Israel at a Crossroads Between Civic Democracy and Jewish Zealotocracy

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TITLE Israel at a crossroads between civic democracy and Jewish zealotocracy

AUTHORS Pappé, I

JOURNAL Journal of Palestine Studies

DEPOSITED IN ORE 14 July 2014

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Israel at a Crossroads between Civic Democracy and Jewish Zealotocracy Author(s): Ilan Pappe Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Spring, 2000), pp. 33-44 Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2676454 . Accessed: 28/03/2014 10:32

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This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ISRAELAT A CROSSROADS BETWEEN CwIc DIEMocRAcY AND JEWISH ZEALOTOCRACY

ILAN PAPPE

MainstreamZionism (now comprisingboth Labor and Likud) is in- creasinglybeing challenged by theRight and Left.Post-Zionism has exposedthe intellectualfallacies underlying traditional Zionism's at- temptto combine ethnic segregation with an opensociety, but it is the moraland ideologicalsubstitute offered by neo-Zionism,opting for ethnicsegregation as an ultimategoal, that is mountingthe realpolit- ical challenge.This article argues that while mainstream Zionists will delineatethe space of a futureIsrael (by drawingthe borders in a settlementwith the Palestinians), the neo-Zionists will cast the ideological contentinto this space (by definingthe identity and orientation ofIsraeli society).

THE VICTORY OF EHUD BARAKin theMay 1999 Israeligeneral election was hailed locallyand internationallyas the returnof theJewish state to the peace track.As theinternational media were quick to note,the final stage in thelong road begunin Oslo was at hand.And yet, thus far, we have wit- nessedthe conclusion of anotherversion of theWye accord, the Sharm al- Shaykhagreement, and preliminarynegotiations on how to negotiatethe finalstages. In short,for all thedramatic announcements and sanguineinter- pretations,there has been verylittle progress. Butmore significant, and on theface of it quitesurprising, is the virtual absence of internaldebate in Israelat this"moment of truth"in thestate's history.As thelast phase in thenegotiations supposedly gets underway, the debatethat several years ago was so heatedas to resultin theassassination ofPrime Minister Yitzhak Rabin has totallysubsided. The Israeligovernment calledupon to makethis final peace is based on a largemajority of Jewish membersof the Knesset, and eventhe opposition accepts with few reserva- tionsthe basic outlines of the settlement likely to be offeredto thePalestini- ans.From Peace Now on theLeft to GushEmmunim on theRight, there is a wide consensuson thenature of the conflict's solution. Whatis clear is thatthe old dichotomybetween Labor and Likudno longerserves as an appropriateindicator of the nature of the internal Israeli debateon thecrucial issues of national concern and particularlyon thesolu-

ILANPAPur is professorof politicalscience at HaifaUniversity and academichead of the Institutefor Peace Research,Givat Haviva. He is the authorof 7he Makingof theArab- Israeli Conflict,1947-1951, amongother works.

Journal of Palestine Studies XXIX, no. 3 (Spring2000), pp. 33-44.

This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 34 JOUNIULOF PALESINE STUDIES tionof the Palestine question. Indeed, Labor (the hegemonic representation of Zionismfrom 1882 untilits fall from power in the 1977 elections)and Likud(inheritor of the alternative, more ethnocentric and segregativevariant ofZionism known as Revisionismthat rose to challengeLabor Zionism as of 1922)can be said to have coalescedinto one majorideological stream. For despitethe bitter antagonism that has separatedthem historically, and de- spiteLabor's loss at thepolls in 1977,it is Labor'svision that has prevailed overRevisionism's commitment to totalsovereignty over the whole of his- toricalPalestine. It is Labor'svision, in whichLikud has essentiallyacqui- esced, thathas remainedthe principalprism through which the political centerand professionalelites in Israelview the Israel/Palestine reality. For thepurposes of thisarticle, we shallcall thisnow-shared approach main- streamZionism.1

