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Predicting the Impact of Health States on Well-Being: Explanations and Remedies for Biased Judgments

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Predicting the Impact of Health States on Well-Being: Explanations and Remedies for Biased Judgments City Research Online City, University of London Institutional Repository Citation: Walsh, E. (2009). Predicting the Impact of Health States on Well-being: Explanations and Remedies for Biased Judgments. (Unpublished Doctoral thesis, City, University of London) This is the accepted version of the paper. This version of the publication may differ from the final published version. Permanent repository link: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/18257/ Link to published version: Copyright: City Research Online aims to make research outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to. 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City Research Online: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/ [email protected] Predicting the Impact of Health States on Well-being: Explanations and Remedies for Biased Judgments Emma Walsh Thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy City University, London Table of Contents Table of Contents ........................................................................................................ 2 List of Tables ............................................................................................................... 7 List of Figures ............................................................................................................. 8 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................... 10 Declaration ................................................................................................................ 11 Abstract ..................................................................................................................... 12 Chapter 1 : Main Introduction .................................................................................. 13 1.1 Affective Forecasting and the Impact Bias ......................................................... 14 1.2 The Impact Bias for Health States ....................................................................... 15 1.3 Implications of Biased Affective Forecasts ........................................................ 16 1.4 Explanations for Biased Affective Forecasts ...................................................... 18 1.5 Causes of Bias in Judged Impact of Health States .............................................. 21 1.6 Summary and Thesis Aims ................................................................................. 24 1.7 Chapter Overviews .............................................................................................. 27 1.8 References ........................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 2 : What is Happiness and How is it Measured? ....................................... 37 2.1 Definitions of Happiness ..................................................................................... 38 2.2 Comparison of Happiness Judgments ................................................................. 41 2.3 Measuring Well-being ......................................................................................... 42 2.4 References ........................................................................................................... 46 Chapter 3 : What Would it be Like for Me and for You? Judged Impact of Chronic Health Conditions on Happiness ..................................................... 49 3.1 Abstract ............................................................................................................... 51 3.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 53 3.3 Method ................................................................................................................ 56 3.3.1 Design .......................................................................................................... 56 3.3.2 Participants .................................................................................................. 57 3.3.3 Procedure ..................................................................................................... 57 Defocusing Control Group ................................................................................ 57 2 Life Domain Defocusing Group ........................................................................ 58 Diary Defocusing Group ................................................................................... 58 3.4 Results ................................................................................................................. 59 3.4.1 Actual Happiness ......................................................................................... 59 3.4.2 Defocusing Health Conditions ..................................................................... 59 3.4.3 Accuracy of Predicted Impact of Health Conditions ................................... 61 Accuracy of Not-haves ...................................................................................... 61 Accuracy of Haves ............................................................................................ 62 3.4.4 Haves’ Awareness of Impact Bias ................................................................ 62 3.4.5 Differences in Self/Other Predictions .......................................................... 63 Not-haves’ Predictions ...................................................................................... 63 Haves’ predictions ............................................................................................. 65 3.4.6 Swapping Health Conditions ........................................................................ 65 3.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................... 68 3.6 References ........................................................................................................... 72 3.7 Appendix ............................................................................................................. 75 Chapter 4 : Health, Wealth and Happiness: Is the Focusing Illusion Responsible for Biased Affective Forecasts? ...................................................................... 77 4.1 Abstract ............................................................................................................... 79 4.2 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 80 4.3 Study 1: Judging the Impact of a Negative Event on Happiness ........................ 83 4.3.1 Method .......................................................................................................... 84 4.3.1.1 Design ................................................................................................... 84 4.3.1.2 Participants ............................................................................................ 84 4.3.1.3 Procedure ............................................................................................... 84 4.3.2 Results .......................................................................................................... 86 4.3.3 Discussion .................................................................................................... 88 4.4 Study 2: Judging the Impact of a Negative Event on Quality of Life ................. 90 4.4.1 Method .......................................................................................................... 90 4.4.1.1 Design ................................................................................................... 90 4.4.1.2 Participants ............................................................................................ 91 3 4.4.1.3 Procedure ............................................................................................... 91 4.4.2 Results & Discussion .................................................................................... 92 4.5 Study 3: Judging the Impact of a Positive Event on Happiness .......................... 95 4.5.1 Method .......................................................................................................... 96 4.5.1.1 Design ................................................................................................... 96 4.5.1.2 Participants ............................................................................................ 96 4.5.1.3 Procedure ............................................................................................... 96 4.5.2 Results & Discussion .................................................................................... 96 4.6 Study 4: Life Domain Defocusing with a Negative Event .................................. 98 4.6.1 Method ........................................................................................................ 100 4.6.1.1 Design ................................................................................................. 100 4.6.1.2 Participants .........................................................................................
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