many, EU membership guaranteed “the security of your identity in a broader context” (Hinds, Author’s interview: 2018). The withering away of the border between Northern Ireland and the Republic, just as has been witnessed all over Europe (Hume, 1996: 46-7; Webster and Timothy, 2006: 162), led to improved relations (O’Dowd, 2002). It has long been appreciated that the opening of the Single Market in 1987 made conflict harder to sustain and led to a greater understanding between Nationalists and Unionists (Hayward and Weiner, 2008: 44). Practically, deeper EU integration saw the “border become less and less

33 visible” (Tonge, Author’s interview, 2018). This allowed Nationalists to feel less isolated from their kin in the Republic, as “Nationalists felt comfortable in an EU framework, they felt like they were part of a bigger entity” (ibid). In addition, EU membership put those in Northern Ireland in a privileged position, where they could get the best out of both worlds. As Warde-Hunter reflects the “Northern Irish do very well in the South” (Author’s interview: 2018).

Importantly, it is not just Nationalists who feel more comfortable with the Republic in an EU framework. Joint EU membership led to Unionists perceiving the actions of their neighbour in a less threatening manner than had defined the first decades of Northern Ireland’s existence. For instance, in the wake of Brexit staunch Unionist and DUP Member of Parliament Ian Paisley jnr. called on his constituents to apply for Irish passports (Payton, The Independent: 2016). This was purely for practical reasons but would have been nearly unthinkable in the past, where such a statement would have been seen as “eroding Unionist identity” (Warde-Hunter, Author’s interview: 2018). However, the EU has provided the context that permitted the thinking that “just because you have an Irish passport, does not mean to say you’re Irish” (ibid). As Crotty notes the wider context of EU membership projected a “rejection of… insularity” (1998: 2), establishing a “broader world view” in the province (Fitzsimmons, Author’s interview: 2018).

2.2.2 The EU’s Direct Involvement

As the previous section demonstrates a shared identity, whether it be Northern Irish or European, has not developed in Northern Ireland. This section will examine the extent in which the EU, through its direct involvement in Northern Ireland, has shaped identity. As mentioned before this direct involvement has exclusively come through financial support to the region through a number of programmes, but particularly through PEACE.

Ultimately, the peace process, was never about constructing new identities (Doyle and Guelke, 2009; Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018). In fact the Good Friday Agreement actually enshrined the positions of the dominant nationalities, declaring that it is “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as British or Irish, or both” (HM Government, 1998: Point 1 Para vi). Essentially, as numerous scholars recognise, the EU’s direct role in the conflict was firmly related to supporting the fledgling peace through economic means (Diez and Hayward, 2008: 55; Hayward, 2006). As this peace was

34 based not on the construction of new identities, but on the consolidation of existing cleavages, PEACE was accordingly “never about reshaping identity” (Hayward, 2006: 263; Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018). FitzGerald reiterates this point, stating that “the peace projects that are funded through the programme are not about politics or changing people’s political views or identity” (Author’s interview: 2018). Consequently, it is unsurprising that the funds in Northern Ireland have not been accompanied by the dramatic emergence of a shared identity.

However, this does not inevitably correspond to the notion that the EU’s direct influence on identity has been negligible. Much of the literature on the PEACE programme is sceptical of its impact on identity, framing them through Diez et al.’s (2008) enabling and connective pathways. For instance, Tonge et al., focus solely on how EU funding enabled both Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries to transition to peace, generally neglecting the impact on identity altogether (2011: 14). Tannam argues that through these funds “the EU’s impact on cross-community and cross-border cooperation has been negligible”, with funding mainly reserved for symbolic projects (2012: 57). Similarly, Fitzsimmons, from the IEF, notes how EU involvement in the effort to integrate schools has been minimal, making it clear that “we don’t have the proactivity in Brussels that we would have in London, Dublin and Washington” (Author’s interview: 2018). Hayward, even perceives the funds as having a negative impact on community relations. Arguing that the “crude categories”, where projects are required to have an equal number of Catholics and Protestants, “reinforce rather than transcend divisions” (Hayward, 2006: 276).

Nevertheless, as explained in chapter 1, these pathways are interconnected and therefore by impacting the other pathways EU funding could “facilitate identity change as foreseen within the constructive impact” (Diez et al., 2008: 28). In this regard, by enabling the paramilitaries to pursue non-violent avenues, PEACE funding ultimately “stopped people killing each other”, buying time for communities to heal which softened the identity divide (Warde-Hunter, Author’s interview: 2018). More importantly, although PEACE may not have aimed to alter identity in a strict sense, it “fostered the non-state sector” (Murphy, 2016: 25), and explicitly aimed to “provide a safe neutral space for people to come together and understand each other’s identity” (FitzGerald, Author’s interview: 2018). The empirical evidence gathered supports this assertion. Hinds, who has been both a recipient of EU funds (for a variety of women’s groups) and sat on PEACE monitoring committees, finds that the funding was essential for Northern Ireland to “develop the community infrastructure”

35 necessary for a lasting peace (Author’s interview: 2018). Moreover, Hackett who has received funding from all four PEACE programmes, recognises that many of these projects are about the “process”, which can lead to criticism, particularly when “people are very focussed on outcomes” (Author’s interview: 2018). However, from her experience, on partly EU funded projects, such as the cross-community Oral History Archives project in West Belfast, she notes that “what endures, is the relationships that have been formed” (ibid). This specific project was ground-breaking as both Nationalists and Unionists agreed to trust the other side and pool their recordings together, something Hackett recognises would have been “impossible without the PEACE funds” (ibid).

Therefore, Haywards argument that PEACE reinforced divisions is unfair. Rather than entrenching divisions, the “crude categories” installed in programme applications meant that, in order to qualify for grants, both sides “had to find partners to dance with” (Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018). Subsequently this “enforced some cooperative relations between two communities who frankly coexisted but never met” (ibid). Similarly, the cross border nature of these programmes should not be undervalued. The way in which PEACE and INTERRAG targeted projects on both sides of the border helped encourage a rapprochement between two rival identities. As Tonge, highlights “they made the cross-border or All Ireland cooperation a little less threatening to Unionist” (ibid), as again the Republic was portrayed as a partner rather than an antagonist.

3.3 Conclusion

This chapter has decisively demonstrated, whether it be through its direct involvement or indirect means, the integration of Northern Ireland into the EU has not led to the growth of a new identity which transcends the existing, historical hostile, identities of British/Unionist and Irish/Nationalist. The evidence suggests that although polls are increasingly depicting the growth of a Northern Irish identity, in reality this identity is relatively ambiguous. Despite this, it is generally accepted that the indirect effects of EU integration have led to a rapprochement between the existing identities, particularly through the filter down effect of improved parent state relations. Overall, the impact of direct involvement on identity, through particularly PEACE, is more controversial. In the academic field there has generally been a lack of connection between EU funds and identity and when there is scholars have often criticised the programmes for intensifying the identity division. However, the evidence

36 conducted with both EU officials and recipients of PEACE funds strongly indicates that these programmes have not just enabled peace in Northern Ireland, but have had a real positive impact on identity relationships themselves.

3. The EU’s Involvement in Cyprus

As achieved in the previous chapter for Northern Ireland, this chapter will establish the main ways in which the EU indirectly and directly impacts identity in the Cypriot conflict. Prior to this an historical overview of this identity conflict will be provided. As has been demonstrated in Northern Ireland, it will become clear that conflict transformation is certainly the most appropriate tradition of conflict resolution to explain how the EU engages in Cyprus.