THEIDEOLOGICAL STREAMS Despitethe convergence of thetwo megaparties into one stream,Israel, notunlike societies in theBalkans, remains very much a societytorn by ide- ology.The leadingideological outlook represented by mainstreamZionism is challengedby twoopposing streams: post-Zionism and neo-Zionism.It is our purposehere to tryto assess thesites and contoursof theideological debateunderway since the last elections, its present balance of power, and implicationsfor the future, not only on thestate of Israel, but for the future of thePalestine question. Fromthe Left, mainstream Zionism has been challengedsince the 1980s bypost-Zionism. This movement represents a cultural view that strongly crit- icizesZionist policy and conductbefore and during1948, accepts many of theclaims made by thePalestinians concerning 1948 itself, and envisionsa non-Jewishstate in Israelas thebest solution for the country's internal and externalpredicaments. As such,it represents a pointof view acceptableto largenumbers of Palestiniancitizens in Israel.Indeed, whether it can ever become a meaningfulpolitical alternative depends largely on itsability to forma lastingpolitical alliance with Israel's Palestinian national minority. Thisalliance has notbeen formed as yet,and thus we cannotnow talkabout post-Zionismas a politicalchallenge. The post-Zionistsuccess so farhas been in legitimizinghitherto taboo topicsof greatrelevance to thepresent debatein Israel:the nature of Zionism,Israel's moral conduct in 1948,the refugeeproblem, policies toward Sephardic Jews (henceforth Mizrahim), and so on.2More significant for the future will be itsinfluence in theuniver- sitiesand, more importantly, in the educational system, as willbe discussed laterin thisarticle. The mainpolitical challenge to traditionalZionism comes from the Right, froma fundamentalistZionism that Uri Ram has termed"neo-Zionism."3 Neo-Zionismis a violentand extremeinterpretation ofZionism. It existed as a marginalvariant of Zionismboth in theLabor and Revisionistcamps and

This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ISRAELAT A CROSSROADSBETwFx CwIc DEMOCRACYAND JEWISHZEALOTOCRACY 35 was nourishedin the teachingcenters controlled by the religiousZionist Hapoel Hamizrachi(which became the National Religious Party, Mafdal). It burstforth as an officialalternative after the 1967war, pushed forward by expansionistsamong the Labor movement, leaders of the newly established Likud,and leadingrabbis. In the 1980s,neo-Zionism widened its constitu- encyby formingalliances with the settlersin the occupiedterritories and withdeprived and marginalizedsectors of society.It is an uneasyalliance comprisingexpansionist nationalists, ultraorthodox rabbis, and ethnicspiri- tualleaders of the Mizrahi Jews, all presentingthemselves as championsof theunderprivileged Mizrahim. As an electorate,the Mizrahim until recently supportedthis alliance, but today have a farmore complicated and sophisti- catedview thatdefies placement on theideological map we are tryingto draw.Quite probably, the Mizrahim are divided,very much like the rest of theJewish community in Israel,among the three ideological streams. The ideologicaldebate in Israelinvolves a struggleover the collective memoryand thepast, the present, and thevision of thefuture. The debate overthe past primarily involves the challenge to LaborZionism's version of historymounted by post-Zionistscholars. It is herethat post-Zionism has made itsmark, having won an importantfollowing in Israeliacademia and centersof cultural production, and-despite the fact that every known histo- rianof the traditional Zionist camp has been recruitedto refutepost-Zionist theses-ithas won wide legitimacyin theWest and thereforein largeseg- mentsof Israeli society. The battlecontinues, its acuteness and indeedacri- monyundimmed because of its connection to thepolicies of the present and postureof the future. That the post-Zionists will ultimately win-indeed have alreadylargely won-is no longerin doubt. Nonetheless, as I haveaddressed thisbattle over the past in earlierarticles in thisjournal,4 we shallfocus the discussionhere on theremaining areas of contest: the present and the future.

