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Digital Dependence: Cybersecurity in the 21St Century

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Digital Dependence: Cybersecurity in the 21St Century Digital Dependence: Cybersecurity in the 21st Century Melissa E. Hathaway Senior Advisor, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard University Presented as part of Project Minerva 14 October 2010 © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 October 29, 1969: The First Transmission ❖ http://www.picsearch.com/info.cgi?q=1969%20Internet&id=PVUGViNVCGnNvPh-pX1_sm_AoVagXS4c9lomC0G41zY © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence 1971—Creeper Worm demonstrates mobility and self- replicating 1978: TCP-IP Commitment 1979—Intel introduces programs on becomes to anonymity universally- 8088 CPU and ARPANet ushers in the new era and open 1974—Development of the accepted global of the microprocessor. systems Graphical User Interface standard to supply (GUI) at the Xerox Palo Alto network layer and Research Center (PARC) transport layer ARPANet 1972: File Transfer functionality 1981: IBM personal Transmisison and TCP (packet switch) computer 1969 1970 1972 1973 1974 1977 1978 1979 1981 1982 1973: Collaboration of ARPANet Virtual 1977: Emergence of 1982: AT&T Scientists Communication Smaller divestiture in with Europe Computers (Tandy return for and Apple 1979: First opportunity to Computers) commercially go into 1970—Intel introduces 1973: Motorola invented automated cellular computer first 1k DRAM the first cellular portable network (the 1G business generation) was launched chip. telephone to be 1977: Microsoft commercialized in Japan by Nippon Forms Telegraph Telephone © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Foreshadow the Future: 1981? ❖ http://books.google.com/books?id=a-YDAAAAMBAJ&pg=PA11&lpg=PA11&dq=computerized+detente+john +markoff&source=bl&ots=w2lZQuT6ro&sig=3M268mjIqFSq-HXLTFffD- NmYdk&hl=en&ei=AHq8S5iAA4aM8gTwrOn5Bw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=3&ved=0CAsQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=computerized%20detente %20john%20markoff&f=false © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Reflection on the First 13 Years ❖ Mobile platforms emerge with the birth of personal computer and cellular voice communications ❖ ARPANet enabled global data communications ❖ AT&T divestiture signaled first market force tensions -- innovation at the expense of national security and the beginning of loss of interest in State influence of core infrastructure (control) © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence 1983: DNS Registry lays foundation for expansion of Internet 1988: Digital (ensure interoperability) 1990: CERN Equipment Corp. develops HTML White Paper on code and software 1983: DoD Begins using Firewalls (world wide web is MilNet--mandates possible) TCP-IP for all 1985: Microsoft 1988: DoD Funds unclassified systems Windows; Utility Carnegie Mellon (ARPANet Continues for of Computer Easier Academic Community CERT-CC for Consumer under NSF leadership) IT Shifts Power; State begins to cede control to the 1983 1985 1988 1989 1983: Wargames Private Sector 1988: Internet Worm (Morris) 1983: First 1985: Generic Infection affects 10% Rise of Internet Innovation Virus Emerges top-level domains of the Internet’s (Risk/ were officially computers 1989: DoD Corporate Vulnerabilities) implemented Information Management (.com, .gov, (Disrupts Internet for Days) (CIM) Initiative to identify .mil, .edu) and implement 1983: Ameritech management efciencies in launches first 1G DoD information systems Cellular Network in (Foreshadow of COTs) Chicago © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Dawn of Information Sharing ❖ World Wide Web enables expanded and user-friendly information sharing on the Internet © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Reflection at Year 20 ❖ DoD becomes the early adopter of the technology ❖ Private sector driving innovation and adoption with value proposition of productivity and efficiency and consumer usability of technology ❖ Foreshadow the potential for e-commerce with .com domain and emergence of world wide web ❖ First demonstration of vulnerability and exploitation possibilities and subsequent emergence of a new market (e.g., Firewall, anti-virus software, IDS and IPS) © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence Organized Electronic Crime Infrastructure Instant Messaging Emerges 1995: AOL Phishing Attacks for 1993: WWW with passwords and 1991: National Mosaic Browser -- Credit Card Academy of Sciences: Internet adoption Information Computers at Risk advances Report 1994: $10M Stolen 1993: MILNET from Citibank 1995: The Net becomes NIPRNET 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1992: