MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Leiden University, The Hague Campus

State Terrorism in the Philippines Unmasking the securitized terror behind ‘War on Drugs’

Master Thesis, Spring 2017 George Plevris (s1722026) Supervisor: Dr. M. Kitzen

Second Reader: Liesbeth van der Heide

University of Leiden- The Hague Campus Master MSc. Crisis & Security Management May 2017

Leiden University 1 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

By the end of this paper, I believe you will come to the same observation that I arrived: Terror (-ism) is the finest tool of political and social governance a state can deploy. If executed well, it does not only achieve the goal of submission of the audience, but it eliminates the latter’s tool of resistance: hope.

Leiden University 2 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Abstract

Typically, modern states have the monopoly on legitimate violence drawn from their sovereignty and democratic rule of law, on the behest of their citizens. This ‘legitimate’ violence however has seen a rise in the last two decades, and taken forms of intricate civil wars, wars on crime, wars on drugs and wars on terror. Yet, despite outcries for violations of laws and human rights, of crimes against humanity and war crimes, policies of extreme violence performed by the democratic states are hardly ever labeled as state terrorism. This paper will explore the scholarship of state terrorism, often a contested topic among academic and experts, and will approach the issue through the current ‘war on drugs’ raging in the Philippines. The theoretical premise that I will carve out aims to explore and acknowledge the existence of state terror but also the difficulty in naming it. What factors blur the picture of a government deploying state terrorism in its crime-governance policies? Securitization and Responsibilisation, as the two most prominent discourse theories on crime governance will shed light to the issue.

Key words: state terrorism, securitization, responsibilisation, war on drugs, Philippines, discourse

Leiden University 3 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 5 Chapter 1: Theoretical Frameworks ...... 10 1.1. State Terrorism ...... 10 1.2. Securitization Theory ...... 16 1.3. Responsibilisation Theory ...... 19 1.4. Theoretical Proposition ...... 21

Chapter 2: Research Design ...... 25 2.1. The Choice of a Case Study ...... 25 2.2. Unit of Analysis and Units of Observation ...... 27 2.3. Methodology ...... 28

Chapter 3: Uncovering Philippines’ War on Drugs ...... 31 3.1. From social, law enforcement drug policies to a war on drugs ...... 32 3.2. Securitizing discourse as a cloak of invisibility ...... 43 3.3. Responsibility, Greed and Fear ...... 53

Chapter 4: Unmasking the state terror in the War on Drugs ...... 57 4.1. Deliberate actions of violence against individuals the state has a duty to protect ...... 58 4.2. Role of state actors and state-sponsored actors ...... 63 4.3. Instilling extreme fear to the targeted audience ...... 69 4.4. Change of behavior: the means justify the ends ...... 73

Conclusion ...... 77 Observations ...... 77 Lessons Learned ...... 80

Bibliography ...... 80

Leiden University 4 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Introduction

When Clausewitz once said, “war is the continuation of politics by other means”, I doubt whether he had in mind modern applications of the concept in domestic politics and crime governance. At the very best, what he must have thought was states, empires, even kingdoms, deciding to claim and effectuate what their diplomacy and politics of trade or economics could not by the brute force of the canon. Where other means were ineffective or insufficient to meet a political end, war was seen as inevitable. In 1945 war was “prohibited”, the UN Chartered stands tall of that prohibition, a watchful eye above the international community. Democracies agreed to that without much resistance; after all which self-proclaimed and acknowledged democracy will claim merit and value in such a devastating tool. Instead, (collective) self-defense took the place of war, and diplomacy and peace triumphed. If this was the narration of a fairytale, the happy ending will be due just about now. But neither war died nor democratic states forgot its raw power and added value. On the contrary, ‘armed conflicts’, as is now the political correct term in international affairs and international law, have spread and still stand strong in many parts of the world, whether international or non-international in their character. But this paper is not a “story” on international conflict. It is a “story” of how war moved realms, and relocated, immigrated to the domestic level. Since 2001, a landmark date for the international community, the noun “war” has crawled its way into much government policies and tactics, as a favorable term for once to indicate the serious commitment of the government to the eradication of a threat, and at the same time to underline the dire, existential nature of that threat. The United States has been waging a “war on terror” ever since, one with a far-reaching hand, much domestically as so internationally. Mexico has also dealt long with its drug crime in similar terms, and last December, a decade was “celebrated” since Felipe Calderon first declared in 2006 a tough “war” against the drug

Leiden University 5 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 cartels and their networks of organized crime.1 For Mexico, ten years after, this “war” has become so normalized, a routine operation, that the level of tolerance for the degradation of human lives has seem to have sunk in low thresholds.2 Similar situations, similar ‘wars’ have been fought in Colombia, in Argentina, in Brazil. Crime, whether drug, organized, terror or mafia crime, is now attracting a new way of governance by the state. Last June, following the Presidential election of Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines joined the club of ‘war’-on-crime countries, by declaring in open terms a crackdown on all drug users, pushers, and addicts in the country. Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ has since then made headlines domestically and all over the world. At the very moment these words are written, I cannot state with certainty the death toll this ‘war’ has claimed. Every couple of days, every other week, the numbers keep rising, with the last count being at more than 9,000 people.3 And it is people that are dying, not just “drug personalities”, a favorite term used by Filipino police and government officials. It is Filipino citizens being killed on the street, in their homes, in a police cell, whether they are drug addicts, recreational users or pushers. These killings, often called extrajudicial or summary killings, have attracted the attention of the international community, and of some domestic opposition. Yet, law and morality seem to dominate in the outcry, focusing on whether Duterte is guilty for crimes against humanity, complicity to murder and so forth. This observation, with slight tones of surprise enclosed in “Yet”, by no means aims at underestimating the nature and power of law, or the value of recognizing these killings as such: murder and crimes against humanity. After all, if accountability is to be attained, this will primarily happen through legal means and paths. But it is peculiar how easily the attention is shifted on the outcome, the killings, and its legal branding, without looking the wider frame of the policy. Last year, Open Society Foundation released a report detailing and discussing

1 Reggie Thomson, “A Decade into Mexico’s War on Drugs”, Stratfor Worldview, December 11 (2006), available at: https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/decade-mexicos-war-drugs 2 Daniel Barker Flores, “Mexico’s war on drug has a long shelf life”, International Policy Digest, January 4 (2017), available at: https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/01/04/mexico-s-war-on-drugs-has- a-long-shelf-life/ 3 Patricia Lourdes Viray, “Philippines maintain commitment to drug war along side ASEAN”, The Philippines Star,April 27 (2017), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/27/1694443/philippines-maintains-commitment- drug-war-alongside-asean

Leiden University 6 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 how the “war on drugs” in Mexico has lead to crimes against humanity and mass atrocities.4 The report is an excellent account of all the atrocities that have taken place in the last decade in Mexico, detailing the actions of both sides, but it does not refer to the aspect of state terrorism. Similarly, in the case of Philippines, Duterte was quickly accused of crimes against humanity, and recently a complaint was filed against him in the International Criminal Court.5 The narrative remains the same, and for good reasons. But Duterte’s policies are not simply one-sided, and should not only exist, named and shamed in the realm of law. They remain policies based on fear and terror, policies that won elections, mobilized support, distorted, and still do so, the role and the purpose of the state. State terrorism does include internationally prohibited acts, and can lead to the commission of international crimes. But it is a policy nonetheless, a choice of politics that must be acknowledged as equal atrocious as international crimes are. The problem in the case of terrorism deployed by states is the incompatibility of the notion with state sovereignty, democracy and the rule of law. Critics of the concept, as will be explained in this thesis’ first chapter, strongly oppose any argument about (democratic) states being capable of terrorism. The concept of state terrorism has only been allowed to flourish, marginally, and to develop, predominantly, on the international level. On this occasion, state-sponsored terrorism is often tolerated and usually swept under the rug of economic state policies and national security interests. State terrorism is limited in international coercive diplomacy, or surrogate, secretive activities that aim for one state to undermine the stability of another.6 Only when the case comes to dictatorial regimes, coups and authoritarianism do critics ‘budge and inch’ and engage in relevant discussions of domestic state terror. But even in these cases, state terrorism is purported as a covert action, of secret and clandestine support, either materially and/or

4 “Confronting Crimes Against Humanity in Mexico”, Open Society Foundation, November (2016), available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undeniable-atrocities-en- 20160602.pdf 5 Oliver Holmes, “Mass Murder Complaint filled against Philippines’ President Duterte at ICC”, The Guardian, April 25 (2017), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/apr/25/mass- complaint-launched-against-philippines-president-duterte-at-icc 6 See Mitchell C., Stohl M, Carleton D., Lopez G., State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement, in Stohl M. and Lopez G. (eds) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 1-26, at p. 5, (1986).

Leiden University 7 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 economically, of paramilitary and vigilante groups, which the state will never acknowledge or be linked to.7 My thesis will draw upon this incompatibility, the debate in state terrorism, and it will try to demonstrate how democratic states and democratically elected leaders can and do deploy state terrorism as policies to meet governance goals. Philippines will be a well- suited case study for a number of reasons. First of all, because Duterte run and won a presidential election on precisely that policy; a ruthless, no mercy, bluntly and vocally articulated killing of drug users and pushers. Secondly, because that policy, that way of curtailing drug crime, found quick implementation in police and state agencies, gathered much support and some opposition; and above all because it materialized not only through police misconduct and criminal action, but through the appearance and predominance of death squads. What is more, the case is of further interest due to discourse President Duterte used before and after his election to the presidential office. Himself a public and vocal supporter of extrajudicial killings, he has defended his policy against critics domestically, and internationally (UN, EU), and remains still one of the most popular Presidents in the Philippines’ history.8 I will therefore take stock of the discourse used alongside with the “war on drugs” and try to explore how it has impacted the latter. I will mobilize the two prominent theories when it comes to discourse and governance of security, namely securitization and responsibilisation. The first chapter of the thesis will present and build my theoretical framework. State terrorism, securitization and responsibilisation will be examined and analyzed, each in a different section, discussing current formulated scholarship, as well as keeping key elements on the side, to be used throughout the paper. At the last part of chapter one, I will put forth my theoretical proposition, the premise that structures my research question and research goal: to what extent can the current ‘war on drugs’ in the Philippines be assessed as state terrorism, and how security discourse has impacted on its perception. Chapter two will deal with the research design and methodology of the thesis,

7 G. Martin, “Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives and Issues”, Sage Publications, at. pp. 81-111, (2003). 8 Prashanth Parameswaran, “The Truth about Duterte’s Popularity in the Philippines”, The Diplomat, October 7 (2016), available at: http://thediplomat.com/2016/10/the-truth-about-dutertes- popularity-in-the-philippines/

Leiden University 8 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 substantiating the choice of a single-n case study. In Chapter three, I will offer an extended account of the situation in the Philippines. I will look on statistics, reports, present and juxtapose facts with policies, including speeches and discourse used by the President and the Filipino government. The goal of this chapter is to allow the reader to become familiar with the situation on the ground, and enumerate all the information, facts and figures necessary before we proceed with the analysis. Chapter four will do exactly that: put the information presented previously in a context, that of state terrorism, and analyze it step by step. At the same time, due account will be given to securitization and responsibilisation as elements that can impact the perception of state terrorism by observers, or magnify its impact for the audience. Finally, in the last part of the thesis, I will conclude with my observations, and answer the research question.

Leiden University 9 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

As briefly described in the Introduction, the aim of this thesis is to describe and explain the current socio-political phenomenon and violent behavior that devolves in the Philippines, labeled as ‘war on drugs’, starting as a landmark date the election of Duterte in the office of the President of the Philippines. The main research question seeks an answer to the inquiry of whether, and to what extent state terrorism as a political science theory fits and explains the violence in the Philippines, while secondary research questions aim to examine and explore potentially how securitization and/or responsibilisation strategies are factors that have either facilitated or distracted the understanding of the said violence as a phenomenon of state terrorism. In this first chapter I will discuss the three main theoretical frames that will be deployed in my thesis, namely state terrorism theory, securitization theory and responsibilisation strategy. In three different sections each theoretical frame will be taken apart and explored, through a short definition and a brief literature review. Subsequently, once all theoretical frames are clarified I will proceed with the last part of this chapter, which is the theoretical proposition. There I will present my theoretical premise, the hypothesis upon which I will base my analysis, by bringing the three above theories in one instrumentality that will be used for the purposes of this case study.

1.1 State Terrorism

One of the perennial issues in classic and current international relations theory and political science is that of terrorism. It is not a concept foreign to the understanding of security politics and security policies. On the contrary, terror has been a “means to achieve ends” that predates modern concepts, and even finds origins in 18th century France and the Revolution of 1793. Yet, it remains a concept difficult to pinpoint with such clarity as to invoke international consensus. Many scholars, academics and politicians have recognized the definitional difficulties when it comes to terrorism as well

Leiden University 10 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 as the lack or agreement in one [definition], amongst them Silke 9 , Barker, 10 and Weinberg et. Al;11 And yet, despite the lack of agreement on what terrorism is, Laqueur notes that more than a 100 definitions of terrorism have been attempted and are currently in place, some to be found in international legislation, others in national or regional legal frameworks, and others for purposes of academic and scholarly studies. 12 This is important to recognize when attempting to conceptualize state terrorism, as it includes a double caveat; not only do we endeavor to examine an already controversial concept, that lacks uniform understanding (terrorism), but one that also prioritizes the role of a contested actor (the state). In a general note however, the majority of terrorism definitions, setting the actor involved aside, have in common the understanding that terrorism has in its core the instrumentalization of the victims’ suffering (whether chosen randomly or deliberately) as a means to communicate a message to an audience, often - but not necessarily- of political nature.13 Turning to the debate of terrorism employed by states, there are two opposing approaches, with an intermediary position: On the one hand, some scholars argue that states simply cannot and do not engage in terrorism. In that approach’s conceptualization of terrorism, only non-state actors can engage in it and this is due to their inability to wield violence in a legitimate way. States on the other hand, as sovereign entities, have a legitimate monopoly on violence that evades the definitional constructions of terrorism, and is grounded on the right and duty to maintain a minimum of order on which society and civilized life rests upon.14 A middle ground is reached by still focusing on the act of terrorism but remaining less resilient in the depiction of its actor; such a possibility allows identifying states as actors of terrorism, but even in that case a call for a sharp distinction of the two, based on situational elements, is still in place. Scholars such as Jackson and Richardson have insisted on drawing a bright red line between the two, for

9 Silke A., Research on Terrorism: Trends, Achievements and Failures, London: Frank Cass., p. 2, (2004). 10 Barker J., The No-nonsense Guide to Terrorism, London: Verso, p. 23, (2003). 11 Weinberg L., Pedahzur A., and Hirsch-Hoefler S., The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16 (4): 777-794, (2004). 12 Laqueur W., The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Aims of Mass Destruction, Oxford University Press, pp. 5 (1999). 13 Jackson R., Murphy E., Poynting S., Terrorism, the State and the Study of Political Terror, in Contemporary State Terrorism, Routledge, pp. 1-11, at p. 4, (2010). 14 Lagueuer, W., No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century, New York Continuum, p. 237, (2003).

Leiden University 11 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 reasons of pragmatism and analytical purposes, turning the spotlight in the apparent differences between the two concepts rather their similarities.15 On the other hand, the third approach to state terrorism categorically argues that states can and actually do engage in terrorism. The proponents of this approach argue that the focus of the research should not be on the nature of the perpetrator, but on the very act itself, allowing state and non-state actors to be examined equally. For scholars like Goodin and Blakeley, terrorism, regardless of the nature of the perpetrator, entails a number of specific moral wrongs, beyond the unjustified killings and harm, such as the instrumentalization of human suffering, the intention to cause widespread fear and the betrayal of the duty to care towards fellow citizens.16 At this point another clarification must be made. The terrorism studies literature, to some extent and with more ease, locate state terrorism in the international sphere, identifying and examining cases where one state engages in terrorism activities in another state, which would also entail state sponsoring or state financing terrorism. State terrorism then is perceived to be a form of coercive and covert foreign policy, and much like Clausewitz’s “war as continuation of politics by other means” it aims to have an equal goal. In line with this perception, frontline scholars like Stohl, writing back in 1984, recognized 3 broad categories of state terrorism: a) overt engagements in coercive diplomacy; b) covert participation in assassinations, coups, bombing campaigns and similar; and c) surrogate activities, in which assistance is offered to a secondary state or insurgent organization for the conduct of terrorism.17 Although this understanding of state terrorism as more obvious in the international foreign-policy practice of a state is not wrong, it should not be seen to preclude a parallel application of the concept for domestic use. Examples in Latin America can explain both the involvement of a state in terrorism in other countries for political, foreign policy gains, such as the frequent US

15 Jackson R., Jarvis L., Gunning J., and Breen Smyth M., Terrorism: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 181, (2011); and Richardson L., What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, NY: Random House, p. 5, (2006). 16 Goodin R., What’s Wrong with Terrorism?,Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 102, (2006); and Blakely R., Bringning the State Back into Terrorism Studies, European Political Science, 6 (3): 228-253, (2007). 17 Stohl M., Carleton D., and Steven E. Johnson, “Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Assistance from Nixon to Carter" Journal of Peace Research, No. 3,: pp. 1-11 (1984).

