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Home , Civic virtue, Michael Sandel, Res publica

C i v i c V i r t u e always under that description. One might argue, for example, that a failure in the F r a n k L o v e t t necessary congruence ultimately doomed soviet-style communism, and some (commu- Any discussion of civic must begin with nitarians especially) worry that widespread the meaning of virtue in general. A virtue, on liberal individualism is gradually eroding the the standard view at least since , is a institutional foundations of liberal as settled disposition exhibiting type-specific well. Though he did not use the expression excellence. Thus, for example, since the central “,” the problem of congruence was purpose of a knife is to cut things, it is a virtue absolutely central to the third part of Rawls’s A in knives to be sharp. Similarly, one might Theory of . In the mainstream tradition argue, since sociability is an important of western political thought, however, the characteristic of human beings, it is a human importance of civic virtue most strongly reso- virtue to be disposed to form friendships. To be nated among writers associated with what is a genuine virtue, of course, this disposition usually called the “classical republican” political must be firmly settled or resilient: much as it tradition. would detract from the virtuosity of an excep- The classical republicans were a diverse tionally sharp knife if its edge dulled after a group of political writers, including among single use, so too would it detract from the others Machiavelli and his fifteenth-century virtue of a human being if he or she were only a Italian predecessors; the English republicans fair-weather friend. Civic are a species Milton, Harrington, and Sidney; of human virtue – specifically, they are those and Blackstone; the eighteenth-century English settled dispositions in human beings that men; many Americans of the exhibit the excellences relevant to membership founding era such as Jefferson and Madison; in a political community. Put another way, civic and some later observers such as Tocqueville. virtue is simply the character of a good citizen. These writers were all committed to the What are the qualities of good ? political ideal of a , where this was Our answer, as Aristotle observed, is partly understood roughly as a community of citizens relative to the community in question. This is governed by a shared system of in which no because civic virtues are connected to the one person or group holds personal mastery problem of stability. Every political order will over any other. In the classic expression of through various means tend to engender James Harrington, such a community would certain dispositions of character in the individ- constitute an “empire of and not of men” uals living out their lives under its auspices: the (1992: 8). Perhaps because the classical repub- issue is whether those dispositions ultimately licans often found themselves living in unstable turn out to be congruent with the political and failing, or new and untested , they order generating them. In the long run, developed a particular fascination with the presumably, no political order can be stable problem of stability. In their writings, the unless it tends to engender a pattern of disposi- expression “civic virtue” (often simply “virtue”) tions that largely supports, rather than under- refers to the dispositions of character necessary mines, its various distinctive institutions and specifically for the long-term maintenance and practices. In this broad sense, every political stability of what Machiavelli called a well- doctrine (liberal, authoritarian, socialist, etc.) ordered ( republica bene ordinata). The will have an interest in civic virtue, though not classical republicans were concerned with

The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0147 2 finding those institutions and practices that possible, whereas after Caesar was assassi- might reliably cultivate civic virtue, so under- nated, it was not? The difference lay in the stood. Conversely, they were also concerned presence of civic virtue in the former case, and with avoiding those institutions and practices its absence in the latter. As the authors of Cato’s that would cultivate the opposite – that is, dis- Letters later put it, the “Roman virtue and … positions of character inimical to the long-run Roman expired together” (Trenchard & stability of a well-ordered republic. These they Gordon 1995 : 195). From this shared starting generally describe as “corruption.” point, the civic republicans go on to account Despite the strong association between for the importance of civic virtue in widely civic virtue and the classical republican tradi- varying degrees of depth and specificity. tion, the problem of stability is a perfectly Broadly speaking, three dimensions to civic general one. It is thus unfortunate in a way virtue were commonly discussed, each that the classical republicans settled on such corresponding to a specific danger facing any aggressively moralistic language as “civic well-ordered republic. virtue” and “corruption,” since this gives an The first and perhaps most obvious danger impression that they were committed to a facing any republic is conquest and subjugation strenuously heroic ideal of citizenship simply by a foreign power. This