3.1 Historical Background

Although Greeks have inhabited Cyprus for up to 4,000 years (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 2), due to its strategic location, in the eastern Mediterranean, the island has long found itself caught between the games of empires (Walker, 1984: 475). This saw the Ottomans conquer the island in 1571 and establish the Turkish Cypriot community (ibid: 12-13). Despite the two main communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot, being divided along religious lines, with the former being almost exclusively Greek Orthodox and the latter almost exclusively Muslim (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 230). Most academic observers see the conflict as largely one of ethno-national proportions and not primarily along this religious divide (Diez, 2002a; Ker-Lindsay, 2011; Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann 2008: 19; Tocci, 2007).

3.1.1 The Seeds of the Conflict (1878-1960)

It is important to note that “Cyprus lacks Ireland’s century-long history of intercommunal animosity” (Zink, 2008: 587), where, although “[T]he potential for inter-communal conflict in Cyprus dates back to the period of Ottoman rule”, in actuality the period of Ottoman rule was largely peaceful (Tocci, 2007: 31). It was under British rule, beginning in 1878, that the “the seeds of the modern dispute were sown” (ibid). As Papadakis, points out “[T]he twentieth century witnessed the gradual rise, first, of Greek nationalism and, later, of Turkish nationalism” (2008: 130). This Greek nationalism centered around an aspiration for Enosis, i.e. union with Greece, and by 1955 The National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) was formed to end British rule on the island and implement Enosis (Loizides, 2007: 176). Turkish Cypriots were naturally suspicious of Enosis, and in response called for Takism, i.e. the partition of the island into Greek and Turkish Cypriot areas (Zink, 2008: 590). By 1958

38 the Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) was formed to resist Enosis (Loizides, 2007: 174; Papadakis, 2008: 130). Turkish Cypriot fears were enflamed by the British, who exasperated these differences through the notorious strategy of divide and rule (Loizides, 2007: 176; Tocci, 2007: 31). Just as the RUC in Northern Ireland became Protestant dominated, the Cypriot police force was increasingly recruited from the Turkish Cypriot community (Kıralp, 2017: 591).

After several years of violent conflict, much of it intercommunal, Britain agreed to grant Cyprus independence, with Britain, Greece and Turkey as guarantors of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) (Treaty of Guarantee, 1960: Article 4, Para 2). The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, also signed in 1960, established Cyprus as a bi-communal state, underpinned by the principle of consociationalism, where power would be shared between the two main ethnic blocs (Article 1, Para 1). However, this was not the result either side wanted, and Walker thus terms this new state- “the Reluctant Republic” (1984: 475).

3.1.2 The Escalation of Conflict (1960-2000)

In this new state “[B]oth ethnic groups continued to pursue their separate objectives” (Papadakis , 2008: 130), only sharing a lack of any “intrinsic loyalty to the new state” (Ker- Lindsay, 2011: 30; Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann , 2008: 19). Many Greek Cypriots believed that Turkish Cypriots, whom made up only 18% of the population yet received 30% of the parliaments seats, had been granted “over-generous concessions” (Demetriou, 2008: 65; Kıralp, 2017: 592; Tocci, 2007: 32). In November 1963, Archbishop Makarios, President of the ROC, made proposals which would amend the 1960 Constitution and would transform the island into “Greek Cypriot unitary state” with minority rights for Turkish Cypriots (Tocci, 2007: 32).

These plans were instantly rejected and by the end of 1963 intercommunal conflict had broken out between the two sides (Papadakis, 2008: 130). This continued sporadically for the next four years, resulting in the deaths of 630 Turkish Cypriots and 260 Greek Cypriots (Kıralp, 2017: 593), and the displacement of over 30,000 Turkish Cypriots (Necatigil, 1998: 9-20; Tocci, 2007: 32). In 1964 the UN, under Resolution 186, intervened and deployed a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, on the island (Kıralp, 2017: 592). This force, established a ceasefire zone (the Green line), which today serves as the marker between the ROC and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) (Innes, 2017: 354).

For the next seven years, Cyprus experienced a lull in violence, but the division between the two communities deepened (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 35; Zink, 2008: 594). On 20th July 1974, in response to a coup d’état orchestrated by the military junta in Athens, which ousted the Makarios’ government and extended the dictatorship to the island, Turkey invoked their rights as a guarantor, invading and occupying 37% of the island (Tocci, 2007: 32). Nearly 200,000 Greek Cypriots were expelled to the South of the island and around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots were sent North (Papadakis, 2008: 131; Tocci, 2007: 32). Although to this day, the figures are hard to calculate, according to Kıralp, 2400 Greek Cypriots, 550 Turkish Cypriots, 350 Turkish troops and 105 Greek troops lost their lives (2017: 602). As in Northern Ireland competing narratives developed around these key events, with Greek Cypriots seeing Turkish intervention as a hostile invasion and Turkish Cypriots viewing it as a liberation (Diez, 2002a: 43; Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 231). By 1983, the de-facto partition of the island was cemented with the unilateral declaration of independence of Northern Cyprus, through the TRNC, which today is still only recognised by Turkey (Papadakis, 2008: 131).

3.1.3 The Annan Plan (2000-2004)

Importantly, and what arguably distinguishes Cyprus from Northern Ireland, is that there has been no mutually agreed solution to the ‘Cyprus Problem’. This is not to say that Cyprus has witnessed a shortage of negotiations and peace initiatives. Nevertheless, these negotiations and initiatives, while often on the brink of success, have always fallen short of a breakthrough. As witnessed in Northern Ireland, these negotiations are not particularly revolutionary in character and in general propose almost identical solutions to the conflict (Tocci, 2007: 34). Despite this some negotiations have come closer than others, such as in 1984 and 1997 (Fisher, 2001: 317; Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 53; Tocci, 2007: 35).

The Annan Plan, first proposed in 2002, is arguably the closest Cyprus has come to reunification. Comparable to previous negotiations, this plan was based on the bizonal, bicommunal federation originally proposed by the UN Security Council through resolution 367 (1975). However, it went further, accounting for the contentious issue of the return of refugees (Sözen and Özersay 2007: 138: Tocci, 2007: 36). This agreement was initially rejected by the Turkish Cypriot side, but the election of pro-reunification parties in late 2003 saw the Annan Plan re-launched and it was decided that the Plan would be put to the people on the 24th April 2004 (Tocci, 2007: 36-7). Whereas, the Good Friday Agreement was

40 overwhelmingly accepted, the Annan Plan was rejected. The people of the TRNC actually voted in favour of the agreement (65%), but the agreement was supported by a mere 23% of Greek Cypriots and was thus rejected (Amaral, 2018: 5). The rejection of the Annan plan “represented a major setback to the decades-long peacemaking process in Cyprus.” (Amaral, 2018: 2). Although negotiations were re-started in 2017, they again faced a similar fate to their predecessors.

3.2. The EU Dimension

In spite of the fact that “[O]ne of the legacies of the conflict in Cyprus is that it seems to have involved, right from the beginning, a number of actors, many of them international” the EU has found itself long at the bottom of this list (Demetriou, 2008: 66). Just as in Northern Ireland, EU involvement in the conflict in Cyprus remained minimal until the 1990s. Demetriou recalls how in the 1970s, despite the signing of an Association Agreement in 1972, the EU actively “avoided involvement in the conflict” (ibid: 70). Nevertheless, individual member states have certainly taken an interest in the conflict. Unsurprisingly, Greece has long had a “national interest” associated with the conflict (Tocci, 2007: 28). Similarly, as a guarantor state with two military bases on the island the UK has long found itself involved with the conflict. Interestingly, these member states conducted their relations with the conflict “outside the confines of the EU” and have even “adamantly resisted an EU involvement in the conflict” (ibid: 30).