MAINSTREAM ZIomsM AND DRAWH4G THE POST-OSLO MAP Whilepost-Zionism has impressivesupport in academia,and to a certain extentin thepress and othercultural media, its vision of a secular,demo- craticnon-Zionist Israel (or Israeland Palestineas a unitarystate) has buta marginalfollowing in IsraeliJewish politics.5 In contrast,while traditional Zionismhas limpedunconvincingly into the new centuryas a scholarlyin- terpretationof Palestine'spast, it remainsthe majorfactor in shapingthe Jewishperception of the present. The mainstreamZionist view has been translatedinto practical terms in theOslo agreementor, more precisely, in theIsraeli interpretation of Oslo. The firstpart of this position is thatpre-1967 Israel is notnegotiable; hence thefuture of the refugees or Israel'srole in creatingthe refugee problem are excludedfrom the negotiating table. Another aspect of the ban on pre-1967 Israelis thecategorical refusal to includeIsraeli Palestinians in anyIsraeli- Palestiniandialogue on thefuture.

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Thus,for Zionism's mainstream, the geographical space ofthe Israeli-Pal- estinianconflict is confinedto theareas occupiedby Israelin 1967,apart fromEast Jerusalem and itsenvirons and mostof the territory controlled by thesettlers. This is thespace in whichthe permanent, not temporary, solu- tionof the question will eventually be implemented.The formula,involving Israelioverall control and some functionshandled by thePalestinians, is a hybridbetween two old Israeli"peace" plans presentedin the 1970s:the YigalAllon plan and the one offeredby Moshe Dayan. Allon sought a territo- rialcompromise with the Jordanians based on thedemographic distribution in theterritories. Dayan wanted to keep all theland but to dividethe func- tionsof authoritybetween Israel and Jordan, with Israel holding mainly se- curityfunctions in theWest Bank and theJordanians keeping the others. A combinationof these approaches,with the Palestiniansreplacing the Hashimitesas partners,is thebasis of thepermanent settlement proposals offeredby Laborand Likudin thepost-Oslo reality. Thisis a sharedvision. Labor and Likud,this combined ideological movement,likewise share the vision of its implementation. Like all theagreements since the conclusionof Oslo, it willbe a dictatedsolution. The notionof dictationenjoys wide supportamong the Jewishpopulation.6 Indeed, Likud'svictory at thepolls in 1996showed that the majority of Jewish voters are willingto imposean even harsherversion of the Oslo realityon the Palestinians:Netanyahu's fall from power had noth- Netanyahu'sfall had ingto do withreservations about this policy, that in nothingto do with manyways Barak promises to imitate.Even though reservationsabout Likuddid not join the new government, Barak's prin- dictatingto the cipal negotiators(retired generals such as Vilnai, Palestinians,a policy that Yatom,Peled, and Stauber)and his government's in many ways Barak compositionpromise a similarapproach. promisesto imitate. Oslo is attractivefor the Israelis because it appeals to thepolitical center. Immediately after the 1996Is- raelielections, Yossi Beilin,a leadingfigure on theLabor's left wing, com- mentedthat he believedLabor and Likudcould find a commonground for peacemaking.7And indeed, Beilin, together with Michael Eytan, considered tobe on theright of the Likud, hammered out a documentthat showed, even then,the extent of theoverlap between the two parties. Despite their posi- tionson oppositeends of the spectrum in their respective parties, they found itquite easy to formulatea document that could serve as thebasis for a per- manentsettlement to be dictatedto the Palestinians.8In it,almost all the settlementswere to remainunder Israeli control and sovereignty;Jerusalem would remaina "singleunified city" under Israeli sovereignty; the Jordan Valleywould be a "specialsecurity zone"; and Israelwould controlborder crossings.No refugeereturn would be permittedinto sovereign Israel, and limitson refugeeentry into the Palestinian entity would be discussed.during finalstatus talks. The documentleft open thepossibility of a semblanceof "statehood"in theareas-less than55 percentof the West Bank and 60 per-