danger was particu- incompatible with the conditions of diverse larly acute in the highly competitive security and complex modern societies. In fact, it is environment faced by -states in the ancient presently a subject of debate just how heroic world and in Italy, though it never the classical republican doctrine was meant to fully receded from view among the later repub- be, as we shall see. Before considering that licans in and America. Size and wealth modern debate, however, the views of the both contribute to security, of course, but as classical republicans themselves should exam- the classical republicans were fond of pointing ined in greater detail, since it is from the out, history was replete with examples of small classical republican tradition (usually via republics defeating much larger and wealthier Tocqueville) that nearly all contemporary kingdoms. The explanation seemed to be that discussions derive. citizens of a well-ordered republic are poten- tially more willing to fight for their community Civic Virtue and Classical than mercenaries or oppressed subjects. Defense against external dangers, therefore, involved designing republican institutions and All classical republicans subscribed to practices such that they inspire this sort of Machiavelli’s dictum that “just as for the main- patriotic on the part of the citizens. tenance of good customs laws are required, so Not all dangers to the republic are external, if laws are to be observed, there is need of good however; no less serious is the danger of customs.” From this interconnection of insti- internal regime change – the overthrow of tutional order and civic culture it follows that republican institutions by ambitious authori- “it is difficult, or rather impossible, either to tarian elites. This was precisely the fate of the maintain a republican form of government in , and also the fate of many states which have become corrupt or to create of the Renaissance Italian city-republics, such a form afresh” (Machiavelli 1983 : 160, including Florence. While intelligent constitu- 164). In support of this contention, the civic tional design can partially reduce this danger, republicans nearly always followed Machiavelli the ultimate safeguard must lie in a sufficient in citing the pre-eminent example of . degree of political engagement on the part of How was it, they asked, that in the very same the citizens themselves. Positions of authority city after the Tarquins were expelled, the estab- in a republic, no less than in any other sort of lishment of a well-ordered republic was regime, come with discretionary powers that 3 can be wielded for or against the common maintain a robust . This cannot be good. So long as a sufficient number of respon- done unless the citizens by and large respect sible and capable citizens remain duly informed the law, both in letter and spirit, and the shared of public affairs, supervise the holders of public institutions and practices of the republic gener- office in the conduct of their duties, and offer ally. Correspondingly, in addition to courage themselves for public service when necessary, and public engagement, the list of citizen vir- there will be little scope for the ambitious to tues must be extended to include some degree usurp public authorities to their own end. of moderation and restraint in pressing private Once political apathy becomes widespread, or factional claims. This need not involve the however, constitutional safeguards alone will complete subordination of private interests to not be sufficient. Indeed, as the Medici in the common good, as some have mistakenly Florence for example demonstrated, the out- believed. Factionalism as such is not always a ward form of republican institutions can easily problem for the republic, provided that enough be preserved as a cover for authori- everyone remains willing to play by the tarian rule. Thus Alamanno Rinuccini, in a accepted rules: indeed, differences of opinion lament typical of the classical republicans, are often conducive to healthy public debate as observed that only “the arrogance of a few Milton, for example, argued in his Areopagitica . overbearing individuals and the apathy of the The danger arises when people begin to regard rest of the citizens” permitted the Medici to those rules strategically, as mere instruments “usurp the power of all. Their impulses and for advancing their private aims. From here it is ambitions decide everything, while almost no only a short step to dispensing with the rules authority is left to the councils or the people” altogether whenever they are found to hinder (Rinuccini 1978 : 205). those aims. Left unchecked, the spread of such Courage and a spirit of public engagement attitudes will undermine public confidence in often run together and support one another, of the rule of law, and the republic will slide into course. On the one hand, active participation anarchy. Things rarely go that far, of course, can engender a devotion to republican institu- since disorder incidentally increases the danger tions, while on the other, courage is sometimes of conquest or regime change, either of which necessary in putting oneself forward for public would cut short the natural life of the republic service. For the classical republicans, these anyway. two virtues were jointly exemplified in the In articulating