However, the ROC’s application for EU membership in 1990 (European Commission, Press Release: 1990), changed this, marking the beginning of Cyprus’s accession to the EU and an EU dimension to the conflict. As in Northern Ireland this dimension, can be divided into indirect and direct involvement. Importantly, the accession process played a more significant role in Cyprus than in Northern Ireland, as the “political situation on the island is[was] the main concern for EU decisionmakers” (Sertoglu and Ozturk, 2003: 55). The European Commission (1993: Para 47) declared that “Cyprus’s integration with the Community implies a peaceful, balanced and lasting settlement of the Cyprus question”. The impact of this more political stance, on the behalf of the EU, will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter. This accession process stimulated an “argument” in the academic field and beyond that there was a “European Solution” to the conflict (Demetriou, 2008: 72; Evagelos, 1997). For instance, former Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Kranidiotis, urged the

EU in 1994 to formally begin the accession process as it would “act as an important pressure lever for a solution to be found” (in Demetriou, 2008: 72).

Although the accession process had become a lot more formal than what it had constituted for the UK and Ireland two decades earlier, Cyprus made good progress (European Commission, 2001: 12; Ker-Lindsay, 2012: 56). Therefore, despite Turkish objections that EU membership violated the 1960 Constitution, which stated that Cyprus could not join an organisation that had only Greece or Turkey as a member (ibid: 66), at the 1994 Corfu European Council it was agreed that Cyprus would be included in the EU’s next enlargement. Interestingly, in this accession period, direct EU engagement in the conflict began. Between 2000-2004, the EU pledged €95 million to Cyprus and Malta, and the share given to Cyprus was destined to encourage “bi-communal measures that can help to bring about a political settlement” (European Commission: 2001: 14).

The rejection of the Annan Plan in April 2004, meant that Cyprus was destined to join the EU, one week later, as a divided island. Many EU officials, such as Enlargement Commissioner Günter Verheugen, felt “tricked” by Greek Cypriot politicians who they believed they had an unspoken agreement with, where in return for EU membership they would encourage the people to accept the Plan (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 71: Pop, The euobserver 2009). This has had severe consequences for EU involvement on the island. As Ker-Lindsay points out it was “legally impossible” for the EU to trade with the TRNC and therefore all trade had to be conducted through the ROC (2011: 72). In addition, although legally Turkish Cypriots are EU citizens, as they live in areas where the ROC “does not exercise effective control” (Council of the European Union, 2004: Para 2), they became effectively isolated from the EU (Lidén et al., 2016: 282).

Since, the accession of a divided Cyprus, the EU has pursued a more direct engagement in the conflict. The main programme in which the EU actively pursues conflict transformation in Cyprus, is through the Cypriot Civil Society in Action programme. This program began in 2006 and in theory sees the EU target civil society in the TRNC. In this sense the “funding has been subject to some resentment in the South” as it is seen as favouring Turkish Cypriot organisations (Lidén et al., 2016: 282). However, in reality, this programme is a bicommunal endeavour, targeting civil society groups on both sides of the Green Line. This scheme has not so indifferent aims to the PEACE programme in Northern Ireland. As is claimed in Cypriot Civil Society in Action V, this scheme aims:

To promote reconciliation, dialogue, closer relationship and trust between the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities through confidence building measures and joint-actions organised by civil society organisations from both communities (2014: Chapter 1, Point 2)

However, in general EU direct involvement in Cyprus is much less coordinated than it is in Northern Ireland, where PEACE ultimately disperses the majority of these reconciliation funds. In Cyprus much of the EU funding to the TRNC, which as of 2016, constitutes €449 million, is directly concerned, in some way, with the conflict and cannot be understood without reference to the partition of the island (European Commission, 2016: Para 2). For instance, the Financial Aid Regulation (FAR), which was designated for the TRNC in 2006, states clearly that the funds:

shall provide assistance to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus by encouraging the economic development of the Turkish Cypriot community with particular emphasis on the economic integration of the island (Council of the European Union, 2006: Article 1, Para 1).

Kyris sums this up effectively, stating that “[T]he overarching rationale of those EU programmes has been the contribution to the resolution of the Cyprus issue, through the integration of the two Cypriot communities” (2012: 93). Therefore, when analysing the direct impact of EU engagement on identity in Cyprus, it is necessary to account for the multitude of relevant measures.

Although, EU engagement in the conflict has increased substantially in recent years it remains a second tier actor. Interestingly, even in the area of civil society funding the UN remains the largest contributor in Cyprus (Lidén et al., 2016: 282). This was traditional through the, no defunct, United Nations Development Programme- Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT). More importantly, the everyday management of the conflicts remains under the watch of the UN (James, 1989: 481). This mission, the UNFICYP, is the UN’s longest running peacekeeping force, and has seen the deaths of 186 UN personnel since 1964 (UNFICYP, 2018). Similarly, what Fisher coined the “the UN mediation process”, is still the case, with an EU presence absent from negotiations (2001: 322). The EU even recognises the secondary nature it plays to the UN, as the European Commission stated, “[T]he Commission remains committed to supporting the settlement process under the UN auspices” (2016: Article 5). Therefore, as in Northern Ireland, the EU’s direct role is

43 ultimately still reserved to the long-term nature of the conflict. Once again, showing that the role of the EU, whether it be direct or indirect, is best understood from a conflict transformation perspective.

3.1.2 The Indirect Impact of EU Involvement

In Cyprus, a similar trend to Northern Ireland is discovered. By examining just certain surveys one could be forgiven for thinking that a shared identity has emerged. A 2002 Candidate Countries Barometer, in the TRNC, found that 73.6% of respondents were ‘very proud’ or ‘fairly proud’ to be European (European Commission, 2002). In this sense it is not hard to see why some would argue that a “European identity came in as an umbrella” (Michael, Author’s interview: 2018). However, the prevalence of this European identity has waned in recent years. The 2007 Eurobarometer found that a mere 37% of respondents from the TRNC were ‘proud’ to be European, with only the UK and Turkey polling lower (European Commission, 2007b: 116). Responses in the ROC were not much better with 50% saying they were ‘proud’ to be European (ibid). The 2015 Eurobarometer (conducted only in the ROC) shows a further backlash against this European identity with a mere 35% of Cypriots defining themselves as a combination of Cypriot and European, the second lowest out of all member states (European Commission, 2015: 22). It can be largely asserted that although, the accession process indirectly stimulated a short and sharp increase in the number of Cypriots (from both communities) who identified as European, this identity marker has largely waned in recent years and certainly does not represent an identity which transcends the old ethnic blocs.

Interestingly, recent surveys do show a growth in both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots who identify increasingly as Cypriot. For instance, the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Index finds that both Greek Cypriots (58%) and Turkish Cypriots (43%) are more likely to define themselves primarily as ‘Cypriot’ than any other identity (Ioannou et al. SCORE, 2014: 123). Similarly, only 6% of Greek Cypriots and 8% of Turkish Cypriots identify primarily as ‘Greek’ or ‘Turkish’ respectively (ibid). On paper, this would suggest the emergence of a common identity on the island. However, when delving deeper into to the interpretations of these identities, it becomes clear that this ‘Cypriot’ identity marker means very different things to each community and consequently does not represent a new identity which transcends the old divides.

