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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR Jl'JZi 52

KRAMER, RUNALD CHARLES CUMSTR’JCT1M& CRIMt: A SOC I3-H ISTUR 1 CAL AN&LYSTS UF THE Ok TSINS AND DLVELLiPMFNT DF THE LEAA CAREER CKT'tlNU PRJGRAM-

THE PHIU STATE UNIVERSITY, PH.D., l?7o

University Microfilms International 3 0 0 n . z e e b r o a d , a n n a r b o r , mi 4b io g

RONALD CHARLES KRAMER

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAA CAREER

CRIMINAL PROGRAM

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate

School of The Ohio State University

Ronald C. Kramer, B.E., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1978

Reading Committee: Approved By

Dr. Simon Dinitz

Dr. Richard J. Lundman

Dr. Joseph E. Scott \ I Adviser Department of Sociology To My Parents: Bob and Doris Kramer

And

To My Wife: Jane Elizabeth Kramer ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study could not have been completed without the assistance of a number of people. I am especially indebted to Charles M. (Bud) Hollis,

Court Specialist, Adjudication Section, LEAA, the program manager for the

career criminal initiative, for allowing me to go through the files of

the program. Without this access, and Bud’s complete cooperation, the

research could not have been done.

I would also like to thank Jim Swain and Dennis Murphy of the

Adjudication Section, LEAA for their excellent assistance during the data collection process.

I am grateful to Charles R. Work for the opportunity to interview him at great length on two different occasions, and for the many written materials he provided to me. My gratitude extends to all of

the other individuals (H. Paul Haynes, Ellen Jasper, Phil Cohen and

William Hamilton) who consented to an interview concerning their

involvement in the creation of the career criminal program.

I am obligated to Phil Cohen and the National Legal Data Center,

the national clearinghouse for the career criminal program, for all the

assistance they gave me.

I would like to thank Jim Kura, and the Franklin County Public

Defender’s Office, for the opportunity to go to Washington, D.C. in

May, 1977. That trip fortuitously led to the present research.

iii I am very grateful to the members of my committee for their many helpful suggestions and criticisms. Thanks to Simon Dinitz for his wise counsel and quiet confidence in me. Thanks to Rick Lundman for

his excellent editorial assistance and cheerful support. And thanks

to my advisor, Joe Scott, for his encouragement of this project, his

support of it, and most of all, for his confidence in me. I think its

beginning to rub off a little.

My gratitude also extends to my family. My parents, my brothers

and sisters, and my in-laws, all helped me with this study in more

ways than they will ever know. Thanks to all of them for their

support and encouragement.

Thanks also to my two good friends, Phil and Chris Niedzielski-

Eichner for enduring ray endless discussions of this project and for

providing pleasant breaks from the drudgery of writing.

Finally, a very special word of thanks to my wife, Jane. Only she

knows how much she contributed to this study. I can truly say that

without her assistance, her support, her encouragement and her confidence,

I could not have finished this project.

iv VITA

January 23, 1951 ...... Bom— Tiffin, Ohio

1973 ...... B.E., The University of Toledo, Toledo, Ohio

1973-1974 ...... Teaching Associate, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1974-1975 ...... Research Assistant, Program for The Study of Crime and Delinquency, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1974 ...... M.A., The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

1975-1978 ... Teaching Associate, Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

"Shock Parole: A Preliminary Evaluation," International Journal of Criminology and Penology 4 (1976):271-284, with Diane Vaughan, Joseph Scott and Robert Bonde.

"The Debate Over The Definition Of Crime: Paradigms, Value Judgments And Criminological Work," International Journal of Criminology And Penology (Forthcoming).

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Sociology of Crime and Deviance Social Theory Social Psychology Social Problems

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

DEDICATION ...... 11

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... 11 i

VITA ...... v

LIST OF TABLES ...... x

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

The Social Construction of Crime ...... 3 Theoretical Perspectives ...... ' 5 Methodology ...... 6 Pragmatic Derivatives ...... 8 Overview of Chapters ...... 10

II. THEORETICAL PARADIGMS AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF C R I M E ...... 15

Explaining Crime: Behavioral and Definitional Realities ...... 18 The Behavioral Paradigm ...... 19 The Classical School ...... 20 The Positivistic School ...... 22 Positivism and the Great American Search . . 24 The Definitional Paradigm ...... 27 The Chicago School Symbolic Interactionist 29 Tradition ...... The Definitional Theme ...... - 3 2 The Behavioral Themes ...... 36 The Positivistic Critics ...... 41 S u m m a r y ...... 44

III. THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME: THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ...... 54

Sutherland's analysis of the Sexual Psychopath Laws ...... 55 The Role of Enterprise In Creating Deviance: Moral Entrepreneurs ...... 58

vi Moral Crusades: An Organizational Perspective . 61 Symbolic Crusades ...... 63 The Social Functions of Crime Creation ...... 67 The Creation of Crime: Class Conflict and Social Power ...... 71 The Interest Group Conflict Perspective: Beyond M a r x ...... 78 Summary ...... 87

IV. M E T H O D O L O G Y ...... 99

The Case Study Approach ...... 99 The Process of Data Collection ...... 101 The LEAA Documents: Historical Materials . 105 Specialized Interviews ...... 107 Data Analysis: Purposes ...... 109 Data Analysis: Problems of Validity ...... X12 External Validity ...... 113 Internal Validity ...... 113 Historiography ...... 115 Specialized Interviews ...... 118 Key Analytic Questions ...... 123

V. THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: HABITUAL CRIMINALS AND THE CRIME PROBLEM ...... 129

The Habitual Offender L a w s ...... 130 The Nationalization of the Crime Problem.... 137 The 1964 Presidential Campaign ...... 139 The Aftermath of the Campaign ...... 141 The 1968 Campaign and the Nixon Administration ...... 147 Thinking About Crime: The New Penology .... 149 The Shift From Rehabilitation to Incapacitation/Deterrence ...... 152 The New Focus on the Habitual Offender . . 155 S u m m a r y ...... 157

VI. THE CREATION OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM: STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT ...... 165

Stage 1: The Crusade for Management Consciousness in the Prosecutor's O f f i c e ...... 166 The Case for Management Consiousness . . . 167 The Development of PROMIS ...... 170 The Formation of the Major Violators Unit . 172 Stage 2: The Initial Development of the Career Criminal I d e a ...... 174

vii A Program to Push P R O M I S ...... 175 An Opportunity to Circulate the Idea.... 178 A Memorandum to the Attorney General .. 181 Stage 3: The Program Becomes A Presidential " Initiative ...... 184 Ford's Speech to the I.A.C.P...... 185 The Aftermath of the S p e e c h ...... 187 1) The Meeting with Local Prosecutors . . 188 2) Formulation of the D e s i g n ...... 191 3) Site Selection ...... 196 Stage 4: The Expansion of the P r o g r a m .... 199 Media Reaction ...... 199 The Expansion of the Program ...... 203 S u m m a r y ...... 205

VII. THE CREATION OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS ...... 216

The Definition of Social Problems ...... 217 Stage 1: The Private Recognition of a Social P r o b l e m ...... 220 Stage 2: Acquiring Organizational Resources and Redefining the P r o b l e m ...... 226 Rule 1: Select A Condition ...... 231 Rule 2: Define The Condition As Problematic 236 Stage 3: Public Recognition of the Problem . . . 238 Rules 3 and 4: Bring the Message to the People and Generate Large Scale Concern ...... 239 Rules 5 and 6: Propose a Solution and Design a Program to Deal with the Problem .... 244 Stage 4: The Expansion of the Program ...... 245 Rule 7: Demonstrate Success ...... 246 S u m m a r y ...... 249

VIII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM: INSTRUMENTAL AND SYMBOLIC EFFECTS ...... 257

Instrumental and Symbolic Effects ...... 258 The Instrumental Objectives of the Program . . . 260 Raising Management Consciousness ; ...... 261 The Reduction of Crime ...... 263 The Symbolic Significance of the Program .... 267 The Symbolic Concern with Crime ...... 268 The Symbolic Return to Punishment ...... 269 The Affirmation of Public Morality ...... 270 Symbolic Meanings and Political Interest Groups . 272 The Ford Administration ...... 272 Local Prosecutors ...... 276 The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration ...... 278

viii The Symbolic Meaning of Crime in a Capitalistic Society ...... 280 Criminal Mythology ...... 280 The Definition of Crime in a Capitalistic Society ...... 283 S u m m a r y ...... 286

IX. SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N S ...... 293

Summary of the Study ...... 293 The Historical Context ...... 294 Conditions and Contingencies ...... 295 Consequences ...... 298 Theoretical Implications ...... 299 Policy-Action Implications ...... 303

APPENDIXES

A. Information Sheet: Original Career Criminal Jurisdictions ...... 306

B. Proposal Guidelines: Career Criminal Program . . . 310

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 316

Ix LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1 . Career Criminal Information Sheet 306

x CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1974, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) of the

United States Department of Justice developed a new program to enhance prosecutorial effectiveness in dealing with so-called "career criminals."

The official goals of this career criminal program were: 1) to help local prosecutors "prioritize" their caseloads so that they could devote more time and effort to the prosecution of "career criminals," 2) to increase the conviction rates and the severity of sentences in cases involving "career criminals," and 3) to reduce the level and frequency of serious crime through the incapacitation and deterrent effects of these convictions and sentences.

Two major assumptions underlie the career criminal program. First, there is the assumption that a small group of "repeat," "habitual," or

"career" offenders are responsible for a disproportionate amount of dangerous and violent crime. In a memorandum to then Attorney General

William B. Saxbe, Charles R. Work, then Deputy Administrator of LEAA, stated that, "it is our hypothesis that a substantial, indeed an inordinate, amount of serious crime in America is committed by a relatively small number of career criminals."^

The second major assumption underlying the program, was that many

"career criminals" were escaping conviction and punishment due to the large caseloads of criminal courts in urban jurisdictions and to the lack

of management resources within prosecutors' offices. LEAA. pointed out

that, "the criminal justice system with a massive number of cases and

assembly line approach is not dealing effectively with the career 2 recidivist offender." Thus, based on these two assumptions, LEAA con

cluded that, "by focusing the resources and attention of the criminal t justice system on the career offender, the criminal justice system can 3 have impact on the level and frequency of serious crime."

The most logical place to attack the "career criminal problem," * according to LEAA, was in the local prosecutor's office. As Deputy

Administrator Work noted, "perhaps the most advantageous weapon we can

utilize, at least initially, is improved and technologically aided prose- 4 cution." The career criminal program, therefore, focuses primarily on

the management and operation of the local prosecutor's office. It was

designed to aid prosecutors in dealing with their case management

problems so that they can devote more resources to the prosecution of

career criminals. Selected prosecutors receive funds from LEAA to set

up special "career criminal units" within their offices. These special

units are staffed with experienced assistant prosecutors, who are

provided with a reduced caseload, and given an increased amount of

prosecutorial resources, in order to screen out and selectively prosecute

those persons whose criminal records indicate a pattern of repeated serious

criminal activity.^

Since its introduction, the career criminal program has become one

of the most publicized and widely hailed programs ever developed by

LEAA.** The program has already been given credit for the recent decreases in the rate of violent crime. From eleven original jurisdic- 8 9 tlons, the program has now spread to over thirty. Furthermore, all available evidence indicates that politicians and criminal justice officials are coming to consider the career criminal program to be an indispensable weapon in the nation’s war on crime.^

The official versions of the development of the career criminal program make it appear that the program was a rational response to the serious social problem of "crime in the streets," and that the primary objective of the program was to reduce serious crime. However, the following study, by directing attention to the sociological fact that

"human events have different levels of meaning,disputes this official interpretation of the program’s creation. Instead, the present research demonstrates: 1) that the original impetus behind the program was not crime reduction but management consciousness raising among prosecutors;

2) that the program, rather than being a response to the social problem of crime, actually helped to shape this social problem; and 3) that the program had less effect on the reduction of crime than it had on the construction of symbolic meanings which reassured the public concerning crime and served the political interests of a variety of groups in society. In general, the present study, through a socio-historical analysis of the origins and development of the career criminal program, illustrates that crime is not merely law violating behavior, but a social construction.

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME

There are two major paradigms (fundamental images of the subject matter of a discipline) which guide theory and research within the sociology of crime and deviance: a behavioral paradigm and a definitional paradigm. From within the behavioral paradigm, criminal behavior is viewed as intrinsically real, objectively given, and determined by ante cedent causal factors. Thus, this paradigm directs attention to the nature, extent and distribution of criminal behavior, and to the explanation of the causes of this behavior.

The definitional paradigm, on the other hand, asserts that crime is not intrinsically real or objectively given, but rather a collective definition or a social construction produced through a definitional process by the activities of various social control agents or agencies.

From this paradigm, no behavior is inherently criminal. Criminality is not a quality which resides within the behavior or the person, it is a legal status socially ascribed to behaviors and persons by legal control agents through a process of social interaction.

The present research has been guided by the assumptions of the definitional paradigm. The creation of the LEAA career criminal program is viewed as an illustration of the process whereby crime is socially constructed. Theoretical and empirical work within this paradigm centers on the operation of the state and the criminal justice system, rather than on criminals or criminal behavior. From the definitional paradigm, the reality of crime is socially constructed through the activities of political authorities, state bureaucrats, and legal control agents. Thus, the following study will concentrate on the collective activities of the following actors: members of the Ford Administration, officials of the Department of Justice, officials of the LEAA, and local prosecutors. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

Within the definitional paradigm, a variety of theoretical perspec tives, analytic categories, and explanatory factors have been utilized to explain specific instances of the general phenomenon of the social con struction of crime and deviance. Among them we find: 1) social

12 13 movements and changes in cultural values, 2) moral entrepreneurs,

14 15 3) organizational interests, 4) symbolic crusades, 5) a functionalist

16 17 perspective, 6) a Marxist perspective, and 7) an interest group

18 conflict perspective. Research within the definitional paradigm has provided some empirical support for all of these explanations.

The purpose of the present research is two-fold. First, the purpose is to describe and explain the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program, drawing on the theoretical perspectives, analytic categories and explanatory factors listed above when appropriate.

Second, the purpose is to assess the adequacy of these sociological explanations for the general phenomenon of the social construction of crime, through their application to the particular case of the creation of the career criminal program.

Thus, the present study is a combination of historical and socio logical work. On the one hand, it will attempt to provide a theoretical explanation for a particular historical event. On the other hand, it will attempt to add something to our knowledge of the social construction of crime in general. Accordingly, the study will begin with a discussion of sociological theory and move from there into a socio-historical analysis of the career criminal program. METHODOLOGY

The present research can be described as a historical "case

19 study." It involves an intensive, in-depth examination of a particular historical event: the creation of the LEAA career criminal program.

This approach typically provides a complete and detailed account or des cription of the events under consideration, along with a careful and systematic analysis or reconstruction of that event from the point of view of sociological theory. The case study approach usually represents a commitment to represent participants "in their own terms." However, * concern with the actor's perspective must always be linked to the social structures and groups in which the actor is located. Finally, the case study method directs attention to the processual aspects of human social events. It focuses on the dynamic and emergent properties of the phenomenon under investigation.

. Two major sources of data were utilized in this case study of the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program. The first source of data was the historical materials drawn from the files of LEAA.

These historical materials consisted of: 1) internal LEAA memorandums concerning the career criminal program; 2) memorandums that flowed between

LEAA, the Department of Justice, and the White House, which were related to the program; 3) copies of speeches given by the President, the

Attorney General, and LEAA officials, which make reference to the career criminal program; 4) numerous press releases concerning the program;

5) newspaper clippings from around the country relating to the career criminal initiative; 6) transcripts of meetings between LEAA officials and local prosecutors to discuss the structure and functions of a national career criminal program; 7) letters from prominent criminal justice planners critiqueing the proposed program; 8) background literature on

the program prepared by the National Legal Data Center (which serves as

the clearinghouse for the program); 9) program proposals from a number of

the original jurisdictions; and 10) numerous other miscellaneous LEAA documents, research reports, and memorandums which were tangential to

the career criminal idea.

The second source of data for this case study was a number of in-

depth, specialized interviews with those individuals who were involved

in the development of the career criminal program. These specialized

interviews attempted to get at the participants' perspectives on the

creation of the program, and they also served to corroborate facts under

covered in the historical materials and in other interviews. Together,

these two sets of data provided a very rich data base for the analysis

of the origins and development of the career criminal program.

The analysis of qualitative data such as these, generally proceeds by

asking three key analytic questions: 1) out of what has the phenomenon

come?; 2) what are the major features of the phenomenon?; and 3) what

are the results, outcomes, or effects of the phenomenon. The present

analysis wll answer these three sets of questions concerning the LEAA

career criminal program. It will: 1) describe and explain the contexts

and conditions out of which the career criminal program emerged, 2) des

cribe the distinguishing characteristics of the program, and 3) delineate

the differential consequences of the program for various groups in

society. PRAGMATIC DERIVATIVES

The primary purposes of the present study are theoretical in nature.

The research is geared toward the production of "disciplinary" knowledge 20 rather than "policy-action" knowledge. Policy-makers and criminal justice administrators, seeking to control the problem of "career criminals," will not find this study to be of any particular use in the pursuit of that goal. In fact, it is the activities of the policy makers themselves which constitutes the focus of the present research.

Thus, the present study will probably have little effect on criminal justice policy formation.

Despite the fact that there are no conventional crime control policy implications in the findings of the present research, there are several pragmatic derivatives of the study which could possibly serve the public interest. First, the study demonstrates how crime control organizations

(through activities such as the creation of the career criminal program) can create a fear of crime among the American people which is far out of 21 proportion to the objective probability of being victimized. This irrational fear of crime is slowly eroding the quality of life in the 22 United States. The present research, by contributing to our under standing of how the fear of crime is socially produced, will hopefully allow us to formulate strategies which can reduce the amount of this irrational fear and the destructive impact it has on society.

The second pragmatic derivative of the present study concerns the 23 relative neglect of upper world crime by criminal justice officials, the public, and even criminologists. In general, the crime "problem" in

America, as defined by politicans, crime-control bureaucracies, the mass media, and many criminologists, directs attention only to the common

24 street crimes committed by lower class, power disadvantaged people.

This social definition excludes consideration of such seriously harmful and often illegal behaviors as: consumer fraud, price fixing, false advertising, pollution of the environment, the creation of unsafe working conditions, the manufacture of unsafe automobiles, political corruption and bribery, police homicides, illegal wiretapping and surveillance, and other types of upper world crime. The present research, by demonstrating how the creation of the career criminal program (and other crime control policies in general) contribute to and help maintain this social defini tion of crime, may be useful to those who are concerned with re-orienting both official and criminological attention to the issue of upper world crime, crime which is often far more costly and deadly than common street crime.

The final pragmatic derivative of the present study may be the estab lishment of more effective external democratic controls over commonweal 25 organizations such as LEAA and prosecutors’ offices. Commonweal organi- 26 zations exist to serve and protect the interests of the public at large.

However, as Lundman points out, "one of the problems associated with all 27 commonweal organizations is that of external democratic control." In democratic societies therefore, the actions of such organizations must be effectively monitored to insure that the ends served are those intended.

The present research, by examining the actions of a number of different commonweal organizations, will hopefully contribute to this monitoring effort and help insure that these organizations do indeed serve and portect the interests of the public at large. 10

OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS

This study of the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program will proceed along the following lines. Chapter II will identify the two major paradigms which guide most theory and research within the sociology of crime and deviance; review the basic assumptions of these paradigms; and locate the present research within the assump tions of the definitional paradigm.

Chapter III will review most of the theory and research which has been carried out within the definitional paradigm, listing eight proposi tions which have been advanced to explain the social construction of crime.

Chapter IV will explain the methodology of the study, describe the data collection process, discuss the validity of the data and outline the key analytic questions of a qualitative analysis.

Chapter V will describe the larger historical context out of which the career criminal program emerged. Three specific components of this historical context will be identified.

Chapter VI will describe the more specific conditions which gave rise to the career criminal program. Four stages of development will be identified.

Chapter VII will analyze the conditions and contingencies which affected the development of the career criminal program. The creation of the program will be explained as the outcome of a definitional process whereby social problems are constructed. Each of the four stages of development will be analyzed as a distinct step in this definitional process. 11

Chapter VIII will analyze the consequences of the career criminal program. Both the instrumental and symbolic effects of the program will be assessed.

Finally, Chapter IX will present a summary and conclusion. FOOTNOTES

Memorandum from Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator for Adminis tration LEAA, to Attorney General William B. Saxbe, subject: "Proposed Career Criminal Impact Program of the U.S. Department of Justice, August 7, 1974. 2 LEAA, Discretionary Funds Guidelines, Chapter 6, Career Criminal Program, 1975, p. 116.

3Ibid.

Memorandum from Charles R. Work to William B. Saxbe, 1974, op. cit., p. 5.

3The common operational components of the career criminal program as identified by the National Legal Data Center are:

1) A process for the earliest possible identification of potential career criminal defendants based upon that jurisdictions selection criteria.

2) Most of the career criminal jurisdictions attempt to expedite the case processing by the immediate direct filing of an indictment in the felony trial court, thereby eliminating the preliminary hearing which typically occurs in the lower courts in the processing of felony cases in most jurisdictions.

3) Most of the career criminal units utilize a system of "vertical" prosecutorial representation, whereby the prosecutor who makes the initial filing or appearance in the case will handle all subsequent court appearances on that particular case through its conclusion.

4) Each career criminal prosecuting attorney has a significantly lower case load than is normal with felony trial attorneys in the office.

5) Every career criminal unit has adopted a policy of eliminating or reducing plea bargaining.

12 13

6) All career criminal units accord priority set ting for court events to career criminal cases.

7) If the defendant in a career criminal case is found guilty by trial, every career criminal unit has a standard policy of requesting the heaviest possible sentence.

8) Every career criminal unit also engages in post-sentencing and prison commitment tracking of career criminal defendants.

^See the evaluation in: Report of the Twentieth Century Task Force on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Law Enforcement: The Federal Role (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1976); and Sarah Carey, Law and Disorder IV (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1976). ' 7 See: The Verdict I (//6, 1976); U.S. News and World Report, "A War on Career Criminals Starts to Show Results,” November 22, 1976; Eugene H. Methvin, "Crime in America— A Turnaround at Last?" Readers Digest, June, 1977; "The Drop in Violent Crime," The National Observer, February 5, 1977. g The 11 original jurisdictions were: New Orleans, Houston, Detroit, Boston, San Diego, Salt Lake City, Columbus, Kalamazoo, Dallas, Indianapolis and Manhattan.

9The Verdict II (#3, 1977), p. 5.

^Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., (R) Maryland has recently introduced Senate Bill 28 which, in part, would "protect Career Criminal Programs from being lost in the annual competition for LEAA funds." The Verdict II (//3, 1977), p. 1. In addition, The California Legislature in 1977 passed SB 683 which provides funding for Career Criminal Programs throughout the State of California. See Program Guidelines, California Career Criminal Prosecution Program (Sacramento, Calif.: Office of Criminal Justice Planning, 1978). Also, LEAA has recently created a "Comprehensive Career Criminal Program." See the Comprehensive Career Criminal Guide Washington, D.C.: LEAA, 1977).

^Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963).

Edwin H. Sutherland, "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws," American Journal of Sociology 56 (September, 1950), pp. 142-148.

13 Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1963). 14

"^Donald T. Dickson, "Bureaucarcy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade," Social Problems 16 (Fall, 1968), pp. 143-156.

15 Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963). 1 6 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York:- The Free Press, 1938). Also see, Kai T. Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Wiley, 1966).

17 William J. Chambliss, "A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy," Social Problems 12 (Summer, 1964), pp. 67-77.

18 Stuart L. Hills, Crime, Power, and Morality: The Criminal Law Process in the United States. (Scranton, Pa.: Chandler, 1971). Also see Edwin M. Lemert, "Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance," ''Social Problems 21 (April, 1974), pp. 457-467. 19 Norman K. Denzin, The Research Act (Chicago: Aldine, 1970). 20 Thomas R. Ford, "The Production of Social Knowledge for Public Use," Social Forces 56 (December, 1977), pp. 504-518. 21 Frank Clemente and Michael B. Kleiman, "Fear of Crime in the United States: A Multivariate Analysis," Social Forces 56 (December, 1977), pp. 519-531. 22 Ibid.

23 See Gilbert Geis, "Upperworld Crime" in Abraham S. Blumberg (ed.) Current Perspectives on Criminal Behavior (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1974). 24 Raymond J. Michalowski and Edward W. Bohlander, "Repression and Criminal Justice in Capitalist America," Sociological Inquiry 46 (#2, 1976), pp. 95-106. 25 Richard J. Lundman, "Routine Police Arrest Practices: A Commonweal Perspective," Social Problems 22 (October, 1974), pp. 127-141.

26 Peter Blau and W. Richard Scott, Formal Organizations (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1962). 27 Lundman, 1974, op. cit. CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL PARADIGMS AND THE

SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF CRIME

The question we should be exploring ought not to be how the new conception can throw light on the traditional concerns in the sociology of deviance. Rather, we should ask how it directs us to investigate new and different aspects of deviance.

(John Kitsuse, "The ?New Conception of Deviance' and its Critics," 1975)1

Empirical observations are always made within a prior conceptual scheme. That is, all empirical research is carried out within, and guided by, an abstract theoretical framework which defines the subject matter of the research, poses the questions to be asked, and spells out the interpretive rules for obtaining answers. These prior conceptual schemes or abstract theoretical frameworks, constitute the parameters which structure theoretical thought within a scientific discipline or sub-discipline. According to Thomas Kuhn, the historian of science, these schemes or frameworks are "paradigms," and he claims that they serve to differentiate one scientific community or sub-community from 2 another. Kuhn asserts that paradigms are of paramount importance to science for they not only serve to guide theoretical and empirical work within a scientific discipline, but they are also critical to the manner

15 16 3 in which disciplines change. Kuhn has used the concept of paradigm to analyze and explain the structure of scientific revolutions in the natural and physical sciences.

Although there has been considerable controversy over what Kuhn him self meant by the term,^ social scientists have frequently used the concept to analyze their own disciplines .■* While the term is often abused, it is a useful tool for making sense of the structure of theoretical thinking within the sociology of crime and deviance. To avoid the confusion surrounding Kuhn's definition of the concept of paradigm, we will use the more precise and rather abstract notion provided by George Ritzer. According to Ritzer:

A paradigm is a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity) from another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars, theories and methods and instruments that exist within it.6

A number of sociologists who have used the concept of paradigm to analyze the discipline of sociology have equated it with more narrow theoretical perspectives like conflict or functionalism.^ it seems more helpful, however, in making sense of the theoretical structure of the discipline and its sub-disciplines, to use the more abstract notion of paradigm supplied by Ritzer. As Ritzer points out, theoretical perspec tives, like symbolic interactionism and exchange, can be subsumed under different paradigms. The important point is that a paradigm provides an abstract definition of the subject matter of a discipline, while more narrow theoretical perspectives, and the more rigorous systems of 17 propositions which may be developed from them, attempt to explain and predict more specific and concrete aspects of that subject matter.

Since paradigms always guide and Influence the work that scientists do, it is incumbent upon them to be aware of the paradigmatic assumptions

that they operate with. This is especially true for sociologists since

there are a number of different paradigms competing for dominance within

the discipline of sociology. In his analysis of the structure of scien

tific revolutions, Kuhn pointed out that theoretical and empirical work within disciplines in the natural sciences tends to be guided by one

Q dominant paradigm in a particular time period. Sociology, on the other hand, is a "multiple paradigm science." As Ritzer observes:

This is the situation in which there are several paradigms vying for hegemony within the field as a whole. One of the defining characteristics of a multiple paradigm science is that supporters of one paradigm are constantly questioning the basic assumptions of those who accept other paradigms. Thus scientists have a difficult time conducting 'normal science' because they are constantly defending their flanks against attacks from those who support other paradigms. It is in the category of a multiple paradigm science that I would place sociology, as well as the other social sciences.

The sociological study of crime and deviance can also be character

ized as a multiple paradigm science. There are two major paradigms

which guide most theory and research within this field. The existence

of two unique paradigmatic frameworks causes a great deal of irrational

and political conflict between the adherents of the two paradigms as

they struggle for dominance within the discipline. The proponents of a

paradigm often fail to recognize the distinctive questions and issues

raised by the other paradigm and thus distort its conceptual scheme by

attempting to force it into their own paradigmatic framework. Therefore,

sociologists who study crime and deviance must be very clear about which 18 4 set of paradigmatic assumptions underlies their work and, they have an obligation to communicate this information to their audiences.

This chapter will review the development of both of the two major paradigms within the sociology of crime and deviance, pointing out the underlying assumptions of each and their distinctive images of the subject matter to be explained.

EXPLAINING CRIME: BEHAVIORAL REALITIES AND DEFINITIONAL REALITIES

A number of sociologists have observed that the study of crime and i deviance involves a "dual problem of explanation." As George Void noted:

Crime always involves both human behavior (acts) and the judgment or definitions (laws, customs, mores) of fellow human beings as to whether specific behavior is appro priate and permissible or is improper and forbidden. Crime and crimality lie in the area of behavior that is considered improper and forbidden. There is, therefore, always a dual problem of explanation— that of accounting for the behavior as behavior, and equally important, accounting for the definitions by which specific behavior comes to be con sidered as crime or non-crime.

Likewise, Ronald Akers has pointed.out:

These, then are the two basic problems facing the sociology of deviance: How and/or why certain kinds of behavior and people get defined or labelled as deviant. How and/or why some people engage in deviant acts. Our research must pro vide data on and our theories should explain both social definitions and behaviors.

1 9 As Void, Akers, and a number of other sociologists have indicated, there are two distinctive focal points for sociological theorizing about the phenomena of crime and deviance. That is to say that there are two distinctive paradigms which guide most theory and research within the 19

sub-discipline of the sociology of crime and deviance. One paradigm

directs attention to the "behavioral realities" of crime and deviance, while the other focuses on their "definitional realities."

It is critically important for sociologists who study crime and deviance to make the distinction between these two paradigms, the radically different kinds of questions that they ask, and the radically different aspects of the reality of crime and deviance that they direct attention to. In the past, the failure to distinguish between the two paradigms, and the fact that each posits a fundamentally different *

image of the subject matter to be explained, has resulted in the confu

sion of important theoretical and policy issues, spawned a number of

long, fruitless, and bitter debates, and impeded the development of

sociological theory. Sociologists must distinguish between the

"behavioral paradigm" and the "definitional paradigm" because of the

implications and consequences the basic assumptions of these paradigms have for the sociological study of crime and deviance.

THE BEHAVIORAL PARADIGM

Historically, most of the theoretical and empirical work in the

sociology of crime and deviance has been carried out within the behavioral

paradigm. This paradigm defines rule breaking behavior as the fundamen

tal subject matter of the study of crime and deviance. Sociologists working within the behavioral paradigm attempt to describe the nature,

extent, and distribution of criminal and deviant behavior in society.

The primary focus of attention, however, within this paradigm, is on

the explanation, prediction and control of rule breaking behavior. 2 0

The behavioral paradigm is based, for the most part, on three major related assumptions. First, the behavioral paradigm assumes that criminal and deviant behavior is intrinsically real. That is to say that there are characteristics of rule breaking that distinguish it from conforming behavior. Related to this, of course, is the notion that criminal or deviant persons can be distinguished from conforming persons. The second major assumption of the behavioral paradigm is that criminal and deviant behavior has an objective nature. Thus, rule breaking behavior is an objective fact, an objective reality, and it is amenable to scientific study. The third assumption of the behavioral paradigm is that criminal and deviant behavior is determined or caused by antecedent factors. Therefore, all rule breaking behavior is caused by prior events, and these causal factors can be described and explained through the use of the scientific method.

Due to these three paradigmatic assumptions, almost all of the theory and research guided by the behavioral paradigm has been pre occupied with the explanation of the antecedent causes of criminal and deviant behavior. To understand these underlying assumptions, and this preoccupation with the causes of rule breaking behavior, we must briefly review the historical development of the behavioral paradigm.

The Classical School

Modern criminological thinking can be traced to the development of the "classical school" of criminology and the positivistic reaction to it in the 19th century. The classical school, which grew out of the

18th century Enlightenment and its emphasis on humanitarian rationalism, 21

13 marked the beginning of a naturalistic approach to criminal behavior.

Classical writers, such as Bentham and Beccaria,^ concerned themselves primarily with the relationship of man to the legal structure of the

State. They were reacting to the arbitrary severity of criminal punish ment in 18th century Europe on the one hand, and yet on the other, they were concerned with protecting society through the rational use of punishment.

The classical school of criminology, thus, believed that the

criminal law should be a rational instrument of society to achieve both social justice and social control. For the criminal law to achieve these goals, however, it must take into account the nature of human nature, and it must place strict limits on the discretion of legal actors. The classical writers assumed that all humans were rational, hedonistic, and endowed with free will. Thus, people freely choose to engage in socially harmful behavior after rational calculation of its pleasures and possible pains. To deter such behavior, the state

establishes criminal punishments. In order to act as a deterrent, however, a punishment need be only slightly more painful than the

pleasure to be derived from the act in question. In addition, and

perhaps more importantly, punishment must be administered fairly but

with certainty. Arbitrary discretion must be eliminated. The classical

school, to control the arbitrary severity of the criminal law, insisted

on a strict legal definition of the behavior to be punished and a pre

cise legal framework to administer the punishment. 22

According to Vold,^^ the classical school can be characterized as "administrative and legal criminology." Classical thought, and its 16 neo-classical modifications, Was influential in the formulation of many of the criminal codes and penal practices of 19th century Europe.

In the late 19th century, however, a new school of thought arose to

challenge the legalistic criminology of the classical and neo-classical writers. The "positivistic school" of criminology, which had developed around the "Italian school" of Lombroso, Ferri, and Garofalo, soon came to rival the classical school for influence in criminology and public policy.

The Positivistic School

The positivistic school is Often thought to mark the beginning of a scientific criminology. Void notes that the "essential point in positivism is the application of a deterministic and scientific method

to the study of crime." In studying criminal behavior, positivistic

criminologists attempted to adopt the point of view and methodology of natural science. The positivists rejected the classical school's

assumptions concerning human nature (especially the assumption of

free will) since they were incompatible with the basic assumptions of

science (especially determinism). In general, the central tenets of

the positivistic school reversed, in almost all respects, those of its

chief rival, the classical school. As Radzinowicz and King observe:

Where the classicists concentrated upon the crime, the positivists concentrated upon the criminal. Where the classicists saw the offender as rational and responsible, free to choose whether or not to break the law, the positivists saw his behavior as strongly influenced, if not completely determined, by his innate constitution and 23

and immediate environment. Where the classicists insisted that the punishment must be strictly related to the crime, » the positivists took the line that it must be related to the offender. Where the classicists saw the sentence primarily as proportionate to the crime already committed, the positivists saw it as a measure for the prevention of future crimes. Where the classicists rejected adaptation of the penalty to the individual personality of the criminal, the positivists insisted upon it. Where the classicist ruled out attempts to reform the lawbreaker, the positivists advocated them. Where the classicists prohibited considera tion of whether he threatened future changes, the positivists insisted that his future dangerousness should be the central criterion for deciding whether or not a criminal must be detained for the protection of others. The contrast between the two schools has been well summed up in the aphorism, ’The classical school exhorts men to study justice, the positivist school exhorts justice to study men.'

The philosophical assumptions, theoretical orientations, and methodological commitments of the positivistic school, taken together, had the effect of redirecting the focus of attention within criminology

from the legal and administrative aspects of crime to the individual

offender and _actors of crime causation. To the classical thinkers crime was not an entity in fact but an entity in law, and they showed little

interest in studying the sources of criminal behavior. The positivists,

on the other hand, with their strong emphasis on the deterministic

nature of human behavior and their dedication to the scientific method

of explanation, became preoccupied with the attempt to discover the

causes of criminal behavior.

Positivistic criminology, thus, by directing attention to indivi

dual criminals and launching the search for the causes of criminal

behavior, generated the set of paradigmatic assumptions which we have

called the behavioral paradigm. Although the positivists were never

quite able to win out in their long struggle with the classical school 24 20 over the shaping of criminal codes and penal practices in Europe, they were able to achieve dominance in the scientific study of crime for over a century by constructing a paradigmatic framework which eventually came to guide all theory and research in the discipline of criminology.

In the United States especially, the behavioral paradigm developed by the positivistic school came to dominant criminological work. Richard

Quinney has pointed out the pervasive influence of this positivist approach on American criminology:

The deterministic concept of human existence and the search ' for scientific explanation have pervaded most twentieth- century American criminological studies. The major differences in the research have been in respect to whether causation is sought in the characteristics of the individual or in the society. Individualistic and multiple factor explanations have largely given way to sociological theories of criminal behavior. Nevertheless, positivistic assumptions have continued to dominate both theory and practice. From the early criminological research by sociologists at the University of Chicago to the later research and theoretical formulations embodied in the work of Edwin H. Sutherland, the approach to crime has been positivistic.21

Positivism and the Great American Search

The strong influence of positivism in American criminology estab lished the behavioral paradigm as the predominant scientific paradigm within which the study of crime was carried out in the United States.

The preeminent position of the behavioral paradigm resulted in, what

Hirschi and Rudisill22 caxij "the great American search"— the search for

the causes of criminal behavior. Within the behavioral paradigm,

criminologists have produced a plethora of theories, taking into account numerous explanatory factors: biological, psychological, social and

cultural. 25

Early in the history of American criminology the most popular explanations for criminal behavior were those which stressed biological

23 and psychological factors. Among the factors stressed by these theories we find: 1) constitutional defects, ^ 2) physical types, ^

3) feeblemindedness,^ A) heredity,^ 5) multiple factors,^8 6) person ality^ and 7) psychopathyto mention only a few. Although biological and psycho-physiological explanations for criminal behavior

31 remain popular with many criminologists and a great deal of empirical

32 research has been conducted in connection with such factors, the vast majority of American criminologists in this century have utilized a sociological perspective in the search for the causes of criminal behavior.

As Geis has pointed out, "partly by default, partly by design, and largely through the operation of what might be called academic squatters rights, sociology has been the major social science represented in the

33 investigation of criminal behavior." Thus, it is not surprising that the major theories of crime causation are sociological or that these explanations have been expanded to cover all rule breaking or deviant behavior. Sociological explanations of criminal and deviant behavior encompass both structural and processual factors. Prominent among these social factors are: 1) anomie, ^ 2) opportunity structures,^ 3) dif

ferential association,^ 4) differential identification,5) culture

c o n f l i c t , 6) social learning,39 7) containment-control,^® 8) societal

reaction,^ and 9) class conflict.^ The sociological approach to crime

is characterized by the variety and diversity of its levels of analysis,

its perspectives, its theories, its methodologies, and even its 26 policy-action implications. But despite this great diversity, the three major assumptions of the behavioral paradigm subsume all of these socio

logical explanations under a common paradigmatic framework which stresses

the discovery of the causes of crime.

Whatever the level of analysis, theory and research within the

behavioral paradigm has greatly contributed to our understanding and

knowledge of the sources of criminal behavior. At the same time, however, many important sociological questions have been ignored due to

the behavioral paradigms overriding emphasis on etiological questions.

As Hartjen has noted:

This emphasis has led criminologists to investigate criminal phenomena from a single conceptual point of view. Most of the research in criminology taking 1 criminal behavior' as its central object of inquiry is oriented toward causal factors. Criminologists following these approaches have been interested mainly in explaining, predicting, and controlling criminal conduct. The Questions they have addressed have been concerned largely with the behavior and characteristics of lawbreakers. Who violates the law? Why do they do it? How can crime be prevented? How can the criminal be rehabilitated? These and similar questions have largely shaped our knowledge and understanding regarding criminal phenomena. We know a good deal about lawbreakers but relatively little about other aspects of crime. Having directed attention to the criminal and the causes of criminal behavior, the behavioral approach to crime has obscured the relevance of other phenomena of interest to criminology.^3

With the development of the labeling perspective, however, these

"other phenomena of interest to criminology'.' quickly became central

topics of sociological inquiry within a new paradigmatic framework. 27

THE DEFINITIONAL PARADIGM

The paradigmatic assumptions generated by criminological.positivism, and the resulting preoccupation with etiological questions concerning behaviors taken for granted to be intrinsically and objectively criminal or deviant, dominated the sociological study of crime for almost a century. In the 1960’s, however, there occurred a revolutionary shift in the theoretical and empirical concerns of many sociologists within the field of deviance and social control. At this time, there emerged 44 ii from the writings of a number of young sociologists a new conception of deviance"^ which came to be known as "labeling theory," the

"societal reaction approach" or "the interactionist perspective." The importance of this new theoretical orientation lies in the fact that it developed a new set of paradigmatic assumptions to guide the socio logical analysis of crime and deviance.

The development of the labeling perspective, according to Malcolm

Spector, "directly challenged the current orthodoxy in the study of crime and deviance," and it became "the basis for what may be a nearly total transformation of the sociology of crime and deviance.

The significance of the development of the labeling approach, was the fact that it directed attention away from etiological questions to a concern with the nature and impact of societal reactions. The labeling perspective laid the basis for a new conceptualization of deviance which, according to Gibbs and Erikson, marked "a major turning point in the sociological study of deviance.

The popularity of the labeling perspective spread quickly and by the late 1960’s and early 1970's, it had become one of the major 28 48 theoretical orientations within the field. Despite the popularity of labeling theory, many sociologists failed to recognize or under stand the distinctive questions and issues which the perspective directs attention to. It is my contention that the power and signifi cance of the labeling approach lies in the fact that it constitutes a new paradigmatic framework within which important sociological concerns

(ignored by the behavioral paradigm) can be addressed. The labeling perspective has been responsible for the development of a "definitional" paradigm within the sociology of crime and deviance. This paradigm focuses attention on the processes whereby persons and behaviors become defined as criminal or deviant.

Many proponents of the labeling approach, however, attempt to utilize Its insights to address questions concerning the behavioral realities of crime and deviance rather than questions concerning their

49 definitional realities. For some reason, these theorists have missed the distinctive question that the labeling perspective raises: how collective definitions of crime and deviance emerge and change over time? Austin Turk has commented on this point:

. . . paradoxically labeling analysts have while talking mainly about definitional processes, actually contributed mainly accounts of how behavioral reactions (sanctioning) by other persons 'caused' individuals to think differently (more negatively) about themselves and, as a result, to continue doing and begin defending the acts that started the process (either by commission or by anticipation).

Thus, the idea that deviance is a definitional reality has been invoked, and illustrations of the definitional process have been offered; but the point in nearly all this work has been to explain deviant behavior in individuals, not to explain the labeling.50 29

Critics of labeling perspective have also failed to understand that its significance lies in the fact that it has generated a new set of paradigmatic assumptions with which to study crime and deviance.

Thus, labeling theory has been attacked for its failure to deal with etiological questions (drawn from the behavioral paradigm),rejected for an alleged failure to account for the role of structured inequali-

c n ties and power elites in the creation of deviance, ^ and pronounced to

53 be in a state of exhaustion and conceptual decay. Many of these critiques are based on a distortion of the labeling approach or on the construction of a straw man to be deliberately demolished by the adherents of the behavioral paradigm.

Since the labeling perspective generated the definitional paradigm, and since the present research has been guided by the assumptions of this paradigm, it is important to trace the development

of labeling theory, pointing out the theoretical sources of both the new conceptualization and the confusion surrounding it.

The Chicago School Symbolic Interactionist Tradition

The labeling perspective emerged primarily from the writings of

a number of young sociologists working in the Chicago school symbolic

interactionist tradition. Although there are other antecedents which

are frequently pointed to, such as Durkheim's discussion of the

normality of crime,Mead's consideration of the symbolic meaning of

criminal law and the ritualistic drama of punitive justice,

Tannenbaum's discussion of the "dramatization of evil,"'*^ the literature 30 on speech pathology, and Qf course, the important writings of Edwin

58 Lemert, it was the Chicago school tradition which gave birth to the labeling orientation.

59 The Chicago school tradition revolved around: 1) Herbert Blumer’s development of the symbolic interactionist perspective out of the works of Mead, Cooley and Thomas,**® 2) the work of Everett Hughes on the sociology of occupations and careers,®1 3) a concern of Chicago urban sociologists, following Robert Park, with the ethnographic and naturalistic description of the social worlds found in the underlife

62 of the city, and 4) a strong preference for the use of qualitative methods, (such as document analysis, life histories, and participant observation), and grounded or inductive approaches to theory con-

63 struction. From these concerns, three broad themes developed within the labeling perspective: 1) a stress on the definitional process whereby deviance is created, 2) a concern with the impact of deviant labels on the self-concept, role relationships, and deviant career of the individual labeled, and 3) an attempt to render naturalistic descriptions of deviant subcultures and social worlds.

The first theme, which deals with the definitional realities of crime and deviance, is the most important, since from this theme the new paradigmatic framework emerged. The first theme concerns the pro duction or creation of deviance through a definitional process. As

Edwin Shur points out, "the central tenet of the labeling orientation is quite straightforward: Deviance and social control always involve 31 processes of social definition."^ We will examine this theme in greater detail shortly, since it is the key to the significance of the labeling approach.

While the first theme of the labeling perspective deals with definitional questions, both of the other two themes direct more attention to behavioral questions. These two themes have not contri buted to the development of the new paradigm, and in fact, they are only minor concerns of the labeling perspective in general. The second theme concerns the effect of labeling someone as deviant on the sub sequent behavior of the actor. The basic idea here is that societal reaction, in the form of labeling persons as deviant, leads to altered self conceptions and modified role relationships which often propel the labeled individual into secondary or career deviance.^ As Nanette

Davis observes, "societal reaction in the form of labeling or official typing, and consequent stigmatization, leads to an altered identity in 66 the actor, necessitating a reconstruction of the self." This altered identity and reconstituted self often results in more stable patterns of deviant behavior and more intense commitment to the deviant role.

As Mankoff points out, "Rule-breakers become entrenched in deviant

roles because they are labeled deviant by others and are consequently excluded from resuming normal roles in the community.

The third theme of the labeling perspective also concerns a behavioral question since it directs attention to the creation and maintenance of deviant subcultures and to the phenomenological analysis

of finite and symbolically bounded deviant worlds. From the labeling

perspective, according to Davis, 32

the subculture represents the major mode of adaptation that deviant actors make to the fact of their stigmatization. The status degradation, perpetuated by conventional society, creates a permanent underworld wherein 'outsiders' may establish an environment conducive to their common interests and needs, as in the inmate culture which develops in the total institution.^8

The labeling perspective represents a microsociological focus on these

deviant subcultures and an attempt to render an appreciative, naturalis

tic account of the symbolically ordered interactional processes within

69 them; following the ethnographic tradition of the Chicago school.

"The Definitional Theme

As mentioned above, the importance of the labeling perspective

lies in the fact that it generated a new paradigmatic framework for the

sociological study of crime and deviance. The first theme of the

labeling approach, the definitional theme, was critical to the genera

tion of this new paradigm. The focus on the definitional aspects of

crime and deviance is derived primarily from the symbolic interactionism

of Blumer.

Symbolic interactionism asserts that human beings live in a world

of symbolic meanings, and that human behavior must be understood as a

process of responding to events and objects in terms of the meanings

that have been given to them. These meanings arise out of social

interaction and they are handled in and modified by an interpretive

process. As Blumer points out, "symbolic interactionism sees meaning

as social products, as creations that are formed in and through the

defining activities of people as they interact. From the inter

actionist perspective, social order is created in the process of 33

social interaction as people define situations, create meanings, fit

their activities together, and forge joint lines of action.

One of the most important concepts in the interactionist tradition

is W . I. Thomas1 notion of "the definition of the situation." The

symbolic meanings people attach to social situations have important

consequences for their behavior in those situations. As Lauer and Handel

observe, "to understand how people define situations, then, is to under

stand the meaning that the situation has for them and thereby to understand why they behave as they do in the situation.Emerging

out of this theoretical background, it is easy to understand why

labeling theorists like Howard Becker emphasize the definitional

aspects of deviance. Becker points out that:

. . . the interactionist approach shows sociologists that a major element in every aspect of the drama of deviance is the imposition of definitions— of situations, acts, and people— by those powerful enough or sufficiently legitimated to be able to do so. A full understanding requires the thorough study of those definitions and the processes by which they develop and attain legitimacy and taken-for-grantedness.

Becker, of course, is one of the chief representatives of the

Chicago school and his work is more frequently cited than that of any

other labeling theorist. It was not only through his writings,

however, that Becker contributed to the development of the labeling

perspective and the definitional paradigm. In his role as editor of

the journal, Social Problems, Becker helped to formulate the definitional

theme of the labeling approach. As Spector points out, Social Problems

played the key role in launching the approach which later came to be

known as labeling theory, and this occurred during the editorship of

Becker. He states that: 34

The emergence of labeling theory in Social Problems began during the editorship of Howard S. Becker, who was elected editor in August, 1960. At that time there was no theory of labeling and Becker was no labeling theorist .... During this period Social Problems published the first three theoretical papers in the labeling tradition.

The three papers, of course, were Kitsuse’s (1962) "Societal

Reaction to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method,"^

75 Erikson's (1962) "Notes on the Sociology of Deviance," and Kitsuse and Cicourel's (1963) "A Note on the Use of Official Statistics."^

Becker’s own influential Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of

Deviance^ Was published in 1963. These four works are now usually cited as the source of the labeling perspective and their publication created the conditions for the recognition that the new writings con-

78 stituted a school and should be read together. Furthermore, Becker acknowledged his debt to the earlier works of Tannenbaum and Lemert and the commonalities in their positions, allowing retrospectively for

79 their work to become a touchstone for labeling theory.

Most important to the development of the labeling perspective, however, may have been the recognition from outside that a new school

80 had developed. As Erich Goode has noted, "a convincing case could be made for the assertion that labeling theory does not exist in the first place. A field has been fabricated by observers and critics out of the

81 raw material of a few arresting passages, phrases, and concepts."

Spector makes much the same point when he observes that: 35

The founders of labeling theory . . . did not constitute an 'invisible college1 prior to their coincidental publi cations .... During the period in which their ideas developed, none of the authors collaborated or were more than vaguely aware of each other's interests .... Their writings were grouped together as a school or theory through the imputations of their critics.

Nevertheless, the writings of Becker, Kitsuse, and Erikson did mark the beginning of a radically different conceptualization of deviance. What emerged from these writings was a focus of attention on the definitional process whereby deviance was created by social audiences through a process of social interaction. Attention was shifted away from behavior and directed to processes of definition, as the following statements document:

Forms of behavior per se do not differentiate deviants from non-deviants; it is the responses of the conven tional and conforming members of the society who identify and interpret behavior as deviant which sociologically transform persons into d e v i a n t s .

Deviance is not a property inherent in certain forms of behavior; it is a property conferred upon these forms by the audiences which directly or indirectly witness them. Sociologically, then, the critical variable in the study of deviance is the social audience rather than the individual persons . . . .

. . . social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person .commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to an offender. The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label.®-*

These statements and assumptions laid the basis for the develop ment of the definitional paradigm in the sociology of deviance and crime.