the importance of civic virtue, tragic figure of , whose devotion to the it is noteworthy that the authors discussed Roman Republic was such that he continued draw almost exclusively on classical sources to defend her institutions long after it was rather than Christian ones. While the Christian politically safe to do so, ultimately at the cost tradition certainly contained resources for an of his life. His De Officiis, which adamantly account of civic virtue (in Aquinas’s discussion insists on the duty of capable citizens to engage of the virtue of justice, for instance), the in the public life of their republic, was enor- classical republicans were generally true to mously popular in the early modern period: it their Renaissance humanistic roots in eschew- was the first non-religious book published on ing such material. Indeed, some went even a printing press (in 1465 at Mainz), and it was further. Machiavelli suggested that, at least as long a best seller. historically interpreted, might be Apart from conquest and regime change, inimical to maintaining a well-ordered every well-ordered republic faces a third republic. “Our religion has glorified humble danger as well: namely, internal disorder. In and contemplative men, rather than men of order to remain a community of citizens in action,” he writes. “It has assigned as man’s which no one person or group holds personal highest good humility,” and where it demands mastery over any other, every republic must strength, “what it asks for is strength to suffer 4 rather than strength to do bold things” 1996 : 196). While Marchamont Nedham and (Machiavelli 1983 : 278). James Harrington generally agreed with Despite a broad consensus on the three main Machiavelli, other English republicans such as dimensions of civic virtue, the classical repub- Henry Vane and John Milton did not, fearing licans vociferously disagreed on how civic that their country at any rate was not ready for virtue might best be encouraged and effica- a commonwealth government. In this they ciously employed. The fundamental issue, were no doubt correct, though it is doubtful recall, is one of congruence – of settling on a that an aristocratic republic of those commit- configuration of institutions and practices that ted to the “good old cause” would have fared will tend to engender the desired dispositions much better. Eventually, of course, it was the (courage, public engagement, and respect for democratic view that won out in the tradition. the law), while also being consistent with one When it comes to nurturing civic-minded another and with the overarching aim of con- dispositions, there is simply no substitute for stituting a genuine empire of law. Broadly involving people in the political process, and speaking, three strategies for securing such any lingering doubts on this score were effec- congruence are available: first, one might select tively erased through Tocqueville’s portrait of institutions that inspire virtue; second, one the broadly inclusive and effective American might design institutions to economize on the . stock of virtue readily available; third and A second debate concerned the appropriate finally, one might attempt to inculcate virtue place of commerce in a well-ordered republic. (through education, religion, public mythology, The concern expressed by many classical etc.) so as to bridge any gap left by the former republicans was that commerce would spread two methods. Among the many debates luxury throughout , and that luxury concerning optimal institutional design, four would promote political apathy and sap martial are especially worthy of note. courage as private material pursuits draw citi- The first of these concerned the important zens away from an interest in public affairs. issue of political inclusiveness. Roughly Here the opening chapter of ’s Bellum speaking, the classical republicans distin- Catilinae was widely influential. According to guished between democratic republics on the his diagnosis, so long as virtue and republican one hand, with a broad citizenship base and government went together, Rome flourished – power-sharing among the various social vanquishing great kingdoms and empires, classes, and aristocratic republics on the other, bringing the entire ancient world under her with a narrow citizenship base and power con- dominion. Alas, this very success later brought centrated in the hands of a relatively small elite. luxury in its train, and public virtue steadily , Rome, and Florence were often cited as decayed until eventually the republic failed. examples of the former, and Venice Fearful of this prospect, some classical republi- as examples of the latter. Initially, the impres- cans followed Machiavelli in believing that sive durability of Sparta and Venice inclined “well-ordered republics have to keep the public observers such as Francesco Guicciardini to rich but their citizens poor” (1983: 201); this favor the aristocratic option. Machiavelli was the view of many English republicans such emphatically rejected this line, however, as Nedham and Sidney, and to some extent it arguing that the only way to inspire the courage survived later in the agrarian idealism of and public engagement required to support . From the beginning, how- republican institutions was to incorporate all ever, there was also a contrary view. The social