In this regard, despite Psaltis and Cakal finding that there is an increasing trend of identification with a, deceivingly shared, Cypriot national identity marker, in reality this “Cypriot identity is still not an identity that symbolically encompasses both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” (2016: 241). This is supported by the quantitate evidence gathered by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (2009: Section A).This study finds that 53% of Greek Cypriots still see Greece as their mother country and 75% of Turkish Cypriots view Turkey as theirs (ibid). Potentially, more damningly, is the tendency for both communities to “explain history in their own ways” (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). In the same study, the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development uncover that 83% of Greek Cypriots believe that “Cyprus historically is Hellenic” and 66% of Turkish Cypriots hold the view that “Cyprus historically is Turkish” (2009: Section A). Furthermore, peoples definition of what a Cypriot ‘is’, is generally exclusive of the other community, i.e. for many Greek Cypriots who identify as Cypriot, “Cypriot = Greek Cypriot in their everyday discussions and understanding” (Loizides, 2007: 174; Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 241). As Ker-Lindsay points out “many Greek Cypriots still think of the island as essentially Greek” (Author’s interview: 2018). Ultimately, although a Cypriot identity exists, it is “not strong” and it is generally subordinate to other aspects of one’s identity, i.e. Greek or Turkish (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018).

However, the absence of a shared national identity in Cyprus does not necessarily correlate with the EU failing to at least soften the identity conflict between the two blocs. In this domain, there is certainly more debate on whether the EU integration and accession process has led to a rapprochement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As in Northern Ireland “the framework of EU membership creates opportunities for reconciliation” (Ker- Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). One of the most important aspects of this was that “the accession process gave an impetus to the opening of the checkpoints”, creating new opportunities for interaction between communities which had been separated for almost thirty years (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018). As Makriyianni et al. emphasise “[T]he process of European Enlargement has undeniably become a catalyst for the resolution of the Cyprus problem” (2011: 3). Moreover, Michael appreciates, that as a result of EU accession “we started to take reconciliation more seriously” (Author’s interview: 2018).

In addition, as seen in Northern Ireland, EU membership indirectly led to a more outward looking Cyprus. Michael found that “it was easier to be part of a bigger community”, which makes island divides less forthcoming (Author’s interview, 2018). EU membership,

45 offered and encouraged, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to travel, and get “out of the little bubble of their immediate environment” (Ker-Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). Through the likes of Erasmus programs, which around 70% of Cypriot students take up, young Cypriots from both communities get to experience life outside the island (Michael, Author’s interview: 2018). From her own experiences Michael found that “if you go outside Cyprus, you become Cypriot”, and the Greek and Turkish identity markers become less prevalent (ibid).

Nevertheless, despite the EU setting the framework for greater interaction between the two communities, evidence suggests that in practice this does not occur as widely as many expected. Ker-Lindsay, points out that “the levels of interaction between the two communities, funny enough, has deteriorated” since the opening of the checkpoints (Author’s interview, 2018). In a 2006 study Webster and Timothy discover that nearly 50% of Greek Cypriots surveyed, had never crossed the Green Line, and a further 28% had only visited once (2006: 172). Although Michael suggests the younger population are more keen to promote reconciliation with the ‘other’ (Author’s interview: 2018), studies show that it is in fact the post-war generation which is least likely to cross the border (Dikomitis, 2005: 10; Webster and Timothy, 2006: 172).

Moreover, the de-facto exclusion of the TRNC from the EU, for some, has exasperated the division on the island. The suspension of the acquis communautaire in the TRNC has isolated Turkish Cypriots both politically and economically. While, Turkish Cypriots are legally EU citizens the issue of recognition has put “hermetic barriers between EU engagement and impact in northern Cyprus” (Bouris and Kyris, 2017: 760). On a similar note, Demetriou points out that the Green Line now “marks the edge of Europe” (2008: 65). In this essence a line of division, which is “tearing apart the island” (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018), is actually being deepened by EU integration. Moreover, although the economic improvement of the ROC can be traced to before EU membership, the divide has only grown in the last fifteen years (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). As Ker-Lindsay points out (in reference to Greek Cypriots) “they live in much better houses now, they drive much better cars. Cyprus is much better economically” (Author’s interview: 2018).

Essentially, it can be argued that EU membership has practically worsened the chances of reunification in Cyprus through the two-tracked nature of the process leading

46 more and more to beg the question “what’s the purpose of reunification?” (Ker-Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). However, in regards to identity EU membership certainly has not had a detrimental effect on relations between the two communities. The accession process even acted as a catalyst for some initial improvements in relations, i.e. the opening of the checkpoints, which although still limited, has increased daily contact. Yet, as time has passed it can be found that the EU’s indirect influence on identity has waned. Where despite more opportunities for interaction, the vast majority of Cypriots do not take advantage of them.

3.2.2 The Direct Impact of EU Involvement

In Cyprus the closest instrument to the PEACE programmes is the Cypriot Civil Society in Action schemes. Roughly €2 Million out of the €32 Million the TRNC receives, per annum from the European Commission goes directly to measures aimed at fostering civil society (European Commission, 2014). Although they are primarily aimed at the TRNC, inevitably the reconciliation programs are offered to both sides of the divide. As stated above, much of the money the EU channels to Cyprus is concerned with the conflict and therefore the impact of programmes, such as FAR, will also be accounted for.

These funds have undoubtedly made some key contributions on the whole island of Cyprus. For instance, the EU is the largest contributor to the Committee of Missing Persons (European Court of Auditors, 2012: Para 48), which is widely heralded as “the island’s most successful bi-communal project” (Kovras and Loizides, 2012: 407). Similarly, through these schemes the EU provided the bulk of the €9 Million necessary to demine the Green Line, which acted as a confidence building measure between the two sides (Court of Auditors, 2012: Para 51; European Commission, 2012: 26). In addition, EU funding helps support Cyprus Community Media Centre (CCMC), a bicommunal online radio station on the island (CCMC, 2018). Michael, a contributor to the station, credits the station for granting a platform for young people who are making “social influences” (Author’s interview: 2018). Although, to some extent, Demetriou is right to note that the “fruition of such bicommunal activities has helped the debate around small and large political issues that centre on this ‘change of scripts’”, in reality these bicommunal activities remain painfully limited (2008: 82).

When examined more closely these programmes, although certainly necessary, have had little real impact on identity relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Ultimately,

47 they are very limited and “not felt by the majority” (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). For instance, the CCMC is based inside the demilitarised Green Line (Michael, Author’s interview: 2018), which gives it a sense of detachment from the people. Ker-Lindsay, also recognises that there is an increasing “scepticism” about what these reconciliation funds are really achieving in Cyprus (Author’s interview: 2018). An EU official in Nicosia sums up the overall feeling around the EU’s direct role in Cyprus, stating that “the projects we do are not very controversial” (Author’s interview: 2018). Although there is nothing wrong with this, it shows that the projects lack the ambition of their contemporaries in Northern Ireland.

This thesis also finds that many grassroots peacebuilding programs in Cyprus, survive without ever accessing EU funding. For instance, Michael, set up a peacebuilding project called Nicosia Photo Walks, which aims at “creating relations between people in a very safe environment” (Author’s interview: 2018). However, this project is totally self-reliant. The same applies for Nicosia Walks, a peacebuilding programme set up by Epaminondas, which aims to address the history of Cyprus’s divided capital from a joint perspective (Author’s interview: 2018). These inherently grassroots and bicommunal programmes, ultimately would have received funding if they were in Northern Ireland. Fundamentally, there is a lot of confusion on EU reconciliation funds, as Michael states “I don’t know if there’s a special part of the EU which is going exactly for peacebuilding” (Author’s interview: 2018).