This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ISRAL AT A CROSSROADSBErwEEN CIVIc DEMocRAcY AND JEWISH ZEALOTOCRACY 37 cent of the Gaza Strip-thatwould remainunder Palestiniancontrol, althougheven underthe most liberal interpretation what would be offered was farfrom normal statehood. Thisvision has an economicdimension too, which cuts across national boundaries.Part of this vision is theintroduction ofa capitalistand freemar- keteconomy both in Israeland in Palestine.Under the Paris Protocol, the economiccomponent of Oslo signedin May 1994,9 Israel and Palestine were to formone economicunit. This can be seen in theway the customs outfits areconnected and the way a jointtaxation policy is beingexercised. Further- more,the agreement grants Israel the right to veto any development scheme putforward by the Palestinian Authority (PA). Israel's monetary and currency exchangesplay a commandingrole in thePalestinian economy, and Israel totallydominates the PA's foreign trade and even industry. The introductionofthe Israeli version of a capitalisteconomy into the PA areascan onlyhave a disastrouseffect. With the absence of democratic struc- turesand a verylow GDP,the integration offered by Oslo can onlyturn the PA areasinto the slums of Israel. An excellentexample can alreadybe seen in Erez,the buffer zone betweenIsrael and the Gaza Strip.There, the Israelis, withthe blessing of the Americans and theEuropean Union, opened an in- dustrialpark. Let the name not mislead the readers: it is a productionline whereall theworkers are Palestinians and all theemployers are Israelis ben- efitingfrom the very low wages theypay theworkers. Israel has plansfor similarparks on theborder between Jordan and theWest Bank. This is why Israeliindustrialists consider themselves part of thepeace camp.The other aspectof thecapitalization of the peace process,of course,is thebenefit derivedfrom such economic transactions by a smallnumber of Palestinians. Whilethis double burden of economicmisery and lack of a satisfactory politicalsolution could lead to a Palestinianattempt to revoltagainst the post-Osloreality, itis difficulttosee whythe Israelis should make an effortto alterthe current situation. For the majority of Israeli Jews, this peace is based on an unbeatablelogic, one thatwas manytimes pronounced by thelate primeminister Rabin. According to thislogic, the Palestinians were in a dis- malsituation before Oslo and are now offeredan improvement.Not a very impressiveone but,still, one thatcan be definedas N+1-"N"being the pre- vioussituation, and "1"being Gaza, Jericho, and Ramallahcovered with Pal- estinianflags and policedby Palestiniansecurity services. This is peace for mostIsraelis, provided there is no terroror bombs. For most Israelis, peace is theirdaily security, and thishas been enhancedby theOslo process.

NEo-ZIONISTS AND THE MAKaNG OF AN ISRAEI ZEALOTOCRACY Withthis geopolitical vision, even theultraorthodox parties of Shas and AgudatIsrael are willing to go along.But the vision of the future is notjust a matterof defining borders or containingPalestinian national aspirations. It is also a matterof identity and theessence of a society.And here we encounter

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the neo-Zionistvision, shared by the settlercommunity, supporters of Mafdal,the ultraorthodox parties, and a new secularRight (including a new partyof Russianimmigrants called Yisrael Beitainu, or IsraelIs Our Home) closelyassociated financially and ideologicallywith the New Rightin the UnitedStates. Unlikethe post-Zionists, the neo-Zionist alliance has representationin the new governmentformed after the 1999elections. They have six ministries, althoughcompared to Netanyahu'sgovernment they have of course lost power.They can join theBarak government because theyshifted from an interestin territory and political borders to socioculturalquestions. The mini- stateoffered by Barakto the Palestiniansfrightens them, but theyaccept theirinability to putforward an alternative.'0 In elementarysociological terms, neo-Zionists thrive on the marginbe- tweendecreased external tensions and risinginternal ones. Post-Oslo Israel is multiethnic,multicultural, and deeplydivided on issues of culture,law, morality,and education.The divisionsdo not reflectclear positions,but rather,confusion and insecurity.The various groups constituting Israeli soci- etyincreasingly tend to stresstheir particular identity at theexpense of the state'sidentity. A changein theelectoral law beforethe 1996elections en- couragedsuch trends: voters could now vote separately for the prime minis- terand theKnesset, allowing them to vote"realistically" for the premiership and more"emotionally" for the party representing their particular interests. Andindeed, the 1996elections made clearthat Ethiopians, Russians, North Africans,secular Tel Avivians,Palestinian Israelis, and so on believedthat theirparticular interests could best be servedin sec- Neo-Ziontsm'sgrowing tarianvoting. The 1999 electionsonly strengthened power is assisted by the thistrend. confusionarising from Neo-Zionism'sgreatest attraction for the Jewish post-Zionism's majorityin Israelis itssimplicity. Ironically, its grow- deconstructionof ingpower is partlyand inadvertentlyassisted by the traditionalZionism. confusionarising from post-Zionism's deconstruction of traditionalZionism. Neo-Zionism conveys confi- dence,not confusion, about the future. Its main tactic is to presentitself as havingthe key for unifying the disintegrated and polarizedIsraeli society- thekey being a clearversion of Judaism as a nationalmovement, something thearticulators ofLabor Zionism never succeeded in doing. The neo-Zionists can thuspretend to be theunifying force bridging the gap betweenconflict- inginterpretations ofJudaism both as a religionand as a nationalmovement. Whilethe post-Zionist scholars saw thefractured reality as indicativeof the need to makeIsrael a statefor all itscitizens, the neo-Zionists proposed a Jewishreligious and nationalistcement that would prevent further fragmen- tationand disintegration. Fourparallel processes are taking place thatforge this neo-Zionist option: (1) thefanatization of the national religious groups (whose strongholdsare in thesettlements and in thewide networkof state-funded yeshiva centers);

