SEDEC Humanitarian Programme Review 1994 – 2004
Hugh Goyder with Alistair Dutton and Sus Abhayaratna
October 2004
SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004
Table of contents page
Executive Summary…………………………………………………………3
1.Background and Methodology……………………………………………8
2.Introduction…………………………………………………………………9
3.History of the church’s work in the conflict: 3.1: The impact of the conflict on the church (1990-2000)…………. ..10 3.2 The transition to peace (2002-4)……………………………………..17 3.3 Conclusions from Historical Review………………………….……..17
4 The church’s response: 4.1 Over view of SEDEC’s humanitarian work………………………...... 18 4.2 The major programmes supported by the Church.………………….19 4.3 Current programme issues…………………………….…………….. 21 4.3.1.Health ………………………………………………………………….21 4.3.2. Education…………………………………………………………… 22 4.3.3. Volunteer programmes……………………………………………… 22 4.3.4 School feeding - the ‘porridge’ programme………………………...23 4.3.5 Microcredit…………………………………………………………….24 4.4. Other programmes of the church: 4.4.1: Peace building………………………………………………………..26 4.4.2 The National Animation Programme………………………………...27
5.Assessment of the church’s humanitarian work in relation to the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross…………………..29
6. The present: the changing context and future challenges…………….32 6.1. The Diocesan Centres…………………………………………………..33 6.2 : Organisational issues: SEDEC and the Dioceses………………….. 34 6.3 SEDEC and its donors: the case for a new Partnership……………...36
Overall Conclusions…………………………………………………………..37
Recommendations…………………………………………………………… 39
Appendix 1: Terms of Reference……………………………………………42 Appendix 2: International Red Cross Code of Conduct…………………..45 Appendix 3: Documents Reviewed………………………………………….48 Appendix 4: Feedback Workshop Report…………………………………..49
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Executive Summary
The purpose of this Review is to document the humanitarian work of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka in response to the long running civil conflict between the Government and the LTTE. The review aims to document both the successes and the struggles of the church in working on both sides of the conflict, to discuss its current programmes, and draw relevant conclusions .
A review of this kind has been planned since 2001 and was undertaken at the request of SEDEC by three consultants- Sus Abhayaratna (local consultant), Alistair Dutton (CAFOD), and Hugh Goyder (independent consultant ) in March 2004, and involved visits to SEDEC in Colombo and six different Diocesan Centres as well as a review of relevant documentation. The review was conducted during the preparations for national elections, and at a time of particular uncertainty in the east of the country due to a split in the LTTE’s leadership. Prior to the finalization of the report the review team’s findings were discussed in detail by both SEDEC and Diocesan staff at a meeting in Colombo.
The review suggests that the church has played a number of different roles - protection, humanitarian relief, and assistance with rehabilitation, especially with respect to shelter and income generation. There were internal tensions in SEDEC in the 1980s when the Northern bishops set up their own relief organisation, and the report documents how it was able to re-unite following the JVP-instigated violence in the south in 1989. Since then the church has been able to bridge the ethnic divide between the Tamils and Sinhalese and to maintain a dialogue with both sides. It has also been active in advocacy in favour of peace, both nationally and internationally, and different Bishops have been involved both in the negotiations that led up to the current MOU, and also in attempts to mediate in the more recent splits within the LTTE with a view to avoiding further violence.
Section 3.1 documents the impact of the conflict both on the different dioceses and on SEDEC as a whole, and reviews briefly first the intense fighting in the East from 1989-92 and then the more protracted battles in the North from about 1994 onwards. At every stage the church was not a neutral observer to the conflict, but was itself a victim of it, as symbolised by the attacks on individual priests, Diocesan offices, and the shrine at Madhu in November 1999. Yet it succeeded in maintaining a delicate balance between the Government and the Northern Dioceses which wanted the Church to be publicly critical of many actions taken by the Security Forces. As government restrictions on the movement of supplies tightened the church could only get relief supplies through if it maintained close working relationships with the Ministry of Defence. Even so in late 1995, following the recapture of Jaffna by the army, there were strong feelings expressed in the Sri Lankan media against all NGOs working in the north which were perceived as aiding the Tamil cause, and two priests from HUDEC were imprisoned. The conflict continued with varying intensity until 2001, and in late 1998 and early 1999 SEDEC was also active in mobilising relief for the victims of floods. The
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conclusion of this historical review is that in spite of all the difficulties both SEDEC and the Dioceses were able to maintain the trust of both sides, and that this must be seen as a considerable achievement.
Section 4 then reviews the church ‘s humanitarian response to the conflict., with a financial analysis of the different international appeals and a review of the major programmes supported. While in the humanitarian sector internationally there is a tendency for agencies to become more specialist, one feature of SEDEC and the dioceses is that they have always responded comprehensively, meeting a wide range of needs from the beginning to the end of life – for example from the training of midwives and supporting pre- schools to funeral expenses, and from immediate welfare grants to micro- credit . A second feature of their approach has been its continuity: other agencies have scaled their activities up or down over the last 10 years, and after the MOU some of the relief agencies, like MSF, left the conflict areas in the north, but SEDEC’s humanitarian programme has continued with only minor changes.
The report then discusses the different programmes undertaken. In education and health, the church has now been paying the stipends of volunteers for many years, and the report recommends that SEDEC needs to do more research and local advocacy to see how it can reduce its funding for these volunteers and ideally get them proper government contracts. The use of such volunteers made much sense at the height of the conflict, and has also been a useful stopgap measure in the two years since the MOU, but is clearly not a programme that donors will be able to fund indefinitely. The value of the church’s long standing school feeding programme is acknowledged, but the report also questions how long this too can be supported. The review documents some of the positive impacts of the microcredit programme during the conflict, including its impact on widows who were previously seen as having a very low social status. It is suggested that the church should review both the size of loans offered and the arrangements for enabling group members to withdraw their savings.
SEDEC’s Peace Building and National Animation Programmes, which complement the church’s humanitarian work are then briefly reviewed. Since a Review of the NAP is already planned, the report suggests that this Review might address both the impact of the current programme and wider issues around animation as a development strategy. A similar external review of the church’s important efforts with regard to peace building is also recommended. One issue for such a review to explore would be whether the exchange programmes may have been more successful so far in improving relations between the Tamils and Sinhalese than in addressing the increasing tensions between the Buddhists and Christians in the south, and the Christians and Muslims in the East.
Section 5 reviews the church’s programme in Sri Lanka against an accepted international standard - the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. This section concludes that when assessed by this code, the church’s humanitarian work
4 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 has performed strongly. The principle of non-discrimination in targeting is seen as especially important, and in relation to this the Review found that the church has a strong reputation but that in the current volatile religious context of Sri Lanka it needs to back this up with a communications strategy so that leaders of other faiths, the wider public, and the media are all clear about its position. A further question raised during the Review is how long after the end of a conflict its ‘victims’ should be specially targeted, and singled out for benefits, as opposed to others from equally poor or even poorer backgrounds.
Section 6.1 then discusses the current context in which each Diocese is working, and explores both the similarities and differences between the different dioceses. The new feature since the MOU for all the Dioceses is the huge increase in the number of NGOs, and in the North the TRO is trying to increase the control over the activities of NGOs at community level. The continuing tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities in the East suggests a need for EHED to improve its abilities to both pre-empt and react quickly to future incidents, which will require it to have sufficient emergency funds at its disposal for such quick responses.
Section 6.2 then explores the generic strengths and weaknesses of the DC’s on the basis of SWOT exercises carried out with each Diocese. The common strengths are seen as low overheads, committed staff with valuable local knowledge, a strong reputation for responding quickly to a wide variety of relief needs, and a diverse range of programmes covering food, health, education, and shelter.
The area where the agencies feel most vulnerable is in their lack of qualified staff, and this relates directly to the issue of salaries. Currently many senior jobs are often held by retired government officials who have long experience, great commitment, and good English language skills, but the Dioceses accept that in the long term they will need to promote a younger cadre of managers to replace this older group, and that higher salaries will be needed to attract and retain such a cadre. A further problem is a perceived lack of resources for transport, which has become more acute now that so much more of the country is accessible.
The review argues that the operating environment for the church is changing, and the church will in future face a greater competition both for funds, and (given the increase in the number of other agencies) for operating ‘space.’ Since it was not in the TOR for this Review to cover organisational issues in any detail, the Review suggests that SEDEC should, with donor assistance, commission an Organisational Review. It is now seven years since the BSM and much has changed in that time. Some suggestions for the TOR of this proposed Review are given in the Recommendations in the final section.
Section 6 then reviews the relationship between SEDEC and its donors. In the long running civil war, followed by two years of an uncertain peace, the attention of donors has been on project implementation rather than SEDEC as an organisation, and the DC’s in the conflict areas have had to react to events rather than being able to follow through longer term strategies. But the review
5 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 suggests that in future donors need to invest more resources in the long term organisational development of SEDEC and the Diocesan Centres. This kind of support should be regarded by donors as an investment which enables SEDEC to become a stronger organisation, better able both to mobilise more resources both from its own church members and from other non-Catholic donors.
The review concludes that given the small number of Catholics in the country as a whole, the church has been surprisingly influential through the conflict, and it has played a number of vital roles (not just in relief and reconstruction but also in peace-building and advocacy at international, national, and local levels.
Though it has been exceptionally difficult for all agencies in Sri Lanka to make long term or strategic plans given the uncertainties of the post-MOU period and the sense of ‘no war, but no peace’, the review concludes that the church has been relatively slow to review and adjust its programmes in the light of the new, and more peaceful situation, and the exponential growth in the number of NGOs. In particular there is a need for the church to undertake more critical analysis of the National Animation Programme, and a need for each Diocese to increase its capacity to identify, implement, and monitor and evaluate locally appropriate interventions.
The final section of the Review makes recommendations for SEDEC, the Dioceses, and the donors.
Hugh Goyder Alistair Dutton October 2004
Acknowledgements
The Review Team would like to acknowledge the enormous co-operation we received from all SEDEC and Diocesan staff, but in particular Mr Theivarajan and Father Damian of SEDEC.
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List of Acronyms
BSM Backstopping Mission (the evaluation of SEDEC carried out in 1997.) CAFOD Catholic Agency for Overseas Development CIDSE International Co-operation for Development and Solidarity. DC Diocesan Centre EHED-B Eastern Human Development Centre, Batticaloa EHED-T Eastern Human Development Centre, Trincomalee IDP Internally Displaced Person HUDEC-J Human Development Centre, Jaffna HUDEC-K Human Development Centre, Killinochchi INGO International NGO LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam MOH Ministry of Health MOU Memorandum of Understanding (agreeing to end the conflict between the LTTE and Government of Sri Lanka) SEDEC Social Economic & Development Centre (sometimes referred to as ‘Caritas Sri Lanka’) SOA Special Operational Appeal SLAF Sri Lankan Armed Forces
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1. Background and Methodology
In contrast with previous reviews and evaluations in SEDEC, this Review was requested by SEDEC and not by any of its donors. The idea of a Review has been under discussion for three years since a meeting between SEDEC and its partners at Trincomalee in 2001. CAFOD was represented at the 2001 meeting, and agreed to supply consultants if SEDEC decided to go ahead with such a Review. A planning meeting to agree the scope of the Review with the different Diocesan Directors and agree the schedule was held in Colombo at the end of January 2004. This review then took place from March 9-29 2004. Following the completion of the report there was a review meeting with staff of SEDEC and the Diocesan Centres in Colombo in September 2004 to discuss the findings and recommendations. Following this meeting this final draft was prepared.
The first aim is simply to document some of the church’s humanitarian activities in response to the extended civil conflict in Sri Lanka. The second aim is to document where the church has been successful in its response, and where it has struggled. It is hoped that a discussion of some of the church’s perceived strengths and weaknesses will enable both SEDEC and the Dioceses to become more effective in the future. We would emphasise that the report does not look at financial systems and that it is not an audit.
The Review was undertaken by three consultants- Sus Abhayaratna (local consultant), Alistair Dutton (CAFOD), and Hugh Goyder (independent consultant ). The Review has an ambitious scope, since it covers all the many programmes undertaken by SEDEC in the last ten years, but for logistical reasons only limited time could be spent with each Diocese and with SEDEC itself. During these visits there were a large number of meetings with Bishops, local priests, Diocesan Centre staff, members of the communities with whom they work, representatives of Government, LTTE, NGO’s and UN agencies.
During the course of the Review it came clear that the experience of each of the Diocesan centres in the disputed areas of the country deserve to be documented in far more detail. However from the viewpoint of both SEDEC and its international partners there are advantages in taking a national approach even though it is impossible to do complete justice to all the activities of the Diocesan centres and SEDEC itself.