Leiden University 12 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

(CIA) activities in Guatemala, Colombia, as well as domestic state engagement in terrorism, such as in Argentina, during the “Dirty War”. Relevant typologies that describe the relationship, even proximity, of the actor to the act of terrorism, of either international or domestic nature, have been brought forth by other prominent scholars, in a more modernized and pragmatic approach. Conn differentiates between state terrorism (direct perpetration), state involvement in terrorism and state sponsorship of terrorism (indirect perpetration).18 In a similar way, Blakeley not only distinguishes between state perpetration and state sponsorship of terrorism, but goes a step further in separating what she calls “limited state terrorism”, that is targeted at a specific narrow audience, and what she labels as “generalized state terrorism” where the entire population is meant to be targeted as the audience of the terrorist act.19 For Blakeley, a prominent scholar in terrorism studies, the significance of the audience as the recipient of the message plays key role in identifying acts of terrorism and separating them from violence and criminal behavior. For the purpose of this thesis, the latter approach will be adopted, supporting that states are capable entities of committing terrorism, with emphasis given at the domestic nature of the act. Accordingly, my analysis will primary focus on the constituent elements of terrorism, without of course downplaying the viewpoint of the state as the actor. What those constituent elements then must be, that will lead us to determine if the violent act is (state) terrorism? There are a couple of important definitional attempts to be discussed before presenting the one adopted for the purposes of this case study. Eugene Walters is one of the first scholars back in the 70s to attempt a conceptualization of what terrorism entails;20 he proposed three key elements to consider: first, there is violence, threatened or perpetrated, directed at some victim; second, the violent actor intends that violence to cause terror in some witness who is generally distinct from the victim, with the later being instrumental to the act; and lastly, the violent actor intends or expects that the terrorized witness to the violence will alter his or her behavior. Later, in the 80s, other

18 Conn J., Typology of Terrorism, in Jarvis L., and Lister M., State Terrorism Research and Critical Terrorism Studies: An assessment, in Critical Studies on Terrorism 7 (1): 43-61, at 45, (2013). 19 Blakeley R., State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, Abington Routledge, p. 35 (2009). 20 Walter E., Terror and Resistance, Oxford University Press, (1969).

Leiden University 13 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 prominent scholars like Lopez, Stohl, and Mitchell build up on these elements to reach a definition of state terrorism that entails the following:

“Terrorism by the state (or non-state actors) involves deliberate coercion and violence (or threat thereof) directed at some victim, with the intention of inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with the victim in such a way that they perceive themselves as potential future victims. In this way they are forced to consider altering their behavior in some manner desired by the actor”.21

In the last years, mainly after 9/11, there have been attempts to redefine terrorism studies, modernize the research agenda and further explore the concept of state and non- state terrorism. This is in line with the overall proliferation of new theories, or old theories that have been revisited, such as the privatization of security, the governance of crime and crime prevention, and governance of security. In light of the first observation- the revisiting of the agenda of terrorism studies-, Blakeley in a recent publication critically discusses conceptions of state terrorism, and by building up on past definitional attempts, such as the ones briefly presented above, she arrives in the following proposition: four key elements are encompassed in state terrorism:22 a. There must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence; b. The act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents; c. The act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim; d. The target audience is forced to consider changing their behavior in some way, without that change need to be political. I will adopt this definition of state terrorism in my analysis, as it covers extensively all the relevant aspects and elements of terrorism raised by other scholars, yet it

21 Id. supra note 5. 22 Blakeley R., State Terrorism in the Social Sciences, in Contemporary State Terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies, Routledge, pp. 12-13, (2010)

Leiden University 14 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 underlines the role of state as the perpetrator of this act. Blakeley gives particular importance to the role of the audience and the victim of the terrorism act, and argues that what differentiates state terrorism from other forms of state repression is the instrumentality of the victims’ suffering to “reason” the audience and coerce a calculated reaction from it. Further analyses in the field of security studies and governance of security have crossed paths with that instrumentality of state terrorism. Stohl for example has underscored the need for the research to focus on the dehumanization as the key precursor to state terror, and to that end he has formulated many relevant propositions in his writings. He calls for better knowledge about regimes that support state terrorism, the justifications, camouflages or strategies used to surround and disorient from it. 23 Attention is shifted to how state terrorism is realized, viable and practiced, and goes in some cases undetected. Other scholars point out further needs in the debate, namely to concentrate on how courses of actions, subjects and objects are constituted as part of state terrorism: “[…] demands attention to the discourses/rationalities and technologies of governing, and the ways in which projects selectively align and assemble diverse entities to achieve their aims, either directly or by ensuring the ‘self-government’ of relevant actors”.24 This modern approach that widens the scope of analysis brings forth a combination of theoretical frameworks of security governance that might prove useful in understanding the complete picture of how state terrorism is deployed. Because the importance and instrumentality of the victims and audience of terrorism lies at heart of the state terrorism theory, cross-reference to security governance theories that adopt the same approach is fitting. I propose two of these theoretical frameworks to be combined with that of state terrorism: securitization and responsibilisation. Both the above theories have at their core the role of the actor and the audience; in securitization, while the securitizing actor performs the process, it is the audience, as the receiver, that will embrace and endorse the policies proposed, thus rendering the securitizing act successful. In a similar reasoning, responsibilisation theories, as strategies to govern crime and

23 Stohl M., Old myths, new fantasies and the enduring realities of terrorism, in Critical Studies of Terrorism, London: Rutledge, pp. 43-50, (2008). 24 Bulkeley H., and Schroeder H., Beyond State/non-State Divides: global Cities and the Governing of Climate change, European Journal of International Relations, 18 (4) ,pp. 743-766, at p. 751 (2012).

Leiden University 15 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 security, aim at raising and appealing to the sense of insecurity of the audience, so as it would feel the need to partake to the crime-governing policies the actor, usually the state, proposes, so as to ensure its own security. Keeping that in mind, the connection is not hard to see. State terrorism also aims at an audience, and has as its end goal to motivate them, through fear and the pain of victims, to change their behavior, or to adopt a specific one. Therefore, as Sthol argued, many strategies of discourse influence and manipulation, can interfere, disrupt or blur the true colors of state terrorism. Or even so, help the latter make its effects be more widespread. This very premise is to be examined in this thesis.

1.2. Securitization Theory

Securitization as a theoretical construct was born out of the so-called “Copenhagen School”, that dealt with and analyzed security as part of the discipline of security studies. Securities studies themselves were an offspring of the field of “strategic studies” and International Relations that found much ground for research during and after the Cold War.25 This school of thought, with its major representatives being Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, focused its work on the character of security, “what security is”, by “who” it is defined and on what terms, and what does it potentially include. The Copenhagen School built up on definitions of security as first conceptualized by Wolfers, the “absence of threats to acquired values”, and went on to argue that security is a contested and ambiguous issue.26 Similarly other scholars came to align with that proposition on the elusive and indeterminate ability to define security, while its use has ever been expanding. Garnett claimed that the concept of security has been dangerously overdeveloped and extended that it was close to lose its meaning.27 In the same note,

25 Charrett C., A critical application of Securitization Theory: overcoming the normative dilemma of writing security, International Catalan Institute for Peace, pp. 1-48, (2009). 26 Wolfers A., National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), pp. 481- 502, at p. 483, (1952). 27 Garnett J.C., European Security after the Cold War, in Davis M.J. (ed), Security Issues in the Post-Cold War World, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 12-39, at p. 12 (1996a).

Leiden University 16 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

Baldwin stated, “security has been turned into a banner to be flown, a label to be applied, but not a concept to be used by most security studies specialists”.28 In their studies of what security is and how it is framed the Copenhagen School coined the theory of securitization, which builds on their understanding of security based on existential threats and emergency measures. Buzan, Waever and De Wilde defined the concept of securitization as “ [a successful speech-act] through which an inter-subjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exception measures to deal with that threat”.29 This approach to security emphasizes its particular discursive and political force in achieving a goal, while its special nature justifies the use of extraordinary measures to reach that goal. To that definition of Buzan et al., Balzaq attributes a firm separation of “normal” and “exceptional” politics, while claiming it not to be necessary to understand the security process. According to him, securitization is:

“An articulated assemblage of practices whereby heuristic artifacts (metaphors, policy tools, images, analogies, stereotypes and emotions) are contextually mobilized by a securitizing actor who works to prompt an audience to build a coherent network of implications (feelings, sensations, thought and intuitions) about the critical vulnerability of a referent object, that concurs with the securitizing actor’s reason for choices and actions, by investing the referent subject with such an aura of unprecedented threatening complexion that a customized policy must be immediately undertaken to block it”.30

According to its proponents, securitization is the (successful) move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics; in that sense it can be seen as a more extreme version

28 Baldwin D. A., The Concept of Security, Review of International Studies, 23(1), pp. 5-26, at p. 9, (1997). 29 Buzan B., Waever O., de Wilder J., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, London,Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.23 (1998). 30 Balzacq T., A Theory of Securitization: Origins, Core Assumptions and Variants’, in Balzacq T. (ed), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve, London: Routledge, p. 3 (2011).

Leiden University 17 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 of politicization.31 Its elements are the securitizing actor, the referent object, the referent threat, the audience and the securitizing speech act. The theory places in a central position the securitizing actor and its relationship with the audience, while the speech act itself is the securitizing move, the securitizing attempt. If the latter hails of acceptance by the audience then we can talk of a securitized issue. According to Buzan et al. the possibility of a successful securitization will vary dramatically with regard to the position held by the actor; it is thus a very much structured field in which some actors are placed in positions of power by virtue of being generally accepted voices of security and having the power to define it (like presidents, prime ministers, defense experts, military generals etc.).32 Facilitating conditions to securitization are (a) the internal demands to the speech act of following the grammar of security; (b) the social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitizing actor, meaning the relationship between the audience and the speaker and above all the likelihood of the former accepting the claims of the latter; and lastly (c) the very features of the alleged threats that can either facilitate or impede securitization. It is important to note that securitization does not work as a “carte blanche” for all topics and all referent objects, as a uniform recipe to be applied regardless. On the contrary, depending on the issue and sector to be deployed, securitization must follow the respective logic and grammar of security, meaning that the securitizing actor has to apply a sub-form or grammar, which is specific to the intended sector. There are five prevalent sectors for securitization theory: the political, the economic, the military, the societal and the environmental.33 What would entail for a security speech act to be successful? According to its three main proponents, there are three steps: identifying an existential threat, the need for emergency action, and the effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of the rules. The distinguishing feature of the securitization is the specific rhetorical structure, that emphasizes the survival, and which is deployed towards the audience through the act. Buzan claims that the phenomenon of securitization can be studied directly, without requiring indicators; the focus turns to the discourse and political constellations that use

31 Id, supra note 21. 32 Id., supra note 21. 33 Id.

Leiden University 18 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 it. If through an argument, with particular rhetorical and semiotic structure, the securitizing actor has managed to break free of rules and procedures that he would otherwise be bound by, and has achieved in making the audience tolerate violations of rules otherwise to be obeyed, then the securitizing move has been successful and we can talk of securitization.34 Securitization theory has been criticized and scrutinized, although it remains an appealing and hopeful concept in understanding the process of security. Balzacq et al, raise their concerns on the vague and simplistic statement of the theory that ignores more subtle elements, such as culture, geography, history and ethnography, and raises up to a pedestal the discursive power of the actor.35 For securitizing scholars like Balzacq the audience does more than merely sanctioning a securitizing move; it is part of an intricate negotiated enterprise, between itself and the securitizing actor. Additionally, he had been the prominent critical scholar to express concerns as to the extent to which the said theory reflects adequately and reliably real-world practices, if it is comprised by specific conditions that are required to make the securitizing act successful, or if it is just a scholarly device for theorizing. Additionally, others point out the weak conceptualization of the audience in the theory, the lack of a coherent model for failed securitizing moves, and the lack of clarity and consistent application of the theory to the empirical analysis.36

1.3. Responsibilisation Theory

Finally, the last theoretical concept to utilize and explore in this paper is the theory, or for some ‘strategy’, of responsibilisation. As with the securitization theory, this too was developed in the process of redefining security and its governance, in particular with the rise of privatization and the policies of crime governance. The idea of the

34 Id., pp. 24 35 Balzacq T., Léonard S., Ruzicka J,, Securitization revisited: Theory and cases, International Relations, 30 (4), pp. 494-531, at 506/507, (2016). 36 Holger Stritzel, Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond‘, European Journal of International Relations 13 357-383(2007); Sarah Léonard and Christian Kaunert, ―Reconceptualizing the Audience in Securitization Theory‖ in Balzacq (ed.), Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve edited by Thierry Balzacq,New York, 57-76, (2011); Mark Salter, ̳Securitization and Desecuritization: Dramaturgical Analysis and the Canadian Aviation Transport Security Authority‘, Journal of International Relations and Development 11: 321-349 (2008).

Leiden University 19 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 responsibilisation strategy revolves around the concept of the state being one of many actors that can provide security, and that the state alone is not capable and cannot effectively be responsible for preventing and controlling crime. This strategy is part of a new mode of governing crime. As theorized in Garland’s text, responsibilisation involves the state seeking to act upon crime not only through a direct approach, say police, courts, prisons, social works, but also, and increasingly, indirectly, by trying to activate action on the part of non-state actors.37 The primary concern in this case is for the state to successfully devolve responsibility for crime prevention on to agencies organizations, individuals that are found outside the traditional spectrum of the sovereign state, and persuade them to act appropriately. As a theoretical concept responsibilisation is closely connected with security and crime governance and the effect that privatization has to it. According to Lea and Stenson, the phenomenon should be seen in the wider context of neo-liberal political discourse that aims to transfer responsibility for a host of public goods, from the state to individuals, families and communities on the one hand, and market on the other.38 Often also observed in welfare policies, responsibilisation strategy targets high-risk groups, and wholly or partly legitimizes a discourse of self-responsibilisation. It employs technics of persuasion, such as public campaigns, speech acts, extensive mass media advertising, aiming to create a consciousness of “sense of duty” and thus lead to change of practices. Citizens and private actors involvement is a key element of responsibilisation practices. A notable example of such practices is the Neighborhood Watch programs that were implemented in the US and UK, or local security networks like the KVO (Keurmerk Veilig Ondernemen) in the Netherlands, that aim to encourage citizen involvement in community based voluntary security initiatives.39 Caparini nonetheless underlines the concerns of many scholars that we are heading towards a pluralization of security, towards a state governing from a distance, only to retain a meta-regulatory role while the

37 Garland D, The Limits of the Sovereign State: strategies of Crime Control in the Contemporary Society, British Journal of Criminology, 36 (4), pp. 445-471, at p. 452-455 (1996). 38 Lea J. and Stenson K., Security, Sovereignty and Non-State Governance From Below, Canadian Journal of Law and Society, 22 (2), pp.9-27, at p. 12 (2007). 39 Caparini M., Applying a Security Governance Perspective to the Privatization of Security, in Bryden A. and Caparini M. (ed), Private Actors and Security Governance, LIT&DCAF, pp. 263-284, at p.266, (2006).

Leiden University 20 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 actual implementation of security measures is taken by private individuals.40 The dangers of such a process would be to rationalize and legitimize the security provision by non- state actors, in different standards and in more flexible terms. To take it a step further, skeptics of this approach argue that attempting to successfully responsibilise non-state actors and individuals in providing and caring for their own security will erode the democratic character of the security governance. When states are the sole provider of security and the way it is governed, there is the perception- and only that according to Hiscock- that security should be provided in a equitable, legitimate, effective and accountable way.41 Yet, by surrendering security governance to private discretion there is a chance it will loose its accountable character, and end up operating in the margins of legality.

1.4. Theoretical proposition

Taking the above theoretical frames into a combining account, my proposition aims to explore the following: state terrorism as a suitable concept to describe the wave of violence that has struck the Philippines since the election of President Duterte in power. Whether the “war on drugs”, as it is labeled by its proponents, can be seen as an organized attempt to achieve societal and domestic state policies (drug control), that utilizes violence to cause terror to a wider portion of the population, that includes drug addicts/users/dealers and their families, as a means of deterrence and punish, aiming at making them forcibly change their behavior, and thus reach the desirable goal of the state. Thus the main theoretical proposition will be examining to what extent state terrorism is taking place in Philippines. At the same time, I will explore how the strategies of securitization and responsibilisation, have facilitated either the goals of the state, which is to terrorize and achieve political and societal change, or have impaired the public from recognizing state’s violent behavior for what it is: state terrorism. As explained in the theory so far,

40 Id. 41 Hiscock D., The Commercialization of Post-Soviet Private Security, in Bryden A. and Caparini M. (ed), Private Actors and Security Governance, LIT&DCAF, pp. 129-148, (2006).

Leiden University 21 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 there is valid reason to ask the question how is state terrorism construed domestically, and what interaction with governance of security it entails. Has securitization discourse cast a veil over state terrorism carried out by the Philippine’s government, normalizing and masking it as emergency and exceptional measures? Have responsibilisation strategies attained a reverse effect, in desensitizing the audience to think that it should too partake in such violent acts, as a need to the elevated emergency situation? Do the reported “death squads” constitute a reverse application of “neighborhood watch”? These are some of the sub- questions that the thesis will try to explore and explain. To depict my use of these frames, I present the following schematic: In Figure 1.a all theoretical concepts are placed vertically, upon the horizontal line that represents the state. The analysis here is state-centered, meaning the state is the actor deploying all three strategies, terrorism, securitization, and responsibilisation. There are three possible combinations of the theoretical proposition: a) none of the theories are applied in conjunction, but can only be observed separately from the other (figure 1.a applies); b) all three theories are observed in the analysis, and are seen to form part of the same theoretical equation, thus forming a pyramid (figure 1.b); c) only two pair of theories converge, and are observed to be deployed in combination (figure 1.c). In the latter assumption, state terrorism is the stable, main theoretical line of reasoning, and thus it is the two others that will be tested along it.

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Chapter 2. Research Design

Having established the theoretical grounds upon which I will base this endeavor, I will turn to the research approach most suited. In this chapter therefore I will present the design of my research, the methodology to be applied, as well as the conceptualization of my reasoning and the data on which I will rely upon. As explained in the Introduction, I have chosen the design of a case study to scrutinize my proposition. I will focus on the Philippines as the singular case on which I will test whether state terrorism can explain the eruption of violence, and how and to what extend securitization and responsibilisation strategies have facilitated that effort. Let me first start by explaining shortly the nature of the case study as a choice of research design, the very characteristics of mine, the units of analysis and observation, and go on with the methodology of the thesis.