Moreover, far from harnessing new grassroots initiatives, much of this funding is simply plugging the gap left by other states and international organisations, who are scaling back their peacebuilding measures on the island (Jarraud et al., 2013: 54; Ker-Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). For instance, UNDP- ACT, which was the main financer of intercommunal activities on the island was terminated in 2016 (UNDP, 2018). In the first ten years of its existence, UNDP-ACT had contributed $62 Million to programs dedicated to enhancing bicommunal relations (McGearty, UNDP: 2015: 4). Whereas, between, 2007-2013 the EU allocated less €5 million to civil society reconciliation programs (Jarraud et al., 2013: 55). Worryingly, according to the Commission the number of EU contracts in general has “dropped significantly in recent years”, raising doubts on whether the EU can really step into the space left by other actors (European Commission, 2016: Point 4.1).

3.3. Conclusion

Overall, as was discovered in Northern Ireland, a new identity which transcends the old identity divide in Cyprus has not emerged as a result of the EU’s direct or indirect engagement. It is also important to note that EU involvement has not had a detrimental effect on relations. Nevertheless and concerning, for the EU, is the fact that, particularly in reference to its direct involvement, there has not been a significant rapprochement between the two communities. Although the evidence suggests that the EU had the potential to act as a catalyst and indirectly facilitate improve relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, in practice this has not been as effective as many envisioned. In the following chapter, the reasons for this will be discussed.

4. Comparison

The two previous chapters have established the impact that EU involvement, both indirect and direct, has had on the two conflicts. The evidence strongly suggests that a shared identity, whether it be European or a more local identity, is not found in either of the case studies. However, when delving deeper into the two it becomes clear that EU membership has had a more positive effect at softening the identity conflict in Northern Ireland than in Cyprus. As explained in the analytical framework Diez et al.’s conflict transformation theory (2008) is ambiguous when it comes to explaining why this is the case. Therefore this chapter will examine whether Whitman and Wolff’s conflict management theory (2012) can be applied to assess the impact of the EU’s, inherently transformative, integration and accession process. This chapter will examine both the internal capabilities of the EU and the local context of the conflicts to discover whether they contribute to the disparity found between the cases.

Unsurprisingly, one of the main external determinants on the success of the indirect effects of EU membership is the fact that Northern Ireland has been in the EU for significantly longer than Cyprus. Hayward and Weiner argue that it is the “process of EU integration”, not its actors and structures, that best explain the EU’s impact in Northern Ireland (2008: 61). In this sense, it is only natural that Northern Ireland has seen more progress in community relations than Cyprus. This argument fits in well with Lederach’s work which highlights the long-term aspects of conflict transformation, where “deeper and longer-term relational and systemic patterns” of conflict will not be changed overnight (2003: 47). Therefore, the simple opening checkpoints in Cyprus, will not change the fact that, for Greek Cypriots in particular, crossing the Green Line remains “a source of often extreme emotional pain” (Dikomitis, 2005: 8; Webster and Timothy, 2006). This argument can also be applied to the direct effects of EU membership. For instance, the IFI, marked the beginning of direct involvement in Northern Ireland, in 1986, and the much heralded PEACE Funds, were established in 1995. In Cyprus a comparable direct EU contribution only occurred in 2006, leaving them with a significantly shorter timeframe in which to impact community relations.

However, the length of time can often be an easy, go-to answer for academics. Yes, conflict transformation notoriously takes time, but Northern Ireland has experienced violent conflict much more recently than Cyprus. Similarly, if the length of membership is really the

50 only factor, then the argument would imply that in twenty more years Cyprus will have made significant strides in bi-communal relations. However, the evidence gathered suggests otherwise. Whereas future generations consistently remain more progressive in Northern Ireland (Fitzsimmons, Author’s interview: 2018), in Cyprus “the youth are actually more hard-line” (Ker-Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). As shown above, younger Greek Cypriots are less likely to cross the border than their elders and there is a growing disinterest in getting to know the other side (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018).

The evidence points to a number of alternative internal reasons for this. First, EU engagement has been effected by the perception of the conflicting parties towards it. This is particularly the case when it comes to the neutrality, or perceived neutrality, of the EU. In Northern Ireland it is widely accepted that the “EU never took a direct political stance” (Tonge, Author’s interview, 2018). As FitzGerald states “[I]t is simply an organisation which had two member states who had this conflict and this difficulty” (Author’s interview, 2018). Although Fitzsimmons is unsure about how significant the EU’s direct role in Northern Ireland was, he does recognise the “neutral position” of the EU (Author’s interview: 2018). This distinguishes the EU from other third party actors, such as the US, as EU money was viewed as “neutral” by Unionists, who were more cautious of accepting US aid (Connelly, New Statesman: 2018).

It is important to note that the EU is not seen as some overarching benevolent third party which brought peace to Northern Ireland. Many in the, more left-wing leaning, Nationalist community are “sceptical” of the EU’s economic policies (Hackett, Author’s interview: 2018). Similarly, the breakdown of the Brexit referendum results, where 60% of Protestants voted leave, clearly displays a rejection of aspects of the EU in the Unionist community (Garry, 2017: 2; Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018). Despite often negative perceptions of the EU, critically its resources were appreciated as neutral and accepted by all sides. As Warde-Hunter recognises, the EU was often viewed as “a lumbering bureaucracy, but as long as the money kept coming people put up with it” (Author’s interview: 2018).

On the other hand, the EU has consistently made political statements about its preferred outcome to the conflict in Cyprus. In no uncertain terms, the EU has long pushed for the reunification of the island of Cyprus. The Council of the European Union declared in 2006 that the EU “has repeatedly underlined its strong preference for accession by a reunited Cyprus” (2006: Para 1). Similarly, the EU have not hidden that “the overall objective of the

FAR is to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus” (Bouris and Kyris, 2017: 261). Although, these statements may seem uncontroversial, it significantly alters the role of the EU in respect to the two conflicts. In Northern Ireland the EU has made sure to “brand” itself in the most neutral way possible, in regards to the outcome of the conflict (Hackett, Author’s interview: 2018). The 1984 Haagerup Report stated that “it is not up to an outside body like the European Parliament to ‘dictate’ anything resembling political proposals” (1984: 69). Similarly, Jacques Delors reiterated this in 1992 stating “I don’t feel that the European Commission has a duty to interfere in the internal problems of a country” (in Murphy, 2016: 71). This is not to say that the EU ever intended to force an agreement in Cyprus, but the fact that the EU clearly has a political motive changes the dynamic of the relationship between the EU and the conflicting parties.

This more overt political stance is not the only reason why the EU is not viewed as a neutral actor in Cyprus. More noticeably, the perception of the EU is also effected by the internal decision to accept a divided Cyprus. Therefore, from a Greek Cypriot and EU perspective the EU may be “totally viewed as a neutral actor” (EU Official, Author’s interview: 2108; Michael, Author’s interview: 2018), but Turkish Cypriots take a very different stance. They feel that the inclusion of both Greece and the ROC, and the exclusion of Turkey and the TRNC mean that they face the “solidarity of the EU against them” (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). Essentially since the accession of a divided Cyprus, the EU “has been written off as a constructive force for the resolution of the conflict” by Turkish Cypriots (Diez and Tocci, 2010: 183). Similarly, Ker-Lindsay recognises, that “Turkish Cypriots became increasingly bitter, with many believing that they had been deceived by the European Union” (Ker-Lindsay, 2011: 72). Therefore in Northern Ireland the EU and it’s money is viewed as neutral. Yet in Cyprus the EU can never hold this position of a non-partisan, honest broker.