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(2) the nationalizationor Zionizationof the previouslyanti-Zionist ul- traorthodoxJews; (3) the ethnicinsulation of segmentsof the Mizrahim caughtin the geographicaland social marginsof society;and (4) Israel's rapidintegration into capitalist globalization-which adds to thealliance an intellectualneoconservative center, a la theNew Right. The groups emerging fromthese four processes share one vision:an ethnicreligious theocracy as thebest means of confrontingIsrael's external and domesticproblems. The dominantforce among these groups are religiousleaders, be theyrabbis, magicians,healers, politicians, or educators.This elite shares an extremely pejorativeperception of secular Israeli Jews. According to a recentbook by SephiRachlevski exposing these views," thisalliance sees thesecular Jews as the"Messiah's Donkey": they did their job incarrying the Jews back to the Holy Land,but theyare obsoletenow and can be treatedlike non-Jews. (Non-Jewsare likebeasts that can be utilizedand exploited,at timesfeared, but alwaysinferior.) As thisbook shows,medieval Jewish thought, devel- oped to counteractand providesolace in theface of a deeplyhostile gentile environment,has been recycledhere as thebasis for a modernracist ideol- ogypositing a clearexclusion/inclusion axis-a futureIsrael without secular Jewsand non-Jews. This concepthas been formulatedby the nationalreligious thinkers (mainlyrabbis). It is presentedas Zionism,not Judaism. It is connectedto the Zionistconcept of fulfillment,hagshama, which in its old interpretation meantonly one thing:settling the land. At first, neo-Zionism saw settlement ofthe West Bank, Gaza Strip,and the Golan as theultimate act of patriotism. Butsettlement is now fadingdue to theOslo accords.Fulfillment has come to meanstrictly observing the Jewish laws and strugglingagainst traditional (secular)Zionism in therealm of the judiciary and legislature;its main target is Israel'sHigh Court because of its attempts to safeguardthe public sphere fromreligious impositions. The neo-Zionists'view of thepast is nationalisticand romantic.Israel of theSecond Temple era is theglorious past that is to be reconstructed.Their resemblanceto theBJP in India is striking.Both groups wish to demolishthe pastof a fewhundred years for the sake ofa distantpast of a fewthousand years.Hence, the neo-Zionists take seriously the idea of rebuildinga Third Templeto replacethe Haram al-Sharif, and theyprepare cadres of would-be prieststo servethere when the time comes. Where the neo-Zionists differ amongthemselves is on whetherto achievetheir goal by blowingup the twomosques on theMount or wait for divine intervention to clear the way.12 Theirgreatest success to date,apart from their leading role in theNetan- yahugovernment, was theirlong control of Israel's educational system.13 In thenew Barakgovernment, they share the office with Meretz, a traditional Zionistparty. This dual control over the educational system by a leftistminis- terand a neo-Zionistdeputy is less absurdthan it seems and reflectsthe currentconfusion about Israel's past, as traditionalZionists fight a rear-guard (albeitlargely losing) battle in theacademy against post-Zionist challengers.