A further problem encountered was in the overall scope of this Review. The prime focus of the Review is on the work funded by the Special Operational Appeals (SOA’s). However a key feature of the Church’s work is that it has always seen its humanitarian work as one component of a far wider programme, only part of which was funded through SEDEC by the SOA’s. At the Diocesan level in particular it is difficult to review only the humanitarian work without commenting on other important complementary programmes especially those in peace-building and animation, and income generation. All these programmes were continuing at the time of the Review, whereas most of the Relief and Rehabilitation programmes had been stopped since the
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signing of the MOU in February 2002. The approach taken in to this Review has been to retain an overall focus on the work funded by the SOAs but to give sufficient coverage to other programmes to show the breadth of the work of SEDEC and the Dioceses.
The TOR (Appendix 1) emphasise a Review of SEDEC’s past activities. In the course of the field work it became clear that there was a need for the study to encompass not just the past, but also issues of the present and (to a far more limited extent) the future. Following discussions with SEDEC staff we therefore decided to add this material in the final section of the Report. The findings of the Review and its recommendations were then discussed at a meeting with SEDEC staff, Diocesan Directors, and other Diocesan staff on September 27 and 28th 2004.
Introduction
The long running civil war in Sri Lanka between the Government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) and the LTTE in the north and east is one of the great tragedies of recent South Asian history. The statistics suggest that about 82,000 people have died in the conflict, of whom 20,000 were young people. A further 2000 people are missing, Over 800,000 people have been displaced (many of them more than once), investment and economic growth have suffered, and Sri Lanka gained the dubious distinction of spending over 6% of its GNP on defence – one of the highest levels in the world. About 2 million land mines are thought to have been planted in Jaffna alone by the warring parties.
At the time this Review took place the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the GOSL and LTTE had been in place for just over 2 years. This MOU established a cease-fire, and was meant to initiate a longer term peace process. In many ways it has been highly successful in that there has been no serious outbreak of violent conflict since the MOU was signed, and there is much rehabilitation and reconstruction activity throughout the war-affected areas. However the MOU has not solved the roots of the conflict, and there are still many costs associated with the current situation, often described as ‘no war, but no peace’. This was most evident in Jaffna where there is still a very heavy military presence from the armed forces, and many people are unable to return to their original homes because the army is occupying their land. Many fishermen are still unable to get to their normal fishing areas as access to much of the coast around Jaffna is still heavily restricted.
There were two further complications in the peace process at the time of this Review. The first was the declaration of a national election by President Chandika for April 2 2004. The outcome of this election, with a clear victory for the President’s alliance, raised questions about whether the momentum for peace of the last two years would be maintained.
The second was a serious split within the LTTE, with a faction in the east under Karuna breaking off from the main leadership under Prabhakaran. This is a source of instability in the Tamil areas, and the divisions within the LTTE are likely to complicate any further negotiations aimed at achieving a lasting
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peace in Sri Lanka. At the time of writing the LTTE was still prepared to order the killing of leading figures in the East who were seen as too sympathetic to Karuna, and the first serious battle between the two factions took place in early April 2004 as the first draft of this report was being written.
3.1: The impact of the conflict on the church (1990-2000)
SEDEC1, the Social & Economic Development Centre, was established as the social development wing of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka in 1968, but its Emergency Dept. (as it was then known ) initially came into prominence following the cyclone on the East Coast in November 1978, and the serious ethnic riots of 1983.
The church in Sri Lanka shares some common characteristics across the different Dioceses, and it is worth summarising these before documenting SEDEC’s history in more detail. First, a major difference between Christianity and other religions in Sri Lanka is a tradition of teaching and practice emphasis the importance of responding to people in need. Through SEDEC and the Diocesan agencies the Church has a national organisation through which it explicitly undertakes this mission.
Secondly, even though only about 6% of the population of Sri Lanka are Catholic, through the dioceses, parishes and religious congregations, the church has a strong network of parish priests and religious throughout the country, and during the conflict this proved a vital source of information about how people were affected. This network has also proved invaluable as a means of distributing relief supplies and running community-oriented development programmes.
Thirdly, during the conflict the church has played a number of roles. The first of these was one of protection, with churches, church compounds or priests’ houses seen as safe (or at least safer) havens. The second (which is the role focussed on in this review) has been to provide humanitarian relief to meet the basic needs of people affected by the war, together with assistance with rehabilitation, especially with respect to shelter and income generation. The third role, which was challenged during the 1980s, but became stronger in the 1990s, was the church’s ability to bridge the ethnic divide between the Tamils and Sinhalese and to maintain a dialogue wherever possible. A fourth role was advocacy in favour of peace, both nationally and internationally. A fifth role was the active participation by different Bishops both in the negotiations that led up to the current MOU, and also in attempts to mediate in the current splits within the LTTE.
It has, however, been challenging for the Church to fulfil all these different roles, and hence retain its comparative advantage throughout the conflict. Though the picture altered at different stages of the conflict, for most of the period under review much of Jaffna Diocese (including the districts of
1 Throughout this Report we will refer to SEDEC when talking about the national structure, ‘the Dioceses’ or ‘Diocesan structures’ for the Dioceses, and ‘the church’ when referring to the Catholic Church of Sri Lanka.
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Killinochchi and Mullaitivu) as well as parts of Mannar Diocese were under the control of the LTTE, while most of the Diocese of Trincomalee and Batticaloa were under the control of the Sri Lankan Security Forces. The church’s Tamil bishops and priests have normally supported the cause of the Tamil people if not the LTTE itself. As one priest told the Review Team: ‘we don’t want war but we want peace with justice. On this we cannot compromise.’’ In the north and east the Church was often seen by the Security Forces as collaborating with the Tamils, and at different times individual priests and bishops were arrested, imprisoned, attacked, and in some cases, killed.
After the riots in the south in 1983 the bishops and priests in the North felt that the Church in Colombo was not in a position to give them sufficient support, and some Sinhalese Catholics were unhappy about the amount of aid being given to the Tamils in the north. At that time SEDEC in Colombo thought that the acceptance of funding for the north would damage its national reputation. There was therefore a real danger that the church would divide on ethnic lines. The three Tamil bishops in the North and East reacted to this lack of support from Colombo by forming their own relief agency – the Catholic Relief Organisation of the North and East (CRONE). The establishment of CRONE was approved by the Bishops Conference in 1983, and was maintained until 1989. The ‘rapprochement’ between the church in the north and south came during the severe violence caused by the JVP in 1988-89, which brought a realisation that the Church should respond to needs arising from violence and intimidation, whatever their source, and that doing so was not a partisan act
At the outset some Directors of SEDEC saw involvement in the aftermath of the JVP-led conflict in the south as a high risk enterprise. 2 They thought that the Government might misinterpret the programme and were afraid that beneficiaries might later discredit the church by joining up with future uprisings. However with strong leadership from Fr. Firth, who was Director of SEDEC at the time, the programme was approved. Initially SEDEC provided legal aid for those held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act and set up programmes to visit them in prisons and detention camps. It also provided funding to enable 19 detainees to continue their study after their release, and some Buddhist monks were also assisted. From 1992 onwards SEDEC supported a new programme called Southern Youth and their Families – Ensuring a Future to a Victimised and Beleagured Generation.3 This aimed to benefit three categories of people – youth released from detention, children in families without a wage earner, and people who had lost their homes in the violence. Almost all the beneficiaries were Buddhist. There were reported to be some implementation problems and only 28% of the original budget was funded, but through this work SEDEC was able to show that it had a national commitment to humanitarian work that went beyond the conflict in the North. This project was also important in that it showed that the church was prepared to address some of the causes of the violence in the south, which in the case
2 From SEDEC News – Bulletin No. 9 – May 1992. 3 The actual spelling of the project document
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of the JVP-inspired insurrection were seen as increasing poverty and the economic marginalisation of youth.
Fr Yvon Ambroise suggests five vital functions for a church undertaking humanitarian operations in a time of conflict. 4
• witnessing – having a presence, reporting, documenting
• voicing – articulating concerns, especially on human rights abuses
• accompanying: it remains with people and does not leave even in times of danger
• suffering: it empathises with victims & becomes a victim itself
• healing: in two respects - through relief and medical aid, as well as through peace & reconciliation efforts.
From 1989-91 one of the areas most affected by the conflict was in the East, where there were heavy civilian casualties as the army took Batticoloa back from the LTTE. The east of Sri Lanka has long been a disputed area throughout the conflict, and many of LTTE’s fighters, including many child soldiers, were recruited in the East. Three priests from this Diocese died in this conflict, one was seriously injured, and many more have witnessed human rights abuses by both sides. From 1990-91 25,000 people took refuge in the church compound, and a local NGO leader told the Review team that many lives were saved as a result. During these dark years the church tried to offer a safe haven for civilians, and was also able to mobilise much-needed relief food from Colombo.
For most of the 1990s the main towns and main roads in the East remained under government control, and while there where many minor engagements, the intense military conflict centred on the Jaffna Peninsular and the Vanni. In these areas civilians suffered enormously both in terms of casualties, and through the loss of homes, communities, and livelihoods. The LTTE occupied Jaffna from 1990-1995, and the re-occupation by the army in 1995 caused massive displacement of people away from Jaffna to the Vanni in the south. Large numbers went to Madhu , a Christian shrine to the south west in the Diocese of Mannar, where they received assistance from a number of NGOs including Valvuthayam, the Diocesan Agency for Manar Diocese.
4 Fr Yvon Ambroise: Caritas Humanitarian Aid & the Military – a case study from Asia – Caritas Sri Lanka (unpublished paper 2003)
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One issue raised in SEDEC’s reports from this period is the need for more ‘development-oriented’ relief, and for more investment on rehabilitation and less on relief. SEDEC staff expressed the same fear which is discussed today, that too much relief aid will make people dependent. In a visit to Jaffna in April 1994 Joe William of SEDEC and Steve Alston of CAFOD expressed some concerns about the need for tighter targeting of aid and for pre- positioning of food supplies in case of further conflict, They recommended that HUDEC should support more income generation, agriculture and credit programmes but were worried about whether the agency had the appropriate skills for this kind of work. One possible solution they suggested was that HUDEC might recruit more lay staff for these roles. They also found innovative ideas at parish level in relation to income generation or FFW projects but noted that these local initiatives were rarely documented or reported by HUDEC. At that time Caritas Netherlands was expressing an interest in supporting an institutional strengthening process in HUDEC. We return to these issues in section 5 below.
However this mission’s recommendations were largely taken over by events. Travel both from Colombo to the north, and within the war zones, became far more difficult. In June 1994 HUDEC’s Jaffna office was shelled and the office was displaced. In 1995 the SL Army then re-occupied Jaffna and the entire population had to evacuate the city within hours. This is still seen by people in Jaffna who experienced it as the most difficult time they had to endure, as this escalation of the war displaced up to 500,000 people and required over 300,000 people to flee south to Vanni, and to remain there for at least four years. Quite soon after the exodus from Jaffna in 1995 HUDEC quickly started schools even in the temporary camps, and in Jaffna itself HUDEC, with external Caritas help, paid for temporary sheds for St Henry’s College, Ilavalai, Jaffna, so that classes could continue in another location even after the original school had been taken over by security forces.
Following this escalation of the war in the mid-1990s moving relief supplies from the south to the north became a major logistical challenge, not just because of the conflict but because of the tortuous procedures required by the GoSL, which was concerned that humanitarian relief might be used as a cover for sending essential supplies to the LTTE. Through the mid-1990s the GOSL gradually tightened its policy in order to exercise the maximum control over the movement of goods. The procedure was that SEDEC first had to apply to the Ministry of Relief & Rehabilitation for permission to distribute certain items; next approval had to be sought from a Commissioner General of Essential Services, & finally the MOD had to issue the permit to allow the goods to move. Even then goods could not be transported directly into the war zone, but they had to be offloaded at the edge of the designated zone and reloaded on to authorised trucks. This meant that many supplies going to the north had to be unloaded up to four times for security checks, and some consignments took three weeks to get through. Once cleared the supplies had to be moved to stores under the administration of the local GA, and after 1997 the GA had a greater say in co-ordinating distribution.
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These restrictions were maintained through the conflict even though HUDEC was one of a number of agencies to be involved in peaceful demonstrations in front of the UNHCR office in Kilinochchi in protest against the restrictions on food supplies into the area, and a number of INGOs also lobbied the government in Colombo to lift the restrictions.
One answer suggested in response to all the restrictions on transport of food and other relief supplies was to try to mobilise more local food wherever possible to cut down on the need for transport. It is not clear how practical this approach was, since the insecurity and heavy use of land mines made the cultivation, transport, and marketing of crops very difficult, but HUDEC’s school feeding programme, discussed in section 4 below, was based on the principle of local procurement.