The inclusion of the ROC and the de-facto exclusion of the TRNC, has also constrained the EU’s capabilities to coordinate. As Tocci notes these traditional constraints stemmed from Greece and the UK, who “adamantly resisted an EU involvement in the conflict” (2007: 30). More recently this resistance has most obviously come from the ROC, who use their EU platform to “‘protect’ its national interests” (Ioannides, 2017: 632). The Greek Cypriot predominant and all-encompassing fear of “recognition by implication”, means that anything approaching direct interaction with TRNC institutions would be resisted “at all costs” (Demetriou, 2008: 81; Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). In

52 this regard a further €259 million the EU “pledged for development of the north” has been held up in Brussels by ROC officials, who dispute the manner in which these funds were to be channelled to the north (Demetriou, 2008: 83).This is not to say, that in reference to the Northern Irish conflict, the UK welcomed a strong EU contribution, but that the UK certainly saw no issue with the EU acting as a “cash-cow” (Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018).

Although the above reasons largely relate to the direct impact of the EU’s engagement in the conflicts, internal decisions by the EU have also affected the impact of the EU’s indirect involvement in the conflict. This is particularly relevant, in relation to the obstruction of Turkey’s accession to the EU. This thesis is not taking a position on whether Turkey should be included or not, it is simply making the point that the exclusion of Turkey has had a detrimental effect on the EU’s indirect impact on community relations in Cyprus. As explained above, due to both the UK and Ireland being members, the EU indirectly influenced the relationship between the two, putting a stop to the “megaphone diplomacy”, which had defined relations between the two prior to 1973 (Hayward and Weiner, 2009: 41; Mulhall, Time Inc.: 2016; Tannam, 2012: 60). These improved relations, ultimately filtered down to the relationships between the communities in Northern Ireland. In Cyprus, where this connection to the parent state is arguably stronger, as “Turkey is the motherland for Turkish Cypriots and Greece is the motherland for Greek Cypriots” (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018), the potential for this filter down effect is even greater.

In this regard, the exclusion of Turkey has obstructed the potentially for the blossoming of a similar relationship. The framework of EU membership permitted the UK and Ireland to work together on conflict related issues, whereas, in Cyprus, conflicted related issues “brought the two mother countries precariously close to direct military involvement” (Tannam, 2012: 52; Zink, 2008: 594). This argument is strengthened by Yavas (2013), who finds that Greek and Turkish relations significantly improved in the late 1990s when Turkey was being seriously considered as a candidate country. Yet the potentially for this in an EU context has never been fully realised. Similarly, the exclusion of Turkey, and the de-facto exclusion of the TRNC, has in many regards deepened the ‘us’ vs ‘them’ mentality in Cyprus. As Kyris finds, this effectively has seen the ROC become “‘armed’ behind the EU membership status” and led to the TRNC “committing to further integration with Turkey” (2012: 89 & 95).

Although these internal factors have certainly played a role in effecting the reception of the EU in the conflicts. It would be naïve to not account for the fact that the conflicts are inherently different in nature. In the two previous chapters, the evidence clearly demonstrates that in both conflicts the EU had the potential to act as a catalyst for social interaction between communities that for years had very little contact. For instance, the opening of the checkpoints in Cyprus and the withering away of the border on the island of island. However, the facts on the ground in Northern Ireland has made this contact easier to facilitate. The Good Friday Agreement is currently in its twentieth year, and although it’s had ups and downs, a successful peace process has developed in Northern Ireland, with the Provisional IRA decommissioning their weapons in 2005 and Sinn Fein endorsing the rule of law and the police services in 2007 (O’Kane, 2013: 531; Dixon, 2011: 650 & 652). As Farrington notes, despite the fact the Good Friday Agreement has not changed many of the constitutional disagreements “the actual disputes and the context in which they operate have altered significantly” (2006: 277).

This is not to say that contact has been easy in Northern Ireland, where 90% of social housing remains segregated (Capener, The Guardian 2017; Warde-Hunter, Author’s interview: 2018). Yet ultimately, the geographic separation in Cyprus remains greater, with a UN manned demilitarised zone dividing the two communities. This contrast is seen clearly in relation to border crossings. At the time of writing, there are around 250 border crossings between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Merrick, The Independent: 2017), compared to a mere six in Cyprus (Taylor, The Atlantic: 2014). This reality of partition has culminated in a complete lack of trust in the other side in Cyprus (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018). This variance is also present in the field of education. Although in Northern Ireland less than 7% of schools are integrated “all schools have to teach the core curriculum” (Fitzsimmons, Author’s interview: 2018). In Cyprus, not only are the vast majority of children educated separately, but the “education systems are parallel” and have long aimed at “creating affiliation to the community or to the nation” (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018; Gillespie et al., 2011: 5; Papadakis, 2008: 131).

The unavoidable implications of the realities of the conflicts themselves have particularly impacted the success of the EU’s direct involvement. From Whitman and Wolff’s national level of analysis it should not be underestimated that Northern Ireland’s “economy is arguably the most subsidized” in Western Europe (Byrne et al., 2009: 476), with the UK roughly spending €16,000 per head each year (Elliott, The Guardian, 2017). Amazingly, by

54 the mid-1990s although the EU was contributing €200 million per annum to Northern Ireland this was a mere 0.6% of the money being pumped in from the UK (Teague, 1996: 553). Ultimately, this “immense” funding from central government allowed a freedom for EU initiatives, such as PEACE, to almost exclusively focus on reconciliation projects with a more conflict transformation character (Tonge, Author’s interview: 2018).

This luxury is plainly not the case in Cyprus. Much of the funds in Cyprus have been spent on short-term tasks, with a more conflict management character. For instance, the Court of Auditors report that 25% of all reconciliation funding between 2006 and 2011 was spent on demining the demilitarised zone (2012: Annex 1). Although this task, which saw the removal of 27,000 landmines, was certainly necessary the impact on identity relations appears to be minimal (European Commission, 2012: 26). Similarly, much of the €32 million that the EU disburses in the TRNC is reserved for projects that aim to tackle the “profound” differences in living standards and infrastructure, between the ROC and the TRNC (EU Official, Author’s interview: 2018). The Court of Auditors reveal that €129 million of the EU’s total expenditure to the TRNC (2006-2011), went on infrastructure projects, particularly in the areas of telecommunications and environmental issues (2012: Annex 1). Although, as mentioned before, these initiatives are ultimately concerned with the reunification of the island, they are more practical and less identity orientated than EU projects in Northern Ireland. As FitzGerald highlights “most of the PEACE money went on people, it didn’t go on buildings” (Author’s interview: 2018).

From a more local level of analysis, the evidence strongly suggests that the strength of civil society in Northern Ireland compared to Cyprus, resulted in a more receptive environment for EU funds. As prominent activist Hinds points out “we have been blessed by a very vibrant grassroots community, including women organisations, that existed before EU money” (Author’s interview: 2018). In Northern Ireland, which is home to 3500-5000 civil society organisations, of which over half existed before 1986 (Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action, 2006: 13-14), 20% of Catholics and 21% of Protestants are members of a civil society organisation (Murtagh, 2002: 2). Essentially “Northern Ireland is rich in social capital, and has a vibrant civil society”, which has existed long before EU involvement (Acheson and Milofsky, 2008: 64-5; Byrne, 2001: 339). This luxury has not been the case in Cyprus, where “there isn’t a great tradition of civil society activity” (Anastasiou, 2008: 182; Ker-Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018). As the 2011CIVICUS report on the state of civil society in Cyprus uncovered, there remains a “lack of engagement” with civil society

55 organisations, with only 14% of Greek Cypriots and 10% of Turkish Cypriots professing to be active members of an organisation (World Alliance for Citizen Participation, 2011: 184- 192). This has resulted in a peace process which is “not conducive to providing platforms for civil society (or citizens in general)” (Gillespie et al., 2011, 17).