classes into a broad-based democratic Florentine republican Leonardo Bruni, for republic. As later said, “men example, believed that commercial wealth was can no otherwise be engaged to take care of the perfectly compatible with civic virtue, and public, than by having … a part in it” (Sidney indeed beneficial to the health of a republic, 5 insofar as it provides a basis for generosity and equality must constitute the basis for any liberality. Among eighteenth-century republi- well-ordered republic. cans such as the authors of Cato’s Letters and The dispute concerned what, if anything, Montesquieu this latter view came increasingly should be done about the danger of excessive to predominate over the former. Provided that inequality, and especially, whether it was a it not lead to excessive inequality (see below), good idea to introduce policies of redistribu- responsible commercial activity could improve tion with the explicit aim of holding that manners, spread useful knowledge, and inequality within bounds. Cicero famously strengthen republics without necessarily weak- believed the cure worse than the disease, ening civic virtue. This line of reasoning explicitly blaming the advocacy of so-called reaches its apotheosis in Alexander Hamilton’s “agrarian laws” by the Gracchi brothers for ini- vision of a muscular commercial republic in tiating the decline of the Roman Republic into the Federalist Papers , no. 11. disorder. While Machiavelli recognized that The issue of commerce and luxury is some- Cicero’s analysis was naive, and that the under- times confused with another debate in the tra- lying inequality itself was the real problem, he dition concerning inequality. Independent of a was pessimistic about its ever being addressed: community’s overall degree of wealth and “to restore equality it is necessary to take steps commercial activity, most classical republicans which are by no means normal,” he feared, “and recognized a connection between equality and this few people either know how to do or are civic virtue on the one hand, inequality and ready to do” (Machiavelli 1983 : 160). It was corruption on the other. Whereas luxury thus left to James Harrington to bite this undermines public-spiritedness by inducing particular bullet and embrace the redistribu- apathy, inequality undermines respect for the tive measures necessary to set republics on a law by inducing factionalism. Citizens will only sound footing. For this he was roundly attacked respect the laws, institutions, and practices of by his immediate contemporaries – John their republic insofar as they can plausibly view Milton and Henry Vane among others – but themselves as participants in a fair system of later republicans such as Henry Neville, the cooperation for mutual benefit. Excessive authors of Cato’s Letters , and Montesquieu inequality can render this difficult to do. On more or less came around to his view: a suitable the one hand, the wealthy and powerful may balance between perfect equality and extreme come to regard themselves as so secure in their inequality had to be maintained one way or position that they can disregard the accepted another if a well-ordered republic was to sur- rules; on the other hand, the poor and weak vive. The difficulty was to reconcile the deeply may come to regard the accepted rules as so controversial measures securing this balance unfair that they would welcome change at any with the need to prevent excessive faction- cost. Summing up this worry, the authors of alism. It was in the hopes of cutting this Cato’s Letters observe that “the first seeds of Gordian knot that Madison famously sug- anarchy … are produced from hence, that gested, in the Federalist Papers, no. 10, that a some are ungovernably rich, and many more large republic might diffuse the problem by are miserably poor; that is, some are masters of multiplying, and thus fragmenting, political all means of oppression, and others want all factions. means of self-defense” (Trenchard & Gordon This brings us to a fourth area of dispute 1995 : 44). With each faction pressing its inter- among the classical republicans – namely, the ests through any means at its disposal, it will issue of size. Is the ideal well-ordered republic not be long before confidence in the rule of law great or small in extent? Considered strictly begins to erode. Thus nearly all the classical from the point of view of encouraging civic republicans from Machiavelli to Montesquieu virtue, it seemed obvious to some that small were agreed that some measure of citizen republics must hold the advantage. The 6 reasoning behind this view was most explicitly tradition today. Among modern political theo- put forward by Montesquieu, who observed rists, there are disputes not only as to practical that in a small republic the public good is more institutional questions, but also more funda- obvious and better understood, and opportu- mentally as to the nature and significance of nities for abuse comparatively scarce. In an civic virtue itself. extended republic, by contrast, the public good Perhaps the simplest way to explain this is harder to see and the invigilation of public modern debate is to return to the definition of authorities more challenging; in the face of civic virtue given at the start of this entry. If a these disincentives, courage and the spirit of virtue in general