They directed sociological attention to new and distinctive questions concerning deviance and social control. They generated a new paradig matic framework for the sociology of crime and deviance which provided a new and unique fundamental image of the subject matter of that field.

They shifted the focus of attention within sociology away from etio logical and behavioral questions to questions concerning the creation of deviance. In general, these statements and the development of this labeling perspective theme, provided the basis for the emergence of a new and powerful paradigm to guide the sociological study of deviance and crime.

As we have already pointed out, many sociologists have failed to recognize the new paradigmatic framework inherent within the defini tional theme of the labeling perspective. The reason for this failure is that both proponents and critics have overemphasized and distorted the importance of the two behavioral themes of the approach. We will consider each in turn.

The Behavioral Themes

Although their theoretical orientation does not derive from criminological positivism, a number of labeling theorists have none theless concerned themselves with questions relating to the behavioral realities of crime and deviance by focusing upon the emergence and maintenance of deviant identities, deviant careers, and deviant sub- 86 cultures. Although these theorists claim to be investigating the relationship between interaction processes, societal reactions, and deviant behavior, their work tends to center on the "deviants" and the symbolically constituted social worlds which they occupy to the exclusion of social control agents and societal reaction. This theme 37 of the labeling perspective has been harshly criticized as insipid, liberal, "underdog" sociology which tends toward "intellectual hipsterisra"®® and the "theory and practice of cool"^ by focusing upon exotic, marginal, and powerless groups. These labeling theorists have been called the "zookeepers of deviance"^ who render sympathetic

91 phenomenological accounts of "nuts, sluts, and perverts" while ignoring

92 both the role of powerful agents and agencies of social control and

93 the deviance of the powerful.

This fascination with the exotic world of deviant subcultures and the sympathetic portrayal of deviant groups, combined with the critiques of this trend, has been one of the major factors in the failure of many sociologists to recognize the paradigmatic implica tions of the labeling perspective. A more important reason for this failure, however, has been the emphasis many labeling theorists place on the concept of "career" or "secondary deviance," and the manner in which positivistic criminologists have used this concept to construct a narrow, causal theory of labeling in an attempt to answer etiological questions. The work of labeling theorists Lemert, Becker, and Scheff has contributed a great deal to this trend.

Although Lemert's work came first, it was only in retrospect that he became a labeling theorist and that his work contributed to the 94 development of labeling theory. While Lemert appears to have much in common with the Chicago school tradition of sociology, a close look at his work indicates that it does not depart as radically from the assumptions of positivism as does the work of the Chicago school sociologists. In fact, Lemert himself has indicated that he does not 3 8 consider himself to be either a labeling theorist or an interactionist 95 sociologist. However, Lemert's theoretical and empirical work has

consistently addressed the issue of societal reactions to deviance, and his concept of "secondary deviance" is considered to be one of the most central concepts in the labeling perspective. Thus, Lemert's work clearly falls within the labeling tradition.

Lemert is concerned with explaining deviant behavior. Even though he directs attention to the defining of persons and their behavior as deviant, the primary focus remains on behavioral questions concerning crime and deviance: what is the effect of labeling on behavior?, how does deviant behavior become stabilized? To answer these questions,

Lemert advocates a two-phase explanation which stresses development rather than origins. According to Lemert, it is important to distinguish between "original causes" and "effective causes," and "primary deviance"

and "secondary deviance.Primary deviance is the violation of

norms arising from original causes which may be social, biological,

psychological or situational. As long as primary deviations are not

discovered or are tolerated, and if the individual can incorporate them

into a non-deviant self conception, they will be of little consequence.

If, however, others become aware of these deviations and react to

them by labeling the individual as deviant and applying social sanctions

to him or her, the process leading to secondary deviation may begin.

According to Lemert, deviance becomes secondary when "a person begins

to employ his deviant behavior or role based upon it as a means of

defense, attack, or adjustment to the overt and covert problems created 97 by the consequent societal reaction to him." Thus, societal reactions 39 to deviance can result in new self conceptions and altered role rela tionships for the deviant, leading to the development of stabilized patterns of deviant behavior and commitment to the deviant role.

Howard Becker's discussion of deviant career sequences, is very similar to Lemert*s analysis of the process of secondary deviance.

Becker (who is a student of Everett Hughes) examines the various

"career contingencies" which can effect an individuals movement through stages into a deviant career and commitment to a deviant role. As

Becker puts it, "one of the most crucial steps in the process of building a stable pattern of deviant behavior is likely to be the ,.98 experience of being caught and publicly labeled as deviant. Being publicly labeled as deviant can have important consequences for the individual so labeled, including the limitation of opportunities for social participation with legitimate groups and the alteration of the self image. One of the most important consequences, according to

Becker, is a drastic change in the individual's public identity which moves them toward greater commitment to the deviant role. The final step in the deviant career sequence outlined by Becker is the movement into an organized deviant group or subculture. Thus, Becker, like

Lemert, is not concerned with the original causes of the deviant behavior but with the effects that labeling or societal reactions can have in producing more stable patterns of the behavior.

Following the insights of Lemert and Becker, Thomas Scheff made perhaps the greatest contribution to the development of this theme

regarding career or secondary deviance with his book, Being Mentally

111: A Sociological Theory. Working from the labeling perspective, Scheff put into propositional form a theory concerning the process of becoming mentally ill. Scheff’s theory revolves around the concept of

"residual rule-breaking"— rule breaking which can not be classified into normal, typical categories of rule breaking behavior— and the impact of labeling for an individuals entry into the sick role and deviant career of insanity. The core of Scheff's "labeling theory" of mental illness is his ninth proposition which states: "Among residual rule-breakers, labeling is the single most important cause of careers

99 of residual deviance." Overall, Scheff's theory combines the labeling perspective with a systems conception to explain an individual's entry into the mentally ill role as the result of "the reciprocal and cumulative interrelationship between the rule-breaker's behavior and the societal reaction."^00

The work of Lemert, Becker, and Scheff, concerning the inter actional processes through which labeling or societal reactions produce stable patterns of deviant behavior and commitment to deviant roles, became very popular in the late 1960's and early 1970's. This populari zation seemed to come about due to the fact that these ideas had considerable ideological attraction for liberal underdog sociologists and other critics of agencies of social control,and because 102 students and readers found the ideas to be "interesting." Whatever the reasons for its popularity, the career or secondary deviance theme

came to be identified as the core of the labeling perspective and its

central concern, by both proponents and critics alike. Much of the

theoretical and empirical work within the labeling tradition has been 103 directed toward issues raised by these ideas. In general, the 41 emphasis on the effects which labeling may have for the consequent behavior of deviants has served to confine the labeling perspective to behavioral questions and prevent the distinctive character of the new paradigm (inherent in the definitional theme) from being recognized.

As Kitsuse observes:

The distinctive character of the societal reaction perspec tive is not that it presents a theory of deviant behavior in opposition to the 'norms-based* theory, nor a theory of deviant behavior systems. Its distinctiveness leads away from these social-psychological issues to a consider ation of how deviants come to be differentiated by imputations made about them by others, how these imputations activate systems of social control, and how those control activities become legitimated as institu tional responses to deviance.1^

The Positivistic Critics

The unfortunate failure of many sociologists to recognize that the true significance of the development of the labeling perspective lay in its generation of a new set of paradigmatic assumptions, was also the result of the work of the perspectives' positivist critics.Not only have these critics attacked the empirical adequacy of the concept of secondary deviance, but more importantly, they have harshly criti cized the labeling perspective for its inability to deal with etiological questions concerning criminal and deviant behavior. Nettler states that,

"labeling theory does not explain the behaviors that lead to the appli- ,.106 cation of labels. Likewise, Wellford, after reviewing the empirical evidence for a number of labeling assumptions, observes that:

In sum, one should conclude that to the degree that these assumptions can be taken to be basic to the labeling perspec tive, the perspective must be seriously questioned; and criminologists should be encouraged to explore other ways to conceptualize the causal process of the creation, perpetua-^^ tion, and intensification of criminal and delinquent behavior. 42

Note the preoccupation of these critics with the explanation of the causes of criminal and deviant behavior. The positivist critics cannot escape from the confines of the behavioral paradigm and the assumption that criminal or deviant behavior is intrinsically and objectively real and determined by antecedent causes. These critics are blind to the fact that the definitional realities of crime and deviance are just as important to explain as the behavioral realities.

The positivist critics erect a narrow, causal theory of labeling which distorts the distinctive approach of the perspective. They have con structed a sociological straw man which they can easily and safely demolish behind the barriers of the behavioral paradigm.

The major critique of labeling theory from a positivist perspec tive, and the clearest example of the construction and destruction of a sociological straw man, can be found in Walter Gove's The Labelling of Deviance: Evaluating a Perspective. This book is a publication of the proceedings of the third Vanderbilt sociology conference in 1974.

Eight original studies are presented to assess the empirical adequacy of the labeling perspective. In each case the conclusion is the same, the empirical facts do not support the labeling perspective of deviance.

Despite the rebuttal of Kitsuse and Schur, and their protests that the

108 labeling perspective has been misconceived by Gove, he concludes in the summary of the reviews that:

The evidence reviewed consistently indicates that it is the behavior or the condition of the person that is the critical factor in causing someone to be labelled a deviant . . . and . . . that labelling is not the major cause . . . of deviant behavior.109 Gove's book appears to deliver a devastating and perhaps fatal blow to the labeling perspective. But as Petrunik^® points out, Gove and the other critics missed the "real" labelling approach and destroyed instead a strawman which they themselves had helped to create. Their formulations of the evidence from a positivist perspective within the behavioral paradigm resulted in their overlooking a number of important studies stemming from the assumptions and concerns of the definitional paradigm. Gove's portrayal of the labeling perspective does not accurately reflect the concerns of the perspective, especially those that center around the definitional theme. As Plummer notes in his review of Gove's book:

At base, all the empirical critiques in this book depend upon the erection of a straw man— upon the construction of a position which no practicing labelling theorist would actually endorse. Here in one book . . . is as clear a statement as possible that the critics and defendants are really talking about quite different things. The critics have erected a very narrow, tight, specific theory of labelling; while the defendants are generating a paradigmatic set of questions with which to approach the study of deviance. They can both be right, because they are both making different claims.m

As Plummer points out, they can both be right because they are operating within different theoretical paradigms with different funda mental images of the subject matter of the sociology of crime and deviance. The power and significance of the labeling perspective does not lie in its two behavioral themes— the microsociology of deviant worlds and the effects of labeling on subsequent behaviors— but in its definitional theme, which directs attention to the social construction or production of the reality of deviance. The development of this 44 theme constitutes the formation of the definitional paradigm in the sociology of crime and deviance. As Plummer notes:

Labelling is not a limited theory as much as a perspective, paradigm, or conception which usefully directs attention to areas hitherto overlooked. Its problematic is the deviant label or societal reaction and it seeks to raise a full spectrum of questions and hypotheses concerning the nature of varying kinds of deviant categorizations, the conditions under which they emerge (historically and situationally) the ways in which they are applied (by self or others) and the impact of such labels (for deviants and the wider society) .... This paradigm . . . promises to become the major set of orientating questions to the field of deviance in sociology for the future.

SUMMARY

This chapter has reviewed the paradigmatic status of the socio logical study of crime and deviance. Two major paradigms were reviewed: the behavioral paradigm and the definitional paradigm. The behavioral paradigm assumes that criminal or deviant behavior is intrinsically real, objectively given, and caused by antecedent factors. This paradigm therefore directs attention to the description of these behaviors and to the scientific explanation of their causes. The behavioral paradigm has dominated theoretical and empirical work within the sociology of crime and deviance for most of the century. However, with the development of the labeling perspective in the early 1960's, a new paradigm emerged to challenge the

The labeling perspective emerged out of the Chicago School Symbolic

Interactionist tradition and it had three broad themes: 1) that deviance was "created" by a social definitional process, 2) that deviant labels might impact on the self-concept, role relationships, and deviant career of the individual labeled, and 3) that sociologists should render naturalistic descriptions of deviant subcultures and social worlds.

Although many labeling theorists, and the positivistic critics of the

perspective, stress the second and third themes (which deal with

behavioral questions) and attempt to place the perspective within the

behavioral paradigm, the real power and significance of the labeling

approach lies in the first theme, which constitutes a new paradigmatic

framework for the sociological study of crime and deviance.

This new paradigmatic framework is the definitional paradigm, and

it assumes that crime and deviance are not intrinsically real or * objectively given. Rather this paradigm assumes that crime and deviance

are collective definitions or social constructions, produced through

a definitional process by the activities of various social control

agents and agencies. Thus, within the definitional paradigm, attention

is directed to the description and explanation of the definitional

process in which deviance and crime are socially constructed. FOOTNOTES

John Kitsuse, "The ’New Conception of Deviance’ and Its Critics," in Walter Gove (ed.)» The Labelling of Deviance; Evaluating a Perspective (New York: Halstead Press, 1975), p. 275. 2 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

3Ibid.

^See the group of essays in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), especially the essay by Margaret Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm." Also see the "Postscript" to the second edition of Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970).

3See Robert Friedrichs, A Sociology of Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1970), Andrew Effrat, "Power to the Paradigms: An Editorial Introduction," Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 42 (1972), pp. 3-33; Derek Phillips, "Paradigms, Falsifications and Sociology," Acta Sociologica, Vol. 16 (1973), pp. 13-31; Charles Reasons, "Social Thought and Social Structure: Competing Paradigms in Criminology," Criminology, Vol. 13 (1975), pp. 332-365; George Ritzer, Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm Science (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1975); and T. P. Wilson, "Conceptions of Interaction and Forms of Sociological Explanation," American Sociological Review, Vol. 35 (August, 1970), pp. 687-707.

^George Ritzer, 1975, op. cit., p. 7.

^See Robert Friedrichs, 1970, op. cit. g Thomas Kuhn, 1962, op. cit. 9 George Ritzer, 1975, op. cit. 10 George Void, Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. V. 11 Ronald L. Akers, "Problems in the Sociology of Deviance: Social Definitions and Behavior," Social Forces, Vol. 46 (June, 1968), p. 456.

46 47 12 See C. Ray Jeffery, "The Historical Development of Criminology,” The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 50 (June, 1959); Austin Turk, "Class, Conflict, and Criminalization," Sociological Focus, Vol. 10 (August, 1977), pp. 209-219; and William J. Chambliss, "The State, the law and the definition of behavior as criminal or delinquent," in Daniel Glaser (ed.), Handbook of Criminology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), pp. 7-43. 13 George Void, 1958, op. cit., p. 26.

^Ibid., pp. 14-26. Also see the essays by Elio Monachesi (on Beccaria) and Gilbert Geis (on Bentham) in Hermann Mannheim (ed.), Pioneers in Criminology (Montclair, New Jersey: Patterson Smith, 1972), pp. 36-68.

15Ibid., p. 23.

16 Ibid., p. 25. The neo-classical school represented certain modifi cations which were necessary in the administration of a criminal law based on classical theory. The neo-classical school was characterized by modifications of the doctrine of free will and the doctrine of responsibility, and the acceptance of the validity of mitigating circum stances. 17 Ibid., p. 39. For a different view, however, see Richard Quinney, "Crime: Phenomenon, Problem and Subject of Study" in Erwin 0. Smigel (ed.) Handbook on the Study of Social Problems (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), pp. 209-246.

18Ibid.

19 Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King, "Ideologies and Crime" in Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Marvin E. Wolfgang (ed.), second and revised edition, Crime and Justice: Volume III The Criminal Under Restraint (New York: Basic Book, Inc., 1977), pp. 432-449.

20Ibid. 21 Richard Quinney, "A Critical Theory of Criminal Law," in Richard Quinney (ed.) Criminal Justice in America: A Critical Understanding (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), p. 4. 22 Travis Hirschi and David Rudisill, "The Great American Search: Causes of Crime 1876-1976," Annals, AAPSS, Vol. 423 (January, 1976), pp. 14-22. 2 3 Ibid. Also see Richard Quinney, 1971, op. cit., p. 217, and George Void, 1958, op. cit. 48

A f See Ernest A. Hooton, Crime and the Man (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939). Also, for a review of American thought on the biology of crime, see Arthur E. Fink, Causes of Crime: Biological Theories in the United States, 1800-1915 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938). 25 See Ernest Kretschner, Physique and Character (translated by W. H. Sprott) (New York: Hatcourt, Brace, 1926); William Sheldon, Varieties of Delinquent Youth (New York: Harper, 1949). Also see the excellent chapter in George Void, 1958, op. cit., pp. 43-74.

26 See Henry H. Goddard, Feeble-mindedness: Its Causes and Consequences (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914). Also see Arthur E. Fink, 1938, op. cit., pp. 211-239. 27 See Robert L. Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease and Heredity (New York: Putnam, 1877); Johannes Lange, Crime and Destiny (translation by C. Haldane) (New York: Boni, 1930).

28 See William Healy, The Individual Delinquent (Boston: Little, Brown, 1915); Cyril Burt, The Young Delinquent (New York: D. Appleton, 1925). 29 See Karl Schuessler and Donald Cressey, "Personality Characteris tics of Criminals," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 55 (March, 1950), pp. 476-484. Also see Gordon Waldo and Simon Dinitz, "Personality Attributes of the Criminal: An Analysis of Research Studies, 1950-1965: Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, Vol. 4 (July, 1967), pp. 185-202. 30 See George Void, 1958, op. cit., pp. 109-140.

31 See the recent writings of C. Ray Jeffery, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, Second edition (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1977) and "Editorial, Criminology: Whither or Wither," Criminology, Vol. 15 (November, 1977), pp. 283-286.

32 For an excellent review of recent research, see Saleen A. Shah and Loren H. Roth, "Biological and Psychophysiological Factors in Criminality," in Daniel Glaser (ed.), Handbook of Criminology (New York: Rand McNally, 1974), pp. 101-173.

33 Gilbert Geis, "Sociology, Criminology, and Criminal Law," Social Problems Vol. 7 (Summer, 1959), pp. 40-47. 34 See Robert H. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," American Sociological Review, Vol. 3 (1938), pp. 672-682.

35 See Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1960). 49

See Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey, "A Sociological Theory of Criminal Behavior" in Criminology (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1974), pp. 71-93. 37 See Daniel Glaser, "Criminality Theories and Behavioral Images," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 61, (March, 1956), pp. 433-444. 38 See Thorsten Sellin, Culture, Conflict and Crime (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938).

39 See Ronald Akers, Deviant Behavior: A Social Learning Approach (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1977).

^See Walter C. Reckless, The Crime Problem, Fifth Edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts); Travis Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); F. Ivan Nye, Family Relationships and Delinquency Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1958).

41 See Edwin M. Lemert, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972).

42 See Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, The New Criminology (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 209-236.

43 Clayton A. Hartjen, Crime and Criminalization (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), pp. 4-5.

44 See Howard S. Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1963); Kai T. Erikson, "Notes of the Sociology of Deviance," Social Problems 9 (Spring, 1962), pp. 307-314: John I. Kitsuse, "Societal Reaction to Deviant Behavior: Problems of Theory and Method," Social Problems 9 (Winter, 1962), pp. 247-256.

45 Jack P. Gibbs and Maynard L. Erickson, "Major Developments in the Sociological Study of Deviance" in Alex Inkeles, James Coleman and Neil Smelser (ed.) Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 1 (Palo Alto, California: Annual Review, Inc., 1975).

46 Malcolm Spector, "Labeling Theory and Social Problems: A Young Journal Launches a new Theory." Social Problems 24 (October, 1976), p. 69-75. 47 Gibbs and Erickson, 1975, op. cit., p. 39. 48 Erich Goode, "On Behalf of Labeling Theory," Social Problems 22 (June, 1975), p. 570-583. Also see Spector, op. cit. 49 This refers to research into deviant subcultures, deviant identi ties and secondary or career deviance. This work will be discussed later in this chapter. 50

■^Turk, 1977, op. cit.

"^Jack Gibbs, "Conceptions of Deviant Behavior: The Old and the New." Pacific Sociological Review 9 (Spring, 1966), pp. 9-14. Also see the collection of articles in Walter Gove (ed.), The Labelling of Deviance: Evaluating a Perspective (New York: Sage Publications, 1975).

52 Alexander Liazos, "The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts and ’Perverts'" Social Problems 20 (Summer, 1972), pp. 103-120; Alex Thio "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance," The American Sociologist 8 (February, 1973), pp. 1-12; Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, op. cit. 53 See Peter Manning, "Survey Essay: On Deviance" Contemporary Sociology 12 (March, 1973), pp. 123-128. Also see Peter Manning, "Deviance and Dogma: Some Comments on the Labeling Perspective," British Journal of Criminology 15 (January, 1975), pp. 1-20. 54 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1938).

"^George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," American Journal of Sociology 23 (1918), pp. 577-602.

56 Frank Tannenbaum, Crime and the Community (Boston: Ginn, 1938).

57 For a review of this literature, see Michael Petrunik, "The Quest for Fluency: A Study of the Identity Problems and Management Strategies of Adult Stutterers." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Toronto, 1977. 58 Edwin Lemert, Social Pathology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951). Also see Lemert, 1967, op. cit. 59 Michael Petrunik, "The Rise and Alleged Fall of ’Labeling Theory’: The Construction and Destruction of a Sociological Strawman." Paper presented at the American Society of Criminology Meetings, November, 1977.

^Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969).

^Everett C. Hughes, Men and Their Work (New York: The Free Press, 1958). 62 See Nels Anderson, The Hobo: The Sociology of the Homeless Man (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1932); Fredric Thrasher, The Gang (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927); Clifford Shaw, The Jack Roller (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930); Harvey Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929); Louis Wirth, The Ghetto (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928). 51

Howard S. Becker, Sociological Work: Methods and Substance (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1970); Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1967). •

^Edwin Schur, Labelling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 7.

^See Lemert, 1967, op. cit., and Becker, 1963, op. cit. 66 Nanette J. Davis, "Labeling Theory in Deviance Research: A Critique and Reconsideration," The Sociological Quarterly 13 (Fall, 1972), p. 460.

^Milton Mankoff, "Societal Reaction and Career Deviance: A Critical Analysis," Sociological Quarterly 12 (Spring, 1971), p. 204. fi ft Davis, 1972, op. cit., p. 456.

69 See David Matza, Becoming Deviant (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).

^ B l u m e r , 1969, op. cit., p. 5.

^Robert H. Lauer and Warren H. Handel, Social Psychology (Boston: Houghlin Mifflin Co., 1977), p. 85. 72 Howard S. Becker, "Labeling Theory Reconsidered" in Outsiders 2nd Edition, 1973. 73 Spector, 1976, op. cit., p. 70.

74 Kitsuse, 1962, op. cit.

^ E r i k s o n , 1963, op. cit.

76 John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel, "A Note on the Use of Official Statistics," Social Problems 11 (Fall, 1963), pp. 131-139. 77 Becker, 1963, op. cit. 78 Spector, 1976, op. cit. 79 Becker, 1963, op. cit., p. 9. 80 See Gibbs, 1966, op. cit.,; Akers, 1968, op. cit.; David Bordua, "Recent Trends: Deviant Behavior and Social Control," Annals AAPSS 369 (January, 1967), pp. 149-163. 81 Goode, 1975, op. cit., p. 570. 82 Spector, 1976, op. cit., p. 73. 52

OO Kitsuse, 1962, op. cit., p. 253.

^Erikson, 1962, op. cit., p. 308.

Or Becker, 1963, op. cit., p. 9. 86 Much of this research can be found in Earl Rubington and Martin S. Weinberg, Deviance: The Interactionist Perspective Third edition (New York: Macmillan, 1978). 87 Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," The American Sociologist 3 (May, 1968), pp. 103-116. 88 William Simon and John H. Gagnon, "Femininity in the Lesbian Community," Social Problems 15 (Fall, 1967), pp. 212-221.

89 Gouldner, 1968, op. cit.

Ibid. 91 Liazos, 1972, op. cit.

92 Dusky Lee Smith, "Symbolic Interactionism: Definitions of the Situation from Howard Becker and John Lofland," Catalyst 7 (Winter, 1973), pp. 62-76.

93 Thio, 1973, op. ext.

94 See Spector, 1976, op. cit., p. 70. Also see Prudence Rains, "Imputations of Deviance: A Retrospective Essay on the Labeling Per spective," Social Problems 23 (October, 1975), pp. 1-11.

95 See Lemert's Presidential Address to the Society for the Study of Social Problems. "Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance," Social Problems 21 (April, 1974), pp. 457-467. Also see Lemert, 1967, op. c i t ., p . V. 96 Lemert, 1951, op. cit. 97 Ibid., p. 76. 98 Becker, 1963, op. cit., p. 31. 99 Thomas Scheff, Being Mentally 111: A Sociological Theory (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1966), p. 92.

100_,Ibid., p. 097.-, 101 Petrunik, 1977, op. cit., p. 24. 53 102 See Murray Davis, "That's Interesting! Toward a Phenomenology of Sociology and a Sociology of Phenomenology," Philosophy of Social Science 1 (April, 1971), pp. 309-344; also see John Hagan, "Labeling and Deviance: A Case Study in the Sociology of the Interesting," Social Problems 20 (Spring, 1973), pp. 447-458. 103 See Rubington and Weinberg, 1978, op. cit.

^"^John Kitsuse, "The 'New Conception of Deviance' And Its Critics," in Walter Gove (ed.) The Labelling of Deviance (New York: Halsted, 1975), p. 282.

^"’See Gibbs, 1966, op. cit. Also see Travis Hirschi, "Procedural Rules and the Study of Deviant Behavior," Social Problems 21 (Fall, 1973), pp. 159-173.

106 Gwynn Nettler, Explaining Crime Second edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978), p. 301.

■^^Charles Wellford, "Labeling Theory and Criminology: An Assess ment," Social Problems 23 (Winter, 1975), p. 343. 108 Kitsuse, 1975, op. cit., p. 275 notes that: "I think we have all been barking up the wrong tree— by which I mean, the questions and issues have been phrased in such ways as to deflect us from a consideration of the sense in which the new conception is distinctively new." 109 Gove, 1975, op. cit., p. 295. 110 Petrunick, 1977, op. cit.

■^^Ken Plummer, "Review of The Labelling of Deviance, ed. Walter Gove," British Journal of Criminology 17 (January, 1977), p. 80.

112Ibid., p. 80-81. CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF CRIME AND DEVIANCE:

THEORETICAL EXPLANATIONS AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The present research has been guided by the assumptions of the definitional paradigm. The creation of the career criminal program is a particular example of the social construction of crime. Before we turn specifically to the examination of the origin and development of the program, however, we need to review the previous theoretical and empirical work concerning the process of the social construction of crime and deviance. Therefore, this chapter will examine the theory and research which exists within the definitional paradigm.

A number of different theoretical perspectives have been used within the definitional paradigm to explain the social construction of crime and deviance. We will review: 1) Howard Becker's symbolic

interactionist perspective and his moral entrepreneur thesis, 2)

Donald Dickson's organizational perspective on moral crusades, 3)

Joseph Gusfield's notion of symbolic, crusades, 4) the functionalist

perspective of Durkheim and Kai Erikson's expansion of it, 5) the

Marxist conflict perspective and 6) the interest group conflict

perspective. These perspectives and the research they have generated

should provide us with a number of analytic categories and explanatory

54 55 factors which can be utilized in the analysis of the career criminal program. This analysis, in turn, should allow us to assess the explanatory adequacy of the propositions derived from these perspec tives .

Although the definitional paradigm did not emerge as a coherent framework for orientating the sociological study of crime and deviance until the 1960’s, there were a number of studies before then that addressed issues which properly fall within this paradigm. For example,

Sutherland's analysis of the diffusion of sexual psychopath l a w s , ’*'

Davis' discussion of the instrumental role played by the psychiatric profession in disseminating conceptions of normality and mental health through the mental hygiene movement, and Hall's interpretation of the origins and development of the modern law of theft from fifteenth

3 century England and the decision rendered in the Carrier's Case, all deal with questions related to the process of the collective definition of crime and deviance. The most important of these early studies, however, was Sutherland's, for his examination of the creation and spread of the sexual psychopath laws foreshadowed many of the central concerns which were to emerge within the definitional paradigm in the future. Thus, we will begin with Sutherland.

SUTHERLAND'S ANALYSIS OF THE SEXUAL PSYCHOPATH LAWS

In his analysis of the diffusion of sexual psychopath laws in the

United States between 1937 and 1949, Sutherland described three major stages which each law passed through. First, he points out, "these laws are customarily enacted after a state of fear has been aroused in 56 4 a community by a few serious sex crimes committed in quick succession."

The second stage in the process of developing sexual psychopath laws, according to Sutherland "is the agitated activity of the community in connection with the fear."^ The most important actors in these first two stages, he notes, are the mass media and political authorities.

The third stage in the process is the appointment of a committee-

According to Sutherland, the "committee gathers the many conflicting recommendations of persons and groups of persons, attempts to determine

'facts,* studies procedures in other states, and makes recommendations, which generally include bills for the legislature."® The main function of the committee is to organize information, and Sutherland points out that the psychiatric profession played the key role at this point.

Sutherland concludes that:

The organization of information in the name of science and without critical appraisal seems to be more invariably related to the emergence of a sexual psychopath law that is any other part of this genetic process.7

While Sutherland's analysis is somewhat superficial, it is, nonetheless, an important piece of work for it presages the central issues involved in the study of the definitional process of crime and deviance. What Sutherland has examined is the production of a social problem, the creation of a criminal law, and the invention of a new legal category of deviance. By pointing out the false or questionable nature of the propositions which underlie these laws,® Sutherland demonstrates that stereotyping operates at the level of collective rule making as well as at the level of organizational processing. He has also pointed out how criminal laws can serve symbolic functions 57 Q independent of their instrumental goals. He has noted how organiza tional factors, especially the organization of information by a committee, can influence the collective rule making p r o c e s s .

Sutherland has also stressed the importance of both moral entrepre- 11 12 neurs, and vested economic interests in the creation of these laws.

Although Sutherland did not spell out the relationships between these factors, nor indicate their relative importance to the definitional process, by including them all in his analysis he did indicate to future researchers that all of these factors may play a role in the explanation of collective rule making.

However, Sutherland's most important contribution was to show that broad scale social movements and related changes in cultural values affect the collective definition of social problems, deviance, and crime. As Sutherland points out, "the most significant reason for the specific content of the proposals of these committees— treatment of the sex criminal as a patient— is that it is consistent with a general social

13 movement." Sutherland observes that the web of cultural values relating to punishment was changing at this point in history with a general shift to a treatment policy based on the rehabilitative ideal.

He points out that:

The trend toward treatment and away from punishment is based on cultural changes in the society. The trend away from punishment in criminal justice is consistent with the trend away from punishment in the home, the school, and the church. The trend toward treatment is consistent with a general trend toward scientific procedures in other fields, as illustrated by medicine, with its techniques of diagnosis and with treat ment and prevention based on scientific knowledge of the causes of disease.14 58

Thus, although Sutherland's analysis of the sexual psychopath laws preceded the full blown development of the definitional paradigm, his work certainly prefigured later sociological work in this area, and his stress on the importance of social movements for a full under standing of the collective definition of crime and deviance was a major contribution to our knowledge of this process.

THE ROLE OF ENTERPRISE IN CREATING DEVIANCE: MORAL ENTREPRENEURS

As we have noted, Howard S. Becker was the pivotal figure in the development of the labeling or interactionist perspective. He has also made an important theoretical contribution to the study of the creation of deviance with his concepts of "enterprise," "moral crusade," and

"moral entrepreneur." These concepts have been among the most popular and useful analytic categories for the sociological study of rule creation and enforcement. Becker, himself, has attempted to demon strate the empirical validity of these concepts through an analysis of the origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937.

Recall that Becker's position is that "social groups created deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as out-

15 siders.” Thus, according to Becker, it is important to study the rule creation and rule enforcement process. Deviance, Becker points out, is always the result of enterprise, 59

Rules are not made automatically. Even though a practice may be harmful in an objective sense to the group in which it occurs, the harm needs to be discovered and pointed out. People must be made to feel that something ought to be done about it. Someone must call the public’s attention to these matters, supply the push necessary to get things done, and direct such energies as are aroused in the proper direction to get a rule created. Deviance is the product of enter prise in the largest sense; without the enterprise required to get rules made, the deviance which consists of breaking the rule could not exist.^

Becker goes on to point out that in a smaller and more particular sense as well, deviance is the product of enterprise:

Once a rule has come into existence, it must be applied to particular people before the abstract class of out siders created by the rule can be peopled. Offenders must be discovered, identified, apprehended and convicted . . . This job ordinarily falls to the lot of professional enforcers who, by enforcing already existing rules, created the particular deviants society views as out siders.^-^

Thus, rules and their enforcement are always the products of someone's initiative and, according to Becker, "we can think of the

18 people who exhibit such enterprise as moral entrepreneurs."

(Emphasis in original). The specific role of the moral entrepreneur

is shaping the general value to specific act of enforcement. As

Becker points out, movement through this sequence is not automatic or

inevitable, it is a process subject to various conditions and contin

gencies. Moral entrepreneurs are the persons who make it their business

to see that the rules are deduced from general values, and to see that

the rules are applied and enforced.

As an illustrative case of the empirical validity of this theory,

Becker examined the origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. He

.stated that, "according to the theory outlined above, we should find in the history of this Act the story of an entrepreneur whose initiative and enterprise overcame public apathy and indifference and culminated in

19 the passage of Federal legislation." To begin, Becker points out three general values of American culture have legitimated attempts to prevent the use of intoxicants and narcotics in the past. The first legitimizing value is a component of the Protestant Ethic and holds that individuals should exercise complete responsibility for what they do and they should never do anything to cause a loss of self-control.

The second value, based on pragmatic and utilitarian cultural emphases, is a disapproval of action taken solely to achieve ecstatic experiences.

The third value providing a basis for attempts at suppression was humanitarianism, a belief that people who were enslaved by the use of alcohol or opium could be helped and reformed.

These three general values provided the basis for more specific

rules regarding the use of marihuana according to Becker, and the moral entrepreneur which made it its business to deduce these rules was the

Treasury Department's Bureau of Narcotics. Becker indicates that the enterprising efforts of the Bureau took two forms. First of all, the

Bureau cooperated with the National Conference of Commissioners on

Uniform State Laws to develop state legislation affecting the use of marihuana. Second, the Bureau aroused the public to the danger of

marihuana through an educational campaign in the mass media. Overall,

Becker points out, the Bureau of Narcotics "provided most of the enter

prise which produced public awareness of the problem and coordinated 20 action by other enforcement organizations." Representatives of the 61

Treasury Department went to Congress with a draft of the Act requesting its passage, and despite minor objections from hempseed oil manufac turers and the birdseed industry, the bill passed easily. The moral enterprise of the Bureau had created a new law whose enforcement would produce a new class of deviants— marihuana smokers. Summarizing the illustration, Becker notes that:

Wherever rules are created and applied, we should be alive to the possible presence of an enterprising individual or group. Their activities can properly be called moral enterprise, for what they are enterprising about is the creation of a new fragment of the moral constitution of society, its code of right and wrong. Wherever rules are created and applied we should expect to find people attempting to enlist the support of coordinate groups and using the available media of communication to develop a favorable climate of opinion. Where they do not develop such support, we may expect to find their enterprise unsuccessful.21

MORAL CRUSADES: AN ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Becker's interpretation of the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act, as the end result of a crusade by a moral entrepreneur has been challenged by Donald Dickson who brings an organizational perspective to bear on the problem. After reviewing Becker's argument that the

Bureau of Narcotics acted as a moral entrepreneur, Dickson states that:

Given the short time span Becker chose and his individualized focus, this seems to be a logical explanation of the Bureau's efforts. Given a broader organizational perspective, however, the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act and the Bureau's part in that passage appear to be only one phase of a larger organiza tional process, that of environmental change."22

Dickson points out that all organizations face an on-going problem of establishing a supportive, or at least a neutral relationship with their environments. Survival necessitates that an organization adapt 62

to environmental demands or attempt to alter the environment in some

fashion so that it is more compatible with the interests of the organi

zation. Dickson analyzes the enterprising activities of the Bureau of

Narcotics concerning the Marihuana Tax Act as part of a larger organi zational attempt at environmental change, rather than as a morally

inspired crusade. The Bureau of Narcotics, according to Dickson, generated a propaganda campaign and instigated legislative efforts in an attempt to alter its organizational environment and increase the

Bureau's power and scope of operations. Thus, Dickson concludes that the Marihuana Tax Act was more a bureaucratic response to environmental conditions based on organizational interests, than a crusade by morally committed entrepreneurs. However, he points out that:

. . . this paper does not presume to refute the moral entre preneur approach— for in many instances it is a valid and useful means of analysis— but rather it attempts to demon strate an alternative explanation that may frequently be appropriate. It would be either naive or presumptuous to deny that some combination of both moral and bureaucratic factors exist in any given crusade. The problem for analysis is to determine the relative importance of each, and the consequences stemming from a particular combination. The utility of the organizational approach lies in that it can be extended to other similar moral crusades or to entire social movements, where the emphasis so far has been on the work of individual crusaders rather than on organizations and their environments. Further, to the extent these movements follow the general societal pattern and become increasingly complex, organized, and bureaucratic, the organizational approach will become even more important in analysis and prediction.^3

Becker and Dickson both have made important contributions to our understanding of how collective definitions of deviance emerge as a result of moral enterprise. Becker highlights the important role that

"moral entrepreneurs" play in this process of deviance creation, while 63

Dickson advances Becker's analysis by introducing the organizational context in which crusades arise. Taken together, these two studies direct our attention to several important explanatory factors which must be taken into account in any empirical examination of the creation of crime and deviance.

SYMBOLIC CRUSADES

Moral crusades which create new criminal laws or categories of deviance can often have symbolic significance. In his detailed investi gation of the American Temperance Movement, Joseph Gusfield called attention to the symbolic nature of rules, and of the social processes involved in their creation.^ Symbolic crusades, according to Gusfield, are those rule creating enterprises which serve symbolic rather than instrumental functions. Instrumental action is "a means to a fixed end." Legal and governmental actions can often "affect behavior in an instrumental manner through a direct influence on the actions of

9 f t people." Symbolic actions, however, are quite different, as Gusfield points out:

They are symbolic in a sense close to that used in literary analysis. The symbolic act 'invites consideration rather than overt reaction.' There is a dimension of meaning in symbolic behavior which is not given in its immediate and manifest significance but in what the action connotes for the audience that views it. The symbol 'has acquired a meaning which is added to its immediate intrinsic signifi cance . . . . ' In analyzing law as symbolic we are oriented less to behavioral consequences as a means to a fixed end; more to meaning as an act, a decision, a gesture important in itself. ^

Symbolic crusades, thus, can be distinguished from more instrumentally oriented enterprises on the basis of their goals. Symbolic 64 goals, according to Gusfield, involve status issues, such as prestige, and life-style. Moral crusades oriented to symbolic goals thus involve, what Gusfield calls, "status politics." Gusfield is careful to dis tinguish between class politics, which involve conflicts over the allocation of material resources, and status politics, which involve conflicts over the allocation of prestige. Class politics are oriented towards the interests of particular groups in the economic system and thus their goals are "instrumental." Movements involving status politics, however, while they may be interest oriented, seek the achievement of symbolic goals rather than instrumental ones.

In his analysis of the American temperance movement, Gusfield

stresses the symbolic character of the status group conflicts in

American society over the use of alcohol. The issues involved in this

social movement, according to Gusfield were not just instrumental ones

of power and economic interest, rather, they more often involved a

question of whose status, prestige, morality and life-style would be

publicly affirmed. Gusfield asserts, that in securing passage of the

Volstead Act, the American Temperance Movement was less interested in

the prevention of drinking (instrumental concern) than in winning public

affirmation of the cultural superiority of their lifestyle over another

(symbolic concern). As he notes:

. . . the issue of drinking and abstinence became a poli tically significant focus for the conflicts between Protestant and Catholic, rural and urban, native and immigrant, middle class and lower class in American society. The political conflict lay in the efforts of an abstinent Protestant middle class to control the public affirmation of morality in drinking. Victory or defeat were consequently symbolic of the status and power of the cultures opposing each other. Legal affirmation or rejection is thus important 65

in what it symbolizes as well or instead of what it controls. Even if the law was broken, it was clear whose law it w a s . 2®

In directing attention to the symbolic significance that public designations of deviance can have for those who produce them, Gusfield has pointed to an important and neglected aspect of the rule creation process. Although Gusfield tends to equate the symbolic dimensions of governmental action only with status group conflicts, he alerts us to the symbolic functions which collective definitions of deviance can serve. He has, therefore, advanced the analysis of moral crusades beyond the work of Becker and Dickson. In fact, the most recent research on the Marihuana Tax Act suggests that there is little evi dence to support the contentions of either Becker or Dickson regarding the origins of the Act, and that instead, the passage of the Act was merely a symbolically reassuring gesture which affirmed the values of

29 federal officials concerning the use of narcotic drugs.

While Gusfield's analysis is valuable, it suffers at several points from a failure to seriously consider the possible relationships between the symbolic and instrumental dimensions of rule creation. For example, he pays little attention to the possibility that the symbolic meanings of a governmental act could serve more instrumental, class related interests, (a point which will be explored in a later chapter).

Although Gusfield acknowledges that most moral crusades contain both symbolic and instrumental elements, his analysis leaves the empirical connection between the two uninvestigated. 66

In the same vein, W. G. Carson has criticized Gusfield's analysis for its failure to specify how symbolic meanings are built up or con structed in the interactional sequences of a crusade. As Carson points out, Gusfield:

. . . fails to portray symbolic meaning as an emergent property of the interactional sequences occurring in connection with particular pieces or types of legisla tion. Indeed, the whole characterization of crusades as symbolic runs the risk of confusing ends with pro cesses, and of adopting the stance of a historian who, in the words of Schutz, 'knows perfectly well what the actor intended to do because he -knows what he did in fact d o . '30

Carson has demonstrated how a legislative issue oriented toward instru mental concerns can assume symbolic significance through interactional processes. His analysis shows how early factory legislation in Britain

(the Factories Regulation Act of 1833) received instrumentally oriented support among both the advocates of factory-reform and the manufacturers themselves. For the manufacturers, however:

the issue became increasingly infused with a symbolic significance which temporarily vitiated their instru mentally based acquiescene. This transformation was largely the result of interpretive possibilities opened up by the specific methods which the movement for reform chose to (or was forced to) adopt. Thus, the symbolic meaning of the struggle only emerged as the battle pro gressed. Once invested with this additional significance, however, the symbolic dimensions of the issue became at least temporarily paramount.

By suggesting that the process of rule creation may contain both

symbolic and instrumental elements, Carson directs our attention to the possible empirical relationships between the two. His analysis advances

Gusfield's work on symbolic crusades by demonstrating that instrumentally oriented enterprises can take on symbolic significance under certain 67 social conditions. Taken together, these two studies sensitize us to the possible importance of the symbolic dimensions of the deviance creation process.

THE SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF CRIME CREATION

Gusfield’s analysis suggested that the collective definition of crime and deviance can serve important symbolic functions for those groups who do the defining. At the same time, a number of sociolo gists have pointed out that the creation of crime tends to serve a number of important functions for the society at large. Durkheim was perhaps the first to comment on this phenomenon in his discussion of

32 the normality of crime. Crime is normal, Durkheim pointed out, since it is found in every known society and since "it is bound up with the

33 fundamental conditions of all social life.” According to Durkheim, crime is functional since it contributes to the maintenance of the society as a whole by providing a target for the collective moral outrage of its members, thereby generating greater social solidarity

among them. In addition, crime marks out the moral boundaries of a

society, and criminal activity can often serve as a catalyst for needed

social change.

Durkheim was not the only writer to note the important social

functions of crime. The American philosopher, George Herbert Mead,

also discussed the symbolic meanings of the criminal law and the

important functions that it serves for society. ^ In his discussion

of the social organization of judicial punishment, Mead focuses on the

public ritual and drama of the criminal trial. Mead compares the

criminal trial to a battle between two contending parties, and the very 68 nature of this battle serves to define and reinforce the emotional attitudes of society toward the criminal. Out of this public drama there emerges an attitude of hostility towards the criminal which fosters a sense of solidarity within the community. Mead concludes that as community members unite in their solidarity against a common enemy, they are contributing to the definition and preservation of the community boundaries.

Durkheim and Mead both, provided an important insight into the nature of crime and deviance:. the creation of deviance by social groups can serve important functions for those groups by defining the moral boundaries and producing a higher degree of social cohesion and solidarity through the collective moral outrage directed at those out side the moral boundaries. One of the few attempts to empirically investigate this functionalist hypothesis, is Kai Erikson's socio- historical analysis of deviance among the Puritan settlement in 17th century New England.

Erikson contends that "deviance is not a property inherent in any particular kind of behavior; it.is a property conferred upon that behavior by the people who come into direct or indirect contact with 35 it." Thus, for Erikson, the critical variable in the study of deviance is the social audience. In attempting to demonstrate the positive functions that crime and deviance may serve for social groups,

Erikson, following Durkheim, places a great deal of emphasis on the fact that communities are boundary maintaining. As he points out, "a human community can be said to maintain boundaries, then, in the sense that 69 Its members tend to confine themselves to a particular radius of activity and to regard any conduct which drifts outside that, radius

36 as somehow inappropriate or immoral." The important question therefore, according to Erikson, is how do people learn about the boundaries of their community?

Erikson1s starting point is the observation that the only material

found in a society for marking boundaries is the network of social

interaction which links its members together in patterned social rela

tionships. The interactions which most effectively locate and publish

the outer edges of the social group are those which regularly take place between deviant persons on the one side and the official control

agents of society on the other. According to Erikson:

. . . members of a community inform one another about the placement of their boundaries by participating in the confrontations which occur when persons who venture out to the edges of the group are met by policing agents whose special business it is to guard the cultural inte grity of the community. Whether these confrontations take the form of criminal trials, excommunication hearings, court-martial, or even psychiatric case conferences, they act as boundary-maintaining devices in the sense that they demonstrate to whatever audience is concerned where the line is drawn between behavior that belongs in the special uni verse of the group and behavior that does not. '

To document his assertions concerning the boundary maintainence

functions of deviance, Erikson investigates three major "crime waves"

which occurred among the New England Puritans in the 17th century: the

Antinomian controversy of 1636, the Quaker prosecutions of the 1650’s,

and the Salem Witchcraft hysteria of 1692. Erikson concludes from

this study that these "crime waves" were created by the Puritan com

munity in order to establish the moral boundaries of the settlement and

contribute to its moral cohesion. Deviance, therefore, can be viewed 70 as the movement of moral boundaries within a social system independent of the movement of actors across those boundaries. 0 According to

Erikson, deviance is not only normal, but an important condition of social life. As he points out:

. . . deviant behavior is not a simple kind of leakage which occurs when the machinery of society is in poor working order, but may be, in controlled quantities, an important condition for preserving the stability of social life. Deviant forms of behavior, by marking the outer edges of group life, give the inner structure its special character and thus supply the framework within which the people of the group develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity.

In providing empirical documentation for the Durkheimian proposi tion that crime serves to define moral boundaries and generate social cohesion, Erikson has made an important contribution to the sociological study of the definitional process of crime and deviance. His study alerts us to the possibility that collective definitions of deviance may serve important societal functions. Erikson's interpretation, however, has been challenged by Chambliss, who claims that Erikson’s own data provides more support for a conflict/power perspective on crime than the functionalist perspective. After reviewing the historical data produced by Erikson, Chambliss argues:

Puritan society created crime waves to help the ruling stratum maintain control of the community. There is no evidence that these crime waves increased moral solidarity, nor is there reason to conclude from this study that crime would serve the same function in another historical period. By adopting the model of functionalism, which seeks universal needs of all societies, Erikson fails to see the important role crime plays in that particular society by enabling the ruling stratum to maintain its privileged position.^*® 71

This argument brings us to a consideration of the various con flict perspectives which have been utilized to explain the creation of crime and deviance.

THE CREATION OF CRIME: CLASS CONFLICT AND SOCIAL POWER

One of the chief criticisms of the interactionist tradition in sociology in general, is that it displays an "astructural bias"^ and deals inadequately with the phenomena of social organization, conflict / A and power. These same arguments have been made concerning the interactionist explanations for collective definitions of deviance. The critics charge that much of the research into the definitional process of crime and deviance suffers from the lack of attention to the critical variables of conflict, power and social structure. As Taylor, Walton and Young point out, "the social reaction theorists, operating within the confines of liberal ideologies, fail to lay base the structured inequalities in power and interest which underpin the processes whereby

4 3 the laws are created and enforced.

It is not true that interactionist theorists have failed to recog nize the importance of power and structured inequalities in the creation of crime and deviance. For example, Becker has stated that:

Differences in the ability to make rules and apply them to other people are essentially power differentials (either legal or extralegal). Those groups whose social position gives them weapons and power are best able to enforce their rules .... We must also keep in mind that the rules created and maintained by . . . labeling are not universally agreed to. Instead, they are the object of conflict and disagreement, part of the political process of society.^ 72

However, in their empirical investigations of rule making most of the interactionist theorists have ignored the ways in which the society's larger structure of power and institutions shapes the definition of

45 crime and deviance within that society. As Austin Turk points out:

Labeling theory does, of course, postulate that the more socially powerful will do the labeling, and that the less powerful will be on the receiving end. But it is one thing to posit the importance of power as a determinant of who shall be labeler and who labelee, and another to specify the political and economic sources and the cultural and behavioral consequences of power differences. Some pertinent studies of moral entrepreneurs, deviance stereotyping, and dis criminatory law enforcement have been produced; but the ^ linkages with class structure have not been spelled out.

Althouth the interactionists did not follow up on their insights into the important roles that inequality, conflict and power play in the creation of crime and deviance, their work did serve as a point of departure for the development of a radical criminology which did make

these issues a central concern. Radical criminology, or the new

conflict/power orientation, is in no sense a unified school of thought.

This emerging tradition consists of a number of distinct individuals

/ 7 and schools, each with their own unique approach. There are, however,

a number of commonalities among them. For one, they all appear to adopt

a neo-Marxist theoretical perspective. For another, they are all highly

critical of the positivistic, liberal and correctional approaches to

crime which have predominated in much of the sociological study of crime

in the past. Most important, however, these theorists all seem to share,

at least on an abstract level, a common set of conceptual concerns which

revolve around the issues of conflict and power. As Nanette Davis

observes: 73

By recognizing the power and conflict inherent in organized life, the sociologist may seek explanations of crime and deviance in the institutions that define and regulate behavior and in the social relations created by these structures. This distribution of power, organization of production, legal definitions, and controlling activities are central concerns which provide analytic starting points for the delineation of the structural conditions that generate rule breakers. Labeling, in a sense, is a consequence and symbol of power. Exactly how such power is appropriated and maintained by organizational exchange and a legitimating apparatus remains a persistent question in sociological theory and research. ®

These concerns, of course, place the work of the new conflict theorists squarely within the framework of the definitional paradigm.