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Duringthe Ministry of Education's long period under neo-Zionist control, whichhas now temporarilyended, several educational kits (textbooks, curricula,etc.) were produced that continue to circulate,particularly in schools withinthe neo-Zionist population centers. One itemin thekit, for example, is a textbookchronicling the state's first fifty years'4 that hardly mentions Palestinians.They are not mentionedwith regard to the 1948war, nor as Israelicitizens under military rule until 1966, nor as an occupiedpopulation in theWest Bank and theGaza Stripsince 1967. The existenceof Palestinian refugeesis somethingthe readers of thisbook willnot know about. They willonly be awareof the existence of Palestinian terrorism, which emerged somewherein the 1960sfor unknown reasons.15 Justbefore Netanyahu's government fell at theend of 1998,a new plan was announcedaimed at "linkingpupils more closely with the army." 16 This Spartan/Prussianscheme was to preparechildren from kindergarten through highschool for a "militaryenvironment and values: coping with situations of pressureand developingleadership skills in a battlefield."Army maneuvers and militaryindoctrination were to be integralparts of the educational sys- temalong with enriched lessons on Zionismand ErezIsrael studies. Specific programsfor each ofthe last three years of high school aimed at "increasing motivationfor the IDF" and strengthening"commitment to homeland."17 Thoughelements of thistype of programalways existed in Israelischools, theyconstituted a marginal part of school life and their content was designed by traditionalZionists. The kitsformulated according to theneo-Zionist interpretation,on theother hand, would be boundto shapethe pupils' vision ofthe future in sucha waythat would be difficultto undoeven by themost persuasivepost-Zionist lecturer-if they were even lucky enough to heardif- ferentopinions in thefuture. Suchelements are no longerofficial policy due to thechange in government,but they continue to be availablefor teachers alongside a new set of kitsissued under the new governmentin September1999.18 The alternative educationalkits mainly include new textbooks that have received front-page coveragein theNew YorkTimes because of their willingness to incorporate a Palestinianperspective in their historical presentation and castsome doubt on themoral rightness of Zionistactions.'9 These books, like the TV docu- mentary"Tekumma,"20 were written by scholarsinfluenced by thepost-Zi- onistcritique and thereforeinclude some reevaluationof thepast, but they are stillbasically faithful to thetraditional Zionist narrative; their inclusion of Palestinianelements is primarilyto explainwhy Zionism was and continues to be opposed.The approachof theauthors of thenew books is well ex- pressedby Avnet Ben-Amos, a member of a committeepreparing the books:

In thepast the teaching of history [in Israel] was dominated by a versionthat claimed that we [theIsraelis] had an un- questionableright to the land to whichwe returnedafter 2,000years of exile and thatwe reachedan emptyland.

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Nowadayswe cannotdivorce the teaching of historyfrom the debateinside academia and in the professionallitera- ture.We haveto insertthe Palestinian version to thestory of Israel'shistory, so thatthe pupils will know that there is an- othergroup that was affectedby Zionismand the [1948] war of independence.2'