All these regulations and restrictions meant that as so often with humanitarian agencies in conflict-related emergencies, SEDEC and the Dioceses had to perform something of a balancing act. SEDEC came under pressure from the Northern Dioceses to be publicly critical of many actions taken by the Security Forces. On the other hand, to preserve its access to those people most in need, the church had to follow government procedures, however complex, and it had to maintain close working relationships with the Government in general and the MOD in particular. In their own areas the Bishops and Diocesan Directors had to try to maintain a similar ‘balancing act’ between the military, local government, and the LTTE.
One advantage of HUDEC in this difficult time was that through its network of priests it was able to monitor the situation and get food and other supplies direct to beneficiaries, while INGOs coming into the area had no such direct access and had to distribute food through the local administration. This advantage has been maintained to the present, with HUDEC appearing to be one of the few agencies able to circumvent the growing restrictions being imposed by the LTTE and TRO on the activities of both international and local NGOs in the areas under their control.
However in late 1995, following the recapture of Jaffna by the army, there were strong feelings expressed in the Sri Lankan media against all NGOs working in the north which were perceived as aiding the Tamil cause. In November the Annual Consultation of the NGO Forum in Colombo was broken up by a mob and in a separate incident Fr Jebanesan, then Director of HUDEC and Father Pius (a former Director of HUDEC) were arrested at a checkpoint when trying to carry Rs. 2 million in cash to support relief work in the north. They were held in prison for three weeks and there was then a detailed CID investigation of all SEDEC’s financial affairs. Fortunately SEDEC had kept sufficiently comprehensive records to be able to pass this investigation.
At the time the church was under attack for its public criticism of the bombing of Jaffna; and SEDEC staff saw these arrests as an attempt by the Government to placate the church’s critics SEDEC itself felt these tensions internally as its three most senior staff at that time were all Tamils, and three
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R & R staff from SEDEC were also briefly detained for questioning in Polonnuruwa in December 1995. During this same period the LTTE established the Tamil Relief Organisation (TRO) to monitor the relief and rehabilitation work undertaken in the areas under LTTE control, and some Diocesan staff found it difficult to work with the TRO..
The year 1996 is described in SEDEC’s reports as ‘the year many would want to forget By this time HUDEC reported it was assisting over 40,000 or about 20% of all IDPs in Jaffna with food, clothing & medical expenses, but it was becoming far harder to assist people in the Vanni due to the escalation in military activity. Some INGOs shifted their HQs to Madhu from Killinochchi and HUDEC itself had to move to two different locations within two weeks but it also ended up with a temporary base at Madhu. Nationally about 800,000 people were reported displaced, and the growing refugee problem in Vavuniya and lack of accommodation for them resulted in the closure of seven schools in the town as they were all being used a temporary accommodation for IDPs.
Following the re-occupation of Jaffna, the army captured Killinochchi , but these apparent successes were balanced by a damaging attack on Mullaitivu by LTTE in July which resulted in the deaths of 1300 Government soldiers and further displacement of many more civilians. In response SEDEC’s Appeal in 1996 (for SL Rs 36million) focussed on food including supplementary feeding for children, lactating mothers, & the elderly. Though this SOA was successful in mobilising the necessary funds, SEDEC ran into difficulties in disbursement in the light of the restrictions on the movement of relief supplies.
In spite of the intensity of the war SEDEC was not wholly occupied with relief during this period, and in 1995-96 it was able to start a new reconciliation programme in Pollonnaruwa Dist through the local NGO INSHA. A further hopeful sign came at Christmas 1996 when a Peace Vigil of 10,000 people in Colombo passed off without incident. SEDEC remained active throughout this period in making direct contact with Ministers, Government officials & NGOs to highlight problems of displaced civilians, and to seek humanitarian access, for food and other relief supplies. SEDEC also asked partners to advocate for better humanitarian access, an end to the bombing of civilians & civilian targets, and the commencement of peace talks involving third parties. 5
In June 1997 there was a offensive by the SL Army in Vanni Region aimed at opening the vital road link between Vavuniya & Jaffna. Each conflict forced civilians further into remoter areas where it was harder to help them, so that by 1997 it was estimated that up to 175,000 people were living in the jungle. Malaria, diarrhoea, and malnutrition were all rife at this time, some people the Review Team met said they had been displaced at least four times, and in some cases as many as seven times, since 1990. A further consequence of the war was an exodus of skilled staff like teachers and doctors, many of
5 Report of Jan 97 by Joe William, SEDEC
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whom have never returned – an issue which HUDEC has tried to address in its volunteer programmes, discussed below.
In December 1998 and January 1999 the people of the North and East had to contend with severe flooding, and people already displaced by the conflict had to move again after the floods. SEDEC responded by providing shelter materials and repairing houses, but the flood relief effort was disrupted by continuing military activity, shortages of building materials and storage facilities, and the continuing problem of lack of cash in the banks.
In October and November 19996 Father Antony reported from Killinochchi that ‘Aerial attacks killing & injuring innocent civilians continued to be the order of the day. A horrible and a very serious non-stop war is going on in Vanni areas now…Aerial attacks continuing…The unexpected & sudden stoppage of conveyance & imposition of a total ban & restriction on travel & transports to & from Vavuniya & Colombo created big shortages of essential items including infant milk food, medicines & fuel. Even the Bank went dry of liquid cash….’ One result was that according to an MOH survey, 52% percent of children under 5 years of age at the welfare centres in Kilinochchi district were said to be suffering malnutrition.
From about 1990 onwards People displaced by the conflict in the north sought sanctuary at the shrine of Madhu near Manar, and established a small camp there. But with the greater intensity of fighting from 1995 the camp expanded to include up to 32,000 displaced people. The Church retained overall administrative responsibility for the site and established a sub-office there but it also took on an important role of facilitating the work of other humanitarian agencies including UNHCR, MSF, and SCF. It also had to arrange temporary shelters and supplement the very intermittent food supplies received from the UNHCR. In November 1999 there was a serious incident when a part of the main church at Madhu was shelled, and 42 people, including 13 children, were killed, and 64 people injured. The church arranged for the transport and disposal of the dead, as well as for ensuring hospital treatment for the injured.
There was widespread outrage in the country as a result of this incident and the Catholics of the Diocese of Jaffna responded by appealing to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Pope John Paul II, to persuade the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE to call off the war with immediate effect and commence negotiations. Over 5000 people of all faiths assembled at Jaffna Cathedral and observed a one-day fast in December 1999.
In spite of these appeals the war was to continue for two more years without any clear victory for either side, but with a very high cost to the civilian population on both sides and the economy as a whole. There were few changes in the R and R programmes during these final years of the conflict,
6 Both SEDEC, Diocesan, and CAFOD records for the period 1997-9 are incomplete
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In Jaffna in particular HUDEC continued to come under pressure from the Government, and the current Diocesan Director was twice summoned to the main police HQ in Jaffna and accused of supporting the LTTE.
3.2: the transition to peace after February 2002
Through the worst of the conflict SEDEC had little difficulty in mobilising resources from donors, and its greatest constraint was get sufficient supplies through to those most in need. As restrictions on the movement of goods eased at the end of the war there was still a good response from donors, and it could increase its expenditure. However, as so often with conflicts, it has found it more difficult to mobilise the considerable resources needed for reconstruction work since the MOU. The MOU and the uncertain peace which has now been established for two and a half years greatly widened the options for all agencies, including SEDEC, and has allowed them to shift the focus of their activities from relief to reconstruction and rehabilitation. SEDEC’s response in its 2003 Appeal was to seek further funding for some existing programmes, like school feeding and support for volunteers, but also to scale up its income generation activities, especially those in support of farmers and fishermen. Though the 2003 Appeal highlighted the importance of employment creation and the need for the church to set up more vocational training programmes in such trades as hotel management and computers, these activities do not seem to have been implemented. The current situation in the Dioceses following the MOU is discussed in section 5 below.
3.3 Conclusions from Historical Review
It is important to note that relative to other similar civil war situations, much was achieved by all agencies, including the Government of Sri Lanka, in terms of supplying relief for IDP’s. As SEDEC’s 1994 Appeal noted in spite of immense human suffering…the various relief agencies involved have been able to provide a safety net of survival assistance to a higher percentage of the affected population than is normal in civil war situations.
In spite of the considerable restrictions NGOs like the church were able to operate on both sides of the conflict. Apart from a few occasions like the period 1995-96 when they came temporarily under attack, both SEDEC and the Dioceses were able to maintain the trust of both sides, and this must be seen as a considerable achievement. The next section reviews the different programmes of the church in more detail.
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4 The church’s response
4.1 Over view of SEDEC’s humanitarian work
It is clear from the previous section that SEDEC’s relief work should be seen as only one component of a broader programme by the church in Sri Lanka. This section reviews how the emergency resources mobilised by SEDEC have been utilised, and comments briefly on the major components. Table 1 shows that between February 1993 and June 2001 a total of almost $US 2.9 million was raised through five Caritas Special Operational Appeals (SOA’s). The largest such appeal was for the period October 1994 to November 1997 and raised over $1 million. This appeal is especially difficult to compare with the other SOAs in the table as it covered a far wider range of activities, including support for unaccompanied children, publications, training, and legal aid.
The largest share of all the appeal funds was spent on food items (26%) and shelter (19%). Food was normally purchased locally and transported into the conflict areas; most of the shelter component was temporary shelter using cut palm branches (cadjans), though HUDEC is now building permanent housing using ECHO funding. An important difference between SEDEC and some INGOs and UNHCR is that SEDEC did not bring in metal roofing sheets but preferred to buy local materials like cadjans which could be made locally and created jobs. The Water and Sanitation component (only 1.3% of the total) was especially important given the frequent displacements of population and the unavoidable concentration of people in temporary camps.
SOA 52/92 SOA 45/94 SOA 43/97 SOA 75/98 SOA 28/00 TOTAL % & 70/95 Feb93 Oct 94 Nov 97 Nov 98 May 00 -Oct 94 -Nov 97 -Nov 98 -Apr 00 -Jun 01 Food items 315,176 48,405 80,953 172,199 118,650 735,383 26.09 Water/Sanitation 12,780 676 16,271 7,994 37,721 1.34 Non-food items 18,104 35,505 1,667 56,363 10,422 122,061 4.33 Health 28,991 9,750 8,758 20,982 68,481 2.43 Education 9,787 50,829 24,821 74,614 160,051 5.68 Shelter 139,374 171,752 5,732 109,299 111,396 537,553 19.07 Income generation 26,172 65,037 1,783 67,574 31,233 191,799 6.80 Transport 31,834 52,884 10,955 12,104 107,777 3.82 Organisational costs 14,750 36,698 7,664 43,913 50,679 153,704 5.45 Funeral costs 3,571 1,261 7,479 8,852 21,163 0.75 Advocacy 1,509 1,750 3,259 0.12 Others 10,146 539,881 4,814 23,291 101,885 680,017 24.12 TOTAL 568,914 1,042,762 114,300 542,432 550,561 2,818,969 100.00
Table 1: SEDEC - Humanitarian Programme Feb 1993-June 2001. Financial Summary (In US $ assuming an Exchange Rate of LKR100 = $1)
While in the humanitarian sector internationally there is a tendency for agencies to become more specialist, one feature of SEDEC and the dioceses is that they have always responded comprehensively, meeting a wide range of needs from the beginning to the end of life – for example from pre-schools and the training of midwives to funeral expenses, and from immediate welfare grants to micro-credit . A second feature of their approach has been its
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continuity: other agencies scaled their activities up or down over the last 10 years as a result of staff security or concerns about access, and after the MOU some of the relief agencies, including MSF, left the conflict areas in the north. However the Dioceses were able to maintain their operations throughout this troubled period. Thirdly the MOU has given SEDEC a little more flexibility in relation to its programme priorities: in the conflict WFP was unable to operate in the areas controlled by the LTTE, but it has now started to operate in the Vanni.
Given the importance of the church’s potential advocacy role in the conflict, the resources allocated to this purpose in the 5 different appeals appear very meagre, but it is possible that SEDEC used other budgets for its advocacy work. The next section reviews those programmes that still continue today, and which the Review Team was therefore able to look at in more detail. This section discusses the origins and initial rationale for the different programmes, as well as their relevance in the current, post-war context.
