Estimating Software Vulnerability Counts in the Context of Cyber Risk
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2020 Sonicwall Cyber Threat Report
2020 SONICWALL CYBER THREAT REPORT sonicwall.com I @sonicwall TABLE OF CONTENTS 3 A NOTE FROM BILL 4 CYBERCRIMINAL INC. 11 2019 GLOBAL CYBERATTACK TRENDS 12 INSIDE THE SONICWALL CAPTURE LABS THREAT NETWORK 13 KEY FINDINGS FROM 2019 13 SECURITY ADVANCES 14 CRIMINAL ADVANCES 15 FASTER IDENTIFICATION OF ‘NEVER-BEFORE-SEEN’ MALWARE 16 TOP 10 CVES EXPLOITED IN 2019 19 ADVANCEMENTS IN DEEP MEMORY INSPECTION 23 MOMENTUM OF PERIMETER-LESS SECURITY 24 PHISHING DOWN FOR THIRD STRAIGHT YEAR 25 CRYPTOJACKING CRUMBLES 27 RANSOMWARE TARGETS STATE, PROVINCIAL & LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 31 FILELESS MALWARE SPIKES IN Q3 32 ENCRYPTED THREATS GROWING CONSISTENTLY 34 IOT ATTACK VOLUME RISING 35 WEB APP ATTACKS DOUBLE IN 2019 37 PREPARING FOR WHAT’S NEXT 38 ABOUT SONICWALL 2 A NOTE FROM BILL The boundaries of your digital empire are In response, SonicWall and our Capture Labs limitless. What was once a finite and threat research team work tirelessly to arm defendable space is now a boundless organizations, enterprises, governments and territory — a vast, sprawling footprint of businesses with actionable threat devices, apps, appliances, servers, intelligence to stay ahead in the global cyber networks, clouds and users. arms race. For the cybercriminals, it’s more lawless And part of that dedication starts now with than ever. Despite the best intentions of the 2020 SonicWall Cyber Threat Report, government agencies, law enforcement and which provides critical threat intelligence to oversight groups, the current cyber threat help you better understand how landscape is more agile than ever before. cybercriminals think — and be fully prepared for what they’ll do next. -
Internet Security Threat Report Volume 24 | February 2019
ISTRInternet Security Threat Report Volume 24 | February 2019 THE DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE DISCLAIMED, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DISCLAIMERS ARE HELD TO BE LEGALLY INVALID. SYMANTEC CORPORATION SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE FURNISHING, PERFORMANCE, OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENT. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THIRD PARTY SOURCES IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE, BUT IS IN NO WAY GUARANTEED. SECURITY PRODUCTS, TECHNICAL SERVICES, AND ANY OTHER TECHNICAL DATA REFERENCED IN THIS DOCUMENT (“CONTROLLED ITEMS”) ARE SUBJECT TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROL AND SANCTIONS LAWS, REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXPORT OR IMPORT REGULATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU AGREE TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO OBTAIN ANY LICENSES, PERMITS OR OTHER APPROVALS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR YOU TO EXPORT, RE-EXPORT, TRANSFER IN COUNTRY OR IMPORT SUCH CONTROLLED ITEMS. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 2 3 BIG NUMBERS YEAR-IN-REVIEW FACTS AND FIGURES METHODOLOGY Formjacking Messaging Cryptojacking Malware Ransomware Mobile Living off the land Web attacks and supply chain attacks Targeted attacks Targeted attacks IoT Cloud Underground economy IoT Election interference MALICIOUS -
Systematization of Vulnerability Discovery Knowledge: Review
Systematization of Vulnerability Discovery Knowledge Review Protocol Nuthan Munaiah and Andrew Meneely Department of Software Engineering Rochester Institute of Technology Rochester, NY 14623 {nm6061,axmvse}@rit.edu February 12, 2019 1 Introduction As more aspects of our daily lives depend on technology, the software that supports this technology must be secure. We, as users, almost subconsciously assume the software we use to always be available to serve our requests while preserving the confidentiality and integrity of our information. Unfortunately, incidents involving catastrophic software vulnerabilities such as Heartbleed (in OpenSSL), Stagefright (in Android), and EternalBlue (in Windows) have made abundantly clear that software, like other engineered creations, is prone to mistakes. Over the years, Software Engineering, as a discipline, has recognized the potential for engineers to make mistakes and has incorporated processes to prevent such mistakes from becoming exploitable vulnerabilities. Developers leverage a plethora of processes, techniques, and tools such as threat modeling, static and dynamic analyses, unit/integration/fuzz/penetration testing, and code reviews to engineer secure software. These practices, while effective at identifying vulnerabilities in software, are limited in their ability to describe the engineering failures that may have led to the introduction of vulnerabilities. Fortunately, as researchers propose empirically-validated metrics to characterize historical vulnerabilities, the factors that may have led to the introduction of vulnerabilities emerge. Developers must be made aware of these factors to help them proactively consider security implications of the code that they contribute. In other words, we want developers to think like an attacker (i.e. inculcate an attacker mindset) to proactively discover vulnerabilities. -