It is this fact (more than anything else) which distinguishes the new conflict theorists from older versions of conflict theory. Conflict

49 50 51 theorists of the past, whether Marxist , positivist , or pluralist ,

"failed to systematically develop the notion of conflict as the source of criminal definition rather than behavior. They were still very much tied to the traditional concern with the scientific explanation of

5 2 criminal behavior." Only since the development of the definitional paradigm in the 1960's, have a group of conflict theorists emerged to systematically explore criminality and deviance as strictly a matter of definition which is conditioned by the variables of structural con-

53 flict and power.

One important study which utilizes a Marxian class conflict approach is Tony Platt's analysis of the "Child-Saving" movement and the invention of juvenile delinquency.’’^ Originally, Platt interpreted the child- saving movement (following Gusfield) as a type of symbolic crusade, which

"served symbolic and ceremonial functions for native, middle class

Americans.Recently, however, Platt has re-interpreted his data from 74 a class conflict perspective.^ He now argues that although the child- saving movement drew its most active and visible support from the middle class, it was the financial and political support of the wealthy and powerful which allowed it to achieve significant reforms. According

to Platt, the child-saving movement "invented" new categories of youth

ful deviance and resulted in the institutionalization of the juvenile

court. He concludes that "the juvenile court system was part of a

general movement directed towards developing a specialized labor market and industrial discipline under corporate capitalism by

creating new programs of adjudication and control . . .

Hagan and Leon have disputed Platt's analysis, however. They

contend that "this Marxist perspective on the origins of American delinquency legislation is either unconfirmed or unconfirmable, plagued

58 by logical errors and, therefore, quite possibly false." Hagan and

Leon attempt to offer an alternative perspective by analyzing the

origins of Canadian delinquency legislation. They show that the prime

factor in the development of this legislation was the emergence of pro

bation work as an organizational concern.^ Hagan and Leon conclude

that their analysis should encourage a reconsideration of the conditions

under which a Marxian, class conflict perspective can be usefully

applied.

Hagan and Leon have pointed out several crucial weaknesses of many

radical criminologists, their failure to consider alternative perspec

tives and the frequent failure to provide empirical support for their

assertions. None of these weaknesses characterize the work of William

Chambliss however. Of all the new conflict theorists, he is probably the most important due to his consistent theoretical perspective, his efforts to ground his theoretical propositions in empirical data, and his willingness to consider alternative explanations. Chambliss'

60 theoretical work (with Robert Seidman) and his empirical investiga tion into the social origins of the law of vagrancy6"*" has done much to develop a coherent conflict theory of criminal law. In addition,

Chambliss has on several occasions attempted to bring together the

62 best available theory and research within the definitional paradigm.

The starting point for the systematic study of crime, according to Chambliss, is to ask why is it that some acts get defined as criminal while others do not? To answer this question, Chambliss points out, we must consider the issue of power, for crime is inherently political. He writes: "Crime is a political phenomenon.

What gets defined as criminal or delinquent behavior is the result of a political process within which rules are formed which prohibit or

63 require people to behave in certain ways." In reviewing the socio logical explanations for the political process of rule-creation,

Chambliss concludes that none of the more prominent theories can 64 account for the creation of all criminal law. Nevertheless, he believes that the available research evidence indicates that one model offers a more general explanation than the others. According to

Chambliss, the theory that is "most compatible with the facts is one that recognizes the critical role played by social conflict in the generation of criminal law."65 More specifically, it is "class con flict" and the power of the "ruling class" which shapes the definition of crime. As Chambliss points out: 76

Research into the origins of criminal laws substantiates quite clearly the important role played in their creation by those classes that control the economic resources of the society. Whether looked at in terms of consequences— that is, the effect the laws have after passage— or the dynamics of the lawmaking process, the results are very much the same: those social classes who control the resources of the society are more likely to have their interests represented by the state through the criminal law than are any and all other social groups.^6

Chambliss attempts to illustrate his conflict theory of criminal law through an examination of the development of the law of vagrancy in England. The first vagrancy statute was passed in 1349, and it stipulated that the giving of alms to any ablebodied person who was unemployed was a crime. The actual intent of this law, according to

Chambliss, was to provide "an abundance of cheap labor to England's ruling class of landowners during a period when serfdom was breaking down and when the pool of available labor was depleted.After the breakup of feudalism, and the increasing dependency of the English economy on commerce and trade, the original vagrancy laws became irrelevant and fell into disuse. However, in the 16th century, the laws were revived with considerable alteration in their working and intent. As Chambliss pointed out:

Whereas in their inception the laws focused upon the "idle" and "those refusing to work," after the turn of the sixteenth century the emphasis came to be upon "rogues," "vagabonds," and others who were suspected of being engaged in criminal activities. During this period the focus was particularly upon "roadmen" who preyed upon citizens who transported goods from one place to another. The increased importance of commerce to England during this period brought forth laws to protect persons engaged in this enterprise and the vagrancy statutes provided one source for such protection by refocusing the acts to be included under these statutes. 77

The analysis of the vagrancy laws by Chambliss, demonstrates that

criminal laws may reflect the economic interests of powerful ruling elites, and it directs our attention to the political economy of crime

creation and the important role that ruling classes can play in this

process. One of the chief criticisms of this neo-Marxist interpreta

tion of law creation, is that it cannot account for the fact that there

are many laws which appear to be contrary to the interests of the

ruling elites. Chambliss, however, points out that "even those laws

that appear to be contrary to the interests of those who control the

economic resources were in fact created to help them increase their

69 profits." Chambliss cites Gabriel Kolko’s historical analysis of

the emergence of laws regulating the railroad and meat-packing

70 industries as evidence for his argument. Kolko demonstrates that

the emergence of regulatory laws in these areas were, in fact,

promoted and shaped by the largest companies in the railroad and meat

packing industries in an effort to control competition from smaller

companies and insure better markets for themselves.

In general, Chambliss provides a good deal of evidence to document

that economic elites become involved in and control law making pro

cesses in order to protect themselves against legislation that could

possibly interfere with their profits.^ Chambliss, however, also

points out that the protection of the interests of economic elites does

not always require the conscious effort of lawmakers and corporate 72 actors. Through the "mobilization of bias" criminal law creation

can reflect the interests of economic elites effectively without a

conscious effort to do so on anyones part. Chambliss re-interprets 78

Hall's analysis of the law of theft to illustrate how the mobiliza-

73 tion of bias can influence the creation of criminal law.

Chambliss' work, overall, provides a very convincing case for

the Marxian class conflict perspective. In general, the radical

criminologists have sensitized us to the issues of conflict and power

in the creation of crime and deviance, and to the ways in which criminal

laws and deviant categories reflect the interests and ideologies of the

governing class and economic elites of society. Despite the important

, contributions the class conflict model has made to our understanding

of crime and deviance, however, there are some indications that the

conflict perspective in sociology is beginning to move beyond Marx.

THE INTEREST GROUP CONFLICT PERSPECTIVE: BEYOND MARX

Hagan and Leon have recently observed that:

It is now common to begin sociological discussions of deviance by reaffirming the shift, in the 1960's, from studying the antecedents of rule-breaking behavior to a concern with the origins of legal norms and the statuses that may or may not follow their violation. Equally noteworthy, however, is an increasingly apparent shift from studying the entreprenurial and organizational origins of legal norms and their enforcement, to a more monotheistic focus in the 1970's on class conflict as the independent variable of concern.^

For the past few years, the Marxian class conflict model has tended

to dominate the sociological concern with the definitional process which

creates crime and deviance, as Hagan and Leon have pointed out.^"*

Recently, however, a number of empirically grounded critiques have been

directed at the Marxian model,^ while within the sociology of law, we

have witnessed the reemergence of a pluralist view of law.^ These 79 events seem reflective of a growing dissatisfaction with the class conflict model as a complete explanation for the creation of- all criminal law and deviant categories. And in fact, a great deal of the recent research concerning the social construction of crime and deviance moves beyond class conflict as an explanatory factor.

Much of the current research within the definitional paradigm, is oriented by a pluralistic conception of interest group conflict. As

Stuart Hills points out:

In a rapidly changing pluralistic society such as the United States . . . with its racial, religious, ethnic, and class diversity, its sharply competing economic and political interest groups, its conflicting life styles and value orientations among different subcultures, and its frequent recourse to the criminal law to regulate and prohibit a wide variety of behavior— the interest- group perspective would seem more useful in understandin| the enactment and selective enforcement of laws ....

And as Edwin Lemert notes:

Empirical materials . . . make it doubtful that the emergence of new morality and procedures for defining deviance can be laid to the creations of any one group, class or elite. Rather they are the products of the interaction of groups. . . . to understand the inter play of many groups out of which materialize new categories of moral and legal control requires a model of interaction quite different than those fathered by the psychologically oriented thought of Mead or those of the class conflict theorists.79

The pluralistic interest group perspective emphasizes the differen tial ability of particular social groups and organizations to shape the definition of crime and deviance to serve their needs and safeguard their interests. This orientation shares with the Marxian approach a concern with the issues of power, conflict, coercion and constraint.

The interest group perspective, however, moves beyond the class conflict 80 model to a consideration of the numerous groups and organizations in society which, because of the unequal distribution of power and authority, have greater access to the decision-making processes and therefore can use their power and influence to shape laws and policies which protect and maintain their interests at the expense of less powerful groups.

A wide range of recent studies lend empirical support to the interest group conflict approach. The analysis of the New York state

80 penal law on prostitution by Pamela Roby, demonstrates that the formu lation and enforcement of this law involved the efforts of numerous interested groups (e.g., the police, the Mayor's office, the New York

Hotel Association, the ACLU) to shape the legislation to fit their own interests or views. The seventy year attempt by the phonograph record industry to obtain federal copyright protection for its products has

Q1 been studied by McCaghy and Denisoff. They conclude that conflicting manifest interests among various media groups, the uncrystallized manifest interests within the phonograph industry, and the failure of the industry to legitimate itself, delayed federal intervention into record piracy for over half a century.

The role of law enforcement bureaucracies in the creation of criminal law has been well documented, especially in the case of the

82 drug laws. An analysis of juvenile court legislation in California

, _ 83 by Lemert, shows how the needs of law enforcement bureaucracies can determine the shape of law. Lemert demonstrates that the revision of the Juvenile Court Law in California, which narrowed the jurisdiction 81 of the court and modified existing definitions of delinquency, emerged from the interactions of a variety of law enforcement professional associations (probation, police, judicial). According to Lemert, each association evaluated the proposed changes in light of its own values and vested interests, and then supported or resisted the revision according to whether or not the changes benefited them. His analysis points out that crime control bureaucracies will use their resources, power, and influence to shape definitions of crime and deviance that represent the interests of the bureaucracies themselves, independent of the "public interest."

Another type of vested interest group which is often influential in the creation of criminal laws and deviant categories is the medical profession, especially psychiatrists. Recall that Sutherland stressed the importance of the psychiatric profession in the creation and

84 diffusion of the sexual psychopath laws. Likewise, Davis points out the instrumental role that the psychiatric profession played in con structing conceptions of normality and mental health through the mental hygiene movement.®-* Thomas Szasz argues that "mental illness" as a technical classification is partly a product of the mental-health move- 86 ment, manufactured by psychiatrists. In a more recent study,

Stephen Pfohl has shown how the organizational advantages surrounding the discovery of child abuse by pediatric radiology set in-motion a process which resulted in child abuse being labeled as deviant and

87 legislated against. in his discussion of the medicalization of deviance, Peter Conrad points out the important roles played by the 82 pharmaceutical industry and the Association for Children with 88 Learning Disabilities in the discovery of hyperkinesis.

In general, these studies demonstrate that the medical profession and related industries and associations often use their power and influence to shape definitions of crime and deviance in order to serve their own needs or portect their own interests. Psychiatrists especially have been able to advance their own professional interests due to the power and influence they have come to exercise over defini-

8° tions of deviance in our society.

The interest group perspective can, of course, easily be linked

90 to Becker's moral entrepreneur thesis. Although Becker's descrip tion may leave the impression that "the moral entrepreneur is a structurally unlocated, morally self-righteous absolutist who campaigns to prohibit activities that others enjoy," nonetheless, he did note that:

Those groups whose social position gives them weapons and power are best able to enforce their rules. Distinctions of age, sex, ethnicity, and class are all related to differences in power, which accounts for differences in the degree to which groups so distinguished can make rules for others.92

Thus Becker's moral entrepreneur could easily be conceptualized as a structurally located, differentially powerful social group pursuing its own vested interests (moral, economic, political) by attempting to shape the law and conceptions of deviance. Among the studies which have moved toward this kind of a conceptualization of moral entre preneurs are Dickson's study of the environmental conditions and organizational interests which lay behind the passage of the Marihuana 83 93 Tax Act, and Hagan and Leon's analysis of Canadian delinquency legislation which revealed that the emergence of probation work as an

94 organizational concern was the prime factor behind this law.

Several recent studies have pointed out that a combination of factors may be responsible for the development of collective defini tions of deviance. Bustamante's analysis of the creation of the

"wetback" as a deviant category shows a complex interplay between

95 moral imperatives, organizational concerns, and economic interests.

He makes a distinction between group interests related to the presence of the wetback and group interests related only to each actor's role independent of the presence of the wetback in order to explain the contradictions in the wetback phenomenon such as:

(1) condemning the wetback by defining him as a deviant, and at the same time, maintaining a demand for his labor force which is reflected in a steadily increasing influx of wetbacks each year; (2) penalizing a person for being a wetback, but not a farmer for hiring one; (3) maintaining an agency for the enforcement of immigration laws and at the same time exerting budget limitations and/or political pressures to prevent successful enforcement of the law.^6

Out of his analysis, Bustamante develops a conceptual addendum to

Becker's moral entrepreneur schema: the "antilaw entrepreneur":

His crusade is directed toward the self-serving enforce ment of existing laws. The source of his crusade is the threat of the loss of cheap labor that would occur if the laws were enforced. Evidently the characteristics of this second type are the polar opposites of those of the moral entrepreneur. The imperative he singles out as a banner is economic rather than moral. The crusade he leads is supported by power and economic interest rather than moral righteousness.^7

Another study which discovered a combination of explanatory fac

tors to be related to the definition of a behavior as deviant is 84 Nuehring and Markle's analysis of the re-emergence of cigarette 98 smoking as a deviant behavior. Nuehring and Markle provide a

historical review of the anti-smoking movement, its decline, and its

recent re-emergence following the Surgeon General's landmark report

in 1964 linking cigarette smoking to cancer. Their study highlights

the roles played by various moral entrepreneurs, public bureaucracies,

and economic interest groups in the conflict processes involved in the

anti-smoking crusade. In summary they point out that:

The cigarette controversy in the United States has reflected a number of theoretical principles familiar to students of the sociology of law. We can see symbolic import in the anti-cigarette legislation; we can observe instances in which organizations' growth, maintenance, or adaptation has been enhanced by supporting the anti cigarette effort. It is also clear that, for the industry and its allies, there have been financial interests at stake which promoted the intense conflict between tobacco and health.^9

The interest group approach, in addition to being combined with

entrepreneurial, organizational and symbolic crusade perspectives, has

also been demonstrated to be compatible to some degree with a Marxist

approach. As Chambliss admits, "there are groups other than economic

elites capable of influencing and determining criminal laws," and,

"conflicts which inhere in the structure of society can also bring

about changes in the prevailing definitions of crime.These

admissions, of course, allow class conflict theorists to interpret

research from the interest group perspective as being basically

compatible with their model. Scotty Embree attempts to draw an

empirical connection between the two with her study of narcotics 102 legislation in the United States. She attempts to demonstrate 85 that the various Interest groups which were involved in the passage of the Harrison Act may not have been as crucial to the definitional process as many suggest. Erabree argues that unless the sought after legislation is acceptable to powerful economic elites, a campaign waged by other interest groups may fail to be successful.

Another attempt to link a Marxian model to the pluralist interest

group perspective, can be found in Drew Humphries research into the

103 abortion movement. Humphries analysis suggests that different

status or occupational groups may initiate or join social movements

to shape the definition of crime or deviance in society as a response

to different social contradictions. As David Greenburg points out:

This insight allows one to avoid the empirically false characterization of all social movements as manifestations of class conflict, yet it allows the theorist to draw on Marxian categories in explaining the existence and nature of contradictions and in accounting for the existence and ideologies of status and occupational groups.^-04

The more pluralist interest group perspective also allows us to move beyond the narrow focus of the class conflict model in considering

the critical variable of control structures. Within the definitional

paradigm, the social control system is conceptualized as an important

independent variable in the deviance creation process. As Elliott

Currie points out, "many elements of the behavior system of a given

kind of deviance, including such things as the rate of deviance and

the kinds of people who are identified as a deviant, will be signifi

cantly affected by the kind of control system through which the behavior

is defined and managed."105 Currie's study of witchcraft and its

control in Renaissance Europe documents that crime can be created

without criminals, and that the crucial factor in this creation is the 86 106 nature of the control system. According to Currie, witchcraft was

invented in continental Europe and sustained there through the vigorous

107 efforts of a system of repressive control. in England, on the other

hand, witchcraft was sustained, far less effectively, through a 108 restrained control system and the semi-official efforts of relatively

small-time entrepreneurs.

In both cases, Currie points out, witchcraft as a type of deviant

behavior, took its character directly from the nature of the respective

- systems of legal control. Currie’s analysis of the creation of witch

craft as deviance also points out, "... vested interests in deviance

may be political, religious, or psychic, rather than economic . . . ,"109

thus providing support for the interest group model. Another important

study which has investigated systems of social control as independent

variables in the creation of deviance, is Walter Connor's examination

of the Stalinist purges of the late 1930’s. H e asserts that these

purges represent the manufacture of deviance on a massive scale. Connor

takes as his point of departure the three propositions advanced by

Erikson in his study of the Puritan crime waves: 1) that every com

munity has its own characteristic styles of deviant behavior, 2) the

amount of deviation a community encounters is apt to remain fairly

constant over time, and 3) every community has culturally conditioned

deployment patterns for creating deviants.

Connor's examination of the purge, its development and outcome,

suggests that:

(1) under certain conditions, the amount of deviance a a society can create, recognize, and process is not, as Erikson suggests, likely to remain 'fairly constant over 87

time," but can be radically and swiftly increased] (2) the major characteristic enabling elasticity in the amount of deviance recognized is a control system of a • special, repressive type; and (3) elasticity is amplified when the deployment pattern used by the society with respect to the deviants is one which, as in the Soviet case, at least appears to minimize the economic costs of isolating large numbers of persons from society.

The creation of crime and deviance, as this review of the litera

ture suggests, is a complex social process. The explanation of how collective definitions of deviance emerge and change over time must deal with a number of important variables. The interest group perspec

tive, while it is certainly not a unified or coherent theoretical orientation appears to be able to make important contributions to our understanding of how crime and deviance are socially constructed.

While it can utilize Marxian categories and deal with traditional

Marxian concerns, the interest group perspective can also move beyond

a narrow or rigid class conflict model to a consideration of a much wider range of empirical materials and explanatory factors. This type

of a pluralist conflict perspective, however, can easily be synthesized with the other theoretical traditions within the definitional paradigm,

such as the moral entrepreneurial, organizational, and symbolic crusade

perspectives. Much of the current research effort within the defini

tional paradigm appears to take as its point of departure the interest

group conflict approach.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to review the theory and

research within the definitional paradigm related to the creation of 88 113 criminal laws or the construction of deviant categories. From this survey of the relevant theoretical and empirical work we have isolated the following propositions:

1) The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories is often

related to larger social movements and changes in cultural

v a lues.

2) The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories will

usually involve a moral crusade and be the result of the

enterprising activities of moral entrepreneurs.

3) Moral crusades may be initiated by social control organiza

tions as a bureaucratic response to environmental conditions

based on vested organizational interests.

A) Enterprise to create criminal laws or deviant categories

may be motivated by symbolic goals rather than instrumental

-goal's, or serve symbolic functions for those who are

engaged in the enterprise.

5) Symbolic crusades may emerge out of more instrumentally

oriented actions and come to dominate them, displacing

the original goals.

6) The creation of crime and deviance serves important

functions for society by defining its moral boundaries

and producing a higher degree of social cohesion through

the collective outrage directed at those outside the

moral boundaries.

7) The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories

is the result of power differences and structured 89

inequalities in class societies and they reflect the

interests and ideologies of the dominant economic

c lass.

8) Collective definitions of crime and deviance emerge

out of the complex interplay between conflicting interest

groups with differential abilities to shape these

definitions to serve their own needs or safeguard their

interests be they economic or otherwise.

These propositions contain a wealth of analytic categories and explanatory factors which can be utilized in the analysis of concrete instances of deviance creation. The analysis of the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program to follow, will make use of many of these interpretive categories. The present analysis will also attempt to specify the relative importance of these factors in explaining deviance creation, determine the relationship that may exist between them, indicate the conditions under which they may or may not hold, and in general, assess their explanatory adequacy. FOOTNOTES

^Edwin H. Sutherland, "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws," American Journal of Sociology 56 (September, 1950). pp. 142-148.

Kingsley Davis, "Mental Hygiene and the Class Structure," Psychiatry 1 (February, 1938), pp. 55-65. O Jerome Hall, Theft, Law and Society 2nd edition (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1952).

^Sutherland, September, 1950, op. cit., p. 143.

"*Ibid., p. 144.

6Ibid., p. 145.

^Ibid., p. 147. O For a fuller discussion of these propositions see Edwin H. Sutherland, "The Sexual Psychopath Law," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 40 (January-February, 1950), pp. 543-554. Also with regard to the operation of stereotypes at both the collective rule making level and the organiza tional processing level see Edwin Schur, Labeling Deviant Behavior: Its Sociological Implications (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); Richard Hawkins and Gary Tiedman, The Creation of Deviance: Interpersonal and Organizational Determinants (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing 1975); and Dennis Chapman, Sociology and the Stereotype of the Criminal (London: Tavistock, 1968).

Q Sutherland points out that most of the states who pass these laws make little or no use of them. They seem to serve symbolic functions rather than instrumental ones, calming the mass fear aroused by a few serious sex crimes and reassuring the public that something has been done. These laws were also a symbolic victory for the psychiatric profession which was pushing the idea that all criminals are psychopathic and should be treated as patients. Sutherland, January-February, 1950, op. cit., p. 554. Also see Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).

■^Sutherland, September, 1950, op. cit., p. 145-6.

■^Sutherland notes the numerous individuals, groups and organiza tions which were agitating for something to be done about sex crimes.

90 91 12 Sutherland also pointed out that psychiatrists more than any other, were the interest group behind these laws and that since the laws usually specified that the diagnosis for the court shall be made by psychiatrists, they had a vested economic interest in the passage of the laws. Sutherland, September, 1950, op. cit., p. 146.

13 Ibid, 147

14 Ibid.

15 Howard S Becker, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1963), p. 9.

16Ibid., P- 162,

17Ibid., P- 163.

18Ibid., P- 147.

1 9 Ibid., P- 135.

20Ibid., P- 142.

21Ibid., P- 146.

^ D o n a l d T. Dickson perspective on a Moral Crusade," Social Problems 16 (Fall, 1968), pp. 143-156. 23. Ibid. 155.

24 Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963).

25 Ibid., p. 170.

26 Joseph R. Gusfield, "Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process In Public Designations of Deviance," Social Problems 15, (Fall, 1967), pp. 175-188.

27 Ibid., p. 176. 28 Ibid., p. 177.

29 John F. Galliher and Allyn Walker, "The Puzzle of the Social Origins of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937," Social Problems 24 (February, 1977), pp. 367-376. Also see Edelman, 1964, op. cit. 92 30 W. G. Carson, "Symbolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early Factory Legislation: A Case Study in the Social Origins of Criminal Law" in Roger Hood (ed.), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 107-138.

31Ibid., p. 137.

32 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1938).

33 Ibid., p. 70.

■^George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," American Journal of Sociology 23 (1918), pp. 577-602.

35 Kai T. Erikson, Wayward Puritans: A Study in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: Wiley, 1966).

36Ibid., p. 10.

37 Ibid., p. 11.

90 Pat Lauderdale, "Deviance and Moral Boundaries," American Sociological Review 41 (August, 1976), pp. 660-675.

39 Erikson, 1966, op. cit., p. 13.

^William J. Chambliss, "Functional and Conflict Theories of Crime," in William J. Chambliss and Milton Mankoff (eds.) Whose Law, What Order: A Conflict Approach to Criminology (New York: Wiley, 1976), pp. 15-16.

41 See Larry Reynolds and Janice Reynolds, "Interactionism, compli city and the astructural bias," Catalyst 7 (1973), pp. 76-85. Also see David R. Maines, "Social Organization and Social Structure in Symbolic Interactionist Thought" in Alex Inkeles, James Coleman, and Neil Smelser, (eds.) Annual Review of Sociology, Volume 3 (Palo Alto, California: Annual Review, Inc., 1977), pp. 235-259.

i A See Richard Lichtman, "Symbolic Interactionism and Social Reality: Some Marxist Queries," Berkeley Journal of Sociology 15 (1970), pp. 75-94. Also see Maines, 1977, op. cit.

43 Ian Taylor, Paul Walton, and Jock Young, The New Criminology (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 168.

^Becker, 1963, op. cit., p. 18. 93

See Alex Thio, "Class Bias in the Sociology of Deviance” The American Sociologist 8 (February, 1973), pp. 1-12. Alexander Liazos, "The Poverty of the Sociology of Deviance: Nuts, Sluts and ’Perverts,'” Social Problems 20 (Summer, 1972), pp. 103-120; Alvin W. Gouldner, "The Sociologist As Partisan: Sociology and the Welfare State," The American Sociologist 3 (May, 1968), pp. 103-116.

46 Austin T. Turk, "C l a s s , Conflict, and Criminalization," Sociological Focus 10 (August, 1977), pp. 209-210.

^Radical criminology loosely consists of: 1) a Berkeley school see Tony Platt, "Prospects for a Radical Criminology in the United States" Crime and Social Justice 1 (Spring-Summer, 1974), pp. 2-10; Herman Schwendinger, "Editorial," Crime and Social Justice 1 (Spring-Summer, 1974), p. 1; Barry Krisberg, Crime and Privilege: Toward a New Criminology (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1975); 2) A British school, see Ian Taylor, Paul Walton and Jock Young, "Advances Towards a Critical Criminology," Theory and Society 1 (Winter, 1974), pp. 441-476; Taylor, Walton and Young, 1973, op. cit.; 3) the work of William J. Chambliss, "Toward a Political Economy of Crime" Theory and Society 2 (Summer, 1975a), pp. 149-170, William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman, Law, Order and Power (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1971), William J. Chambliss (ed.) Criminal Law In Action (Santa Barbara, California: Hamilton, 1975b); 4) the work of Richard Quinney, Class, State and Crime (New York: David McKay, 1977), Richard Quinney, Critique of Legal Order: Crime Control in Capitalist Society (Boston: Little Brown, 1974) . Also see Gresham Sykes, "The Rise of Critical Criminology" Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 65 (June, 1974), pp. 206-213, Charles Reasons "Social Thought and Social Structure: Competing Paradigms In Criminology" Criminology 13 (November, 1975), pp. 332-365, Robert Meier, "The New Criminology: Continuity in Criminological theory," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 67 (1976), pp. 461-469, Steven Spitzer, "Toward a Marxian Theory of Deviance" Social Problems 22 (June, 1975), pp. 638-651, Frank Pearce, Crimes of the Powerful: Marxism, Crime and Deviance (London: Pluto Press, 1976).

48 Nanette J. Davis, Sociological Constructions of Deviance (Dubuque, Iowa: Wm. C. Brown Publishers, 1975), p. 215. 49 Willem Bonger, Criminality and Economic Conditions (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1916).

50 Thorsten Sellin, Culture, Conflict and Crime (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938).

"^George Void, Theoretical Criminology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958).

^Alex Thio, Deviant Behavior (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978). 94

That recent conflict theory falls within the definitional paradigm can be documented by the fact that it has been criticized for failing to deal with etiological questions: "the principal inadequacy of conflict theories on deviance and criminality lies in the area of causal or etiological hypotheses ..." Don C. Gibbons and Joseph F. Jones, The Study of Deviance: Perspectives and Problems (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 102.

^Anthony Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969).

55Ibid., p. 98.

Anthony Platt, "The Triumph of Benevolence: The Origins of the Juvenile Justice System in the United States" in Richard Quinney (ed.) Criminal Justice In America: A Critical Understanding (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), pp. 365-389.

^ I b i d . , p. 377

58 John Hagan and Jeffery Leon, "Rediscovering Delinquency: Social History, Political Ideology and the Sociology of Law," American Sociological Review 42 (August, 1977), p. 590.

59Ibid., p. 598.

^Chambliss and Seidman, 1971, op. cit.

^William J. Chambliss, "A Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy" Social Problems 12 (Summer, 1964), pp. 67-77. 62 William J. Chambliss, Crime and the Legal Process (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), Chambliss, 1975b, op. cit.

63 William J. Chambliss, "The State, the Law and the Definition of Behavior as Criminal or Delinquent" in Daniel Glaser (ed.) Handbook of Criminology (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1974), p. 39.

^Chambliss makes reference to the Conflict-Consensus debate here. He claims that the empirical evidence supports the conflict perspective. For another study which supports the conflict model see Lynn McDonald, The Sociology of Law and Order (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976). A number of recent studies have questioned the accuracy of class conflict propositions. See Peter Rossi, Emily Waite, Christine Bose, and Richard Berk, "The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative Structure and Individual Differences," American Sociological Review 39 (1974), pp. 224- 237, Theodore Chiricos and Gordon Waldo, "Socioeconomic Status and Criminal Sentencing: An Empirical Assessment of a Conflict Proposition, American Sociological Review 40 (1976), pp. 753-772, John Hagan, "Extra- Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint," Law and Society Review 8 (1974), pp. 357-383. Many sociolo gists have begun to view this as a rather futile debate. For two well 95 balanced reviews of the debate see, Andrew Hopkins, "On the Sociology of Criminal Law," Social Problems 22 (June, 1975), pp. 608—619, and W. G. Carson, "The Sociology of Crime and the Emergence of Criminal Laws" in Paul Rock and Mary McIntosh (eds.), Deviance and Social Control (London: Tavistock, 1974), pp. 67-89. For an insightful discussion of how nsus itself is socially constructed in Capitalist societies see ,ond J. Michalowski and Edwin Bohlander, "Repression and Criminal . ..^tice in Capitalist America," Sociological Inquiry 46 (1976), pp. 95-106.

65 Chambliss, 1974, op. cit., p. 8 .

66Ibid.,

67Ibid., p. 15.

68Ibid., p. 16.

69Ibid.

7®Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism (New York: Free Press, 1963), Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).

7^See James M. Graham, "Amphetamine Politics on Capitol Hill," Society 9 (January, 1972), pp. 14-23.

72 E. E. Schattschneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realists View of Democracy in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960).

78Chambliss, 1974, op. cit., pp. 25-27.

7^Hagan and Leon, 1977, op. cit., p. 587.

76 Rossi, Waite, Bose and Berk, 1974, op. cit.; Chiricos and Waldo, 1976, op. cit.; Hagan, 1974, op. cit.

77 See Lawrence M. Friedman; The Legal System: A Social Science Per spective (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975);. William E. Nelson Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachu setts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975), Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modern Society: Toward a Criticism of Social Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1976). Also see the review of these three books by Allan Horowitz in Contemporary Sociology 6 (May, 1977), pp. 308-310.

78 Stuart L. Hills, Crime, Power and Morality: The Criminal Law Process in the United States (Scranton, PA: Chandler, 1971), p. 6.

79 Edwin M. Lemert, "Beyond Mead: The Societal Reaction to Deviance," Social Problems 21 (April, 1974), p. 462. 96

^Pamela A. Roby, "Politics and Criminal Law: Revision of the New York State Penal Law on Prostitution," Social Problems 17 (Summer, 1969), pp. 83-109.

Charles H. McCaghy and R. Serge Denisoff, "Pirates and Politics: An Analysis of Interest Group Conflict," in R. Serge Denisoff and Charles McCaghy (eds.), Deviance, Conflict and Criminality (Chicago: Rand Mcnally, 1973), pp. 297-310. 82 See Alfred R. Lindesmith, The Addict and The Law (New York: Vintage Books, 1965); Troy Duster, The Legislation of Morality (New York: The Free Press, 1970); Charles Reasons, "The Politics of Drugs: An Inquiry in the Sociology of Social Problems,” The Sociological Quarterly 15 (Summer, 1974), pp. 381-404; Shirley Cook, "Canadian Narcotics Legis lation Review of Sociology and Anthropology 6 (1969), pp. 36-46; Richard J. Bonnie and Charles H. Whitehead, The Marihuana Connection (Charlettesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1974); David F. Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotics Control (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).

83 Edwin M. Lemert, Social Action and Legal Change: Revolution within the Juvenile Court (Chicago: Aldine, 1970).

^Sutherland, September, 1950, op. cit.

85 Davis, 1938, op. cit. 86 Thomas Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). 87 Stephen J. Pfohl, "The Discovery of Child Abuse," Social Problems 24 (February, 1977), pp. 310-323. 88 Peter Conrad, "The Discovery of Hyperkinesis: Notes on the Medicalization of Deviant Behavior," Social Problems 23 (October, 1975), pp. 12- 21.

89 See Nicholas N. Kittrie, The Right To Be Different: Deviance and Enforced Therapy (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1971).

90 Becker, 1963, op. cit.

91 Scotty Embree, "The State Department As Moral Entrepreneur: Racism and Imperalism as Factors in the Passage of the Harrison Narcotic Law" in David Greenberg (ed.), Corrections and Punishment (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 201.

92 Becker, 1963, op. cit., p. 18.

93 Dickson, 1968, op. cit. 97 94 Hagan and Leon, 1977, op. cit.

9^Jorge A. Bustamante, "The ’Wetback' As Deviant: An Application of Labeling Theory," American Journal of Sociology 77 (January, 1972), pp. 706-718.

96 Ibid., p. 714.

97Ibid., p. 715.

98 Elane M. Nuehring and Gerald E. Markle, "Nicotine and Norms: The Re-emergence of a Deviant Behavior" Social Problems 21 (April, 1974), pp. 513-526.

99 Ibid.

^^Chambliss, 1974, op. cit., p. 27.

^■^See Chambliss, 1975b, op. cit., and Chambliss, 1969, op. cit. Also see Quinney, 1974b, op. cit. ] 02 Embree, 1977, op. cit.

103 Drew Humphries, "The Movement to Legalize Abortion: A Historical Account" in David Greenberg (ed.), Corrections and Punishment (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), pp. 205-224.

^^David Greenberg, "Introduction," Corrections and Punishment (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1977), p. 13.

■^^Elliott P. Currie, "Crimes Without Criminals: Witchcraft and its Control in Renaissance Europe," Law and Society Review 3 (August , 1968), p. 8 .

106Ibid.

"^"^According to Currie a repressive control system involves: 1) Invulnerability to restraint from other social institutions; 2) Systematic establishment of extraordinary powers for suppressing deviance, with a concomitant lack of internal restraints; and 3) A high degree of structured interest in the apprehension and processing of deviants. 108 A restrained control system, according to Currie involves: 1) Accountability to, and restraint by, other social institutions; 2) A high degree of internal restraint, precluding the assumption of extraordinary powers; and 3) A low degree of structured interest in the apprehension and processing of deviants. 109 Currie, 1968, op. cit., p. 31. 98 110 Walter D. Connor, "The Manufacture of Deviance: the case of the Soviet Purge, 1936-1938," American Sociological Review 37 (August, 1972), pp. 403-413.

^■■^Erikson, 1966, op. cit., pp. 19-29.

^■^Connor, 1972, op. cit., p. 403.

113 This chapter has not reviewed the theory and research related to the application of deviant categories and the enforcement of criminal laws, although these concerns properly fall within the definitional paradigm. The ethnomethodological perspective for example, was not dis cussed since the research generated from this approach has generally been confined to the investigation of the interpretive procedures used by legal control agents in the organizational processing of alleged deviants, and has not been addressed to the question of the social origins of laws and deviant categories. Important research studies within the defini- 'tional paradigm have addressed the following concerns: 1) the effects of officially held stereotypes of deviants: See Irving Pilliavin and Scott Briar, "Police Encounters with Juveniles," American Journal of Sociology 69 (September, 1964), pp. 206-214; David Sudnow, "Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public Defenders Office," Social Problems 12 (Winter, 1965), pp. 255-276; Thomas J. Scheff, "Typification in the Diagnostic Practices of Rehabilitation Agencies," in Marvin B. Sussman (ed.), Sociology and Rehabilitation (Washington, D.C.) American Sociological Association, 1964) ; Victoria L. Swigert and Ronald A. Farrell, "Normal Homicides and the Law," American Sociological Review 43 (February, 1977), pp. 16-31; 2) The methods of keeping agency records: See John Kitsuse and Aaron Cicourel, "A Note on the Use of Official Statistics," Social Problems 12 (Fall, 1963), pp. 131-139; Jerome Skolnick, Justice Without Trial (New York: John Wiley, 1966); 3) the effects of different clinical models and diagnostic procedures: see Jane Mercer, Labeling the Mentally Retarded (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973); John R. Seeley, "Alcoholism is a Disease: Implications for Social Policy" in David Pittman and Charles Snyder (eds.), Alcohol, Culture and Drinking Patterns (New York: John Wiley, 1962); 4) the effects of the behavior of potential clients towards the rule enforcers: see Egon Bittner, "The Police on Skid Row: A Study of Peace Keeping" American Sociological Review 32 (October, 1967), pp. 699- 715; Dorothy Miller and Michael Schwartz, "County Lunacy Commission Hearings: Some Observations on Commitments to a State Mental Hospital, Social Problems 14 (Summer, 1966), pp. 26-35; David M. Petersen, "Police Disposition of the Petty Offender," Sociology and Social Research 56 (April, 1972), pp. 320-330; 5) Official actions that coerce deviants to conform to public images of them: see Robert A. Scott, The Making of Blind Men (New York: Russell Sage, 1969); James P. Spradley, You Owe Yourself a Drunk (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970); 6) interaction processes in court: see Aaron Cicourel, The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (New York: John Wiley, 1968); Robert Emerson, Judging Delinquents (Chicago: Aldine, 1969); Jacqueline Wisman, Stations of the Lost: The Treatment of Skid Row Alcoholics (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970). CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

THE CASE STUDY APPROACH

The present research involves an intensive, in-depth examination of a particular historical event: the LEAA career criminal program.

As such, it can be described as a historical "case study." The case study or life history approach typically provides a complete and detailed account or description of a particular phenomenon (event, group, or social process), along with a careful and systematic analysis or reconstruction of that phenomenon from the point of view of socio logical theory. This approach requires sociologists to be flexible, open ended, and resourceful in the data collection process. They should be willing and able to use any and all available sources of data which bear on the particular case under investigation. Furthermore, the case study design requires sociologists to be explicit about the theoretical framework and interpretive categories to be used, as well as about the rationale and the evidence which guide the interpretive decisions made during data analysis.'*'

A central assumption of the case study or life history method is that "human conduct is to be studied and understood from the perspective 2 of the persons involved." Given this assumption it is not surprising to discover that the case study approach has been most extensively

99 employed by those sociologists who work within the Chicago school symbolic interactionist tradition. The commitment to represent participants "in their own terms," is not only characteristic of the 4 case study method but of all qualitative research. Concern with the actor's perspective, however, must always be linked to the social structures and groups in which the actor is located. As Denzin points out:

The sensitive observer employing the life history will be concerned with relating the perspectives elicited to definitions and meaning that are lodged in social relationships and social groups. Additionally, the variable nature of these definitions across situations will be examined.-’

Another important feature of the case study approach, common to most qualitative methods, is the concern with process. The case study directs attention to the unfolding history of a particular phenomenon over time. It focuses on the dynamic and emergent properties of the phenomenon under investigation. As Denzin observes, "this feature becomes a hallmark of the life history— the capturing of events over time."6

Case study materials consist of any document that bears a rela tionship to the meanings, definitions, or experiences of the actors who are under examination. Two basic forms of these data have been noted by Denzin: public archival records and private archival records

Public archival records are those documents prepared for the express purpose of examination by some specified set of actors (often legally defined).. There are four major types of these data: 1) actuarial records (statistics concerning births, deaths, marriages and divorces)

2) political and judicial records (concerning court decisions, public 101 votes, budget decisions and so on), 3) other government records (such as crime statistics, social welfare records, and so on), and 4) mass media productions (such as editorials, letters to the editor, syndi-

g cated columns, and other such 'media products). The present study involved the collection of public archival data in the form of historical documentary materials drawn from the files of LEAA in

Washington, D.C.

Private archival records are documents such as autobiographies, letters, diaries, and other personal records, as well as question- g naires, interviews, and private reports. In these materials, Denzin points out, "the subjects’ definitions of the situation emerge and it is precisely these definitions that the sociologist wants to juxtapose against the public document.In the present study private archival records have been gathered in the form of in-depth specialized inter views with those persons instrumental in the development of the career criminal program.

The data collection process is, of course, a critical phase of any research project and the researcher has an obligation to inform the audience how this process was carried out. The following section will describe the data collection process of the present research. Through a first person account, it will describe how the researcher became involved with the study, specify what data were collected, and detail how these data were collected.

THE PROCESS OF DATA COLLECTION

My Involvement in the study of the national career criminal program occurred In a serendipitous fashion. In December, 1976 I was asked by 102 the Franklin County Public Defender's Office in Columbus, Ohio to evaluate their recently created "Career Criminal Defense Program."

This program was a direct response to the "Career Criminal Prosecution

Program" of the Franklin County Prosecutor's Office, a LEAA funded program which had been in operation since June, 1975.^ The "Career

Criminal Defense Program" was also funded by LEAA (through a discre tionary grant of $114,100), and it was actually a component of the 12 national career criminal program operated by LEAA. On June 1, 1976, the Franklin County Public Defender's "Career Criminal Defense Program" began operation with the clear expectation that a second year of funding would be forthcoming.

I accepted the Public Defender's offer and started my evaluation.

In late May, 1977, as I was in the midst of writing the evaluation report on the "Career Criminal Defense Program," the Public Defender for Franklin County, James Kura, informed me that the second year of funding for the program was in jeopardy. He was very concerned about losing the program and the extra staff members. LEAA officials were to make the decision concerning the second year of funding in the following week. At Kura's request, I quickly prepared a preliminary evaluation report summarizing my findings to that point. This report was sent to Washington, D.C. To follow this up, Kura arranged a meeting with LEAA officials in Washington. He requested that I accompany him to answer any questions LEAA might have concerning the preliminary report. Thus, on May 24, 1977, Kura and I flew to

Washington, D.C. 103

Although I was going along to answer questions concerning the evaluation of the "Career Criminal Defense Program," I also had an ulterior motive for making the trip. During the course of the evaluation study and my observations of the two career criminal pro grams in Columbus, I became very interested in the origins of this particular LEAA initiative at the national level. I wanted to know who had created this legal category of deviance, how it had been constructed, and why. I began to formulate a number of concrete questions about the program (i.e., how had the program developed and become institutionalized in so many local jurisdictions?) and to link it with a larger sociological issue (the collection definition of crime and deviance).

As we arrived at the LEAA offices for our meeting, I was hopeful that I would have an opportunity to ask some of these questions and obtain some information about the origins of the career criminal idea.

We met with Jim Swain, head of the Adjudication section of LEAA, and

Charles M. (Bud) Hollis, program manager for the career criminal initia tive. For thirty minutes Kura negotiated with Hollis over money for the

"Career Criminal Defense Program," with Hollis finally agreeing to fund the program through calendar year 1977. When discussion of the Columbus program concluded, I took the opportunity to question Bud Hollis con cerning the origins of the national career criminal program. I informed him that I was a graduate student in sociology and that I was interested

in the career criminal program as a possible dissertation topic. What could he tell me about the origins of the program; who were the indivi duals involved; were there any sources of information available concerning

the program's development? 104

Hollis thought for a moment and then he began to mention the names of several individuals he thought were instrumental in developing the program. He indicated to me, however, that he did not really know much about the origins of the program, since he had only recently become the manager of the program after serving as a Court Specialist in the Philadelphia regional office of LEAA.

Although Mr. Hollis knew very little about the creation of the career criminal initiative himself, he did show me several large file drawers in his office which he claimed contained all the available documents bearing on the development of the program. All memorandums, reports, press releases, speeches, etc., relating to the career criminal program had been saved and stored in these files. Hollis told me that he had never had the time to go through these files himself and

therefore he did not know exactly what was in them. I was more than welcome to go through them sometime, he said, and use whatever was in

them in my research, if I would prepare for him an index of their 13 contents and promise him a copy of my report. I felt as if I had

discovered a goldmine of data, and I assured Mr. Hollis that I would

return to Washington as soon as possible to go through the files and

do the research.

For various biographical reasons I was unable to return to

Washington until early October, 1977. At that time I spent a full week

in the offices of the Adjudication section of LEAA going through the

career criminal files. I was allowed the complete freedom to examine

any file that was even remotely related to the career criminal initia

tive. I was given an empty office to work in and I received the 105 complete cooperation of everyone in the Adjudication section from 14 secretaries to courts specialists. Head of the section, Jim Swain, and a number of other individuals in the office, took the time to sit . down with me on several different occasions and answer my questions concerning the organizational structure of LEAA, its internal poli

tics, and of course, the origins of the career criminal program.^

In addition, they hunted down annual reports and other documents that

I felt would be helpful as background information. Most importantly,

I was allowed to photocopy any and all documents that I wanted to without restriction. This allowed me to bring back all the data to analyze in greater detail on my own time. All things considered, the

Adjudication section of LEAA provided me with an ideal research 16 setting.

The LEAA Documents: Historical Materials

The data which was drawn from the LEAA files would primarily fall into the category of historical materials. According to Cicourel, historical materials "refer to materials produced in the past and which are in many ways unique records and expressions of behavior that

the sociologist seeks to reconstruct and/or analyze by means of some 17 set of interpretive categories." The most important of all the historical materials that were collected from the files, and the most

helpful, were the numerous memorandums relating to the career criminal

program development. Foremost among these were the internal LEAA memorandums. These internal memorandums flowed to and from Charles

R. Work, who at that time was the deputy administrator for the adminis

tration of LEAA. Deputy administrator Work, as we shall see, was the 106 pivotal figure in the creation of the career criminal program, and these memorandums detail his communications with those below him in the LEAA hierarchy who were developing specific aspects of the career criminal idea, and with those above him in the LEAA and Justice depart ment hierarchy who he was attempting to sell the idea to.

Deputy administrator Work’s communications with the Justice department included several memorandums to then Attorney General

William Saxbe. It appears that Work discussed the career criminal program with Saxbe on several occasions. Included in the data are a number of other memorandums between LEAA and various officials of the

Justice department concerning the career criminal initiative. In addition, several memorandums from Attorney General Saxbe to Presidents

Nixon and Ford, of importance to the origins of the program, were also obtained.

Also among the historical materials collected from the LEAA files were copies of a number of speeches given by President Ford, Attorney

General Saxbe, and LEAA administrator Velde, all of which make reference to the career criminal program. These include: 1) President

Ford's address to the 81st annual conference of the International

Association of Chiefs of Police (September, 1974); 2) Ford's speech at the Yale Sesquicentennial convocation dinner at the Yale law school

(April, 1975); 3) Ford's remarks at the first LEAA Career Criminal

Conference (September, 1975); 4) Ford's Presidential crime message to Congress (June, 1975); 5) Saxbe's address before the I.A.C.P.

(September, 1974); and 6) Saxbe's remarks to local prosecutors at the

Career Criminal Initiative meeting (September, 1974). The historical materials drawn from the LEAA files also included the following data: 1) numerous press releases concerning the career criminal program; 2) newspaper clippings from around the country relating to the program; 3) transcripts of meetings between LEAA officials and local prosecutors to discuss the structure and functions of a national career criminal program; 4) letters from prominent criminal justice planners critiqueing the proposed program; 5) back ground literature prepared by the National Legal Data Center, (which serves as the clearinghouse for the program); 6) program proposals from a number of the original jurisdictions; and 7) numerous other miscellaneous LEAA documents, research reports, and memorandums which were tangential to the career criminal data. These historical materials, memorandums, speeches, press releases, and newspaper clippings con stitute much of the data on which the present analysis is based.

Specialized Interviews

The historical materials described above are representative of the public archival records which are often utilized in the case study approach. As Denzin points out, however, the most important types of 18 data for the case study are the private archival records. For it is in these materials that we can catch the meanings and definitions of the participants themselves to balance off against the public docu ments. The case study approach, like all qualitative methods, involves a significant commitment to represent the participants "in their own terms." To capture the participants "in their own terms," according to John Lofland, "... one must learn their analytic ordering of the world, their categories for rendering explicable and coherent the flux 108 of raw reality."^ To catch the individuals who are responsible for the creation of the career criminal program "in their own terms," and to supplement the historical materials, the present research draws upon private archival records in the form of in-depth, specialized inter views .

A specialized or elite interview, according to Lewis Anthony

Dexter i s :

. . . an interview with any interviewee— and stress should be placed on the word "any"— who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, non standardized treatment. By special non-standardized treatment I mean: 1) stressing the interviewee's defini tion of the situation, 2) encouraging the interviewee to structure the account of the situation, 3) letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent . . . his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying upon the investigator's notions of r e l e v a n c e . 20

•The specialized interviews conducted in the present study attempted to get at the participants perspectives on the creation and development of the career criminal program. The interviews allowed the interviewees to reconstruct "what really happen" from their point of view in their own words. Their definition of the situation was stressed, they were

encouraged to structure the account of the situation, and they were allowed to introduce their notions of what was relevant.

The manner in which these individuals were selected to be inter- 21 viewed exemplifies the notion of purposive sampling. From the historical materials, there emerged the names of a number of people who were apparently instrumental in the development of the program. This

list of names was checked by several independent informants and

gradually a final list of people to interview emerged. Those indivi

duals who were interviewed were asked to supply a list of names of 109 persons responsible for creating the career criminal initiative. These lists led to new individuals and back to some people on the original list. Through this technique, all of the important participants were 22 located and interviewed. The data collected through these inter views make up the second set of materials on which the present analysis

23 is based. It is to a discussion of this analysis that we now turn.

DATA ANALYSIS: PURPOSES

Of all the major decisions to make in data analysis, the decision

concerning the purpose of the analysis is the most important. The

purpose of the analysis may be description or policy evaluation. It may be generalized explanation, either through the verification of

theoretical propositions or the derivation of grounded theory. In

designing a study, researchers should be very clear about the purpose

of the analysis of the data which they collect. In terms of research

designs, particular methodological strategies are thought to be

better suited to certain types of analysis. For example, the analysis

of quantitative data through various kinds of statistical techniques

lends itself readily to the testing of hypotheses and the verification

of theory. To many sociologists, the deductive form of explanation

through hypothesis testing is the only appropriate form of explanation 24 for sociology. Qualitative methodologies, according to these socio

logists, can only serve descriptive purposes or to suggest hypotheses

25 through a preliminary analysis.

The present research, however, follows an alternative sociological

tradition which recognizes the appropriateness of other types of 2 f. theoretical explanation besides the deductive one. The case study 110 approach, and the qualitative analysis of data (such as historical materials and in-depth interviews) can also provide a form of theo retical explanation and even allow us to assess the adequacy of theoretical propositions.