Figure 1: Total Relief and Rehabilitation Expenditure by Category for Six Centres Reviewed, 1988-2003 90,000,000 Income Generation (inc 80,000,000 vocational training)
70,000,000 Health (inc hospitals, mobile clinics, volunteers 60,000,000 Education (inc pre-school, 50,000,000 children's homes, 40,000,000 porridge, volunteers, etc) Non-food relief items (inc 30,000,000 cash relief for elders, disabled and w idow s) 20,000,000 Water & Sanitation Sri Lankan Rupees 10,000,000 Food & transport - 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Housing & Shelter (inc Year temp & permanent, & cadjans)
4.2 The major programmes supported by the Church Although there was some variation between different Dioceses, and a different ‘mix’ of programmes at different stages of the conflict, the major programmes supported were as follows:
Relief: During the conflict the DC’s offered dry rations, supplementary food, cash relief for widows and the elderly, drinking water, toilets and temporary shelters for IDP’s; funeral expenses for war victims, relief assistance to detainees and their families, Though relief has been an important component of all the appeals, the rationale for its continuation after the MOU was to help support people like farmers and fishermen who were still prevented by military occupation from earning their livelihood.
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In Jaffna groups of widows produced a local food called Jeevashakthi which was distributed to the children of IDP’s. This was an interesting example of ‘developmental relief’ in that HUDEC first encouraged local farmers to grow more nutritious crops like green gram, and black gram which could be included in the supplementary food as well as rice. Groups of widows then made a small profit of about Rs 10 per kg. by cooking, packaging, and selling the food, and the supply gave children a greater incentive to go to school.
As an example of the scope of HUDEC’s humanitarian work, in April 2001 it reported it was: • feeding 13,404 school children & 1,076 pre-school children • supporting 89 health & 171 teacher volunteers, 150 widows & 136 destitute children; • running a Revolving Loan Fund for 150 people – Rs 10,000 per head for fishermen, Rs. 11,640 for farmers. • constructing 1500 temporary shelters, 8 refugee settlements, 42 wells & 116 toilets; • offering transport to hospital for the sick and disabled and had a Mobile Medical Unit • supporting an Association of the Families of the ‘Disappeared’ – and had given each person in a group of 75 people a cash grant of Rs 5000.
Rehabilitation: This includes the reconstruction of houses, agricultural assistance (including livestock, and deepening of village tanks), and assistance with demining in Killinochchi.
Health: In Jaffna the Church runs Holy Cross Hospital, and from this base it ran a mobile medical unit which was an important part of HUDEC’s programme during the war, as it was able to serve people even after they had been displaced. The mobile unit had to move to Vanni in 1995, but was able to return in 1996/7. The unit has mainly focussed on primary health care, and has referred more serious cases to the hospital. Other assistance includes support to health volunteers (discussed below), eye camps in Mannar Diocese, training for midwives in Trincomalee, and a well-regarded trauma counselling centre in Killinochchi.
Disability: Valvuthayam manages the Prosthesis Clinic in Manar, which has so far supplied artificial limbs to 360 people, many of them the victims of landmines. This unit was the first such centre to be set up in Mannar, and when it was set up in 1996/7 it was still seen as politically sensitive as the Government was reluctant to admit that civilians could be blown up by land mines. A dedicated team of staff currently run this unit, and once people have received artificial limbs they are given a loan of Rs 10,000, and repayment of these loans is said to be about 50%.
Education. The Dioceses offer support for pre-school teachers and volunteer teachers, Stationery, school uniforms, and other financial support for orphans,
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IDP’s and other poor students and support for 24 children’s welfare homes.7 At one level, these could be seen as traditional interventions for a church agency, but they also involved an important element of protection. During the conflict young people were targeted by both sides. The LTTE saw them as a vital source of new recruits, and as a result the army saw them as a highly suspect group, and many were killed or disappeared during army raids. These same young people could enjoy a slightly higher degree of security once they were in a residential school or college, but they needed financial support to go such colleges. Given the growing understanding within the whole humanitarian sector about the importance of protection, this kind of intervention might be worth considering in other conflict situations where young people are especially at risk.
Nutrition: The Dioceses support both pre-school & primary school feeding programmes, which got strong support from both sides in the conflict.
Local Advocacy: in addition to the advocacy undertaken at the international and national levels, dioceses have undertaken their own advocacy work: such advocacy in Manar Diocese by Valvuthayam with LTTE and the army has enabled people to return to two High Security Zones covering a total area of 25 square kilometres.
The Church has also supported, and continues to support, a variety of Community development, Income Generation, Micro-credit, Animation, and Peace programmes which are referred to below.
4.3. Current Programme Issues
4.3.1 Health
In Mannar in June 1994 SCF reported to the local NGO Forum that
‘the lack of preventive health care personnel is keenly felt. There was nobody from the Health Dept who was in a position to take action when the dysentery broke out in Katmadhukulam. The issue of lack of personnel has been reported in the consortium report for over 2 years. One wonders whether there is any value in reporting such issues to this forum’…
There are acute problems in the health sector in all the war zones. In those areas worst affected by the war it has naturally proved problematic to maintain health services, especially as many health facilities, including the district hospital in Killinochchi town and most of the clinics in rural areas were destroyed in the conflict. To this day there are only 15 nurses in the Killinochchi district, against a required cadre of some 100. In the district
7 Though these centres are often referred to as orphanages, many children in them have at least one living parent.
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hospital the Review Team found there are still up to three patients in each of the 125 beds, there are only four medical officers compared to the 20 required. Even though a new hospital will soon be open in Killinochchi it is not clear whether sufficient medical staff will be found to run it. In order to help maintain essential services, HUDEC Kilinochchi has provided a small incentive of Rs. 1000 per month to a total of 20 nursing assistants, a radiologist and other support staff who work voluntarily in the hospital. Medical staff told the Review Team that it would be difficult to run the hospital without these volunteers. In total HUDEC supports 53 of the 285 voluntary health workers in Kilinochchi and Mullaitaivu districts: the long term future of these volunteers is discussed below.
4.3.2 Education
In surveys of displaced people done at the height of the conflict education was given a high priority, with some families reporting that they sold dry rations to pay school fees and buy educational material. But these long term educational needs could not be met by occasional distributions of school books or other supplies, and in common with other humanitarian agencies the church saw a need for longer term interventions
Throughout the north and east there is a chronic shortage of professionals, particularly within the public sector. In the high school in Kilinochchi there are only 13 qualified teachers for the 1,250 pupils, with class sizes of up to 100. The recommended cadre is 408. In Kilinochchi District as a whole, 1579 secondary school teachers are needed, but only 993 are reported to be in post (63% of the recommended cadre), with particular shortages reported in Science and English, and a related decline in the number of Tamil students getting a University place. While the usual ratio of students to teachers is 28 to one, in Kilinochchi District it is 48 to one. This shortage of teachers is not considered accidental: even since the MOU there is still a strong feeling in the Tamil areas that the Government is still not committed to giving Tamils the same quality of education as is received by the Sinhalese majority.
In order to go some way to improving the teaching ratio in schools HUDEC in the Vanni and EHED have provided a small incentive to volunteer teachers working in State schools. This has been a popular programme and by 2002 HUDEC and EHED between them provided basic stipends for a total of 420 volunteers.
4.3.3 The future of the volunteer programmes
The use of volunteers in both health and education made much sense at the height of the conflict, and has also been a useful stop gap in the two years since the MOU. However it is clearly not a programme that donors will be able to fund indefinitely.
8 This should be compared to the school the review team visited near Habarane in central Sri Lanka in which there were 30 teachers serving 980 pupils. It is surprising that there should be even less teachers in Kilinochi town than were reported to be in post in the rest of the District.
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The review team were also concerned at how small the incentive was. Teachers and health workers alike were being paid Rp. 1,000/=9 (US$ 10) per month. Equivalent to US$ 0.33/day, this is well below the Millennium Development Goal poverty criterion of $1/day, and should be compared to the incentives which are paid by other agencies (FORUT Rp.1,500/=, Oxfam Rp.2,500/= and UNICEF Rp.3,500/=)
The problems recruiting sufficient teachers and medical staff in the north and east include: • security concerns; • insufficient numbers of trained Tamil-speaking teachers in particular subjects • budgetary constraints; • a reluctance of professionals to live with the basic accommodation and facilities available (particularly in the Vanni). • government policies, and especially a perceived lack of commitment to the education of Tamils.
In the conflict the support to volunteers was a sound intervention which helped the education and health systems to continue functioning. Now that the situation is improving there are questions about how long SEDEC should continue to subsidise the Government’s Education and Health Department. In the Vanni FORUT, the Norwegian INGO, is now withdrawing its own support for 52 health volunteers, but is offering them a severance package. This draconian step appears rather premature when one considers the persistent shortages of staff. UNICEF remains concerned about the lack of manpower especially in the remoter parts of the Vanni. Before withdrawing support from volunteers it will be important to ensure the Government has been able to increase its own manpower.
However the problems faced by the volunteer programme illustrate the need for SEDEC to add a research and advocacy arm to its operations, both at Diocesan and National levels. There is a need for practical, well- disseminated, comparative research on staff shortages, the numbers of staff being trained both in health and education, why they are unwilling to come to the ex-conflict areas, and the government’s budget allocations. If SEDEC is to continue funding what must in the long term be a government responsibility it must combine the actual support for volunteers with an active campaign to get those who are sufficiently qualified absorbed into the government structures. Otherwise there is a danger that SEDEC is becoming locked in to funding programmes that had a rationale in the conflict, but no longer make sense even in a time of uncertain peace.
4.3.4 School feeding - the ‘porridge’ programme
One of the most long lasting and popular programmes funded through the SOA in all areas has been the school feeding or ‘Porridge Programme’. Loans are given to farmers who in turn supply local food to Widows
9 A similarly-experienced and qualified, State-employed teacher earns c.Rp.12,000/= per month.
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Associations which in their turn prepare packets of nutritious food. This programme is universally very highly valued and appears to have had four positive impacts. Firstly, it has been helpful in increasing school enrolment (which in the Kilinochchi area increased from 16,154 to 18,401 in the year 2000-01.) Secondly, in the same area farmers were able to sell their produce as ingredients for the porridge – which was especially important during the conflict when they had difficulty in accessing their normal markets. Thirdly the programme provided an income for the women involved in preparing the food. Fourthly the nutritional programme helped students’ concentration and their exam performance improved. Fifthly, the rate of school dropouts fell from 14.5% to 4.4% between 1995 and 2002.
This programme still continues today throughout the north and east, and in Kilinochchi covers 19,000 school students. As with the volunteer programmes there are questions about how long a programme started as a response to the conflict should continue in so-called ‘normal’ times. Some church leaders expressed concerns to the Review Team about people becoming over- dependent on foreign aid in the current post-war situation, and SEDEC urgently needs to discuss a gradual exit strategy with the Government and the donor agencies. The issues to be resolved are first the degree of nutritional need, and whether such a programme is needed in all areas and at all times of the year, and secondly once these needs are better defined, whether other agencies could not take on this programme. A nutritional assessment done by WFP in November 2003 indicated a surprisingly high rate of malnutrition in Killinochchi District, and as a result it seems that WFP or UNICEF may also be prepared to undertake school feeding.
The SL Red Cross in Kilinochchi told us the story of a boy from a very poor family who had no way of feeding himself at school, so he would drag a ‘cadjan’ branch (used for roofing material) three 3 kilometres along the beach every morning and try to exchange it for a little food. Once HUDEC’s school feeding programme started he was able to stop carrying the cadjan: the same boy has now passed his O-levels.
In Aligambai (Batticaloa Diocese) EHED provides grants of Rs 500 per month to students from a displaced, gipsy community to help them to go to College. This has enabled one student from the settlement, which suffered greatly during the war, to go to university
4.3.5 The micro-credit programmes supported by both HUDEC-Jaffna and HUDEC-Killinochchi through the conflict met important needs. The surveys done by OXFAM and SCF on people’s views of the relief programme at the height of the conflict in 1998 showed that food was not as big a problem as the ability to earn money to buy the food they needed.10 An important lesson for other similar situations is that even in a long running conflict it is possible to combine relief and microfinance interventions, and (as the box below shows) the latter appear to have a strongly beneficial psychological impact.
10 Summary Report – Listening to the Displaced and Listening to the Returned – OXFAM/SCF 1998
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As is often the case the actual schemes supported through microfinance have had a mixed record. HUDEC initially encouraged some groups to take out loans for poultry, which at first was profitable. However the chickens all died in an epidemic, after which many women were reluctant to take similar risks again. The fishermen’s co-operatives at Point Pedro on the Jaffna Peninsular argue that the loan size (fixed at Rs 10,000 per family) was too small as new boats cost about Rs 125,000. Given limited funds there is a choice between giving a larger loan to a small number of people, or a smaller loan to a larger group – which was HUDEC’s choice in this case. Other agencies, including UNHCR and UNDP were able to help the fishermen and some got help from relatives who had left Sri Lanka. The difficulty of offering much larger loans sufficient for new boats, engines, and a complete set of nets is that it would only have assisted a small number of fishermen. The problem is that because of pressure of time, or lack of staff, the different options may not always have been fully discussed with the fishermen themselves.