2.1. The Choice of a Case Study

Case studies are part of a multitude of research strategies deployed in social and political sciences. And although case studies are often misconceived to fit better in the area of empirical and practical science, with empirical observation and field research, that is not the only possibility. On the contrary, case studies have been frequently used in descriptive analytical research, with many historic elements to it, and can encompass various approaches. In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” or “to what extend” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon with real-life context.42 Case studies can be explanatory, exploratory or descriptive. They can also combine all three elements, as there is no strict hierarchy on the design of the research. In fact, some of the major case studies in social and political sciences have been a combination of two or more kinds.43 The study of a social phenomenon features front and

42 Yin R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Method Series, Vol. 5, (2003). 43 For example, see Allison G.T. & Zelikow P., Essence of decision: Explaining the Cuban missile crisis, NY: Addison Wesley Longman, (2nd ed.), (1999).

Leiden University 25 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 center in a case study: research is carried out within the boundaries of one social system (the case), that can include people, organizations, local communities or nation-states; the researcher monitors the phenomenon during a certain period of time, or alternatively, by collecting information afterwards with respect to the development of the phenomenon during a certain period; the focus is on process tracing, the description and explanation of social and political processes that unfold between persons participating in the process, their values, expectations and behavior.44 In case studies several data resources are used, with the main ones being available documents, interviews and/or observation. Some of the advantages of the case study include the simplicity of theory application, which is based on the goal to have a “sufficient blueprint” for the study, grounded on the structured and well-developed theoretical frameworks. Case studies of this sort allow for concrete and step-by-step implementation of theory to the case, reaching a successful conclusion that is much dependent on the commitment of the researcher and collection of facts, and not to outside factors of unpredictability. Additionally, case studies allow for analytic generalization, which means that the case does not represent a “sample”, but the goal is to expand and generalize theories, and not to seek to enumerate frequencies (statistical generalization).45 I chose this research design due to my belief that it better serves the purpose of my research and study. Throughout the academic process of learning about security and concepts of its governance, securitization and responsibilisation have always been to my mind strong theories that can find application in an array of issues along the spectrum of security. The nature of both concepts, their reliance and study through discourse and speech acts, campaigns and public sentiment does not facilitate a strictly qualitative, statistical analysis. In a similar manner, state terrorism is also a strain of international relations theory that, although it can be quantified in to data, - number of terrorists attacks, organizations, casualties, etc.-, it renders itself more adaptable to a descriptive analytic application to the facts. Therefore, looking to examine the interaction of these concepts, it would be more efficient to do so in the design of a case study. At the same time, the inspiration for this research topic came from the very distinct case of the

44 Swanborn P. G., Case Study Research: What, why and how?, SAGE, p. 48, (2010). 45 Id., supra 34, at p. 10

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Philippines. The eruption of violence, the wave of extra-judicial killings, of the targeting of a specific portion of the population, and above all with the open and public support of the government, under the controversial public speeches of President Duterte, all these factors made the case of the Philippines a suitable one for such a research design.

2.2. Unit of Analysis and Units of Observation The unit of analysis, as follows from above, will be the ‘war on drugs’ currently conducted by the Filipino government. The theoretical propositions will be contradicted and tested again this policy, to examine the extent of compatibility and explanatory degree. The units of observations will be first and foremost President Duterte, as the champion and enforcer of the policy, government officials, the police, as well as the audience and public in the Philippines. Because the unit of analysis entails theoretical propositions that include and attempt to explore discourse power, i.e. contribution of securitization and responsibilisation theories to the one of state terrorism, it is important to map as many speech acts, discourse elements, and public sentiments as possible. To better understand the units of analysis and observations and how they fit in the theoretical premise, I have compiled the following table:

State Terrorism Securitization Responsibilisation Case-Study Units Deliberate Acts of Securitizing speech Responsibilisation Speech acts, policies violence (or threat proposing campaign: state not and governmental of) against citizens Emergency action the only provider behavior: “war on the state has a duty against a referent of security drugs” in the to protect threat Philippines State Actors, or Securitizing actor State actors, President Rodrigo non-state actors in private security Duterte & Filipino conjunction with actors governmental officials state Targeted audience Audience that is Targeted audience, Drug personalities and that identifies with securitized as a individuals of a the wider public of the targeted victims referent object of the high-risk group Philippines threat Change of Change in the Change: the Change in the drug behavior of the normal behavior of targeted audience crime rate, behavior of audience state- normalization takes up action for drug personalities

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of emergency action its security

2.3. Methodology

My approach to the problem in the case study of the Philippines is a descriptive and exploratory one. I have formulated my research question by asking the questions “to what extent” and “how”. In the former, I am interested to the extent of applicability of the state terrorism theory to Presiden Duterte’s “War on Drug” policy. I have already defined and conceptualized what state terrorism is for the purposes of this thesis. I will use Blakeley’s 2010 definition and constitutive elements. Then, setting the day of the presidential election of (President) Duterte, his official ascension to a state office, as a landmark date (30 May 2016) I will deploy and apply these state terrorism definitional elements to analyze the actions of the Philippine government thereafter. Due notice nonetheless will be given to the months previous to the election, the presidential election race, and some information from the background and history of President Duterte. This is so because he will feature as the securitizing actor in my research, thus his discourse before the election is also of importance, as it can be seen to have heavily influence the outcome. In the data collection phase (chapter 3) I will attempt to map major official and unofficial government acts in the course of the declared “war on drugs”. By mapping the policy I will have a blueprint, which I can then juxtapose and overlap with the blueprint of state terrorism and see the extent to which they match. This in any case remains an analytical and descriptive process that will include however some quantitative elements, such as number of victims killed, number of people targeted, statistics on drug use etc. The issue in the Philippines is the extensive use and sale of drugs that has created, according to the governmental discourse, a huge number of drug addicts and has contributed to the rise of drug crime. Thus to assess this argument, I will inevitably have to collect statistical information through national, international and NGO reports. These will include among others UN official reports; NGO’s like Human Rights Watch, publications and news articles, official statements by the Philippine government, etc.

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At the same time, I will attempt an exploratory research to examine how the two described strategies, namely securitization and responsibilisation, have affected the ‘war on drugs’ and how the fit with the constitutive elements of the deployed state terrorism definition. My main inquiry when contemplating the facts of the case is why, what happened and the public opinion is so tolerant of such extreme violent behavior. How come people participate themselves in the extra-judicial killings, and remain “immune” to the controversial statements their head of state is making? For this part of the research I will concentrate on a micro-level of analysis, i.e. I will focus on the discourse used by the President of the Philippines, as the main representative of the state apparatus, and its effects on the people of Philippines, the wider audience. It may be necessary to extend my base of actors when the factual circumstances demand it, and thus turn to police or other government officials. Similarly, the data collection process will be one of discourse and speech act analysis, media coverage and campaign slogans/elements. However, to properly assess the securitization and responsibilisation part of the research, I will shortly extend my focus by a couple of months prior to the election. This is due to the fact that Duterte was elected on an extensive campaign advocating the ‘war on drugs’. Therefore it is vital to examine the rhetoric used and the effect it had on the audience, i.e. the citizens of Philippines. From a prima facie, ex-facto assessment, I could argue that since he was eventually elected in the office, this attests to some kind of success of his securitizing move. Of course that would be a premature assessment, as it does not comply fully to the basic elements of a successful securitization, the extreme measuress taken, which where seemingly effectuated after his ascension to the office. In the next chapter of this research paper, Chapter 3, I will present the collection of data. This will be a descriptive-discursive presentation of the most relevant facts, information, statistics and current developments that will complete the picture of what is the current, real-life situation in the Philippines. One of the main restraints I will come across, and which could be foreseen from early on, is the potential language barrier. As I don’t speak local language, a first disclaimer is that I will primarily rely upon English reports and information. Especially for the discourse and speech act analysis this will inevitably be a drawback, but only a small one, since English is one of the two official languages of the Philippines, so I am optimistic that I will have wide access to materials

Leiden University 29 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 and speeches. What is more, I will have to rely heavily on local, national media outlets, and to the extent possible to international ones. As a result, this will influence the reliability of the information. Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that the majority of the essential information will be found in local news reports, and a prima facie reliability- unless otherwise showed- must be conferred to them. In Chapter 4 I will then proceed with the analysis, contrasting and juxtaposing my theoretical conceptualization to the information, data and observations gathered. As I stated in the previous chapter, section 1.4 of my Theoretical Proposition, there are three possible conclusions -plus one- to reach, namely that state terrorism is observed regardless of the other two supplementing theories, state terrorism is observed with both supplementing theories, or state terrorism is observed with one of the two supplementing theories. Various degradations and degrees of interaction can be observed. There is the “plus one” possible conclusion where state terrorism itself will not apply to the case. Finally, the last chapter will be my concluding remarks on the progress and process of the research, with lessons learned and the answer to the research question.

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Chapter 3: Uncovering Philippines’ ‘War on Drugs’

This chapter will come to serve as a brief presentation of facts and figures, sketching the situation on the ground, and allowing the reader to formulate a clear picture of what is going on the Philippines, before the next step, which would be the analysis of the facts based on the theoretical premise. This chapter’s structure follows that of the theoretical conceptualization; first, I will present some basic figures and statistics about the current situation in the Philippines: statistics and information on drug users and addicts, the rate of drug crime before and after President Duterte’s elevation to the public office, facts and numbers on the people killed so far, as well the arrests made, and registrations on rehabilitation centers. The reasons I will turn to these facts and figures is due to the fact that state terrorism comes to serve a policy, a political –usually- purpose on behalf of the state. In our case, what I examine as state terrorism is the so called “war on drugs”, therefore it only makes sense to look at the plausibility of the numbers, to assess the need for a “war” against drugs, instead of an anti-drug campaign, or health and social policies. Secondly, I will briefly examine some speech acts by the President and government officials of the Philippines. This is meant to serve as the factual background on which I will analyze the theoretical premise of securitization. How has the “war on drugs” been framed by the state, and particularly by President Duterte? The very use of the word “war” indicates from the very beginning a highly charged discourse. But further examples of the language used prior to and after his election are necessary to evaluate the extent to which it has affected the public’s perception of the drug issue. I will incorporate excerpts from speech acts and discourse in my paper, and highlight in bold the operative words at which emphasis must be paid to understand the securitizing attempt. Lastly, I will then proceed with juxtaposing reports and articles that describe the reaction of the public, the citizens of Philippines, to that war. To what extent have they embraced this practice, do they support it, and if they do, do they feel the need to be part of this war, and individualize the responsibility that arises from the encouragements of their President. This chapter is to be understood as a bridge of information and facts between the

Leiden University 31 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 theoretical part and this thesis’ actual analysis. The reader will get a clear picture – to the extent possible- of the situation on the ground, in order to follow the analysis and conclusion in the next chapters.

3.1 From social, law enforcement drug policies to a ‘war’ on drugs

One of the main arguments and campaign poster in President Duterte’s electoral run was the dire situation of drug users and pushers in the country. The problem of drug use has always been an acute one in the Philippines scoring all time highs from the 1990s up until 2004. But thinking on the issue, and looking at the facts, is the problem that acute to justify a shift from social policy and law enforcement approach, to a full fledged war on drugs? To answer this question, I will turn to the numbers and statistics of drug use and drug crime in the Philippines, as well as in other neighboring countries, looking at official national and UN reports, news articles and commentaries, in an attempt to sketch the true extent of the issue. Then, I will turn to the response by the Duterte, the very “war on drug” practice, the number of victims it has claimed so far, the police practices and the reports of “Death Squads”, pertaining both to current police operations, but also some dating back to when Mr. Duterte was Mayor at the city of Davao. To begin with, during the election campaign, as well as after the rise to the office, President Duterte has claimed a soaring number of drug users in the country, claiming an alleged number of more than 3.1 million people. This figure has been used again and again in reports and speeches of many governmental officials. Although the Dangerous Drug Board (DDB), the official institution that releases the relevant statistics every year, has not yet published its 2016 report, the report it published in 2015 lies in stark contrast with this alleged number. In 2015 the current drug user rate was around 1.8% of the entire population (age 10 and above), meaning that roughly 1.8 million people were drug users. The latter term is meant to signify individuals who are currently using or have used illegal drugs more than once; emphasis in these data is given regarding the use of methamphetamine drugs (what is known as shabu in the Philippines). The time of the survey of this report is between January 1st 2015 and February 5 2016, only four months

Leiden University 32 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 before the election of President Duterte.46 What is more, reports from the previous years show a relative fluctuation in the numbers of drug use, with some small increases after 2008. But even so, that such resurge does not reach the extent put forth by Duterte during and after his election campaign. According to the National Surveys of the DDB, in 2012 there were 1.3 million reported drug users47 while in 2008 the number was higher, at 1.7 million.48 The drug situation in the Philippines has seen worse days, as the highest numbers were recorded in 2004, of a soaring rate of 6.4 million users. The graph below shows the official reported drug user number from 1999 till 201249:

46 Jodez Gavilan, “DDB: Philippines has 1.8 million current drug users”, Rappler news report, September 19, 2016, available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/146654-drug-use-survey-results- dangerous-drugs-board-philippines-2015 47 “National Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2012), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/research-statistics/research/45- research-and-statistics/88-2012-researches#a 48 “Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2008), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/psrsd_report/2008%20National%20Household%20Survey.pdf 49 “Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?”, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data-drug-problem- philippines

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These numbers of course should not be seen in absolutely certainty, as there have been issues reported on the methodology and validity of the DDB’s research methods. It also becomes obvious from the above graph, that the said surveys are not conducted or made publicly available every year. To that end, it is important to look to other outside sources, and how they reported the drug situation in Philippines and cross reference the reliability of the above numbers. The United Nations Office of Drug and Crime’s (UNDOC) reports help shed light on the matter. Indeed, in 2007 the published UN Word Drug Report noted that the Philippines had the world’s highest “methamphetamine prevalence rate” at that time. 50 According to the same report, behind Philippines, Australia had the highest rate of methamphetamine use for the same time period.51 In 2013, UNDOC published a more specialized report, titled “Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-typed Stimulant and Other Drugs”, with particular emphasis in the regions of Asia and the Pacific.52 There a comparative listing of all relevant countries took place, and Philippines featured no longer on the top of the list. The report noticed that methamphetamine drug use in the Philippines was on a steady decrease till 2012, while in compering the rates with neighboring countries, Philippines numbers meet the average of the region: Australia had a methamphetamine increased rate in 2010, reaching 2.1% of the general population, while people reporting methamphetamine use for at least one time in the lives was situated in 7% of the general population, in contrast with Philippines, which that number rises to 4.1%.53 In fact, recent reports argue that methamphetamine drug addiction in Australia is one of the major threats to its health future.54 What is more, UNDOC has noted that the prevalent rate of drug use in the Philippines remains low in

50 “World Drug Report”, United Nations Drugs and Crime Office, pg. 151 (2007), available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf 51 Id. page 151. 52 “Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-typed Stimulant and Other Drugs: Challenges for Asia and Pacific”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Smart Programme, November (2013), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/2013_Regional_ATS_Report_web.pdf 53 Id., pg 41-42. 54 Sharon Verghis, “We are Ticking Time Bombs:Inside Australia’s Meth Crisis”, Time Magazine, May 4 (2017), available at: http://time.com/4737800/meth-australia-ice-crystal-methamphetamine- methylamphetamine/

Leiden University 34 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 comparison to the global average.55 The above numbers are by no means an attempt to underestimate or misrepresent the problem Philippines is facing with regards to drug use. It is indeed true that the country features globally among the top countries that are troubled by generally high rates of drug use, as well as production.56 Nonetheless, the above statistics aim to put the issue into a wider context of drug crime and abuse equally troubling other countries in the region, and that has been dealt with for years through consistent social, health and crime prevention policies. Additionally, one should always keep in mind the overall population of the Philippines that exceeds that of 100 million people.57 The Philippines’ previous government had adopted strong social and health policies that have achieved a decrease of the drug issue after 2004. Between 2004-2013, the drug related arrest where at a record low compered to previous years. It was after 2013 and mainly in 2014 where law enforcement operations were intensified again, reaching the highest number of drug related arrest and killings in the last decade.58 Additionally, the rehabilitation centers admissions were increased the same year to a staggering number of 10,000.59 The problem with these policies nonetheless was that they seem not to be entirely effective, as drug abuse continued inside the rehabilitation centers with more than 4,300 cases reported in 2013.60 The graph below presents that fluctuations between drug raids, arrest and rehabilitation admissions in the Philippines since 1999.61

55 “Philippines: Duterte’s 100 days of carnage”, Amnesty International, October 7 (2016), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/philippines-dutertes-hundred-days-of- carnage/ 56 “World Drug Report”, United Nations Drugs and Crime Office, pg. 41, 75, 91, (2014), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf 57 Philippines Population, Trading Economics- online website tracker, available at: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/philippines/population 58 “Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data-drug-problem- philippines 59 Id. 60 Dr. Lisa Grace Berlsales, “The Philippines in figures”, Philippine Statistics Authority, pg. 25, (2016), available at: https://psa.gov.ph/content/philippines-figures-0 61 “The Philippines Statistical Yearbook”, Philippines Statistics Authority, pg 13, 17-16, October (2015), available at: https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2015%20PSY%20PDF.pdf , in Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data-drug-problem-philippines

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The situation has dramatically deteriorated since President Duterte was elected in to office last summer, 30 of May 2016. From 1 July 2016 till 7 January 2017 there have been more than 44,000 arrests, while during the anti-drug operations more than 2,000 people have been killed.62 What is more characteristic of the new anti-drug operations by the police since Duterte took office, is the offensiveness and eagerness to kill the suspected users, and according to reports by NGOs and investigative reporters, plant evidence in the crime scene to make the operation look like a “buy-bust” drug operation gone wrong. These operations take place under the projects of “TokHang” and “Opperation Double Barrel” of the Philippine National Police, which entail the police drafting up lists with suspected drug criminals (users and pushers) and specifically targeting them, as well as visiting their homes so as to convince them to surrender.63 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) recently published an extensive report titled “License to kill” looking at the modus operandi of the police anti-drug campaign methods and