The case study approach requires the researcher to self consciously and explicitly carry on detailed description and careful analysis simultaneously, in order to provide an adequate theoretical explanation of the particular phenomenon under examination. The form of explanation utilized by such a qualitative method is variously

27 28 29 referred to as understanding, pattern, or purposive. This type of theoretical explanation is contrasted to the deductive or predictive models. As Sjoberg and Nett observe:

There appear to be two major types of explanation employed within the social sciences: verstehen, or understanding, and prediction. Those sociologists who align themselves with the positivist tradition contend that prediction is the key criteria for adequate explana tion, that the adequacy of one's data relative to one's hypotheses or theory lies in the resulting ability to predict patterns in a given realm. Opposed to this group are sociologists in the heritage of Dilthey, Windelband, and Weber who see understanding as the basis for adequate explanation.^0

Those sociologists who stress understanding as the key criterion of explanation often vary widely in their use of the term. There are, however, a number of common themes associated with this form of explana tion. One of these themes concerns the importance of the subjective meanings of the actors to the formulation of sociological interprets-

31 tions of patterns of social interaction. In Kaplan's terms, the

"act meaning" of the participants is the key feature of the "action meaning" of the sociological interpretation of social interaction. Ill

Thus, according to Kaplan, sociology uses "purposive explanations."

He notes that "in these explanations, acts are given (or found to have)

a meaning, and this meaning then enters as an essential constituent of

32 the explanations offered for the resultant actions."

Understanding as a form of theoretical explanation is often used

in historical research and many social scientists have sought to attain

such understanding by placing the patterns of social interaction under

examination into a historical perspective. The historian Dray has

formulated a very precise conception of this form of explanation in

historical research:

The function of an explanation is to resolve puzzlement of some kind. When an historian sets out to explain an historical action, his problem is usually that he does not know what reason the agent had for doing it. To achieve understanding, what he seeks is information about what the agent believed to be the factors of his situation, including the likely results of taking various courses of action considered open to him, and what he wanted to accomplish: his purposes, goals or motives. Understanding is achieved when the historian can see the reasonableness of a man's doing what this agent did ....

Explanation which tries to establish a connection between beliefs, motives, and actions of the indicated sort I shall call 'rational explanation.'33

The major purpose of the present analysis is to explain the origins

and development of the career criminal program by building through

detailed description and careful consideration of the available data,

a holistic understanding of the meanings and purposes of the partici

pants who created the program, and the historical context and structural

parameters within which these meanings were constructed.

The case study approach, however, is not restricted to the develop

ment of a sociological understanding of a particular phenomenon. The 112 analysis of case materials can also contribute to the development of explanations for more general social processes. Through methodological 3 / strategies such as analytic induction, the examination of single cases can help to test hypotheses and verify theories. Positive cases lend support to the hypothesis and negative cases call for a redefini tion or reformulation of it.35 Thus, the analysis of case materials can serve to confirm, clarify, falsify, or even discover hypotheses.

As Sjoberg and Nett point out:

deviant (or negative) cases serve to clarify the rela tionships among variables in statistical hypotheses and to falsify universal hypotheses. But in both instances, they may lead to the discovery of new relationships and thereby lay the basis for the formulation of new hypotheses.^

A second purpose of the present analysis, therefore, is to assess the adequacy of the eight explanatory propositions concerning the collective definition of deviance which were discussed in the previous chapter. The examination of this particular case (the origins of the career criminal program) may contribute to the clarification of the relative importance of these factors and the relationships between them. Thus, the present analysis may aid us in specifying the condi tions under which collective definitions of deviance are made.

DATA ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS OF VALIDITY

All types of social research are subject to the problems of inter-

37 nal and external validity. External validity concerns the generalizability of the findings obtained by a particular method.

Internal validity refers to whether the explanatory factors truly made a difference or whether the research process itself caused the 113 difference. This section will briefly consider the problems of internal and external validity for the present analysis.

External Validity

The topic of the external validity of the present research has already been broached. In the discussion of the purposes of the analy sis, it was pointed out that one of the purposes of this study was to assess the adequacy of several empirical generalizations concerning the deviance creation process. The findings of this study, by itself, cannot be generalized to all instances of the collective definition of deviance since it is but one case and not representative of instances of deviance creation in general. However, following the methodological strategy of analytic induction, the findings of this study can be used to help confirm, clarify, or even falsify the existing generalizations concerning this process. As Denzin notes, "ideally the use of analytic induction frees the case study approach from the question of external validity.

Internal Validity

The notion of internal validity sensitizes the researcher to the biasing and distorting effects of such intrinsic factors as: history, subject maturation, subject bias, reactive effects of the observer, changes in the observer, and the peculiar aspects of the situations

39 in which the research is carried out. Many of these factors were present in this study.

The effects of history, subject maturation and subject bias will be considered together since the strategies for dealing with these 114 effects were the same for all three. . Historical factors refer to

those events that intervene between observations, or in this study,

to those events which intervene between the actions under examination and the actor’s reconstruction of those actions. Maturation refers to changes occuring within the actor operating as a function of time.

Subject bias refers to either deliberate or unintentional distortions

in the reconstruction of past actions by the actors. All three of

these factors point to the bias or distortion which can creep into a subjects reconstruction of past events. Two strategies for dealing with these effects were utilized.

The first strategy involved the comparison of descriptions of

events at two points in time. The historical materials drawn from the

LEAA files provide descriptions of the events under consideration at

the time of their occurrence, while the in-depth interviews with the

participants provide descriptions (reconstructions) of these same

events at a different point in time. A comparison of the two sets of

descriptions should allow us to control for the effects of history,

maturation and subject bias. The second strategy for dealing with

these effects was to compare the reconstructions of independent partici

pants. The consistency or inconsistency of these accounts should allow

us to assess the effects of historical factors, subject maturation and

subject bias.

Internal validity is also effected by the reactive effects of

observation, and the situational aspects of data collection. Since

these factors apply only to the in-depth interview phase of the present

research, a discussion of their effects will be held for a more detailed 115 consideration of the interview process. Since most problems of validity and data analysis concern the particular techniques of data collection, we now turn to a consideration of historiography and specialized interviewing.

Historiography

The present analysis, as we have noted, is primarily based on historical materials and is therefore a form of historiography. As

Denzin points out:

Any method that attempts to collect, record and analyze documents from the past and to weave these documents into a meaningful set of explanations is historical. The reconstruction of the past from such data is termed historiography.^0

Sociologists who work with historical data will be confronted with many of the same problems historians face and attempt to resolve through the

41 use of the historical method. This section will briefly discuss the attempt to deal with these problems in the present analysis.

Whether dealing with primary sources (first hand reports) or secondary sources (second hand reports), the sociologist using, histori cal documents has to "go to some lengths to establish what has been called the 'framework of facts,' that is, events, incidents, or structural features and so forth, for which there is a high degree of / o probability." The attempt to establish the "framework of facts" or

interpret any historical materials, is always confronted by the "reality distance problem." This refers to the fact that the researcher is often several times removed from the problem under study. As Denzin puts it: "reality (subjectively perceived) leads to subject's interpretation, which is translated into a document perceived, interpreted and 1 1 6 43 analyzed by the investigator." Thus, the analysis of historical materials always involves a chain of interpretations or recon structions of the actual events under study.

Since sociological researchers bring their own preconceptions into the analysis of such data, it seems wise to allow the documents to speak for themselves as much as possible. However, there must be some general rules to be used in judging the validity and reliability of historical documents. Denzin, following Gottschalk, has formulated 44 four such rules. The first rule concerns the proximity of the sub ject to the event. The closer the subject is to the event, the greater the validity and reliability of the report. The second rule concerns the purpose of the report. As Gottschalk notes, "the more serious the author's intention to make a mere record, the more dependable the 45 source." The third rule is based on the number of people the report is intended for. The fewer number of persons a document is prepared for, and the greater the confidential nature of the report, the greater is its probable validity. Finally, the fourth rule suggests that sociologists give greater weight to those reports prepared by expert or highly trained observers. As Denzin notes, "sociologists then suspect the naive reports of a person who learns of an event at a dis tance. Similarly, the greater the familiarity of the author with the A event, the greater the validity of his statements."

Many of these same standards have been advocated by David Pitt in his discussion of the critical analysis of documentary evidence.

He points out that: 117 . . . an assessment of the accuracy of a particular docu ment can be achieved by looking critically at the subject matter of the document and its author (for example, is .there an official line on the subject?), its intended circulation, its purpose (the most accurate documents are aide-memoires and straight reports), its confidentiality (the more confiden tial it is, the more truthful it is likely to be), the personal position of the writer and his sympathies and antipathies (even such things as the state of his health), what, if anything, the author has to gain from a particular point of view, and so on. There are also certain conditions favorable to credibility, for example, when the witness is under legal oath, or fears retributions to himself or family for prevarication, or when he is indifferent to consequences and has little desire to please, displease, propagandize and so forth, or when he has little to gain financially or ^ otherwise, or when the facts are felt to be common knowledge.

This process whereby the contents of historical documents are analyzed to detect inconsistencies, errors, or falsehoods is referred 48 to as internal criticism. The standards relating to internal criti cism can be summarized in the following four questions. 1) Did the reporter have the ability to tell the truth? (Was the reporter close

to the event, competent to report on it, and so on.) 2) Was the reporter willing to tell the truth? (Was the reporter biased, did he or she have a vested interest to protect, etc.) 3) Were the conditions surrounding the report favorable to credibility? (For example, were

there organizational pressures to report on an event in a particular way?) 4) Is there any external corroboration of the report? This question appears to be the most important question of all concerning

the validity of historical data. As Denzin points out, "the historian will not accept a document, or a particular from a document, as

reliable and valid unless it is corroborated by the independent 49 testimony of two or more witnesses: the principle of triangulation."

The present study has attempted to apply these rules and ask these

questions in the analysis of the historical materials gathered from 118

LEAA. The analysis has tried especially to corroborate the historical data internally with other documents and externally with in-depth interviews. It is to the interview process that we turn next.

Specialized Interviews

The present analysis has also been based to a considerable extent on data gathered through in-depth, specialized interviews with those individuals who were instrumental in the development of the career criminal program. As we have noted, specialized interviews stress the interviewee's definition of the situation, encourage the inter viewee to structure the account of the situation, and allow the 50 interviewee to introduce his or her notions of what is relevant.

These interviews play two extremely important roles in the analysis.

First, the interviews allow us to get at the meanings, the purposes and the definitions of the actors involved in the creation of the career criminal program. The interviews allow us to catch the partici pants "in their own terms.11 As we have pointed out, capturing the meanings and purposes of the actors is critical to the theoretical explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. Second, the inter views serve to corroborate the historical data bearing on the development of the career criminal idea. The interviews provide an independent description of the events under examination which can be compared to and balanced against the historical materials.

As we pointed out earlier, this comparative function of the interview data is important to the question of internal validity. The comparison of accounts offered by participants in the interview process with accounts derived from the historical documents, not only serves to 119 corroborate the data, but it also allows us to control for the effects of history, maturation and subject bias. Specialized interviews also allow us to deal with other factors related to internal validity such as the reactive effects of observation, and the situational aspects of the research setting.

The reactive effects of observation are always a threat to the internal validity of sociological data. A number of social scientists have urged that "unobtrusive measures" be used in social research as much as possible."*'*' The use of public archival records in the present study is an example of the type of nonreactive research they argue for.

The reactive effects of observations, however, are inherent in the interview process. Denzin describes the interview as an "Observational encounter" and he notes that:

The reactive effects of observations raises the problem of demand characteristic effects within the interview, and suggests once again that the respective selves of inter viewer and respondent cannot be ignored. That is, the knowledge that one is being observed, or interviewed, leads to a deliberate monitoring of the self so that only certain selves are presented. Because many interviews convey implicit demands to the respondent (e.g., social desirability) there is often an attempt to present a self that meets these demands. This has the potential of creating a built-in, self-fulfilling prophecy within the interview: the subject may tell the interviewer what he thinks the interviewer wants to hear.-^

Pfohl observes that "interviews are inherently enfleshed with situated negotiations for definitions of what to do, say and think which have not been previously anticipated, rehearsed and standard- 53 ized." The negotiated interaction of the interview process, according to Cicourel, should not be viewed as an eliminatable bias but "as an unavoidable dilemma of field research.The impact 120 of negotiated interaction and the reactive effects of observations cannot be avoided in the interview situation. The researcher, however, should be aware of these potentially biasing factors and attempt to minimize their impact.

Pfohl has pointed out two specific areas of social interaction within the interview process in which the interviewer can attempt to minimize the reactive effects of interviewing. The first of these concerns the issue of what to do about showing evaluative responses to

the interviewees answers. Pfohl notes that people in conversation tend

to search for cues on how they are coming off and being received, and

they will carry on this search despite the interviewers attempts to withhold evaluative cues and be neutral.

Believing that respondents search for interest and evalua tion cues regardless of an interviewers overt behavior, we decided to attempt to provide interest cues (smiles, nods, statements of interest) for all lines of a respondents formulation. We attempted, in other words, to provide an undifferentiated positive response for all categories of respondent answers. Rather than trying to act uniformly neutral (and be read into and discovered), we tried to act uniformly interested.^5

The second element of interview interactions, Pfohl was concerned with, focused on the interviewees efforts to attribute or typify the motives of the interviewer for asking certain questions. Pfohl’s

"real" motive, as is the motive of the present analysis, was simply

to gain understanding of the perspectives, meanings, and purposes of

the participants. As such, he points out, "we tried to preface our various questions with lead-in descriptions of the reasons for asking

them."^^ By prefacing.questions with general motive statements, Pfohl believed that he was able to reduce interviewee suspicion about what 121 he was really after. Also, in introducing certain probes at various points in the interview, Pfohl used the technique of probing

"innocently" to reduce respondent suspicion of what he was really

after. This technique:

. . . employed the reasoning that, since we're only sociologists (and not psychiatric professional), we might not understand this or that 'psychiatric topic.' Hence, more information was requested without necessarily arousing respondents suspicions that we didn't trust, honor, accept or think much of an original answer. The main thrust of this strategy was to get 'innocently' an elaboration of an answer without putting a respondent on guard about revealing too much. It ordinarily resulted in more information without loss of rapport. ^

Although the reactive effects of interviewing and the negotiated

interactions of the interview process threaten the internal validity

of interview data, the influence of these factors can be minimized

through the use of these interactional strategies and the interviewers

general awareness of the potential biasing effects of reactivity.

Internal validity can also be effected by the peculiar aspects of

the interview situation. Denzin points out:

The situations of interviewing must also be treated as potential sources of invalidity. Just as selves are defined through a process of interaction, and the inter pretation of rules, so too are situations. It is the combination of selves and rules that give situations their definition and it may be assumed that few inter views occur in situations defined in exactly the same CO J manner. °

The specialized interviews of the present research were all conducted

in the offices of the respondents. The interview process was geared

toward achieving a situation in which the interviewees felt that they

were operating on their own "home grounds." The theoretical reasons

for this home grounds approach has been well stated by Pfohl: 122

It was our assumption that respondents sense of being on their own home grounds would encourage them to be more 'pro-active' in reconstructing their patient review experiences. Surrounded by the spatial and social symbols of their own professional lives, it was hypothesized that respondents would feel more in control and be less 're-active' to the cues of interviewers concerning how to answer particular questions. . . . to talk with the psychiatric professionals in their own offices was to literally cast them into the role of resident expert. This we hoped would maximize our role in controlling their substantive formulations.59

Thus, the "home grounds" interviewing strategy was adopted for the present study, not only for practical reasons of obtaining the number of interviews desired, but also to minimize the threat to internal validity which is posed by the research situation itself.

In summary, the collection of data through specialized interviews presents the sociological researcher with a number of problems both practical and methodological. The process of getting, conducting and recording the interview itself can often be very difficult.^ The major problems, however, appear to be problems of validity. To deal with the problems of internal validity, we have suggested triangulating interview data with other sources of data and other methodological techniques (history, maturation and subject bias). A number of inter actional strategies have also been proposed to deal with other threats to validity (reactive effects and the interview situation). Above all else, the researcher needs to bear in mind that the interview process itself is a form of social interaction in which social realities are constructed and reconstructed, and that the sociologist plays a crucial role in the process of their construction. 123

• KEY ANALYTIC QUESTIONS

The qualitative analysis of a social phenomenon generally proceeds

by asking three key analytic questions: 1) out of what has the

phenomenon come?; 2) what are the major features of the phenomenon?;

and 3) what are the results, outcomes, or effects of the phenomenon.

The first question concerns the contexts and conditions out of which

the phenomenon emerged. Contexts refers to the larger framework or

background out of which the event under examination has come, while

conditions refers to the specific factors or social phenomena which

are associated with or closely identified with the subject to be

explained. The second question concerns the identifying or dis

tinguishing characteristics and categories of the phenomenon under

investigation. What is the range and variation of its major features

and what are its boundaries or parameters? The third question refers

to the consequences of the phenomenon. What does the phenomenon do,

what are the outcomes, results, or effects of this particular event?

The present analysis will answer these three sets of questions

concerning the LEAA career criminal program, based on the historical

materials and interview data which have been discussed in this chapter.

Thus, the analysis will: 1) provide a theoretical account of the

contexts and conditions out of which the career criminal program

emerged, 2) describe the/ distinguishing characteristics of this program,

and 3) delineate the differential consequences of the program for

various individuals and groups. Then, based on this "understanding"

of the career criminal program, we can assess the adequacy of the eight

explanatory propositions which were discussed in the previous chapter. FOOTNOTES

See Aaron Cicourel's discussion of how unstated and unnoticed "background expectancies" shape sociological research and his suggestions for approximating objectivity by progressively freeing observations and interpretations from the context and process in which they were made, in The Social Organization of Juvenile Justice (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968). Also see Jack Douglas, Understanding Everyday Life: Toward a Reconstruction of Sociological Knowledge (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), pp. 22-31 and Steven Pfohl, The Social Construction of Psychiatric Reality: A Systematic Study of Diagnostic Procedures in a Forensic Psychiatric Hospital. (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, 1976). 2 Norman K. Denzin, The Research Act, (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 2 2 0 . 3 Ibid., p. 219. Following the journalistic tradition of Robert Park and the theoretical dicates of Mead and Blumer.

John Lofland, Analyzing Social Settings: A Guide to Qualitative Observation and Analysis (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1971).

^Denzin, op. cit., p. 221,

6I b i d .

Ibid., p. 223. Also see Eugene Webb, Donald Campbell, Richard Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 8 See Webb, e t . al., op. cit, for a discussion of these types of data.

Denzin, op. cit., p. 225. Also see Webb, et. al., op. cit. 10 Ibid.

The Franklin County "Career Criminal Prosecution Program" in Columbus, Ohio was one of the eleven original career criminal units funded by a discretionary grant from LEAA. 12 Although the national career criminal program of LEAA is primarily a prosecution program, LEAA also funded a few public defense services in jurisdictions with career criminal prosecution units to help them deal with the overload caused by the prosecution of "career criminals."

124 125

The Franklin County Public Defender's Office was one of these select few to receive LEAA money for the defense of career criminals.

13 I believe that the reason I was allowed access to these materials was because Mr. Hollis was relatively new to the job of career criminal program manager and he was unaware of the origins of the idea himself. Thus, he was eager to have someone who would wade through this ocean of paper for him, organize it, and present him with a summary. In addition, the program was now housed in the Adjudication section of LEAA while it had been developed by the National Office of Priority Programs. Had the program still been the responsibility of the NOPP with the original people who had developed the program still in charge, I doubt very much if X would have had the same kind of access to these files. As it was, Hollis and the Adjudication section had nothing to lose by an investiga tion of the program since they had nothing to do with it.

^Again, I believe the reason that I was given such freedom and cooperation was because I did not present a threat to the people in the Adjudication section. To them the career criminal program was only an adopted child to which they had no great personal commitment.

■^In many ways these individuals acted as "informants." Lewis Anthony Dexter, Elite and Specialized Interviewing (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 7-8 points out that "an informant is, in the common usage of the term, distinguished from an elite interviewee by two factors: participation and time. The informant is regarded to some, often to a considerable extent, as a sub professional colleague or co-worker of the research investigator." Benjamin Paul, "Interview Techniques and Field Relationships" in A. L. Kroeber (ed.) Anthropology Today (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 430-451 describes "key informants" as:

Ideally . . . individuals who have not only proved themselves well informed and well connected, but have demonstrated a capacity to adopt the stand point of the investigator. Informing him of rumors and coming events, suggesting secondary informants preparing the way, advising on tactics and tact, securing additional data on their own and assisting the anthropologist in numerous other ways.

■^Although I have stressed some of the structural reasons that I was allowed such complete access and freedom while collecting data at LEAA, I also want to point out that Jim Swain, Bud Hollis and all the people who work in the Adjudication section of LEAA were extremely nice to me, open and honest at all times, with a sincere desire to be helpful. I want to take this opportunity to thank them once again for their kind ness .

■^Aaron Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1964), p. 142. 126 18 Denzin, op. cit., p. 225. 19 Lofland, op. cit,, pp. 3-4. 20 Dexter, op. cit., p. 5. 21 See John Mueller, Karl Schuessler and Herbert L. Costner, Statistical Reasoning in Sociology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. 351. 22 These interviews took place in Washington, D.C. during the week I stayed there in October, 1977, or they took place over the phone in November, 1977.

23 Additional data was also collected from a number of other sources. From the Franklin County Clerk of Courts Office, data was gathered on the social and legal characteristics of all persons prosecuted as career criminals in Columbus, Ohio from 1975 to 1977. Specialized interviews were conducted with the Franklin County Prosecutors Career Criminal Unit and with the Franklin County Public Defender's Career Criminal Defense Unit. Career criminal case dispositions (both negotiated pleas and trials) were observed in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. Performance summaries for all career criminal units around the country were obtained from the National Legal Data Center. Finally, reports of evaluation studies conducted by outside, independent research organiza tions, which deal with career criminal units, were also obtained.

24 See Hans L. Zetterberg, On Theory and Verification in Sociology (Totowa, New Jersey: Badminister Press, 1965); Clarence Schrag, "Elements of Theoretical Analysis in Sociology" in Llewellyn Gross, Sociological Theory: Inquiry and Paradigms (New York: Harper and Row, 1967); and Joan Huber, "Symbolic Interaction as a Pragmatic Perspective: The Bias of Emergent Theory," American Sociological Review 38 (August, 1973), pp. 274-284.

25 See the critical discussion of this tendency in Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), pp. 15-18. 26 See Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism; Perspective and Method (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); T. P. Wilson, "Conceptions of Interaction and Forms of Sociological Explanation," American Sociological Review 35 (August, 1970), pp. 697-707; and Glaser and Strauss, op. cit. 27 Gideon Sjoberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social Research (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 288.

28 Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for Behavioral Science (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1964), p. 327. 127

29 Wilson, op. cit., p. 706. . Also see Kaplan, op. cit., p. 363 and Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 98-99.

30 Sjoberg and Nett, op. cit., p. 288.

•^Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 358-363.

32Ibid., p. 363.

■^^William Dray, "The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered" in Sidney Hook (ed.) Philosophy and History (New York: New York University Press, 1963), p. 108.

3^See the discussion of analytic induction in Denzin, op. cit., pp. 194-199.

oc See W. S. Robinson, "The Logical Structure of Analytic Induction," American Sociological Review 16 (December, 1951), p. 813. 3 Sjoberg and Nett, op. cit., p. 259.

37 Donald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963). Also see the discussion of these factors in Denzin, op. cit., pp. 22-25 and in Webb et al., op. cit., pp. 10-27.

33Denzin, op. cit., p. 200. Also see Denzin, op. cit., p. 241.

39Ibid., p. 201. 40 Ibid., p. 246. Also see Louis Gottschalk, Clyde Kluckhohn and Robert Angell, The Use of Personal Documents in History, Anthropology and Sociology (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1945), and David C. Pitt, Using Historical Sources in Anthropology and Sociology (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972).

41 Gottschalk, et. al., op. cit.

^2Pitt, op. cit., p. 46.

43 Denzin, op. cit., p. 247.

44 Ibid. Also see Gottschalk, et. al., op. cit., p. 16.

^G o t t schalk, et. al., op. cit., p. 16.

^Denzin, op. cit., p. 248.

^ P i t t , op. cit., p. 49. 128

48 External criticism refers to the job of establishing the physical authenticity of a document. Because I worked directly with the LEAA files, external criticism was not an issue in this research.

49 Denzin, op. cit., p. 252. Also see Denzin's discussion of triangulation, pp. 297-313.

"^Dexter, op. cit. 51 Webb, et. al., op. cit. 52 Denzin, op. cit., p. 137. 53 Pfohl, op. cit., 54 Cicourel, 1964, op. cit., p. 93.

55„Pfohl, r t-i op. cit.

^Ibid.

57Ibid.

“^Denzin, op. cit., p. 136.

59^ ^ Pfohl, op. cit. 60 See Dexter, op. cit., pp. 23-80. CHAPTER V

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT:

HABITUAL CRIMINALS AND THE CRIME PROBLEM

The national career criminal program of the Law Enforcement Assis tance Administration did not emerge-full-blown in the 1970Ts out of a historical vacuum. The program grew out of a specific historical con text under particular social conditions. This chapter will describe three components of that historical context.

First, the passage of the habitual offender laws during the 1920's will be discussed. The reasons for the emergence and subsequent failure of these laws will be explored, along with a consideration of the prece dents they established and their relationship to the current career criminal program.

Second, an account of the nationalization of the crime problem in the United States during the 1960's will be presented. This account will describe how crime emerged as a national political issue leading to the expansion of the federal role in law enforcement which resulted in the creation of LEAA.

Finally, the rise of the neo-classical revival in criminology or the

"new penology" will be discussed. The manner in which the intellectual

129 130

milieu created by this "new thinking about crime" influenced the development of the career criminal initiative will be considered.

THE HABITUAL OFFENDER LAWS

There is evidently a large class of habitual criminals— who live by robbery and thieving and petty larceny— who run the risk of comparatively short sentences with compara tive indifference. They make money rapidly by crime, they enjoy life after their fashion, and then, on detection and conviction, serve their time quietly, with the full deter mination to revert to crime when they come out. We are inclined to believe that the bulk of habitual criminals at large are composed of men of this class. When an offender has been convicted a fourth time or more he or she is pret iy sure to have taken to crime as a profession and sooner or later to return to prison. We are, therefore, of opinion that further corrective measures are desirable for these persons. When under sentence they complicate prison manage ment— when at large they are responsible for the commission of the greater part of the undetected crime; they are a nuisance to the community. To punish them for the particular offense is almost useless, the real offense is the willful persistence in the deliberately acquired habit of crime.1

The above quote could easily have come from a recent Presidential message on crime or from a LEAA report on the career criminal program.

Actually, the quote comes from the Gladstone Committee Report to the

English House of Commons in 1895.2 Concern with habitual criminals, repeat offenders, and recidivists is not an entirely new phenomenon.

The problem of habitual offenders (and what to do about them) has been a recurring topic of discussion among legislators, criminal justice officials, and criminologists for quite some time now.

Recidivism, as a social problem, first emerged toward the end of the nineteenth century as an outcome of the movement for penal reform 3 in England. As Katkin points out, prior to the penal reform movement

"even the most trifling offenses were punishable either by hanging or 131

by imprisonment which was considered to be only a slightly more pro tracted death. Thus, while there were unquestionably habitual criminals,

there were few whose careers were not ended by a first conviction."^

The presence of habitual criminals therefore, was not recognized or attended to much before this particular time period. The Gladstone

Committee was one of the first official groups to recognize and direct attention to the presence of habitual offenders and the crime problems

they caused.

The English Parliament first attempted to operationalize the

Gladstone Committee's recommendations for the treatment of habitual

criminals in the Prevention of Crime Act of 1908. This Act authorized

the English courts to sentence habitual offenders to periods of preven

tive detention, if after conviction, the offender admitted or was found by a jury to have had at least three prior convictions since the age of 16. This was a "dual track" system of sentencing with the preventive detention sentence (not less than five nor more than ten years) to be

served consecutive to the term awarded for the substantive offense."*

The Prevention of Crime Act was one of the first in a class of legisla- 6 tive acts which came to be known as habitual offender laws.

Habitual offender laws probably reached their zenith in the United

States between the years of 1920 and 1930. Concern over the problems

caused by habitual criminals, however, goes far back into American

History. By 1797 the state of New York had a statute prescribing life

imprisonment for persons convicted of a second felony, while Massachusetts

enacted a habitual offender law in 1817.^ By the end of the 19th 132 century, nine other states had passed habitual offender laws similar g to the Massachusetts statute. It was in the early part of the 20th century, however, that the majority of the habitual offender legisla tion in the United States was passed. By 1939, laws of this type existed in forty-three of the forty-eight states and in the District 9 of Columbia.

The majority of the habitual offender statutes in the United

States provided for mandatory life imprisonment upon the third or fourth conviction. A few of the statutes made the life sentence dis cretionary with the courts, and several others simply graduated penalties for second and subsequent convictions. In general, however, habitual offender laws prescribed life terms for repeat offenders.

The justification for such harsh punishment usually rests on the arguments of deterrence and incapacitation rather than on the more tra ditional retributive argument. As Katkin has noted:

Proponents of such plans do not generally justify them on the basis of the social utility of punitive ness despite the fact that other types of harsh punishment have frequently been rationalized by the argument that society has a right, if not an obligation to respond to "awful” acts with "awful" denunciations. Deterrence and social protection are the usual justifi cations for life sentences.

Most of the mandatory habitual offender laws in the United States were enacted during a ten-year period following the first World War.

Twenty-three states adopted legislation of this kind between the years of 1920 and 1930.^ This legislative outburst has been attributed to several different factors. First, it appears that the United States experienced a dramatic increase in the volume of crime after World 12 War I. Much of this increase apparently was due to the passage of the 133

Volstead Act (the prohibition law). As Brown points out, "this law was instrumental in producing more crime than any other type of legisla-

13 tion. This increase in crime prompted an intense criticism of current laws and the inefficiency of penal treatment by the press and the public, which forced law-makers to re-examine the crime problem.

The other factor which was important to the passage of so many habitual offender statutes at this particular time, was the pressure placed on legislators by the various crime commissions which were popular in the early 19201 s. ^ Sutherland has pointed out that many of the mandatory characteristics of the habitual offender laws came about because of the investigations and recommendations made by these 1 A commissions. Although many viewed the legislative response to the pressures of the crime commissions, the public, and the press, to do something about habitual criminals as a rational approach to a vexing problem, some commentators at the time felt that the law-makers were

"carried away by hysteria, mass instinct and what not, except of course a sense of justice, fairness or logic.

Whatever the nature of the legislatures response to these pressures, it seems clear that their primary intent in enacting these laws was to deprive the courts and the parole boards of the authority to fix penalties in cases involving repeat offenders. "The legislative assembly made the pronouncement that no one who had the specified number of previous convictions should be granted freedom by any 18 authority other than a governor," thus establishing the mandatory character of most of the habitual offender laws. 134

The prime exemplar of a habitual offender statute, in both its content and process of passage, is the New York law of 1926. The

"Baumes Law," as it was called, after its sponsor Senator Caleb Baumes, received the greatest publicity of any of the habitual offender laws and it was most influential as a model for similar laws in other states. The "Baumes Law" required the court to sentence an offender with three prior convictions to a term of life imprisonment. The

New York Crime Commission, of which Senator Baumes was the chairman, played a key role in the passage of this law, as did the fact that 19 there was a high volume of crime in the state. A look at the legis lative history of the law reveals that "its purposes were to deter potential recidivists by making the risks too great, and also to isolate from the society upon which they preyed those offenders who 20 would not be deterred."

Whether for deterrent or incapacitative reasons, those who advo cated habitual offender laws of this type, believed that "they would 21 practically eliminate serious crimes." Of course, they did not. The laws were seldom if ever, used. Brown, in his study of the treatment of the recidivist in the United States, noted that: "The only conclu sion one may draw from the preceding meager statistics is that although these laws are still on the statute books they are seldom used."^

Despite the fact that these laws generally had the enthusiastic support and approval of the legislatures, the crime commissions, the press, and the public, they met strong disapproval from criminal justice officials and academic criminologists. As Tappan noted: 135

Throughout the country trial judges, appellate courts, prosecutors, and criminologists have given clear epxression of their disapproval of or disregard for the recidivist laws. Disapproval appears generally to have been predicated mainly on the grounds of their excessive severity, their encroachment upon the powers of the judiciary, their interference with diagnostic and clinical goals in failing to individualize treatment according to the particular requirement of the offender, and their encouragement to nullification wherefrom^ loss in the deterrent efficacy of the law results.

The greatest opposition to the habitual offender laws came from judges. Their opposition stemmed from a belief that the punishments prescribed by these laws were excessively severe and from the fact that the mandatory nature of these laws encroached upon their judicial power. As Brown observed concerning the "Baumes Law":

No matter how logical and necessary the public and the legislature thought this law, they did not find the courts in agreement. The courts were vehement in their criticism of the act on the grounds that it exacted a most severe penalty. It is extremely doubtful if this was the real reason for the courts objecting to the legislation. It is quite probable that the vested discretionary power of the court was invaded and that this was regarded as a supreme catastrophe.^

And, concerning the habitual offender laws in general, Brown concludes that, "as a result of the opposition of the courts in the United States to these laws, most of these statutes have remained inoperative. It is doubtless true that in the majority of instances the court evaded in

25 one manner or another the specific provisions of these acts."

The courts evaded the provisions of these acts, thereby effectively 26 nullifying them, in a number of ways. First, they tended to read the statutes strictly in favor of the defendant. Secondly, they created obstacles to a finding of prior conviction by setting unusually high standards of proof and imposing rigorous limitations on the admissibility 136 of evidence. Thirdly, they refused simply, either directly or through

subterfuge, to apply the statutes to uncontroverted facts. In general,

the judges used every legal technicality that they could to evade these

laws, and if they couldn't find a technicality, they often simply

ignored the law.

The courts, of course, were aided by the prosecutors who were

also opposed to the habitual offender laws. Prosecutors were able to

circumvent the provisions of these acts through their control of the

plea-bargain and charging processes. Overall, the judges and prosecu

tors were able to combine forces in such a way as to effect the nullification of the habitual offender laws in practice.

Despite the fact that these statutes were never used, they are

nonetheless a crucial background condition for the development of the

career criminal program. In the first place, these laws created a

general awareness of the problems caused by repeat or habitual offenders,

and they focused attention on the need to devise solutions to these

problems. Second, these laws helped advance strong arguments for the

deterrent and incapacitative goals of punishment. Although these goals

went into a decline for a period of time, they have recently re-emerged

27 as part of the neo-classical revival in criminological thought and

they are once again receiving careful consideration from criminal

justice officials. Most important of all, the habitual offender laws

created a new legal category of deviance to be applied by legal control

agents, and they produced a new popular stereotype of the criminal for

the press and the public. The fact that these typifications existed

and were embedded in the stock of knowledge of political authorities 137 and the public, played an extremely important role In the subsequent creation of the career criminal program. Finally, these statutes, through their failure, demonstrated how not to approach the problem of the habitual criminal. The lessons learned from the failure of these laws helped to shape the career criminal program.

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE CRIME PROBLEM

The habitual offender laws were an important component of the historical context out of which the LEAA career criminal program developed. They focused attention on the nature of the problem posed by the habitual criminal, advanced arguments for deterrence and incapicitation as legitimate goals of the criminal justice system, and created new legal and popular conceptions of criminality. The habitual offender laws, however, by themselves, did not directly influence the creation of the career criminal program. Their effect was indirect and dependent on the emergence of a number of other important socio- historical conditions, such as the nationalization of the crime problem in the I960’s.

The crime wave of the 1920’s, noted earlier, generated a national concern with the problem of crime. One outcome of this concern was the habitual offender legislation. Another, was the election of a conserva-

28 tive Republican, Herbert Hoover, in 1928. Shortly after Hoover's election, the national concern with crime began to diminish, although 29 there appeared to be no decrease in the actual incidence of crime.

The diminished public interest in the issue of crime probably reflected a general belief that something "had been done" about the "crime problem." Most of the habitual offender laws had been passed by this 138 * time even if they were never used; and President Hoover had appointed a special commission on ’’law observance and enforcement." The Wickersham

Commission surveyed the crime situation in 1929 and made its recommenda tions to the President. As Mauss points out: "it is not clear to what extent, if any, the Commission’s work actually affected the control of

30 crime, but it apparently had some effect on calming public opinion."

The national concern with crime continued to decline during the decades following the release of the Wickersham report. At the same time, concern with the issue of habitual criminals also declined. The depres sion, World War II, and post-war prosperity are some of the reasons why

the public did not perceive crime to be a major domestic issue. The

federal government was involved with other, more pressing, economic and political problems, and either ignored the crime issue or clung to

the traditional position that crime was a "local" or state matter.

Occasionally, the government would focus attention on a particular type

of criminal activity (such as the Kefauver investigation into organized

crime), but in general, crime was not a national political issue at this

time in our history. Had this trend continued, especially the tendency

of the federal government to play a limited role in law enforcement, it

is very likely that there would be no career criminal program.

Beginning in the 1960’s however, this trend was reversed. During

the decade, the American public came to define crime as the number one

domestic problem facing the nation, and the federal government began to

31 play a much larger role in law enforcement. In general, crime became

a national political issue in the 1960's. This nationalization of the

problem constitutes the second critical component of the historical

context out of which the career criminal program emerged. 139

The 1964 Presidential Campaign

There are a number of factors which are related to the emergence of crime, or more appropriately "law and order," as a national political issue during the 1960's. For one, the United States experienced a sharp rise in the crime rate (especially violent crime) around 1960, and this

32 increase accelerated after 1965. Another important factor was the pub lic perception of the seriousness of the crime problem. The Gallup Poll reported, in May 1965, that for the first time "crime was viewed by

Americans as the most important problem facing the nation.Still another factor was the fear of crime. An American Institute of Public

Opinion survey in 1965, found that a large number of Americans (especially 34 women) were afraid to walk alone at night in their own neighborhoods.

These factors alone, however, do not explain the nationalization of the crime problem. Crime became a national political issue only because of a series of political events which occurred between the years of 1964 and

1968.

The most significant event in this entire process was the 1964 presidential campaign. As Caplan has noted, this campaign "signaled the

35 entry of crime as a national issue." In this campaign, Senator Barry

Goldwater, the Republican nominee, ran on a "law and order" platform, attacking the Johnson administration for its inattention to "crime in the streets." Finckenauer points out that "the 1964 presidential campaign

36 was critical in initiating a new political era in the United States."

The enlargement of the federal role in local law enforcement and criminal justice problems can be traced directly to this campaign. 140

In the 1960 presidential campaign, crime was hardly mentioned and it

37 was certainly not an Important issue. The Goldwater strategists,

however, selected law and order as the principal campaign issue in 1964.

Early in the campaign, Goldwater predicted that "the abuse of law and

order in this country is going to be an issue— at least I'm going to make 38 it one because I think responsibility has to start some place."

During the campaign, Goldwater repeatedly attacked the Supreme Court for

coddling criminals, and Lyndon Johnson for allowing the crime rate to 39 climb "five times faster than the population." As Caplan observes:

In these remarks, both by holding President Johnson accountable for yesterday's crime in the streets and by affirming his own willingness to assume responsibility for reducing crime and the fear of crime, Senator Goldwater was moving the country, perhaps unwittingly, toward a radically different concept of the federal anti crime role. It would not be as easy in the future to view the enforcement of state and local criminal codes as the,. 11 y exclusive responsibility of state and local governments.

While Goldwater toured the country stressing the seriousness of the

crime problem and outlining the actions he would take to deal with it,

President Johnson responded to the issue very cautiously. Many of

Johnson’s political aides, who did not accept the legitimacy of the

crime issue, urged him not to respond at all, for they felt that "law and

order" and "crime in the streets" were simply code words for heightened

41 racism. During the course of the campaign, when responding to the

issue of crime, Johnson stressed two points. First, he pointed to the

socio-economic roots of crime and asserted that many aspects of his Great

Society program, such as the anti-poverty and education components, were

really crime reduction efforts. Second, he stressed that the federal

government should only play a modest role in dealing with a local problem

such as crime: 141

The first point that must be made, again and again, to the point of exhaustion— is that crime is a local problem. Its control is a local responsibility. Except for a few func tions clearly spelled out by law, the federal government has little or no power to deal with the problem . . . nor should it h a v e . ^

President Johnson won the 1964 election by a landslide. Despite the impressive margin of victory, he felt that he could ill-afford to dismiss some of the more explosive issues raised by Goldwater during the campaign. Crime was one of those issues. Goldwater's "theme of lawless ness had become ingrained in the public's perception of the reality of crime. Lyndon Johnson recognized the explosive potential of this issue, and it became an important factor in his domestic policy-making."^

Despite his campaign stance, Johnson began to move in the direction of an enlargement of the governments role in law enforcement. As Caplan points out, "following the election victory, the Johnson administration felt

ii A A compelled to develop a program to meet the voters concern over crime.

Thus, one of the principal outcomes of the 1964 campaign was the legiti mation of crime as a national political issue.

The Aftermath of the Campaign

Also as a result of the election campaign there had emerged a con sensus "that the President must be involved, must do more, and must be

45 held responsible." In the face of these pressures Johnson acted on the crime problem. On March 8 , 1965, only four months after the election, 46 he issued the very first presidential message on crime. This message entitled "Crime, Its Prevalance, and Measures of Prevention," did two things. It created a National Crime Commission, the President's Commission 142

on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice. And it proposed

legislation which would create a grant-in-aid program for law enforce ment within the Justice Department.

The proposed legislation was called the "Law Enforcement Assistance

Act" and it came through the Congress without opposition. This Act

created the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance (OLEA), which was the

forerunner to LEAA. Over seven million dollars was appropriated for

OLEA and the spending authority was vested in the Attorney General's

discretion. OLEA was to provide financial assistance to state and local

law enforcement officials for innovative programs. These grants would

hopefully aid the development of pilot projects of national significance.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Act, even though it had a small budget

and was not well received by local law enforcement officials, marked the

first step in the enlargement of the federal role in law enforcement.

At the time however, Attorney General Katzenbach assured Congress that

this was not the case:

A massive federal subsidy program is, in my judgment, undesirable. It would alter and undermine the traditional division of responsibility for law enforcement among federal, state and local jurisdictions. The Federal Government can, however, provide selective support for model programs, programs to show what is possible .... That is the role we see for the Federal Government under this measure.^

Despite Katzenbach’s assurance, the federal government continued to

move toward a massive financial aid program for law enforcement. The

President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of

Justice played a crucial role in this movement. The Commission, as

Walker points out: 143

. . . was a characteristically liberal response to a social problem, embodying both the liberal faith in social engineering and the strategy of cooptation. The commission approach reflected the reformist faith in the power of 'facts': First, study the problem and make recommendations for reform, then seek to implement the recommendations. Further, by appointing a national commission, Johnson sought to respond to the ^g Goldwater initiative by seizing the crime issue as his own.

The Commission's report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, published in 1967, reflected this liberal approach and was consistent with the broader objectives of the "Great Society." The report avoided the "get tough" proposals which are usually advanced by politicans and concentrated instead on the socio-economic roots of crime: poverty, unemployment, racism, and inadequate housing. The Commission asserted, as Johnson had during the campaign, that by "warring" on these problems the federal government was "warring" on crime.

The President's Commission, however, made its most critical contribu tion to the enlargement of the federal role in the war against crime by focusing attention on the administration of justice and the operation of the criminal justice "system." Walker notes that "one major consequence of the President's Crime Commission has been an increased awareness of 49 . . . . the criminal justice system as a system." Following the Commission s report, both political authorities and criminologists have devoted more attention to the day to day operation of this system, the interaction between its component parts (police, courts, corrections), and the alleged lack of coordination between them.

To deal with the problems of the criminal justice system, the

Commission recommended greater federal action in the "Great Society" tradition. As Walker points out, "like its political father, the New

Deal, the Great Society accepted as given the idea that social problems 144 could best be handled through federal action. The federal government could best mobilize the intellectual and financial resources necessary to tackle a national problem."50 This was especially significant for the criminal justice system for it "inevitably dictated a comprehen sive, systems orientation toward criminal justice even though the primary responsibility for implementation would remain with local agencies."5'*'

Thus, as a start, the Commission recommended the continuation of the OLEA program of grants-in-aid to local and state law enforcement agencies.

The Commission, however, had an even greater impact on federal aid efforts, for it later contributed substantially to the passage of the Safe

Streets Act, which created the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 52 (LEAA). The Safe Streets and Crime Control Act was to be the Johnson

Administration’s principal vehicle for combating crime. It was first unveiled by Johnson on January 10, 1967, during his State of the Union 53 Address. The Safe Streets Act proposed a program of massive federal financial assistance to state and local criminal justice agencies. The provisions of the Act were detailed later in the President’s third annual 54 Message on Crime to the Congress. An expenditure of $50 million was proposed for the first year with $300 million to be appropriated for the second year. This money was to go largely for planning grants, research and pilot projects. The Johnson Administration attempted to justify the expenditure by pointing to the experience of the OLEA. Attorney General

Clark contended that:

Unquestionably, /OLEA/ as small as it is, has provided significant stimulation toward implementation of the Crime Commission's recommendations. More than all else, it clearly demonstrates the great need for and the feasi bility of the massive financing promised by the Safe Streets and Crime Control Act. ^ 145

The Safe Streets and Crime Control Act soon became a very contro versial piece of legislation. It became embroiled in the political turmoil of the late 1960’s: crime was still an explosive political 56 issue, the crime rate continued to soar and the fear of crime was

57 increasing. A 1968 Gallup Poll showed that "crime and lawlessness" ranked second only to the Viet-Nam War as the most important problem 5 8 facing the nation. Racial violence, radical student demonstrations, and anti-war protests wracked the nation. It was in this political climate that the Congress considered the Safe Streets Act during 1967 and 1968. Advocates of the bill insisted that its passage was necessary to restore "law and order." Senator John McClellan, the official sponsor of the bill, declared that, "It is quite probable that these hearings and the bills we will be considering will mark the turning point in the

59 struggle against lawlessness in this nation." Clayton Hartjen, however, suggests another view:

Crime in the late 1960’s was surely a matter for serious concern, but rather than being the ominous threat to the nation and its citizens as the advocates of the crime bill purported, it became a pawn in a political power feud. The public fear of crime, while real enough, was the justifica tion for, rather than the reason behind, congressional action to solve the problem. And officials played on that public fear to achieve ends quite different from the goal of remedying the condition which was said to be the cause of public anxi et y.^0

An analysis of the legislative history of the Safe Streets Act reveals that this legislation, once introduced, was used in an attempt to undermine or nullify a number of Supreme Court rulings concerning the rights of the accused, and to extend the powers of the police into areas fin such as wiretapping and electronic surveillance. There were two major reasons behind these attempts, as Hartjen points out: 146

. . . two Interrelated circumstances seem to lie behind the move to treat crime as so onerous and threatening as to neutralize Supreme Court rulings and the provisions of the Constitution. One factor involved governmental fear of political unrest and the empowered administration's desire to find a more effective way of controlling dissi dents— especially civil-rights advocates and anti-war demonstrators. The second factor centered on a power dispute that arose between the three branches of government, particularly regarding the interests of some members of Congress (in large part Southern Democrats) to override the civil-rights leanings of the court.62

Thus, this legislation (now re-titled the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act) became a weapon for Congress to use against both the Supreme Court and those who were engaging in violent dissent. The

Johnson Administration disliked many aspects of the revised bill but did

63 nothing to change those sections. On June 6, 1968, after months of controversy, debate, and rhetoric on crime, Congress enacted the Omnibus

Crime Bill. On June 19, 1968, President Johnson signed it into law stating that the bill "contains more good than bad."^ The New York

Times described it as "a surrender to public hysteria,and some commentators felt that the legislation constituted "a great leap toward 66 a police state."

It was in this political environment that the Law Enforcenfent

Assistance Administration (LEAA) was born. LEAA was created by Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. Whatever else this legislation did or did not do, one thing that it did for sure was to begin a massive flow of federal money to state and local law enforce ment agencies through LEAA. Given the seriousness of the crime problem and the political turmoil surrounding it, the mission of LEAA was clear: reduce crime! To be more specific: 147

The mission of LEAA Is to reduce crime and delinquency by channeling Federal financial aid to state and local governments, to conduct research in methods of improving law enforcement and criminal justice, to fund efforts to upgrade the educational level of law enforcement personnel, to develop applications of statistical research and applied systems analysis in law enforcement, and to develop broad policy guidelines for both the short and long-range improvement of the Nation’s Criminal Justice System as a whole.67

The 1968 Campaign and the Nixon Administration

Despite the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets

. Act and the creation of LEAA, crime remained as an important national

political issue. As the two major political parties gathered for their

national conventions in the summer of 1968, the Gallup poll continued

to report crime as the most important domestic issue, while a Harris

poll found that 81 percent of the American people believed that law and 68 order had broken down. The assassinations of Martin Luther King and

Robert Kennedy, and the riots in Chicago during the Democratic national

convention did little to dispel this notion. Thus, during the 1968

election campaign, crime was once again a critical issue. In fact,

as Finckenauer notes, "crime as a campaign issue was now even more signi

ficant than in 1964, and the candidates had become more sophisticated in 69 its exploitation.11

Using crime as one of the cores of his campaign, Richard Nixon won

the 1968 election. He was given the opportunity (unlike Goldwater) to

implement his concepts of law and order and of retributive justice.

During his first term, Nixon did, in some senses, compile a strong

record on crime. He greatly increased the amount of federal money

flowing to state and local law enforcement efforts, primarily through 148 the newly created LEAA. For example,.In 1969, LEAA's first year of operation, it distributed a total of 60 million dollars; but by 1972, the year Nixon was re-elected, the agency was distributing over 698 70 million dollars. In addition to increasing federal expenditures for law enforcement, the Nixon administration could also point to a decreas ing rate of increase for serious crimes, and to the fact that in 1972, an election year, the overall crime rate dropped 4 percent, the first

71 decrease xn years. According to some commentators, the Nixon record on crime successfully muted the political issue of crime during the 1972 72 campaign.

The Nixon administration, however, was ultimately unable to control the crime problem in any of its dimensions. In 1973, at the start of

Nixon’s second term, the crime rate resumed its climb, rising 6 percent

73 that year and skyrocketing 17 percent in 1974. Survey data from the early 1970's indicates that the fear of crime remained high among the 74 American public. Public opinion polls in 1973 and 1974, reported that crime continued to be one of the top domestic problems facing the 75 nation. The political issue of crime had clearly not gone away. The high expectations engendered by the creation of LEAA and the election of a conservative, law and order President only exacerbated the sense of

frustration and failure that many Americans experienced in connection with the crime problem. By 1974, when the initial development of the

career criminal program began, there was a widespread perception that

7 f» America was "losing the war against crime."

In summary, the nationalization of the crime problem in the 1960’s

and early 1970's, constitutes another one of the critical background 149

conditions for the subsequent development of the career criminal program.