Widows groups supported by HUDEC
As a result of the war there are estimated to be about 20,000 widows in Jaffna alone. One group came together and approached HUDEC for help. In addition to the trauma of bereavement these women had lost their ‘breadwinners’, and were ostracised by their communities not least for fear that they would become too dependent on relatives and neighbours. Initially it was hard for them even to leave their houses.
HUDEC assisted this first group of 90 widows, and later 3 other groups of widows were formed in other villages. HUDEC gave each woman an initial loan of SLR 5,000 on which they charged interest of Rs 600 over the course of the loan. This was repaid to the women once they had repaid their loan in full, and the loan size was later increased.
For four years this group of women were displaced to the Vanni due to the conflict, and on their return they received roofing material from HUDEC. The review team found that this combination of help with both reconstruction and micro –credit has done much to increase the women’s self confidence in a society in which traditionally widows are ostracised and have a very low social status. While they remain poor they have become articulate and financially self sufficient .
Six representatives from one group of widows formed their own Peace Keeping Committee and HUDEC arranged for them to travel to Colombo where they met representatives of the National Peace Keeping Committee. As one of them said proudly ‘Before we had to go in search of foreigners. Now the foreigners are coming in search of us’.
The Church may also need to review savings arrangements for its groups. While both the savings and loan facilities were popular, and have had a very positive impact, one complaint from a group in the Mullaitivu area was that HUDEC had encouraged people to save but had not then allowed them to
25 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 have access to their savings on request. One consequence of making it hard for people to access their own savings is that they may be forced back to traditional moneylenders in times of crisis. On the other hand there is a problem of trust in some groups, as there have been cases where a group has lodged its savings with a Secretary or Treasurer of the group who has then misused the money. Since the Dioceses are likely to increase their involvement in micro-finance activities we recommend SEDEC helps them access more local expertise to assist in the design of future programmes
Currently microcredit is an important part of HUDEC’s programme in the Jaffna area, and it now has a wide coverage – reaching 14 different Fishermen’s Societies with a total of 2,569 members and 9 women’s groups with 612 members. So far the repayment rates on the loans disbursed look promising.
4.4 Other programmes of the church
4.4.1: Peace building
The church has been active in support of peace for over ten years, and even at the time of this Review the Bishop of Batticoloa was trying to mediate in the growing split between the Eastern and Northern wings of the LTTE In April 93 all 11 Diocesan Directors went to study Peace Programmes in the Phillipines, and there was then a return visit by an inter-religious team back to Sri Lanka. SEDEC staff were instrumental in setting up the National Peace Council, which was initially located within SEDEC, but later received SEDEC’s assistance to set up its own office and become an independent organisation. In 1998 the Bishops and the diocesan Directors traveled to Bangkok and formulated a peace education and promotion programme.
There have been numerous moves in support of peace by different bishops during the conflict, especially in Jaffna where prior to the MOU the Hindu Chief Priest undertook joint lobbying for peace with the Bishop. In 1997 the Bishop of Batticoloa interceded between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). Following the National Consultation in July 1999 SEDEC, the members of the Justice and Peace Commission, and the Bishops, launched a National Peace Programme, using trained peace activists in 11 different dioceses.
This programme is worthy of its own evaluation, and this Review proposes that there should be such an evaluation in the coming year. The Review Team was able to meet both Sinhalese and Tamil people who had travelled to other areas of the country and met people from other ethnic groups. These exchange visits were popular and appeared to have a positive impact. For example this programme arranged for a Buddhist monk who was highly suspicious of all Christian churches to travel from Welekanda in the central part of Sri Lanka to Manar. When the Review Team met this monk he suggested that there should be more such exposure programs.
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Also in Trincomalee the church has been supporting a small English language programme with the help of VSO in order to help the two groups improve their communication through learning a common language.
While all these initiatives are helpful in improving human relations, they are clearly necessary but not sufficient: once there is a long term political settlement, there is a far better chance of peaceful co-existence between different ethnic groups. . However it is possible that if the current peace between the Government and LTTE can be maintained, future conflicts in Sri Lanka will be more on religious, rather than ethnic lines. Even if there is a full political settlement to the conflict, there remain considerable religious tensions which suggest a need for more similar exchanges and peace building programmes between Christians and Buddhists in the south and between Christians and Muslims in the East. The different exchange programmes need to be rooted in a strong analysis of the current situation in each location, and should be supported by strong research and advocacy at both the local and national levels.
There are though still dangers on the horizon. Though the Dioceses have an excellent network of parish priests who can identify and report potential conflicts, the staff on the ground need the capacity to analyse conflicts as they arise in their own areas, and to work out and resource prompt interventions to deal with them. One independent study of EHED’s work done in 1999, while being positive about many aspects of the agency, suggested that its ability to respond to this kind of crisis was inhibited by its management structure, which at that time was felt to be over-centralised. 11
Though this criticism is less relevant today given the ‘uncertain peace’, it is still valid for the East where there is a high probability both of further strife between the Tamils and Muslims, and further factional fighting between the Northern and Eastern wings of the Tamil Tigers. The Diocesan structures can usually respond to these incidents quickly, but they need both well-trained staff on the ground with a high degree of delegated authority, a commitment to take risks in volatile situations, and contingency funds to support these initiatives which can be allocated quickly. Thus the challenge for the church in volatile areas like the East will be to build up strong ‘early warning’ and other information systems about local level tensions, and to develop an ability to respond quickly once incidents occur.
4.4.2 The National Animation Programme (NAP)
This Review did not look in any detail at the Animation Programme, but discussions with both Diocesan and SEDEC staff raised a number of relevant issues about the relationship between the animation and the R & R programmes. One issue which emerged was that during the conflict it made some sense for SEDEC to manage its humanitarian and animation work as distinct programmes. However as the focus shifts to reconstruction and
11 See Goodhand, Hulme, & Lewer (1999): NGOs & Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: a Case Study of Sri Lanka
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development the Review Team would suggest that this separation needs to be reviewed. There seem to be a lot of strong potential links between the animation of groups, and building their capacity to prevent and handle conflicts.
It is now three years since this programme was last reviewed (by Abid Gulzar et al) in May 2001, and SEDEC are planning to undertake a further review in the coming year. It would be helpful if the Terms of Reference for this Review could cover the following issues:
First the animation programme was conceived during the conflict. It started in the south in 1998 as no Directors from the north were able to attend the initial meetings, and the NAP was only initiated in the north from 2000 onwards. It will be most interesting for this review to look at the programme’s performance in very different parts of the country, and whether the assumptions on which the programme was based then are equally valid in a time of peace.
In respect of the current programme it might also be useful if the proposed review could document the problem of ‘poaching’ of groups by other NGO’s (by which another NGO takes over or offers to assist a group ‘nurtured’ by a church animator.) This links to some wider resourcing issues: if animators’ salaries are far below those paid by other agencies, will staff turnover increase as interventions by NGOs expand? Now that so much more of the country is accessible, is there sufficient budget for the transport of the animators?
During this review both Diocesan staff and Review Team members raised some interesting questions relating to the concept of animation. Some animation programmes start from the assumption that if people are ‘aware’ or more ‘animated’ they will be better able to improve their livelihoods. An alternative view is that such awareness is necessary, but is never sufficient, and that people can only improve their status if they can improve their skills, livelihoods, or bargaining power, and often these issues are outside their control. It is also often the case that many poor people are acutely ‘aware’ of the reasons for their poverty but they can only advance with real improvements both in income generating opportunities and services, especially basic health and education.
We recommend that the Review planned for the NAP in 2005 needs to address both the impact of the current programme and the wider issues around animation as a development strategy
28 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004
.
5. Assessment of the church’s humanitarian work in relation to The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief
This section reviews the church’s programme in Sri Lanka against this code, which is becoming an accepted international standard of good humanitarian practice. The complete code is provided in Appendix 2.
5.1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first. On this issue the Code states that ‘The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries’. As documented in this study the church fought hard for this principle, in particular through a number of years in which the defence forces were reluctant to allow relief supplies through for fear they would end up in LTTE hands.
As regards targeting, given the time that has now elapsed from the end of the war it was difficult for the Review Team to gather much evidence about the extent to which the church had been able to target its aid to those most in need. Initially when whole populations were evacuated, as in the case of Jaffna in 1995, those needing immediate relief and shelter included people from all sections of society. One could presume that those people with money and connections found it easier to find their way out to Colombo or to other countries, and that long term IDP’s were from poorer families.
The church funded a mix of programmes, some of which were targeted at especially vulnerable people, especially widows; while others, especially those like school feeding, have covered all school children regardless of income.
One major issues which arose during the Review was the need for each Diocese to adapt its whole programme, but in particular its targeting criteria, to changing circumstances. Staff from the Sethsaviya working in Anuradhapuram Diocese reported that they were finding it difficult to justify the fact that only people directly affected by the war were eligible for SEDEC’s relief and rehabilitation assistance. While this approach was justified during the war, a new situation has existed since the MOU, and many people in the communities where they worked found this distinction outdated and unjust. An important question here is how long after the end of a conflict its victims should be specially targeted, as opposed to others from equally poor or even poorer backgrounds. At some point in a peace process it is necessary to remove the old ‘labels’ to help people who suffered in the conflict move on. We recommend that SEDEC should encourage the Diocesan Centres like Sethsaviya to discuss their current targeting criteria and possible revisions both with their field staff and with the communities themselves. (This also relates to the discussion of provision no. 7 of the Code below).
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5.2 Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind.
At different times in the last ten years some concerns have been expressed by SEDEC staff about the quality of needs assessment and targeting. While there could have been more analysis of gender issues some programmes (especially the assistance for widows, pre-schools, and the rehabilitation of amputees) did focus on vulnerable groups. Since this provision of the code overlaps with provision 5.3 which also focuses on discrimination in the distribution of relief aid, we review this issue in the next section.
5.3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
The issue of non-discrimination in the distribution of relief has been and remains a critical issue for the church. Relief and rehabilitation assistance from a church agency can fuel conflicts if the distribution criteria are seen to favour church members. This is currently a live issue at present as the Buddhist community in particular feels that some Christian churches in the south are misusing their resources to convert Buddhists to Christianity. One of the issues covered by the Review Team in all areas was the extent to which the church was discriminating in favour of Catholics in the distribution of relief and rehabilitation. However the Team found no evidence of any such discrimination and overall was impressed by the extent to which SEDEC is committed to, and has a reputation for, following the principle of non- discrimination.
The Review Team was able to meet a local Buddhist leader near Ponnuruwa who was convinced that people he called ‘Christians’ were trying to convert Buddhists. In further discussion it came clear he was referring not to the Catholic Church, but to other, more evangelical churches.
One lesson from this experience is that it is no longer sufficient for the church just to follow a policy of non-discrimination: in addition the policy needs to be supported by a strong communications strategy so that leaders of other faiths, the wider public, and the media are all clear about its position. 12
5.4 We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.This clause was especially relevant for humanitarian crises like that in Kosovo in 1999 when many INGOs felt they were being used to support NATO’s political agenda. It is less relevant for Sri Lanka since no governments outside the region have a particular foreign policy interest in the country. Indeed, the struggle has been to get governments in the US and Europe to become more engaged in finding a solution to the conflict.
12 To avoid charges of discrimination SEDEC may also need to review whether its staff recruitment policy is open to people of all faiths.
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5.5 We shall respect culture and custom. Again this has not been a major issue as the Church is part of the local culture, and through its parish network it has a strong local knowledge. Assistance with funeral expenses and the transport of dead bodies were unusual, but perhaps especially helpful and culturally sensitive, interventions.
5.6 We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities. A strong feature of the response of both SEDEC and the Dioceses was that throughout their operations were run by skilled and committed Sri Lankans. They also worked in close co-operation with local government structures wherever possible and some programmes, like those in support of volunteers, were in direct support of government services. During the conflict it was difficult to build the capacity of Diocesan staff, but one finding of our Review was that this kind of capacity building could have been strengthened after the MOU. (See conclusions & recommendations).
5.7 Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid. This review suggests that there was plenty of informal dialogue between the church and the people it was trying to assist, but that there were few formal ways in which recipients were involved in distribution. However this review shows that, unlike more specialised agencies, the church had a wide range of programmes that met both peoples’ more immediate needs (food, shelter) and also longer term needs like education and microfinance.