can be understood as a settled public engagement will tend to slacken. disposition exhibiting type-specific excellence, Montesquieu recognized, of course, that small then civic virtue in particular can be under- republics were more vulnerable to conquest, stood as those human dispositions specifically and so he also recommended that they band exhibiting the excellences of citizenship in a together in defensive confederations. American well- ordered republic. Presumably, it is good anti-federalist writers such as the author of the for citizens to have these civic-minded disposi- Letters of Brutus followed this line of argument tions, but what sort of good is it? Broadly in their objections to the proposed federal speaking, some things are good primarily for . instrumental reasons, whereas other things are Not all the classical republicans agreed, how- good intrinsically – for their own sake, so to ever. Machiavelli, for one, believed it necessary speak. It follows that there are two possible to restrict the territory only of aristocratic views with respect to the good of civic virtue. republics, which he did not favor in any case. On one view, while the community at large cer- On his analysis, supported with the example of tainly benefits from the virtues of its members, the great extended Roman Republic, corruption civic virtue is most importantly an intrinsic had its roots in inequality rather than size. The good for the person exhibiting it, in the sense later English republicans, to the extent that that possessing civic virtue is itself a part of they bothered to consider the issue, tended to what it means for that person to live a fully agree with Machiavelli. Madison and Hamilton flourishing human life. On another contrasting were likewise not concerned that great size view, civic virtue is (at least for most people) would detract from civic virtue in the fledgling primarily an instrumental good, in the sense American republic: good governance, they that its main benefit is simply to contribute believed, would generate the necessary ties to the stability of a well-ordered republic; it is of sentiment. Conveniently, this meant that assumed, of course, that people benefit from Madison’s proposed solution to the problem of living under a well-ordered republic, but faction might be congruent with the institu- the civic virtues as such are merely a means to tional requirements of a well-ordered republic. that end. One especially influential group of modern Modern Debates concerning scholars, usually referred to as the “civic Civic Virtue humanists,” argue that civic virtue should be understood in the first way, as an intrinsic Despite many differences of opinion as to the human good. So understood, civic practical institutional implications, the classical is essentially a variety of perfectionism – in republicans were by and large agreed on both other words, it is a political theory according to the meaning of civic virtue and on its central which certain specific forms of human life are importance in securing the long-run stability regarded as objectively more excellent than of a well-ordered republic. Surprisingly, the others. Political institutions and social prac- same cannot be said about those interested in tices should thus be designed so as to promote civic virtue and the classical republican or honor those particular forms of human 7

excellence. Prominent civic humanists such as of their community, and thereby (apparently) , J. G. A. Pocock, Gordon to lead fully flourishing lives. Second, apart Wood, and Paul Rahe have argued that from the infeasibility of the civic humanist something like this view of civic virtue can ideal, it is also criticized as unattractive and be discovered in the classical republican tradi- elitist. As with any perfectionist political doc- tion; has suggested that it also trine, it would seem that civic humanism holds represents a central (though momentarily out one sort of human life as best for all – suppressed) aspect of the American political namely, the life exhibiting civic virtue through culture. Their claims essentially involve attrib- active political participation. Why should this uting to the republican tradition an Aristotelian be, however? Are there not many different rea- conception of the good. Aristotle held that sonable accounts of the good, and thus many what was good for human beings was to exhibit different ways in which human beings can lead their distinctive capacity to act according to flourishing lives? Designing society so as to reason, and that this could only be done cater to one particular – and controversial – through the active practice of virtuous con- conception of what it means to live a good life duct. Thus, to have those virtues exhibiting seems elitist. human excellence (together with the material Regardless of the merits of civic humanism means necessary to employ them) itself consti- as a contemporary political doctrine, there is tuted a flourishing human life. Aristotle further the separate issue of whether it offers the most held that among the virtues relevantly exhibit- plausible interpretation of the classical repub- ing human excellence was the specific capacity lican tradition. Many modern scholars take to rule well and be ruled in turn among a the view that it does not: civic virtue should community of political equals. This