The lackof clarity in theeducational system arising from the coexistence ofdiametrically opposite educational materials-some shaped by neo-Zion- istsand othersinfluenced by post-Zionists-iscompounded by anotherfac- tor:the ministerof educationhimself. Yossi Sarid accepts some of the alternativepostures suggested by post-Zionistscholars and seemsto dislike the neo-Zionistkits. However, he allows onlya modicumof criticismto enterthe curriculum. As a traditionalZionist, he has no clearobjective of orientingthe educationalsystem toward a new look at thePalestinians or humanand civicrights issues. His deputy,however, is determinedto intro- duce moreJewish content-both national and religious-intothe system. Thisuneasy coexistence of two contradictoryapproaches to Zionisthis- toryis yet anothermanifestation of the extentto whichthe ideological center'sview of the past has been underminedand theimpact of this on the present.One can eitherchallenge fundamentally the truisms of Zionismin the name of democracyand liberalism,or one can remaincommitted to thesetruisms at theexpense of democracy and liberalism.The Labormove- mentwanted to squarethe circle and find a wayof reconciling the contradic- tionsby concludingpeace and turningIsrael into a democraticand liberal entity.As itturned out, it is impossibleto do both.The realizationthat it must be one or theother is at theheart of the post-Zionist position, but it is also themotivating force behind neo-Zionism. So a balancesheet of present Israel reads as follows.In thepolitical field, the centeris dominatedby the two main partiesof traditionalZionism, closelyconnected to theprofessional elites in thecountry. This center sees no need to makedecisions about Israel's future development apart from the realmof Israeli-Palestinianrelations: what parts of theWest Bank and the Gaza Strip(the tendencyis to give up at leasthalf) are to be givento an autonomousPalestinian Authority that could be called a stateif necessary. The restof the area will be settledby Jews and annexedto Israel,with Jeru- salemremaining united and thecapital of Israel.The refugeeproblem will remainunsolved or at leastpostponed to thevery distant future. Thispolitical center's vision of the past makes it blind to thelink between ethnicand groupidentity on theone handand economicpoverty and social deprivationon theother. It refusesto be concernedabout (or even accept) thefragmented nature of society. Its main concern is to enhanceIsrael's nu- clearcapability and high-techprosperity as theguarantees for Israel's future survivability.In contrast, the post-Zionist reading of thepast renders a just solutionto therefugee problem as a farbetter guarantee for security.

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The domesticscene is thuseffectively abandoned, and thisis whereneo- Zionismas an optionthrives. With their programs replacing government services(providing financial aid, child care, and schools withextended hours)in deprivedareas, the neo-Zionists are steadilyincreasing their electorate.While they adopted the traditional Zionist discourse of "one people" thatexcludes the Palestinian citizens of Israel, they gave itnew meaningby excludingas well purelysecular Jews, foreign workers (estimated at about 300,000),and non-Jews(estimated as another300,000, mainly from the for- merSoviet Union and Ethiopia).There are, of course, internal power strug- gles among the variouscomponents of the neo-Zionistinterpretation. However,the common ground is wide,and thusfar the coalition has not brokendown. On thecontrary, ithas gainedmomentum and force.

FuTu1u DIRECTIONS Israelat fiftyis a societyat severalcrossroads. One, obviousand well re- ported,involves decisions about how muchof the occupied territories must be givenup in orderto moveon withthe peace process.But this is a small junction,and if it is crossedIsrael will be confrontedwith far more meaning- fuland confusingcrossroads. The mostimportant of these is theethnic-civic dichotomyof Israel. It is,as mentioned,already clear that mainstream Zion- ism'soption of reconcilingthe contradictionsthrough peace cannotsuc- ceed. The "post-Zionist"scholars, with the help of themedia, have already hintedat the other choices. One is an ethnicstate that allows no compromise withthe Palestinians and deniesequal rightsto Israel'sArabs and socialjus- ticeto Israel'sdeprived populations. This is an ethnicityclosely associated withan inflexibleinterpretation of Judaism-an ethnocracy or, indeed,a zealotocracy.As faras can be judged,this option is also fixatedon thefree marketeconomy and capitalismalready widespread in Israel.The otherop- tion is a civicsociety accepting the historicalverdict of the post-Zionist scholarsand connecting the wrongs of the past to the positive possibilities in thefuture. These include a comprehensivepeace in Palestine,a genuinede- mocracywithout discrimination, and a moreegalitarian society able to offer hope to deprivedgroups and wrongedminorities. This could be a formula notjust for Israel proper but preferably (albeit in a moredistant future) for a new politicalentity between the Jordan and Mediterranean-asecular and democraticPalestine. Betweenthese two options, the neo-Zionists so farhave the upper hand. Theyhave the advantage of being disassociated in thepublic mind from the deedsof the past. Hence, unlike the traditional Zionists, they have no qualms about describingthe unpleasantchapters in the historyof Zionismand Israel:the massacres and expulsionof Palestinians (which they advocate im- plicitlytoday) and thediscrimination against Sephardic and OrthodoxJews. Unlikethe traditional Zionists, they are able to offera clearfuture, not a fu- turetorn between secular democracy and ethnictheocracy but a futurebuilt