5.8 Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs. Traditionally responses to emergencies follow an almost linear pattern, with relief, then rehabilitation, then ‘development’ interventions. Given the long time span of this conflict the church’s response had to be far more multi-dimensional, and its R & R work was supported by many interventions which could be seen as trying to ‘reduce future vulnerabilities’ including advocacy, animation, micro-credit, and peace programmes. There were many fears expressed about the growing dependency of beneficiaries on external aid, but this report suggests that this problem affected only a minority, and not the majority, or those receiving assistance. (See Conclusions)
5.9 We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
Between 1995 and 1997 SEDEC reported some financial & management weaknesses in EHED, Trincomalee, but there are no similar reports from any other Dioceses. Following the Back Stopping Mission of 1997 there have been major improvements in SEDEC’s financial management and financial reporting, but a common perception of donors is that there is still scope for improving narrative reporting, and in particular for monitoring and reporting on the impact of particular interventions. This problem links closely with the fact
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that all senior staff both in SEDEC and the DC’s tend to be overstretched (see section 5.2). and there are few staff with the relevant skills and the time to write more analytical reports.
5.10 In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.
For SEDEC this is not really a relevant issue. This study shows that all of SEDEC’s appeals refer to the causes of the problem (the on-going conflict) and they have always discussed people’s needs within this wider political context.
6. The present: the changing context and future challenges
This section reviews the current situation in the different Diocese as seen in March 2004 and moves on to some of the current organisational issues.
6.1. The Diocesan Centres
HUDEC – Jaffna & Killinochchi
At the time of this Review there was still a heavy military presence on the Jaffna Peninsular, with an estimated 40,000 troops still stationed there . Jaffna is known as an area of ‘Golden Soil’ because of its traditional fertility but much of this is now a High Security Zone to which people do not have access. For reasons that were not entirely clear the army was causing difficulties in letting people from the Tamil-held or ‘uncleared’ areas remove bodies from the Hospital in Jaffna, and HUDEC continues to help with transport and funeral expenses for this purpose. Many people are unable to return to their original homes because the army occupies their land, and the defence forces also keep tight control of access to the sea, making it difficult for fishermen to earn their livelihood.
Figure 2: Total Programme Expenditure for Six Centres Reviewed 1995-2003
120,000,000
100,000,000 Anaradhapura
80,000,000 Batti Trinco 60,000,000 Manar 40,000,000 Kilinochchi
Sri Lankan Rupees 20,000,000 Jaffna
- 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year
32 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004
Kilinochchi, the ‘de facto’ capital of the LTTE-controlled areas, presents a very different picture. The town was almost entirely destroyed during the war, and is now being reconstructed. As in other post-war situations there is a time lag between peoples’ return to their original areas and the reconstruction of permanent houses, and the revival of basic services, especially health and education. There are a large number of UN agencies and both local and INGOs active here, but there is a tendency for much reconstruction work to be concentrated on the main A9 Road from North to South: the progress of rehabilitation away from this road appears to be far slower. The large number of land mines left in the area must certainly be one discouraging factor.
The TRO appears anxious both to control and take the credit for work done by NGO’s in the LTTE-controlled areas. As in Jaffna, HUDEC in the Vanni is currently in a privileged position in that it has so far managed to avoid the controls imposed by the TRO on those NGOs, especially those INGOs, which want to work at community level.
Valvuthayam (meaning ‘Dawn of Life’) is the name for the church’s relief and development wing in Mannar Diocese. Mannar has been very much a ‘border area’ throughout the conflict, with the army struggling to maintain control of the main road east from Valvuniya and the main towns. From 1997 onwards Government forces retained control of the island of Mannar and of the main road linking Mannar to the rest of the country, but the LTTE has made incursions into, and remains in control of, many of the inland rural areas but not the island on which Mannar town is situated.
EHED – Trincomalee and Batticoloa
The difference between the East of Sri Lanka and the other Dioceses is that in the East there has been sporadic violence between Muslims and Tamils even since the MOU. The Muslims are traditionally traders and moneylenders who were seen by both sides as ‘doing well out of the war’. They still live in very separate communities, and it is sometimes difficult for EHED to have the same kind of dialogue with their leaders as HUDEC has achieved with the Hindu priests. A more recent source of dispute is that in the LTTE-controlled areas in the East, the LTTE has been trying to levy taxes on the Muslim community, and it has become increasingly restrictive on what rehabilitation work NGOs are allowed to take up without its prior permission.
The current ‘faction warfare’ within the Tamil Tigers, in which the Bishop of Batticaloa and some of his priests were trying to intercede at the time of this Review, means that much of the east of Sri Lanka is still an unstable area. In spite of the MOU there have been many allegations that the LTTE is conscripting child soldiers in the Batticoloa area, and as recently as October 2003 the Church supported UNICEF’s efforts to stop this recruitment.
The broad combination of programmes covering health, animation, peace- building, and relief and rehabilitation is much the same as in the other Dioceses. In Trincomalee the Diocese also runs a peace education project which uses a British volunteer and encourages the use of English as a
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common language between different ethnic groups. This is currently on quite a small scale, and if it is successful SEDEC might consider replicating the project in other Dioceses.
In the Telugu-speaking gypsy community of Aligambai to the south of Batticaloa where EHED has worked for many years the review team was able to see three generations of housing – the original houses, built by the church, which were destroyed in an attack in 1990, the ‘temporary’ shelters in which people currently live, and the foundations for new houses, construction of which was earlier suspended but has now been continued by the TRO.
As in the other areas, the context within which EHED works has changed dramatically since the MOU. In Trincomalee District there were only 22 NGOs before the MOU, while now there are 46 and the numbers are increasing all the time. This is reported to be having a serious impact on the animation programme, since groups with whom EHED is working can easily get ‘poached’ by other NGOs which are prepared to offer them more immediate benefits. EHED –T has a health programme covering 117 villages but faces difficulties both in retaining skilled staff and in finding the transport to supervise the programme. In 2003 there were serious riots in Mutur between Tamils and Muslims but EHED-T told the Review Team that it had insufficient budgets to respond to requests for shelter as SEDEC had no budget for this purpose.
Sethsaviya (Habarane) – Anuradhapura Diocese
Sethsaviya is the name for the relief and development wing of Anuradhapura Diocese which was visited very briefly by the Review Team. This covers the north central part of Sri Lanka which was seen during the conflict as a ‘border area.’ Sethsaviya staff now mainly work on the animation and peace programmes, rather than relief, and are thus facing some of the problems discussed in section 3.3.2.above in relation to this programme. Sethsaviya has had some management difficulties; its Diocesan Director was seriously ill at the time of this Review, and it is has been less well resourced than other Diocesan centres. However the staff are highly committed and represent an important resource for the future.
6.2 : Organisational issues: SEDEC and the Dioceses
As regards the relationship between SEDEC and the Diocesan Centres the DC’s normally implement programmes and projects, while SEDEC supports their efforts by mobilising and accounting for resources, offering technical support and training, assisting with purchasing of supplies and logistics, and co-ordinating the church’s relief , rehabilitation, peace-building, and animation programmes at the national level. In practice the distinction is less clear cut as most dioceses have their own direct relationships with funding agencies, and as a result have taken on responsibilities for resource mobilisation and reporting to donors as well as implementation.
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SEDEC has had a strong national profile and has fulfilled a wide range of roles at the national level including being a founder member of the Committee of Humanitarian Agencies, a co-ordinating group of humanitarian agencies in Sri Lanka, and being a lead agency for the Sphere project. Its staff have served on a Presidential Task Force on Disasters.
During the Review we discussed strengths and weaknesses with all six Diocesan agencies, and found that they share some common characteristics. In relation to strengths, they have a continuous presence in almost all areas; they have low overheads, committed staff with valuable local knowledge, and they are known and trusted by the people; they have a strong reputation for responding quickly to a wide variety of relief needs; and they have a diverse range of programmes covering food, health, education, and shelter.
The first area where the agencies feel most vulnerable is in their lack of qualified staff. Staff report working all hours with tremendous commitment but many noted that they had been given little appropriate training, and the intensity of the conflict made it impossible for them to get even the most basic in-service training. In the last two years since the MOU there have been many more training courses organised by SEDEC in Colombo but since many staff in the North did not speak English or Sinhalese it was initially difficult for them to benefit from such training. This became easier once CAFOD funded SEDEC to install simultaneous translation facilities which are now used by some UN Agencies and other NGO’s.
Figure 3: Total Income Sources for Six Centres Reviewed 1988-2003 120,000,000
100,000,000 Other funding
80,000,000 Direct funding 60,000,000 from donors Funds via SEDEC 40,000,000
Sri Lankan Rupees Sri Lankan 20,000,000
- 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 Year
Secondly, given the large number of agencies either starting up or expanding their activities in the North, and the associated rise in salaries, it is already difficult for all the Dioceses to attract or retain qualified younger staff: currently senior jobs are often held by retired government officials who have long experience, great commitment, and good English language skills, but the Dioceses accept that in the long term they will need to promote a younger
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cadre of managers to replace this older group, and that higher salaries will be needed to attract and retain such a cadre.
The 1997 BSM noted the problem over continuity in the DC’s, and this Review Team found that this problem has yet to be addressed.13 Priests are normally appointed as Diocesan Directors for a six-year term. However if they have no previous relief, development, or management experience there is a huge amount to learn, and it can take up to two years before a Director feels fully confident and competent in his post. In the case of HUDEC-Jaffna and EHED-B, the same Diocesan Director has remained in post for many years, and perhaps as a result both DC’s are supported by an impressive range of donors – at least 9 in the case of EHED-B. But all the Dioceses need a clearer ‘succession plan’ with longer hand-over periods between Directors, and probably a greater delegation of senior management responsibility to lay staff.
Currently all the Northern DC’s are working in a highly sensitive and volatile political environment. In the future collaboration with the LTTE, TRO and other agencies will become a larger challenge and will require considerable managerial and diplomatic expertise. There is also a need to ensure that returnees receive their full resettlement package from the Government, and further research and advocacy work will be required to resolve the issues discussed in section 3.2.3 above in relation to the volunteers working in health and education.
During the war there was so much to be done, and so few agencies to do it, that the commitment of staff and volunteers, and a basically reactive approach were sufficient. Now, assuming the current peace is maintained and consolidated SEDEC faces a different, but in some ways more difficult challenge – to become ‘fit for purpose’ in this new era. This means that both SEDEC and the individual dioceses may need to review and adapt their organisational structures to cope with this changed environment. Since it was not in the TOR for this Review to cover organisational issues in any detail, we suggest that SEDEC should, with donor assistance, commission an Organisational Review: some ideas for the scope of this proposed review are given in the Recommendations below. Depending on the outcome of this proposed review both the Dioceses and SEDEC might consider first reviewing their salary scales and then over the next one to two years trying to recruit more staff with appropriate skills.
6.3 SEDEC and its donors: the case for a new partnership?
Since the BSM which took place almost 7 years ago donors have not really given much capacity building support to SEDEC as an organisation: our financial analysis shows that only 5.4% of the SOAs were used for the purpose of organisational development, and SEDEC staff report that they have often come under pressure from donors to cut their administrative budgets and salaries. In the long running civil war, followed by two years of an
13 Report of the BSM - p.vii – September 1997
36 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 uncertain peace, the attention of donors has been on project implementation rather than SEDEC as an organisation, and the DC’s in the conflict areas have constantly had to be reacting to events rather than following through any kind of longer term strategy. Even following the MOU it has been difficult both for SEDEC and the Dioceses to build a strong organisation on the basis of short-term, normally annual, funding streams.
A further impact of the conflict and the long running humanitarian programme is that there has been little space for SEDEC to think about its own long term future and what type of organisation it wants to become. Diocesan structures have been able to look to SEDEC for much of their funding, and SEDEC in turn has usually been successful in mobilising this funding through the SOA mechanism from its traditional Catholic donors. During the Review we discussed with SEDEC staff whether or not this dependence on donors may be holding SEDEC back from asserting its own identity and developing its own priorities, strategies, and work plans.
One important issue is local resource mobilisation. Sri Lanka is now considered by some donors like DFID to be a ‘middle-income’ country, and in future the church will need to generate a greater proportion of its income from within the country. There seems to be plenty of potential, first for greater fund raising for SEDEC in the wealthier dioceses, and secondly for Dioceses to consider investing in further enterprises like the printing press Valvuthayam has been running in Mannar since 1992. If this venture is profitable other dioceses might consider investigating the feasibility of similar ventures both to raise some income for the Dioceses and to create training and employment opportunities.
This review suggests that in the future donors need to invest more resources in the long term organisational development of SEDEC, and they should regard such long term support to SEDEC as an investment. Nationally SEDEC has an important role to play, and (as was discussed in the final meeting held by the Review Team in Colombo) a strong SEDEC will help strengthen the Catholic church in Sri Lanka, while a weak SEDEC is likely to result in a weaker church. One indicator of the success of an organisational change and capacity building process in SEDEC will be its ability to attract funding from different, and especially non-Catholic donors. HUDEC and EHED are already able to access such funding, and with organisational reform of the type proposed here SEDEC should also be in a position to mobilise funding for its advocacy and peace building programmes from a wider variety of donors.