After a long period of decline, following the crime wave of the 1920's,

crime once again emerged as a national political issue in the 1964

presidential campaign. This campaign forced President Johnson to take a

number of actions, following the election, to deal with the public's

growing concern over the issue. The creation of OLEA, the President's

Crime Commission, and the proposal of the Safe Streets Act, all contri

buted to the process of enlarging the federal government's role in the

war against crime which culminated in the establishment of the Law

Enforcement Assistance Administration. Born in a turbulent climate of

political backlash against the Supreme Court, the Civil Rights Movement,

and anti-war protests, LEAA represented the largest expansion of federal

involvement in local law enforcement in history. Despite the creation of

this agency and the election of a conservative, law and order President

in 1968, crime remained a difficult and frustrating national issue.

THINKING ABOUT CRIME: THE NEW PENOLOGY

The emergence of crime as a national political issue during the

1960's, like the development of the habitual offender laws in the 1920's,

was a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the development of the

career criminal program. The nationalization of crime led to the enlarge

ment of the federal role in the law enforcement process and resulted in

the creation of LEAA. Although the establishment of this agency set the

stage for the subsequent development of the career criminal initiative,

by itself it does not account for the creation of the program. Other

factors must be taken into consideration. A final background condition

which must be considered is the neo-classical revival in criminological 150 thought or the new penology.^ The new penology has had a profound

Impact on the definition of the crime problem and on crime control policies in the 1970's. It constitutes a third component of the historical context out of which the career criminal program has emerged.

The neo-classical revival consists primarily of the writings of a number of academic criminologists such as James Q. Wilson and Ernest 78 van den Haag. Although-there is some diversity among them, they appear to hold similar views on such topics as incapacitation, just deserts, deterrence, discretion, and indeterminate sentences to mention a few. The new penology found fertile soil for growth in the frustration and failure of American crime control policies in the 1960's and early 1970's. This new school of thought is grounded in a conserva tive philosophy of crime (similar to that espoused by law and order politicians like Goldwater and Nixon) which emphasizes the retributive, deterrent, and incapacitative purposes of punishment. These writers focus attention on predatory street crimes and advocate a greater use of punitive methods in crime control.

The new penology spurns the discussion of the root causes of crime

(so popular with liberal criminologists and politicans). Causal analysis, these writers contend, leads to the "causal fallacy" which assumes that no problem is adequately addressed unless its causes are eliminated.^

Thus, the new penology abandons social reform and rehabilitation as crime control strategies. Instead of causal analysis, these writers stress "policy analysis," which is addressed to those conditions that can

80 be manipulated to produce the desired effect. The basic argument of the neo-classical writers has been outlined by Schrag: 151

Crime prevention through programs of social reform is not within the purview of criminal justice. Criminal courts should not be organized around the ’largely mythic task of determining guilt.' Their main business is sentencing convicted offenders. Moreover, since the treatment of offenders is regarded as having little effect on either recidivism or the amount of crime, the purpose of correc tions should be ’to isolate and to punish.1 What remains as the justice system's essential function, then, is the administration of punishment.

Thus, the new penology stresses a crime control strategy based on

the punishment of criminals. The failure to control crime they assert,

is largely a result of the failure to punish criminals, especially

' repeat offenders. The responsibility for this failure, according to

the new penology, rests with the courts and corrections and not with

the police or the public. The neo-classical writers have therefore

directed a great deal of attention to the reform of the sentencing

process, with proposals calling for flat-time sentencing, mandatory

82 sentencing, "justice models," and the elimination of discretion.

They have also directed new attention to questions concerning the nature, 83 purpose, and future of imprisonment. In general, the new penology has

re-opened the debate over punishment and focused attention on the institu

tions which administer it.

The rise of the new penology in the early 1970’s greatly influenced

the formulation of crime control policies, such as the career criminal

program. The new penology influenced the creation of this program by

fostering a new intellectual milieu which was conducive to the develop

ment of such an idea. The philosophical assumptions and ideological

beliefs of the neo-classical revival struck a respondent chord with many

government officials charged with the responsibility of controlling crime.

The definition of the crime problem advanced by the new penology was a 152 critical factor in the subsequent development of the career criminal idea. Had this new "thinking about crime" not appeared at this particu lar time, it is doubtful that a program of this kind would have materialized. There are two major features of this new intellectual milieu which are of special importance to the specific content of the

LEAA career criminal initiative. They are: 1) the shift from rehabili

tation to incapacitation or deterrence as the major purpose of criminal

sanctions, and 2) the new focus on habitual offenders. These two

features have been well described by Petersilia:

In recent years the balance in criminal justice thinking has been shifting from an emphasis on rehabilitation to a more 'hard line' view that emphasizes incapacitation by means of imprisonment. The latter policy seeks to enhance public safety by removing serious offenders from the streets and by heightening the deterrence of crime through the use of harsher punishment.

The change is occurring, in part, because of a growing disillusionment with what once was viewed as the main task of the prisons— the rehabilitation, or reform, of criminals. And in part, it is motivated by a belief that the crime problem has been exacerbated by the existence of a relatively small, hard-core element of habitual offenders who are repeatedly apprehended but who, after returning to the streets, commit more crimes.®^

The Shift from Rehabilitation to Incapacitation/Deterrence

One of the most important characteristics of criminal justice in the 85 20th century, as Edwin Sutherland pointed out, has been the movement

toward rehabilitation or treatment and away from punishment. Although

the two are not necessarily antithetical, a criminal justice system tends

to emphasize one over the other with important consequences for the

nature of that system and the manner in which it functions. The "reha

bilitative ideal" has long dominated American penology, in theory if not 153 always In practice. For quite some time now, treatment ideologies have outweighed punitive ideologies in influencing public policy, as evidenced by the fact that prisons are no longer prisons but "correc tional institutions." The plethora of correctional programs which exist within and outside the walls of the modern mega-prison gives testimony to the power of the rehabilitative ideal in the American criminal justice system.

The treatment orientation may well have reached its zenith during the 1960's with the report of the President's Crime Commission. The

Challenge of Crime in a Free Society reflected "the Commission's extreme faith in the rehabilitative ideal and the belief that a system of correction could in fact change hahavior and make a significant impact 86 on the crime problem." Thus, the Commission endorsed the notions of individualized treatment and community based programs as mechanisms by which convicted offenders could be returned to the community as productive citizens.

In recent years, however, the treatment orientation has been largely disvalued. There has been a massive and widespread erosion of faith in the rehabilitative goal of imprisonment. This growing dis illusionment with the rehabilitative ideal is often attributed to the impact of the so-called Martinson report.This massive study of evaluations of numerous treatment programs concluded that, "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been 88 reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism." t The conclusions of the study were quickly reduced to the cliche: 154

"Nothing works," which found ready acceptance among a large audience.

The retreat from rehabilitation is a critical event within criminology

and it is beginning to have a profound effect on criminal justice

policies.

The neo-classical revival in criminological thought stems in part

from the loss of faith in the rehabilitative ideal. Disillusionment with the treatment orientation has caused a number of criminologists

to return to more punitive ideologies. The new penology is based

entirely on the goals of punishment. The purpose of imprisonment is

punishment. According to the new penology, punishment is justified on

the grounds of utility (deterrence), fundamental justice (just

deserts), or social protection (incapacitation). One of the major

characteristics of criminal justice in 1970, is the return to punish

ment and the move away from rehabilitation.

With the retreat from rehabilitation as a viable goal of the

criminal justice system, the punishment goals of deterrence, incapacita

tion and retribution have once again come to the forefront of academic

and policy discussions. A great deal of theoretical and empirical work

is being carried out in connection with these goals. In general, the

new penology has created an intellectual and political climate which

is highly favorable to the serious consideration of incapacitation,

deterrence and retribution as criminal justice goals. As we noted

earlier, one of the major objectives of the career criminal program is

to reduce the level and frequency of serious crime through the incapa-

citative and deterrent effects of the convictions and sentences obtained 155 through the program. It is doubtful that a program with such an objective could have been created and accepted in a milieu where the treatment ideology reigned supreme. Thus, the new penology and the intellectual climate it fostered, certainly was an important influence on the formulation of the career criminal idea.

The New Focus on the Habitual Offender

Following the passage of the habitual offender laws In the late

1920’s and their effectual nullification by prosecutors and judges, the use of the typification "habitual criminal" went into decline. This typification, both as a legal category of deviance and a popular stereo type, did not disappear of course, but it was used infrequently and it did not exert much influence on either the social definition of the crime problem or the formulation of crime control policies. The term recidivist (which is for all practical purposes an equivalent concept) was much more popular during the middle decades of this century than that of habitual offender, but it was usually used in a more technical and morally neutral sense. The stereotype of the habitual criminal is more connotative, evoking images of hardened, ruthless individuals committed to crime as a way of life from which they could not be deterred.

Whatever images the typification of habitual criminal evokes, after the 1930's it was little used by either legal authorities, the press, or the public. By the 1960's, the habitual offender idea was dormant, if not slightly anachronistic. The new penology, however, has 156 revived the legal category and popular stereotype of habitual offender.

The writings of James Q. Wilson especially, have helped to resurrect this concept. He notes:

Most serious crime is committed by repeaters. What we do with first offenders is probably less important than what we do with habitual o f f e n d e r s . 89

The proposition that a relatively small, hard-core element of habitual offenders are responsible for most crime is a central tenet of the new penology, and this notion has become an important part of the social definition of the crime problem in the 1970's. This proposi tion has received some empirical support from the cohort study of

Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin.^0 They reported that chronic recidivists

(5 or more arrests by age 18) represented only 6 percent of the birth cohort, while accounting for over half of all offenses and about two- thirds of all violent crimes.^1 As Petersilia observes:

/This_/ study brought to the forefront the concept of the chronic offender, and this class of offenders is achieving increased recognition as a distinct, and extremely important, issue in the criminal justice field. Indeed, several authorities believe that harsher treatment of the chronic offender could significantly reduce the overall level of crime.92

The authorities that Petersilia cites, of course, are Wilson and van den Haag, two of the most influential proponents of the neo-classical revival. Thus, the new penology played an important role in reviving the typification of the habitual offender and making it an important part of the intellectual milieu surrounding the discussion of the crime problem during the early 1970's. This notion, of course, profoundly influenced the creation and development of the LEAA career criminal pro gram. 157

SUMMARY

This chapter has described three important components of the historical context out of which the LEAA career criminal program developed. Each of these components represents a necessary, but not

a sufficient, background condition for the emergence of the career

criminal initiative. The old habitual offender laws developed and popularized many of the basic assumptions underlying the program, and

they created a legal category and popular stereotype which would later

evolve into the typification of career criminal. The hostility of

prosecutors and judges to these laws, and their subsequent failure, were important influences on the specific approach adopted by the

career criminal program to deal with the problem of habitual

offenders in the 1970's.

The nationalization of the crime problem during the 1960's played

an important role in the subsequent development of the career criminal

program by contributing to the enlargement of the federal government's

role in fighting the war against crime. The emergence of crime as a

national political issue and the expansion of the federal role in law

enforcement resulted in the creation of LEAA, thus setting the stage

for the future development of the career criminal initiative. The new

penology generated an intellectual milieu during the early 1970's which

was conducive to the development of the career criminal idea. By

redirecting criminological attention to the deterrent and incapacitative

purposes of criminal sanctions, and resurrecting the typification of

the habitual offender, the neo-classical revival played an important

role in the creation of the career criminal program. 158

These three conditions comprise the larger historical context or framework within which the career criminal initiative developed- The following chapter will consider the more specific conditions which gave rise to the program. FOOTNOTES

^"Quoted in Daniel Katkin, "Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsidera tion," Buffalo Law Review 21 (No. 3, 1971), pp. 99-100. 2 The Gladstone Committee was formed by the English House of Commons in 1894 under the chairmanship of Mr. Herbert Gladstone to inquire into the state of the prisons. See House of Commons, Report of the Committee on Prisons (1895). Also see Norval Morris, The Habitual Criminal (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 34-36.

"^Katkin, 1971, op. cit., p. 99.

4Ibid.

'’ibid., p. 100. Also see Morris, 1951, op. cit., and MacDonald, "A Critique of Habitual Criminal Legislation in Canada and England," University of British Columbia Law Review 4 (1969).

^For a review of habitual offender legislation outside the United States see: N. S. Timasheff, "The Treatment of Persistent Offenders Outside the United States," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 30 (November-December, 1939), pp. 455-69; B.V.A. Roling, The Law's Concerning the So-Called Professional and Habitual Criminals (The Hague: Martinius Nijhoff, 1933).

^George K. Brown, "The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States," Canadian Bar Journal 23 (1945), p. 641. 8 Edwin Sutherland and Donald Cressey, Principles of Criminology Fifth edition (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1955), p. 564.

^Notes, "Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes," Columbia Law Review 48 (March, 1948), p. 238. 10 Katkin, 1971, op. cit., p. 103.

^Brown, 1945, op. cit., p. 642.

^Paul Tappan, "Habitual Offender Laws in the United States," Federal Probation 13 (March, 1949), p. 28.

^Brown, 1945, op. cit., p. 642. 160

The crime commissions were civic agencies which were composed of public-minded citizens, legislators and legal control agents, who. were interested in obtaining knowledge about crime in order to do something about it. The majority of them were established during the crime wave of the 1920's.

■^Edwin Sutherland, Principles of Criminology (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1939), p. 539.

"^A. M. Herzog, quoted in Harry R. Posner, "Criminal Law-Prior Convictions: Baumes Law," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (February, 1931), p. 615. For other critical comments concerning the Baumes Law and habitual offender legislation in general see: John Barker Waite, The Prevention of Repeated Crime (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1943); Brown, 1943, op. cit.; Cressman, "New York Bludgeon Law," Review of Reviews 77 (1928); Shumaker, Life Imprisonment for Habitual Offenders, Law Notes 31 (1927); Notes, 1948, op. cit. 18 Sutherland and Cressey, 1955, op. cit., p. 564. 19 Brown, 1943, op. cit., p. 642. 20 Katkin, 1971, op. cit., p. 104. In a speech to the New York Bar Association Senator Baumes stated:

When a man has been convicted of four serious crimes he has furnished abundant— yes, positive proof that he is incurable; he is non-reformable. That is to say he is what we call "anti-social." Either he cannot, or will not, submit to the fixed and settled rules of society. . . . he is an habitual criminal, a menace to society, and as such we say should be segregated from society for the benefit of society . . . ." Quoted in Posner, 1931, op. cit., p. 65. 21 Sutherland and Cressey, 1955, op. cit., p. 564. 22 Brown, 1943, op. cit., p. 659 23 Tappan, 1949, op. cit., p. 29. 24 Brown, 1943, op. cit., p. 661

25Ibid. 26 Notes, 1948, op. cit., p. 661. 27 The neo-classical revival and its relationship to the career criminal program will be discussed shortly. 161

28 Armand L. Mauss, Social Problems As Social Movements (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975), p. 100.

29 Ibid.

38Ibid., p. 101. Also see V. A. Leonard and Harry More, The General Administration of Criminal Justice (Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, 1967).

3^James 0. Finckenauer, "Crime as a National Political Issue: 1964-76: From Law and Order to Domestic Tranquility," Crime and Delinquency 24 (January, 1978), pp. 13-27.

3^Mauss, 1975, op. cit., p. 79.

Finckenauer, 1978, op. cit., p. 19.

34Michael J. Hindelang, "Public Opinion Regarding Crime, Criminal Justice, and Related Topics," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency (July, 1974), pp. 101-116. qe Gerald Caplan, "Reflections on the Nationalization of Crime, 1964-1968," Law and the Social Order 3 (No. 2, 1973), p. 585. qr Finckenauer, 1978, op. cit., p. 16.

3^Caplan, 1973, op. cit., p. 585.

38Ibid.

39Ibid., p. 586.

40Ibid.

^Finckenauer, 1978, op. cit., p. 16-17.

43Quoted in Caplan, 1973, op. cit., p. 587.

43Finckenauer, 1978, op. cit., p. 19.

44Caplan, 1973, op. cit., p. 588.

45Ibid., p. 589.

48Lyndon Johnson, "Crime, Its Prevalence and Measures of Preven tion," House of Representatives Document No. 103, 89th Congress, 1st Session (1965).

4^Quoted in Caplan, 1973, op. cit., p. 613. 162 48 Samuel Walker, "Reexamining the President’s Crime Commission: The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society After Ten Years," Crime and Delinquency 24 (January, 1978), p. 4. 49 Ibid., p. 10.

50Ibid., p. 11.

•^Ibid.

■^Finchenauer, 1978. op. cit., p. 19.

-^Caplan, 1973, op. cit., p. 627.

■*^Ibid.

55u. S. Department of Justice, Annual Report to the President and the Congress on Activities Under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1965 (1968), p. 3.

■^Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967).

~*^George Gallup, Gallup Opinion Index: Report No. 27 (Princeton, N.J.: American Institute of Public Opinion, September, 1967), p. 20.

~*®George Gallup, Gallup Opinion Index: Report No. 33 (Princeton, N.J.: American Institute of Public Opinion, March, 1968), pp. 14-17.

^Quoted in Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime (New York: Praeger, 1968), pp. 31-32.

^Clayton Hartjen, Possible Trouble: An Analysis of Social Problems (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 66-67.

^Harris, 1968, op. cit.

^Hartjen, 1977, op. cit., p. 66.

^Harris, 1968, op. cit.

64Ibid., p. 110.

65Ibid.

66Ibid., p. 15.

^ L a w Enforcement Assistance Administration, 3rd Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Fiscal Year 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. ii.

^Finckenauer, 1978, op. cit., p. 20. 163

70 Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 6th Annual Report of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration Fiscal Year 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 71 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1972).

^Finckenauer, 1978. op. cit., p. 21. 73 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

^Hindelang, 1974, op. cit., p. 103.

^Results of a Gallup poll reported in "The Losing Battle Against Crime in America," U.S. News and World Report, December 16, 1974, p. 30.

76Ibid.

77These two expressions will be used interchangeably here. 78 James Q. Wilson, Thinking About Crime (New York: Basic Books, 1975); Ernest van den Haag, Punishing Criminals: Concerning A Very Old and Painful Question (New York: Basic Books, 1975. Other neo-classical writers or works include: David Fogel, We Are the Living Proof: The Justice Model for Corrections (Cincinnati: W. H. Anderson Co., 1975); Andrew Von Hirsch, Doing Justice - The Choice of Punishments (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976); Norval Morris, The Future of Imprisonment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974); Norval Morris and Gordon Hawkins, Letter to the President On Crime Control (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977).

7^Wilson, 1975, op. cit., pp. 48-56.

80 Ibid. Also see Richard Quinney, Class, State and Crime (New York: David McKay, 1977), p. 18.

81 Clarence Schrag, "Review of Thinking About Crime, Punishing Criminals, and We Are the Living Proof," Criminology 14 (February, 1977) pp. 569-573.

®^See Fogel, 1975, op. cit., and Von Hirsch, 1976, op. cit., 83 See Morris, 1974, op. cit.

^^Joan Petersilia, "Developing Programs For the Habitual Offender: New Directions in Research" in C. Ronald Huff (ed.) Contemporary Corrections: Social Control and Conflict (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 104. 164

®"*Edwin Sutherland, "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Laws,” American Journal of Sociology 56 (September, 1950), pp. 142-148.

^Walker, 1978, op. cit., p. 8 .

87 Douglas Lipton, Robert Martinson, and Judith Wilks, The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment (New York: Praeger, 1975). 88 Robert Martinson, "What Works? - Questions and Answers About Prison Reform," The Public Interest 35 (Spring, 1974), p. 25.

^Wilson, 1975, op. cit., p. 223.

90 Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).

91Ibid.

9^Petersilia, 1977, op. cit., pp. 104-105. CHAPTER VI

THE CREATION OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM:

STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT

The previous chapter described several components of the larger historical context of the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program. This chapter will focus on the more specific condi tions and events surrounding the creation of this program. Four specific stages of development will be identified and described. The first stage consists of the initiation of a crusade to foster management conscious ness among public prosecutors by a small group connected with the

United States Attorney’s Office in the District of Columbia. This crusade led to the development of PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management

Information System) and the creation of a Major Violators Unit in the

U. S. Attorney's Office.

The second stage of the development of the career criminal program began when this small group from the U.S. Attorney's Office were offered high level positions within LEAA. Once at LEAA, they searched for a program to push PROMIS and management consciousness. The idea for a career criminal impact program was developed and presented to the

Attorney General, but it laid dormant for several months.

165 166

The third stage of development began shortly after Gerald Ford became President. Ford's announcement of the creation of a career criminal program in a speech before the International Association of

Chiefs of Police marks the program as a Presidential initiative and acts as a catalyst for its programmatic development and design within

LEAA.

The fourth stage concerns the actual operation of the career crimi nal units, the media reaction to the program, and the expansion of career criminal jurisdictions around the nation.

Each of these four stages of development will be described in great detail. The aim in this chapter is to provide a complete account of the emergence and growth of the LEAA career criminal initiative. This des cription will allow us to identify and analyze the conditions and contingencies associated with the creation of this program in the following chapter.

STAGE 1: THE CRUSADE FOR MANAGEMENT CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE

The genesis of the LEAA career criminal program can be traced directly to the development of PROMIS and the creation of the Major

Violators Unit within the office of the U. S. Attorney for the District of Columbia during the early 1970's. Both PROMIS and the Major Violators

Unit, however, were the result of a crusade to develop management consciousness among public prosecutors. This crusade therefore marks the beginning of the first stage of development of the career criminal program. 167

The Case For Management Consciousness

The Important role of the prosecutor has often been ignored in dis cussions of the criminal justice system. In fact, a typical description of the system includes only the three components of police, courts, and corrections. Prosecutors, when they are considered, are usually viewed as a functionary of the court, and not treated as a separate unit of analysis. The prosecutor, however, not only "represents a separate and equal branch of government which is intended to be independent of the court,but he or she also occupies one of the most critical roles in the entire criminal justice system. As Albert J. Reiss recently noted,

"by legal authority and by practice, U. S. prosecutors have the greatest 2 discretion in the formally organized criminal justice network."

In recent years more and more attention— theoretical, empirical, and pragmatic— has been directed to the prosecutor's role in the court system.

A deep concern for this issue evolved among a small group of people within

the U. S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia during the late

1960's. This group, headed by Charles R. Work, then Deputy Chief of the

Superior Court Division of the U. S. Attorney's Office, became concerned about the practical role of the urban prosecutor during the massive reorganization of the District of Columbia court system.^ Deputy Chief

Work and his associates perceived an urgent need for new techniques to manage the thousands of cases which were then being handled on an

assembly-line, mass production basis.** Out of this perception there emerged a "crusade" to develop management consciousness among prosecutors.

This crusade was to ultimately lead to the creation of the career criminal

program. 168

The crusade for management consciousness in the prosecutor's office, as we noted above, grew out of a concern for developing new case manage ment tools to help prosecutors effectively fulfill their critical role in the criminal justice system. According to Deputy Chief Work the prosecu tor should play an active role. "Unlike the court, the prosecutor is not constrained to accept passively as his workload every matter that is presented to him."*’ Prosecutors, Work points out, have a great deal of discretion. They can screen out cases brought to them by the police; they can initiate and channel investigations into areas they view as having priority; they can evaluate the importance of individual cases relative to other cases they judge to be more important. In general, in the performance of their role, prosecutors serve an important function for the court, as Charles Work has pointed out:

By properly exercising his role, the prosecutor performs a vitally important function for the court which the court is prevented from performing for itself; he precludes random access to its limited adjudicative resources, and preserves these resources for the timely judgment of the matters to which the public attaches priority. It is in this sense that the prosecutor serves as the guardian, protector, and custodian of the community's scarce resources for adjudica tion. ^

Work and his associates however, felt that many prosecutors were not performing this function satisfactorily, due to the fact that they were

g understaffed and lacked strong management consciousness. According to

Work, far too many prosecutors adopt a passive role similar to that of

the court, accepting all cases referred to them indiscriminately, and giving them all equal emphasis. Even when prosecutors strive to play an active role and fulfill their custodial responsibility, they are often hampered by a lack of means and techniques which would allow them 169 to differentiate among their massive caseloads and selectively prosecute the most serious cases. As Charles Work has observed:

As a result of inadequate staffing, inadequate differen tiation among cases and insufficient management consciousness, court backlogs grow inexorably .... To be an effective custodian of the community's adjudicative resources, the prosecutor must actively manage his caseload and systematically develop and apply priorities. The need for priorities is most obvious in major urban centers where the public prosecutor must handle thousands of cases on an assembly line, mass-production basis.9

The assembly-line nature of the handling of criminal cases by prosecutors usually means that the individual prosecutor has little time for case preparation. Work points out that the combination of a high- volume caseload and inadequate staffing precludes adequate case preparation and vertical prosecution (one prosecutor handling a case from start to finish through all stages of criminal procedure)

One particularly pernicious effect of this system, according to Work,

is that it allows the habitual or repeat offender to "slip through the cracks" of the criminal justice system.

One frequent result of the high-volume, assembly-line system is that the habitual offender can achieve a degree of anonymity in the crowd and thereby exploit the system to make its weaknesses work for him.^

In summary, at the time of the court reorganization in the District

of Columbia, Charles Work and some of his colleagues at the U. S.

Attorney's Office became concerned with the critical role of the urban

prosecutor and the Important function that he or she performs for the

court. Based on his analysis of the assembly-line, mass production

nature of most criminal prosecutions, Work perceived the need to develop

case management tools which would allow prosecutors to prioritize their 170 caseloads and allocate scarce prosecutorial resources more effectively.

Thus, the crusade to develop management consciousness among prosecutors was launched.

The Development of PROMIS

The first important result of the crusade for management con sciousness was the development of PROMIS (Prosecutor's Management

Information System). In 1969, with a grant from LEAA, Charles Work helped to bring together a special team of lawyers, management analysts, criminologists, statisticians and computer science specialists

for the purpose of developing new case management techniques for prose cutors. The team was headed by Work, and Joan E. Jacoby, then Director 12 of the Office of Crime Analysis of the District of Columbia. The efforts of this team led to the development of an innovative computer based information system for the prosecutor, which became known as

PROMIS.

The PROMIS system contains a number of types of information relating to defendants and criminal cases. First, PROMIS contains a

complete summary of information concerning the defendant. Not only

does it include the socio-demographic characteristics of defendants, but it also stores information concerning their criminal history

(previous arrests, previous convictions, use of aliases, use of drugs,

and so on). PROMIS also contains information about the alleged crime

(date, time, place, gravity of offense, etc.), and the defendants arrest

(date, time, place, type of arrest, and arresting officers). A complete

history of the criminal charges growing out of the incident is also

contained in the PROMIS system (the original charges filed by the police, 171 the charges actually filed, in court, the reasons for any changes in charges, etc.). Further, PROMIS contains a complete summary of court events and information about witnesses (the dates of all court events connected with the case, the names of all parties involved in each event, the outcome of each event and the reasons for each outcome, the names and addresses of all witnesses, and so on).

The central feature of the PROMIS system, however, is the automated designation of priorities for pending criminal cases. Priorities are assigned to cases by the computer on the basis of an evaluation of the seriousness of the crime, the criminal history of the defendant, the age of the case, and the probability of the defendant being convicted.13

Thus, PROMIS identifies the most serious or most important pending cases for prosecutors allowing them to allocate scarce resources in such a way as to insure that these cases will receive intensive, individualized pretrial preparation. As Charles Work points out, "PROMIS not only

supplies the prosecutor with a highly efficient data retrieval system, but also enables him to quickly identify those cases from among his

staggering caseload that involve serious crime or habitual offenders and

those most urgently requiring intensive preparation and expeditious

trial."14

According to Work, the use of the PROMIS system gives prosecutors

the critical capability to actively manage their voluminous caseloads

and systematically develop and apply priorities to insure that the most

serious cases and offenders are given special treatment. Thus, PROMIS

allows prosecutors to effectively perform their role as the custodian 172 of the community's scarce adjudicative resources, and it also represents a major step in the development of the selective prosecution .concept. 15

The Formation of the Major Violators Unit

One of the most important benefits wrought from the development of

PROMIS, according to Work and his associates at the U. S. Attorney's

Office, was the formation of a special unit dedicated to tracking and preparing cases Involving repeat misdemeant offenders. ^ This Major

Violators Unit was set up within the Superior Court Division of the U.S.

Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia in 1971 during the reorganization of the D. C. Court system. The creation of the Major

Violators Unit was an important component of the crusade for management consciousness and it later served as a model for the career criminal program.

Prior to the formation of the Major Violators Unit, all misdemeanor cases were handled by inexperienced "rookie" prosecutors with little or no advance preparation, regardless of the seriousness of the offense or the criminal history of the defendant. And, as Deputy Chief Work pointed out, "the more serious the offense and the more serious the 17 offender, the more difficult it was to obtain a conviction." Repeat offenders, he noted, were fully aware of the entire operation of the court system and they took advantage of overcrowded dockets, multiple continuances, and even witness intimidation, to increase their chances of obtaining an acquittal or a dismissal. Further, these individuals often had other cases pending against them (or serious criminal histories) of which prosecutors were unaware. 173

In the face of these problems, Deputy Chief Work directed the

Major Violators Unit (a team of six experienced attorneys and support personnel) to devote all its energies to insuring that cases involving serious crimes or criminals were properly prepared in advance. The

Major Violators Unit was to provide continuous, concentrated monitoring of all cases identified by PROMIS as having a high priority. Although the members of this Unit do not try the cases themselves, they do the critical background work and preparation required for successful prosecution.

Once a case has been flagged as a priority case by virtue of a high crime gravity rating or a high defendant criminal history rating, it is assigned to a member of this unit. That assistant prosecutor contacts the witnesses, interviews them, and personally arranges for them to be present on the trial date. He reviews the periodic PROMIS reports on the case to determine whether there are any other pending cases against the same defendant and, depending upon his overall evaluation, may also contact defense counsel to ascertain 1 ft if a plea can be negotiated. °

According to Work, the Major Violators Unit was successful. In the first six months of its operation, the unit increased the conviction rate for serious misdemeanors by over 40 percent. The unit also reduced the average time from arrest to trial in these cases by two to three weeks. In addition, the overall conviction rate for the priority cases handled by the Major Violators Unit was said to be 25 percent

?n higher than the rate for those cases which were processed routinely.

The real importance of the Major Violators Unit, however, lies in the fact that it was later to serve as a model for the development of the career criminal idea. As Charles Work recently noted: 174

. . . I find some satisfaction in the fact that I was later able to put our experience with the misdemeanor Major Violators Unit to good use. While Deputy Administrator . of LEAA, my experience with the Major Violators Unit became the primary catalyst for the creation of the Career Criminal Program.

STAGE 2: THE INITIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL IDEA

Originally, both PROMIS and the Major Violators Unit were designed to operate only in the U. S. Attorney's Office in the District of

Columbia. Deputy Chief Work and his associates, however, had a strong desire to spread these two programs to other prosecutors in their

n r\ crusade for management consciousness in the prosecutor's office.

Replicating the programs in other jurisdictions was a difficult task, given the limited resources of the group. Although two additional LEAA grants were obtained for the futher development of PROMIS in order to make it possible to replicate the system efficiently and cheaply in

2 ^ other jurisdictions, very few prosecutor's offices adopted it. Work and his associates wrote a number of articles on PROMIS, but they did little to sell the system. At this point, the crusade for management consciousness appeared to have no potential for having any significant impact on the criminal justice system. Both PROMIS and the Major

Violators Unit appeared destined to be nothing more than innovative

local programs. A critical contingency in the development of the career criminal program had been reached.

Then, a crucial event occurred. Donald E. Santarelli, who became

the Administrator of LEAA in April, 1973, asked Charles Work to become

the new Deputy Administrator for Administration with LEAA. Santarelli, a former Assistant Deputy Attorney General, first met Charles Work when 175 he worked at the U. S. Attorney's Office in the middle 1960's. Later

Santarelli and Work had frequent contacts during the reorganization of the D. C. court system, and Santarelli was impressed with Work's ability

2 4 and his dedication to improving criminal justice. Work accepted

Santarelli's offer and he went to LEAA in the summer of 1973. With

Work's assumption to the second highest post within LEAA, the opportunity for the subsequent development of the career criminal program was opened.

The second stage of development had begun.

A Program to Push PROMIS

When Charles Work went to LEAA as the new Deputy Administrator, he took along with him two close associates from the District of Columbia court system. H. Paul Haynes, a former administrator in the D. C.

Superior Court, became an Assistant Deputy Administrator, and R. Alan

Jones, the former head of the Major Violators Unit, became a Sepcial

Assistant to the Administration. Thus, those individuals who were most heavily involved in the development of PROMIS and the creation of the

Major Violators Unit, now occupied key structural positions within LEAA.

The crusade for management consciousness was now located within a new environment which possessed enormous political and economic resources.

Shortly after Work went to. LEAA, he and Paul Haynes began to dis cuss ways in which LEAA could help strengthen the prosecutorial component 25 of the criminal justice system. Work felt that, in the past, LEAA had poured far too much money into hardware and technology for the police, while the agency had done little for the other components of the system. 26 Because of his strong "prosecutorial bias," Work felt that LEAA should 176 be doing more to aid the prosecutorial component. As Haynes later put

2 7 It, "Chuck had a fetish for giving money to prosecutors."

Work felt that one of the best ways LEAA could aid local prosecutors was to help them develop management consciousness by inducing them to install the PROMIS system in their office. Thus, Work hoped to somehow nationalize the PROMIS system. As Ellen Jasper, the former manager of the career criminal program, noted, "he [Work] really wanted to push the

PROMIS program. He tried to think of some kind of program which he could use to promote it."^® Selling PROMIS, however, by Work's own

29 admission was "like pulling teeth." What was needed was a program to

give "sex appeal" to something as sexless as a computer based informa

tion system. As Work noted, "there's no sex appeal in raising

qn management consciousness."

Work therefore, asked Haynes to think of some type of national prosecutors program that LEAA could fund which would push PROMIS.He wanted to develop some program which could serve as a "marketing tool”

for the PROMIS system; some program which could showcase the capabili

ties of PROMIS. What was needed was an attractive package to put it in,

an appealing program which could demonstrate to local prosecutors what

the PROMIS system could do for them. They needed something with "sex

appeal" to sell the ideal of management consciousness.

At this time, as Work and Haynes began to search for a program to

push PROMIS, they became aware of two studies which helped lead them to

formulate the idea for a career criminal program.-^ The first study was

the landmark research of Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin. In Delinquency

In A Birth Cohort, Wolfgang, et. al., focused attention on the concept of 177 the chronic offender. They reported that 6 percent of the cohort they studied accounted for over 50 percent of the crimes committed by the cohort and two-thirds of the violent offenses.35 As noted in the previous chapter, this research was instrumental in reviving the notion of the habitual offender and thrusting this typification back into the centerstage of criminal justice debate.

The second study which came to the attention of Work and Haynes was based on PROMIS data from the District of Columbia. The research carried out by the Institute for Law and Social Research (INSLAW), 36 reported that those arrested four or more times over a 56 month period represented only 7 percent of arrestees but they accounted for 24 percent of all the a r r e s t s . 37 Thus, both of these studies directed Work and

Haynes' attention to the habitual offender or career criminal. They served as justifying data for a program which would attack the problem of the career criminal documented in these reports.

These studies led Work to reflect upon his experiences with the Major

Violators Unit in the District of Columbia. Eventually Work and Haynes decided that a program based on the model of the Major Violators Unit and directed against the habitual offender was the perfect idea for the national prosecutors program they had been searching for. Such a program had "sex appeal" and would be attractive to local prosecutors.

In order to go after the habitual offender, however, prosecutors would 38 need some way to identify them. Thus, the program would serve as an excellent showcase for PROMIS. At this point, Work and Haynes began to

formulate and refine the idea of a career criminal program. The LEAA career criminal initiative was born. 178

An Opportunity to Circulate the Idea

Once the decision had been made to push PROMIS and attack the pro blem of the habitual offender through a career criminal impact program based loosely on the model of the Major Violators Unit, an opportunity arose to bring this idea to the attention of the highest officials in the Justice Department and the Nixon Administration. The opportunity occurred following the release of the F.B.I.'s Uniform Crime Report on

July 15, 1974. This report indicated that there had been a 15 percent increase in the first quarter crime statistics. President Nixon was apparently upset by this large increase in reported crime. During 1972, the year of Nixon’s re-election, the United States had experienced a decrease in the crime rate for the first time since 1955. However, in

1973 the crime rate increased again (up 6 percent). During the last quarter of 1973 crime rose 16 percent, and now came the report that crime had increased by 15 percent in the first quarter of 1974.

Disturbed by these statistics, President Nixon directed a memoran dum to Attorney General Saxbe on July 16, 1974, expressing concern over

the increase and requesting a series of options designed to reduce

39 crime. Saxbe in turn, requested that the Justice Department and LEAA forward to him a response to the President's memorandum. Saxbe's request

for crime reduction options for the President's consideration provided an excellent opportunity for Work to circulate his idea for a career

criminal program around LEAA and the Justice Department, and win support

v for the fledgling program.

In response to the.Attorney General's request, LEAA assembled a

series of crime reduction proposals which were then channeled to Malcolm

Hawk, Acting Director of the Office of Policy Development in the 179

Department of Justice. Hawk, who was responsible for drafting the

Attorney General's response to the Nixon memorandum, was apparently impressed with the idea of a career criminal program sent to him by

Work. In a memorandum to Deputy Attorney General Laurence Silberman,

Hawk discusses at great length the idea of a career criminal impact program.

In this memorandum, Hawk notes that the federal government has

injected large amounts of money into the police component of the criminal justice system to the neglect of other components. He suggests that

greater attention be directed to the problem of prosecutorial resources.

Hawk then points to PROMIS and the Major Violators Unit as two programs which "have been initiated to attempt the task of improving prosecutorial management techniques so as to enable prosecutors to allocate their

existing resources more efficiently in order to bring prosecution up to 40 speed with apprehension." Noting that the Major Violators Unit is

dedicated to the tracking and preparing of cases involving "repeat

offenders, career criminals," Hawk states that:

As is well known, the recidivist accounts for a major percentage of all crime. The career criminal often utilizes his familiarity with the criminal justice system to successfully avoid prosecution and punishment. Early identification of such offenders enables the prosecutor to focus his resources on efficient prosecu tion of hard-core criminals.

Hawk then proposes that

LEAA should develop a program to supply a number of jurisdiction [sic] with enough resources to enable them to demonstrate the effectiveness of the above described programs. Some of these projects can be established by the reallocation of existing prosecutorial resources into Career Criminal Impact Programs throughout the n a tion.^2 180

The final version of the memorandum sent by Attorney General Saxbe to President Nixon in response to his request for crime reduction options

I ^ also bears the imprint of Charles Work. The Attorney General’s memoran dum first lists a number of possible causes for the recent increase in crime. Among the factors cited is the "failure to deal quickly and effectively with the recidivist.The memorandum then outlines specific options designed to reduce crime. Under the heading "Pin pointing Federal Assistance," the Attorney General writes:

Since 1969 when LEAA funding reached significant levels police have received the bulk of federal money. Other components of the system have not been able to keep up with the tremendous increase in offender apprehensions. This is particularly true of the prosecutors who have had to clear their swollen dockets by non-trial means. The primary present need of prosecutors is the capability of setting priorities to permit the allocation of resources most efficiently.^5

The Attorney General then lists some possible programs for the President to consider:

- - task forces dedicated to the apprehension and conviction of the 'career criminal.' While relatively small in numbers, recidivists have an immense impact on crime because of the number and effectiveness of their criminal activity. Teams of attorneys and support personnel directing their efforts against identifiable offenders or against particularized types of criminal activity have in the past proved effective;

- - computer-based information systems designed to retrieve data and to identify quickly cases involving the most serious offenses or habitual offenders.

- - additional training to insure that prosecutors are maximizing their research and advocacy abilities and resources to process successfully the largest possible number of cases.^6

Thus, the crusade for management consciousness in the prosecutor's office, which Charles Work had initiated while still a member of the 181

U. S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia, had now reached the

White House and was under active consideration as an option to help reduce crime by attacking career criminals.

A Memorandum to the Attorney General

At this point, Deputy Administrator Work felt that it was important to fully develop the career criminal idea in a memorandum. Thus, Work pulled together the underlying assumptions, hypotheses, and rationale of the proposed program in a long memorandum to Attorney General Saxbe dated

August 7, 1974. The memorandum begins by stating that, "In response to another increase in reported crime levels and what appears to be renewed growth in the level of nationwide criminal activity, LEAA proposes that the Department of Justice sponsor a program to impact against career criminals.11 ^

Work then reviews the recent history of increases in the crime statis tics collected by the F.B.I., and he also discusses the limited role the federal government can play in reducing crime. Further, he cautions that all crime in America cannot be eradicated, for the criminal justice system cannot significantly alter the social and institutional problems which contribute to criminal activity. Then he states:

Therefore, we propose that the Department of Justice under take a program to impact on a visible, identifiable limited area of criminal activity which is of great concern to the public, a program the impact of which will be statistically measurable. It is our hypothesis that a substantial, indeed an inordinate amount of serious crime in America is committed by a relatively small number of career criminals.

After reviewing statistics supportive of his hypothesis, Work observes that: 182

Studies indicate that as much as 50 percent of street crime in this country is probably committed by as little• as 15 percent of the offenders. Although only a segment of the population, these dangerous persons who have chosen the commission of numerous crimes as a vocation must be charged and quickly prosecuted. We recommend that the Attorney General direct LEAA to design a new initiative program of the U. S. Department of Justice to activate resources to treat the problem of the dangerous, some times professional, recidivistic and career criminal.

Having established the nature of the problem, Work returns to his favorite theme of management consciousness in the prosecutors office as the solution. He notes that, "the focus of the new program should be

'the prosecutor."^ Then he reviews the importance of the prosecutors role in the criminal justice system.

Anglo-American jurisprudence has evolved the role of the public prosecutor, especially in mass litigation courts, to a point where the prosecutor's administrative decision making is much more important than that done in the course of a trial, as proof of which one need only cite the number of cases disposed of in the plea bargaining process.51

Work goes on to point out the management problems confronting most urban prosecutors as they attempt to carry out their critical role.

. . . the ills which plague the administration of criminal justice are particularly acute in the country's large metropolitan prosecutor's offices and resources needed to aid prosecutor training and prosecution management are easily identifiable. The increase in crime has resulted in a proliferation of caseloads which has far outstripped the growth of prosecutorial technique. The day when every defendant went quickly to trial, against a prosecutor who had prepared the case from its inception, has long since passed in urban jurisdictions. There, cases are handled on an assembly line, mass production basis. Most cases never even reach the trial stage, as the prosecutor, operating under the sheer weight of an enormous caseload, engages in plea bargaining, jettisoning half his case in an effort to salvage any of it.^2

Work then points out that the large-scale, assembly-line system of case processing affords "protective coloration" to recidivists who exploit 183 the weaknesses of the systen in order to escape prosecution and conviction.

He alleges that many of these habitual offenders, because of their clever ness and their experience with the court, routinely "slip through the cracks" of the criminal justice system. Work concludes, however, that

"even without these efforts by defendants to frustrate the system, effective administration of justice is often obstructed by management and 53 operational problems."

To deal with these related problems of career criminals and prosecu torial management resources, Work suggests that new techniques of case management are needed by prosecutors; "perhaps the most advantageous weapon we can utilize to maximize impact on the administration of justice, at least initially is improved and technologically aided prosecution."^

At this point, of course, Work begins to discuss the two prosecutorial management techniques that he himself has helped to develop: the PROMIS system and the Major Violators Unit. He describes in great detail the advantages of these two tools, stressing the PROMIS system's ability to

"prioritize" caseloads, and the Major Violator's Unit capability of providing intensive preparation of high priority cases. Work then suggests that these two programs serve as the models for the development of the career criminal initiative. In conclusion he states that:

In this era of continued crime, prosecutors must make the most of their scarce resources. This will never be done without improved management in the office of the prosecutor, and the development of techniques which will bring to justice those criminals who seriously and continuously impact on society. It is in these areas this program will focus^

Following the delivery of this memorandum to Attorney General Saxbe, the career criminal program lay dormant for close to two months. The idea itself was fully developed at this time, but no steps were taken to 184

Implement the idea and make it an operational program. The governmental crisis brought on by the Watergate scandal and the general inertia of a large bureaucracy like LEAA probably explain the inactivity of this period. At this point then, it seemed clear that some type of career criminal program would be developed, but certainly no one at LEAA or the Justice Department anticipated that this idea would become a major

Presidential initiative involving millions of dollars and attracting a great deal of national attention. In fact, had no other outside factors impinged upon it, the career criminal program would have probably become just another in a mass of unnoticed LEAA programs that have no dis- cernable impact on the crime problem or the administration of justice.

A critical event, however, would soon transform the career criminal program into the major anti-crime initiative of a new Presidential

Administration and thrust it into national prominence.

STAGE 3: THE PROGRAM BECOMES A PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVE

On August 9, 1974, rather than face impeachment for his participa tion in the Watergate cover-up, Richard Nixon resigned. Gerald R. Ford thus became the next President of the United States. Ford's assumption of the Presidency marks the beginning of the third stage of the develop ment of the career criminal program, for his actions were to transform the program into a Presidential initiative and serve as a catalyst for its programmatic development and design, and its rise to national prominence. 185

F o r d ’s Speech to the I.A.C.P.

Shortly after he became President, Gerald Ford was invited to address the International Association of Chiefs of Police at their annual conference in Washington D.C. The President accepted the invita tion and requested that his speech writers prepare some remarks. One of

Ford's speech-writers was a close personal friend of Charles Work, and he called Work to ask for input into the speech.Although it was outside departmental channels, Work sent two of his assistants, H. Paul Haynes and R. Alan Jones, to the White House to help prepare the President's address.^7 Both Work and Haynes recognized that this was a golden opportunity to push the career criminal program and sell the idea of management consciousness to a wider audience. They fully intended to take advantage of the opportunity.”*^

Paul Haynes spent two days at the White House with the President's speech writers helping to draft the speech that Ford was to give to the

I.A.C.P. In fact, the final version of the speech was written almost entirely by Haynes. There were several things that both Work and Haynes wanted the President to stress in his remarks. One thing, of course, was the need for better management in the prosecutor's office. Another was the need to establish priorities. Still another was the problem of the habitual offender. Finally, they wanted the President to direct LEAA to develop a career criminal impact program. All of these elements were written into the speech, and apparently Ford liked them, for he gave the speech almost exactly as Haynes had written it.

The President addressed the 81st Annual Conference of the Inter national Association of Chiefs of Police on September 24, 1974 at the 186

Washington Hilton. The Ford Presidency was only six weeks old at the time and this speech would establish the framework of the new administra tion's crime policy. Ford made it clear at the beginning that the control of crime would be one of his top priorities.

Six weeks ago, I told the American people and the Congress that we all have a lot of work to do. We have a long national agenda, and I stress today that the control of crimes, especially violent crime, is one of the top items on that agenda. I think it is fair to say that all Americans can agree on some conclusions about crime. There is far too much of it. It can no longer be ignored. It can no longer be rationalized away. The time has come for all of us to act.

The President then went on to discuss the federal role in the control

of crime, noting that it is essentially supportive. Law enforcement he

pointed out, is primarily a state and local problem. However, the

President stated:

We are cooperating with local agencies in pilot development and in pressing new law enforcement tools. In this process we have learned that there is need for better management, particularly the need to concentrate limited resources where they will be most effective.^

Later in the speech, the President discussed the issue of priorities,

suggesting that a high priority be placed on violent crime and street

crime in the inner city. Then he turned to the topic of the career

criminal.

Another priority as I see it is the habitual offender, the so-called career criminal. Most crime, according to the statistics, is the work of a limited number of hardened criminals. We must take the criminal out of circulation. We must make crime hazardous and very costly. We must insure that swift and prolonged imprisonment will inevitably follow each and every offense. Only then will we deter others from pursuing careers of crime.^

The President then indicated that he was taking action to deal with the

career criminal. 187

Accordingly, I have directed the Department of Justice to undertake in cooperation with state and local governments a career criminal impact program. It will target and keep track of professional criminals. This program will also assign priority to cases of habitual criminals and expedite the process by which they are brought to justice.

As a justification for this approach, the President cited the experience of the Major Violators Unit.

In the U. S. Attorney’s Office, a special group known as the Major Violator's Unit, has been established. This unit tracks the cases of major repeat offenders. It insures that these cases receive the most urgent attention of prosecutors. This unit has dramatically reduced the ability of case-hardened offenders to escape through the loopholes of the criminal justice system.**^

With this speech, President Ford focused national attention on the

"problem" of the "career criminal.The President also directed attention to the need for management consciousness among prosecutors and the need to develop priorities in the war against crime. Most importantly however, this speech transformed the career criminal program into a "Presidential initiative." In the aftermath of the President's speech, the idea of a career criminal program suddenly became a reality.

The Aftermath of the Speech

The President's speech to the I.A.C.P. dramatically altered the course of development of the career criminal program. This speech was the catalyst for the transformation of the idea into an operational program. It was the spark which ignited the entire project. Following the speech, the career criminal program received a great deal of national publicity and attention. The law enforcement community, the press, and the public, alltgave the program an enthusiastic reception.**-*

Interest in the idea Increased significantly. As Ellen Jasper, the 188 former manager of the program observed, "all of a sudden it just kind ,66 of exploded, we just couldn t believe the interest.

The career criminal program was the first LEAA program ever to be announced by the President of the United States. This, of course, was a great boon to the project within LEAA and the Justice Department as well as nationally. As Ellen Jasper exclaimed, "it was just great I Then we could bill it as a Presidential initiative." ^7 As a Presidential initiative, the status of the program within LEAA rose considerably. As it did, the program picked up a great deal of momentum and support which enabled it to move faster and obtain more money than had been originally anticipated. With the increasing visibility, status, and support of the program in the aftermath of the speech, the internal programmatic development of the career criminal idea began in earnest.

There were three major steps involved in the programmatic develop ment of the career criminal idea by LEAA. They were: 1) the meeting between LEAA officials and selected local prosecutors to obtain practical input for the program's design, 2) the internal formulation of the design, and 3) the site selection process. With the completion of each of these steps, the career criminal initiative of LEAA moved closer to becoming an operational program.

1) The Meeting With Local Prosecutors

Ford's I.A.C.P. speech had given the career criminal idea

"Presidential exposure" according to Charles Work, and he decided "to

69 capitalize on it" immediately. Within a week of the speech, Work and the newly formed career criminal initiative team,^ arranged for a 189 meeting between LEAA officials and local prosecutors to discuss the issues involved in designing such a program. As H. Paul Haynes noted, this meeting was an attempt to:

. . . go directly to the front line criminal justice practitioner who will deal daily with this problem, to obtain from them at the earliest stages of the program development, what they consider to be the goals, the objectives, and the programmatic process which will really do the most good, which will fulfill the mission of the President and Attorney General that 71 has been given to us.