62 Mong Palatino, “Duterte’s ‘War on Drugs’ in the Philippines: By the Numbers”, The Diplomat, January 9 (2017), available at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/dutertes-war-on-drugs-in-the- philippines-by-the-numbers/ 63 Michael Bueza, “In numbers” The Philippine’s war on drugs”, The Rappler news reporting, April 18 (2017), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/145814-numbers-statistics- philippines-war-drugs

Leiden University 36 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 particularly the two specific projects.64 The report examines in detail 24 incidents that led to 32 deaths that involve National Philippine Police personnel, from October 2016 till January 2017, looking at police reports, witness testimonies and family confessions. The findings of the report have been both published in a dedicated electronic version, as well as in an interactive format at their website. The report concluded the involvement of police in ‘extrajudicial executions’ conducted through the two above-mentioned projects. HRW has specifically observed a unique and self repeated pattern to almost all incidents under examination: it begins with an individual (suspected drug user) receiving a visit or a phone call from an official from the local barangay (neighborhood) informing them that they were on a drug “watch list” drawn up by barangay officials and the police. Such visits often proved not so much to be warnings as a method of confirming the identity and whereabouts of a target.65 Soon after the visit, the suspected drug users end up being shoot to death in all examined incidents in the report, either by the police, or by masked groups of unidentified men that often arrive at the scene before the police, and departed along with them. Additional information that sketch a well thought plan by the police include the alleged planting of evidence: in every dead body the police always find a gun and a bag of “shabu”, the methamphetamine drug, classifying the incidents as a “buy- bust” drug operation gone wrong, where police had to shoot the drug user in self defense.66 The evidence collected however, including testimony and eyewitness reports, are contradictory to the police reports, where the victims- the drug suspects- carried no guns with them, and some of them were in police custody shortly before they were found dead.67 Amnesty International conducted a similar detailed investigation on 33 incidents

64 “License to kill: Philippine Police Killings in Duerte’s ‘War on Drus”, Human Rights Watch, March 1 (2017), available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/philippines0317_web_1.pdf 65 Id., website version, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/03/01/license- kill/philippine-police-killings-dutertes-war-drugs 66 Id. 67 Phelim Kine, “Killing and Lies: Philippines President Duterte’s War on Drugs Exposed”, Human Rights Watch, March 9, (2017), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/09/killing-and- lies-philippine-president-dutertes-war-drugs-exposed

Leiden University 37 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 that left 59 individuals dead, reaching similar conclusions of police cooperation with death squads and fabrication and planting of evidence.68 The death toll however is not high only in relation to official police operations. As briefly mentioned above, the majority of killings take place through vigilante, death- squad style groups, that often are perceived to work with the national police, either as hired guns or masked policemen themselves.69 Specifically, since July 2017, more than 4,000 deaths have occurred outside police operations, of which only 875 incidents have successfully been concluded by police investigation.70 Some of these incidents occur in daylight, by vigilantes patrolling neighborhoods on motorcycles, shooting their victims, leaving them on the side of the street; other times, victims are found tied up on hands and legs, suffocated with a plastic bag around their head.71 President Duterte’s coming to the highest office of the country is seen to be accompanied with the widespread phenomenon of death squads, one he is no stranger to. Throughout his election campaign concerns were raised on his past tenure as a Mayor in the city of Davao, were the famous “Davao Death Squad” was responsible for hundreds of killings of not only drug users, pushers, and street criminals but also judges, journalists and critics of Duterte.72 In 2009, HRW conducted a similar investigation into the killings of individuals in the province of Mindanao, gathering testimony and incident description that revealed a pattern of a “group of masked men in black jackets” targeting-killing individuals around the city.73 In its report, HRW alleges evidence of complicity and at times direct involvement of government officials and members of the police in killings by the so-called Davao Death

68 “Philippines: The Police’s murderous war on the poor”, Amnesty International, January 31 (2017), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/philippines-the-police- murderous-war-on-the-poor/ 69 Kate Lamb, “Philippine’s secret death squads: officer claims police team behind wave of killings”, The Guardian, October 4 (2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/04/philippines-secret-death-squads-police-officer- teams-behind-killings 70 Id., supra note 53. 71 Katrin Kuntz, “A politician and an ex-hitman take on Philippine Leader, Spiegel online, February 27 (2017), available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-1136508.html 72 Id. 73 “You can die anytime: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao”, Human Rights Watch, April 6 (2009), available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/04/06/you-can-die-any-time/death-squad-killings- mindanao

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Squad (DDS).74 Last September 2016, a former member of the DDS came forth and testified in a Senate Hearing against President Duterte. Edgar Motobato claimed he was part of the death squad under the direct guidance of –at that time- Mayor Duterte, and was personally involved in the killings of more than 1,000 people. 75 The same accusations were made by a retired police officer at the same hearing, Arturo Lascanas, who confessed to the killings of over 200 people while in police service, under the Mayorship and orders of Duterte.76 Both individuals have been under witness protection programs, while Mr. Lascanas fled the country for fear of his life.77 Their testimony to the Senate in September 2016 was part of an attempt of the opposition to take control of the situation and investigate the extrajudicial killings and the President’s involvement in them. Leading the attempt was Senator and Head of the Justice and Human Rights Committee Leila de Lima. Senator Lima was a vocal critic of President Duterte and had chaired the extrajudicial investigation that brought to light the above two testimonies. President Duterte had publicly lashed against her, stating, “I will destroy her” during an interview.78 Soon after the hearings of the Committee that were held in September and October 2016, the Senate stripped her of her chair and involvement into the investigation.79 A couple of months later, in February 2017, Senator Lima was arrested on drug trafficking and corruption charges for the period of 2010- 2015, when she was serving as justice secretary in the previous administration.80 Many politicians and academics call her arrest a “political prosecution” and an attempt by

74 Id. 75 Id., supra note 60. 76 Manuel Mogato, “Philippine’s death squad membernot afraid of Duterte, says more will speak out”, Reuters news reporting, March 9, (2017), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us- philippines-drugs-idUSKBN16G1OZ 77 Neil J. Morales, “Ex-policeman flees Philippines after testifying to Duterte’s death squad link”, Reuters news reporting, April 10, (2017), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us- philippines-drugs-duterte-idUSKBN17C0P8 78 “Duterte vows to destroy female government official” ABS-CBN news, August 12 (2016), available at http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/12/16/duterte-vows-to-destroy-female-govt-official 79 Nash Jenkins, “The Fighter: How Leila de Lima Ended Up Leading the Opposition to Rodrigo Duterte's Drug War”, The Times magazine, December 15 (2016), available at: http://time.com/4603123/leila-de-lima-philippines-opposition-duterte-drug-war/ 80 Karen Lema & Manuel Mogato, “Rodrigo Duterte’s biggest critic:Philippines’ Senator Leila de Lima arrested on corruption charges”, The Independent, February 24 (2017), available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/rodrigo-duterte-biggest-critic-philippines- senator-leila-de-lima-arrested-corruption-charges-war-a7597291.html

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Duterte to silence his critics.81 Furthermore, quite recently, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), an international monitoring organization based in The Hague, made similar claims, accusing both President Duterte and Secretary of Justice Vitaliano Aguirre II of making inflammatory statements that “flout the presumption of innocence and may put undue pressure in the course of [de Lima’s] criminal case”.82 The report also highlighted concerns about the safety of the detained Senator as well as the possibility of her getting a fair trial.83 This will not be the first time such allegation sees the light of day. In January 2017, President Duterte compiled a list with officials allegedly involved in drug crimes, and invited all the Mayors of the country to a meeting; there he encouraged them to resign or face the same fate with others, i.e. death. Mayor Krisel Lagman Luistro, present at the meeting, claimed that Duterte “ warned us that those involved in drugs should stop or face the consequences. He specifically said he will kill whoever is involved”. 84 President Duterte’s spoke person declined to comment or share the specific list with the public. What is more, investigative journalism has uncovered further individuals that have anonymously came forth to confess their active participation in death squads, often with the knowledge and support of the police. In October, SBS Satellite TV run an interview with a couple admitting they have gone into killing spree as part of a death squad formed after the election of President Duterte in office.85 The couple describes the way the receive and execute the killings:

“So our boss contacts us by phone and tells us we need to do a job on someone. They might be ordinary people, but they’re all pretty much the same – drug pushers or crooks. Or they’ve crossed our boss. We bring down those types of people. Just with a

81 “Senator Leila de Lima arrested in the Philippines”, Al Jazeera, February 24 (2017), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/leila-de-lima-arrested-philippines- 170224003808389.html 82 “Decision of the IPU council on Leide de Lima of Philippines”, Inter-Parliamentary Organization, April 5 (2017), available at: http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/200/phi08.pdf 83 Phelim Kine, “Philippines Slammed for Senator’s politically motivated prosecution”, Human Rights Watch, April 21 (2017), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/21/philippines- slammed-senators-politically-motivated-prosecution 84 Id, supra note 71. 85 “Meet the husband and wife assassin team, carrying out the Philippine’s drug war”, SBS Satellite, October 24 (2016), available at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/article/2016/10/20/meet- husband-and-wife-assassin-team-carrying-out-philippines-drug-war

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phone call we get the person’s identification, we’ll just base it on that. Then, if we find the person on their own, we go in immediately and kill him. And then get away. We get told to kill them, because the boss is a well-known policeman. The moment I’m given a photo, it automatically becomes a job for us [to do]. The job is drug-related. We don’t know the persons, and we don’t ask questions.”86

The couple admits that they have gone into this kind of line of “work” because of the money, and because no one will care about the victims. They feel that Duterte’s vocal stance on extrajudicial killings has empowered the police and the death squads to do this kind of action uninhibited. Furthermore, they claim to fear for their own lives if they decide to stop the killings, since their “boss” is a police officer, and they can be killed at any time. At every killing they do the admit leaving a sign with the word “pusher” written on it, so people that pass by they know the reason this person was killed. It is kind of a branding of the victims.87 So far, the information allows us to sketch a clear picture. Duterte, both as President and Mayor can be seen to cultivate and implement a different way of dealing with social and crime governance policies. During his tenure as Mayor of Davao, he is accused of directing a death squad group that targeted not only petty criminals and drug users, but also fierce critics of his policies. Since his election to presidential office, although the statistics and numbers of drug abuse are in the low levels compared both domestically with previous years and internationally to other countries of the region, he has been inclined to wage a ruthless war against drug pushers and users. However only the latter seem to be in the far end of his targeting, with the overwhelming majority of the victims to be poor, unemployed drug users and addicts, and in some cases suspected drug dealers.88 Additionally, the police has been observed to be less restrained in the way operations are conducted, with a staggering increase in the deaths of the suspected criminals- what they label as “drug personalities”-, while the majority of killings takes

86 Id. 87 Id. 88 “Philippines: The Police’s murderous war on the poor”, Amnesty International, January 31 (2017), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/philippines-the-police- murderous-war-on-the-poor/

Leiden University 41 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 place by unidentified group of individuals, for which police dismisses as unproven allegations or inter-gang violence. After his election, on July 1st, Duterte appointed General Ronald dela Rosa as Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP), a former police official in the Duterte administration when he was Mayor of Davao city. In his turn, dela Rosa proclaimed he would replace all major police officials, in an attempt to purge the police of corrupted individuals.89 What is more, President Duterte has actively threatened politicians and critics with secret drug lists, while his main critic Senator Lima was arrested on drug charges. Additionally, he has turned against journalist and critics in the press claiming “just because you are a journalist, you are not exempt from assassination if you are a son of a bitch”.90 Although one could question the plausibility and causality between all these facts and the role of President Duterte, which will become clearer in the next section, in the extra judicial killings, a key incident that took place in January 2017 revealed the determination and devotion of Duterte to his policies. At the beginning of this year, Ick-joo, a South Korean businessman, was kidnapped by an anti-drug police unit and was strangled to death on the very grounds of the national police headquarters.91 Duterte ordered the dismantling of the units, only to declare through the chief of police, that this will be temporary and only for purposes of restructuring. At the same time, Duterte called upon the military to take up anti-drug operations, with 5,000 military personnel being on stand by to form teams, claiming however that at this point he will not declare martial law. 92 This raised concerns for the deterioration of the situation with the involvement of military, and fears of even more excessive violence and use of force. The situation seems to be on a slippery slope towards regime-style governance, as was the

89 Bea Cupin, “Warning to drug dealers: PNP has ‘double barrel’ plan”, Rappler reporting, June 29 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/138049-dela-rosa-pnp-plan-drugs 90 “Philippine’s Duterte threatens press over critical coverage” Daily Mail, March 30 (2017), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4364220/Philippines-Duterte-threatens- newspaper-broadcaster.html 91 “Philippines to disband anti-drug police units after rogue agents kill South Korean businessman”, Business Insider, January 29 (2017), available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/philippines-to- disband-anti-drug-police-units-after-rogue-agents-kill-south-korean-businessman-2017- 1?international=true&r=US&IR=T 92 Karen Lema & Marti Petty, “Philippine’s ministry asks Duterte to clarify military’s role in drug war”, Reuters, February 21 (2017), available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines- drugs-idUSKBN15G3CK?il=0

Leiden University 42 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 case in some countries of Latin America and south Africa from the 60s all the way to the 90s. Why hasn’t there been a more revolting response to these unlawful policies of extrajudicial operations and terror? This question will be mostly answered in Chapter 4 during the analysis part, but for the moment, the necessary information will be given in the next section.

3.2 The securitizing discourse as a cloak of invisibility

Should the above numbers and described situation come as a surprise to the Philippine society, and the international community that observes? The answer would be yes and no. No, because throughout his campaign, presidential candidate Rodrigo Duterte made his intentions clear regarding the way he intends to reduce and eradicate drug abuse and drug crime. At heart of his campaign was the intent to wage a ruthless battle against drugs, as he did when Mayor of Davao city. Few thought the ways would be similar. Yet, where other candidates announced social and economic policies to convince their audience, Duterte adopted a tough language, which many saw as exaggerations and campaign strategy. And that is where the surprise comes. Many in the Philippines, including supporters, voters and public never read much into the campaign; they never saw how extrajudicial killings and police terror will be the modus operandi of Duterte’s administration. Some, maybe the majority of the public, shared the opinion that Christian Quedado, a 22 years old Duterte’s voter, shared: “I don’t agree with killings. I just think he will have an alternate plan to stop crime… He knows what he is doing”.93 This section will present some brief excerpts and elements of the discourse Rodrigo Duterte used before and after his election to the Presidential office, as well as that of his administration and supporters. The aim is to find these elements in his speeches and discourse that could have acted as a securitizing cloak, dressing up his unlawful policies as something imperative, necessary and something that the public wants. Some instances

93 Oliver Holmes, “Philippine’s Election: Punisher Rodrigo Duterte in lead as polls close”, The Guardian, May 9 (2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/09/philippines-election-2016-polls-open-amid- death-threats-from-presidential-hopeful

Leiden University 43 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 and examples of speeches to be presented and analyzed walk on a tight rope between populism and condescending politicization. It is important however not to alienate the securitizing aspects of his speech from the overall context. Although securitization is different from populism and rhetoric provocation, techniques as such during a presidential campaign should not be lightly dismissed. This is due to the fact that during presidential elections, even absent securitizing discourse, populism does effectuate some similar results. The very presidential status and background of the candidates allows them to impose their authoritative figure and discourse in a more extensive way and with more gravitas. As a result, populism that is interchangeable with even the slightest forms of securitizing discourse draws from the latter like a sponge in the water, allowing for a wider range audience impact. During his election campaign Duterte presented a grave situation when it came to drug abuse and drug crime in the country. As mentioned in the previous section, he exaggerated the drug numbers, claiming that more than 3 million drug users currently trouble the Philippines. He didn’t even shy away from comparing himself to Hitler, and proclaiming he will kill them [drug users and pushers] like Hitler killed the Jews.94 His notions drew from the past, during his tenure as a Mayor of Davao city, when he publicly proclaimed that they way he has kept his city safe was by killing all criminals, robbers, rapists, drug addicts, “kill them all” he has been quoted saying.95 At an official visit of then President Mrs. Arroyo to Davao city, which has been labeled one of the safest in the country, Mayor Duterte was quoted bragging “ but the best practices in the city, ma’am, are the killings of criminals”.96 However, the early stages of his election campaign in general have been mixed with moderate mentions on the dug issues, along with acute problems on corruption, gang wars and values to God. In the first months of his campaign, Duterte claimed the country is at war, and his main intention was to save it.

94 Euan McKirdy, “Philippine’s President likens himself to Hitler”, CNN news reporting, September 30 (2016), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2016/09/30/asia/duterte-hitler-comparison/ 95 “Duterte on criminals: Kill all of them”, Inquirer Mindando news reporting, May 15 (2015), available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/691527/dutertes-secret-in-keeping-davao-city-phs-safest- kill-criminals 96 Id.

