SEDEC Humanitarian Programme Review 1994 – 2004 Hugh Goyder with Alistair Dutton and Sus Abhayaratna October 2004 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 Table of contents page Executive Summary…………………………………………………………3 1.Background and Methodology……………………………………………8 2.Introduction…………………………………………………………………9 3.History of the church’s work in the conflict: 3.1: The impact of the conflict on the church (1990-2000)…………. ..10 3.2 The transition to peace (2002-4)……………………………………..17 3.3 Conclusions from Historical Review………………………….……..17 4 The church’s response: 4.1 Over view of SEDEC’s humanitarian work………………………......18 4.2 The major programmes supported by the Church.………………….19 4.3 Current programme issues…………………………….…………….. 21 4.3.1.Health ………………………………………………………………….21 4.3.2. Education…………………………………………………………… 22 4.3.3. Volunteer programmes……………………………………………… 22 4.3.4 School feeding - the ‘porridge’ programme………………………...23 4.3.5 Microcredit…………………………………………………………….24 4.4. Other programmes of the church: 4.4.1: Peace building………………………………………………………..26 4.4.2 The National Animation Programme………………………………...27 5.Assessment of the church’s humanitarian work in relation to the Code of Conduct of the International Red Cross…………………..29 6. The present: the changing context and future challenges…………….32 6.1. The Diocesan Centres…………………………………………………..33 6.2 : Organisational issues: SEDEC and the Dioceses………………….. 34 6.3 SEDEC and its donors: the case for a new Partnership……………...36 Overall Conclusions…………………………………………………………..37 Recommendations…………………………………………………………… 39 Appendix 1: Terms of Reference……………………………………………42 Appendix 2: International Red Cross Code of Conduct…………………..45 Appendix 3: Documents Reviewed………………………………………….48 Appendix 4: Feedback Workshop Report…………………………………..49 2 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 Executive Summary The purpose of this Review is to document the humanitarian work of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka in response to the long running civil conflict between the Government and the LTTE. The review aims to document both the successes and the struggles of the church in working on both sides of the conflict, to discuss its current programmes, and draw relevant conclusions . A review of this kind has been planned since 2001 and was undertaken at the request of SEDEC by three consultants- Sus Abhayaratna (local consultant), Alistair Dutton (CAFOD), and Hugh Goyder (independent consultant ) in March 2004, and involved visits to SEDEC in Colombo and six different Diocesan Centres as well as a review of relevant documentation. The review was conducted during the preparations for national elections, and at a time of particular uncertainty in the east of the country due to a split in the LTTE’s leadership. Prior to the finalization of the report the review team’s findings were discussed in detail by both SEDEC and Diocesan staff at a meeting in Colombo. The review suggests that the church has played a number of different roles - protection, humanitarian relief, and assistance with rehabilitation, especially with respect to shelter and income generation. There were internal tensions in SEDEC in the 1980s when the Northern bishops set up their own relief organisation, and the report documents how it was able to re-unite following the JVP-instigated violence in the south in 1989. Since then the church has been able to bridge the ethnic divide between the Tamils and Sinhalese and to maintain a dialogue with both sides. It has also been active in advocacy in favour of peace, both nationally and internationally, and different Bishops have been involved both in the negotiations that led up to the current MOU, and also in attempts to mediate in the more recent splits within the LTTE with a view to avoiding further violence. Section 3.1 documents the impact of the conflict both on the different dioceses and on SEDEC as a whole, and reviews briefly first the intense fighting in the East from 1989-92 and then the more protracted battles in the North from about 1994 onwards. At every stage the church was not a neutral observer to the conflict, but was itself a victim of it, as symbolised by the attacks on individual priests, Diocesan offices, and the shrine at Madhu in November 1999. Yet it succeeded in maintaining a delicate balance between the Government and the Northern Dioceses which wanted the Church to be publicly critical of many actions taken by the Security Forces. As government restrictions on the movement of supplies tightened the church could only get relief supplies through if it maintained close working relationships with the Ministry of Defence. Even so in late 1995, following the recapture of Jaffna by the army, there were strong feelings expressed in the Sri Lankan media against all NGOs working in the north which were perceived as aiding the Tamil cause, and two priests from HUDEC were imprisoned. The conflict continued with varying intensity until 2001, and in late 1998 and early 1999 SEDEC was