The meeting, which was arranged on very short notice, took place on

October 2, 1974 at LEAA headquarters in Washington, D.C. Prosecutors

72 from fifteen urban jurisdictions met with the new LEAA Administrator

Richard Velde, Deputy Administrator Charles Work, and other members of the career criminal initiative team. The background paper issued to the prosecutors at the start of the conference stated that:

The scope of this meeting is to review present staff work; discuss relevant experiences, and advise the Administrator of LEAA regarding an appropriate programmatic response. The intention of the meeting is to begin the planning for the new initiative with a discussion of what has been tried; what has worked; and what is needed to prosecute the career criminal.

The discussion items and anticipated products of the meeting were listed as follows:

1) What is the best definition of the career criminal? 2) What is the effect of specialized treatment of the career criminal to crime reduction and law enforcement? 3) What is existent in the research; state of the art; and, working models? What is the scope of the problem? 4) What has been the relevant experiences? 5) What policy issues are inherent in the program develop ment and advise on treatment of these issues? 6) What data elements are needed? 7) What are the variables? Controlled? Uncontrolled? 8) What safeguards are necessary? 9) What should programmatic design include? 190 10) How can the entire system be organized or reorganized to bear on this problem? Priority Docketing? Speedy Trial? 11) What are the necessary elements in site selection? 12) How should this initiative be evaluated?

These issues and many others were raised, discussed, and debated during the course of the meeting. Many of the prosecutors related their own practical experiences in dealing with the so-called habitual offender. LEAA officials were especially interested in the experience of Mario Merola, the District Attorney of Bronx County, New York. With a LEAA grant, Merola had established a widely hailed Major Offense

Bureau (MOB). ^ The MOB is a separate bureau within the Bronx County

District Attorney's Office which assigns full-time attorneys to the continuous prosecution of "career criminals." MOB uses an objective case screening and evaluation system which considers not only the seriousness of the offense but also the criminal history of the defendant, to iden tify its cases. Vertical prosecution, no plea bargaining, and separate trial sessions, also characterize the MOB. The LEAA career criminal team was apparently very impressed with the MOB and its success, for it eventually became a model for the development of local career criminal units under the career criminal initiative.

The meeting also touched on the topics of the definition of career criminals, the criteria to be used to identify them, the operational components of a career criminal program, and the relationship of such a program to other components of the criminal justice system. LEAA appeared to be most anxious to receive input from "front-line" people concerning these issues. Later, members of the LEAA career criminal initiative team stressed the importance of this meeting for the formula tion of the design of the program.^ 191

The next day, primarily for publicity purposes, the fifteen prosecu tors met briefly with Attorney General Saxbe. According to Charles Work, it was this meeting, more than anything else, which convinced Saxbe to back the program whole-heartedly 7^ Saxbe was especially impressed with

District Attorney Merola and the MOB program. In a press release following the meeting, Saxbe praised MOB and commented on its value as a model for the development of other career criminal program efforts.

Saxbe's comments, of course, served the purpose of attracting more national media exposure for the career criminal program in general.

In summary, the two-day conference of LEAA officials and local prose cutors was an important first step in the development and design of the career criminal initiative. The key issues and program elements dis cussed at these meetings (especially the MOB) influenced the formulation of the operational components of the program. The conference also served to direct additional attention to the career criminal program and maintain its visibility to the press and public.

2) Formulation of the Design

An important result of the two-day conference with local prosecutors was the production of a number of internal memorandums and concept papers by the career criminal initiative team which refined and clarified the career criminal idea, and discussed some of the major issues involved in

78 the implementation of the idea. This was the beginning of the second step in the programmatic development of the career criminal initiative: the formulation of the program's design. These memorandums and papers covered the following topics: 1) the evolution of the selective prosecu-

79 tion concept; 2) the experiences of Major Violator Units other than in the District of Columbia;®® 3) the selection of criteria and the formula-

81 tion of definitional guidelines; 4) the support of a prosecutor based program targeted at violent, career criminals by the corrections oo O o component; and by the police component; 5) the formulation.of an evaluation plan for the program; 6) the potential constitutional issues and safeguards in such a program;85 and finally 7) a summary of 86 the program's underlying rationale and hypotheses.

All of these memorandums and concept papers were directed to Deputy

Administrator Charles Work and delivered to him on or around the 8th of

October, one week after the prosecutors meeting. From these materials,

Work and his staff pulled together an overview and summary of the career criminal program and its design in a memorandum directed to Administrator

Richard Velde. This memorandum, dated October 16, 1974 reveals much about the design of the career criminal initiative. Work begins the memorandum by reviewing the background of the program and the data which justifies its specific approach. Then he presents a hypothesis statement

This initiative seeking to attack the problem of the recidivist will verify the following hypotheses:

1) A small group of offenders is responsible for a dis proportionate amount of dangerous and violent crime;

2) An accurate profile of such offenders which distin guishes them from other less dangerous offenders can be developed and utilized by the criminal justice system;

3) The development of improved prosecutorial procedures will increase significantly conviction rates for violent and dangerous offenders;

4) Increased conviction rates for violent offenders will have an observable effect upon violent crime rates; 193

5) The demonstrable results of the pilot programs will stimulate the reallocation of resources within the criminal justice system to deal more responsively with the dangerous career c r i m i n a l .87

As he goes on to describe the design of the program which will verify these hypotheses, it is clear that Work still hopes to push PROMIS and prosecutor management consciousness with the career criminal initia tive, although by now the idea has begun to snowball and take on a life of its own. Work states that:

The pivotal role in the Career Criminal Initiative will be played by the public prosecutor. Resources will be made available for the prosecutor to set as his highest priority those cases involving the dangerous and career criminal. Methods to obtain and utilize data which prioritizes and moves these cases immediately to the front of the line for prosecution must be developed and implemented. LEAA has set aside funds for the purpose of instituting, especially in urban and metropolitan jurisdictions, a system which can track, select, and prioritize the dangerous and career criminal. The system is known as PROMIS, the prosecutors management information system. Multiple Violators Units can be installed which will assign the most senior and best prepared prosecutor to this type of case.88

At great length Work describes again the management and operational problems facing urban prosecutors and the ability of career criminals to manipulate these problems to avoid prosecution and conviction.

Finally, Work defines for Velde the initiative and its target in more specific terms:

The impact of this initiative is to design and implement model programs which prioritize for speedy prosecution those persons whose criminal histories indicate repeated commission of dangerous criminal acts. Specifically, the program target is offenders who frequently commit the crimes of homicide, forcible sex offenses, aggravated assault, robbery and burglary.

Work's overview and summary of the programmatic development of the carreer criminal program was then passed on to the Justice Department. 194

Eventually, much of his discussion of the program’s design was included in a special progress report sent to President Ford by Attorney General

Saxbe. In this memorandum, Saxbe states:

This memorandum is intended to acquaint you with the efforts of the Department of Justice which comply with your direction and to seek your concurrence in certain additional actions. Finally, the Department of Justice proposes that considera tion be given to certain necessary legislative changes; the Career Criminal Impact Program be vocalized in your public addresses; and that consideration be given to incorporation of the career criminal concept in your crime message before Congress and possible inclusion in appropriate parts of the State of the Union message. 90

Saxbe goes on to describe the background of the career criminal

initiative and to review the progress which has been made in its pro grammatic development and design since the President's speech to the

I.A.C.P. He informs the President that he has recently presided over a.meeting of local prosecutors which was conducted by LEAA in order to

"assure that important viewpoints from practitioners would be included

91 in the development of the program." Support for the career criminal

concept and program design has been widespread he tells the President.

In glowing terms he describes the MOB program in the Bronx, indicating

that it has been used as a working model for the design of the career

criminal initiative. Finally, Saxbe states to Ford that:

At the state and local level, LEAA has written and is publishing a guideline for a program which prioritizes for speedy prosecution those persons whose criminal histories indicated repeated commission of dangerous criminal acts. Federal funds ranging to $400,000 per site are available to the prosecutor for this program. The guideline is tightly drawn to assure Inclusion of every indicator to assure success.92

The culmination of the design of the career criminal program was the

publication of the program's guidelines in January, 1975. These 195 guidelines governed the distribution of LEAA discretionary funds for the career criminal initiative. Included in them were sections on:

1) the program objective, 2) the program description (which included sub-sections on the hypothesis to be tested, the results sought, the assumptions of the program and program strategy), 3) the eligibility to receive grants, 4) the allocation of funds, 5) the range and number

QO of grants, and 6) the deadlines for submission of applications.

At the time the guidelines were published, LEAA released a news letter for the press entitled, "Funds Available For Assault Against

Career Criminals." This press release stated that, "A multimillion dollar program to fund several demonstration projects aimed at quick and just prosecution of the nation’s career criminals was recently

04 announced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.' In the release, LEAA Administrator Velde was quoted as saying:

A wealth of crime in the United States is committed by a relatively few number of individuals. Historically, police departments, prosecutor's offices, court systems, and corrections policies have operated on the assumption that each case was equal in importance. These experimental demonstration projects will cause the system to examine priorities, and develop mechanisms for concentration of criminal justice system resources on major criminal cases. This intervention approach will provide a means for police departments and prosecutors to set up major violators units which can specialize in making arrests and prosecutions stick when a multiple violator is involved. It will also mean that the repeat offender will not be lost in court backlogs and delays. Some courts may wish to use a priority docket for immediate trial in those cases where the defendant is a recidivist, a professional criminal, a person who substantially derives his livelihood from illegal activities, or constitutes a significant threat of violent injury to others. In other cases involving career criminals and insure that the full resources of the system are brought to bear on the case. 95 196

And in the same press release, Charles Work was quoted as follows:

The mechanism to distribute federal discretionary funds . to the selected systems will be immediately responsive to the President's and Attorney General's request. Because the prosecutor is the fulcrum in an organized assault on the career criminal, we have requested advice with respect to the development of the program from the National District Attorney's Association as well as numerous urban prosecutors .... Those selecting a life of crime are put on notice that they will not slip through the cracks in the criminal justice system. The recidivist can anticipate that the finest police investigators, the most capable prosecutors, and swift and sure justice will await him.9°

Once the guidelines were published and publicized, local jurisdic tions were invited to apply for one of the ten awards which were being contemplated (with grants ranging from $100,000 to $500,000). The guidelines spelled out in specific terms what information was required in all applications.^ The response to the invitation was described by

98 Charles Work as "overwhelming." Over fifty jurisdictions expressed an interest in applying for the program. At this point, the third major step in the programmatic development of the career criminal initiative began: the process of site selection.

3) Site Selection

As mentioned above, local jurisdictions which were interested in obtaining a LEAA discretionary grant for the purpose of establishing a career criminal unit were required to submit an application which followed the program guidelines. A large number of jurisdictions submitted applications or concept papers in early 1975.99 Prosecutors, apparently, were not excited about installing PROMIS or raising their management consciousness, but they were certainly eager to obtain 197 federal money to fight "career criminals." LEAA now had to review the numerous proposals and decide which jurisdictions would get the money.

The actual selection of sites for career criminal units, however, entailed more than just an evaluation of the applications received.

The career criminal team, especially Charles Work and H. Paul Haynes, played a very active role in the site selection process, and this pro cess began immediately after the President's speech to the I.A.C.P.

Thus, site selection and the formulation of the program's design

(including the guidelines) were going on simultaneously, mutually influencing one another.

Following Ford's speech, Charles Work began an active search for jurisdictions where successful career criminal units could be organized.

Even at this early stage, Work had a good idea of which jurisdictions he wanted to see career criminal units located. As a former prosecutor and the Deputy Administrator of LEAA, he knew a large number of prosecutors around the country. Because he "wanted to see the program go well,"

Work decided to handpick the sites, with the aid of the career criminal initiative team. As he stated later: "I knew where to put it. I wanted

to sell it to the best, the most progressive prosecutors. I wanted to put it in places where it would do well."'^'*'

Thus, shortly after the prosecutors conference in October, 1974,

Work began to talk with a number of prosecutors around the country,

concerning the career criminal initiative. Those that expressed an

interest were encouraged to submit an application, and as Work traveled

the country on speaking engagements, he made it a point to begin to 198 visit some of the prospective sites. At the same time, Haynes and the rest of the team also began to visit juristictions which had expressed an interest in the program, or to which Work desired to sell the idea.

As the career criminal initiative team travelled around the country dis cussing the program with local prosecutors, they began to develop more specific ideas concerning the operational components to be included.

These discussions contributed a great deal to the formulation of the 102 program's design and the development of the guidelines. The guide lines, however, were considered by Work to be an "impediment to progress" and a "bureaucratic hassle." ^he primary purpose of these visits, was to find "success models" which could showcase the career criminal program, and then sell the idea to them.

The selection of the original sites was, as Ellen Jasper pointed out, "important to the success of the program." Charles Work and his staff reasoned that if the career criminal program was to be successful and expand nationwide, the original jurisdictions would have to be exemplary programs. Thus, great care was exercised in the selection of these sites. All of the proposals were carefully reviewed, all of the prospective jurisdictions were visited, and then in the Spring of 1975,

Charles Work began to personally select the first eleven career criminal 106 sites. New Orleans ($421,789) was first, followed by: Houston

($321,090), Detroit ($576,040), Boston ($463,963), San Diego ($274,118),

Salt Lake City ($302,000), Columbus ($239,416), Kalamazoo ($78,548),

Dallas ($308,000), Indianapolis ($315,000), and New York-Manhattan

($555,968) The program was now ready to begin. 199

STAGE 4: THE EXPANSION OF THE PROGRAM

By the autumn of 1975, all eleven of the original career- criminal jurisdictions had their programs fully operational. Despite some differences in the definition of a career criminal, and differences in the selection criteria, the eleven career criminal units were roughly similar in their operation. (See Appendix 1) By the end of 1975, several hundred people had been prosecuted and convicted under the 1 OR program. The idea of a career criminal program was now an operational reality. But the program did not remain static now that it was under way.

As evidenced by the media reaction and the demand for the program’s expan sion, the popularity of the career criminal initiative continued to grow, and career criminals units began to expand into all parts of the country.

These events constitute the fourth stage of the program's development.

Media Reaction

The LEAA career criminal initiative has received a great deal of attention from the nation's media ever since President Ford announced the program in his speech to the I.A.C.P. in September of 1974.

As the Center for National Security Studies pointed out in their massive review of LEAA entitled Law and Disorder, "The program was designed with a careful eye toward its publicity potential and, in a time of rising crime rates, received widespread press attention because of its hard- nosed focus on hitting repeat criminals swiftly and effectively." 200

The attention that the program has received from the media has, 110 for the most part, been very favorable. The press' positive response to the program has played an important role in its success and subsequent expansion. The media has helped to publicize and popularize the program with criminal justice professionals and the public, and it has helped to create a favorable political climate for the initiative to grow in.

Initially what was most important to the career criminal program was the reaction of the press in the local communities of the eleven original jurisdictions. Charles Work expressed a great deal of concern with the reaction of the local media to the program. As he noted, "we didn't want to get burned by the local media." Thus, as Work traveled around the country he made it a point to arrange meetings with the local media in career criminal jurisdictions to explain the program, answer questions, and try to insure a favorable reaction.H2 As he pointed out,

113 "we paid attention to the media, we worked on it.'

Apparently, Work and his staff were highly successful in their attempt to generate favorable media coverage of the career criminal initiative, as evidenced by the following letter to Work from Houston prosecutor Carol Vance.:

Dear Chuck:

Enclosed are copies of the articles which appeared in Houston's two daily newspapers following your trip to the city. As you can see, the publicity is excellent, and we are most grateful to you for devoting a day to coming here and focusing attention on the career criminal project.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Carol S. Vance District Attorney Harris County, Texas 201

A flavor of this overwhelmingly favorable media coverage of the career

criminal program can be gained from the following sample of headlines

selected from the LEAA career criminal initiative clippings file:

PRAISE PROSECUTORS UNIT: HITS "CAREER CRIMINALS" CAREER CRIMINAL PLAN CALLED TOP PROGRAM SPEEDY JUSTICE FOR CAREER CRIMINALS SPECIAL UNIT SPEEDS RETIREMENT FOR THOSE MAKING CRIME A CAREER DA FORMING ROUGH PROSECUTION UNIT MORGY'S TOP COUNT PROSECUTION LOCKING JAIL DOORS BAYLEY DECLARES WAR ON CAREER CRIMINALS CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM LAUDED HABITUAL CRIMINALS HERE BOW TO NEW PROSECUTOR CRIME CRUSHERS 115

In addition to feature articles which highlight the operation of

local career criminal units, numerous editorials also appeared praising

the program and its "get tough" approach. The following are representa

tive quotes from two of these editorials:

It is not hard to understand why this program has received widespread support from both law enforcement agencies and the public. Without doubt the most common complaint about law enforcement in the United States has been the fact so many offenses are committed by individuals who have been given light sentences for previous crimes or are free awaiting long delayed trials. 116

The program is not aimed at first time offanders. It is targeted at men who make a career of burglary or armed robbery the way other men make careers of medicine or law. These criminals certainly do not merit the bleeding heart compassion of those who say, 'society is to blame.' Against these people, society has a right and an obligation to protect itself. H 7

Media reaction to the career criminal initiative was not only

favorable at the local level, but also on the national scene as well.

Numerous articles appeared in the major news magazines, national news

papers, and popular journals, all praising the creation of this new

program. Articles appeared in Time Ma g a z i n e u. S. News and World

Report,'The Wall Street Journal, The National Observer, 202

N^w York Magazine, and Readers Digest to mention a few. In addi tion, the widely read syndicated columnist James Kilpatrick devoted an entire column to the career criminal program. In it Kilpatrick stated that:

The history of crime and criminal justice in our country is largely a history of failures. One approach after another has been tried; nothing much has succeeded. But in its attack on 'career criminals,1 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration may have hit upon something that works.124

Not all of this national media exposure was spontaneous of course.

LEAA made an active effort to keep the career criminal program in the news, and to generate favorable publicity. The Public Information Office of LEAA released, on a regular basis, "LEAA News Features" concerning the career criminal program.125 These press releases would usually contain quotes from Justice Department and LEAA officials, statistics, and vignettes of typical career criminals who had been prosecuted under the program.

LEAA also strove to keep attention focused on the career criminal initiative by having President Ford make public statements concerning the program at regular intervals.-*-^6 por example, the President*s speech at the Yale Sesquicentennial Convocation Dinner at the Yale Law School on

April 25, 1975, was devoted to the issue of crime, repeat offenders, and the career criminal program. Also, the President's crime message to

Congress on June 19, 1975, contained a section which discussed the LEAA career criminal initiative. In addition, LEAA arranged for the President to "drop in" and make a few remarks at the 1st Annual LEAA Career

Criminal Conference (a meeting of all the local career criminal units), 203 held on September 26, 1975. Thus, the career criminal program was kept

in the news constantly due to the national media’s attention ,to the actions of the President.

With all of this national media attention, the career criminal

initiative began to snowball. No longer was it just a program to push

PROMIS and crusade for management consciousness among prosecutors. The

idea of attacking "career criminals" had taken on a life of its own and was now independent of the concern with PROMIS. In fact, as Ellen

Jasper noted, "people almost forgot that PROMIS was an integral part of

it in the beginning." I2? At this point, the career criminal program was rolling on its own, growing beyond the fondest hopes of people within

■I OQ the Ford Administration, the Justice Department, and LEAA.

The Expansion of the Program

The popularity of the career criminal program and the national

attention it was attracting, both grew in late 1976 and early 1977 when

the rates of violent crime began to decrease slightly. Prosecutors in

career criminal jurisdictions were quick to take the credit. At this

time, the national media exposure concerning the program grew larger with articles like these appearing in popular newspapers and magazines:

"The Drop in Violent Crime: Big City Rates Fall Sharply: Anti-Crime

129 i oa Programs Cited;" "A War on Career Criminals Starts to Show Results'" 131 and "Crime in America— A Turnaround at Last?"

With praise pouring in from all sections of the nation concerning the

"success" of the original eleven career criminal units, there was a demand

to expand the program to other jurisdictions. LEAA responded to the

demand by making more discretionary funds available for the establishment 204 of new career criminal units, and by providing technical assistance to

Prosecutors interested in starting the program in their jurisdiction even without federal money. This expansion of the program was underway already in 1976, when it was given a major boost from President Ford, who announced that he was directing LEAA to double the number of dis cretionary funded career criminal units. Thus, to the eleven original

1 22 jurisdictions, LEAA added a number of new jurisdictions, ^ bringing the total number of LEAA funded career criminal units to twenty-four by the summer of 1977.

The LEAA discretionary fund route, however, is not the only way in which the career criminal program has expanded. As mentioned above,

LEAA, through the National Legal Data Center (the career criminal program clearinghouse), has provided technical assistance to jurisdictions to aid them in establishing career criminal units which utilize sources other than LEAA discretionary funds. As the Center noted in its newsletter

The Verdict:

President Ford recently directed that the Career Criminal Program be significantly strengthened, and one of the ways in which we are carrying out this directive, is to encourage replication of the Program in jurisdictions currently not receiving LEAA discretionary funding. There is no reason (with our full technical assistance), why the concept cannot be implemented in prosecuting attorney’s offices.

An additional indicator of the popularity of the career criminal program and its potential for expanding even more in the future is the introduction of United States Senate Bill 28. This bill was introduced by Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., (R) Maryland, and it is entitled, "The

Repeat Offenders Prosecution and Prison Improvements Act of 1977." One provision of S.B. 28 calls for the creation of a specific program under 205

LEAA with its own appropriation to protect career criminal programs from being lost in the annual competition for LEAA funds. When the bill was introduced, Senator Mathias praised the career criminal program stating that:

Perhaps the most important aspect of S.B. 28 is that it is not a one shot demonstration project .... I specifically included . . . a provision for continued annual funding of the Career Criminal program. -^4

Thus, the future for the career criminal program looks bright. It appears that the program has a great deal of popular and political support and will continue to expand for some time yet. It is not hard to imagine a time, in the not too distant future, when every major jurisdiction in the country will have some type of career criminal program.

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter has described the specific conditions and events which gave rise to the LEAA career criminal program. Four stages of develop ment were identified, and a detailed account of each stage was presented.

The first stage of the development of the career criminal program consisted of the period of time when Charles Work and his colleagues at the U. S.

Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia launched a crusade for management consciousness among.prosecutors, developed the PROMIS informa tion system, and formed the Major Violators Unit. The second stage consisted of the initial development of the idea for a career criminal program by Work and his associates after they had moved over to LEAA.

The idea grew out of Work's experience with the Major Violators Unit, several empirical studies which documented the problem of the repeat offender, and the desire to develop a program which would showcase PROMIS and sell it to local jurisdictions. The career criminal idea, however, lay dormant until Gerald Ford became President. The third stage of the development of LEAA’s career criminal initiative began when Work and his staff had the fortuitous opportunity to prepare a speech for Ford. In this speech, given to the

International Association of Chiefs of Police on September 24, 1974,

President Ford announced the creation of the career criminal program

transforming it into a Presidential Initiative. The speech also served as a catalyst for the programmatic development of the program. The

fourth and final stage of the career criminal program’s development began when the program became an operational reality. With the favorable media reaction to the program and its concomitant popularity, came a demand to expand career criminal units into other jurisdictions around the country.

LEAA responded by increasing the number of discretionary funded programs and by providing (through the National Legal Data Center) technical assistance to jurisdiction which were willing to start up career criminal units without federal funds. Finally, it was predicted that the career criminal program would continue to expand in the foreseeable future. FOOTNOTES

William A. Hamilton and Charles R. Work, "The Prosecutor's Role in the Urban Court System: The Case For Management Consciousness." The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 64 (No. 2, 1973), p. 183. 2 Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "Discretionary Justice in the United States," International Journal of Criminology and Penology 2 (1974), p. 181. 3 See Lief Carter, The Limits of Order (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974); Albert Alschuler, "The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining," University of Chicago Law Review 36 (1968); Frank W. Miller, Prosecution: The Decision to Charge a Suspect with a Crime. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); Brian A. Grosman, The Prosecutor: An Inquiry Into The Exercise of Discretion (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1969); Arthur Rosett and Donald R. Cressey, Justice By Consent (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1976). 4 In the early 1970's, the District of Columbia court system was reorganized. The D. C. Court of General Sessions, which handled only misdemeanors, became the Superior Court for the District of Columbia. The Superior Court was responsible for all common law crimes in the District of Columbia. Until then, all common law felonies had been handled in the U. S. Federal District Court. This reorganization caused a dramatic increase in the workload of the Superior Court. 5 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977. 6 Hamilton and Work, 1973, op. cit., p. 183. 7 Ibid., p. 184. These same points were made by Mr. Work in the October 4, 1977 interview. Quotes from the Work and Hamilton article have been used because they are more articulate expressions of these points. 8 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977. 9 Hamilton and Work, 1973, op. cit., p. 184. 10 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977. 11 Hamilton and Work, 1973, op. cit., p. 184.

207 208

12 Other members of this team were: William A. Hamilton (Project Manager), Sidney H. Brounstein, Robert H. Cain, Joyce H. Deroy, James M. Etheridge, John L. Gizzarelli, Fred L. Lander III, Soo Lee, Dean C. Merrill, John M. Middleton, Stanley H. Turner, Frederick G. Watts, Dennis W. Wright, and Robert Whitaker. 13 The gravity of the crime is measured by the Sellin-Wolfgang scale. The gravity of criminal history is assessed by a modified version of a scale developed by Don Gottfredson. See Don Gottfredson and D. Ballard, "Differences in Parole Decisions Associated With Decision-Makers," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 3 (1966), p. 112. 14 Memorandum from Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator for Administration LEAA, to Attorney General William B. Saxbe, subject: "Proposed Career Criminal Impact Program of the U. S. Department of Justice, August 7, 1974, p. 5.

"^Memorandum from Greg Brady, Courts Specialist, LEAA and Phil Fraas, Court Specialist LEAA, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, Subject: "Development of Selective Prosecution Concept and the Experiences of Major Violators Units other than in the District of Columbia, October 7, 1974, p. 4.

^From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; and William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978.

■^From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

"^Hamilton and Work, 1973, op. cit., p. 187.

19Ibid.

20Ibid. 21 Charles R. Work, "Foreword" in INSLAW, Curbing the Repeat Offender: A Strategy for Prosecutors. (Washington, D.C.: INSLAW, 1977), p. 4. 22 From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977; and William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978. 23 At that time, PROMIS had been replicated in Los Angeles, Cobb County, Georgia, the State of Rhode Island and selected jurisdictions in the State of Louisiana. 24 From an interview with William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978. 25From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977. 26 From an interview with H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977.

27Ibid. 28 From an interivew with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

29 From an interview with Charles Work, April 27, 1977.

30ibid. 31 From an interview with H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977.

32 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1977.

33 From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977. Q / Marvin Wolfgang, Robert Figlio, and Thorsten Sellin, Delinquency in a Birth Cohort (Chicago: University of Chicago Prees, 1972).

Ibid.

. INSLAW (Institute for Law and Social Research) is a non-profit research organization founded by William A. Hamilton in 1973. INSLAW was a direct outgrowth of the development of PROMIS and with LEAA funding does research with data from PROMIS systems around the country.

37 INSLAW, Curbing the Repeat Offender: A Strategy for Prosecutors (Washington, D.C.: INSLAW, 1977). Also see Brian Forst and Kathleen Brosi, "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of the prosecutor>" The Journal of Legal Studies 6 (January, 1977), pp. 177-92.

38 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

39 I do not have a copy of the Nixon memorandum, however the content of the memorandum can easily be inferred from Saxbe's response: Memorandum from Attorney General Saxbe to President Nixon, subject: "The 15 percent Increase in First Quarter Crime Statistics," undated (probably around August 1, 1974).

Memorandum from Malcolm D. Hawk, Acting Director Office of Policy Development DOJ, to Deputy Attorney General Laurence Sillerman, subject: "Crime Reduction Options," July 29, 1974, p. 1. / *x According to Work (interview, April 27, 1978) he and Saxbe used to "shoot the breeze" quite often about crime and crime control. In the summer of 1974 he discussed the idea of a career criminal program with him on a number of occasions.

^Memorandum from Attorney General Saxbe to President Nixon subject "The 15 percent Increase in First Quarter Crime Statistics," undated (probably around August 1, 1974), p. 2.

^Ibid., p. 4-5.

Ibid., p. 5.

^Memorandum from Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA to Attorney General Saxbe, subject: "Proposed Career Criminal Impact Program of the United States Department of Justice," August 7, 1974, p • 1 •

48_, XDXCL • y P- 2 .

49Ibid.

50Ibid., P- 3.

51Ibid.

52Ibid. 53 Ibid., P- 4. 54.,., Idx q • y P- 5. 55t,., Ibid., P- 1 1 .

■*^Work had lunch career criminal idea to him and he liked it. Then they arranged for Haynes to go to the White House to help prepare the speech. (From an interview with Work, April 27, 1978).

■^Every person I interviewed mentioned this event.

58 From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; and H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977.

59 Remarks of the President to the 81st Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, The Washington Hilton, September 24, 1974, p. 1.

60Ibid., p. 2. 61 Ibid., p . 3 . After this speech the program was named the 'career criminal’ program. According to Haynes (interview, November 15, 1977), Charles ■ Work was not going to call it the ’career criminal' program. After the speech, however, he had no choice for the program was named.

^Memorandum from Charles Work Deputy Administrator LEAA to Richard Velde, Administrator LEAA, subject: "Update on status of Presidential Initiative-Career Criminal," April 4, 1975, p. 1.

^From an interview witli Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

67Ibid. 68 From interviews with: H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; and Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

^From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

7^The team included Ellen Jasper, R. Alan Jones, H. Paul Haynes, and Marcia Madsen.

7^Transcript of Career Criminal Initiative Conference, LEAA Washington, D.C., October 2, 1974, p. 9. 72 The prosecutors attending were: Christopher Bayley, Prosecuting Attorney, Kings County, WA; David Bludworth, State's Attorney, Palm Beach, FL; Dan Hurley, Assistant to State's Attorney, Palm Beach, FL; William L. Cahalan, Prosecuting Attorney, Wayne Co., MI; William Cahn, District Attorney, Nassau Co., LI, NY; Bernard Carey, State's Attorney, Cook Co., IL; Harry Connick, District Attorney, Orleans Parish; Ray Comstock, Chief Investigator, Orleans Parish; Elliott Golden, Chief Assistant District Attorney, Kings County, NY; Patrick Healy, Executive Director, National District Attorneys' Assoc.; Mario Merola, District Attorney, Bronx Co., NY; Paul Gentile, Assistant Attorney, Bronx Co., NY; Carl Rauh, Principal Assistant U. S. Attorney; Preston Trimble, President, National District Attorneys' Assoc.; Carol Vance, District Attorney, Houston, TX. 73 LEAA, "Background; Scope, Intentions and Discussion Items,” background paper prepared for Career Criminal Initiative Conference, Washington, D.C., October 2, 1974, p. 1.

74Ibid., p. 1-2.

7**National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA Major Offense Bureau: Bronx County District Attorney's Office, New York (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976). 2X2

76 From interviews with: Charles Work, October 4, 1977; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; and Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

77 From an interview with Charles Work, October 4, 1977.

78 Many of these memos were written in preparation for the prosecutors conference.

79 Memorandum from Greg Brady, Courts Specialist LEAA, and Phil Fraas, Court Specialist LEAA, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, subject: "Development of Selective Prosecution Concept and the Experiences of Major Violators Units other than in the District of Columbia," October 8 , 1974.

80Ibid. 81 Memorandum from Richard Van Duizend, NILECJ, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, subject: "Persistent Violent Offender Pro gram," October 8 , 1974.

82 Memorandum from Kenneth Carpenter, Chief, Corrections Section, LEAA to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, subject: "Correc tions Support of a Prosecutor Based Program Targeted at Violent, Career Criminals," October 4, 1974. 83 Memorandum from David J. Farmer, Director, Police Division LEAA, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator, subject: "Police Support of a Prosecutor-Based Program Targeted at Career Criminals," September 30, 1974. 84 Memorandum from Richard S. Laymon, Office of Evaluation LEAA, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator, subject: "Outline of Evaluation Plan for Prosecutor Augmentation Program," October 7, 1974. 85 Memorandum from Office of General Counsel to Administration, subject: "Potential Constitutional Issues and Safeguards in a Major Violators Program," October 10, 1974. 86 Memorandum from John M. Greacen, Deputy Director, NILECJ, to Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, subject: "Toward a Definition of What We Are About," October 1, 1974. 87 Memorandum from Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, to Richard Velde, Administrator LEAA, subject: "Preliminary Program Development of the Violent and Career Criminal Initiative," October 6, 1974, p. 2. OO Ibid., p. 3.

89TU4.Ibid., p. 5. c- 213 90 Memorandum from Attorney General Saxbe to President Ford, subject: "Reducing Crime— The Career Criminal Impact Program," undated, (Probably around November 1, 1974), p. 1.

91 Ibid., p. 2-3. 92 Ibid., p. 3.

93 The full guidelines are included in Appendix B.

94 LEAA, "Funds Available For Assault Against Career Criminals," LEAA Newsletter, Washington, D.C., January, 1975, p. 1.

95 Ibid., p. 2. 96--. .. i Ibid., p. 3.

97 See Appendix B for the data required of all applicants.

98 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

99 This was stressed by all of the interviewees.

■^^This was also stressed by all interviewees. 101 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978. 102 According to Ellen Jasper (interview October 7, 1977), after the first couple of trips the proposals started getting better. 103 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978. 104 From an interview with H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977. 105 From an interview with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977. 1 flfi From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1977.

^^Data supplied by LEAA, Adjudication Section. 108 Information supplied by National Legal Data Center.

109 Sarah Carey, Law and Disorder IV (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1976), p. 22.

^^This is based on a review of the career criminal clippings file at LEAA.

^■^From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

112Ibid. ^■^This letter was contained in the career criminal clippings file at LEAA. It is dated May 8, 1975.

■^^^Taken from a review of the career criminal clippings file at LEAA.

^"^From the Flint Michigan Journal, July 30, 1976.

117 From the Long Beach, California Press-Telegram, November 24, 1976. IIO "The Crime Wave," Time Magazine, June 30, 1975.

119 "The Losing Battle Against Crime in America," U. S. News and World Report, December 16, 1975. 120 "Experimental Program Musters Legal Forces Against Repeat Offen ders to Boost Convictions," The Wall Street Journal, August 19, 1976. 121 "How One City Shrinks Its Crime Rate," The National Observer, May 22, 1976. 1 99 John Berendt, "I Catch A Burglar," New York, September 27, 1976.

123 Eugene Methvin, "Crime In America— A Turnaround At Last?", Readers Digest, June, 1977.

12 A James Kilpatrick, "Career Criminals," Syndicated column, November 23, 1976.

125 Obtained from LEAA files.

126 Phil Cohen, Director of the career criminal clearinghouse (NLDC) was a personal friend of the President and may have helped Ford maintain an interest in the program.

127 From an interview with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977. 128 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

129 The National Observer, February 5, 1977. 130 U. S. News and World Report, November 22, 1976.

‘'■"^Readers Digest, June, 1977. 215 1 These jurisdictions were: Albuquerque ($99,000); Baton Route ($178,000); Clearwater, Florida ($242,000); Las Vegas ($135,000); Louisville ($285,000); Memphis ($300,000); Miami ($350,000); Minneapolis ($232,000); Portland ($295,000); Portsmouth, Virginia ($130,000); Rhode Island State ($190,000); San Francisco ($296,000); and St. Louis ($350,000).

^33The Verdict 1 (//6, 1976), p. 1.

134The Verdict 2 (//3, 1977), p. 1. CHAPTER VII

THE CREATION OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS

The LEAA career criminal program developed in the four distinct stages described in the previous chapter. The present chapter will analyze the conditions and contingencies which affected the development of this program, in order to provide a sociological explanation for its creation.

The career criminal initiative represents a specific instance of the social construction of crime. The construction of crime, whether in the form of a new criminal law or a new legal category, always involves the definition of a "social problem." The social definitional process whereby certain conditions are selected and defined as problematic provides the framework within which the analysis of the construction of crime can be carried out. This chapter will explain the creation of the career criminal program as the outcome of such a definitional process.

Each of the four stages of development of the career criminal program will be analyzed as a distinct step in this definitional process.

In the first stage we will examine the private recognition of a particu lar social problem (prosecutor management problems) and the creation of a solution to this problem (PROMIS).

216 217

In the second stage a number of factors will be analyzed beginning with the acquisition of organizational resources necessary to transform a privately recognized problem into a widely recognized public issue. Then, we will investigate how the existence of a solution can lead to the creation of a problem. Third, we will examine the redefinition of the social problem and the seven "rules" which were followed to accomplish this redefinition. Finally, we will look at how the first two of these

"rules" were followed.

In the third stage we will analyze how the public recognition of the social problem came about. We will examine how "rules" three through six were followed, focusing especially on the role of the mass media.

In the fourth stage we will investigate how "rule" seven was followed. We will consider how the success of the program was demon strated, leading to the expansion of the program nationwide. Again, the critical role of the media will be analyzed.

THE DEFINITION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

In recent years, the sociology of social problems has been trans formed. A number of sociologists have stressed that social problems, rather than being viewed as a set of objective social conditions, are better conceptualized as the products of collective definitions or social movements.^ These theorists point out that not all harmful social conditions become "social problems." Only certain conditions are selected and defined as such. What is significant sociologically about social problems, is the definitional process which produces them. As

Herbert Blumer has observed: 218

. . . a social problem exists primarily in terms of how it is defined and conceived in a society instead of being an objective condition with a definitive objective makeup. The societal definition, and not the objective makeup of a given social condition, determines whether the condition exists as a social problem. The societal definition gives the social problem its nature, lays out how it is to be approached, and shapes what is done about it . . . . These few observations suggest a clear need to study the process by which a society comes2to see, to define, and to handle their social problems.

This perspective is closely related to the definitional paradigm 3 ' of crime and deviance. In fact, the social construction of crime

always involves the definition of a social problem. The societal

definition of certain conditions or behaviors as harmful, troublesome,

or problematic is a necessary condition for the creation of crime.

Thus, the social definitional process of social problems provides the

framework for analyzing the construction of crime. The description

and explanation of this definitional process is central to the descrip

tion and explanation of the career criminal program. Spector and

Kitsuse have spelled out what the analysis of the definitional process

entails.

A central task of a theory of social problems and deviance [crime] is to describe and explain the definitional process in which morally objectionable conditions or behaviors are asserted to exist and the collective activities that become organized around those assertions. Such a theory would seek to explain how those definitions and assertions are made, the processes by which they are acted upon by institutions, and how those institutional responses do or do not produce socially^ legitimated categories of social problems and deviance [crime].

Spector and Kitsuse go on to point out that definitions of social

problems are socially processed, and in this sense we can say that they

have careers or natural histories. The notions of career or natural

history, of course, stress the emergence and development of phenomena 219

over time. As Spector and Kitsuse note, they direct sociologists

to:

. . . constructions of histories, to descriptions of how things develop over time. Park stated that 'the socio logical point of view makes its appearance in historical investigation . . . This directs the researcher to organize data over time, to have a dynamic open-ended model that reflects the conception of society as an on-going process. The symbolic interactionists who have made the greatest use of this conception of society insist that social phenomena must b| studied and analyzed as an emergent sequence of events.

Thus, any analysis of the definitional process of social problems must take into account the dynamic and emergent quality of that process.

The present analysis attempts to be sensitive to this issue by examining

the various stages of the career criminal program's development. Condi

tions which affected the program's development will be analyzed within

each stage, and these conditions will be related to the larger

historical context within which the program emerged. Not only will the

factors or events influencing the program within each stage be examined,

but also the contingencies affecting movement between stages will be

analyzed. According to Spector and Kitsuse, "A contingency is a branching

point between two adjacent stages of a career. The notion points to work,

decisions, or changes that must happen in order for activities to

advance from one stage of a career to the next."^ By analyzing the

career criminal program's stages of development, the conditions which

gave rise to them, and their various contingencies, we hope to produce

a sociological explanation of the creation of the program which adequately

captures its dynamic and emergent character. 220

STAGE 1: THE PRIVATE RECOGNITION OF A SOCIAL PROBLEM

Social problems are the product of a definitional process.. The first stage of this social definitional process involves the private recognition of the problem by some individual or group. As Ross and

Staines point out:

The career of a social problem begins with its being privately recognized as a problem. Some individual or group comes to believe that a certain social problem exists because what their ideology designates as an ideal state of affairs diverges significantly from that they perceive the real situation to be. Thus, as ideologies and perceptions of reality vary across social actors (whether individuals or groups) and historical periods, different social problems will achieve private recognition.^

In this stage of the analysis, therefore, we need to identify the individuals or groups which come to recognize the existence of objection able conditions and make assertions about them. In addition, we need to examine the collective activities that become organized around these assertions once they are made.

The first stage of the development of the career criminal program did involve the private recognition of a social problem. In the late

1960's, Charles Work and his associates at the U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia, came to recognize the existence of a number of objectionable conditions in the urban criminal courts of the nation.

g Work and his colleagues defined these courts as a "floundering'system."

They pointed out that, "Too often, the criminal court system appears to be operated in an aimless, unfocused and arbitrary fashion, ingesting

9 and disposing of its workload without any sense of direction." They went on to assert that due to large caseloads, inadequate staffing, inadequate differentiation among cases, and lack of management 221 consciousness, prosecutors were handling cases on an assembly-line, mass-production basis, and failing to fulfill their role as the custo dian of the community's scarce adjudicative resources.^

Thus, Work and his associates at the U.S. Attorney's Office, defined the management problems of urban prosecutors as an important social problem. They felt that this problem was made more acute by the fact that repeat or habitual offenders were exploiting the system 11 to escape prosecution and conviction. Something needed to be done, according to Work, to deal with this problem. Prosecutors somehow needed to prioritize their caseloads and use more efficient case 12 management techniques. As the previous chapter documented, based on this perception, Work and his colleagues developed the PROMIS informa tion system and formed the Major Violator's Unit within the U.S.

Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia.

At this point, we need to ask what conditions or factors influence individuals or groups to recognize the existence of a social problem?

What causes people to make assertions about certain social conditions and then engage in collective action based on those assertions? Ross and Staines claim that the private recognition of a social problem depends upon the ideology of the group (or individual) and their

13 perception of reality. Hartjen is more specific:

Activity to bring about or block social change is not likely to occur unless (1) groups perceive a threat to their interests/values that (2) is attributable to some exterior social force that (3) group members feel is amenable to control through their own efforts. In this case, the actual act of mobilizing public concern will depend on (4) the limit to which the group tolerates the threat and (5) its willingness to acknowledge the existence of some t h r e a t . ^ 222

In the case of the career criminal program, what is important at this stage is that Work and his associates did perceive a threat to their values and interests.The values and interests involved were derived from their group membership as prosecutors. The occupational ideology of the prosecutor, above all else, stresses the value of prose cuting "bad guys" to insure that they receive their deserved punishment.

Any factor which impinges upon the prosecutors ability to perform this role is likely to be regarded as a threat to this value. Furthermore, prosecutors operate in a bureaucratic environment which stresses the

16 organizational values of efficiency, perpetuation, and accountability.

The voluminous caseloads, inadequate staffing, and other management problems pose an obvious threat to the organizational functioning of the prosecutor's office.

The management problems cited by Work are threats to the values and interests of all urban prosecutors. They represent a significant departure from the ideal conditions which prosecutors, as a workgroup, would like to operate under. What magnified Work's perception of the departure of reality from the ideal, was the reorganization of the District of

Columbia court system in the late 1960's. With this reorganization, the

Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office faced a massive increase in its caseload. This increase made Work, the Deputy Chief of the Superior Court Division, more acutely aware of the problems of case „ 17 management.

In addition, it seems appropriate to characterize Charles Work, 18 following Becker, as a type of "moral entrepreneur." It was Work's recognition of the management problems of urban prosecutors that 223 eventually led to the creation of the career criminal program. Recall from Chapter III Becker's assertion that rules (programs) are shaped by their movement through a sequence from general value to specific act of enforcement. Movement through this sequence, according to Becker is not automatic or inevitable, it is a process subject to various conditions and contingencies. Becker points out that moral entrepreneurs play a critical role in this passage from general value to specific rule

(program). Moral entrepreneurs are the people who make it their business to see that the rules (programs) are deduced from general values.

Charles Work acted as a moral entrepreneur in the creation of the career criminal program. It was his enterprising activities which moved the idea through this sequence from general value to specific program.

The general value for Work was management consciousness among prosecutors.

This value led Work to privately recognize the existence of a social problem and make it his business to see that a specific program would develop from it. Thus, Work and his associates acted as moral entrepre neurs in launching the crusade for management consciousness which eventually led to the development of the career criminal program.

The perception of a threat to values or interests is only the first condition which influences Individuals or groups to recognize the existence of a social problem. The threat must then be attributed to some external factor which the individual or group believes that they can "do something" about. In the case of the career criminal program, the initial definition of the problem— management problems in the urban prosecutors office— was attributed to: 1) the organization of the prosecutor's office; 2) the lack of case management tools, and 3) the 224 19 lack of management consciousness. In making these attributions, Work and his colleagues were thoroughly convinced that they could do some- 20 thing to control or correct these conditions. This belief, that something can be done to alter an undesirable condition is very important to the definition of that condition as a social problem. As Horton and

Leslie note:

A condition is a problem when it is believed something can be done about it. It is the belief in the possibility of treatment that causes people to consider it a problem. Whether this belief is correct can often be determined only by trial. Meanwhile the hope of treatment is sufficient to lead people to consider a condition a ^ problem and to seek ways of doing something about it.

The thing that Work and his associates felt that they could do first of all, was to develop new case management tools for prosecutors.

Work assembled a team to devise such tools, which led to the creation of the computer based information system called PROMIS. With PROMIS prosecutors could prioritize their caseloads and concentrate scarce resources on the most serious cases. To facilitate such selective prosecution, Work organized a special Major Violators Unit within the

Superior Court Division of the U.S. Attorney's Office. This unit, with its unique division of labor and other additional organizational resources, allowed the superior court division to be more adequately prepared in cases involving repeat misdemeanant offenders. With the new case management tool (PROMIS) and new organizational structure

(Major Violators Unit), Work believed that he could raise the management consciousness of prosecutors nationwide and therefore do something about the problems facing urban criminal court systems. 225

At this point, Work and his colleagues had acknowledged a dis parity between the ideal conditions for urban prosecutors to function in and the real conditions they did operate in. They had privately recognized the existence of a social problem, attributed the problem to several factors which they believed they could alter and they had taken action to deal with the problem. Moreover they had put forth a great deal of effort to define the management problems of urban prose cutors as a social problem. As Hartjen notes, "the degree to which a condition is successfully defined as a social problem does not auto matically flow from the desire to generate social change. In part it depends on the amount of effort some group devotes to heightening

ti22 concern. Work’s group had devoted so much energy to define these conditions in the urban prosecutor's office as a social problem that we have characterized them as moral entrepreneurs.

Despite their private recognition of the problem and all of their efforts, however, Work and his colleagues were limited in their ability to generate widespread public concern over the problem. They lacked the organizational resources to make prosecutorial management a national issue of public concern. They were limited in their ability to define a social problem due to their position in the criminal justice system and the larger social structure. Since the subsequent development of the career criminal program was dependent on the public recognition of this social problem, the program had reached a critical contingency in its development.

Recall that a contingency is a branching point between two adjacent stages of development. It points to the events which must occur if an 226 activity is to advance from one stage of a career to the next. If Work

and his group had not acquired the organizational resources to push the

crusade for management consciousness and generate public recognition

of the problem of prosecutorial management, then the career criminal

program would not have advanced to its other stages of development.

STAGE 2: ACQUIRING ORGANIZATIONAL RESOURCES AND REDEFINING THE PROBLEM

The private recognition of a social problem does not guarantee

that it will become a publicly recognized and legitimated social problem.

Despite the best efforts of groups which privately recognize conditions

as social problems, many of these conditions never become publicly

accepted as such. The ability of a group to define a social problem which becomes publicly recognizable depends upon the organizational

resources of the group. Without organizational resources a group

cannot create a social problem. Ross and Staines have identified two

organizational resources which appear to be critical in the social

definitional process: 1) legitimate authority and 2) material

resources.

Clearly, the transformation from social problem (privately recognized) to social issue (publicly recognized) has many determinants and defies precise statement at the moment. Two strategic resources, nevertheless, do seem critical in the contest over whose issues will gain a place on the public agenda. The first resource, legitimate authority, may stem from the charisma of office (for officials) , of achievement (for businessmen), or expertise (for scientists) .... The other sort of resource is less symbolic and more concrete, more material, more economic. It is the ability to impose an issue upon the public by virtue of one's position.^3

A group which privately recognizes a social problem can acquire these

resources in a number of ways. The best way is to get the federal 227 government, or some official agency, to respond. Governmental recogni tion and response provides the organizational resources necessary to generate public recognition and legitimation for a social problem, thereby advancing it to the next stage of development. As Spector and

Kitsuse note:

The idea that the natural history of a social problem is divided into stages suggests that the career of the phenomenon may be divided into several periods, each characterized by its own distinctive kind of activities, participants, and dilemmas. When governmental agencies or other official and influential institutions to which claims might be put respond to the complaints of some group, the social problems activity undergoes a considerable trans formation. This transformation begins when the agencies ^ start to recognize a group and respond to its complaints.

To gain governmental recognition for its problem a group may use a number of techniques, as Spector and Kitsuse point out:

The group may have brought considerable pressure to bear on the agency through confrontation tactics, mass media campaigns, demonstrations or threats. It may have applied economic pressue, such as the threat of a boycott, or used political influence, or the agency may have recognized that it had something to gain by taking over and controlling the issue.

Governmental recognition and response to the problem of prosecutorial management came about in a rather unique fashion. Charles Work and his associates at the U.S. Attorney's Office did not use any of the tactics described above to gain this recognition. Instead, Work became an important official of one of the most influential criminal justice agen cies in the federal government. As described in the previous chapter,

Work was asked to become the Deputy Administrator for Administration at

LEAA. When Work went to LEAA in 1973, he took along with him several individuals from the District of Columbia court system who had played 228 instrumental roles in the crusade for management consciousness, the development of PROMIS, and the formation of the Major Violators Unit.

Thus, the group which had privately recognized the existence of the social problem of prosecutorial management, and had launched the crusade for management consciousness among prosecutors, now occupied key posi tions in a powerful agency of the federal government. Governmental recognition of, and response to, this problem was substantially increased. In becoming LEAA officials, the group acquired the needed organizational resources to generate a wider recognition of the problem of prosecutorial management and continue the crusade for management consciousness. The development of the career criminal program advanced to its second stage at this point.

Once at LEAA, Work and his group began to consider ways in which they could use the resources of LEAA to continue their crusade. As the previous chapter documented, Work was especially concerned with pushing the PROMIS system because he felt that it was the best solution to the management problems of urban prosecutors. With the organizational resources of LEAA behind him, Work felt that he could "sell" the PROMIS

26 system to prosecutors nationwide and solve these problems.