Understanding the Syntactic Rule Usage in Java
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UCL Discovery Understanding the Syntactic Rule Usage in Java Dong Qiua, Bixin Lia,∗, Earl T. Barrb, Zhendong Suc aSchool of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University, China bDepartment of Computer Science, University College London, UK cDepartment of Computer Science, University of California Davis, USA Abstract Context: Syntax is fundamental to any programming language: syntax defines valid programs. In the 1970s, computer scientists rigorously and empirically studied programming languages to guide and inform language design. Since then, language design has been artistic, driven by the aesthetic concerns and intuitions of language architects. Despite recent studies on small sets of selected language features, we lack a comprehensive, quantitative, empirical analysis of how modern, real-world source code exercises the syntax of its programming language. Objective: This study aims to understand how programming language syntax is employed in actual development and explore their potential applications based on the results of syntax usage analysis. Method: We present our results on the first such study on Java, a modern, mature, and widely-used programming language. Our corpus contains over 5,000 open-source Java projects, totalling 150 million source lines of code (SLoC). We study both independent (i.e. applications of a single syntax rule) and dependent (i.e. applications of multiple syntax rules) rule usage, and quantify their impact over time and project size. Results: Our study provides detailed quantitative information and yields insight, particularly (i) confirming the conventional wisdom that the usage of syntax rules is Zipfian; (ii) showing that the adoption of new rules and their impact on the usage of pre-existing rules vary significantly over time; and (iii) showing that rule usage is highly contextual. -
Viewed Through the Prism of Clausewitzian Strategy
CYBERWAR – VIEWED THROUGH THE PRISM OF CLAUSEWITZIAN STRATEGY Commodore Vishwanathan K Ganapathi, VSM Introduction In a globalised world where speed and reliability of information exchange is thesine qua non of technological advancement, the importance of cyberspace to a country is immeasurable. Knowledge and awareness, which derive from the degree to which cyberspace can be exploited for rapidly storing, manipulating and disseminating data, have become important measures of a nation’s power.1 As a consequence, the destruction or disruption of any of the constituent elements of cyberspace from a cyber attack would not just blunt a country’s ability to gain strategic advantage from its technological superiority but would gravely threaten its security as well. Depending on their intensity and complexity, cyber attacks can inflict a wide spectrum of damage ranging from less dangerous depredations like the theft of personal information and digital heists to highly destructive actions like the disruption of critical infrastructure- ‘the facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the delivery of essential services and functions’2 - industrial sabotage, subversion, data destruction or theft of sensitive information. It is the latter category, most often believed to be orchestrated for political reasons by a potential adversary, which has transformed cyber attacks from being perceived as a trivial problem befitting address by an IT professional to one that merits the focus of policy planners and strategists alike.3 The concerns of governments about the gravity of the threat from cyber attacks stem from the certitude that easily accessible destructive technologies are being exploited by state and non-state actors alike to launch attacks even against powerful adversaries several thousand miles away. -
Development of an Enhanced Automated Software Complexity Measurement System
Journal of Advances in Computational Intelligence Theory Volume 1 Issue 3 Development of an Enhanced Automated Software Complexity Measurement System Sanusi B.A.1, Olabiyisi S.O.2, Afolabi A.O.3, Olowoye, A.O.4 1,2,4Department of Computer Science, 3Department of Cyber Security, Ladoke Akintola University of Technology, Ogbomoso, Nigeria. Corresponding Author E-mail Id:- [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] 4 [email protected] ABSTRACT Code Complexity measures can simply be used to predict critical information about reliability, testability, and maintainability of software systems from the automatic measurement of the source code. The existing automated code complexity measurement is performed using a commercially available code analysis tool called QA-C for the code complexity of C-programming language which runs on Solaris and does not measure the defect-rate of the source code. Therefore, this paper aimed at developing an enhanced automated system that evaluates the code complexity of C-family programming languages and computes the defect rate. The existing code-based complexity metrics: Source Lines of Code metric, McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity metrics and Halstead Complexity Metrics were studied and implemented so as to extend the existing schemes. The developed system was built following the procedure of waterfall model that involves: Gathering requirements, System design, Development coding, Testing, and Maintenance. The developed system was developed in the Visual Studio Integrated Development Environment (2019) using C-Sharp (C#) programming language, .NET framework and MYSQL Server for database design. The performance of the system was tested efficiently using a software testing technique known as Black-box testing to examine the functionality and quality of the system. -
