Hannah Arendt's Political Action: a Dialectic of Expression and Deliberation

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Hannah Arendt's Political Action: a Dialectic of Expression and Deliberation Loyola University Chicago Loyola eCommons Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 2018 Hannah Arendt's Political Action: A Dialectic of Expression and Deliberation Paul Richard Leisen Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Leisen, Paul Richard, "Hannah Arendt's Political Action: A Dialectic of Expression and Deliberation" (2018). Dissertations. 3347. https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3347 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License. Copyright © 2018 Paul Richard Leisen LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO HANNAH ARENDT’S POLITICAL ACTION: A DIALECTIC OF EXPRESSION AND DELIBERATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY BY PAUL R. LEISEN CHICAGO, IL DECEMBER 2018 Copyright by Paul R. Leisen, 2018 All rights reserved. “I’ll have grounds more relative than this–the play’s the thing Wherein I’ll catch the conscience of the King.” —Wm. Shakespeare, Hamlet, III.i.603 (RS 1159) ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am fortunate to acknowledge the following people for their support and commitment to my work. Without their guidance, love, and shared investment, this project would not have come to fruition. KellyAnn Corcoran’s love and unwavering belief made the pursuit of this work possible. Our children: Betty, Matthias, Penelope, and Sven grew up as this project developed, they have known Hannah Arendt’s name for as long as they can remember. These five are for me, a philosophy of the family. My parents Richard and Rhea Leisen made a loving home, and set a table that gave their children a view towards the better world Arendt imagines. My sister Dr. Mary Beth Leisen was especially supportive of my early efforts. My brother Peter Leisen and his son Dalton Leisen supported me as well, working to allow me to travel from Iowa to Chicago to complete necessary program requirements. The Chicago fringe theater community, especially the Curious Theatre Branch, the writers, creators, makers, and artists shaped my thought and raised questions. Professors Andrew Cutrofello, David Schweickart, and David Ingram were my teachers. They were generous and persistent supporters throughout my graduate career. That which shines forth in this work owes its clarity to their kind instruction and insight. As dissertation director, David Ingram patiently curated my struggle to clarify the basis for a life’s work. I wish for all students to have such teachers. Dr. Nicoletta Ruane shared encouraging words and conversations throughout the process. Finally: during a crucial late period of rewriting, Ms. Joni King’s delight and kindness, our conversation and friendship, helped me to clarify core issues in the final chapters. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................... iv INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1 CHAPTER ONE: ARENDT’S PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND AND HER PHENOMENOLOGY OF LABOR AND WORK .....................................................................24 CHAPTER TWO: ARENDT’S CONCEPT OF POLITICAL ACTION ......................................43 CHAPTER THREE: THE SOCIAL POLITICAL DIVIDE AS UNDERSTOOD BY ARENDT AND HER CRITICS .................................................................................................57 CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONCEPT OF GLORY AS UNDERSTOOD BY ARENDT AND HER CRITICS; EXAMINING EXPRESSION ................................................................88 CHAPTER FIVE: PROMISING RELATED TO ARENDT’S THEMES ON REVOLUTION....................................................................................................................106 CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND REVIEW: THE ACTOR AND SPECTATOR, RETROSPECTIVE JUDGMENT AND PRACTICAL DELIBERATION .............................120 BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................................142 VITA ............................................................................................................................................147 v INTRODUCTION What follows seeks to clarify Hannah Arendt’s famous exhortation “to think what we are doing” (HC 5) by means of exploring a resolution to an ongoing interpretive controversy focused on her expressive and deliberative forms of political action. If this clarification succeeds, various criticisms that cast doubt on Arendt’s political philosophy will have to be reconsidered. Thusly reconciled, an expressive-deliberative interpretation may open new avenues for the continued application of Arendt’s political philosophy in conditions of accelerating fragmentation.1 Arendt’s deceptively simple exhortation, upon close reading, reveals a thread that may be followed through a selection of her most famous works, The Human Condition, On Revolution, and other essays. Following this thread leads to a resolution of the thesis. This line of thought will help to draw together disparate commentators such as Dana Villa, David Ingram, Juergen Habermas, Jane Mansbridge, and others. Arendt’s persistent fascination with drama will here be referenced. Her ‘dramaturgy’ may be shown to be closely associated with what are traditionally considered as expressly political concerns.2 Arendt has encouraged us to “think without bannisters” (RPW 336). In so doing she urges us to contest the limits of traditional categories, confronted as we are with new political challenges. Examining the above commentators in light of the thesis will provide opportunities to do so. 1Recent events suggest that fragmentation may furthermore be driving an aberrant contest between globalization and a form of nativist authoritarianism in the U.S. and parts of Europe—the excesses of expression and the reticence of deliberation are coming into sharper focus. 2Different approaches to Arendt’s work make use of the social sciences to support their interpretations. Here, select elements of Arendt’s dramaturgy will be considered. 1 2 Abstract and Argument: Summary of the Problem and Commentators’ Responses Commentators disagree about what Hannah Arendt means by political action. This has led some, Dana Villa for example, to suggest that Arendt’s theory is “hopelessly at odds” with itself (AH 59). One interpretation, offered by Richard Bernstein emphasizes that political action is rational deliberation; in another interpretation Arendt identifies political action with expressiveness or the performative expression of personal virtuosity and greatness. Both interpretations taken separately are unsatisfactory. Rational deliberation with others appears to be less what Arendt might refer to as vita activa and more vita contemplativa, or more reflective. If we think of political action along these deliberative lines: as reason-giving oriented toward establishing the truth or rightness of norms-then it would appear to be bound by common conventions of reasoning and inasmuch fails to satisfy the utterly original and free interruption that Arendt says it is. Conversely, if we think of political action as a subjective expression or performance of the identity of the actor and agonal display of her virtuosity (glory or greatness), then it seems divorced from the content of political life, which is to secure agreement among others to act together and thereby generate political power. Each of the above interpretations separately captures only one aspect of what Arendt means by political action. The deliberative model captures the aspect of constituting political power through collective agreement based on reason-giving (combining a plurality into a polity). The expressive model captures the aspect of natality, originality, spontaneity, and freedom from conventional ways of reasoning. As Villa argues, these opposing interpretations appear to be irreconcilable, so that Arendt appears to make contradictory (AH 55) claims about political action. The deliberative model 3 would seem not to be insulated from instrumental action, viz. deliberation about means and ends. Alternately, the expressive model, as described by Arendt, appears to be totally divorced from instrumental action and means-ends deliberation, as if it were “self-contained,” existing only for itself, (i.e., as if the only reason for engaging in it was expression of individual distinction). Thesis The deliberative and expressive models of Hannah Arendt’s political action can be reconciled contrary to a claim that her theory is incoherent. The key to this argument is that the expressive interpretation also focuses on how political action exemplifies an objective principle, not merely the subjective quality of the actor. Villa notes this but focuses only on principles that exemplify subjective-attribute principles, such as courage and freedom. But Arendt, in On Revolution and elsewhere, explicitly asserts that the principle expressed is the objective norm of promise-making and promise-keeping. Promise- making/keeping implies a weak normative rule—implying free consent among equals to cooperate together
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