7. Overall Conclusions
The major lesson from this Review is the importance of a national, faith-based organisation like SEDEC as a humanitarian actor. In most emergency situations international agencies are dominant, and the role of local agencies like SEDEC is often not fully acknowledged. This review found that, given the small number of Catholics in the country as a whole, the church has been surprisingly influential. It has played a number of different roles (in relief,
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reconstruction, advocacy, and peace-building) at international, national, and local levels. In spite of various vicissitudes it has managed to maintain the respect of both sides.
But the Review shows that at times the Church has had to struggle to preserve this influential position. During the 1980s it split on ethnic lines, and in the mid -1990s came under fire from the Government for its perceived support for the Tamil cause.
Compared with many other agencies, SEDEC and the DC’s have never become too specialised, and have continued to fund a wide range of humanitarian programmes. This is consistent with the church’s view that it needs to meet the needs of the ‘whole person’ and cannot be too selective. However in a more peaceful situation it is important that the services of the church do not come to substitute for the services which the Government of Sri Lanka ought to be offering, and there is also a case for a pragmatic division of labour between different agencies.
The church has always seen Relief and Rehabilitation as one component of a far wider programme that also includes advocacy, peace-building, and animation. A common feature of humanitarian work is that the relief of immediate needs absorbs most of the available funding, and it is often far harder to mobilise resources for other, more developmental interventions once the crisis is past and international interest has diminished. SEDEC’s approach has been to include in its appeals funding for health, education, and income generation programmes. This review very much endorses this approach as it was vital to support basic services and provide economic support for vulnerable groups like widows throughout the conflict.
In the last two years it has been exceptionally difficult for all agencies in Sri Lanka to make long term or strategic plans given the uncertainties of the post- MOU period and the sense of ‘no war, but no peace’. On the other hand one conclusion of this Review is that the Church has been slow to review and adjust its programmes in the light of the new, and more peaceful situation, and the exponential growth in the number of NGOs. It has yet to take full advantage of the opportunities presented by the peace.
One lesson of this Review is the need for better documentation in SEDEC as a whole. The quality and quantity of reporting by SEDEC to donors seems to have been at its best between about 1995 and 1997, but (in the view of the review team and some of the donors) has declined since then.
One issue on which it is difficult for this Review to be conclusive is on the question of dependence. Both during and after the conflict, some SEDEC reports and people interviewed by the Review Team suggested that relief continued over such a long period had made people too dependent. There was a call for more ‘development oriented’ relief.
There are clear problems in measuring dependency. When dealing with humanitarian agencies like SEDEC, people often express demands as part of
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a normal bargaining process. But the evidence both from this Review supports the findings of far more detailed research on the views of IDP’s conducted by SCF and Oxfam from 1996-98. The major finding was that people’s priorities were for peace and freedom, followed by self reliance – and the ability to earn their own living with good access to land, water, and basic services. 14 This suggests that relief aid was accepted as a necessity and as a partial compensation for the deprivations and disruptions of war, but that it did not have the effect of increasing dependency that was feared.
While the church has achieved a lot during the conflict over a long period with a high degree of personal commitment and only modest donor resources, it now faces the challenge to adapt both its organisation and its programmes to the post-war situation whilst still being prepared to respond to further conflict as it erupts. Some of the recommendations below are designed to facilitate this adjustment process.
8. Recommendations15
Recommendations Relating to the Dioceses
1 In order to have a high quality programme in the future the dioceses should scale up their local research and advocacy and recruit appropriate staff. For example there is a need for practical, well-disseminated, comparative research on staff shortages, the numbers of staff being trained both in health and education, why they are unwilling to come to the ex-conflict areas, and the government’s budget allocations.)
2 Bearing in mind the need for greater financial sustainability, and increasing constraints on donor funds, the dioceses need to review their volunteer programmes. They need to consider the levels of remuneration and work out what training or career development might be provided to help volunteers be absorbed into the State systems, with the aim of gradually withdrawing from these programmes
3 Similarly the dioceses should review its support for the school feeding programme, with a view to a gradual withdrawal.
4 Since the Dioceses are likely to increase their involvement in micro- finance activities we recommend SEDEC helps them access more local expertise to assist in the design of future programmes
5 While in the conflict there was a good case for a wide diversity of programmes, there are now many other agencies active and the dioceses should therefore consider focussing its energies on a smaller range of programmes. This prioritisation process will require the DC’s to improve
14 Oxfam/SCF: 1998: Summary Report – Listening to the Displaced and Listening to the Returned (cited above) 15 Recommendations that were made in the final review meeting are marked with an asterisk*.
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their skills in relation to programme design, monitoring and evaluation, so that they have a better idea of the relative success of different interventions.
6 *Under the principle of subsidiarity, responsibility in each Diocese should be delegated to the most appropriate level, including giving more responsibility for programme implementation to the laity.
7 *Dioceses should establish training and personal development plans for all staff.
8 *Dioceses should ensure that women hold positions at all levels.
Recommendations relating to SEDEC
9 SEDEC and the Dioceses should with donor support commission an Organisational Review to cover the following: 16
• the key functions that need to be performed by SEDEC in Colombo • the staff competencies required to carry out these functions effectively • the current balance between administrative and programme staff; • recruitment procedures • the salaries required to fill these posts with suitably qualified staff • the feasibility of opening up all senior jobs in SEDEC and the Dioceses to suitably qualified lay applicants • how SEDEC can become more professional and attract and retain appropriately qualified staff without losing its special character as a faith-based organisation.
10 *While undertaking this Review process SEDEC should also consider appointing a suitably qualified lay programme manager at national level.
11 SEDEC should ensure that women hold positions at all levels in the organisation.
12 National Animation Programme: the Review planned for the NAP in 2005 needs to address both the impact of the current programme and the wider issues around animation as a development strategy.
13 Since in the long term SEDEC needs to aim for an increase in the amount of income it raises within Sri Lanka, SEDEC should explore different ways in which the Catholic parishes and schools in Sri Lanka can increase the financial contribution they make to SEDEC at the national level.
16 By September 2004 such a Review had already been commissioned as part of SEDEC’s Strategic Planning process.
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Recommendations relating to the Bishops*
14 The Bishops (in their capacity as SEDEC’s Board ) should ensure SEDEC provides induction training for new Diocesan Directors.
15 They should also consider offering a 6-year fixed-term contract for DD’s so that they have long enough to gain experience, but are not so long in the job that they become exhausted.
16 Equally they should review the job content of the Diocesan Director post to ensure that DD’s do not become overloaded.
Recommendations relating to the Donors
17 Donor agencies should co-ordinate their efforts far more closely to ensure that within an agreed time period SEDEC becomes a strong, professional agency while still retaining its distinctive character as a religious organisation. This means that, rather than donors just ‘cherry picking’ particular projects or programmes as they have done in the past, they should commit themselves to underwriting a programme of long-term organisational development, which will allow it to offer reasonable salaries. This will require more multi-year programme funding from donors.
18 Once agreement has been achieved in respect of both SEDEC’s and the Dioceses’ long term strategy between donors and the Bishop’s Conference, donors should make a greater degree of long term financial commitment to SEDEC’s organisational development.
19 In particular Caritas agencies and CIDSE should commit themselves to a far greater degree of co-ordination to ensure that their suggestions and demands do not conflict and pull SEDEC and the Dioceses in different directions.
20 If requested by the Bishop’s Conference, donors need to commit themselves to support the difficult process of organisational change in SEDEC as proposed above. This might include one agency agreeing to support SEDEC with a qualified ‘Accompanier’ for a limited period.
21 The continuing volatility of the political situation in Sri Lanka means that both the Diocesan centres and SEDEC at the national level need a greater ability to respond quickly to emergencies as they arise. We therefore recommend that the donors arrange that SEDEC should always hold in its bank account a contingency fund of an agreed amount, which can be released immediately to the relevant Diocesan Centre on the basis of an exchange of e-mails when an emergency occurs.
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APPENDIX 1 SEDEC Humanitarian Programme Review 1995 - 2003 Terms of Reference
1. Introduction The idea of undertaking a detailed review/evaluation of the SEDEC’s response to the humanitarian emergency in Sri Lanka has been discussed between SEDEC and key partners for a number of years. The original idea stemmed from a SEDEC programme review workshop held in Trinco on the 4th May 2001 with all the North East Directors and staff members. Steve Alston the CAFOD Programme Officer and Matthew Carter CAFOD Head of Emergencies were also present and helped lead the discussion.
The CAFOD Emergencies Section has been providing technical assistance to SEDEC and the different diocese effected by the humanitarian crisis for many years and in addition has provided funding for the SOA’s and also more directly to parts of the HUDEC emergency programme.
During the Trinco discussion there was great enthusiasm expressed by the staff and regional Directors about the usefulness in undertaking such a review. It was felt that the review should be as participatory as possible and optimise the use of workshops and group discussions for obtaining information and feedback. The key issue was to review and highlight the Churches response to the crisis, which within the international arena has often been overlooked and this in turn has been immensely frustrating for SEDEC and the Sri Lanka Catholic Church. The Directors also felt the review would not only help to build on their strengths but also highlight future areas for growth and development within their diocesan and SEDEC programmes.
Discussions with SEDEC have focused on how the review would lead on from the Back Stopping Mission (evaluation), which was undertaken nearly six years ago by a group of independent consultants.
The review would for the first time help to show how the Sri Lanka Church responds in complex emergencies and highlight the added value that local civil society/Church bodies have in delivering humanitarian programmes.
The idea on completion of the review would be to openly publish the report.
2. Objectives The key objectives of the review would be to highlight and map out the programme SEDEC has delivered, to show where the strengths have been and also to highlight the areas in which SEDEC has struggled. The review in essence should be seen as a learning mechanism rather than process purely based around accountability. The review would also be extremely useful for those Caritas partner agencies who have provided support to SEDEC over the years, The Sri Lanka Working Group, Secours Catholique and other organisations who have provided vital support of the past years.
The review shall examine: Church a. How the Church responded and the Churches role b. Different approaches of the Church c. How the Church worked with the dioceses, parishes and community d. How the Church listened to the community, how participation worked
42 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004
SEDEC e. The design and implementation of the SEDEC programme f. How SEDEC worked in partnership with other Caritas agencies g. The relationship between SEDEC and the MoD and GoS
Diocesan Centres h. Different approaches of the diocesan centres i. How the diocesan centres worked with the parishes and community j. How the diocesan centres listened to the community, how participation worked k. How were the programmes implemented? and what systems were used? l. What were the strengths and weaknesses of each centre, both in terms of programming and capacity? m. What constraints or difficulties did the diocesan centres encounter? and how were they overcome?
Programme n. Were the programme’s activities successfully completed? o. Was relief provided irrespective of religious affiliation, caste or ethnicity? p. What was the impact of the programme? q. What is the beneficiaries opinion about the programme? r. Did the programme cause any insecurity or hostility in the community? s. How did the diocesan centres work with the relevant government officials and other NGOs? t. How did the programme incorporate issues of justice, peace and human rights
3. Team Composition The team shall comprise three people who would bring contextual knowledge, partnership experience and independence to the review. These shall be: a. Sri Lanka consultant with experience of the Church – Mannel Abyeratna b. Independent consultant with experience in humanitarian programmes, evaluation and review – Hugh Goyder c. CAFOD Asia Emergency Programme Officer – Alistair Dutton
4. Reporting The Review Team shall produce a report which shall comprise: a) an executive summary, b) key findings, and c) the main body of the report. To ensure that all concerned are involved in agreeing the final report, a first draft shall be emailed to SEDEC on 16th April. Comments on this draft should be returned to Hugh and Al by 30th April. A second draft shall then be sent to SEDEC by 5th May. Comments on the second draft should be returned to Hugh and al by 28 May. The final draft shall be sent to SEDEC on 4th June.