Crucially, civil society in Northern Ireland has long been a “non-partisan civil society” (Hinds, Author’s interview: 2018). As Murtagh highlights 70% of Catholics and 61% of Protestants, who are involved in a club or society, do so in an integrated setting (2002: 2). The emergence of a similar non-partisan, pro-reconciliation civil society, has always faced hurdles in Cyprus. This is partly down to the partition of the island which meant that until recently “contacts between civil society organisations across the Buffer Zone were almost impossible” (Jarraud et al., 2013: 48). In 1993 when the Fulbright Commission organised civil society workshops within the Green Line, civil society activists remained separated for the first two years of the programme (ibid: 48-9). Astonishingly, in 1997, the TRNC government even banned peacebuilding activities (Laouris, 2011: 99). This stark contrast can be seen in the role of religious civil society organisations in both conflicts. As Byrne, points out, in Northern Ireland “[T]he churches have reached across the bicommunal divide”, playing a vital role in the 1994 ceasefire (2001: 339). Whereas in Cyprus the Orthodox Church, in particular, has long promoted the idea of the Greekness of the island (Michael, Author’s interview: 2018) and actively campaigned against the Annan Plan (Jarraud et al., 2013: 51).

Certainly, the context of the two conflicts has impacted the effectiveness of the EU’s impact on softening identity stances. Yet, as explained above, the internal capabilities of the EU also account for the success of its engagement in the conflicts. Almost paradoxically, to the widely recognised issue of neutrality, the evidence suggest another internal reason why the EU has been more successful in changing identity scripts in Northern Ireland. Interestingly, this has largely been overlooked when it comes to accounting for the organisations capability to act. This relates to the issue that, although the EU did not have a partisan political interest in the outcome of the conflict in Northern Ireland, the EU was desperate for a political win. The first ceasefires were called in 1994 in Northern Ireland, just two years after the EU’s political expansion through the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Therefore a resolution to a conflict, which had been running for decades, represented the perfect opportunity for the EU to announce itself on the global stage as a conflict resolver. Essentially, a successful involvement in Northern Ireland “justified the EU’s expansion in

56 terms of its competences” (Tonge, Author’s communication: 2018). This thinking, although cynical, is supported by the continued use of the Northern Ireland ‘model’ by the EU for “lesson-learning and modelling” (Hayward and Murphy, 2012: 439). For instance, on a visit to the province, Barroso predictably declared “[W]e can use Northern Ireland as an inspiration for other parts of the world” (Barroso, 2008: 2). Similarly, Commissioner Hubner, argues that “[T]his work[i.e. peacebuilding] is important not only for Northern Ireland, but also for other parts of Europe which can learn valuable lessons from what has been achieved here” (European Commission, 2007a).

One may argue that Cyprus could have just as easily been this ‘win’ for the EU. As Yilmaz states the lack of a resolution in Cyprus severely “weakens the credibility of the international community to deal with intra-state conflicts” (2008: 427). However, the Cypriot conflict always presented more risks. For starters, there has always existed a fear that an overtly direct involvement in Cyprus, was a security risk. Fundamentally “no one wants to poke the hornets’ nest” in Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot Official, Author’s interview: 2018). Essentially, while Northern Ireland sits on the edge of the Atlantic, with largely amicable parent states, Cyprus lies in a potential hostile region, with two easily agitated parent states. As Tocci points out “EU interests in the Cyprus conflict are defined in relation to its wider concerns for peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean” (2007: 28). In this sense, involvement in the conflict in Northern Ireland constituted a win-win situation, whereas in Cyprus, the EU had everything to lose. This disparity in ‘political will’, in a combination with the other factors, helps to explain why between 2007-2012 a mere €5 million went directly to civil society bicommunal schemes in Cyprus (Jarraud et al., 2013: 55), whereas from 2007- 2013 a colossal €225 million went straight to grassroots projects in Northern Ireland through PEACE III (Special EU Programmes Body, 2016: 2).

4.1 Conclusion

Overall, the evidence determines that a combination of both external factors and internal capabilities, explain why a disparity exists between the success of the integration and accession process at transforming identity in the two conflicts. The first and most obvious being that Northern Ireland has been in the EU much longer than Cyprus and therefore has benefited from both the indirect, facilitative effect of EU membership, and its financial support, for significantly longer. Moreover, it is impossible to deny that Northern Ireland and

Cyprus are very different conflicts, where the catalytic effects of EU membership have been more readily received in the former. However, it has been discovered that it is not simply events outside the EU’s control which impact the way in which the EU influences the conflicts. In practice, internal decisions and actions affect the EU’s capabilities to transform identity in the two conflicts. In Northern Ireland the desire for a political win led to a disparity between the EU’s capabilities to act and to fund compared to Cyprus. Finally, the exclusion of Turkey from the EU has ultimately restricted the EU’s potential to have a positive impact on a conflict, which is fundamentally and intrinsically linked to the parent states. This will be discussed in regards to the hypotheses in the empirical findings in the following chapter.

5. Conclusions

The purpose of this research has been two-fold. First, this thesis established the extent in which the EU integration and accession process impacted identity relations in the two case studies. Second, this research has also added to the academic discussion on what makes EU involvement in conflicts successful. Whitman and Wolff’s (2012) theory, which applies to the management of conflicts in the EU’s Neighbourhood, has been extended to examine the reasons why disparities exist between the success of EU engagement in conflicts closer to home. In order to achieve this, this thesis established that in the identity conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus conflict transformation represents the most appropriate tradition of conflict resolution to explain the impact of the EU’s integration and accession process on identity. This is the result of other actors taking responsibility for the day-to-day management of these conflicts. In Northern Ireland, the British state takes responsibility for this and in Cyprus, since 1964, the UN performs these tasks. Consequently, the EU role is found to be more on the edges of the conflict, with a more long-term dimension to the engagement. This engagement occurs both through direct EU measures and the indirect context of membership.

5.1 Empirical Findings

In this section, the hypotheses presented in the introduction will be tested. As expressed above these five hypotheses can be divided into two groups. The first three relate to ‘how’ the EU impacts identity in the two conflicts and are as follows:

H1. The European Union has constructed a shared identity in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H2. The European Union transformed existing identities to become less conflictual in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

H3. The European Union has entrenched existing conflicting identities in Northern Ireland and/or Cyprus.

The empirical evidence gathered convincingly concludes that EU involvement, whether it be direct or indirect, has not led to the emergence of a shared identity, which transcends the old ethnic fault lines, in either Cyprus or Northern Ireland. The idea of a common Europeanness can be out rightly rejected, as it lacks both statistical and qualitative

59 support. This is not to say that a European identity does not exist, but that it certainly is not an overarching identity. However, in both cases a growing proportion of statistical data, such as censuses, EU public opinion surveys and election surveys, suggests the growth of what appears to be a shared local identity, whether it be Northern Irish or Cypriot. Yet, when delving further into this it is found that these statistics are misleading and in both cases the traditional, conflictual, identities remain pre-eminent. Interestingly, the qualitative evidence finds that people often have a different perception of what this supposedly shared identity means. For instance, in Cyprus for many Greek Cypriots, the notion of a Cypriot identity is viewed from an exclusive Hellenic perspective (Psaltis and Cakal, 2016: 241). Hence, when it comes to the first hypothesis it is uncovered that a shared identity, as a result of EU influence, does not exist.