The Commenting Practice of Open Source
The Commenting Practice of Open Source Oliver Arafat Dirk Riehle Siemens AG, Corporate Technology SAP Research, SAP Labs LLC Otto-Hahn-Ring 6, 81739 München 3410 Hillview Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94304, USA [email protected] [email protected] Abstract lem domain is well understood [15]. Agile software devel- opment methods can cope with changing requirements and The development processes of open source software are poorly understood problem domains, but typically require different from traditional closed source development proc- co-location of developers and fail to scale to large project esses. Still, open source software is frequently of high sizes [16]. quality. This raises the question of how and why open A host of successful open source projects in both well source software creates high quality and whether it can and poorly understood problem domains and of small to maintain this quality for ever larger project sizes. In this large sizes suggests that open source can cope both with paper, we look at one particular quality indicator, the den- changing requirements and large project sizes. In this pa- sity of comments in open source software code. We find per we focus on one particular code metric, the comment that successful open source projects follow a consistent density, and assess it across 5,229 active open source pro- practice of documenting their source code, and we find jects, representing about 30% of all active open source that the comment density is independent of team and pro- projects. We show that commenting source code is an on- ject size. going and integrated practice of open source software de- velopment that is consistently found across all these pro- Categories and Subject Descriptors D.2.8 [Metrics]: jects. -
Differences in the Definition and Calculation of the LOC Metric In
Differences in the Definition and Calculation of the LOC Metric in Free Tools∗ István Siket Árpád Beszédes Department of Software Engineering Department of Software Engineering University of Szeged, Hungary University of Szeged, Hungary [email protected] [email protected] John Taylor FrontEndART Software Ltd. Szeged, Hungary [email protected] Abstract The software metric LOC (Lines of Code) is probably one of the most controversial metrics in software engineering practice. It is relatively easy to calculate, understand and use by the different stakeholders for a variety of purposes; LOC is the most frequently applied measure in software estimation, quality assurance and many other fields. Yet, there is a high level of variability in the definition and calculation methods of the metric which makes it difficult to use it as a base for important decisions. Furthermore, there are cases when its usage is highly questionable – such as programmer productivity assessment. In this paper, we investigate how LOC is usually defined and calculated by today’s free LOC calculator tools. We used a set of tools to compute LOC metrics on a variety of open source systems in order to measure the actual differences between results and investigate the possible causes of the deviation. 1 Introduction Lines of Code (LOC) is supposed to be the easiest software metric to understand, compute and in- terpret. The issue with counting code is determining which rules to use for the comparisons to be valid [5]. LOC is generally seen as a measure of system size expressed using the number of lines of its source code as it would appear in a text editor, but the situation is not that simple as we will see shortly. -
2019 Sonicwall Cyber Threat Report
MID-YEAR UPDATE | JULY 2019 2019 SONICWALL CYBER THREAT REPORT Arm Your Business with the Latest Threat Intelligence from the First Half of 2019 SONICWALL CAPTURE LABS 1 MILLION + THREAT NETWORK Sensors 215 + Countries & Territories 24 x 7 x 365 Monitoring < 24 HOURS Threat Response 140K + Malware Samples Collected Daily 28M + Attacks BlockeD Daily 2019 GLOBAL CYBER ARMS RACE 2018 1H 2019 1H SonicWall recorded more than 4.78 billion malware attacKs for the first half of 2019 — a 20% year-to-date 5.99 Billion decrease. 4.78 Billion Global malware volume dips to start 2019, but other attack types rebound. MALWARE INTRUSION WEB APP RANSOMWARE IOT ENCRYPTED CYBERATTACK TRENDS ATTACKS ATTEMPTS ATTACKS ATTACKS MALWARE THREATS 76% 55% As global malware 11% 15% volume declines, 4% other attacK types increase during -20% the first half of 2019. 4.8 BILLION 2.0 TRILLION 19.2 MILLION 110.9 MILLION 13.5 MILLION 2.5 MILLION 2019 MALWARE VOLUME: TOP GLOBAL COUNTRIES 2019 Malware Attacks Top Countries Malware attacks 52.0 are largely down in France -53% 2019 witH a few Netherlands 56.5 +3% exceptions. Germany 66.5 -63% Switzerland 75.9 +72% InDia (25%), SwitzerlanD Brazil -4% 121.2 (72%) anD tHe China -61% 138.3 NetHerlanDs (3%) were the top coUntries that Canada -11% 155.4 sUffereD increaseD India +25% 226.9 malware activity. United Kingdom -9% 313.6 United States -17% 2,494.5 - 500 1,000 1,500 2.000 2,500 3,000 MILLIONS RANSOMWARE STILL RISING Ransomware VolUme YTD 110.9 Million Ransomware AttacKs 1H 2018 1H 2019 Change U.K. -
