Self-Organized Terrorist- Counterterrorist Adaptive Coevolutions, Part I
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
CRM D0010776.A3/1Rev February 2005 Self-Organized Terrorist- Counterterrorist Adaptive Coevolutions, Part I: A Conceptual Design Andrew Ilachinski 4825 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1850 Approved for distribution: February 2005 Dr. Gregory M. Swider Director, Tactical Analysis Team Operations Evaluation Group This document represents the best opinion of CNA at the time of issue. It does not necessarily represent the opinion of the Department of the Navy. Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited. Specific authority: N00014-00-D-0700. For copies of this document call: CNA Document Control and Distribution Section at 703-824-2123. Copyright 2005 The CNA Corporation [Osama bin Laden is a] “...product of a new social structure; a new social feeling in the Muslim world. Where you have strong hostility not only against America, but also against many Arab and Muslim regimes who are allying to America... and that's why, if bin Laden was not there, you would have another bin Laden. You would have another name, with the same character, with the same role, of bin Laden... ...That's why we call it a phenomena, not a person.”1 “Osama bin Laden’s most brilliant stroke may well have been to allow the global Salafi Jihad network to evolve spontaneously and naturally, and not interfere too much with its evolution, except to guide it through incentives because of his control of resources. The system developed into a small-world network with robustness and flexibility and became more militant and global for both internal and external reasons.”2 1.Extract from an interview with Saad al Fagih (a London-based Saudi Arabian exile who heads the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia), on Public Broadcasting Service's Frontline, 1999. 2.M. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, University of Pennsyl- vania Press, 2004; page 172. i ii Contents Summary . 1 Introduction . 5 Purpose . 9 Background. 10 Approach . 11 Semiotic Agents . 12 Modeling terrorist-counterterrorist coevolutions . 15 Issues, problems and questions . 17 Organization of paper . 22 Complex networks: basic concepts . 25 Introduction . 25 Formalism . 31 Research problems . 32 Basic terminology . 34 Mathematical representations . 38 Graph visualization. 40 Complex networks: zoology. 47 Graph space . 47 Zoology of graphs . 49 In what region(s) of graph space do TNs live? . 51 Random graphs . 52 Erdos-Renyi random graphs . 52 Small-world random graphs . 55 Scale-free random graphs . 57 Clustered scale-free networks . 61 Triad-creation . 61 State-activation/deactivation . 62 Search in complex networks. 63 Navigability Problem . 64 Local Search . 64 iii Evolving searchable nets . 67 Network search and information theory . 72 Dynamic graphs . 75 Structurally dynamic cellular automata . 76 Complex networks: metrics . 83 Overview . 83 Characteristic Path Length . 84 Clustering Coefficient . 86 Degree centrality . 88 Group degree . 90 Link Degree . 90 Link Density . 91 Eigenvector centrality . 92 Information Centrality . 93 Closeness centrality . 94 Group closeness. 95 Betweenness centrality . 96 Computation times . 97 Flow betweenness. 98 e-betweenness . 98 Efficiency centrality . 100 Node information centrality . 101 Group information centrality . 101 Graph efficiency centrality . 101 Comparison with other centrality measures . 102 Structural Holes . 102 Effective Network Size . 104 Efficiency . 107 Community structure . 107 Finding community structures . 108 Example 1: social networks . 109 Example 2: terrorist networks. 110 Cluster finding algorithms . 111 Quantifying community structure . 113 Vulnerability . 115 Network Reliability . 117 Error tolerance versus vulnerability to attack . 118 Attack Strategies . 121 iv Cascade attacks . 121 Using ordered set theory to break Al-Qaeda cells. 123 SOTCAC: conceptual design . 127 Modeling ontology . 128 SOTCAC’s ontology . 131 Design overview . 133 What is, and is not, being simulated . 138 Terrorist network. 141 T-agents . 141 T-agent types . 143 Recruit . 143 Infiltrator. 145 Recruiter . 145 Trainer . 145 Mission Operative . 145 Leader . 146 Support Agents . 146 T-agent characteristics . 147 Primitive . 147 Composite . 149 Dynamic . 149 Social network maps . 150 LoTo-map . 150 Ego-map . 152 Trusted Prior (TP) Contacts . 154 Current Contacts (CCs) . 155 Terminated Contacts (TCs). 155 Potential Contacts (PCs) . 156 T-agent personality . 156 Physical domain . 158 Information domain. 159 T-agent actions . 160 Movement . 160 Acquiring manpower: recruiting . 160 Acquiring skills: training . 161 Acquiring resources . 161 Communications . 161 Defection. 162 v Promotion . 163 Cells . 163 Size. 164 Adhesion . 164 Coordination Strength . 165 Cohesion . 166 Social network links . 166 Invisible links . 167 Communication. 167 Type . 168 Content . 169 Vulnerability . 170 Adaptive topology. 171 SDCA . 171 EINSTein’s rules. 172 Social network interaction rules . 177 SOTCAC’s link rules . 184 Motivations. 185 Constraints . 187 Counterterrorist network . 188 Functions . 188 INTEL Assets . 190 Physical Agents . 190 Virtual Resources . 191 CTN Actions. 192 CTN Beliefs . 198 OperativeID-belief vector . 199 Composition-belief matrix . 200 Structure-belief matrix . 201 Activity-belief vector . 202 CTN inference personality . 202 Interpretation of INTEL data . 203 Valuation of INTEL data . 204 Fusion of INTEL reports . 204 Tactical action plan logic . 207 Conclusion . 215 Appendix 1: Social network analysis . 221 vi Example . 224 Appendix 2: Mapping Al-Qaeda . 229 Trusted Prior Contacts . 230 Meeting Ties . 232 Direct & Indirect Links . 234 Observations . 236 Lessons . 238.