OSD Issues 1991: First 1995: Evident Surprise Policy 1994: VCJCS Directs IW Wargame GSM network 3600.2 launches in Joint Warfare DEPSECDEF and IC Information Capability Assessment Agree to Coordinate IW Policy Finland giving Warfare way to 2G cellular Networks Government shifts to COTS 1994: Nokia proof -- send data over cell 1992: Sneakers phone (Wi-Fi possible) © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence 1999: US Space Command 1996: ITU works on 1997: Framework for Assigned military Standard (H-323) for Voice Electronic Global Cyber Ofense-Defense over Internet Protocol Commerce (policy) Mission Responsibility (voice and data over single 1998: Internet Encourage Corporation of Assigned network reduces International infrastructure costs) Names and Numbers Net Centric Warfare Concept adoption of DNS (ICANN) Established emerges 1996: Defense Science Board Paper: 1997: Google 1998: PDD-63 Critical 1999: Melissa Virus Information Search Engine Infrastructure Sets Stage for Rapid Warfare -Defense invented Protection Policy Infections 1996 1997 1998 1999 1996: OSD Issues 1997: 802.11 Policy Shift Begins: 3600.1 International Trust Model breaking down 1999: In-Q-Tel Information Operations Standard agreed to established to Broadening the Definition (Wi-Fi global) help to Engage during Peace 1998: DoD creates Government 1997: Eligible Receiver Exercise JTF-CND to address innovate Focus DOD and IC on Vulnerabilities of Threats to DoD US Infrastructure & Foreign IO Programs networks 1996: US relaxes 1999: export controls on DCI agrees to use same 1997: President’s Commission on 1998: Solar Sunrise: encryption products definitions Critical Infrastructure Protection DoD penetrations to foster global Signing out DCID 7-3 electronic commerce (Nation is Vulnerable) realized © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Reflection at Year 30 ❖ Rapid infections on Internet realized; policymakers begin to discuss and write about problem ❖ Organized electronic crime infrastructure emerges--anonymity provides safe have for criminals-- e-commerce trust model begins to break down ❖ Data over wireless emerges as next market wave and voice over Internet presents a second market disruption to “traditional voice carriers” ❖ Relaxation of export controls (crypto) along with promotion of international adoption of DNS encourages the world to depend upon the Internet ❖ Need for “controls” on interoperability and stability of the Internet is recognized with establishment of ICANN © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence 2001: Launch of first pre- 2002: Department of Homeland commercial trial 3G Security Assumes Global Understanding of network (packet-switch) Critical Infrastructure Protection Critical Infrastructure by Nippon Telegraph Mission Vulnerability Telephone 2003: CA State Data Breach Law 2000: HTML businesses must report breach of PII accepted as 2001: DoD international Quadrennial 2002: Social Networking Standard ISO: 15445 Defense Review Technology takes off with 2003: Linked-In Renews Focus Friendster business application Y2K On Information of social networking Operations 2000 2001 2002 2003 2001: Wikipedia 2002: US Strategic created 2000: National Command Assigned 2003: DoD Academy of military Cyber Transformation Sciences: 2001: Council of Ofense-Defense Planning Guidance Trust in Europe, Cybercrime Mission formalizes Net Cyberspace Convention (Treaty) Responsibility Centric Warfare 2001: Nuclear Posture 2002: DOD 3600.1 policy is 2003: Beta version of 2000: DDOS Review calls for re-issued with new definition Skype released Attacks against replacement of Nuclear for Information Operations (voice over Internet e-commerce Weapons with Non- revolution) kinetic Weapons © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Reflection at Year 35 ❖ World wide recognition of convergence of Internet with critical infrastructures because of Y2K computer programming error and that problem cannot be solved without a private-public partnership ❖ International awareness on threat of cybercrime -- but not fully embraced ❖ 9/11/01 refocused mission toward physical security vice electronic security and blurred mission responsibility with stand-up of Department of Homeland Security ❖ Recognition that the government must embrace innovation wave ❖ Social Networking technology emerges with fast consumer adoption rates, foreshadows next “rich” target for exploitation © 2010, Hathaway Global Strategies, LLC Sunday, November 28, 2010 Timeline of Digital Dependence 2005: Choice Point First Breach of 2007: USAF 2008: President announces Personal Identifiable Establishes a Cyber modernization program (Smart Information (PII) Command Grid, Next Gen FAA, Health- IT, Broadband to America) 2007: Comprehensive
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