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That was not out of ambition but out of respect for duty.97 He praised his belief in principles of faith in God and good governance and promised to govern with a good heart. Nonetheless, he did not dismiss his image as a hard, uncompromised, tough- talking, crime-fighting Mayor that now wanted to become President only to “save this Republic, […] to make this sacrifice if only to save this country from being fractured”. 98 His discourse intensified towards the last months before the elections. He persistently stated that regions in the Philippines, such that of Mindanao are deteriorating into chaos and violence, while called upon the inaction of the current government and opposing presidential candidates: “Let this be a fair warning to our national leaders. The indicators of an eruption of violence in Central Mindanao area are becoming very evident”.99 His comments followed a police operation disaster in the Mamasapano, Maguindano province, where more than 40 police officers were killed by members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Duterte took this rhetoric and discourse for action against militias and terrorist groups, and unified it to fit all criminals alike. He intensively started to use military language to describe drug crime, and started to refer to it as a ‘war’. This was in turned picked up from local media outlets that featured headlines of “Duterte saves PH from disaster” and soon after the “war on drugs” prevailed as the term to describe his policy. His reference to drug users and pushers was often made in gruesome terms. While his campaign emphasized mainly on the drug pushers, and drug dealers as the ones that are threatening the country, Duterte’s opinion on the drug users was not any different. In his speech at the “Leader I want” Forum conference, Duterte framed the country to be hostage of the previous government’s inability to deal successfully with drug criminals. He vowed that “If I become President, there is no such a thing as a bloodless cleansing. I

97 Franklin A. Caliguid, “Duterte on 2016 presidential bid: I am wating for a ‘divine’ signal”, Inquirer Mindanao news reporting, January 23 (2015), available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/667533/duterte-on-2016-presidential-bid-im-waiting-for-divine- signal 98 Gabriel Cardinoza, Germelina Lacorte, Yolanda Sotelo, “Duterte eyes presidency in 2016 to save PH from disaster”, Inquirer Mindanao news reporting, February 19 (2015), available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/673999/duterte-eyes-presidency-in-2016-to-save-ph-from-disaster 99 Id.

Leiden University 45 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 propose to get rid of the drugs between 3 to 6 months”.100 In the same conference he confronted his opponents and the conduct of previous administrations, claiming that they themselves had taken similar action during counter-operations against terrorist groups, “knocking the door with no warrants”; why should criminals be any different?101 On February 2016, only three months before his election, Duterte became even more vocal on his plans and policy. He claimed that it was his duty to make police officers feel safe during operations, and that his end goal was to restore the sense of safety and security to the Philippine society.102 Additionally, he promised to provide pardon and immunity to all police officers that will be accused by following his orders:

“When push comes to shove and Congress, the Ombudsman, and the Commission on Human rights grill policemen, there is a provision in the Constitution that the President can pardon the criminal whether conditional or full”.103

It is questionable, although a lawyer himself, if he understood that at this very moment he was acknowledging the fact that policemen that will follow his orders would potentially become criminals themselves. In May 2016 Rodrigo Duterte was elected in the office of the President of the Philippines, with one of the highest popularity rates. At his inaugural speech Duterte reiterated his policies and plans and underlined the urgency and devastation drug crime has brought to the country, and asked Congress not to step in the way. According to the new President, there was a clear mandate for his way of governance104:

100 Pia Rananda, “Duterte: no bloodless cleansing vs. crime”, Rappler news reporting, January 20 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/119688-rodrigo- duterte-no-bloodless-cleansing-crime 101 Id. 102 Raymon Dullana, “ Duterte: I will pardon cops who kill criminals, civilians in line of duty”, Rappler news reporting, February 11, (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/politics/elections/2016/122044-duterte-pardon-cops-kill- criminals 103 Id. 104 Full text: Inaugural Address of President Rodrigo Duterte, Inquire news reporting, June 30 (2016), available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/793344/full-text-president-rodrigo-duterte- inauguration-speech

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“I have seen how illegal drugs destroyed individuals and ruined family relationships. I have seen how criminality, by means all foul, snatched from the innocent and the unsuspecting, the years and years of accumulated savings. Years of toil and then, suddenly, they are back to where they started. Look at this from that perspective and tell me that I am wrong. In this fight, I ask Congress and the Commission on Human Rights and all others who are similarly situated to allow us a level of governance that is consistent to our mandate. The fight will be relentless and it will be sustained”.105

It was a central belief in Duterte’s mind that he was elected to save the country, and that people have specifically condoned his policies with their votes: “ Let me remind in the end of this talk that I was elected to the presidency to save the entire country. […] I now ask of everyone to join me as we embark on this crusade for a better and brighter tomorrow”.106 To the new President’s mind, drugs and corruption was part of a disease, one if its many consequences, that was spreading and taking over the society of the Philippines, that needed immediate action:

“There are many amongst us who advance the assessment that the problems that bedevil our country today which need to be addressed with urgency, are corruption, both in the high and low echelons of government, criminality in the streets, and the rampant sale of illegal drugs in all strata of Philippine society and the breakdown of law and order. True, but not absolutely so. For I see these ills as mere symptoms of a virulent social disease that creeps and cuts into the moral fiber of Philippine society. I sense a problem deeper and more serious than any of those mentioned or all of them put together. But of course, it is not to say that we will ignore them because they have to be stopped by all means that the law allows.”107

This notion of drug pushers and users being a disease that has fallen upon the nation, and was threatening the very existence of it and its future generations was a theme

105 Id. 106 Id. 107 Id.

Leiden University 47 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 that featured in many important speeches of the President elect. In August, during a public mourning for the loss of police personnel, Duterte restated similar claims. The same language was also used by his administration. Commenting on a New York Times article, governmental spokesperson Ernesto Abella stated, “drugs are killing people in our country and all around the world. Our President is committed to stopping this cancer on our nation and to building a better life for all Filipinos”.108 He fiercely stated that the situation with the drugs (sabu/sabi, i.e. methamphetamine) has not only reached “crisis proportions” but it has turned into a “pandemic”.109 He further exaggerated his claims about the drug users, claiming that “two, three years ago there were 3 million addicts”, and the rate keeps going up; dealing with them as it has happened so far, he alleged, is ineffective, a “vicious cycle”.110 At the same speech Duterte introduced the famous ‘list’, a method that was to become a practice in the way police would come to target suspected individuals. Duterte claimed he had compiled a list with officials from the branch of government, police, judiciary, Senate and so forth, with alleged ties to drug offences and drug corruption. He publicly read more than 150 names, and stated:

“All policemen, PNP personnel, security guards, mayors I have mentioned, you are hereby relieved of your duty and [should] immediately report to your mother unit. […] I give you 24 hours to report [to] your mother unit or I will whack you. I will dismiss you from your service. […]You do not do that, I will order the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the entire PNP to hunt for you”. 111

Duterte’s discourse did not only aim at creating a feeling of national emergency, existential threat that drug addicts, users and pushers pose to society, and how cleansing

108 Trisha Macas, “Malacanang responds to NY Times editorial: Duterte committed to saving Filipino lives” GMA new online, April 26 (2017), available at: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/608516/malacanang-responds-to-ny-times- editorial-duterte-committed-to-saving-filipino- lives/story?utm_source=GMANews&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_campaign=news 109 Full Text: Duterte’s speech linking government officials to illegal drugs”, The Philippine Star news reporting, August 7 (2016), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/07/1611020/full-text-dutertes-speech-linking- government-officials-illegal-drugs 110 Id. 111 Id.

Leiden University 48 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 it from the them was his gift of salvation to the country. His public humiliation and intimidations of his critics, dressed as a purging of the government from corrupt elements was not the only strategy deployed. Duterte used tough language for drug addicts, sometimes sketching them in anonymity, calling equally drug dealers, pushers, and addicts as “drug personalities”, a term used in all official reports and government statements, and other times by labeling them as something less of humans. Commenting on the recently published HRW report “License to kill”, Duterte stated: “When you kill criminals that is not a crime against humanity. The criminals have no humanity God damn it”.112 This perception of drug addicts and drug criminals is not a strange one in the Philippine society. In 1988, the Supreme Court of the Philippines asserted in one of its decisions that “ [it is] common knowledge that drug addicts become useless if not dangerous members of society and in some instances turn up to be among the living dead.”113 This inhumane perception of people that have fallen addicted to drugs, or that deal and use drugs has been prevalent in many administration members, including the Chief of Police, General dela Rosa. When he was asked to comment on the high number of killings of drug addicts during police operations, and the high number of extrajudicial killings by vigilante groups, his response is indicative of the Duterte administration’s perception: “Before, when you were talking about murder, it’s people who are innocent; they are victims of drug-crazy people who committed crimes. Now most of these killed are drug personalities. That’s a very big difference.” 114 Before turning to the last section of this chapter, that will discuss the response of the audience to the above-described discourse, two things are necessary. First, to provide some information on that audience, briefly explaining education background, economic status, religious background, and geographic distribution. This is important information to keep in mind when attempting to assess the impact of the securitizing discourse, or any

112 “Duterte slams repot: Criminals have no humanity” ,The Philippine Star news reporting, March 3 (2017), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/03/1677475/duterte-slams- report-criminals-have-no-humanity 113 Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines, “People of the Philippines v. Romeo Policarpio y Miranda”, G.R. No. L-69844, February 23 (1988), available at: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/feb1988/gr_l_69844_1988.html 114 Mong Palatino, “Duterte’s war on drugs in the Philippines: by the numbers”, The Diplomat, January 9 (2017), available at: http://thediplomat.com/2017/01/dutertes-war-on-drugs-in-the- philippines-by-the-numbers/

Leiden University 49 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 discourse for that matter, to an audience, as the success of the former will heavily depend on its acceptance by the latter. Furthermore, by doing that exercise one places the securitizing discourse into context, which in this case is the wider audience. Secondly, at the end of the section, a table of all relevant elements of the discourse will be given, which will summarize the main points to keep for the analysis part, and will render itself useful for subsequent reference. As mentioned above, the Philippines’ population is a little over 100 million people. This number is almost equally divided between people living in urban (45.3%) and rural areas (54.7%).115 Around 60% of the overall population of the Philippines are eligible to vote.116 The majority of the population, more than 90% are Roman Catholics.117 When it comes to education, only a small number, compared to the entire population, has attained higher education. More specifically, around 22 million people are elementary undergraduates and below, around 9 million are elementary graduates, while high school undergrads and graduates account for 27 million people. Only 8 million people are reported as college graduates.118 Nonetheless, basic literacy rates for population of 10 years of age and above remain in high numbers, at 95%.119 Finally, due notice should be given to the poverty and employment situation in Philippines. This is for two reasons: first, because the use of methamphetamine is prevalent to poor people, often because it has been claimed to help them work for more hours, and thus earn more money. Shabu pills contain large amounts of caffeine that would seem to support in part this claim.120 Secondly, and as a subsequent result, much use and addiction to the drug is rendering users unable to work in the long term, leading them to loose their jobs and find recourse to drug pushing and trade, so as to make a living. The reality is that drug use is more prevalent to low class, poor people, and yet despite that, the official numbers are still in

115 Dr. Lisa Grace Berlsales, “The Philippines in figures”, Philippine Statistics Authority, pg. 33, (2016), available at: https://psa.gov.ph/content/philippines-figures-0 116 Id. 117 Id. at pg. 35. 118 Id. at pg. 43. 119 “Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Philippines”, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), May (2015), available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002303/230331e.pdf 120 “Philippines Meth Trade out of the shadows again”, Voice of America news reporting, Reuters, February 25 (2017), available at: http://www.voanews.com/a/philippines-meth- trade/3739546.html

Leiden University 50 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 contrast with that of the Duterte’s government. In 2015, around 26 million Filipinos (21.6%) were below poverty line, and almost half of them found themselves under extreme poverty.121 Yet placing this number next to the 1.9 million drug users it only shows the low prevalence of drug use even among poor people. All the above information should be interpreted in light of the overall electoral picture: In a country with medium educational rates, large numbers of population, with large amount of people living below poverty line, framing the drug issue as a serious crisis, that is spreading like a disease can have two consequences: on the one hand, people living at the poverty line or below feel threaten as they are the ones that run the risk to be affected more than any other class. At the same time, those that find themselves detached from poverty and drug use can either be also alarmed by the issue and thus act upon preemptively by voting in favor of an outspoken candidate like Duterte, opting for his extreme measures, while at the same time remain indifferent as they feel they will not be harmed by such tough policies. Noteworthy are the opinions of poor, shabu-addicted users that have misinterpreted the intentions of the President: “ I thought he would go after the big syndicates that manufacture the drugs, not the small dealers like me. I wish I could turn the clock back. But it is too late for me. I can not surrender, because if I do the police will kill me”- said Roger, an anonymous interviewed drug pusher to BBC.122 In December of last year, President Duterte addressed the issue of innocents being killed in his ruthless “war on drugs”, describing the victims as “collateral damage”. “I would admit there were killings that were really unintended, like the children who were caught in a crossfire. Collateral damage, and I’m sorry. There has to be a casualty and there has to be some drawbacks there”.123 Furthermore, Duterte stated that his intention is to instill fear in the hearts of the criminal and lawbreakers, claiming that unless the last drug pusher, user and dealer are dead, his campaign will not end. “You want the killings to stop in the Philippines,

121 Press Release: Philippines poverty indices, The Philippines Statistics Authority, October 27 (2016), available at: https://psa.gov.ph/poverty-press-releases 122 Jonathan Head, “Philippines drug war: The woman who kills dealers for a living”, BBC news, August 26 (2016), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37172002 123 Alexis Romero, “Sorry for the unintended killings in drug war”, The Philippine Star, December 30 (2016), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/12/30/1658054/sorry-unintended- killings-drug-war

Leiden University 51 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 foreigners and natives should stop drugs. You stop this and everything will be OK. We can concentrate on other things of government”.124 To sum up this part, the discourse used throughout the campaign and after by Rodrigo Duterte shows mixed signs of securitizing strategy, mixed with populism and demoralizing language. Below the table gathers all the main elements of the discourse we need to keep in mind as we proceed with the analysis on the next chapter.

President Duterte. Figure of authority, Presidential Candidate, former Mayor.Framed as the savior, one who Securitizing Actor makes sacrifices, the only capable of achieving the solution (comparisons to his tenure as “iron-fist” Mayor). Drug crime described through drug use, addiction and trade. Emphasis on the number of drug addicts. Framed as a Existential Threat national threat, a disease that is spreading to the country, an illness, cancer, that is depriving next generation from a future, fracturing society apart. It is a crisis, a pandemic that requires emergency action; either surrender or be killed. Police officers, the Army, the Emergency Action public, all forces necessary to discard the threat. Killing of every last drug pusher and user. Immunity guaranteed to everyone. Drug users and drug pushers are not just criminals with Demoralized rights; they are zombies, “personalities” that do not deserve Target or enjoy human rights. Killing them does not amount to “murder”, it is something different. Low level of educated voters/citizens, High rates of unemployment and concentrated living in rural areas; high Securitized rates of religious believers. Strong convictions of a corrupt audience government. Their role emphasized in the process. They are part themselves of the emergency action.

124 Id.

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3.3. Responsibility, Greed and Fear

This section will examine the relevant discourse and public campaign that aimed at responsibilising and encouraging (instigating) citizens to become active part of the policy to fight drug addiction. The proposed paths were two: if one knows of drug users and pushers he/she is encouraged to kill them him/herself. If one is a drug user or pusher, the option is to surrender to rehabilitation centers and police or face the possibility of death. The above options where presented in various speeches and political campaign rallies of President Duterte. In August, President Duterte was praising the high numbers of killings and public endorsed such policy: “My orders are shoot to kill you. I don’t care about human rights, you better believe me”. 125 He encouraged citizens to actively participate in the killing spree with no fears for prosecution: “If you know of any addicts, go ahead and kill them yourself, as getting their parents to do it would be too painful”. 126 In another public speech he reiterate that call: “[...] For those among your respective neighbors, feel free to call the police, or do it yourself If you have the gun, you have my support”.127 For the police officers that are involved in killings, as was mentioned above, the President said he will provide immunity to all, and he wont allow Congress of Human Rights Committees to stand in the way. Furthermore, Duterte stated that he is willing to create some kind of neighbor watch, selected individuals in each barangay to be supplied with guns and the mandate to assist the police in the tracking down of drug addicts and pushers. The qualifications for these individuals, selected few, would be simple: gun and law enforcement minimum knowledge, meaning ex-officials, ex-soldiers, or people that received ROTC training

125 Id. supra note 55 (HRW Report: License to kill). 126 “Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte urges people to kill drug addicts”, The Guardian news reporting, July 1st (2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-urges- people-to-kill-drug-addicts 127 Katerina Franscisco: “Shoot to kill”: Duterte’s statements on killing drug users”, Rapplers news reporting, October 5 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/148295- philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-statements-shoot-to-kill-drug-war

Leiden University 53 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

(Reserve Officers Training Corps).128 It is unclear to what extent this policy plan has been fully implemented, although in the HRW “License to kill” report, in all registered incidents there was mention of “barangay”, armed individuals that compile lists and work closely with the police before every killing or drug operation. This information, in combination with the reports on vigilante killings, performed by masked armed men only reinforce the position that individuals have been taking arms and forming groups, taking up to themselves, in collaboration with the police, to eliminate drug users, and pushers alike. In August 2016, BBC published an exposé that featured the anonymous confession of a woman, claiming to belong to such armed groups, death squads, hired by the police to kill drug personalities. She claims that she has been an assassin in a group of three women, targeting drug users and dealers for two years now, long before Duterte came into power, but that the last months, killings have been intensified.129 Her husband introduced her to the group, due to the fact that as a woman she can approach targets with out raising their suspicions. The incentives are monetary for the most part, as her group receives 20,000 pesos (around 430$) for each kill they perform. For low income Filipinos, where basic income is estimated at around 1,000 pesos a month, this is a fortune. In the same note, stories of citizens turned opportunistically members of deaths squads after the election of Duterte have surfaced in many media investigations.130 In some cases however, it is the families of individuals lost to drugs that are out for the killings of drug pushers and addicts. In the same BBC report, confidential discussion with drug pushers and addicts confirm this fear that has become a reality in Duterte’s Manilla: “I feel guilty and it is hard on my nerves. I don’t want the families of those I have killed to come after me”.131

128 Pia Ranada, “Duterte: Armerd personnel per barangay to crack down on drugs”, Rappler news reporting, May 17 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/nation/133289-duterte-armed- personnel-barangay-crackdown-drugs 129 Jonathan Head, “Philippines drug war: The woman who kills dealers for a living”, BBC news, August 26 (2016), available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-37172002 130 Chris Kitching, “Husband and wife death squad execute 800 people in brutal Philippines’ war on drug dealers”, The Mirror, October 14 (2016), available at: http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world- news/husband-wife-death-squad-execute-9114244 131 Id.