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5. Timetable Day Date Task End Nov Agree ToR and circulate to partners End Nov Brief Bishops & Diocesan Directors about the review Feb Mary lucas, Matthew and Al to meet Hugh Goyder in London for briefing, interviews of CAFOD staff and identification of key documents Mon 8-Mar Hugh & Al fly from London to Colombo Tues 9-Mar am: arrive Colombo, pm: review team meeting Wed 10-Mar Colombo - meetings & interviews with SEDEC Thurs 11-Mar am: fly to Jaffna. pm: begin interviews Fri 12-Mar Jaffna Sat 13-Mar Jaffna Sun 14-Mar am: 2hr drive to Vanni (Kilinochchi), pm: interviews Mon 15-Mar Vanni Tues 16-Mar Vanni Wed 17-Mar am: 2hr drive to Vavaniya Thurs 18-Mar Vavaniya Fri 19-Mar am: 3hr drive to Tincomalee, pm: meet staff Sat 20-Mar rest day Sun 21-Mar rest day Mon 22-Mar am: 6hr drive to Batticaloa; pm: interviews Tues 23-Mar Batticaloa Wed 24-Mar am: 2.5hr drive to Polonaruwa; interviews in border villages Thurs 25-Mar am: 1hr drive to Habarane; meetings with Annuradhapura diocesan staff Fri 26-Mar am: 6hr drive to Colombo; pm: meet SEDEC staff Sat 27-Mar organise & clarify initial findings, & prepare feedback Sun 28-Mar organise & clarify initial findings, & prepare feedback Mon 29-Mar Feedback of findings to Bishops, SEDEC staff, & all diocesan directors 16-Apr 1st draft of report to be emailed to SEDEC by 30-Apr 1st must be comment to be returned to Hugh and Al 5-May 2nd draft of report to be emailed to SEDEC 28-May 2nd comments to be returned to Hugh & Al 4-Jun Final report to be emailed to SEDEC
Interviews & focus groups shall be held with: a) Bishop chairman + 3 others northern & eastern bishops b) Diocesan directors, project officers, field officers & finance officers (past & present) c) Direct beneficiaries – disaggregated by age, gender, race, religion, caste d) Non-beneficiaries e) Local government & LTTE officials
K. Theivendirarajah and Al Dutton Colombo, Thursday, 29 January 2004
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APPENDIX 2
The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief
1 The Humanitarian imperative comes first
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility. The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.
2 Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind.
Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need alone Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint
Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and communities. Notwithstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of the recipients to those opinions. We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.
4 We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy
NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government,except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow
45 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments.
We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source.
5 We shall respect culture and custom We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities and countries we are working in.
6 We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities
All people and communities - even in disaster - possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and co-operate with local government structures where appropriate. We will place ahigh priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses. This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.
7 Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are involved in the design,management and implementation of the assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation programmes.
8 Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either in a positive or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes which actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long-term beneficiary dependence upon external aid.
9 We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources
We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves accountable to both constituencies. All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries
46 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 shall reflect an attitude of openness and transparency. We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance. We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.
10 In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While we will cooperate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance. We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.
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Appendix 3
Documents reviewed
SEDEC - Report of Backstopping Mission – (Bastian et al: 1997)
The Long Journey – Documentation on the Ethnic Conflict (Manel Abhayaratna)
Development Towards Peace ((Manel Abhayaratna 1999)
Jaffna – The Land of the Lute - N.M.Saveri 1996
The Role of Humanitarian Assistance in Promoting Peace & Reconciliation (unpublished paper, Caritas International, 1998)
SEDEC Reports: Dec 1994, 1995, 1996, 1999-2000, 2002-3: (1997-98, 2001 missing)
Internal CARITAS and CAFOD reports
Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies – Newsletter – Jan/Feb 1999
Nutrition Survey of Kilinochchi – Sept 1998
Situation Report – Kilinochchi – Sept 2003
Listening to the Displaced and Listening to the Returned – Summary Report (OXFAM/SCF -1998)
Second Series of Interviews in Oxfam Operational Areas of Northern Sri Lanka (Oxfam 1998)
NGOs & Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: a Case Study of Sri Lanka (D. Hulme , J. Goodhand & N. Lewer (IDPM, Manchester & University of Bradford 1999)
Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (ANNUAL REPORT 2002)
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Appendix 4 SEDEC Humanitarian Programme Review 1994-2004 Workshop 27-28 September 2004
Present: Fr Damian SEDEC Dir Ganesh HUDEC Vanni Theiva SEDEC R&R Johnson HUDEC Vanni Mithsuri SEDEC R&R Fr Jesurajah Valvuthayam (Manar) Quintus SEDEC R&R Fr Gilbert Sethsaviya (Anaradhapura) Shiva SEDEC Finance Punir EHED Batticaloa Fr Jayakumar HUDEC Jaffna Fr Francis EHED Trincomalee Fr Peter HUDEC Vanni
Objectives • To ensure that the report is understood and owned by SEDEC and the dioceses, and that it is taken as a starting point from which to make the transition from relief into rehabilitation and development. • To ensure that the conclusions and recommendations are included in the current strategic planning. By the end of Monday we will have agreed the report, and its conclusions and recommendations, having rectified any errors or omissions By the end of Tuesday we will have agreed specifically what SEDEC and the dioceses will do differently as a result of this review and how, and how it will be integrated into the current strategic planning
Day 1 – Agreeing the Report, Conclusions and Recommendations:
Programme In the the first day participants discussed their expectations:
Expectations
Expectations of the Workshop Expectations of the Review
• Understand the implications of the • Learning process
current peace for R&R & development • Course correction • Ensure the report is correct • Revalidate SEDEC’s humanitarian • Making the shift to meet future needs approach • Ensure recommendations are locally • Understand strengths & weaknesses appropriate • What will come out of it? • Report must not be (unduly) negative • Better understanding of the programme • Report must reflect the perspective of a ¾ Each other faith-based organisation ¾ Between SEDEC & the dioceses
• Integrate humanitarian work into the • Improved programme with better research strategic planning • Understand what can be improved? • Need for a national focus • Document Church’s role
• But underplays continuing need for rehabilitation
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Then in small groups they discussed:
• What were the things you thought most helpful about the report? • What did you object to in the report? • What do you think was factually incorrect in the report? • What did you think was missing from the report? • What were the most significant events from which we could learn how to improve our future response?
Agreeing the Report Following this the attendees agreed the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the report with few modifications. Some additional recommendations were made, particularly relating to the Bishops. Detailed comments were taken away by Hugh to be incorporated in a final draft. This will be circulated by 8 October 2004.
Recommendations Each of the participants was asked to say whether they strongly agreed, agreed or disagreed with the recommendations, and invited to comment on, or suggest any modifications to, them. A table of the recommendations and the number of votes for each category is given overleaf. A score of +3 was given for each person who strongly agreed with a recommendation, +1 for each who agreed, and –3 for those who disagreed. Thus an overall score was calculated for each recommendation and an order of priority decided.
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SEDEC Humanitarian Review 1994-2004 Ranking of Recommendations
Who? Recommendation Strongly Agree Reject Points Position Modifications & Comments Agree 31-3 Dioceses responsibility should be devolved to the Not voted most appropriate level (subsidiarity) on Dioceses provide staff development 12 0 36 1 Donors allow an emergency contingency fund 11 1 34 2 Dioceses vocational technical training 9 3 30 3 in all dioceses Dioceses Technical support for micro-finance 9 27 4 & other sectors (x4), already started in Apura Dioceses scale-up research & advocacy 6 6 24 5 with clarity & qualification SEDEC review NAP 7 3 24 5 & NPP (x4)/ NAP review Feb '05 SEDEC raise more resources in Sri Lanka 6 6 24 5 Caritas Asia training? Bishops provide induction training for new directors 6 5 23 6
Donors co-ordinate more effectively 5 7 22 7 Bishops give 6-year fixed-term contracts for DD 5 6 21 8 Donors underwrite SEDEC's core costs 6 2 20 9 SEDEC & dioceses (x2) Donors fund process of organisational change & 6 2 20 9 SEDEC & dioceses (x3) support Bishops review DD job content 5 6 1 18 10 focus on institutional & programme sutainability SEDEC ensure women hold positions at all levels in 3 8 17 11 women already hold 3 impotant posts the organisation SEDEC commission an organisational review 4 4 16 12 SEDEC & dioceses (x3)/ part of strategic planning? Dioceses review volunteer & school feeding prog 3 4 13 13 because of current context/ needs clarification (x2) Dioceses ensure women hold positions at all levels in 2 7 13 13 the organisation SEDEC professional (lay) programme manager at 3 6 1 12 14 national level Dioceses focus on smaller range of programmes 1 10 2 7 15 51 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final draft
Pros, Cons and Implementation of Recommendations 1. Dioceses and SEDEC to provide staff development Considered the most important priority, this was seen to involve staff development for everybody in the dioceses and SEDEC from top to bottom, including managemenet training, seminars, workshops and training of trainers. That said, no specific recommendations or plans were proposed and further work is needed to work out what is required. It is suggested by the review team that this should begin with a skills & capacity audit of SEDEC. This may then be compared to skills and capacity required in the forthcoming strategic plan, and the appropriate training, etc identified. 2. Donors to allow an emergency contingency fund Donor recommendations should be examined by the donors; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 3. Dioceses to provided vocational skills (technical) training This was not really addressed. There may have been some confusion as to whether vocational skills referred to staff development, or skills training for people outside SEDEC and the dioceses as was originally intended. 4. Dioceses and SEDEC to provide technical support for micro-finance The group welcomed this recommendation, believing that improving the quality of the dioceses’ micro-finance programmes would lead to more people becoming self-reliant. It was suggested that SEDEC should run a common training programme for all the dioceses, providing support and expertise to trainees. They would hope that this could begin by the end of 2004 but this would depend on donors’ willingness to support it. 5. Dioceses and SEDEC to scale-up research and advocacy While the group believed that the dioceses and SEDEC should increase the amount of research and advocacy they did, they thought that this would lead to more political interference in, and pressure on, the Church. This idea has been suggested before but the partners are not convinced. It remains to be seen how this will appear in the strategic plan. Technical assistance and support would be needed for the dioceses and SEDEC to do more research. Acknowledging that some advocacy was already being done, training and money would be needed if they were to do more. This could be done in six months, depending on the assistance provided. 6. SEDEC to review the National Animation Programme (and the National Peace-building Programme) With the intention of improving the professionalism of the National Animation Programme a review is planned for February 2005. A pre-review was held in Colombo from 20-24 September 2004, and a meeting to plan the integration of the national peace and animation programmes will be held on 27-28 October 2004. 7. SEDEC to raise more resources within Sri Lanka This was seen as a constructive suggestion as it would increase SEDEC and the dioceses’ own contributions to their projects, which would in turn give them greater autonomy. There are already some diocesan collections which support
Page 52 of 54 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final draft specific programmes but it was agreed that it would be good to look at raising more general funding for SEDEC and the dioceses from Sri Lankan Catholics. 8. Bishops to provide induction training for new Diocesan Directors The Bishops’ recommendations should be examined by the Bishops; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 9. Donors to co-ordinate more effectively Donor recommendations should be examined by the donors; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 10. Bishops to give 6-year, fixed-term contracts for Diocesan Directors The Bishops’ recommendations should be examined by the Bishops; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 11. Donors to underwrite SEDEC’s & the dioceses core costs 12. Donors to fund the process of organisational change and support Both these recommendations should be examined by the donors; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 13. Bishops to review Diocesan Directors job content The Bishops’ recommendations should be examined by the Bishops; they were not discussed in detail in this workshop. 14. SEDEC, the dioceses and Bishops to ensure that women hold positions at all levels of the organisation All three groups discussed this recommendation and strongly agreed with it. Particular steps to increase the number of women at all levels of SEDEC and the dioceses which were suggested include: increasing the commitment to practical and workable terms for women; including women in decision making; giving women equal chances for training and promotion in the field; and involving women in the leadership of the organisations. These, it was thought, could begin immediately. That said, it was felt by some that women are not able to hold some positions because of security, travelling at night, etc. Within SEDEC, five out of eight of the heads of unit are women, and 10 of the 20 programme staff are women. 15. SEDEC and the dioceses to commission an organisational review Since the review took place in March an organisational review has been commissioned as part of the 5-year strategic planning that will be complete by March 2005. It is foreseen that this will help SEDEC and the dioceses to develop further, and will increase their impact. The timescale of this planning, however, is seen to be rather tight and longer will be required for the plan to be accepted at all levels of the organisation. In consultation with the Board of Directors and the Justice and Peace Commission, SEDEC have reaffirmed their role in coordination and facilitation, rather than implementation. The strategic planning is focussing on: a) staff competence and capacity, b) salaries and benefits, c) structural changes based on functional requirements, & d) future directions for the next 5 years. This last area will be addressed by examining: where were we? to where do we want to get? and how do we get there?
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16. Dioceses to review the school feeding and volunteer programmes Recognising the need to gradually phase out these programmes in the future, HUDEC have already done a small review of them which concluded that they are still needed., but many donors may feel these programmes are no longer appropriate. Political situation permitting, HUDEC intends to review the school feeding and volunteer programmes again in 2005. It is currently foreseen that the programmes will be required until 2006. 17. SEDEC to appoint professional (lay) programme managers at national level It was felt that the need for this should be confirmed by the strategic planning process before any more is done on this. 18. Dioceses to focus on smaller range of programmes This was not addressed. 19. SEDEC and the dioceses should ensure that responsibility is devolved to the lowest level at which it can be exercised (subsidiarity) This was a late addition and was therefore not addressed by the groups.
Alistair Dutton Hugh Goyder Humanitarian Officer Consultant CAFOD CAFOD
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