LEAA provided Work and his group both of the "strategic resources" identified by Ross and Staines. As an agency of the federal government dedicated to reducing crime, LEAA gave the group the critical resource of "legitimate authority." More attention was now given to the group, especially by the media, because of their status as government "experts" on crime and criminal justice. Assertions made by the group concerning

problematic conditions were more credible and respected now since they

came from an official, authorized source. 229

The other organizational resource which LEAA provided to Work and

his colleqgues was more material in nature. As Hartjen notes, "besides

the resources of status, the ability to define or block a social problem

depends on a group*s material, economic, and social positional ,,27 resources. The most important material resources acquired from LEAA were financial. Work and his group now had access to millions of dollars

of federal money to use in the crusade for management consciousness. In

addition, the group was now provided with staff support, research capa bilities, and political influence greater than they had ever known.

Together these two organizational resources gave Work and his group

the ability to generate more widespread recognition of the problem of

prosecutorial management and develop a specific program idea to deal with it. The acquisition of these resources were critical to the

creation of the career criminal program. As Hartjen points out:

Together these two classes of resources constitute the underlying bases of power upon which the successful pur suit of interests rest. Regardless of how concerned a particular group may be, regardless of how strongly it desires to promote its felt interests, lacking these resources renders it impotent to act according to its desires.2^

Once established at LEAA, with the organizational resources of the

agency behind them, Work and his group continued the crusade for manage

ment consciousness. Charles Work felt that PROMIS was the solution to

the problems of prosecutorial management and the urban criminal court

system. The problem, however, was to sell the system to local prosecu

tors, to convince them of its worth. Apparently a number of prosecutors

29 were not interested in PROMTS. For some reason the PROMIS system and 230

management techniques were simply not attractive to many prosecutors.

As Work observed, "there is no sex appeal in raising management con-

sciousness.H 3 0

To make PROMIS more attractive to local prosecutors, Work and his

31 associates began to search for a program which did have "sex appeal."

To sell PROMIS they decided to develop a national prosecutor's program

32 which could showcase the capabilities of PROMIS. They wanted to

design an attractive package to wrap the system in. They decided

therefore to develop a program which would focus on a more concrete

problem and dramatically illustrate the importance of management con

sciousness to deal with the larger, more abstract problems of 33 prosecutorial management. They decided to create a new social problem

in order to sell their "solution” to another more generic problem.

Work and his associates did not consciously go about creating a

new social problem. However, in the process of developing a program to

push PROMIS they did exactly that. They developed the career criminal

program to give "sex appeal" to PROMIS and management consciousness,

and in so doing created the social problem of "career criminals." It

was a case of the solution producing the problem. As Spector and

Kitsuse point out, "solutions produce problems by providing the frame-

3 / work within which those problems can be stated." They go on to note

that, "only the prior existence of institutional arrangements and

putative solutions make problems possible, perceptible, nameable and 35 actionable." In this case, the institutional arrangements were those

of LEAA (which include the agency’s organizational resources); the 231 putative solution was PROMIS and management consciousness; and the problem made possible, perceptible, nameable, and actionable was the problem of the career criminal.

To illustrate how Work and his colleagues produced the social problem of career criminals in their attempt to devise a program which would showcase PROMIS for local prosecutors (and thereby deal with the more abstract problem of prosecutorial management), we will demonstrate how they followed certain "rules" for the creation of social problems.

Hartjen has outlined seven "rules" for "creating, perpetuating, and 36 solving social problems." They are: 1) select a condition, 2) define the condition as problematic, 3) bring the message to the people, A) generate large-scale concern, 5) propose a solution, 6) design a program to deal with the problem, and 7) demonstrate success.

To one extent or another, Work and his group followed these rules in developing a program to push PROMIS and sell management consciousness to prosecutors. They were not explicitly following these rules, of course, but the rules accurately describe the steps they took in developing the career criminal program in stages two, three, and four.

As a result of following these seven rules, the privately recognized social problem was re-defined. A new social problem was produced which would eventually lead to the creation of the career criminal program and the construction of a new category of criminal: the career criminal.

Rule 1: Select A Condition

To develop a national prosecutors program which would showcase

PROMIS and the need for management consciousness, Work and his assistant

Paul Haynes had to first of all select a condition to focus on. The idea 232

of focusing on habitual offenders or career criminals came quickly to 37 them. According to Work, it seemed "natural" to do so, "It just fit."

The decision to develop a program which would deal with habitual offen

ders, however, was not a haphazard one. Work’s concern with repeat

offenders dated back to his days with the U.S. Attorney's Office in the

District of Columbia. His recognition of the management problems facing

prosecutors included a recognition of the "fact" that habitual offenders

routinely exploited the large caseloads and assembly-line processing 38 within the court to escape prosecution and conviction. xn addition, while he was still with the U.S. Attorney's Office, Work had organized

the Major Violators Unit to prepare cases involving repeat misdemeanant

offenders.

Work’s experience with the Major Violator's Unit played an important

role in the selection of career criminals as the focus for the new

prosecutor's program. As he later noted, the Major Violator's Unit

served as a "catalyst" for the development of the career criminal

39 program. Still, the selection of this particular condition was the

result of more than just the fact that Charles Work "had the idea in 40 storage" when he came over to LEAA. There were other factors which

affected this decision. Three of the most important were: 1) the

existence of typifications of habitual offenders, 2) the intellectual

milieu created by the new penology, and 3) the existence of social

science data concerning chronic offenders.

The fact that typifications of habitual offenders already existed

and were widely disseminated, facilitated the selection of these offen

ders as the focus for the new prosecutors program, and played an 233 important role in the subsequent development of the career criminal program. As Edwin Schur points out, "widely held and often stereo

typical beliefs about particular forms of deviation frequently influence

the substance and implementation of formal legal rules and other 'policy' ■'41 measures." In general, typifications are important to the definitional process of social problems.

Typifications "are descriptions drawn from a common stock of m42 knowledge which serve as short-hand notation for various phenomena."

They are simplified, standardized categories or labels, which are used

to place people or things. Typifications, such as "habitual offender,"

"repeat offender," "recidivist," and "career criminal," serve as conven

ient short-hand descriptions of problematic conditions, which can then be 43 used to arouse fear or concern among the public. In the selection of

a condition to focus the new prosecutor's program on, therefore, Work and

Haynes found these typifications to be extremely useful. They utilized

them to provide a simple, standardized description of the condition and

to generate widespread concern over it. Thus, the existence of such

typifications had an important effect upon the selection process.

Typifications of habitual offenders have a long history, as we

noted in Chapter V. However, the most recent source of these stereotypes,

and the mechanism by which they were widely disseminated, was the habitual

offender legislation of the 1920's. These statutes created a general

awareness of the problems caused by repeat offenders and they focused

attention on the need to "do something" about these problems. Although

these habitual offender laws were rarely used, they did serve the symbolic 234 function of reassuring the American public and calming its fear of crime at that time. The most important outcomes of these statutes, however, were the creation of new legal categories of deviance and the construc

tion of popular typifications of "habitual offenders."

Following the crime wave of the 1920's, these categories and typifi

cations quickly became dormant. Due to the opposition of criminal justice officials and criminologists, the legal category of habitual offender was

little used. In addition, the public's fear of crime was calmed during

the 1930's. As a result of these conditions, typifications of habitual

offenders receded from public consciousness. Also aiding the decline of

these typifications was the existence of a general social movement away

from punishment toward the rehabilitative ideal. This trend toward

treatment and away from punishment was based on cultural changes in 44 society according to Sutherland. As a consequence of this social move ment, attention was deflected away from such topics as deterrence,

incapacitation, and most importantly, the "problem" of the repeat offender.

In the early 1970's, a new social movement emerged to reverse these

trends. Based primarily on the writings of academic criminologists, the

neo-classical revival or new penology, represents a movement back toward

punishment and away from treatment. The new penology rejects much of the

rehabilitative ideal, stressing instead the deterrent, incapacitative,

and retributive goals of criminal punishment. This social movement, which

grew out of the failure and frustration engendered by the crime control

policies of the 1960's, also played an important role in the selection of

career criminals as the focus for LEAA's new prosecutor program. 235

The new penology influenced the development of the career criminal program, as noted in Chapter V, by fostering an intellectual tnilieu which was conducive to the creation of this idea. This milieu was just beginning to have an impact on criminal justice thinking when Work and

Haynes moved to LEAA. The philosophical assumptions and ideological beliefs of the new penology directed attention once again to the "prob lem" of repeat offenders and it resurrected the typifications concerning habitual criminals. This social movement and the intellectual milieu it created undoubtedly influenced Work and Haynes' awareness of "career criminals" and their selection of this issue as the focus for the new program they were about to create.

The third factor which affected the selection made by Work and

Haynes was the existence of some social science data pertaining to repeat offenders. Everyone connected with the career criminal program points to the importance of two studies in particular which influenced the decision 46 to focus on career criminals. Most important was the Delinquency In A

Birth Cohort study by Wolfgang, Figlio and Sellin. This study, as noted in the previous chapter, was also instrumental in reviving the typification of the habitual or chronic offender. The other study was INSLAW's analysis of PROMIS data from the District of Columbia. Work was especially impressed with this data because of its connection to PROMIS.

These two studies apparently influenced Work and Haynes very much.

Thus, the studies themselves must be treated as data for the analysis of the social definitional process. As Spector and Kitsuse point out,

"if we alter our frame of reference so that the causal statements of 236 sociologists and other scientists are part of the data for our analysis, we may ask what distinctive role they play in the process through which social problems are defined."^ In this case, the findings of social science research were used to justify the decision to focus on career criminals and lend some scientific legitimacy to this selection. These studies allowed LEAA to say that the program is "based on research."^®

Actually the decision to focus on career criminals was not based on research. The decision had already been made. The research then was

49 simply used as "justifying data" for the decision. As Ellen Jasper observed: "If we didn't have at least those statistics to assume that the repeat offender is doing a disproportionate share of the crime, then why have it, why give priority to those people?"^

Rule 2: Define The Condition As Problematic

Once a condition is selected, it must be defined as problematic.

Assertions that the condition needs to be dealt with in some way, must be made. As Hartjen points out, "the condition must be classified as undesirable, troublesome, or in some way harmful but one that can be ..51 resolved through concerted action. For Work and Haynes this was certainly the easiest rule to follow in creating the social problem of career criminals.

Because the fear of crime in the United States is great, and the nation as a whole is so concerned with increasing crime rates, all that

Work and Haynes had to do, in order to define career criminals as problematic, was link these individuals with the crime problem in general. This was easy to do for several reasons. First, an essential feature of the typification of habitual offenders is the assumption that these individuals account for a disproportionate amount of the crime which is committed. The common sense everyday taken-for-granted notions and descriptions embedded in these typifications ascribe the major responsi bility for serious crime to this group of offenders.

Second, Work and Haynes had scientific research to "prove" that these common sense assumptions were correct. The Wolfgang cohort study and the INSLAW data provided them with empirical evidence to use in their attempt to define career criminals as a serious social problem.

These studies, therefore, not only served to justify the existence of chronic, repeat offenders and legitimate their selection as the focus of the LEAA prosecutors program, but they also served to document the linkage between these offenders and the "crime problem" in general.

The third reason that Work and Haynes had such an easy time in defining the existence of career criminals as problematic and the core of the crime problem, was their structural location and their access to organizational resources. As the Deputy Administrator of LEAA,

Charles Work was defined as a "legitimate authority" on crime, both within and outside of government. Thus, his assertions concerning career criminals and the crime problem (which were made in the numerous memorandums described in the previous chapter) were highly respected and taken to be creditable (by such people as Malcolm Hawk, Director of the Office of Policy Development in the Department of Justice,

Attorney General Saxbe, and President Ford, as well as the public).

Also because of their material resources (power) within LEAA, derived 238 from their positions in the agency's hierarchy, Work and Haynes were able to impose an issue.on the agency, define career criminals as a problematic condition, and initiate the program development.

At this point, Work and Haynes have selected a condition and defined it as problematic. They appeared to be well on their way to creating a social problem which they could then attack with a prosecutor's program which would feature PROMIS and raise management consciousness. However, for reasons which are not entirely clear, they were unable at this time to follow the other steps which are necessary for the creation of a social problem. The idea for a career criminal program lay dormant.

"Career Criminals" were not yet a publicly recognizable social problem.

A second contingency in the development of the program had been reached.

Some outside event would be needed to advance the career criminal pro gram to its third stage of development.

STAGE 3: PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM

Social problems are always the product of a definitional process.

The most critical step in this process is the transformation of a privately recognized problem into a widely recognized public issue. Public recog nition is crucial to the creation of a social problem, and it usually requires a complex political process. As Ross and Staines point out, the outcomes of this political process whereby privately recognized social problems are transformed to public issues can be measured on two dimen sions. 239

First is the matter of issue salience, which may be measured in several ways: How important does the general public rate the issue, how much media coverage does the , issue receive, how intense is the response of elites other than the media to the issue, etc.? Second is the question of issue legitimacy. Once an issue has gained at least some salience, the question of its legitimacy becomes pertinent. An issue may be defined as legitimate to the extent that people agree that a genuine or real social problem exists and that attention should be directed to its solution. ^2

In the summer of 1974, as Work and Haynes developed the idea for a

' career criminal program, "career criminals" were not yet a publicly

' recognized social problem. The issue had not yet attained salience or

legitimacy. Despite the fact that Work and his associates had the

organizational resources of LEAA behind them, and the fact that they

had followed the first two "rules" for creating a social problem,

"career criminals" remained a privately recognized problem. In order

to transform this problem into a public issue, and advance the program

to its third stage of development, Work and Haynes needed to somehow

•follow the remaining "rules" for defining a condition as a social problem.

Only by "bringing the message to the people," "generating large-scale

concern," "proposing a solution," and "designing a program to deal with

the problem," could they produce a salient and legitimate issue and

transform "career criminals" into a publicly recognized social problem.

Rules 3 and 4: Bring The Message To The People and Generate Large-Scale Concern

Following Charles Work's August 7, 1974 memorandum to Attorney

General Saxbe, the development of the career criminal program languished

for several months. This can probably be attributed to Richard Nixon's 240

resignation on August 9, 1974, the general atmosphere created by the

Watergate scandal, and the fact that a new administration was- taking

over on short notice under difficult conditions. The idea for the program was already fully developed at this point. The "solution" was

ready to be implemented. All that was necessary now, was for the

"problem" to be "created," that is, become a widely recognized public

issue.

At this time, Work and Haynes were discussing ways to "bring the message to the people" and "generate large-scale concern" over the issue

of "career criminals" (and thus indirectly deliver a message and generate 53 concern regarding the management problems of prosecutors). Due to the

strategic resources of LEAA, there is no doubt that they would have

eventually been successful in transforming "career criminals" from a

privately recognized problem into a public issue. However, it is

doubtful that the "career criminals" issue could have attained the degree

of salience and legitimacy that it subsequently did, as quickly as it did,

had it not been for a fortuitous sequence of events which took place

outside of LEAA in the autumn of 1974.

These events revolve around a speech President Ford gave to the

International Association of Chiefs of Police in late September, 1974.

As described in the previous chapter, one of Ford’s speechwriters (a

personal friend of Charles Work) contacted Work informally to request

some input for the President's IACP speech. Work realized that this was

an excellent opportunity to provide nationwide exposure for PROMIS,

management consciousness, and the career criminal program. Work arranged

for his assistant Paul Haynes to go to the White House and help prepare 241 the President's remarks. As it turned out, Haynes wrote the entire speech, and both he and Work were amazed when the President gave the

54 speech almost exactly as Haynes had drafted it.

In the speech, Ford expressed concern with the "fact" that most crime is committed by a small group of habitual offenders. The

President declared that he would give priority to the conviction and punishment of these "career criminals." Then he announced that he was directing the Department of Justice to develop a "career criminal impact program." Finally, as a justification for this particular approach, the President cited the experience of the Major Violators

Unit in the District of Columbia, noting that "career criminals" would no longer be able to escape through "the loopholes of the criminal justice system."

With these remarks President Ford helped to create the social problem of "career criminals" and spark the programmatic development of the career criminal program. As a result of this speech, the problem of "career criminals" was transformed into a public issue of great salience and legitimacy. The speech and its aftermath fulfilled the requirements of "rules" three and four for the creation of a social problem: it brought the message to the people and generated large- scale concern. Thus, "career criminals" became a publicly recognized social problem.

The reasons behind Ford's ability to define "career criminals" as a social problem and impose this issue on the American public, have to do with the organizational resources of the Presidency. The President of the United States lends tremendous legitimate authority to most 242 topics he discusses because of the symbolic trappings and prestige of the office. In addition to the resource of legitimate authority,'the

Presidency has an awesome array of material and positional resources at his disposal, which can be used to create public issues at will.

These resources place the President in a preeminent position to bring messages to the people and generate large-scale concern for problematic social conditions.

Perhaps the greatest resource of the Presidency Is access to the mass media. This is a positional resource which is critical to the definition of any condition as a social problem. For a group to effectively bring their message to a large number of people in a mass society and generate large-scale concern over some putative social problem, they must have access to the mass media. As Hartjen points o u t :

In modern mass society, an essential ingredient for generating and maintaining social problems is access to channels of public communication. People cannot become concerned about an issue unless they know of its existence, which means that those who would want to generate concern must gain access to the mass media in order to voice their claims and opinions.

Also, as Ross and Staines have noted, the media plays an important role

in determining the salience and legitimacy of an issue.

The mass media prove critical in providing visibility to a potential issue. They also influence whether the problem is assigned legitimacy as a social issue or is discredited as illegitimate.^^

Public officials and government agencies in general, usually have

easy access to the media. Because of this positional resource, public

officials (especially the President) and the bureaucratic organizations 243 of government (i.e., LEAA) are in a position to define almost any condi tion as a social problem and have it accepted as legitimate. Thus, which privately recognized problems will become publicly recognized social issues depends on the interrelationship between the media and public officials. Although the media and the government are often pictured as having an adversary relationship, there are important cooperative ele ments to the interrelationship between the two which impacts on the definition of social issues. As Ross and Staines point out:

The media and public officials, of course, interact closely as determinants of social issues. Their relationship contains both important competitive and cooperative elements .... Media and officialdom, nevertheless, usually adopt a cooperative stance. The interests of government are more likely to be enhanced than to be frustrated by media activities. In particular, the media provide politicians with the channels of communication needed to proselytize official images and interpretations of social problems. ^

The media, therefore, through its coverage of President Ford's speech to the IACP, provided the President with the necessary channels of communication to popularize the typifications of career criminals and define them as a serious social problem about which something needs to be done. This speech, and the media coverage of it, was the most critical

factor in the process which defined "career criminals" as a social problem and created the career criminal program. This speech made people aware of the "problem" and generated widespread concern over it among 58 the public, the law enforcement community, and the media. The legiti mate authority and positional resources of the Presidency had made

"career criminals" a salient and legitimate issue. The social problem

of "career criminals" was now publicly recognized as such. 244

Rules 5 and 6: Propose A Solution And Design A Program To Deal With The Problem

President Ford's speech to the IACP, and the aftermath of the speech, also fulfilled the requirements of rules five and six for the creation of a social problem. In the speech, Ford not only defined career criminals as a serious social problem, he also proposed a solu tion to the problem. He announced that he was directing the Justice

Department to initiate a "career criminal impact program" which would

target these career criminals for selective prosecution and conviction.

This program would reduce the level and frequency of serious crime in

the United States through its deterrent and incapacitative effects.

Thus, the President's speech fulfilled "rule" five: it proposed a solu

tion.

The solution of course, already existed before the problem of career

criminals was publicly recognized as such. PROMIS, management conscious

ness, the Major Violators Unit, and the idea of a career criminal program,

all predated the definition of the secondary problem of career criminals,

since they had been developed to deal with the primary problem of prose

cutorial management'. However, following Ford's speech to the IACP, the

internal development and design of the career criminal program began in

earnest. The program was now a "Presidential initiative" and Work and

Haynes moved fast to "capitalize" on the Presidential exposure given to

59 the program in the media.

Work and Haynes quickly arranged a meeting between LEAA officials

and local prosecutors in order to obtain practical input for the pro

gram's design and keep the program in the news.^^ Next Work and his 245 staff formulated the operational design of the program and drafted guide lines for the discretionary funds competition. However, there was no real competition for career criminal funds. While the guidelines were being written, Work and Haynes were engaged in an active search for jurisdictions in which to place the new program. They were interested in finding progressive prosecutors who could make the program succeed.

They were looking for "success models" who could show off the career criminal program (and of course PROMIS) and help it expand nationwide in the future. Finally, Work hand picked the original eleven jurisdic tions where career criminal units were established. By the end of

1975, all eleven units were fully operational. Work and Haynes had fulfilled the requirements of "rule" six: they had designed a program to deal with the newly created social problem of career criminals. At this point stage three ended and stage four began.

STAGE 4: THE EXPANSION OF THE PROGRAM

After the career criminal program became fully operational in 1975, it reached the third major contingency in its development. If the cru sade for management consciousness among prosecutors was to spread nationwide, as Charles Work clearly desired, the career criminal program would have to expand and carry it. According to Work, the career criminal program was the "cutting edge" for management consciousness and a "marketing tool" for the PROMIS system.As the career criminal initiative expanded, so would PROMIS and prosecutor management conscious ness expand, thus solving the prosecutorial management problems which plagued the urban court systems of the nation. In order for the career 246 criminal program to expand however, Work and LEAA would have to demon strate the success of the program in dealing with the social problem of

"career criminals."

Rule 7: Demonstrate Success

As Hartjen points out, the final "rule" for "creating, perpetuating, and solving social problems," is to demonstrate success in dealing with 62 the putative conditions defined as problematic. To expand the career criminal initiative, Work and LEAA needed to follow "rule" seven and demonstrate that the program was successfully dealing with the crime problem caused by career criminals. Some statistical evidence of the program's impact on crime rates was especially desirable. All that LEAA needed, was some evidence that this program was making progress against

the social problem of career criminals, even if the problem was not

completely eliminated.

Thus, LEAA commissioned an outside evaluation of the career criminal

program's impact on crime rates in four selected cities. After three years however, this evaluation has still not been completed. While LEAA waited on the results of this national evaluation, they were forced to

use the purely descriptive, summary statistics collected by the program's

national clearinghouse (The National Legal Data Center). These summaries

simply list totals for certain court related events involving career

criminal units, (i.e., total number of convictions obtained). There is

no baseline data to use in making comparisons and thus this data is

limited for evaluative purposes. Actually, LEAA was unequipped to

evaluate the Impact of the career criminal program on the level and fre

quency of crime in the nation. 247

Yet, the career criminal program came to be defined as a highly successful program which was having a dramatic impact on serious crime across the nation. The primary reason the program was defined as successful, despite the fact that there is little valid evidence to show one way or the other what effect the program has actually had on crime, was because of its treatment in the mass media. As the previous chapter documented, the career criminal program received a great deal of attention from the media on both local and national levels. This attention was overwhelmingly favorable and it served to publicize and popularize the program. Eventually, most of the press reports on the career criminal initiative came to describe the program as successful in fighting crime, despite the fact that no valid evidence existed to document this.

Several factors might explain this taken-for-granted assumption of the program's effectiveness. First, there was a slight decrease in rates of violent crime in late 1976 and in 1977. Several prosecutors immediately attributed these decreases to the career criminal program.

Soon, a number of articles appeared in national magazines, newsweeklys and newspapers which took the correlation between the existence of the career criminals program and the drop in the crime rate as positive proof that the program was responsible for the decrease in violent crime. ^ Speaking of the career criminal program and the new "get tough" attitude it expresses, and noting that prison populations are up, Eugene Methvin, Senior Editor of Readers Digest, stated that: 248

And, as if someone had thrown a giant switch, police departments across the land registered the first drop in violent crime since 1955. The conclusion seems inescapable: Put more criminals in prison, and we will have less violent crime in the streets. (Emphasis in original)

The second factor behind this widespread acceptance of the notion that the career criminal program was successfully reducing crime was the release of "LEAA News Features" by the Public Information Office

Of LEAA. These press releases, as noted in the previous chapter, usually contained the NLDA summary statistics, quotes from LEAA and

Justice Department officials concerning the effectiveness of the program, and striking case histories of individual convicted "career criminals."

These press releases illustrate how government agencies are able to influence the communication of issues through their status and control of the information communicated.

The third factor which contributed to the taken-for-granted assump tion that the career criminal program was highly effective in fighting crime, was the President’s public statements relating to the program.

As pointed out in the previous chapter, President Ford took a personal interest in the program and commented on the effectiveness of it at regular intervals. Ford's praise of the career criminal program kept it in the news constantly and contributed to the notion that the program was a great success, even though, as we pointed out, there is little evidence to support or reject that idea. The official pronouncements of the President are, of themselves, always newsworthy and such pronounce ments can simply overwhelm any opposite point of view because of their ability to be aired to the public. 249

Thus, with the complete, and often independent assistance of the mass media, LEAA was able to "demonstrate" the "success" of the career criminal initiative fulfilling the requirement of "rule" seven." Once the program was defined as successful, there was a tremendous demand to expand it into other jurisdictions. And, as the previous chapter docu mented, the career criminal program has expanded across the nation in a variety of ways. The number of career criminal units has climbed steadily since 1975, and it shows signs of continuing to climb even more in the future.

The development and expansion of the career criminal program, how ever, did not have the consequences that Charles Work intended or expected when he first set out to create it. Originally, Work designed

the career criminal program to raise management consciousness among prosecutors and push the adoption of the PROMIS system which he helped design. As the career criminal program developed though, several latent

consequences emerged which had nothing to do with PROMIS and prosecutor management consciousness. The career criminal program snowballed-and moved far beyond these original goals. The emergence of these latent

consequences and the socio-political interests they served will be dis

cussed in the following chapter.

SUMMARY

This chapter has analyzed the conditions and contingencies which

affected the development of the LEAA career criminal initiative. The

development of this program was intertwined with the creation of the

"social problem" of "career criminals." Thus, the social definitional 250 process whereby certain conditions are selected out and defined as

"social problems," provided the framework within which the analysis of the creation of the career criminal program was carried out. The analysis attempted to be sensitive to the dynamic and emergent qualities of this definitional process by describing the various stages of the career criminal program’s development, examining the conditions which gave rise to these stages, and considering the contingencies which affected movement between the stages.

The first stage involved the private recognition of a social pro blem by a small group of "moral entrepreneurs" who made it their business to devise a "solution" to this "problem." Charles Work and his asso ciates at the U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia, perceiving a threat to their values and interests as prosecutors, defined the management problems of urban prosecutors as a serious social problem. They felt that they could do something about this problem by developing new case management tools and raising management consciousness.

Thus, they developed PROMIS, formed the Major Violators Unit, and launched a crusade for management consciousness.

For a privately recognized problem to become a publicly recognized

issue, the defining group must have access to certain organizational

resources (legitimate authority and material resources). Since Work

and his group did not, at this time, have this access, the definitional

process reached its fir..t major contingency. At this point, Work was

asked to become Deputy Administrator of LEAA and when he moved to LEAA

he took several members of the management consciousness group with him.

Thus, the group had acquired the necessary organizational resources and

the second stage was under way. 251

During the second stage, the "social problem" in question was redefined. The "solution" which had been developed (management con sciousness) lacked "sex appeal" and was not popular with prosecutors.

Thus, Work and his group, acting as "moral entrepreneurs" began to search for a way to "sell" the solution to the nation’s prosecutors.

They decided to focus on a more concrete aspect of the larger problem: the prosecution of career criminals. They began to develop an idea for a program which would focus on career criminals and demonstrate the capabilities of PROMIS and management consciousness. In so doing, they created the social problem of career criminals. It was a case of the solution producing the problem.

In creating the "problem" which they could then use to showcase the "solution," Work and his group followed seven "rules" for creating, perpetuating, and solving a social problem. They are: 1) select a condition, 2) define the condition as problematic, 3) bring the message to the people, 4) generate large scale concern, 5) propose a solution,

6) design a program to deal with the problem, and 7) demonstrate success.

The group had no trouble selecting a condition and defining it as problematic. Work's experience with the Major Violators Unit, the existence of typifications of habitual offenders, the intellectual milieu created by the new penology, the existence of social science data concerning chronic offenders, and the organizational resources of

LEAA were important factors in following the first two rules. The

group's inability to follow rules three and four however, brought the definitional process to its second major contingency. 252

The fortuitous chance to contribute to a speech of President Ford's gave public recognition to the problem of "career criminals" and moved the definitional process into its third stage. Ford's speech to IACP and the media handling of it, brought the message to the public and generated large-scale concern over the social problem of "career criminals." Ford's speech also took care of "rule" five: propose a solution. Also in the aftermath of the speech, the internal program matic development and design of the career criminal program began in earnest, taking care of "rule" six.

After the program became fully operational it moved into its fourth stage of development. In this stage, LEAA through the media, followed

"rule" seven and "demonstrated" the "success" of the program (even though there is no valid evidence of its success). Once the program was defined as successful there was a great demand for its expansion.

Since then the program has expanded in a variety of ways and shows signs of expanding even more in the future. FOOTNOTES

See Herbert Blumer, "Social Problems as Collective Behavior" Social Problems 18 (Winter, 1971), pp. 298-306; Howard S. Becker, Social Problems A Modern Approach. (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse, Constructing Social Problems (Menlo Park, California: Cummings Publishing Co., 1977); Clayton Hartjen, Possible Trouble: An Analysis of Social Problems (New York: Praeger, 1977); Armand Mauss, Social Problems as Social Movements (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1975). 2 Blumer, 1971, op. cit., p. 300.

3 See Spector and Kitsuse, 1977, op. cit., p. 72.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 137.

^Ibid., p. 139.

Robert Ross and Graham L. Staines, "The Politics of Analyzing Social Problems" Social Problems 20 (Summer, 1972), pp. 18-40. g William A. Hamilton and Charles R. Work, "The Prosecutor’s Role in The Urban Court System: The Case For Management Consciousness," The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 64 (#2, 1973), pp. 183-189.

^Ibid., p. 183.

1 0Ibid. T

11Ibid.

12Ibid. 13 Ross and Staines, 1972, op. cit.

^4Hartjen, 1977, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

^From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

^Richard Hawkins and Gary Tiedeman, The Creation of Deviance: Interpersonal and Organizational Determinants (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1975), pp. 185-191.

253 254

^From an interview with William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978. 18 Howard S. Becker, Outsiders (New York: The Free Press * 1963).

19 Based on all of the interviews which were conducted. 20 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977. 21 Paul B. Horton and Gerald R. Leslie, The Sociology of Social Problems, 4th edition (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 5. 22 Hartjen, 1977, op. cit., p. 41.

23 Ross and Staines, 1972, op. cit., p. 25-26.

24 Spector and Kitsuse, 1977, op. cit., p. 148.

25Ibid.

26 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977. 27 Hartjen, 1977, op. cit., p. 44.

OQ Ibid., pp. 44-45. 29 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

30Ibid. 31 From interviews with: Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978; H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977; Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977; and William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978. 32 Ibid. 33 JJIbid. 34 Spector and Kitsuse, 1977, op. cit., p. 84.

35Ibid., p. 85.

Hartjen, 1977, op. cit., pp. 45-48. 37 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

38 Hamilton and Work, 1973, op. cit., p. 184. 39 Charles R. Work, "Foreword1' in INSLAW, Curbing The Repeat Offender: A Strategy For Prosecutors (Washington, D.C.: INSLAW, 1977), p. 4. ^From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

41 Edwin M. Schur, Labeling Deviant Behavior; Its Sociological Implications (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 51.

42 Hawkins and Tiedman, 1975, op. cit., p. 82.

/ ^ See Edwin H. Sutherland, "The Diffusion of Sexual Psychopath Law," American Journal of Sociology 56 (September, 1950), p. 142.

^Ibid., p. 147.

45 See the Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on LEAA, Law Enforcement: The Federal Role (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. 65; and Sarah Carey, Law and Disorder IV (Washington, D.C.: The Center For National Security Studies, 1976), p. 22.

46 All interviewees stressed this point.

47 Spector and Kitsuse, 1977, op. cit., p. 65.

48 From an interview with H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977.

49 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

“*^From an interview with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

^Hartjen,. 1977, op. cit., p. 46. 52 Ross and Staines, 1972, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

53 Work and Haynes did not discuss this matter in these exact terms of course.

54 From interviews with: Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977; and H. Payl Haynes, November 15, 1977.

■’"iHartjen, 1977, op. cit., p. 53.

■^Ross and Staines, 1972, op. cit., p. 22.

■^Ibid., p. 23. 58 Memorandum from Charles R. Work, Deputy Administrator LEAA, to Richard Velde, Administrator LEAA, subject: "Update on status of Presidential Initiative - Career Criminal," April 4, 1975. 59 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1977. 256

^ H a r t j e n , 1977, op. cit., p. 48.

631he MITRE Corporation of McLean, Virginia is conducting this evaluation.

^IJ.S. News and World Report, "A War on Career Criminals Starts to Show Results,” November 22, 1976; Eugene H. Methvin, "Crime in America - A Turnaround at Last?" Readers Digest, June, 1977; "The Drop in Violent Crime" The National Observer, February 5. 1977.

^ M e t h v i n , 1977, op. cit., p. 62. CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM: INSTRUMENTAL AND SYMBOLIC EFFECTS

This chapter will analyze the consequences of the creation of the career criminal program. After distinguishing between Gusfield's con cepts of instrumental functions and symbolic functions, the analysis begins with an examination of the original instrumental objectives of the program as defined by the actors who created it: to raise manage ment consciousness among prosecutors and to reduce crime. The emergence of these two goals will be considered, the relationship between them analyzed, and an evaluation of the extent to which they have been achieved will be offered.

An analysis which remains at the level of instrumental action, however, fails to grasp the larger social significance of the creation

of the career criminal program, its contribution to the social construc

tion of the meaning of crime in our society. To demonstrate the role

that the career criminal initiative has played in the construction of

crime, the analysis will focus on the symbolic significance of the

activities which became organized around the legal category of career

criminal.

257 258

The symbolic meanings which became attached to these activities served the important function of reassuring the public that the govern ment was concerned about crime, doing something concrete about crime, and upholding public morality. These symbolic meanings, in turn, served the concrete political interests of a number of governmental organizations and groups. Three groups will be considered: the Ford

Administration, local prosecutors, and LEAA.

In addition, the symbolic significance of the creation of the career criminal program will be analyzed for the effect that it has on the definition of the crime problem in the United States, a definition which serves the interests of the dominant economic class.

INSTRUMENTAL AND SYMBOLIC EFFECTS

Since this chapter wiil be examining both the instrumental and

symbolic functions of the creation of the career criminal program, it

is important to draw a clear distinction between the two. Both of

these concepts have been derived from Gusfield's work on "symbolic

crusades." Gusfield has distinguished between the two concepts in the

following way.

Let us begin with a distinction between instrumental and symbolic functions of legal and governmental acts. We readily perceive that acts of officials, legislative enactments, and court decisions often affect behavior in an instrumental manner through a direct influence on the actions of people. The Wagner Labor Relations Act and the Taft-Hartley Act have had considerable impact on the conditions of collective bargaining in the United States. Tariff legislation directly affects the prices of import commodities. The instrumental function of such laws lies in their enforcement; unenforced they have little effect.^ 259

Having defined instrumental functions, Gusfield turns to the notion of symbolic functions:

Symbolic aspects of law and government do not depend on enforcement for their effect. They are symbolic in a sense close to that used in literary analysis. The symbolic act ’invites consideration rather than overt reaction.’ There is a dimension of meaning in symbolic behavior which is not given in its immediate and manifest significance but in what the action connotes for the audience that views it. The symbol ’has acquired a meaning which is added to its immediate intrinsic significance.'^

Instrumental actions are designed to directly influence the behavior

of groups; they are oriented "to behavioral consequences as a means to a fixed end."^ Symbolic actions, on the other hand, have a representa

tional character; they are oriented "more to meaning as an act, a

decision, a gesture important in itself."^ Although these two functions

can be separated, analytically and empirically, Gusfield makes the point

that they will usually both be present in any particular governmental

action.

The distinction between symbolic and instrumental dimensions of 6 governmental acts has also been explored by Carson, who has made two

important criticisms of Gusfield’s conceptualization. First, Carson

maintains that Gusfield has failed to investigate the possible empirical

relationships between instrumental and symbolic actions. He writes:

. . . it has been suggested that although the distinction between the instrumental and symbolic impact of legal norms is an important one, analysis in terms of an exclusive empirical dichotomy between the two is likely to be misleading. Such an approach not only glosses over the fact that, in practice, most attempts to make law probably contain elements of both, but also neglects the vital possibility of a dynamic interplay between them.7 260

Second, Carson criticizes Gusfield for failing to portray symbolic meanings as an emergent property of the social interaction occurring in

connection with a particular governmental act. He maintains that

governmental actions "take on" an additional range of symbolic signifi

cance as they move through different interactional sequences:

Symbolic meanings are not an intrinsic property of the attempt to make law, but an emergent property of the interaction which occurs along the way. They are constructed in the course of the reciprocal processes of interpretation which constitute an ongoing feature of legislative, as of any other interaction.^

The following analysis of the instrumental and symbolic functions

of the creation of the career criminal program will take these two

criticisms into account, by examining the empirical relationship between

the instrumental and symbolic functions of the program, and investigating

the emergent character of its symbolic meanings. The instrumental

objectives of the program will be considered first.

THE INSTRUMENTAL OBJECTIVES OF THE PROGRAM

The origins of the career criminal initiative can be traced directly

to the crusade for management consciousness, and the primary objective

of the program, at least initially, was to raise management conscious

ness among urban prosecutors. Later, with the creation of the social

problem of "career criminals" crime reduction emerged as the primary goal.

In both cases the explicit objective of the actors who developed the pro

gram was to directly influence the actions of specific groups. Following

Gusfield, both "raising management consciousness" and "reducing crime"

can be characterized as "instrumental objectives." 261

Raising Management Consciousness

The crusade to raise management consciousness among prosecutors emerged from the perception of Charles Work, that the troubles of the urban court system could be attributed to the management problems that 9 existed in the prosecutors office. The original goal of the career criminal initiative was to directly influence the operation of the urban prosecutor's office through the installation of PROMIS, the creation of special career criminal units, and the increased awareness of management problems.

To what extent was this instrumental objective accomplished? The

LEAA career criminal program did provide the financial resources to numerous jurisdictions which allowed them to increase their staffs and reorganize their offices. Special career criminal units were established in each jurisdiction, and from all the available evidence these units have increased the speed and efficiency of prosecutorial efforts directed at career criminals.Such factors as lowered case loads, vertical prosecution, early case entry, direct indictments, and special investi gation appear to have a beneficial effect on case management.^

However, despite these effects, it is doubtful that the career criminal program has done much at all to raise management consciousness among prosecutors. For one thing, few of the career criminal jurisdic tions have installed the PROMIS system. Although PROMIS has been expanding across the nation, factors other than the career criminal 12 initiative have been responsible for this expansion.

The major reason that the career criminal program has not achieved this instrumental objective, however, is the fact that the primary focus 262 of the program shifted so quickly from management consciousness to crime

reduction. This shift occurred due to the fact that, in the process of

devising a program to "sell" PROMIS and management consciousness, Work

and his staff created the social problem of "career criminals." The

social problem of "career criminals," as noted in the previous chapter, was created primarily by the attribution of the crime problem in general

to the existence of a small group of career criminals. Thus, LEAA (and

later President Ford) presented the career criminal program as the solu

tion to this social problem, and as a means by which the level and

frequency of serious crime could be reduced.

Following President Ford's speech to the IACP, which generated

large-scale concern with the problem of "career criminals," the career

criminal initiative began to "snowball." The response to Ford's announce

ment of the program was tremendous, and in the aftermath of the speech,

the program grew larger and more popular than Work or anyone at LEAA

13 expected. The status of the career criminal program within LEAA

increased greatly now that it was a "Presidential initiative;" more money

was made available than had been originally anticipated; and the program

continued to receive a great deal of attention from the news media.

One result was that the career criminal initiative emerged as an

important program in its own right, overshadowing PROMIS and management

consciousness. As the program developed, the original goal became

secondary. Former program manager Ellen Jasper recalls being told by

H. Paul Haynes, Look, the idea about this program is no longer PROMIS;

and she went on to note that "people almost forgot that PROMIS was an 263 15 Integral part of the program in the beginning." As the career criminal program "snowballed," it moved beyond the original instrumental objec tive. The primary goal of the program was redefined. No longer was the explicit purpose of the career criminal initiative to "raise management consciousness," instead the objective of the program was now defined as the reduction of serious crime.

The Reduction of Crime

Although Charles Work had always intended for the career criminal program to reduce crime, he felt that this could best be accomplished through the introduction of new case management techniques into the urban prosecutors office, and by generally raising the prosecutors awareness 16 of management problems. However, following the "Presidential exposure" provided to the program by President Ford, and the positive response the idea received, the primary instrumental objective of the career criminal initiative emerged as the direct reduction of crime through the incapaci tation and deterrence of career criminals. As the program guidelines state:

The objective of this program is to demonstrate that homicide, rape, robbery and burglary can be reduced through special prosecutory emphasis on cases involving career criminals .... By focusing the resources, and attention of the criminal justice system on the career offender, the criminal justice system can have impact on the level and the frequency of serious crime. ^

And, as the U.S. News and World Report stated:

Take aim at the repeater and put him away for a long time: That’s the way backers of the new career criminal program figure the crime rate can be cut.^® 264

The primary instrumental objective of the career criminal program,

19 20 therefore, as expressed by the President, the Attorney General, 21 22 LEAA, and the mass media, was clear and simple: to reduce crime through the incapacitation of career criminals. What is not clear, however, is whether or not this program has really reduced the level and frequency of serious crime, or more fundamentally, even if it can at all.

In the first place there is simply little valid and reliable evi dence available to document what impact, if any, the career criminal program has had on the level and frequency of serious crime in the

23 United States. Currently there is no methodologically sound data available to determine if the program has in fact reduced crime, for the evaluation studies have not yet been completed. LEAA, career criminal prosecutors, and the media, of course, have all claimed that the career criminal initiative is responsible for the recent reduction of violent crime. However, as noted in the previous chapter, there is no evidence to support these assertions, and there are any number of other factors which could be responsible for this decrease. The career

criminal program may well be reducing crime, but until some empirical evidence is produced to document this, there is no way of knowing. The

1976 conclusion of the Center for National Security Studies still holds

true:

. . . as a practical matter it is impossible to tell at this point whether the added influx of special federal funds to prosecutors' offices actually improved performance.^ 265

Not only is there a lack of evidence to document whether or not the career criminal program is reducing crime, but also there are' a number of reasons to be suspicious of the program's potential to impact dramati cally upon crime. First of all, the program's strategy of incapacitation may be questioned. A recent empirical attempt to evaluate the effective ness of the incapacitation strategy concluded that incapacitation makes only a small and modest impact on violent crime rates. Van Dine, Dinitz and Conrad found that a mandatory five year prison sentence for any felony conviction would result in the prevention of only 4 percent of

25 violent crimes. These findings lend credence to the observation of

Clarence Schrag, that incapacitation provides "little more than an apologia for prolonged imprisonment of common criminals— certainly one of the oldest, best tested, and most thoroughly discredited of all forms of crime control."^

Secondly, no one really knows for sure how much crime is actually committed by so called "career criminals." It may well be, as William

Ryan argues, that career criminals (defined as those previously convicted and imprisoned) account for such a small percentage of the total number of crimes committed, that their incarceration cannot dramatically affect crime rates.^

Even if you assume that a small number of career criminals do account for a large portion of all crime committed, there are still grounds to suspect that this program will not actually reduce crime.

There are good reasons to believe that most of the people who are con victed and sentenced under the career criminal program would have been 266

OO convicted and sentenced harshly even without the program. ° As the

Center for National Security Studies points out, most prosecutors make it their natural order of business to focus on the most serious criminals first and concentrate their resources on the prosecution of these indi viduals . ^

In addition, it is important to remember that prosecutors are dependent upon the police to bring cases to them. Since clearance rates 30 for many serious crimes are very low, only a small percentage of all

"criminals" ever come to the attention of prosecutors at all. Even then,

the people most likely to get caught are the incompetent, the socially

31 inadequate, the "born losers." Due to the screening criteria of the

career criminal program these individuals are the ones most likely to be selected into the program, while the more skillful, violent organized

and professional criminals, who probably constitute a greater threat to

the social order, may not be in any way affected by the operation of

32 this program.

In summary, there is little reliable evidence at this time to demon

strate that the career criminal program is achieving its primary

instrumental goal of reducing crime, and there are reasons to believe

that the program may be incapable of affecting the amount of crime which

is committed. Furthermore, since the career criminal initiative came to

focus so heavily on the goal of crime reduction, it has had little

influence on its original instrumental objective of raising management

consciousness. Thus, at this point, it appears that the career criminal

program has had few instrumental effects.

' ...... •. \ ' •- 267

As noted earlier however, an analysis which remains at the level of

instrumental action will fail to grasp the larger sociological signifi

cance of the creation of this program. An analysis of instrumental

functions represents only one level of meaning which the program may

have. And as Peter Berger points out:

To ask sociological questions, then, presupposes that one is interested in looking some distance beyond the commonly accepted or officially defined goals of human actions. It presupposes a certain awareness that human events have different levels of meaning, some of which are hidden from the consciousness of everyday life. It may even presuppose a measure of suspicion about the way in which human events are officially interpreted.

The remainder of this chapter will attempt to look beyond the

commonly accepted and officially defined instrumental goals of the

career criminal program and analyze the consequences of the program at

other levels of meaning. The analysis will point out that the career

■criminal initiative is important in what it symbolizes rather than in

what it does or does not control or instrumentally affect. It is the

symbolic significance and meaning of the program which contributes to

the construction and maintenance of the social reality of crime in our

society.

THE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROGRAM

During the development of the career criminal initiative, the col

lective activities of LEAA, the Ford Administration, local prosecutors,

and the mass media, generated a new "social problem" and a new legal

category of deviance. As the program evolved, these activities which

were organized around the typification of "career criminals" (i.e.,

Ford's speech, the prosecutors meeting with LEAA, the site selection, 268 the beginning operation of local career criminal units, and the mass media attention) came to acquire symbolic significance. In general, these activities collectively came to symbolize three things: 1) the government’s symbolic concern with the serious problem of crime and its intention to reduce the level of crime; 2) the return to the punishment of criminals as an explicit crime control policy; and 3) the affirmation of public morality. These emergent symbolic meanings came to serve the function of reassuring the public concerning the problem of crime.

The Symbolic Concern With Crime

A pervasive and genuine fear of crime exists among the American people as evidenced by numerous findings from a variety of sources.^

In fact, some commentators have asserted that the fear of crime has

35 become a problem as serious as crime itself. This pervasive anxiety over possible victimization causes many Americans to drastically alter their lifestyle, and it slowly erodes the quality of American life, as Clemente and Kleiman have observed:

Such widespread anxiety over possible victimization takes a serious toll in the daily lives of many Americans. People are forced to change their usual behavior. They stay off the streets at night, avoid strangers, curtail social activities, keep firearms, buy watchdogs and may even move to other neighborhoods .... In short, the cost of crime goes far beyond the economic and physical losses imposed by criminals. It extends to the negative psychological effects of living in a state of constant anxiety. Further, fear of crime has a deleterious effect on the general social order. As fear becomes manifest in the avoidance of strangers, sociability, mutual trust and the willingness to help others disappear. °

Not only are Americans fearful of crime, they have been frustrated by the government's seeming inability to do anything about the problem.

In the middle 1970's, as the media reported on an ominous new "crime 269 wave,' a large segment of the public came to feel that the government

38 was "losing the battle against crime." Thus, it was in this climate of fear and frustration that the President of the United States announced to the American people that a new career criminal program was being created to reduce crime.

At this point, with the legitimate authority of the Presidency behind it, the career criminal initiative began to take on symbolic overtones.

The activities organized around this concept began to symbolize the government's concern with the crime problem and its intention to do some thing to reduce crime. As one high ranking official at LEAA explained,

"there was a need for good news on the crime front at this time," for the

39 control of crime "was a first concern of the American people." The career criminal program was the "good news" the public was thought to need, it represented the government's concern with crime. It was evi dence that the government was doing something concrete to reduce the level of serious crime. And, as a LEAA official pointed out, "it has a great name for these purposes— career criminal— you can see it and under g o stand it quickly and say well, we are getting those career criminals.

The Symbolic Return To Punishment

The career criminal initiative not only symbolized the government's concern with crime and its intention to reduce it, but it also symbolized a return to a more explicit policy of punishing criminals. For years government policies toward crime at the federal level had been dominated by the rehabilitative ideal and liberal social welfare programs. During

this period, government policies reflected the larger cultural movement 270 away from punishment toward treatment. In the early 1970's however, this movement was reversed. With the rise of the "new penology," the rehabili tative ideal was debunked and a new emphasis was placed on "punishing 41 criminals."

Governmental crime policies in the 1970's, soon came to reflect this new "thinking about crime." The career criminal program, as already noted, was created in the intellectual milieu of the "new penology," and it came to symbolize the punitive themes of this movement. As

Charles Work points out, the career criminal initiative was able to tie in with the popularity of James Q. Wilson and the other neo-classical 42 writers, due to its incapacitative and deterrent objectives. The program came to be symbolic of the government's return to punishment as an explicit crime control policy. As the most visible and heavily pub licized crime reduction program of the Ford Administration, the career criminal program symbolized the new criminal justice policy of the

Administration, the Justice Department and LEAA.

The Affirmation of Public Morality

In addition to symbolizing the government's concern with crime and the return to a more explicit policy of punishing criminals, the career criminal program also came to symbolically affirm public morality. The

activities which were directed against career criminals were symbolic

acts designed to uphold conceptions of right and wrong and affirm notions

of good and evil. As Gusfield has pointed out: 271

In their representational character, governmental actions can be seen as ceremonial and ritual performances, desig nating the content of public morality. They are the statement of what is acceptable in the public interest. Law can thus be seen as symbolizing the public affirmation of social ideals and norms as well as a means of direct social control. This symbolic dimension is given in the statement, promulgation, or announcement of law unrelated ^ to its function in influencing behavior through enforcement.

The activities which were organized around the career criminal pro gram can be viewed as such ceremonial and ritual performances which serve to designate the content of public morality. The public statements of politicians, mass media communications, and official reports from

LEAA serve to express revulsion at certain kinds of behavior while pub licly affirming "law-abiding behavior." Both Durkheim and Mead pointed out that crime can serve important functions for society by defining the moral boundaries and generating social solidarity through the

4 collective moral outrage directed at those outside the moral boundaries.

The career criminal program serves much the same symbolic function. By

4 5 calling attention to certain acts that "everyone detests, the program helps to define the moral boundaries of the society and symbolically affirm the content of public morality.

In summary, the career criminal program is more important socio logically, for what it symbolizes rather than for its instrumental accomplishments. The activities of the Fbrd Administration, the Justice

Department, LEAA, local prosecutors, and the mass media, originally directed to the instrumental goal of reducing crime, came to acquire several symbolic meanings. The emergence of these symbolic meanings was one of the most significant outcomes of the career criminal program 272 for it served to reassure the public about a problem which they found both fearful and frustrating. Therefore, it was the symbolic signifi cance of the program, and not its instrumental effects, which led to such favorable media reactions and such an enthusiastic public reception; and it was the symbolic significance of the program which led to its widespread expansion.