particular be understood in the second way noted above, capacity, according to the civic humanists, is as an instrumental good whose main benefit none other than the civic virtue discussed in is to contribute to the long-run stability of a the classical republican tradition. To possess well-ordered republic. Numerous consider- this virtue is itself part of what it means to live ations weigh in support of this reading of the a flourishing human life, and this is precisely historical tradition, but perhaps the most why the classical republicans advocated a significant is the overwhelming preference republican form of government: only in a among the classical republicans for citing republic is it even possible for citizens to exhibit Roman (rather than Greek) authors and refer- their civic virtue, and thus lead flourishing ring to examples from Roman (rather than lives. From this point of view, we must under- Greek) history. Consider Machiavelli, for stand the political liberty or freedom enjoyed example, a figure absolutely central to the in a republic – which the classical republicans classical republican tradition on all accounts. extolled obsessively – as the exercise of civic His major treatment of republican theory is virtue through political participation. represented by the Discourses on the First Ten As a contemporary political doctrine, civic Books of Titus , which, obviously, abounds humanism has been criticized primarily on in Roman examples. In all of Machiavelli’s two grounds. First, it is commonly pointed out writings, there is no more than a single that the heroic vision of active participation (exceedingly obscure) reference to Aristotle, and muscular civic virtue is simply impractical which, together with the absence of any mean- in complex modern societies, where people ingful thought or expression clearly attribut- are pulled in diverse directions by many wants able to Aristotle’s influence, suggests that and cares. Furthermore, the scale of modern Machiavelli may never have bothered to read is such that it is simply infeasible for him. Nor is the picture much improved if any significant number of individuals to have we turn to another figure central to the more than a token role in the joint government tradition, James Harrington. His major work 8

Oceana contains a dozen or so references to adopted precisely this view. To the extent that Aristotle to be sure, but the majority of these republicanism is associated with a concern for are merely casual inclusions of his name – citizen virtue, these writers can be described as always together with either Livy, Cicero, or “republican liberals,” though only Dagger has Machiavelli – on a list of persons who take a embraced that designation. Republican liberals vaguely republican view of things in contrast argue that the commitment to protecting with Thomas Hobbes. The handful of individual and maintaining strict neu- substantive references to Aristotle indicate trality among controversial conceptions of the that Harrington had certainly read the Politics , good in mainstream liberal doctrine has some- but for the most part they draw on the prac- times led to a disregard for the social founda- tical aspects of that work in order to further tions of a liberal society. In order to counteract bolster his contention that well-ordered this tendency, they emphasize the point that in republics must restrain excessive inequality. order to achieve long-run stability, the institu- At no point in Harrington’s writings is there tions and practices of liberal societies must any suggestion that he was aware of, much generate liberal virtues among their members. less sympathetic with, an Aristotelian concep- These usually include in some form the virtues tion of human flourishing as consisting in familiar from the classical republican tradition active political participation. Nor is there (courage, public engagement, and respect for much evidence for such a view lurking in any the law), but also some others, such as a dispo- of the other classical republican writers, which sition to respect the rights of other citizens, a is hardly surprising: for most of the early generally tolerant attitude towards diverse modern period, Aristotelian remained values and beliefs, a commitment to fair play, firmly in the grips of a scholastic philo- and an appreciation of personal autonomy and sophical tradition anathema to the classical individuality. republicans and many others (such as Hobbes) There is a third group of modern scholars, besides. however, who, while rejecting civic humanism, There is, however, a downside to abandoning nevertheless see important differences between the civic humanist interpretation. If the republicanism and : prominent fascination with civic virtue in the classical among these “civic republicans,” as they are republican tradition is read as a straightforward often called, are Quentin Skinner, , pragmatic concern with the long-run stability and Maurizio Viroli. The civic republicans of a well-ordered republic, then it becomes far agree with liberals that civic virtue should be less clear how that tradition is distinct in any understood primarily as an instrumental good, meaningful way from the mainstream liberal but they reject the view of both liberals and tradition that ultimately supplanted it. Liberal civic humanists that a concern