Leiden University 54 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

The end result of President Duterte’s encouragement and tough stance on killings seems to be the distortion of the notion of public participation and collaboration in criminal governance. It resembles the idea back in the 1960s, when we had formulations of neighborhood watches. Then citizens were responsibilized and encouraged to contribute to their security through close collaboration with the police, a private watchful eye. Now in Duterte’s Philippines one observes death squads poping up, citizens encouraged taking killings in their hands. The practice as the reporting and investigation purports is not new, but it has been magnified in the last year, not coincidently, since the presidential run and election to the office of President Rodrigo Duterte. Finally, before we turn to the analysis chapter, another aspect of the behavior of the citizens needs to be acknowledged: that of the voluntary or forceful registration in rehabilitation centers and lists. It has been reported by national and international reports that since the election in office of Duterte there has been a spike in the rehabilitation centers, with drug addicts and their families rushing to commit themselves and their family members out of fear fort heir own lives. 132 According to a Financial Times investigation, public rehabilitation centers have been floated with terrified civilians, drug addicts, that are trying to register themselves or their families, including their children, to avoid the possibility of being killed by police or death squads.133 Prices have spiked as well, while those who can afford it choose private clinics and centers for issues of better safety. It is remarkable however, how despite the prevalent fear among citizens, Duterte still remains popular, even after reported incidents of wrongful killings and collateral damage. The Social Weather Stations survey report recently published in a Financial Times article claims that Duterte’s approval ratings remain significantly high at 63%. At the same time however, in a paradoxical turn, four-fifths of the respondents of the same survey were worried that either they or someone they know would be killed, become a victim of the anti narcotics crackdown.134

132 Alberto Maretti, “Prisons and rehab overcrowding in the Philippines”, Aljazeera news reporting, December 14 (2016), available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/inpictures/2016/12/prisons- rehab-overcrowding-philippines-161207091046623.html 133 Michael Pee and Grace Ramos, “Bloody Philippine drug war sparks rush for rehab”, Financial Times, January 29 (2017), available at: https://www.ft.com/content/bd131d46-e3af-11e6-8405- 9e5580d6e5fb 134 Id.

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To sum up, the brief information presented above sketches a rather distorted image of responsible, often money-motivated, citizens taking up arms, joining death squads and barangay groups with the support and close collaboration of the police. At the same time, fear, and not responsibility or personal health interest, drives drug addicts and their families to register in rehabilitation centers in an attempt to save their lives. Although more plausible information would be necessary, to compare the situation with responsibilisation strategies that often entail long public relation campaigns, catchy slogans and smiley reliable individuals, in this case, we fall short of that, but not in an inadequate way. The long public relations campaign was the presidential elections, and the public speeches of the President, the catchy slogans are none other but “kill them all”, “ I will give you a medal”, “I will offer impunity”, “they are a disease” and so forth. And for the “campaign poster boy”, Rodrigo Duterte, the elected President, has manage to replace successfully the PR-reasoned, PR-mandated smile of such campaigns with a fierce “iron fist” posture, that will instill fear in to drug personalities and safeguard police officers and the innocent. In the next chapter I will take stock of all the information and facts presented here, and examine them under the light of the proposed theoretical premise. Can the above facts, elements and information support the theoretical baseline, that the “war on drugs” currently fought in the Philippines is nothing less that a state terrorism act? Does it entertain all the elements scholars and experts put forth for such kind of state terrorism? Additionally, have securitization and responsibilisation elements, through presidential discourse and speeches, managed to blur, misrepresent and confuse the nature of state terrorism policy found in Duterte’s war on drugs? In the analysis part I will not re- incorporate all information, facts and evidence presented in this chapter. I will rely upon them and when need be, make a short reference to this very document, but the task will include the analysis of the knowledge obtained here, under the scope of my theoretical proposition.

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Chapter 4: Unmasking the state terror in the “War on Drugs”.

Now let us turn to the crucial part of this thesis: the analysis of Duterte’s ‘war on drugs’ policy under the prism of state terrorism theory. The structure of this chapter will follow Blakeley’s definition of state terrorism adopted in Chapter 1 and reiterated below. It will take apart all four key elements that are encompassed in the definition and contrast them with the information and facts I discussed in the previous chapter. The aim is to proceed step by step, much as a check list, and see if these elements are met. If so, then we have to undeniably talk about state terrorism. For the sake of clarity, I am presenting these four elements of state terrorism again below:135 a. There must be a deliberate act of violence against individuals that the state has a duty to protect, or a threat of such act if a climate of fear has already been established through preceding acts of state violence; b. The act must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents; c. The act or threat of violence is intended to induce extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim; d. The target audience is forced to consider changing their behavior in some way, without that change need to be political. What is more, securitization and responsibilisation theories will be interchangeably examined and analyzed within each section-key element of the definition. The point is to explore whether either theory is deployed at the same time with elements of state terrorism, in such a way, that the end result is blurred, or distorted, thus evading public perception of the police being state terror. The chapter therefore will be divided in four subsections, and at the end of each I will mark in a short sentence, as a way to keep score, whether this key element is met, and if it is combine with either securitization, responsibilisation or both. In each section, I will draw from generally and historically

135 Blakeley R., State Terrorism in the Social Sciences, in Contemporary State Terrorism, Critical Terrorism Studies, Routledge, pp. 12-13, (2010)

Leiden University 57 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 accepted examples of state terrorism to facilitate and strengthen both comparison and analysis with the Philippines’ case. The overall observations will take part in the final part of this paper, the Conclusion.

4.1. Deliberate acts of violence against individuals the state has a duty to protect

The first fundamental part of all three theories examined and combined in this paper is the existence of an audience, a large group of individuals, that are unique in a certain way, different for each theory. State terrorism does not only have an audience, it also has a targeted group; the individuals which the state has a duty to protect. These individuals are singled out and targeted by the state, either through clearly executed and deliberate acts, or through the threat of such violent acts. The distinction between audience and targeted group is fundamental in understanding state terrorism, as the instrumentality of the fear imposed on the latter is used to coerce the change of behavior in the former. In the Philippine ‘war on drugs’ case, the targeted group is the “drug pushers” and “drug users”, although many more people not related to drug trade or drug use have been targeted and killed. This includes individuals killed under wrong identity, politicians and journalists that have been intimidated and threatened, bystanders caught in the cross fires, and so forth. Nonetheless, because it will be perilous to try to distinguish between all of this other groups of people targeted and killed, the “collateral damage” according to President Duterte, I will primarily focus on the “drug personalities”, meaning the drug addicts, users and pushers. They will form the targeted group at which the deliberate acts of violence are directed. At the same time, the other groups, journalists, NGOs or politicians that Duterte has threatened will be a second, underlined group, a wider audience along with citizens and other drug addicts. The first element to inquire upon here is whether drug users and pushers meet the criteria of a protected group, i.e. a group of individuals the state has the right to protect. To answer this question - although it would be rather reasonable that the answer is yes - I will briefly present key parts of the Philippines legislation that underlines rights for due

Leiden University 58 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 process and fair trial, even in the case of criminals. Article III of the Bill of Rights incorporated in the Constitution of the Philippines carves out the fundamental rights even individuals accused of a crime have.136 The very first Section declares, “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws”.137 Furthermore, Sections 11 and 12 reiterate the commonly known knowledge that any person accused of a crime shall be informed of his rights, receive legal representation, will have free access to courts and the justice system, and above all no torture, force, violence, or threat of violence, intimidation and any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him/her.138 Finally, Section 14 states in clear language that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence without due process of law. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.139 It is evident that despite their labeling as criminals, ‘drug personalities’ still enjoy the protection of the law and of the State. Their summary execution, targeted killing, intimidation and undue process, through lists compiled by local neighborhood groups and the police would seem to be in direct violation of Constitutional provisions. Notwithstanding just the provisions of the Constitution, the Philippines have ratified and incorporated in their legal order international treaties such as the Rome Statute that prohibits that kind of behavior. In fact, President Duterte has been accused by many, including those at the international level, for being responsible for crimes against humanity. Recently, a complaint was filed with the International Criminal Court that alleges such crimes, dating all the way back to the tenure of Duterte as a Mayor, till his current term as President,

136 Fair Trial Standards, Constitution of the Republic of Philippines 1987, Cooperation and Judicial Assistance Database, available at: https://cjad.nottingham.ac.uk/en/legislation/717/keyword/310/ 137 Id. 138 Id. 139 Id.

Leiden University 59 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 alleging that his policies have claimed the life of more than 9,000 people.140 In October 2016, ICC’s Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda released a public statement declaring that the Court is closely monitoring the situation that can potentially lead to a criminal case against the President for crimes against humanity.141 It is worth mentioning the legal framework of crimes against humanity, which protects citizens both in peace and during war, and as such is applicable in our case, and renders positive duties for protection to the state. Even criminals do not lose their status as citizens and the protection this entails by international agreements. As such, crimes against humanity means the widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack, and can include the following forms: willful killing, extermination, enslavement, arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer, imprisonment or other severe privation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons, and persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, ethical, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation or other groups that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law. These provisions have been incorporated into the Philippines’ legal order by national law, thus binding the state in a positive duty for protection, and establishing subsequent rights for the citizens.142 It becomes obvious therefore that there is a group of individuals, the suspected drug users and drug dealers, that despite their labeling as criminals, or “drug personalities”, still remain citizens and enjoy equal protection and due process rights by the state. It is understandable to some extent, when one thinks of targeted

140 Particial Lourdes Viray, “Criminal case vs Duterte filled at the International Criminal Court”, The Philippines Star, April 24 (2017), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/04/24/1693489/criminal-case-vs-duterte-filed- international-criminal-court 141 “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda concerning the situation in the Republic of Philippines”, Internationcal Criminal Court, October 13 (2016), available at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=161013-otp-stat-php 142 Republic Act No. 9851, “An Act defining and penalizing crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide, and other crimes against humanity, organizing jurisdiction, designating specialized courts, and for related purposes”, Republic of the Philippines, 14th Congress, July 27 (2009), available at: http://www.lawphil.net/statutes/repacts/ra2009/ra_9851_2009.html

Leiden University 60 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 individuals in the course of (state) terrorism, ones’ mind will mostly entertain more narrowly defined categories, that stand out by virtue of the ethnicity, race or religion, and are usually targeted by a state in a “cleansing” effort, to eliminate minority population, or to curtail dissent. Examples of such state terrorism exist many in history. That was the case in Sudan, with the systematic destruction of civilian lives and livelihood in the western region of Darfur that was directed against non-Arab civilian population, by virtue of its ethnicity.143 Similarly in Pakistan, where religious disparities between Hindus and Muslims lead to various forms of state terrorism during various governmental regimes, such as that of Ayub Khan, and later Yahyan Khan.144 The violence was much fostered and encouraged by the military regimes, reiterating Jackson’s remark that terrorism by states is characterized by official government support for policies of violence, repression and intimidation.145 Yet there are also examples in history of terrorism and policies of terror conducted by state, much as the ones happening in the Philippines, which do not necessarily conform to the stereotypical “race, ethnicity, religion” characteristic of the targeted group. A memorable example is the so-called “Dirty War” in Argentina - another instance of military vocabulary used to indicate domestic policies- that raged from 1974 to 1983. During that period, individuals were targeted in virtue of their political association with socialism or communism, and their membership in trade unions, including students and journalists. 146 State officials, military, police and ad hoc formulated death squads were conducting

143 David Mickler, “Darfur’s dread: Contemporary state terrorism in the Sudan”, in “Contemporary State terrorism: Theory and Practice”, edited by R. Jackson, E Murphy and S. Poynting, Critical Terrorism Studies, Rutledge, pp. 31 (2010). 144 E. Murphy and A. Tamana, “State Terrorism and the military in Pakistan”, in “Contemporary Sate Terrorism: Theory and Practice”, edited by R. Jackson and E. Murphy and S. Poynting, Critical Terrorism Studies: Rutlegde, pp. 53-55, (2010). 145 R. Jackson, “An argument for Terrorism”, Perspectives on Terrorism, 2 (2), November 18 (2008).

146 Mc. Sherry, J. Patrice, “Industrial repression and Operation Condor in Latin America”, in “State violence and Genocide in Latin America: The Cold War Years”, edited by Esparza Marcia, Henry R. Huttenbach, Daniel Feierstein, Critical Terrorism Studies, Rutledge, pp. 107 (2011).

Leiden University 61 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 routine abductions, forced disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture that resulted in 13,000 disappearances and deaths. 147 The examples given above attest to the fact that deliberate actions of violence can be directed against individuals for various reasons and on various occasions. However, what all these examples have in common, is that the targeted individuals enjoy- or at least should in cases likes these enjoy- state protection. The state of Philippines has a positive duty to protect equally drug addicts and drug pushers, and other drug personalities from execution and targeted killings, as it would come to protect other categories of criminals and innocent citizens. Yet, policies of law enforcement killings and death squad killings have given their place to that framework of protection. In the previous chapter, I provided some examples where police operations have lowered the threshold of excessive violence during their operations, while many human rights organizations, watchdogs and politicians have denounced and condemn the possible links of the police with death squads and extra-judicial killings.148 So what has stopped the recognition of this group of individuals as victims of a deliberate act of violence by the state? Securitization theory can help us answer this question. To begin with, it is important to recognize right from the start the precarious position of these individuals by virtue of their association with drugs. Public perceptions and societal tolerance when it comes to “criminal elements” and individuals associated with drugs are from the very start negative and biased, in most societies, let alone in one that has experience acute problems with drugs in the past. The very Philippines Supreme Court’s decision back in 1988 that demoralized and dehumanized these individuals- drug addicts-, as individuals worthless to society, “zombies”, demonstrates the fertile ground which Duterte’s rhetoric builds on.149 President Duterte, along with government officials like the Chief of Police, constantly emphasized the notion of “drug personalities”, of drug addicts and pusher not being

147 Wolfgang S. Heinz and Hugo Frühling, “Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and State-sponsored Actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina (1960-1990)”, Springer, pp. 626 (1999). 148 See Chapter 3 of this paper. 149 Id. supra note 103.

Leiden University 62 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 human, or equal to humans, thus not deserving humanity and human rights. Police Chief dela Rosa even denied to equate their killing as murder, as he claimed the latter term should only be reserved for innocent individuals.150 Moreover, what further alienates these individuals as a protected group in the mind of the public is their slamming as “a disease” to the nation, as a threat, as something that must be dealt with for the sake of future generations and of that country. As a result, securitized discourse in our case not only distorts and detaches the targeted individuals from claims to state protection, but also perverses the deliberate violence against them as something necessary, normalized, “as a cure” to a “disease”.

à State Terrorism first key element met; enhanced and empowered by securitized discourse.

4. 2. Role of state actors and state-sponsored actors

The second key element of state terrorism is that the deliberate acts (or threat of) must be perpetrated by actors on behalf of or in conjunction with the state, including paramilitaries and private security agents. This is a crucial element as it shifts and attributes liability for any forms of violence, terrorism and unlawful behavior from groups of people to the entire state. Attention thus must be paid to who is conducting this deliberate violence and the ties he is bearing with the government. As the element above states, the actor can either act on behalf of the state, and in that case it would be named as state actor, or in conjunction with state, and will include paramilitary actors, death squads, or violent acts of groups that are tolerated, encouraged, or ignored and go unpunished by the state. There are various historical examples that detail the involvement and role of state actors in terrorism. The case of state terrorism in Sudan will be the first example to turn to in our assessment of state actors involved in state terrorism. As briefly mentioned above, in 2003 the Sudanese government declared a state of emergency following protests

150 Id. supra note 104.

Leiden University 63 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 in Darfur against central government policies. The governors of Northern and Western Darfur were dismissed and replaced by a “special task force” of officials from President’s Bashir government.151 The Sudanese Armed forces were involved in and supported operations carried out by paramilitary organizations, the Janjaweed, that targeted non-Arabs, of African descent individuals on the grounds of their ethnicity. 152 According to a UN report the COI, Sudan’s National Security and Intelligence Service took on a central role in the design, planning and implementation associated with the conflict.153 Government military equipment, such as Antonov bombers and helicopters were reported to conduct aerial attacks against non-Arab civilian population.154 State and non-state actors collaborated in conjunction to intensify the effects of terror and violence. In a similar note, state terrorism in Colombia during the conflict that started back in the 1960s demonstrates the cooperation and collaboration in coordinated acts of violence between state and non-state actors. The prevalence of pro-state violence in the country, which is primarily carried out by para-military groups and death squads alongside military ‘counter-insurgency’ armed forces, forms one of the most brutal campaigns of state terror in the region.155 State terror in this case is deployed in the context of a civil armed conflict, a fight against armed groups positioned against the state, such as the FARC and ELN. However, in many cases, military and paramilitary action was jointly and consistently deployed against civilian population, protected under International and National Laws, in an attempt to spread fear and deter people from supporting the insurgent armed groups. In 1996, Human Rights Watch conducted an investigation on the actions of paramilitary groups and found evident their close collaboration with military and

151 R. O. Collins, “Disaster in Darfur: historical overview” in S. Tottern and E. Markusen (eds) “Genocide in Darfur: investigating atrocities in the Sudan” NY and UK Rutledge, pp. 11-12 (2006). 152 L. Feinstein “Darfur and beyond: what is needed to prevent mass atrocities” Council Special Report no. 22, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, pp. 38. (2007). 153 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary- General, Geneva: United Nations, pp. 25, January 21 (2005). 154 E. Reeves, “ A long day’s dying: critical moments in the Darfur genocide”, Toronto Key Publishing House, pp. 3, (2007). 155 A. Jones, “Parainstitutional violence Latin America”, Latin American Politics and Society, 46 (4):127-148, at pp. 129 (2004).

