i [H.A.S.C. No. 115–94] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING ON REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 HEARING HELD MARCH 22, 2018 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 30–564 WASHINGTON : 2019 SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York, Chairwoman BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana JIM COOPER, Tennessee LIZ CHENEY, Wyoming, Vice Chair JACKIE SPEIER, California JOE WILSON, South Carolina MARC A. VEASEY, Texas FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado BETO O’ROURKE, Texas AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida JODY B. HICE, Georgia MARK PEPPLE, Professional Staff Member LINDSAY KAVANAUGH, Professional Staff Member NEVE SCHADLER, Clerk (II) C O N T E N T S Page STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 2 Stefanik, Hon. Elise M., a Representative from New York, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................................... 1 WITNESSES Osterman, LtGen Joseph L., USMC, Deputy Commander, U.S. Special Oper- ations Command .................................................................................................. 8 Oxford, Vayl, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency .................................. 7 Rapuano, Kenneth P., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy ...... 3 Roberts, Hon. Guy B., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment ........................................................................ 5 APPENDIX PREPARED STATEMENTS: Osterman, LtGen Joseph L. ............................................................................. 66 Oxford, Vayl ...................................................................................................... 51 Rapuano, Kenneth P. ....................................................................................... 27 Roberts, Hon. Guy B. ....................................................................................... 42 Stefanik, Hon. Elise M. .................................................................................... 25 DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: [There were no Documents submitted.] WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 77 (III) REVIEWING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY, POLICY, AND PROGRAMS FOR COUNTERING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 22, 2018. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:18 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elise M. Stefanik (chairwoman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ELISE M. STEFANIK, A REPRE- SENTATIVE FROM NEW YORK, CHAIRWOMAN, SUBCOMMIT- TEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Ms. STEFANIK. The subcommittee will come to order. Thank you for your patience. Welcome, everyone, to today’s hearing on the Department of De- fense’s [DOD’s] policy and programs for countering weapons of mass destruction [CWMD] for fiscal year [FY] 2019. Almost 1 year ago, we met to discuss this same topic amidst news of Syria’s repeated use of chemical agents and North Korea’s advancements in nuclear weapons as well as their asymmetric use of nerve agent for political assassination. In the year between, reports have surfaced of North Korea’s bio- logical weapons program and their regular transfer of chemical weapons technology to Syria. We have also seen Russia’s attempted use of a military-grade nerve agent in support of their ongoing po- litical assassination campaigns. Needless to say, a lot has hap- pened in just a year. The pursuit and potential use of weapons of mass destruction re- mains a high-consequence threat to our national security. Thank- fully, we have not seen any use domestically, but we must not take this for granted. As the past few years have shown, the use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] is unfortunately becoming more and more com- monplace. Low barriers and, in some cases, no barriers to entry should force us to continually review and evaluate our programs, policies, and activities designed to counter and mitigate these threats across the WMD spectrum, from state and nonstate actors alike. From an adversarial standpoint, I am particularly concerned about advancements being made in the areas of synthetic biology [syn bio] and biotechnology. China and Russia continue to pursue gene editing and unique approaches to biotechnology that should give us all tremendous pause. (1) 2 With respect to nonstate threats, some analysts say that the po- tential for a single undetected terrorist group to develop and deploy first-seen engineered pathogens has never been higher. And as the subcommittee has discussed before, synthetic biology and gene edit- ing, when combined with high-performance computing and access to large-scale genetic data sets, has the potential to redefine bio- logical threats as we know them today. With all of this in mind, we can understand the importance of today’s hearing. We have before us four distinguished witnesses: from my left, Mr. Ken Rapuano, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security; Mr. Guy Roberts, Assistant Secretary of Defense [ASD] for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs; Mr. Vayl Oxford, Director of the Defense Threat Reduc- tion Agency [DTRA]; and Lieutenant General Joseph Osterman, Deputy Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command [SOCOM]. I would now like to take a moment to recognize Ranking Member Jim Langevin for his opening remarks. [The prepared statement of Ms. Stefanik can be found in the Appendix on page 25.] STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTA- TIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOM- MITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Chairwoman Stefanik. And thanks to our witnesses for being here today to provide tes- timony on the Department of Defense’s strategy, policy, programs, and preparedness for countering weapons of mass destruction and the fiscal year 2019 CWMD budget request. In 2014, the Department released its strategy for CWMD, which outlined three end states: that no new actors possess WMD; that there be no WMD use; and that, should WMD be used, that there be a minimization of their effects, with associated objectives and lines of effort. The strategy notes that fiscal constraints require that DOD makes strategic choices and accept some risk. However, increas- ingly bold rogue actors and technological advances are challenging the strategy’s goal of ensuring that the U.S. and its allies and part- ners are not attacked or coerced by adversaries possessing WMD. For example, earlier this month, we witnessed a peacetime chem- ical weapons attack in the United Kingdom [U.K.] in an assassina- tion attempt on one of Russia’s former military intelligence officers. This attack on one of our closest allies, perpetrated by Vladimir Putin, demands a strong and unequivocal response, which is why I introduced bipartisan House Resolution 786 last week in condem- nation of this attack in support of our allies. In Syria, pro-regime forces and ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] consider the use of chemical weapons on civilian popu- lations as advantageous to achieving tactical and strategic objec- tives. Technological advancements, especially in biotech, as Chair- woman Stefanik has referred to, may allow individuals with nefar- 3 ious intent, or simply by chance, to produce biological agents in a scope and scale not yet encountered. Since the strategy was released, the Department has taken some initial steps to strengthen CWMD efforts. In 2017, Special Oper- ations Command was designated as the coordinating authority for CWMD. Today, we will hear from Lieutenant General Osterman, the Deputy Commander of SOCOM, about how the command is leveraging best practices from its traditional missions and from les- sons learned in its role as CA [coordinating authority] for counter- ing violent extremism, to reinvigorating CWMD awareness, plan- ning capacity and capability across the DOD and the interagency. The witnesses also include Assistant Secretary of Defense Ken Rapuano and ASD Guy Roberts as well as Director Vayl Oxford from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. Together, these indi- viduals hold positions that comprise the bulk of assigned roles and responsibilities associated with aligning CWMD policy, strategy, and programs, executing CWMD programs, and delivering current and future personal protective equipment and other CWMD capa- bilities to our warfighters. Since the last