for civic virtue societies, no less than republican ones, must alone is what (if anything) distinguishes generate the dispositions necessary for their from other traditions. long-run maintenance, and thus will have an Instead, the civic republicans point to the interest in promoting citizen virtue. Provided central role of political liberty or freedom as an these “liberal virtues” are regarded strictly in ideal among the classical republican authors. the modest instrumental sense, and not as part Roughly speaking, freedom might be under- of a controversial conception of human flour- stood as either an exercise concept – something ishing obtainable only by an elite, there seems people enjoy through the performance of to be no conflict between the republican and certain distinctive sorts of activities; or as an the liberal traditions. opportunity concept – something people enjoy Some modern political theorists working in whenever certain distinctive sorts of obstacles the liberal tradition, such as Stephen Macedo, are absent from their lives. The civic humanists , and Richard Dagger have argue that the classical republican tradition 9 reflects an exercise conception of freedom, program of civic education now has serious according to which one enjoys freedom critics, for example those who worry that it through active political participation; indeed might render citizens too attached to their they must argue something like this in order particular communities and thus insufficiently to square the obvious importance of political cosmopolitan. These interesting debates are liberty in that tradition with an Aristotelian unfortunately beyond the scope of this entry. conception of human flourishing. Civic repub- licans reject the latter attribution, however, SEE ALSO: Aristotle (384–322 bce ) ; Cicero, freeing them to read the classical republican Marcus Tullius (106–43 bce ) ; Citizen/Citizenship ; commitment to political liberty in a very dif- Harrington, James (1611–77) ; Machiavelli, Niccolò ferent light. On their view, the ideal of political (1469–1527) ; Madison, James (1751–1836) ; liberty in the tradition is best read as an oppor- Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de (1689–1757) ; Pocock, J. G. A. (1924–); tunity concept, according to which one enjoys Republicanism ; Republican Political Thought ; freedom to the extent that one is not subject to Republics ; Skinner, Quentin (1940–); Tocqueville, arbitrary rule or domination. This sort of free- Alexis de (1805–59) dom can be enjoyed only in a well-ordered republic – that is, in a community of citizens References governed by a shared system of law in which no one person or group holds arbitrary power Harrington , J. ( 1992 ) The Commonwealth of Oceana over any other. According to the civic republi- and A System of Politics , ed. J. G. A. Pocock . cans, it is a commitment to this ideal of liberty Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Machiavelli , N. ( 1983 ) The Discourses , trans. as nondomination that distinguishes republi- L. J. Walker . New York: Penguin Books. cans from liberals, who are rather generally Rinuccini , A. ( 1978 ) “ Liberty .” In R. N. Watkins committed to an ideal of individual rights. (It (Ed.), Humanism and Liberty: Writings on also distinguishes republicans from communi- Freedom from Fifteenth-Century Florence . tarians like Sandel, who are primarily inter- Columbia : University of South Carolina Press . ested in republicanism insofar as it happens to Sidney , A. ( 1996 ) Discourses concerning represent the shared values of a particular his- Government, ed. T. G. West . Indianapolis, IN: torical community.) Liberty Fund. These, in broad outline, have been the main Trenchard , J. and Gordon , T. ( 1995 ) Cato’s Letters, theoretical debates among those modern or, Essays on Liberty, Civil and Religious, and scholars interested in the idea of civic virtue Other Important Subjects , ed. R. Hamowy , 2 vols. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund. and its history. Distinct from these are another important set of debates concerning the civics education policy of modern democratic Further Reading societies. Ironically, of the three main strategies Arendt , H. (1958 ) The Human Condition . Chicago : for securing a congruence between institutions University of Chicago Press . and practices on the one hand, and disposi- Arendt , H. ( 1993 ) “ What Is Freedom? ” In tions of character on the other, the classical H. Arendt , Between Past and Future: Eight republicans overall had the least to say Exercises in Political Thought . New York : Penguin about inculcation. Perhaps this is because Books . sophisticated systems of formal public educa- Brennan , G. and Hamlin , A. (1995 ) “Economizing on Virtue ,” Constitutional Political Economy , 6 , tion were simply not available until compara- 35 – 60 . tively recently. Whatever the reason, however, Burtt , S. ( 1990 ) “ The Good Citizen’s Psyche: On the current debate is almost exclusively focused on Psychology of Civic Virtue ,” Polity , 23 ( 1 ), 23 – 38 . education – what its aims ought to be, which Cicero . ( 1991 ) On Duties . ed. M. T. Griffin and methods are best, whether it has any limits, and E. M. Atkins . Cambridge : Cambridge University so forth. It is also worth noting that the Press . 10

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