Leiden University 64 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 state actors: “Officials who go overboard when faced with the temptation to multiply their ability to act and take advantage of private agents, whom they end up using as a hidden weapon so that, with this plan of hired killers, they can do officiously what they cannot do officially”.156 Paramilitary groups systematically targeted trade unionists in large numbers since the 1980s, leading to more than 2,500 deaths in a period of 20 years.157 The HRW report mentioned above details how the Colombian Army, taking advantage of paramilitary groups, in essence authorized and encouraged civilians to pursue and kill any suspected guerrilla.158 A similar conclusion was reached by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which concluded that Colombian military recognized they could avoid political cost of engaging in war without limits by leaving to the paramilitary groups the tasks which violated human rights and international humanitarian law and which would attract attention of the public and of the international community. 159 Colombia is an example of the added value for states of using paramilitary groups as part of effectuating specific policies. There are two major advantages to it. First, use of paramilitaries by the state allows for the maintenance of a veneer of innocence, a kind of ‘plausible deniability’.160 Secondly, the use of paramilitaries increases the terror experienced by the target audience, as Stohl notes: fear is maximized through the use of ‘notoriously vicious vigilante groups’ who are widely recognized in society to act as agents of the state but at the same time those groups are not ‘’legally” constrained in ways that official organs might be felt to be.161 As these cases illustrate, cooperation, coordination and even the simple encouragement of non-state actors for violence acts can lead to state terrorism. The

156 “Colombia’s killer networks: the military- paramilitary partnership and the United States”, Human Rights Watch (1996). 157 M. Snachez-Moreno, “Violence against trade unionists and human rights in Colombia”, testimony before the US House of Representatives, June 27 (2007). 158 Id., supra note 146. 159 “Third Report on the Human Rights situation in Colombia”, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, document 9, revision 1, February 26 (1999). 160 R.D. Duvall and M. Stohl, “Governance by terror” in M. Stohl (ed) “The Politics of Terrorism”, 3rd edition, NY: Marcel Dekker, at pp. 245-246 (1988). 161 M. Stohl “The state as terrorist: insights and implications”, Democracy and Security, 2 (1):1-25, at p. 10 (2006).

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‘war on drugs’ in the Philippines can only be seen through a similar scope. The national police counter-drug operations have intensified in the last months, with staggering increase not only in arrests, but above all in casualties, people killed during these operations, “drug personalities” found shot dead on the street, moments after they are released by the police. What is more, the cooperation of the local “barangay” departments with the police in the listing and targeting of individuals, only underlines and sharpens the contrast between routine police operations and terror policy. HRW and Amnesty International reports have detailed in dozens of investigated incidents how the police is framing operations, that are predetermined to lead to the killing of the drug user or drug addict, planting evidence in the scene, for classification as a “buy-bust” operation gone wrong. But most importantly, in all the reports the common feature is the presence and action of vigilante death squads, armed, masked men that arrive shortly before the police, kill the suspected drug users, and then rejoin police forces and depart together. Countless are also the cases in the news reports of suspected drug users and pushers being killed in the street, with their hands and feet tied up, a bag over their head, and a sign, a branding, reading “pusher” for by standers to see. The vocal stance of President Duterte in favor of these killings should not be ignored at this point, as it is the corner stone element of this paper. One can not simply ignore the fact that the President, the Commander in Chief of a Republic is actively encouraging police officers, military, common civilians to not hesitate and kill suspected drug users and pushers, offering medals and immunity in exchange. Is this enough however to talk about successful responsibilisation strategy? In the previous chapter, section 3.3, I discussed two confessions by members of death squads, whose motivation whose primarily money, fear for their own lives, and the tolerance of such acts by the public, after the election of President Duterte. Keeping that in mind, one would question how this leads to responsibilisation, but the latter term might be misleading in a first reading. Responsibilisation does not mean to indicate responsibility in the sense of duty, a higher moral feeling of taking action. That was not after all the very intent with which it was first used in the UK and US, when government was simply looking to share the burden of crime governance.

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Responsibilisation in the context of privatization as part of a wider process dignifies the challenge to the state’s traditional responsibility and presumed capacity to act as primary provider of safety and security to its population.162 As such, any attribution to the concept of high morals and duty would be with no merit. On the contrast the policy merely aims to instill to members of society individually, as well as in local communities the belief that they share in the responsibility to reduce crime.163 This takes flesh and bones for each individual and each community in a different way; some may form neighborhood watches, some install high systems of security alarms, others, as in the US, may feel the need to buy a gun, and uphold the “castle” doctrine, and others may feel safe by simply putting up a “be aware of dog” sign up on their door. The point is responsibilisation theory does not enumerate or limits the ways people will respond to campaign of responsibility. It is only concerned with the very fact that the audience will partake into some form of action that will aim in reinforcing their sense of security, and adheres to the principle that the state alone is not the only provider of safety. As such, responsibilisation implies a sense of acceptance and legitimization of security provision by non-state and commercial actors. Looking at the concept in this way, there is some ground to be argued that Duterte’s “war on drugs” has to some part profited from responsibilisation techniques. We can explain this in two ways. First and foremost, citizens may ascribe some degree of legitimacy, along with terror and monetary incentives, to the vigilante groups, operating even at daylight. There are three levels of interaction before a drug personality is killed: local ‘barangay’, i.e. neighborhood officials, which are citizens, some ex-soldiers, or security guards, but nonetheless, current citizens, compile lists of suspected individuals. They alert the police, sometimes even call or drop by the houses of the individuals to verify the targets, and then an operation takes place, either by the police, or by vigilante groups, that most of the times results in the killing of the suspect. Taking police and death squads aside for a moment, since the former act upon official orders, while the latter on monetary incentives,

162 Id., supra note 33. 163 Id. supra note 29.

Leiden University 67 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 what drives the group of ‘barangay’ members, former neighbors of the suspected victims, to actively be involved in such operations? Is there merit in the argument that they feel legitimized and empowered by Duterte’s strong discourse and encouragement, to take action against people they suspect being drug users or pushers, and contribute to their killings, in order they themselves to feel both safe, and carrying out public service? Secondly, we must not forget the other side of the “war on drug” policy, which is proclaimed and advertised by government supporters: they high number of drug users registering for rehabilitation centers and rehabilitation waiting lists. As explained in the previous chapter, section 3.3, hundreds of drug users have lined up for waiting lists in public rehabilitation centers, while those that can afford it choose private clinics. Had there not been a campaign of terror executed by the state, this could be easily explained by responsibilisation theory. Drug addicts, being sensitized about their health security, their wellbeing, they take individual action and register up for health rehabilitation clinics. In this case however, the existence of terror, has shifted the attention from health security to mere survival. Due to fears for their own lives, being killed by vigilante groups or surrender and die in police custody, drug addicts seek security in the halls of a rehabilitation center. In the Philippines case, not only state is seen as not the only provider of security, or the only actor of governing crime, but is primarily seen as the actor that threatens the safety and security of these individuals, as the actor that encourages certain forms of crime. Yet, admittedly, it is questionable to what extent the discourse in Duterte’s speeches, encouraging some citizens to kill others, has led the former group to take actions on their safety, by registering for rehabilitation centers. Rather, the more likely scenario, is that the terror and fear that the deliberate acts of violence have spread among the drug users, pushers, etc., and the possibility of them being killed, has lead to this action. This latter observation will become relevant for the next two elements of state terrorism, particularly the last one that indents to the change of behavior of the audience.

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à State terrorism second element met; some undertones of responsibilisation strategy.

4.3. Instilling extreme fear to the targeted observers.

The third key element of terrorism examines the impact and effects of the deliberate acts of violence by state or non-state actors acting in conjunction with the state. State terrorism, as any kind of terrorism, intends and aims to induce extreme fear (terror) in some targeted observers who identify with the victims. Although the actions are directed against specific individuals, in our case drug users and pushers, the fear is meant to spread in a wider audience that will in some ways identify with the victims. Fellow drug addicts and users, families that have in their midst members involved in drugs, will be amongst the wider audience. As well as anyone within the wider public that demonstrated opposition to the terror policies, including sympathy and support for the victims. Having discussed the two previous elements, it is not hard for someone not to see this one as met. But it is important to discuss the instrumentality of fear at this section, as it is the most important part of (state) terrorism and separates it from other forms of crime and violence. For (state) terrorism does not only embarks on senseless and random, no matter how deliberate, acts of violence, or threat of, but it intends to use that terror, that extreme fear and insecurity in the advantage of some policy, some purpose. Staying true to my method so far, I will first look on an example, where instrumentality of terror is at the front and center of state terrorism. This example, taken from India, is a complex but useful one, as it craftily demonstrates, how violent acts committed by non-state actors, can be encouraged and go unpunished by the government, so as for the latter to use the consequent fear to achieve political ends. In 2002, the state of Gujarat in western India experience an unprecedented incident of vicious communal violence, during which Hindu mobs executed a well- planned and coordinated campaign of violence, killings and terrorism against the Muslim population. The death toll of a three-day killing spree mounted up to 2,000

Leiden University 69 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 men, women and children.164 The role of the state was not negligent, as Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, member of the ruling nationalist party BJP, encouraged and condoned the violence, and obstructed the police and state agencies from intervening for three consecutive days.165 To offer background to the story, the trigger event for the violence was a train fire that occurred at the Godhra station on the morning of 27 February 2002. The train was carrying Hindu pilgrims (karsevaks), returning to the city, who were shouting anti-Muslim slogans. Followed an altercation between Hindus and Muslims outside the train, in the station platforms, the train caught fired, burning alive 58 passengers. 166 The Hindu community held responsible and accused the Muslims for setting the train on fire on purpose. Although these allegations were not substantiated, and the police report concluded at the probability of an accident due to the overcrowded train, animosity sparked off between the two groups. It is generally known that relations between the Hindu and Muslim communities in India have been strained throughout the history of the country, and as such any incident like the one that broke out in the station could only precipitate any subsequent violence between the two communities.167 On the morning of 28 of February, Hindu nationalist and extreme-right mobs were mobilized around the city, targeting Muslim residential compounds and apartments. The mobs targeted and killed Muslim men, rapped Muslim women and girls, and then lit them on fire, burning them alive. Reports on the incident account for unspeakable atrocities, including beheadings, killings of infants and pregnant women, and many more.168 Police and security agents were not only absent and took no action to stop the violence and punish the offenders, but on the contrary,

164 E. Murphy, “We have no orders to save you: State terrorism, politics and communal violence in the Indian state of Gujarat, 2002”, Contemporary State Terrorism, Rutledge, pp. 86 (2009). 165 Id. 166 M.C. Nussbaum, “The clash within: Democracy, Religious violence and India’s future”, Harvard University Press, pp.18 (2007a). 167 P. Brass, “The Gujarat Pogrom of 2002”, Social Science Research Council, May 26 (2004), available at: http://conconflicts.ssrc.org/archives/gujarat/brass/ 168 T. Tejpal, “Explosive Report by Indian Magazine Exposes Those Responsible for 2002 Gujarat Massacre”, Democracy Now!, December 5 (2007), available at: https://www.democracynow.org/2007/12/5/explosive_report_by_indian_magazine_exposes

Leiden University 70 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 some police officers partook to the killings spree, and went unbothered by their colleagues for hours.169 The police call center that received hundreds of calls for help remained unresponsive, while some reports of witness testimonies claim that the police’s answer was simply “we have no orders to save you”.170 The Chief Minister of the State, N. Modi, had specifically instructed the senior police officials and state agencies not to take any action against the mob violence, which was in turned interpreted as a “green light” by the local Hindu nationalist community that carried out their lynching and killings, uninhibited for three days.171 The question then arises why the state took that stance against the Muslim community, why did it encouraged and condoned the action of the Hindu nationalist mob? The answer is to be found in the political spectrum. Hindu nationalist groups and Muslim political parties have been in ‘conflict’ for control of the political life for years. Muslims in India are not a big population, and only account for 12% of the overall population. In the past however, Muslim political elites have been the ruling class, since Hindus have been fragmented in their caste system, not allowing for strong unified political opposition. Hindu nationalist parties, in order to win support in elections and rise in the political elites, started to slowly cultivate an ideology of intolerance against the Muslim community, bringing together at the same time all Hindu communities and castes through emphasis on their common identity as Hindus. 172 The Hindu nationalist parties managed to dominate the political life and elections for years. Nonetheless, operative in their campaign is the notion of insecurity and intolerance against Muslims.173 The above incident described, the three days of carnage, was instrumentally used by the ruling Hindu elites in two ways. On the one hand, they satisfied the feeling of anger, insecurity, hate and

169 Id. 170 S. Narula, “ We Have no Orders to Save You: State Participation and Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat”, Human Rights Watch, 14 (3) (2002), available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/india/ 171 N. Sud, “Secularism and the Gujarat State: 1960-2005”, Modern Asian Studies, 42(6):1251-1281, at pp. 1227 (2008). 172 G. Shah, “The BJP’s Riddle in Gujarat: Caste, Factionalism and Hinduvta” in T.B. Hansen and C. Jefferlot (eds) “The BJP and the Compulsinos of Politics in India”, Oxford University Press, at pp. 248 (1998). 173 Id.

Leiden University 71 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 intolerance their Hindu nationalist communities had been harboring against Muslims, strengthening their base. At the same time, they used the message of fear and terror in the political elections of 2002, only months after the incident, to attract votes and discourage the general Muslim community that identified with the victims, and felt the terror and possibility of further violence.174 Turning now to the ‘war on drugs’ in the Philippines, the terror and fear cultivated and spread by police, death squads and the very vocal President is nothing but evident. But the terror, the extreme fear in this case of the Philippines should not only bee seen vis-à-vis the deliberate acts of violence by the vigilante groups, or the terrifying amount of dead, reaching more than 7,000 in less that a year. Above all its should be examined through the inaction of the police to prosecute and investigate the soaring number of extrajudicial killings; through the support of the state and President Duterte in these killings; through the legitimization of the death squads and of citizens taking up guns and shooting suspected drug addict, and immunity, impunity and inaction the President is promising. The state is seen to foster and thrive on that fear, and directing it towards anyone that can relate with drug users and pushers, even political critics and journalists and NGOs. As Duterte claimed, journalists will not be exempted from being assassinated “if they are sons of a bitch”. 175 What is more, securitization plays some part in the perception of this fear as a legitimate situation during a “war”. The President has demoralized the targeted audience, dehumanized them in the context of a legitimate and much necessary action to rid the country of a disease. Thus the fear and terror felt by the wider audience of drug users, families with drug addicts or dealers, is magnified in the double. Not only they might end up dead as well, they or their children, but at the same time, they can not seek recourse to the police, the state, as they will be labeled as suspected drug personalities, and will be killed as well. Stepping one line back, to an even wider audience, the public, which under normal conditions might protest

174 S. Majumder, “Gujarat: BJP’s Testing Ground”, BBC News online, 15 December (2002), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/2578185.stm 175 Id. supra note 81.

Leiden University 72 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 and object to the violence and to the fear cultivated, is itself engulfed in a similar state of confusion and insecurity. Critics and opponents of Duterte are widely unpopular, some end up investigated and imprisoned (Senator de Lima). The frame of national threat and the highly securitized discourse of Duterte have far-reaching consequences even for the public to exercise free speech and oppose the policies. Journalist are afraid to be overcritical of the President and the campaign of terror, either fearing of loosing access to the government, and thus loose their jobs, or even being associated with drugs. The US State department in a report released earlier this year took notice of the practice, and the public attacks Duterte is making through his securitized speech, that leave no margin for opposition, or exercise of free speech.176 To conclude, terror is instrumental in the case of Philippines not only to audiences that identify with the targeted victims, but for even a wider array of the public, politicians, journalists and everyone who will now think twice before opposing the ‘war on drugs’.

à State terrorism’s third element met; coupled and empowered by securitized discourse.