In regards to the second hypothesis there is significantly more traction for discussion. In Northern Ireland, the context of EU membership has certainly improved identity relations between Nationalists and Unionists. Essentially, this context facilitated the growth of an environment which made the constitutional issue less antagonistic, with Nationalists feeling less isolated from their kin in the South and Unionists feeling less threatened by a more European Ireland. In Cyprus, some argue the indirect effects of both accession and integration have had a negative effect on reunification, with the de-facto exclusion of the TRNC creating a two-speed integration process, exasperating economic cleavages (Ker- Lindsay, Author’s interview: 2018; Turkish Cypriot official, Author’s interview: 2018). However, in relation to identity, it would be disingenuous to argue that EU membership has not been largely positive. The EU is recognised to have provided the impetus for the opening of the checkpoints in 2003 (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018), and has generally helped forge a more outward-looking Cyprus (Michael, Author’s interview: 2018). This softening of identity has admittedly occurred to a lesser extent in Cyprus than in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, in both cases hypothesis 3, can be out-rightly rejected, as European engagement certainly has not led to a regression in identity relations.

Similarly, the effect of the EU’s direct role, through direct financial support, can certainly be witnessed in relation to the second hypothesis. The colossal and well-coordinated funds stemming from PEACE have directly improved community relations in Northern Ireland. Although this has not been as significant as the indirect effects of EU membership, these improved community relations have undoubtedly led to a softening of the identity division, allowing for a shared space to develop between both sides (Hackett, Author’s

60 interview: 2018). The scope of the direct financial impact of EU funds on identity in Cyprus, is much trickier to gauge. The uncoordinated nature of the EU’s direct involvement means that much of the EU’s financial contributions to the TRNC is conflict related (European Council, 2006: Article 1, Para 1; Kyris, 2009: 93). Despite this, these EU funds have largely failed to soften the identity divide. There exists a lot of confusion on the aims of the funds and many grassroots movements operate without their support (Epaminondas, Author’s interview: 2018; Michael, Author’s interview: 2018). The politicisation of this direct involvement can also be argued to have negatively impacted identity relations between the two communities, as they have further highlighted the legal issues between the two parts of the island (Bouris and Kyris, 2017). However, the primary evidence suggests that this can be overstated and in reality both sides of the community call for a greater EU economic involvement (Turkish Cypriot official, Author’s interview: 2018). These findings are condensed in Table 3, where each hypothesis is given a score between 0-5, where ‘0’ equals ‘no impact’ and ‘5’ equals ‘strong impact’. Essentially, hypothesis 1 and 3 can be firmly rejected, as neither of the two cases has witnessed the emergence of a shared identity or seen a regression in identity relations as a result of EU involvement. In regards to hypothesis 2, the results are more varied. In both cases it is found that the EU has helped soften the identity divide, although in Northern Ireland it has been substantially more successful. In addition it is found that in both cases the integration and accession process is more effective at softening the identity divide through indirect means.

Table 3: Hypotheses Test

Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 3 Northern Ireland 0 4 0 (Indirect) Cyprus 0 2 0 (Indirect)

Northern Ireland 0 3 0 (Direct) Cyprus 0 1 0 (Direct)

This thesis has additionally, addressed the disparity between the impact of the EU on the two cases, using the following two hypotheses:

H4. The internal capabilities of the European Union explains the disparity between the two cases.

H5. The external context of the conflicts explains the disparity between the two cases.

As Diez et al (2008) alludes, “events outside the EU’s control”, are expected to play a decisive role in determining the EU’s success (2008: 3). However, this research has shown that although important, it far from solely accounts for the disparity between the success of EU engagement. In reality there is a delicate balance between both internal capabilities and the external context. For instance, the fact that a positive engagement in Northern Ireland was a win-win opportunity for the EU to announce itself on the world stage, should not be understated when accounting for the sheer scale and coordination of the PEACE Funds, compared to Cyprus. As expressed, an overtly strong EU presence in Cyprus has always been curtailed by a fear of poking the hornet’s nest.

Similarly, a number of internal EU decisions have impacted the perception of the EU in the conflicts. The EU’s exclusion of Turkey, has cemented a view among many Turkish Cypriots, that the EU is no honest broker and is in fact used by Greece and Greek Cypriots to promote their own interests. This is in stark contrast to the perception of the EU in Northern Ireland. This is not to say the EU is adored in Northern Ireland, but with respect to the conflict, both sides perceived it as being non-partisan. In addition, this exclusion of Turkey also negatively affected the indirect impact that improved relations, between the parent states of Greece and Turkey, could have fostered. Crucially, this research has found that, the inclusion of both the UK and Ireland not only improved relations between the two, but had a filter down effect towards the two communities in Northern Ireland (Hinds, Author’s interview: 2018; Warde-Hunter, Author’s interview: 2018). In Cyprus, where attachment to the mother state is arguably larger, the opportunities offered by EU membership to improve Greek-Turkish relations would almost certainly have had a positive impact on bicommunal relations.

Nevertheless, the external context of the conflicts undoubtedly effects EU engagement too. It has been found that local and national external factors are the most important determinants of the EU’s success. For instance, Northern Ireland is engaged in a successful peace process and Cyprus is not. The context of partition in Cyprus, severely harms the EU’s direct involvement, with a significant portion of EU funds going to more practical and short-term projects, such as demining the Green Line. The everyday reality of

62 partition also makes it substantially harder for the EU to indirectly facilitate an improvement in relations between the two communities, as contact between the two communities is trickier to inspire. Obviously, Northern Ireland remains a divided society, but where Belfast is divided by neighbourhoods and city streets, Nicosia is divided by a UN manned demilitarised zone. Hence, Northern Ireland was more receptive to the indirect effects of EU membership, which saw barriers break down between the two communities. Moreover, the success of the Good Friday Agreement permitted EU projects in Northern Ireland to almost exclusively be reserved for grassroots civil society organisations and the people most damaged by the divide. Essentially, both hypotheses can be confirmed.

5.2 Conceptual Findings

The findings of this thesis have added to the understanding of the EU’s integration and accession process, building on Diez et al. (2008) four pathway theory. Firstly, using the case studies of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, it has added to the well-recognised but understudied constructive impact pathway, which focuses on the importance of identity in conflicts. Thus demonstrating how the integration and accession process impacts identity through a combination of direct and indirect measures. Secondly, as conflict transformation inadequately accounts for ‘why’ this is the case, a conflict management theory (Whitman and Wolff, 2012) has been used to provide a framework examining ‘why’ the EU is successful in transforming certain conflicts and not others. Ultimately, this has demonstrated that both internal factors and the external circumstances affect the success of EU engagement in conflicts.

In regard to the conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus it would be interesting to understand further, why local and national determinants are more important at explaining the EU’s success compared to regional and global determinants. Furthermore, in regards to these case studies, a cross-sectional interviewing project could complement the elite interviewing conducted in this research by attaining a more bottom-up perspective of the EU’s role in transforming identity. Moreover, future research can build upon this more complete explanation of the success of the integration and accession process, to examine the EU’s role in additional conflicts. Concerning for the EU, is the reality that most conflicts in the EU’s Neighbourhood do not appear to possess the conducive conditions necessary for a successful transformation of identities. For instance, both Northern Ireland and Cyprus are much more

63 favourable conflicts for EU engagement than the Israel/Palestinian conflict, where the management of the conflicts is less stable and the EU faces a composition of internal divisions.

To conclude, the integration and accession process has failed to create a shared identity in Northern Ireland or Cyprus. However, the evidence gathered clearly finds that the EU has more successfully impacted identity relations in Northern Ireland. This is the result of a combination of both internal and external factors, which can be generalised. From an internal perspective the EU is most effective at transforming conflicts when it plays an apolitical, non-partisan role. This allows more readily for the coordination of its funds and significantly effects the reception, by the local parties, of the EU. Moreover, EU involvement is better able to affect the transformation of a conflict when the conflict is in a more stable conflict management stage, with this management being performed by a third party. This allows for the EU to coordinate its direct involvement, i.e. its funding, more freely to grassroots, conflict transformation projects and also leads to a more positive environment for the indirect, facilitation of improved identity relations.

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