C i v i c V i r t u e always under that description. One might argue, for example, that a failure in the F r a n k L o v e t t necessary congruence ultimately doomed soviet-style communism, and some (commu- Any discussion of civic virtue must begin with nitarians especially) worry that widespread the meaning of virtue in general. A virtue, on liberal individualism is gradually eroding the the standard view at least since Aristotle, is a institutional foundations of liberal societies as settled disposition exhibiting type-specific well. Though he did not use the expression excellence. Thus, for example, since the central “civic virtue,” the problem of congruence was purpose of a knife is to cut things, it is a virtue absolutely central to the third part of Rawls’s A in knives to be sharp. Similarly, one might Theory of Justice . In the mainstream tradition argue, since sociability is an important of western political thought, however, the characteristic of human beings, it is a human importance of civic virtue most strongly reso- virtue to be disposed to form friendships. To be nated among writers associated with what is a genuine virtue, of course, this disposition usually called the “classical republican” political must be firmly settled or resilient: much as it tradition. would detract from the virtuosity of an excep- The classical republicans were a diverse tionally sharp knife if its edge dulled after a group of political writers, including among single use, so too would it detract from the others Machiavelli and his fifteenth-century virtue of a human being if he or she were only a Italian predecessors; the English republicans fair-weather friend. Civic virtues are a species Milton, Harrington, and Sidney; Montesquieu of human virtue – specifically, they are those and Blackstone; the eighteenth-century English settled dispositions in human beings that commonwealth men; many Americans of the exhibit the excellences relevant to membership founding era such as Jefferson and Madison; in a political community. Put another way, civic and some later observers such as Tocqueville. virtue is simply the character of a good citizen. These writers were all committed to the What are the qualities of good citizenship? political ideal of a res publica , where this was Our answer, as Aristotle observed, is partly understood roughly as a community of citizens relative to the community in question. This is governed by a shared system of law in which no because civic virtues are connected to the one person or group holds personal mastery problem of stability. Every political order will over any other. In the classic expression of through various means tend to engender James Harrington, such a community would certain dispositions of character in the individ- constitute an “empire of laws and not of men” uals living out their lives under its auspices: the (1992: 8). Perhaps because the classical repub- issue is whether those dispositions ultimately licans often found themselves living in unstable turn out to be congruent with the political and failing, or new and untested republics, they order generating them. In the long run, developed a particular fascination with the presumably, no political order can be stable problem of stability. In their writings, the unless it tends to engender a pattern of disposi- expression “civic virtue” (often simply “virtue”) tions that largely supports, rather than under- refers to the dispositions of character necessary mines, its various distinctive institutions and specifically for the long-term maintenance and practices. In this broad sense, every political stability of what Machiavelli called a well- doctrine (liberal, authoritarian, socialist, etc.) ordered republic ( republica bene ordinata ). The will have an interest in civic virtue, though not classical republicans were concerned with The Encyclopedia of Political Thought, First Edition. Edited by Michael T. Gibbons. © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Published 2015 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. DOI: 10.1002/9781118474396.wbept0147 2 finding those institutions and practices that possible, whereas after Caesar was assassi- might reliably cultivate civic virtue, so under- nated, it was not? The difference lay in the stood. Conversely, they were also concerned presence of civic virtue in the former case, and with avoiding those institutions and practices its absence in the latter. As the authors of Cato’s that would cultivate the opposite – that is, dis- Letters later put it, the “Roman virtue and … positions of character inimical to the long-run Roman liberty expired together” (Trenchard & stability of a well-ordered republic. These they Gordon 1995: 195). From this shared starting generally describe as “corruption.” point, the civic republicans go on to account Despite the strong association between for the importance of civic virtue in widely civic virtue and the classical republican tradi- varying degrees of depth and specificity. tion, the problem of stability is a perfectly Broadly speaking, three dimensions to civic general one. It is thus unfortunate in a way virtue were commonly discussed, each that the classical republicans settled on such corresponding to a specific danger facing any aggressively moralistic language as “civic well-ordered republic. virtue” and “corruption,” since this gives an The first and perhaps most obvious danger impression that they were committed to a facing any republic is conquest and subjugation strenuously heroic ideal of citizenship simply by a foreign power. This danger was particu- incompatible with the conditions of diverse larly acute in the highly competitive security and complex modern societies. In fact, it is environment faced by city-states in the ancient presently a subject of debate just how heroic world and in Renaissance Italy, though it never the classical republican doctrine was meant to fully receded from view among the later repub- be, as we shall see. Before considering that licans in England and America. Size and wealth modern debate, however, the views of the both contribute to security, of course, but as classical republicans themselves should exam- the classical republicans were fond of pointing ined in greater detail, since it is from the out, history was replete with examples of small classical republican tradition (usually via republics defeating much larger and wealthier Tocqueville) that nearly all contemporary kingdoms. The explanation seemed to be that discussions derive. citizens of a well-ordered republic are poten- tially more willing to fight for their community Civic Virtue and Classical than mercenaries or oppressed subjects. Defense against external dangers, therefore, Republicanism involved designing republican institutions and All classical republicans subscribed to practices such that they inspire this sort of Machiavelli’s dictum that “just as for the main- patriotic courage on the part of the citizens. tenance of good customs laws are required, so Not all dangers to the republic are external, if laws are to be observed, there is need of good however; no less serious is the danger of customs.” From this interconnection of insti- internal regime change – the overthrow of tutional order and civic culture it follows that republican institutions by ambitious authori- “it is difficult, or rather impossible, either to tarian elites. This was precisely the fate of the maintain a republican form of government in Roman Republic, and also the fate of many states which have become corrupt or to create of the Renaissance Italian city-republics, such a form afresh” (Machiavelli 1983 : 160, including Florence. While intelligent constitu- 164). In support of this contention, the civic tional design can partially reduce this danger, republicans nearly always followed Machiavelli the ultimate safeguard must lie in a sufficient in citing the pre-eminent example of Rome. degree of political engagement on the part of How was it, they asked, that in the very same the citizens themselves. Positions of authority city after the Tarquins were expelled, the estab- in a republic, no less than in any other sort of lishment of a well-ordered republic was regime, come with discretionary powers that 3 can be wielded for or against the common maintain a robust rule of law. This cannot be good. So long as a sufficient number of respon- done unless the citizens by and large respect sible and capable citizens remain duly informed the law, both in letter and spirit, and the shared of public affairs, supervise the holders of public institutions and practices of the republic gener- office in the conduct of their duties, and offer ally. Correspondingly, in addition to courage themselves for public service when necessary, and public engagement, the list of citizen vir- there will be little scope for the ambitious to tues must be extended to include some degree usurp public authorities to their own end. of moderation and restraint in pressing private Once political apathy becomes widespread, or factional claims. This need not involve the however, constitutional safeguards alone will complete subordination of private interests to not be sufficient. Indeed, as the Medici in the common good, as some have mistakenly Florence for example demonstrated, the out- believed. Factionalism as such is not always a ward form of republican institutions can easily problem for the republic, provided that enough be preserved as a cover for authori- everyone remains willing to play by the tarian rule. Thus Alamanno Rinuccini, in a