4.4. Change of behavior: the means justify the ends.

Finally, the last key element of state terrorism is the desired change in the behavior of the audience. This change does not have to be necessarily political, although that can be, and often is, the case when terrorism is deployed by state actors. But in some cases, as in the Philippines’ ‘war on drugs’ state terrorism operation, there are other undertones and end-goals to terror. In this final section I will not start of with a comparative example, as I believe the ones mentioned above, of Sudan, Colombia, Pakistan and India, have made clear how terrorism can be used to effectuate change or establish a new

176 Rosette Adel, Duterte public attacks have chilling effect on the free speech- US State Department, The Philippine Star news, March 5 (2017) available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/05/1678210/duterte-public-attacks-has-chilling- effect-free-speech-us-state

Leiden University 73 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 policy. At this section I will directly turn to the Philippines case, and examine what change is effectuated by the use of state terrorism. First of all, one has to examine prima-facie what do the deliberate acts of violence and the terror achieve? Looking at the numbers alone, the ‘war on drug’ has claimed the lives of more than 7,000 individuals and lead to the arrest of more than 16,000;177 According to the governmental spokesperson, the ‘war on drugs’ has been successful since the drug crime has decreased by 30%. 178 Additionally, more than 1 million people have surrender to the police, of which 75, 000 are drug pushers, and 940,000 are drug addicts.179 So from a first look, state terrorism is used in lieu of governmental social and crime control policies. Instead of investing in long-term social and health policies to curtail and control drug addiction, and use counter –drug law enforcement operations to apprehend and put an end to drug production and trade, Duterte is taking a shortcut. “Killing two birds with one stone”, the crackdown allows for the reduction of both drug users and drug pushers in numbers, either through killing them, or instilling fear so as to force their surrender. Additionally, state terrorism in this case has also a long-term thinking. Notwithstanding the high numbers of drug personalities being killed, high numbers of individuals, as we already discussed, are registering in rehabilitation clinics for fear of their own lives. As such, ineffective health polices and rehabilitation campaigns of the past, are now giving way to a campaign of terror that gets the job done: less drug addicts and users in the streets, more in the rehabilitation centers. This also aims to curtail the demand for drugs; if drug addicts and users shake off their addiction and are rehabilitated to society, keeping in their minds the constant looming terror of extrajudicial killings, the low demand for drug substance will eventually lead drug production to a halt. Duvall and Stohl did highlight this aspect of state terrorism, the “expected utility”, when they argued that states will use state terrorism as a policy when they anticipate that the responding

177 Id, supranote 61. 178 Id, supra note 107. 179 Id., supra note 53.

Leiden University 74 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 costs of terrorism will be lower than the costs of other strategies and policies, and terrorism will allow for lower production costs than the alternatives. 180 Securitization is also playing a catalyst role in this part. Replacing social and crime governance policies with state terrorism is not an act that is likely to go unnoticed or un- scrutinized. This is true for a variety of policies, and a variety of discourses used. “War on drugs” and “War on Crime” have been waged in the past, and are still waged in some countries, like Brazil and Mexico. The latter has been entangled in decades in a brutal fight with drug cartels, but at any attempt of the state to use unlawful means, or remain a bystander when local authorities collaborate with cartels and employ terror to deter citizens and other federal state agents, there is a vocal outcry and at least and attempt from the central government to initiate investigations, to take action and to oppose such acts. One example the case of the 43 Ayotzinapa students that were kidnapped and killed by police officers and drug cartels acting together.181 Despite the discourse used over the years by the Mexican government, to militarize and label the counter-drug operations as a “war”, incidents like that do not evade criticism, slamming the local police and state authorities for terrorism, and the federal state for complicity to it. Similarly, recently in Brazil there was an outrage and subsequent investigation when Human Rights Watch released a report, along with videos published by news agencies and social media, claiming that Brazilian police officers have engaged in extrajudicial killings when fighting crime in Brazil. 182 In general, it has been observed in the last decade or so, that specific discourse is used to dress up modern crime governance policies. This is a no-brainer when one thinks how the (securitized) discourse used on “War on Terror” has not only justified instances of torture by governments, such as the US, but it was been used as an umbrella term in many contested and questionable, from a legal viewpoint, actions such as the War on Iraq, and drone strikes and targeting killings throughout the middle east. Yet in the past,

180 Id., supra note 150, at pg 253-262. 181 Kirke Semple, “Missing Mexican Students Suffered a Nights of Terror, Investigators say”, The New York Times, April 24, (2016), available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/25/world/americas/missing-mexican-students-suffered-a- night-of-terror-investigators-say.html 182 “Brazil: Extrajudicial Executions Undercut Rios Security”, Human Rights Watch, July 7 (2016), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/brazil-extrajudicial-executions-undercut-rio- security

Leiden University 75 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 the “war on crime”, “war on mafia” was more close to a political slogan than a highly securitized, impact-full discourse. Yet, after 9/11, this attitude, these domestic policies have taken a turn into a paradigm of fighting crime, that slowly but steadily is justifying and legitimize inhumane treatment.183 Securitization is a big part of that discourse and that change, and this is evident in our case. Duterte has managed to frame the entire process of extrajudicial killings and terror as a normalized, a much need response to a threat, a disease, a “cancer” that the drug user and pushers are for his country. As such, any derivative response or outcome from this policy will only be treated as such, a normal outcome in an abnormal, existentially threatening situation. The overwhelmed number of registrations in rehabilitation centers by terrorized drug addicts is not an outcome of terror but a success of a policy, one less symptom of the disease that seems to subdue and fade away. The silence of critics and public is not an attempt to intimidate but one to unmask corruption, as the critics of the contested policy are bound to be corrupt and related to drug crime. The drug users and addicts surrendering to the police in hope to escape arbitrary killings is not a story of state terror, but rather a story of state success. And as for those that do not change their behavior at all, or fast enough, they are bound to meet the same fate as the targeted audience: be killed. Only, they won’t be framed as victims of unlawful, arbitrary killings, but as one less threat to deal with.

à State terrorism’s fourth key element met; empowered and supplemented by securitized discourse.

183 Mireille Delmas-Marty, “The Paradigm of the War on Crime: Legitimizing inhumane treatment?”, Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (3), pp. 584-598, July 1 (2007), available at: https://academic.oup.com/jicj/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/jicj/mqm027

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Conclusion

This thesis took upon research to answer the question “To what extent can Philippines’ ‘war on drugs’ be regarded as state terrorism, and how security discourse strategies have impacted on it”. It can be reasonably concluded that the ‘war” currently fought in the Philippines is indeed a continuation of politics by other means. Social, health and law enforcement drug policies have been replaced with terror and terrorism. Thus the answer to my research question is to be given in the positive; to the full extent possible, the Philippines are engaging in state terrorism. What is more, securitization is omnipresent and omnipotent along with state terrorism, concealing the latter from scrutiny, accountability and public knowledge. In this final chapter of my thesis I will offer my concluding remarks. First, at Observations, I will summarize the analysis findings, and evaluate the extent to which the theoretical premise has been proven. I will sum up observations on state terrorism, securitization and responsibilisation theory, and discuss their interplay, by reconstructing the figure featured in Chapter 1. Then, at the final section, I will turn to the research process, discuss degrees of generalization and lessons learned, for both the researcher and the research process.

Observations

Looking at the analysis part from a holistic point of view, and summing up all the key elements of Blakeley’s definition, the answer to our research question can be given in the positive: state terrorism is the case in the Philippines. The “war on drugs” constitutes a deliberate act of violence (extra judicial killings, detentions and abductions) against individuals that the sate has a duty to protect (drug addicts, pushers – drug personalities-, as well as by-standers, and the public). The violent act is perpetrated by state actors, the Philippines National Police, in conjunction with non-state actors, vigilante groups, death- squads, ‘barangay’ officials that act on behalf of or in collaboration with the state. The “war on drugs” is intended to induce extreme fear in the rest of the ‘drug personalities’ community, along with the public or officials that think of associating themselves with

Leiden University 77 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 drugs, or willing to oppose the policy. The final goal is to effectuate a change at the behavior of the targeted audience, which in our case has led to a surge in drug users surrenders, registrations in rehabilitations centers, and private clinics. Crime governance and health security policies have been replaced in the case of Philippines by state terrorism, who has at its center the instrumentality of the suffering and image of dead bodies, ‘dead drug personalities’, lying lifeless on the streets for the rest of the public to take a good look at them. In a not so well thought metaphor, it reminds me of the images placed at cigarette packages, of cancer pictures, diseased lungs etc., that aim to scare off, and deter the public from smoking. Only in our case, the ‘images’ are more close to reality than thought; dead bodies on the streets, with the sign of ‘pusher’ or ‘drugs’ carved out at a paper carton box, a reminder that President Duterte’s stance on drugs use or push is of zero tolerance: “quit or be killed” were his words. Securitized discourse is also seen to play an important part in two out of the four elements of our definition, in particular elements one and three. The main securitized actor, President Duterte, has successfully deployed metaphors, language and sentiment to sketch the targeted group by state terrorism, as an existential threat. By using language such as “threat”, “disease”, “cancer”, and directing their effect to the securitized audience, “the nation”, “the future generations” (i.e. at the same time the referent object of the threat) he managed to successfully normalize state terror and extrajudicial killings as the emergency action. The success should not be seen merely by his election to the office, which is one first validation and sign of the power of his discourse, but also from the fact that he still remains highly popular, with no major opposition, even after 9,000 people have been killed. This should be placed in another context: that of the religious population. In chapter 3 I tried to offer some background to the population of Philippines, important to my view in assessing the level of commitment of the securitized audience to the very act of securitization. What it can be observed is that the public, a highly catholic group, were murder is a grave sin, has nonetheless accepted and condoned such policy. State terrorism thus is found to be enhanced, empowered and coupled with securitized discourse, allowing it to slip under the radar. What is the interaction between the two can be articulated as follows. State terrorism relies on the instrumentality of the

Leiden University 78 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 extreme fear, caused by extreme and deliberate acts of violence, often unlawful themselves, that is felt so strongly by the targeted audience, that will lead to a change in behavior. Yet, unless the targeted audience is the entire population of the country, the question remains how would the non-targeted group, the rest of the citizens, in our case non-drug users or pushers, react to such extreme force, violence and terror. Securitization then, once deployed, lowers the threshold of extremity for the rest of the audiences, by elevating their own “fears” of an existential threat, a grave danger. As such, the extreme terror and violent acts that state terrorism deploys are seen as normalized, a necessary action in their minds, justified by the feeling of insecurity. Responsibilisation on the other hand as a discourse strategy was only present in one key element of state terrorism. It was observed that to some extend barangay officials, with no monetary motives, unlike the death squads that perform the killings, are actively involved in the process, by drafting up lists, and acting as informants to the police and to the death squads. It could be argued, with margins for disagreement, that they do so because they feel the drug threat is ominous, and they seek to ensure their security by participating in the killings. At the same time, drug users are registering by the hundreds in rehabilitation facilities. However, it would be difficult to be conclusive on the matter, on the extent to which responsibilisation is present, due to the high levels of fear and terror among the targeted group and the general audience. After all, as discussed, it is fear for their lives, and not health concern, that pushes drug users to register in rehabilitations centers. Nonetheless, responsibilisation is the strategy that pushes the targeted, high-risk, group, to think “outside of the box” when it comes to its security, as the state is no longer capable of providing for it alone. Combine that with a state that deploys terrorism, and the mixture of fear and responsibility for ones’ security might lead to similar results. In this case, the targeted high-risk group is the drug addicts. The high-risk comes from the acts of violence from the police and vigilante groups, meaning that drugs addicts are quite likely to be killed unless they take action to ensure their security. That action is to register in rehabilitation centers and private clinics, Placing all theories together, and re-formulating the graph presented at Chapter 1, it can be seen that the State of Philippines is deploying terrorism, that is strongly and in equal terms empowered and enhanced by securitized discourse, while responsibilisation,

Leiden University 79 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 although present, plays a smaller part, due to the disproportionate effects that terror has. Responsibilisation is portrayed in doted lines to underline the need for further research in order to reach a more conclusive argument. The graph (Figure 1.d) then looks as follows:

Lessons Learned

In concluding this thesis some remarks are due on the utility of the theoretical frames, the possibility of generalization and the hardships terrorism studies scholarship has to face. To begin with, throughout my research and evaluation of sources, reading all the materials, news reports and articles, Blakeley’s definition, the one used for this endeavor, stuck in my mind as a good fit. Not only it describes and does justice to the aim of terrorism, fleshing out its instrumentality of terror, and not so much the illegality of its violence, but it also allows, as it is act-centered, to be used in examining state behavior. Furthermore, to my viewpoint, (state) terrorism scholarship has a long way to go still, in order to be able to understand, to name and shame state behavior of that sort. The case of Philippines is a case study that can be exemplified, generalized to fit other cases, other

Leiden University 80 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 domestic “wars” that tip toe on a tight rope between state legitimate violence and state terrorism. But what is most important to keep in mind, I believe is the effects securitized discourse might have on such theories and concepts as state terrorism. The latter has always been, and studied for the most part, as a secretive, clandestine state action, one that was not to see the light of day, let alone the light of newspaper headlines. Yet, President Duterte has managed to turn the theory and practice to its head, and manage to utilize state terror openly and shamelessly, by disrupting and distorting the perception the public holds for it. This new, securitized terror has managed to slip under the radar of observations and of stigmatization, and replace the governmental policies and crime governance a normal, democratic state would deploy. While in our days, and in most scholarship, terrorism is reserved as a term to dignify non-state actors, mostly jihadist groups, and ruthless dictators like Assad, a democratically elected President has managed to kill in less than a year more than 9,000 people without so much as a single reference been made to the term. To sum up, in my point of view, this is one of the biggest challenges (state) terrorism studies, as well as security studies, have to explore and explain. The various possible cross-paths of different strains of action and discourse, like state terrorism and securitization, and the new hybrids that come of it. A new, fresh perspective is necessary in order to scrutinize and recognize new ways of security governance and crime conflict that evade the strict formats of the past, and set dangerous precedence. The role of discourse theories and the power of words should not be underestimated or undervalued, as they have been mobilizing people to one direction or another for decades and decades before that. Studies on nationalism, populism, radicalization, and as it can be seen in this paper terrorism, all can profit from discourse analysis and discourse research.

Leiden University 81 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017

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http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/608516/malacanang-responds-to-ny- times-editorial-duterte-committed-to-saving-filipino- lives/story?utm_source=GMANews&utm_medium=Twitter&utm_campaign=news • Walter E., Terror and Resistance, Oxford University Press, (1969). • Weinberg L., Pedahzur A., and Hirsch-Hoefler S., The Challenges of Conceptualizing Terrorism, Terrorism and Political Violence, 16 (4): 777-794, (2004). • Wolfers A., National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, Political Science Quarterly, 67 (4), pp. 481-502, at p. 483, (1952). • Wolfgang S. Heinz and Hugo Frühling, “Determinants of Gross Human Rights Violations by State and State-sponsored Actors in Brazil, Uruguay, Chile and Argentina (1960-1990)”, Springer, pp. 626 (1999). • Yin R. K., Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Applied Social Research Method Series, Vol. 5, (2003). • “Brazil: Extrajudicial Executions Undercut Rios Security”, Human Rights Watch, July 7 (2016), available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/brazil-extrajudicial- executions-undercut-rio-security • “Colombia’s killer networks: the military- paramilitary partnership and the United States”, Human Rights Watch (1996). • “Confronting Crimes Against Humanity in Mexico”, Open Society Foundation, November (2016), available at: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/undeniable-atrocities-en- 20160602.pdf • “Decision of the IPU council on Leide de Lima of Philippines”, Inter-Parliamentary Organization, April 5 (2017), available at: http://www.ipu.org/hr-e/200/phi08.pdf • “Duterte on criminals: Kill all of them”, Inquirer Mindando news reporting, May 15 (2015), available at: http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/691527/dutertes-secret-in-keeping- davao-city-phs-safest-kill-criminals • “Duterte slams repot: Criminals have no humanity” ,The Philippine Star news reporting, March 3 (2017), available at: http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/03/03/1677475/duterte-slams-report-criminals- have-no-humanity • “Duterte vows to destroy female government official” ABS-CBN news, August 12 (2016), available at http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/12/16/duterte-vows-to-destroy- female-govt-official • “Education for All 2015 National Review Report: Philippines”, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), May (2015), available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0023/002303/230331e.pdf • “Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data- drug-problem-philippines • “Explainer: How serious is the Philippines drug problem?”, Rappler news reporting, August 27 (2016), available at: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/144331-data- drug-problem-philippines • “License to kill: Philippine Police Killings in Duerte’s ‘War on Drus”, Human Rights Watch, March 1 (2017), available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/philippines0317_web_1.pdf

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• “Meet the husband and wife assassin team, carrying out the Philippine’s drug war”, SBS Satellite, October 24 (2016), available at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/dateline/article/2016/10/20/meet-husband-and-wife- assassin-team-carrying-out-philippines-drug-war • “National Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2012), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/research- statistics/research/45-research-and-statistics/88-2012-researches#a • “Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-typed Stimulant and Other Drugs: Challenges for Asia and Pacific”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Smart Programme, November (2013), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/scientific/2013_Regional_ATS_Report_web.pdf • “Philippine’s Duterte threatens press over critical coverage” Daily Mail, March 30 (2017), available at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-4364220/Philippines- Duterte-threatens-newspaper-broadcaster.html • “Philippines Meth Trade out of the shadows again”, Voice of America news reporting, Reuters, February 25 (2017), available at: http://www.voanews.com/a/philippines- meth-trade/3739546.html • “Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte urges people to kill drug addicts”, The Guardian news reporting, July 1st (2016), available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/01/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte- urges-people-to-kill-drug-addicts • “Philippines to disband anti-drug police units after rogue agents kill South Korean businessman”, Business Insider, January 29 (2017), available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/philippines-to-disband-anti-drug-police-units-after- rogue-agents-kill-south-korean-businessman-2017-1?international=true&r=US&IR=T • “Philippines: Duterte’s 100 days of carnage”, Amnesty International, October 7 (2016), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/philippines-dutertes- hundred-days-of-carnage/ • “Philippines: The Police’s murderous war on the poor”, Amnesty International, January 31 (2017), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/philippines- the-police-murderous-war-on-the-poor/ • “Philippines: The Police’s murderous war on the poor”, Amnesty International, January 31 (2017), available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/01/philippines- the-police-murderous-war-on-the-poor/ • “Senator Leila de Lima arrested in the Philippines”, Al Jazeera, February 24 (2017), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/02/leila-de-lima-arrested-philippines- 170224003808389.html • “Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda concerning the situation in the Republic of Philippines”, Internationcal Criminal Court, October 13 (2016), available at: https://www.icc- cpi.int/pages/item.aspx?name=161013-otp-stat-php • “The Philippines Statistical Yearbook”, Philippines Statistics Authority, pg 13, 17-16, October (2015), available at: https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2015%20PSY%20PDF.pdf • “Third Report on the Human Rights situation in Colombia”, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, document 9, revision 1, February

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26 (1999). • “World Drug Report”, United Nations Drugs and Crime Office, pg. 41, 75, 91, (2014), available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_Report_2014_web.pdf • “You can die anytime: Death Squad Killings in Mindanao”, Human Rights Watch, April 6 (2009), available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/04/06/you-can-die-any- time/death-squad-killings-mindanao • [1] “Study on the Current Nature and Extent of Drug Use in the Philippines”, Dangerous Drugs Board, (2008), available at: http://www.ddb.gov.ph/images/psrsd_report/2008%20National%20Household%20Surv ey.pdf • [1] “World Drug Report”, United Nations Drugs and Crime Office, pg. 151 (2007), available at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07/WDR_2007.pdf

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