Indicative Guidelines for Chemical Safety and Security in Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises to Foster the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry
Indicative Guidelines for Chemical Safety and Security in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to Foster the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons © Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The Hague, the Netherlands, 2021 No use of this document may be made for any commercial purpose whatsoever without prior permission in writing from the OPCW. The views expressed in any article of this document do not necessarily represent those of the OPCW and the OPCW accepts no responsibility for them. Mention of the names of firms and commercial products does not imply endorsement by the OPCW. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Editors: N. Kojevnikov, L. Zhao, H. Mat Som, T. Zhang Indicative Guidelines for Chemical Safety and Security in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises to Foster the Peaceful Uses of Chemistry The Outcome of the Workshops on Developing Tools for Chemical Safety and Security Management TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 PREFACE ..................................................................................................................... 1 2 TABLE OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................................... 3 3 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 5 3.1 Role of the Employer ........................................................................................... -
Morpheus Adaptive Defenses for Tomorrow’S Secure Systems
Morpheus Adaptive Defenses for Tomorrow’s Secure Systems Todd Austin University of Michigan [email protected] Joint work with: Valeria Bertacco (UM) Sharad Malik (Princeton) Mohit Tiwari (UT-Austin) Assessing the State of Security • Jeep hacked remotely while driving • DHS attacks Boeing 757, details classified • Pacemaker wirelessly infiltrated • Mirai botnet disables DynDNS • Entire baby monitor market hacked • Atrium fish tank thermometer hacked 2 Why is Security So Hard to Get Right? • Currently, a patch-based approach • Find and fix vulnerabilities • Complexity growth far outstrips security • Manual testing & analyses don’t scale • Endless security arms race • Patch and pray… • How do we protect against unknown (0-day) attacks? • Anticipate the “unknown unknowns” 3 Attacking is Easy, Protecting is HARD • Attacking is easier than protecting • Attackers needs only one vulnerability • Protecting requires 100% coverage • Related software growth rates: • Protections: doubles every 2 years • Malware: 40% growth in 30 years • Vulnerabilities are on the rise • Rate of attacks is exploding 4 Durable Security: the Big Unsolved Challenge • What we do well: Synopsys’ Valgrind • Finding and fixing vulnerabilities Coverity Tools Intel’s • Deploying system protections that ARM’s Control-Flow stop well-known attacks TrustZone Enforcement • Where we fail: identifying and stopping emergent attacks 5 What If a Secure System Could… • Respond lightning-fast against common attacks • Self-adapt quickly to unknown emerging threats • Learn and prioritize -
Controlling Cyberwarfare International Laws of Armed Conflict and Human Rights in the Cyber Realm
Controlling Cyberwarfare International Laws of Armed Conflict and Human Rights in the Cyber Realm by William James Jordan A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2021 © William James Jordan 2021 Examining Committee Membership The following served on the Examining Committee for this thesis. Thedeci sion of the Examining Committee is by majority vote. External Examiner: Col. David Barnes Professor, Department of English and Philosophy United States Military Academy Supervisor: W. Mathieu Doucet Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal Member: Brian D. Orend Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo Internal Member: Patricia A. Marino Professor, Department of Philosophy University of Waterloo InternalExternal Member: Veronica M. Kitchen Associate Professor, Department of Political Science University of Waterloo ii Author’s Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my ex aminers. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the pub lic. iii Abstract Cyberwarfare, military activities in cyberspace conducted by a state against another state and intended to disrupt or destroy computing or communica tion systems or data, is a recent addition to the warfaring arsenal. The in ternational laws of armed conflict set out an obligation for states at warto protect civilians from the effects of the conflict. As societies continue toex pand their activities in the cyber realm, the risk of cyberwarfare negatively affecting the civilian population increases.