SYMBOLIC MEANINGS AND POLITICAL INTEREST GROUPS

The creation of the career criminal program not only served the function of symbolically reassuring the public concerning the crime problem, it also came to serve the concrete political interests of a variety of governmental agencies. These interests were not always served as a direct result of the operation of the program itself, rather they were often mediated through the symbolic meanings which became attached to the program. These symbolic meanings, which emerged around the activities directed toward the instrumental goal of crime reduction, had the effect of conferring certain political benefits upon a number of political interest groups in government. Three groups in particular derived political benefits from the symbolic significance of the career criminal program: 1) the Ford Administration, 2) local prosecu tors, and 3) LEAA.

The Ford Administration

The Ford Administration became accidently involved in the creation of the career criminal program when one of the President's speechwriters contacted Charles Work for input into a speech Ford was to give. After the reaction to the President's IACP speech, in which he announced the 273 creation of the program, the Ford Administration became more and more involved with the career criminal initiative. Above and beyond the instrumental goal of reducing crime, there were a number of good reasons for the Administration to continue its involvement in the development of the career criminal program. There were a number of political benefits to be gained by the Administration for its participation in this program.

First, the career criminal program helped President Ford deal with one of the most serious problems of his Administration: how to move away from the policies and practices of the Nixon Administration.

To be an effective President, Ford had to move out of the shadow of

Nixon and Watergate. The career criminal program was a fortuitous opportunity to begin this process. Although Ford's position toward crime was actually very similar to Nixon's (conservative, law and order, retributive justice), the symbolic meanings which became attached to the career criminal program allowed Ford to begin to make distinctions between his Administration and the Nixon Administration. As one news paper editorial observed following Ford's career criminal speech at the

Yale Law School:

In several subtle and important ways, President Ford has been guiding the country away from the policies and practices of the Nixon administration. He has not always been successful in making the distinction clear in the public mind. But it is obvious that he is deeply engaged in a process of becoming his own President, of coming out from the shadow of the tragedy that preceded him. The other evening at Yale Law School, Mr. Ford took a giant step. The subject was crime, and his words were badly needed. There will be those who will maintain that the President didn't go far enough to rid the subject of its Nixonian overtones, but it i^fair to say that Mr. Ford has set an encouraging course.

Richard Nixon had come to power on a conservative, law and order platform, a platform which was amenable to Gerald Ford. In practice 274 however, the Nixon crime control program consisted primarily of "empty rhetoric" and repressive policies such as no-knock warrants and preven-

47 tive detention. Watergate discredited this law and order stance along with its spokesmen. The problem for the Ford Administration was how to move away from this discredited program while developing a policy which was compatible with Ford’s own conservative law and order ideology.

Ford’s involvement with the career criminal program allowed his

Administration to move away from the discredited policies of the Nixon

Administration in a way which was consistent with his own political philosophy. The campaign against career criminals was touted as the

48 "major anticrime initiative of the Ford Administration" and it came to symbolize Ford's policy concerning crime. The career criminal program symbolized Ford’s concern with the problem of crime, symbolized his intention to do something concrete about the problem (convict and punish career criminals) and it symbolized that the President was upholding public morality. The symbolic meaning attached to the career criminal program allowed the Ford Administration to clearly distinguish itself from the discredited crime policies of the Nixon Administration.

Ford's continuing involvement in the career criminal program not only allowed him to begin moving out of Nixon's shadow, but it also benefited his Administration in other ways. For example, the symbolic significance of the program helped Ford direct attention away from the

Watergate scandal and deflect criticism of the Nixon pardon. Watergate, of course, had raised the consciousness of the nation concerning crime in high places, and the pardon of Nixon had placed President Ford in deep political trouble. The Ford Administration therefore quickly 275 seized upon the career criminal initiative as its major anticrine program because it was a way of symbolizing what the "real" crime problem was all about (violent street crimes) and who the "real" criminals actually were

(repeat offenders who commit violent street crimes).

In all of his crime speeches and in his message to Congress on Crime,

Ford kept hitting on the theme of violent street crime which he said was committed by violent career criminals. The President declared that this was the crux of the crime problem in the United States today. And, due to his access to the mass media and his legitimate authority, President

Ford was able to play a major role in the creation of the social problem of "career criminals," which in turn helped to divert attention away

from the crimes of Watergate and the Nixon pardon by stressing that violent career criminals posed the more serious threat to the welfare

of the American people.

The third political benefit for the Ford Administration was the

President's election campaign. In July of 1975, Ford announced that he would be a candidate for President in 1976. However, the President was

facing a serious challenge from the conservative former Governor of

California, Ronald Reagan, for the Republican nomination. As the 1976

presidential campaign developed, crime once again became a national 49 political issue and thus a major campaign issue. During the campaign,

Reagan "took one of the most aggressive law and order stances in any

campaign.Ford, however, was able to counter Reagan's law and order

stance on crime due to his sponsorship of the career criminal program

and the fact that the program symbolized Ford's concern with this

issue and his active involvement in the war on crime. The career 276

criminal program, of course, was not the major reason Ford won the

Republican nomination over Reagan. However, Ford’s involvement in the

program and what that came to symbolize, was certainly a major weapon

in the President's campaign against Reagan in the primaries and Carter

in the November election.

Local Prosecutors

The Ford Administration was not the only political interest group

to benefit from the career criminal program. Local prosecutors who

* received LEAA career criminal grants also benefited politically from

the program in a number of ways. The most important political benefit

the local prosecutors derived from their involvement in the program was

a potent propaganda tool for use in their political campaigns. Since

prosecutors are elected officials who must stand for re-election, their

offices are usually highly politicized and sensitive to "public rela

tions." In addition, the prosecutors office is often used as a stepping

stone to higher political office. Thus, it is not surprising that many

of the local career criminal prosecutors used their career criminal

units to generate favorable "PR" and generally serve as an important

aid in their political campaigns. As Ellen Jasper noted, these units

are "politically great, they are great PR;"^ and William Hamilton,

president of INSLAW pointed out, "with all of the PR these programs

52 are made to order for re-election."

The favorable publicity generated for local prosecutors by the

career criminal program came about because of what the program symbolized.

The prosecutor's participation in the career criminal initiative came to 277 serve as a symbol of their concern with the problem of crime, efforts to fight serious crime by getting tough, attempts to uphold public morality, and in general, it symbolized that these prosecutors were really taking an active role in the war against crime. The symbolic meanings, communicated through the mass media, enabled local prosecutors to get a great deal of political mileage out of the fact of their involvement in this program, which aided many of them in their re- election campaigns.

The local prosecutors also received another important political benefit from their involvement in the career criminal program: money.

The LEAA career criminal grants brought a great deal of money flowing into the offices of these prosecutors. This money enabled them to hire more attorneys and additional support staff, and to buy additional equip ment for their offices. At a time when many local budgets were being squeezed, the career criminal program provided local prosecutors with the means to expand their offices without additional local funds. Money was one of the direct benefits of the program for local prosecutors.

In fact, two independent evaluations of LEAA concluded that this finan cial interest was the primary reason these prosecutors became involved in the career criminal program in the first place, since they already gave priority to the prosecution of cases involving repeat offenders.

As the Center for National Security Studies pointed out:

The prosecutors participating in the program were somewhat amazed at the presentation of the program as a new initiative in national crime fighting policy. At least two officials from participating prosecutors' offices commented that their natural order of business is to focus on the most serious criminals first and to bring to bear all the resources of 278

the office in prosecuting such individuals. They admitted, however, that they were delighted to receive the new federal funding at a time when state and local governments are suf fering from budget constraints.

And as the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force On The Law Enforcement

Assistance Administration noted:

As one beneficiary of the Career Criminals Program explained it, ’I'm grateful for the money. I don’t know what we’d do. without it. But of course any prosecutor knows enough to spend his time going after repeaters— whether or not there is an LEAA program. You’d be insane not to. So to get the money, you call it a program.’ Undoubtedly, prosecutors need the money, but when they must juggle accounts, hire writers to prepare grant proposals, and pretend that a continuing function is a blue-ribbon experiment in order ^ to get money, the entire criminal justice system .suffers.

The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration

A third interest group which benefited politically from its involve ment in the career criminal program was the Law Enforcement Assistance

Administration. As a government bureaucracy, LEAA has a number of vested interests it seeks to protect and enhance (primarily money and power) through the operation of its various programs. These are above

and beyond the public interest which it is supposed to serve as Hartjen points out:

Government occupies a service status geared to enhancing and protecting the interests of the entire constituency. At the same time, as bureaucratic organizations, government agencies are self-perpetuating entities, geared to protecting and expanding their domains.55

To protect and enhance its political interests, a bureaucratic

organization must establish a favorable relationship with its environ

ment. As Dickson observes: 279

. . . if the organization wishes to grow and expand or even continue to exist, it must come to terms with its environment, and where necessary insure acceptance by it. No doubt a few organizations with substantial resources may exist for some time in a hostile environment, but the more normal case seems to be that an organization must at least establish an environ mentally neutral relationship if not an environmentally supportive one.56

Thus, an organization faced with environmental hostility must some how act to alter its relationship with that environment. In the middle

1970's, LEAA existed in such a hostile environment. Critics of the agency abounded, especially in the Congress which controlled the purse strings of the organization and also its future. LEAA, therefore, faced the necessity of altering this relationship if the agency was to survive, and the career criminal program came along at a very opportune time. The development of the program, the publicity it generated, and its popularity, helped to ease congressional criticism of the agency, reducing the hostility of that environment. As one LEAA official noted concerning the career criminal initiative, "it makes the agency look good," and that helps when "you go up on the hill and there is a budget cycle.Likewise, the career criminal program helped to reduce criticism of LEAA in the press. As one editorial stated:

Financing of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) for the next few years would not be so doubtful if more of its programs had been like a fairly new one that is attracting attention throughout the United States. Known as the Career Criminal Program, it has been operating since October and is being tested in 18 cities.56

The career criminal program, of course, was not deliberately designed to change the hostile environment in which LEAA exists, nor has it done so completely. However, one latent consequence of the program has been the softening of this environmental hostility. Again, 280 this effect, like most of the program's effects, did not come about because of any instrumental results produced by the program (like reducing crime) but rather because of what the program has come to symbolize. Furthermore, after Charles Work and the other "moral entrepreneurs" for management consciousness left LEAA, the agency continued and expanded the career criminal initiative, primarily because the symbolic meanings attached to the program made it such a

59 success with the press, the public, and especially the Congress.

THE SYMBOLIC MEANING OF CRIME IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY

In addition to serving the concrete political interests of specific governmental agencies, the career criminal program had the important effect of contributing to and maintaining a particular definition of crime. The program helped to shape the symbolic meaning of crime for the society in general. The "criminal mythology" that the program con tributed to is not, however, a neutral social definition. Rather, it subtly serves the economic and political interests of the dominant economic class in society.

Criminal Mythology

As James Inciardi has pointed out, "American society has a generalized criminal mythology, a complex of conceptions of crime and criminals generated by history, cultural traditions, the arts, mass communication media, governmental structures, and interest groups.

This criminal mythology has three basic components: 1) definitions of which categories of behavior are "crimes"; 2) stereotyped conceptions of who the "criminals" are; and 3) conceptions of the extent of and distribution of "crime" in society. 281

First of all, Inciardi notes:

When thinking about crime, most of us give almost immediate consideration to 'crime in the streets' or ’organized crime,’ for these are the more popular, or most feared, categories of crime that are given attention in the press, television, and popular culture.61

However, as Inciardi goes on to point out, these represent only a small portion of the crime in America.

White-collar crime involves billions of dollars annually through tax evasion, price fixing, embezzlement, swindling, and consumer fraud. Conduct once deemed immoral and made criminal— gambling, prostitution, alcohol, and drug abuse— reflect a face of crime that has resulted in placing criminal definitions on millions of persons. There are criminal regulatory violations in the areas of traffic control, building codes, fire ordinances, standards of quality, safety precautions, and misrepresentation that result in more deaths each year than criminal homicide. There is corruption in public office through bribes, payoffs, fixes, and conflicts of interest that occur in every branch of government at every level. And there is police crime in the form of wrongful arrest, brutality, and blackmail.^

The career criminal program helps to maintain this particular aspect of the criminal mythology, for it stresses only common "street crimes." The LEAA guidelines for the program state explicitly that,

"the objective of this program is to demonstrate that homicide, rape, robbery, and burglary can be reduced through special prosecutory 63 emphasis on cases involving career criminals." By focusing only on common street crimes, the career criminal program implies that these acts are the most serious crimes and the core of the crime problem in the United States. This in turn deflects attention from other cate gories of crime, especially upper-world crime.

The second component of the criminal mythology, according to

Inciardi, "includes a series of stereotyped conceptions as to the nature and composition of the criminal. This mythology offers set 282 characterizations for murderers, rapists, robbers, racketeers, addicts, burglars, and prostitutes."^ The career criminal program added a new stereotyped conception to this mythology: the career criminal. A new typification, as well as a new legal category, had been created by the program. Although the typification of repeat or habitual offender has a long history,^"* the stereotype of the career criminal seems to add some additional dimensions to the older notions. The concept suggests a rational and voluntary choice of occupational pursuit and a patterned process of occupational achievement. Combined with the focus on street crimes, this conceptualization influences the public's perception of what types of people constitute the "criminal element" in society (the young, the Black, the lower class).

Inciardi has also pointed out that, "criminal mythology does not limit itself only to the nature of crime and criminals, but in addition

. . . it has impacted on our perceptions concerning the extent of crime, 66 where crime is most likely to occur, and why crime occurs." The career criminal program has also contributed to this aspect of the criminal mythology. The program implies that violent street crime is the most frequent kind of criminal activity, that it occurs at all levels of our society, that it is committed by a small group of offenders, and that these offenders engage in crime as part of a rational occupational pursuit (career). The public gets a distorted picture of how much violent crime is actually committed, what their

chances are of becoming a victim, who actually commits violent crimes,

and why they do so. 283

In summary, a criminal mythology exists in this country, and it consists of symbolic meanings that define what behaviors are "crimes," what kinds of people are "criminal" and how much "crime" there is.

The career criminal program generated symbolic meanings which contributed to or helped maintain the definition of crime contained in this criminal mythology. This highly selective and distorted definition of crime serves several important functions for the dominant economic class in society.

The Definition of Crime in a Capitalist Society

Although Inciardi provides an excellent description of the criminal mythology that exists in the United States, he does not analyze what functions these social constructions might have. Recently, a number of sociologists have suggested that the definition of crime in America serves the political and economic interests of the capitalist ruling

67 class. As Michalowski and Bohlander point out:

In the U.S. the legal order serves the interests of the capitalist ruling class by 1) facilitating the pursuit of capitalist goals, 2) legitimizing the repression of the economically and politically disadvantaged classes which must exist to maintain a capitalist distribution of wealth and who threaten capitalist interests through criminal activity, and 3) creating and maintaining a definition of ’crime* which guarantees the continued gg enjoyment of the first two benefits by the ruling class. (My emphasis)

Although a comparative analysis would probably show that ruling elites in all types of political and economic systems use the legal system and definitions of crime to serve their own political interests,

the present research concentrates on the construction and use of symbolic meanings of crime and criminals in capitalistic or class societies. As

Spitzer notes: 284

Most fundamentally, deviance production involves the develop ment of and changes in deviant categories and images. A critical theory must examine where these images and definitions come from, what they reflect about the structure of and priorities in specific class societies, and how they are related to class conflicts. ^

The present analysis has attempted to demonstrate that the career

criminal program, as it developed, acquired certain symbolic meanings which shaped the social definition of crime, criminals, and the "social

problem" of crime in the United States. As Michalowski and Bohlander

point o u t :

The meaning of crime, like all other behaviors, is acquired through social learning, and for most individuals the social meaning of crime is acquired through initiative learning. The official responses— both dramatized and real— experienced by others for harmful acts prohibited by law provide a definition of crime. The understanding of what constitutes crime, the relative seriousness of various criminal acts, and the established perception of who is ’criminal' is based upon observations of the types of harmful acts prosecuted as criminal, the relative severity of the sanctions applied to these acts, and the types of individuals associated with these acts. Thus, those who control law making, establish penal sanctions, and^gdminister justice also control the definition of crime.

In creating the career criminal program, the President of the

United States, the Attorney General, and LEAA officials, symbolically

affirmed that "crime" means only the common law crimes of the power

disadvantaged. In their speeches, press releases, and public state

ments, these officials continually emphasized that the most serious

criminal acts are the common street crimes. In his crime message to

Congress, President Ford stated that:

America has been far from successful in dealing with the sort of crime that obsesses Americans day and night— I mean street crime, crime that invades our neighborhoods and our homes— murders, robberies, rapes, muggings, holdups, break-ins— the kind of brutal violence that makes us fearful of strangers and afraid to go out at night.71 285

The career criminal program contributes to the maintainence of a definition of crime which tends to exclude upper world crimes (many of which are just as harmful if not more harmful than the crimes stressed by the program) from any consideration. Even when upper world crimes are considered, the sanctions attached to them are comparatively mild, while the career criminal program emphasizes that common street crimes must be punished severely (usually by long prison sentences). Thus, the program influences the public's conception of the relative seriousness of criminal activity. As Michalowski and Bohlander note:

Persons socialized into a society where they observe that an individual can be deprived of his liberty for several years for breaking into a house, but will only pay small fine for selling adulterated foods will tend to assume that breaking into the house is the more serious of the two behaviors.

Furthermore, as Clarence Schrag points out, an emphasis on harsh punishment for street crimes:

. . . has a certain attraction for persons in positions of power and authority. By equating justice with the administration of punishment, it helps preserve the government's monolopy over legal force and coercion. By directing the people's attention to street crimes, it tends to make things a little safer for those who profit from corruption in high places.^3

In addition, the career criminal program also influences the percep tion of what types of people are "criminal." The stereotype of the

"career criminal" presented in the media, usually focuses attention on the lower class males, usually young and black, who are disproportion ately represented in the official crime statistics. In its operation the career criminal program tends to reinforce this perception because these are the types of people most likely to be screened into the program and prosecuted as "career criminals. Most of these indivi duals are culled from, what Quinney calls, the "surplus population," 286 an unemployed sector of the lower and working classes which constitutes

75 a threat to the existing social and economic order. The career criminal program reinforces the perception that the only source of the

"crime problem" is rooted in this impoverished and powerless population, whose members commit common law offenses.

In conclusion, one important consequence of the creation of the career criminal program has been to contribute and maintain a social definition of crime which serves the political and economic interests of the dominant class in society. Michalowski and Bohlander have adequately summed up the important function this program has served for this class:

Through all of this the powerful class shapes a definition of crime which supports their capitalist interests by insuring that the bulk of offenses from which individuals will acquire the meaning of crime bear no resemblance to the harmful acts of corporate profiteers, and that the majority of offenders— by the example of whom we learn to identify who is the criminal— bear^no resemblance to members of the capitalist ruling class.

SUMMARY

This chapter has analyzed the consequences of the career criminal program. Following Gusfield, both instrumental (direct influence on behavior) and symbolic (the meaning or representational character of an act) effects were examined. The first instrumental objective of the program was to raise management consciousness among urban prosecutors.

This objective, however, was pushed aside when the instrumental goal of crime reduction emerged as the primary objective of the career criminal program. There is no valid evidence available at this time to document whether or not the program has had an impact on the level 287 and frequency of serious crime in this country, but there are several good reasons to believe it cannot. Although there is no evidence to demonstrate that the career criminal initiative has reduced crime, the collective activities which became organized around this instrumental goal did take on symbolic significance.

These activities symbolized the government's concern with the serious problem of crime and its intention to do something about it, symbolized a return to the punishment of criminals, and symbolically affirmed public morality. These symbolic meanings served the important function of reassuring the public concerning the crime problem, which they found both fearful and frustrating. In addition, these symbolic meanings served the concrete political interests of the Ford Administra tion, local career criminal prosecutors, and LEAA.

Furthermore, the activities organized around the career criminal program helped to shape the symbolic meaning of crime in the United

States. These activities contributed to and maintained a "criminal mythology" which defines which categories of behavior are "criminal," produces stereotyped conceptions of who the "criminals" are, and influences the public's conception of the extent and distribution of

"crime" in society. This social definition of "crime" serves the interests of the dominant economic class in society by focusing atten tion exclusively on the common law street crimes of lower class, power disadvantaged people, while deflecting attention away from upper world crimes committed by the more powerful members of society. FOOTNOTES

^Joseph R. Gusfield, Symbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963). 2 Joseph R. Gusfield, "Moral Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance," in F. James Davis and Richard Stivers (eds.), The Collective Definition of Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 86.

3Ibid.

4Ibid. 5 Gusfield, 1963, op. cit., p. 180.

6W. G. Carson, "Symbolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early Factory Legislation: A Case Study in the Social Origins of Criminal Law," in Roger Hood (ed.), Crime, Criminology and Public Policy (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 107-138.

7Ibid., p. 136.

3Ibid., p. 136-137.

9 From an interview with Charles R. Work, April 27, 1978.

Judith S. Dahmann and James L. Lacy, Criminal Prosecution- in Four Jurisdictions: Departing from Routine Processing in the Career Criminal Program (McLean, Virginia: The MITRE Corporation, 1977).

U T,., Ibid. 12 From an interview with William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978.

13 From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

14 From an interview with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

15Ibid.

288 289

■^From an interview with Charles R. Work, October 4, 1977.

"^LEAA, Discretionary Funds Guidelines, Chapter 6, Career Criminal Program, 1975, pp. 115-116. lft A War on Career Criminals Starts To Show Results," U.S. News and World Report (November 22, 1976), p. 73.

19 Remarks of the President to the 81st Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, The Washington Hilton, September 24, 1974. 20 Remarks of the Attorney General to the 81st Annual Conference of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, The Washington Hilton, September 23, 1974.

^ L E A A , 1975, op. cit., p. 115. 22 U.S. News and World Report, 1976, op. cit. 23 There is no methodological sound evaluation of the career criminal program. The MITRE Corporation is currently performing such an evaluation but they have not released any findings as yet. The only statistics that are available concerning the program are the total number of individuals convicted under it, and other summary descriptive statistics. 2 A Sarah Carey, Law and Disorder IV (Washington, D.C.: Center for National Security Studies, 1976), p. 23. 25 Stephan Van Dine, Simon Dinitz, and John Conrad, "The Incapaci tation of the Dangerous Offender: A Statistical Experiment," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 14 (January, 1977), pp. 22-34. The Van Dine, Dinitz and Conrad study has been criticized for under estimating the incapacitative effects of a mandatory five year prison sentence for any felony. See Barbara Boland, "Incapacitation of the Dangerous Offender: The Arithmetic Is Not So Simple," and Jan Palmer and John Salimbene, "The Incapacitation of the Dangerous Offender: A Second Look," in the Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 15 (January, 1978), pp. 126-134. Also see the authors reply to their critics in the same issue. 26 Clarence Schrag, "Review of Thinking About Crime, Punishing Criminals and We Are The Living Proof," Criminology 14 (February, 1977), p. 573. 27 William Ryan, Blaming The Victim (Revised edition), (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 330. 28 Daniel Katkin, "Habitual Offender Laws: A Reconsideration" Buffalo Law Review 21 (//3, 1971), p. 106. 290

2 9 Carey, 1976, op. cit. 30 Clayton A. Hartjen, Crime and Criminalization (Second edition), (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 97.

3^Katkin, 1971, op. cit., p. 107. Katkin quotes H. G. Moeller, Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, who maintains that:

without question, the largest group of chronic offenders with whom we are acquainted are dependent, socially inade quate men and women who have come to accept prison rather than crime as a way of life. . . . in any representative group of such offenders we find a high percentage of chronic alcoholics, a variety of physical and intellectual handicaps and limitations, gross lack of work skill and experience, serious inadequacies in capacities to relate to other human beings, and a wide variety of other socially disabling characteristics. 32 Ibid. 33 Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963), p. 29.

Q/ For a review of these studies see: Frank Clemente and Michael B. Kleiman, "Fear of Crime in the United States: A Multivariate Analysis," Social Forces 56 (December, 1977), pp. 519-531.

35Ibid.

36Ibid., p. 519-520. 37 "The Crime Wave," Time Magazine, June 30, 1975.

38 "The Losing Battle Against Crime in America," U.S. News and World Report, December 16, 1975.

39 From an interview with Jim Swain, October 4, 1977.

4°Ibid.

41 See the discussion of the "new penology" in Chapter V. 42 From an interview with Charles Work, April 27, 1978. 43 Gusfield, 1975, op. cit., p. 86, 44 See Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method (New York: The Free Press, 1938) and George Herbert Mead, "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," American Journal of Sociology 23 (1918). 291 45 From an Interview with H. Paul Haynes, November 15, 1977.

^Unmarked newspaper editorial from the LEAA files (probably the Washington Post, April, 1975).

47Ibid. 48 U.S. News and World Report, 1976, op. cit.

49 James 0. Finckenauer, "Crime as a National Political Issue: 1964-76: From Law and Order to Domestic Tranquility," Crime and Delinquency 24 (January, 1978), p. 22.

50Ibid. 51 From an interview with Ellen Jasper, October 7, 1977.

52 From an interview with William A. Hamilton, April 14, 1978.

53 Carey, 1976, op. cit., p. 23. 54 Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, Law Enforcement: The Federal Role (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976), p. 66.

"^Clayton A. Hartjen, Possible Trouble (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 56.

56 Donald T. Dickson, "Bureaucracy and Morality: An Organizational Perspective on a Moral Crusade" in F. James Davis and Richard Stivers (eds.) The Collective Definition of Deviance (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 336.

“*7From an interview with Jim Swain, October 4, 1977. 58 From the Flint Michigan Journal, July 30, 1976.

59 H. Paul Haynes stressed this point in an interview, November 15, 1977.

^James A. Inciardi, Reflections on Crime (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), p. 12. 6L,., Ibxd.

62Ibid.

^ L E A A , 1975, op. cit. 64 Inciardi, 1978, op. cit., p. 12. 292

^"*See the discussion of the habitual offender laws in Chapter V.

^I n c i a r d i , 1978, op. cit., p. 13.

^ See Raymond J. Michalowski and Edward W. Bohlander, "Repression and Criminal Justice in Capitalist America," Sociological Inquiry 46 (//2, 1976), pp. 95-106; Steven Spitzer, "Toward a Marxian Theory of Deviance," Social Problems 22 (June, 1975), pp. 638-651; Richard Quinney, Class, State, and Crime (New York: David McKay, 1977). 68 Michalowski and Bohlander, 1976, op. cit., p. 100.

69 Spitzer, 1975, op. cit., p. 640.

^Michalowski and Bohlander, 1976, op. cit., p. 104.

^Quoted in "The Crime Wave," Time Magazine, June 30, 1975.

72 Michalowski and Bohlander, 1976, op. cit., p. 104.

73 Schrag, 1977, op. cit., p. 573.

74 Data from Columbus, Ohio show that 95 percent of career criminal defendants are male, 90 percent could be classified as "lower class," 70 percent were unemployed at the time of arrest, and over 60 percent were black.

^ Q u i n n e y , 1977, op. cit. 76 Michalowski and Bohlander, 1976, op. cit., p. 104. CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY OF THE STUDY

This study has attempted to describe and explain the origins and development of the LEAA career criminal program from a sociological perspective. The research was guided by the assumptions of the defini tional paradigm of crime and deviance. The creation of the career criminal program was viewed as an illustration of the general phenomenon of the social construction of crime. Theoretical and empirical attention focused on the collective activities of a variety of governmental groups

■and agencies which produced the legal category and social problem of

"career criminals," and helped to maintain a particular social definition of "crime" in American society.

The research was described as a historical "case study," since it involved an intensive, in-depth examination of a particular historical event (the creation of the career criminal program). Data for this

"case study" were derived from the files of LEAA in Washington, D.C. and from specialized interviews with the major participants in the creation of the program. The qualitative analysis of this data proceeded by asking the following analytic questions: 1) what was the historical context out of which the career criminal program emerged?; 2) what were

293 294 the more specific conditions which gave rise to the program?; 3) what were the contingencies which affected its development?; and 4) what were the consequences of the career criminal program.

The Historical Context

The historical context out of which the career criminal program developed had three important components. Each of these components represented a necessary, but not a sufficient, background condition for the emergence of the program.

The first component was the passage of habitual offender legislation in the 1920's. These laws developed and popularized many of the basic assumptions underlying the career criminal program, creating a legal category and popular stereotype which would later be resurrected as the

typification of the "career criminal."

The second component of this historical context was the nationali zation of the crime problem during the 1960's. The emergence of crime as a national political issue led to the expansion of the federal role

in law enforcement. The expansion of the federal role in the "war on crime," in turn, resulted in the creation of LEAA. This set the stage

for the future development of the career criminal program.

The third component was the emergence of the "new penology." This

academic and popular social movement away from rehabilitation towards

the punishment of criminals, generated an intellectual milieu during

the early 1970's which was conducive to the development of the career

criminal program. 295

Conditions and Contingencies

The conditions which gave rise to the career criminal program and the contingencies which affected its creation were described and analyzed through the identification of four specific stages of the program's development.

The first stage of the development of the career criminal program began with the private recognition of a "social problem" by a 9mall group of "moral entrepreneurs" who made it their business to devise a

"solution" to this "problem." Charles Work and his associates at the

U.S. Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia, perceived a threat to their values and interests as prosecutors which led them to define the management problems of urban prosecutors as a serious social problem.

Work felt that they could do something about this problem by developing new case management tools and by raising management consciousness among prosecutors. Thus, Work and his associates, developed the PROMIS infor mation system, formed a special Major Violators Unit, and launched a crusade for management consciousness.

The second stage of the program's development would not have occurred had Work and his colleagues not acquired the organizational resources to continue their crusade for management consciousness. This was the first contingency of the developmental process. They acquired these organizational resources (legitimate authority and financial support) when Work became Deputy Administrator of LEAA. Once at LEAA,

Work began to search for a way to "push" PROMIS and management conscious ness, which he saw as the solution to the management problems of urban prosecutors. 296

This "solution," however, was not popular with local prosecutors.

It lacked "sex appeal." To "sell" management consciousness to local prosecutors therefore, Work and his associates decided to focus on a more concrete aspect of the larger problem: the prosecution of repeat offenders. They began to develop an idea for a program which would focus on "career criminals" and demonstrate the capabilities of PROMIS and management consciousness. In so doing, Work and his colleagues

"created" a new social problem and a new legal category. The existence of a "solution" led to the production of a new social problem. Both the social problem of "career criminals" and the career criminal program, emerged out of the crusade for management consciousness.

In creating the social problem of "career criminals," Work and his associates followed (not consciously of course) seven "rules" for creating, perpetuating, and solving a social problem. They: 1) selected a condition, 2) defined the condition as problematic, 3) brought the message to the people, A) generated large scale concern, 5) proposed a solution, 6) designed a program to deal with the problem, and 7) demonstrated success.

The group selected "career criminals" as the condition to define as problematic because of Work's experience with the Major Violators Unit,

the existence of typifications of habitual offenders, the intellectual milieu created by the new penology, and the existence of social science

data concerning chronic offenders. To bring the message to the people

and generate large scale concern, however, Work and his associates needed

outside help from someone with even greater organizational resources than

they possessed at LEAA. This was the second contingency in the program's

development. 297

The third stage of the development of the career criminal program began when Work had the fortuitous opportunity to contribute to one of

President Ford’s speeches. Work was contacted by one of the President's speechwriters, and his assistant Paul Haynes then went to the White House and wrote the speech that Ford gave to the International Association of

Chiefs of Police in September, 1974. In this speech, President Ford announced the creation of the career criminal program. It was this speech, and the media handling of it, that brought the message to the people, generated large-scale concern over the social problem of

"career criminals," and proposed a "solution" to this.problem. In addi tion, in the aftermath of the speech, the internal programmatic development and design of the career criminal program began in earnest.

The fourth stage of the program's development began when the program became fully operational. To expand the program, and thus the crusade for management consciousness, Work and his associates had to demonstrate the success of the program. This was the third contingency. Through the skillful manipulation of the mass media and the personal involvement of

President Ford, LEAA was able to "demonstrate" the "success" of the program, despite the fact that there is little valid or reliable evi dence of any success in reducing crime. Once the program was defined as successful, there was a great demand for its expansion. Since then, the program has expanded in a variety of ways and it shows signs of expanding even more in the future. 298

Consequences

The consequences of the career criminal program were analyzed on two different levels. Both the instrumental (direct influence on behavior) and symbolic (the meaning or representational character of an act) effects were examined.

There were two instrumental objectives of the career criminal pro gram, one following the other. The first instrumental goal of the program was to raise management consciousness among urban prosecutors.

This objective, however, was superceded by the emergence of the instru mental goal of crime reduction as the primary objective of the program.

Although there is no valid evidence to demonstrate that the career criminal program has or has not impacted on the level and frequency of serious crime in this country, the collective activities which became organized around this instrumental goal did acquire several important symbolic meanings.

These activities came to symbolize: 1) the government's concern with the serious problem of crime and its intention to do something about it, 2) the return to punishment as an explicit government crime control policy, and 3) the affirmation of public morality. These symbolic meanings came to serve the important function of reassuring the public concerning the problem of crime, which they found to be both fearful and frustrating.

Furthermore, these symbolic meanings also served the concrete political interests of a variety of governmental groups and agencies.

Among them were: 1) the Ford Administration (to move away from Nixon, deflect attention from Watergate, and help Ford's election campaign); 299

2) local prosecutors (a propaganda tool for their re-election and to bring more money into their offices) ; and 3) LEAA (to serve its vested bureaucratic interests of money and power).

Lastly, the activities organized around the career criminal program helped to shape the symbolic meaning of crime in the United States. They contributed to and maintained a "criminal mythology" which defines which categories of behavior are "criminal," produces stereotyped conceptions of who the "criminals" are, and influences the public's perception of the extent and distribution of "crime" in society. This social defini tion of "crime" serves the interests of the dominant economic class in society by focusing attention exclusively on the common law street crimes of lower class, power disadvantaged people, while deflecting attention away from upper world crimes committed by the more powerful members of society.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The purpose of this study was not only to describe and explain the creation of the career criminal program, but also to assess the.explana tory adequacy of a number of theoretical propositions which have been offered to explain the social construction of crime and deviance. Eight specific propositions were considered.

The first proposition states that: The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories is often related to larger social movements and changes in cultural values. This proposition was advanced by Sutherland in his study of the sexual psychopath laws. The present research supported this proposition. The creation of the career criminal program was related to the academic and popular movement known as the "new 300 penology." This cultural movement away from rehabilitation back toward the punishment of criminals (for incapacitative, deterrent, and retribu tive purposes) was a major influence on the development of this program.

The second proposition comes from the work of Howard Becker, and it states that: The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories will usually involve a moral crusade and be the result of the enterprising activities of moral entrepreneurs. This proposition was also supported by the present research. The creation of the career criminal program did involve a type of moral crusade: the crusade for management con sciousness. The program was a direct result of the enterprising activities of a number of "moral entrepreneurs," who made it their business to develop the career criminal initiative as a means to raise management consciousness among prosecutors.

The third proposition states that: Moral crusades may be initiated by social control organizations as a bureaucratic response to environmen tal conditions based on vested organizational interests. This proposition was derived from the work of Dickson and it was partially upheld by the present study. Although the career criminal program was not initiated by LEAA as a response to the environmental conditions of the agency, it was continued by LEAA, long after the "moral entrepreneurs" had left the organization, to develop a more favorable relationship to its environ ment (Congress) and to serve the vested organizational interests (money, survival) of the agency.

The fourth and fifth propositions can be treated together.

According to Gusfield: Enterprise to create criminal laws or deviant categories may be motivated by symbolic goals rather than instrumental 301 goals, or serve symbolic functions for those who are engaged In the enterprise. The fifth proposition is Carson's corollary to Gusfield's proposition and it states that: Symbolic crusades may emerge out of more instrumentally oriented actions and come to dominate them, dis placing the original goals. The present research supports both of these propositions. The career criminal program, although it was not motivated by symbolic goals in the beginning, did come to serve a number of impor tant symbolic functions. The symbolic meanings which became attached to the program, emerged out of the instrumental goal of crime reduction, and came to serve a number of important functions for a variety of groups in society.

The sixth proposition is somewhat related to the fourth and fifth propositions. It states that: The creation of crime and deviance serves important functions for society by defining its moral boundaries and producing a higher degree of social cohesion through the collective outrage directed at those outside the moral boundaries. This proposition was advanced by Durkheim and later Erikson. The present study provided partial support to this notion. The symbolic meanings which became attached to the career criminal program did come to affirm the content of public morality and direct outrage against the "career criminal."

Furthermore, the program served the important function of reassuring the American people that something was being done to control the crime problem.

The seventh proposition was derived from Marxist thought. It

states that: The creation of criminal laws and deviant categories is

the result of power differences and structured inequalities in class 302 societies, and they reflect the interests and ideologies of the dominant economic class. The proposition was also partially supported by the present research. The creation of the career criminal program, although it was not a direct result of power differences and structured inequalities, did serve the interests of the dominant economic class through the maintainence of a social definition of crime which defines only certain categories of behavior and certain kinds of people as criminal. By focusing exclusively on the common law "street crimes" committed by lower class, power disadvantaged people, the career criminal program helps to shape a distorted image of crime which

creates an irrational fear of street crime while deflecting attention

away from the upper-world crimes committed by the powerful classes.

The eighth and final proposition states that: Collective defini

tions of crime and deviance emerge out of the complex interplay between

conflicting interest groups with differential abilities to shape these

definitions to serve their own needs or safeguard their interests be

they economic or otherwise. This interest group conflict approach was

partially supported by the present study. The creation of the career

criminal program involved the activities of a variety of governmental

interest groups. All of these groups helped to shape a symbolic meaning

of crime, through the career criminal program, which served their own

political interests.

In conclusion, the present study offers some empirical support

for all eight of these propositions. Each of these theoretical state

ments contributes in some way to the explanation of the career criminal

program, and therefore, to the larger phenonenon of the social 303 construction of crime. Any adequate theory concerning the social con struction of crime will have to take all of these propositions, explanatory factors, and analytic categories into account. A synthesis which can specify the relative importance of each of these factors in explaining crime creation, determine the relationships that may exist between them, and indicate the conditions under which they may or may not hold, will have to be developed. This research constitutes a first step toward that synthesis. However, much more empirical research will need to be done before such a synthesis can be constructed.

POLICY/ACTION IMPLICATIONS

The primary purposes of the present research have been theoretical in nature. As noted earlier, the study was geared toward the produc tion of "disciplinary" knowledge rather than "policy-action" knowledge.

Due to its theoretical perspective, the present research has no conven tional crime control policy implications. However, there are several pragmatic derivatives of the study which may have some policy-action implications.

First, the creation of the career criminal program has contributed to and helped to maintain a fear of crime among the American people which is far out of proportion to the objective probability of being victimized. As pointed out earlier, this irrational fear of crime erodes the quality of life in America. One implication of the present study is that crime control bureaucracies should exercise more caution in their public statements and actions concerning the crime problem so as to not produce a distorted picture of the danger crime presents.

If these organizations exercised more responsibility in their portrayal 304 of crime and criminals, much of this irrational fear and the destructive impact it has on society could be lessened, and as a nation we would be free to deal with crime in a more rational manner than we do now.

Second, the creation of the career criminal program helps to shape a social definition of crime which directs attention only to the common street crimes committed by lower class people. This social definition excludes consideration of many seriously harmful and illegal activities committed by the powerful classes in society and by social control agents.

A second implication of this study is that crime control organizations, criminologists, and the public should stop being fixated on "street crimes" committed by the lower classes, and begin to devote some time, energy and money to the problem of upper-world crimes committed by the powerful in society. For a time, following the Watergate scandal, it appeared that this redirection was taking place. However, the career criminal program has once again deflected attention away from upper-world crimes back to common law street crimes.

In conclusion, it is doubtful that either of these two policy-action implications will ever be acted upon, at least by those with the power to act. For as we pointed out earlier, the policy makers and crime control organizations who created the career criminal program, reap tremendous political benefits from such policies. Thus, even though these agencies are commonweal organizations which are supposed to serve the public in general, it seems likely that they will continue (due to lack of external democratic control) to construct a social definition of crime which does not really serve the best Interests of the American 305 people. But rather, serves (through Its symbolic meanings) the narrow political and economic interests of crime control bureaucracies and the powerful classes in society. APPENDIX A

TABLE 1

CAREER CRIMINAL INFORMATION SHEET

Funding Personnel Jurisdiction Start Duration Federal/Non-Federal At ty/Non-Atty

Boston 07/01/75 12 tnos. 463,963 56,564 12 15

Columbus 07/21/75 12 mos. 239,416 26,601 6 4

Dallas 10/01/75 12 mos. 5 5 •

Detroit 06/01/75 12 mos. 576,040 64,005 11 6

Houston 07/15/75 12 mos. 321,090 66,300 4 7

Indianapolis 09/15/75 12 mos. 315,000 46,026 8 12 ,306 TABLE 1— Continued -

Definition - Selection Criteria

Persons with 1 prior or pending violent felony conviction & 4 other offenses; recent release from correction facility; serious juvenile record same as present case, known to be terrorizing community but police so far ineffective, elderly victim, victim injury. Targeted crimes: assault with intent to mur der, burglary, sex offenses, robbery, larceny from person, possession of firearms, forgery, uttering.

Persons with 2 prior felony convictions but also distinguishes professional & habitual. Professional who has escaped convictions in past may qualify. Targeted crimes: murder, robbery, (agg. or unarmed), burglary, assaults with weapons, RSP, rape, arson.

Persons with 1 or 2 prior felony convictions or on bound or at least one case pending or prior record or evidence of propensity for violence. Targeted crimes: crime index, Part I, offenses (murder, robbery, rape, burglary, or attempt).

Persons identified by record search or M.O. of having 2 prior felony convictions or 2 felonies pending. Targeted offenses: homicide, robbery, assaults, burglary.

Persons with past conviction for felony or propensity for violence, or crime particularly aggravated and against stranger; i.e.,: murder for financial gain, rape with injuries, robbery with injury, etc. Targeted crimes: murder, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, kidnapping, burglary. Non-dangerous crimes (RSP, forgery) required 2 priors, narcotics trafficing.

Person with 2 prior felony convictions or, 1 prior or 2 pending or, no prior and 3 pending or 5 prior misdemeanors or, probation violations by targeted offenses. Targeted crimes: aggravated assaults,

burglary, robbery, drug offenses. 307 TABLE 1 — Continued

Funding Personnel Jurisdiction Start Duration Federal/Non-Federal Atty/Non-Atty

Kalamazoo 08/20/75 12 mos. 78,548 8,728 2 2

New Orleans 05/01/75 12 mos. 421,789 89,808 13 15

New York 11/01/75 12 mos. 555,968 72,660 10 13

San Diego 07/01/75 12 mos. 247,118 32,921 6 4

Salt Lake City 07/01/75 12 mos. 202,000 20,200 4 4 308 TABLE .1— Continued

Definition - Selection Criteria

Persons with 2 prior felony convictions and/or 5 or more felony arrests if present case is Part I index or for delivery or narcotics. Targeted crimes: Part I index and delivery of narcotics. ,

Persons with 5 or more prior felony arrests. Consideration given to time span between offenses, violence of the crime(s), repetition of similar offenses and any progression to more violent or serious offenses.

Persons who frequently & habitually commit targeted crimes & who frequently have more than 1 such prosecu tion pending. Targeted crimes: robbery, burglary, felonious assault against strangers.

Person with prior robbery conviction or related homicide or prior conviction for grand theft (from person) £r present charges specify 3 or more separate robberies. Considerations for severity of offense violence, known propensities of defendant not-withstanding lack of prior convictions. Targeted crimes: robbery, & robbery related homicide.

Persons with more than 2 felony convictions for homicide, sex offenses, agg. assault, robbery, burglary or more than 3 felony convictions or 5 or more felony arrests for violent crimes or serious property crimes or more than 2 felony convictions in last 5 years, or 2 or more cases of serious crimes pending. 309 APPENDIX B

LEAA DISCRETIONARY FUND GUIDELINES

M 4500.ID July 10, 1975

CHAPTER 6. CAREER CRIMINAL PROGRAM

56. PROGRAM OBJECTIVE. The objective of this program is to demonstrate that homicide, rape, robbery and burglary can be reduced through special prosecutory emphasis on cases involving career criminals. This program supports LEAA's program objective 1.20.1.

57. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION.

a. Hypothesis to be tested.

The criminal justice system will be able to impact on the level and frequency of serious crime by focusing resources on the career criminal through the establish ment and utilization of Major Violator Units (MVUs) designed to quickly prosecute cases involving such violent offenders.

b . Results Sought.

In cases involving career criminals, the results sought are:

(1) reduction in pre-trial, trial, and sentencing delays.

(2) reduction in the number of pre-trial release or bail decisions made without knowledge of other cases pending or the defendants past criminal history.

(3) reduction in the number of cases where a plea bargain is made without knowledge of other cases pending or the defendants past criminal history.

(4) increased utilization of applicable habitual offender statutes.

310 311

(5) reduction in the number of dismissals for reasons other than the merits of the case through two means:.

(a) reduce the number of witnesses who fail to appear

(b) reduce the number of dismissals caused by the failure to collect all evidence necessary for the prosecution of the case or of evidence in such a way that it is not admissible. c. Assumptions. The program is based on the following assumptions. The career criminal:

(1) Commits dangerous violent crimes regularly and habitually and is responsible for a significant portion of serious crime committed.

(2) Will generally have two or more open cases pending in court system at any given time.

(3) Utilizes his familiarity with the criminal justice system to avoid prosecution and punishment.

(4) Has generally not been influenced by traditional social service programs.

(5) The criminal justice system with a massive number of cases and assembly line approach is not dealing effectively with the career recidivist offender.

(6) By focusing the resources and attention of the criminal justice system on the career offender, the criminal justice system can have impact on the level and a frequency of serious crime. d. Program Strategy.

(1) The purpose of this program is to:

(a) design and implement model programs which establish priorities to speed the prosecution of those persons whose criminal histories indicate repeat commission of dangerous criminal acts and to bring this individual to treatment quickly. Specifically, the program target is offenders who frequently commit the crimes of homicide, forcible sex offenses, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. 312

(b) Induce local prosecutory units to identify and quickly prepare the cases of the violent, recidivistic, career criminal and develop methods of identifying cases in which career criminals are accused, and of assuring thorough and expeditious processing of these cases. As an optional part of this program, a corrections component dealing with the treatment of career offenders may be funded. If Part E funds are sought, a separate budget for Part E funds should be included in the application. Only those applications which demonstrate a system-wide approach to the career criminal will be considered.

(2) Documentation of nature and scope of the problem.

All applications must contain the following data:

(a) A profile of the local crime problem: i.e., general crime rate (UCRs; victimization, where available); homicide, forcible sex offenses, aggravated assault, robbery and burglary rates; clearance rates by crime; court and prosecutor caseloads by crime; conviction rates by crime presents jail and prison populations and capacities.

(b) An indication of the number or percentage of career criminals or repeat offenders. (This may be calculated by taking a sample of the caseload and determining what percentage are repeat offenders).

(c) A description of each component of the criminal justice system including but not limited to police agencies, the prosecutor, courts and the public defender. The description should include jurisdiction, felony caseloads, staff levels, data processing capabilities, information systems and support staff.

(d) A system description and flow chart of the present system from arrest to trial, including the number of work units and elapsed time between events. Supporting data must also be included. (This would include such data as number of felony arrests, number of cases screened, number of cases accepted, number of cases dismissed and reasons, number of cases filed under a reduced charge, conviction rate, time from arrest to trial, and time from arraignment to trial and disposition of offenders). 313

(e) A discussion of the roles of the following criminal justice components. Cooperation of all parts of the system is required. Outlined below are the key program elements which should be addressed in each application.

POLICE IDENTIFICATION AFTER ARREST INSURE EVIDENCE IS ADMISSABLE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE OFFENDERS.

PROSECUTOR SCREENING AND EVALUATION OF CASES. IDENTIFICATION OF CAREER CRIMINAL. PRIORITIZING CAREER CRIMINAL CASE. MONITORS CASE TO REDUCE UNNECESSARY OR UNJUSTIFIED DELAYS. REQUESTS APPROPRIATE BAIL. INDIVIDUALIZED CASE PREPARATION (VERTICAL HANDLING). WITNESS COORDINATION MAY REPRESENT STATE AT PAROLE HEARINGS. SENIOR PROSECUTORS HANDLE MORE SERIOUS CASES.

COURTS PRIORITY DOCKETING. SPEEDY PREPARATION OF PRESENTENCE REPORT.

CORRECTIONS DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING OF NEW TREATMENT MODES. INFORMS PROSECU TOR OF UPCOMING PAROLE OR PARDON HEARINGS. REPORT RELEASE.

INFORMATION PROVIDES INFORMATION ON DEFENDANTS. SYSTEM PAST CRIMINAL HISTORY, NO. OF CASES PENDING, INFORMATION ON WITNESSES, VICTIMS, ATTORNEYS, BONDSMEN. RANK CASES. PROVIDES INFORMATION ON THE FLOW OF THE CASE THROUGH THE SYSTEM.

(f) Criteria to be used in even-handed selection and prosecution of the career criminal.

(g) A description of current processing of defendants.

(h) A description of the proposed approach which shows how the defendant will be processed, and how this procedure varies from current practice and resources required.

(1) A description of treatment approaches (if funding is sought). 314

(±) Impact on criminal justice system. All applications must include:

(1) A description of corrections and defense implications of the proposed program, as well as a description of action to be taken with respect to any problems posed by the program for corrections or the defense.

(2) Evidence of support from criminal justice official in addition to the prosecutor, including court and police officials.

(3) A description of all statutory, administra tive and/or court rules pertinent to the program (e.g., habitual offender statutes, speedy trial rules, etc.).

(4) A description of the impact of the program on diversionary programs such as Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC). A discussion of any problems or conflicts between these programs and the proposed Career Criminal programs.

58. ELIGIBILITY TO RECEIVE GRANTS.

Preference for selection as a demonstration site will be given to public prosecutors offices serving major metropolitan areas. (As an optional part of this program, funds will be made available for a corrections component dealing with the treatment of the career offender). No separate awards for Corrections projects will be made.

59. ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TO PROGRAM.

$4 million in Part C and $2 million in Part E funds has been allocated. No ceiling or allocation to Regional Offices is proposed. Regional Offices are asked to nominate cities for consideration.

60. RANGE AND NUMBER OF GRANTS, EXPECTED NUMBER OF YEARS OF FUNDING, AND MATCHING RATIO

Grants may range from $100,000 to $500,000. Ten awards are contemplated. Funding will be available for two years. For the first year, the matching ratio will be 90 percent Federal, 10 percent grantee. If a second year grant is optional, grantees are to provide 20 percent of the funding. 315

61. DEADLINES FOR SUBMISSION OF APPLICATIONS.

Concept papers should be submitted by August 15, 1975. Final applications must be received no later than September 30, 1975. BIBLIOGRAPHY

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