also active in mobilising relief for the victims of floods. The 3 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 conclusion of this historical review is that in spite of all the difficulties both SEDEC and the Dioceses were able to maintain the trust of both sides, and that this must be seen as a considerable achievement. Section 4 then reviews the church ‘s humanitarian response to the conflict., with a financial analysis of the different international appeals and a review of the major programmes supported. While in the humanitarian sector internationally there is a tendency for agencies to become more specialist, one feature of SEDEC and the dioceses is that they have always responded comprehensively, meeting a wide range of needs from the beginning to the end of life – for example from the training of midwives and supporting pre- schools to funeral expenses, and from immediate welfare grants to micro- credit . A second feature of their approach has been its continuity: other agencies have scaled their activities up or down over the last 10 years, and after the MOU some of the relief agencies, like MSF, left the conflict areas in the north, but SEDEC’s humanitarian programme has continued with only minor changes. The report then discusses the different programmes undertaken. In education and health, the church has now been paying the stipends of volunteers for many years, and the report recommends that SEDEC needs to do more research and local advocacy to see how it can reduce its funding for these volunteers and ideally get them proper government contracts. The use of such volunteers made much sense at the height of the conflict, and has also been a useful stopgap measure in the two years since the MOU, but is clearly not a programme that donors will be able to fund indefinitely. The value of the church’s long standing school feeding programme is acknowledged, but the report also questions how long this too can be supported. The review documents some of the positive impacts of the microcredit programme during the conflict, including its impact on widows who were previously seen as having a very low social status. It is suggested that the church should review both the size of loans offered and the arrangements for enabling group members to withdraw their savings. SEDEC’s Peace Building and National Animation Programmes, which complement the church’s humanitarian work are then briefly reviewed. Since a Review of the NAP is already planned, the report suggests that this Review might address both the impact of the current programme and wider issues around animation as a development strategy. A similar external review of the church’s important efforts with regard to peace building is also recommended. One issue for such a review to explore would be whether the exchange programmes may have been more successful so far in improving relations between the Tamils and Sinhalese than in addressing the increasing tensions between the Buddhists and Christians in the south, and the Christians and Muslims in the East. Section 5 reviews the church’s programme in Sri Lanka against an accepted international standard - the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief. This section concludes that when assessed by this code, the church’s humanitarian work 4 SEDEC Humanitarian Review: final report October 2004 has performed strongly. The principle of non-discrimination in targeting is seen as especially important, and in relation to this the Review found that the church has a strong reputation but that in the current volatile religious context of Sri Lanka it needs to back this up with a communications strategy so that leaders of other faiths, the wider public, and the media are all clear about its position. A further question raised during the Review is how long after the end of a conflict its ‘victims’ should be specially targeted, and singled out for benefits, as opposed to others from equally poor or even poorer backgrounds. Section 6.1 then discusses the current context in which each Diocese is working, and explores both the similarities and differences between the different dioceses. The new feature since the MOU for all the Dioceses is the huge increase in the number of NGOs, and in the North the TRO is trying to increase the control over the activities of NGOs at community level. The continuing tensions between the Christian and Muslim communities in the East suggests a need for EHED to improve its abilities to both pre-empt and react quickly to future incidents, which will require it to have sufficient emergency funds at its disposal for such quick responses. Section 6.2 then explores the generic strengths and weaknesses of the DC’s on the basis of SWOT exercises carried out with each Diocese. The common strengths are seen as low overheads, committed staff with valuable local knowledge, a strong reputation for responding quickly to a wide variety of relief needs, and a diverse range of programmes covering food, health, education, and shelter.