This content downloaded from 144.173.152.98 on Fri, 28 Mar 2014 10:32:44 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions ISRAEL AT A CROSSROADS BrwEEN CIc DEMocRAcY AND JEWISH ZEALOTOCRACY 43 on an unquestionablepreference for the latter. In short,unlike the traditional Zionists,neo-Zionists are notoccupied with trying to squarethe circleby presentinga reality based on oxymoronssuch as "enlightenedoccupation," "purearms," "liberal ethnocracy," or "ethnicdemocracy."22 They are also helpedby a confusedIsraeli academia, where traditional Zionists, despite theundermining of theirofficial "version" of history, continue to controlthe majorrequired introductory courses in the humansciences and are still strugglingto keep theillusion of a societycapable of being both ethnic and civic. Threefactors can affectthese admittedly gloomy prospects. One is a bolderdefinition of objectives by all thosewho countthemselves as belongingto thecivic and democraticcamp in Israel.Thus far, the objectives have notbeen clarified,and suchclarification would inevitably reopen the ques- tionof what kind of entitycould replace the Jewish nation-state in orderto safeguardboth Israeli and Palestinianhuman and civicrights. On theseis- sues,there is moreconfusion than determination in the post-Zionist camp. Thisis whyI use theterm "post-Zionism" advisedly, because, for better or forworse, this approach is not totallyliberated from the Zionistideology withall itslimitations and problematics. The secondfactor is willingnesson thePalestinian side to engageopenly on a democraticbasis in a searchfor a jointsolution. Post-Zionism is a Jew- ishphenomenon, but it is a transitionalphase out of Zionism. But into what? Itseems pointless to define the final destination without first exploring Pales- tinianaspirations. Can a civicand democraticstate serve both peoples? Are bothpeoples' goals best served within a federatedstructure that could satisfy nationalidentities? Or is itnecessary to have twostates (if the latter is even possiblein a meaningfulway, given the post-Oslo reality)? The thirdfactor is theposition to be takenby theUnited States and Eu- rope,for without pressure on Israelthere is littlehope forchange from within.Sanctions or boycottscould be counterproductive,creating an even more entrenchedneo-Zionist approach, but the West needs to redefine agentsof progress,stabilization, and humanwelfare in the region.Israel's distortedself- and externalimage as the"only democracy in theMiddle East" has to be challengedby Americans and Europeansby pointingto persistent patternsof behaviorever since 1948.A continuousWestern portrayal of Israelas a Westerndemocratic island in an Arabwilderness has been one of themajor obstacles faced by those in Israelworking for the establishment of a humanisticand civicsociety that benefits everyone living in Israeland Palestine.

NOTES 1. Whenreferring toLabor and Likud, discourseof individualsregarding them- I refernot only to their platforms but also selvesas belongingto the"silent major- to theattitudes of their electorate as man- ity"or "mainstream"Israel. ifestedin opinion polls and the political

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2. Even thepresent manipulation of 12. Ehud Sprinzak,The Ascendance of Holocaustmemory has become a legiti- Israel'sRadical Right(New York:Oxford matetopic for debate, not only in UniversityPress, 1991). academiabut in thepublic discourse. A 13. The neo-Zionistshad controlof measureof thechange is thefact that the theMinistry of Educationin the lastunity Knessetfor the first time has agreedto government,1984-88; in theShamir gov- debate proposalsto transformIsrael from ernment,1989-92; and again in theNe- a Jewishstate to a statefor all itscitizens. tanyahugovernment, 1996-99. Thishas no chance of beingendorsed, 14. The Ministryof Education,Israel's but in the past itwas forbiddenby law to Jubilee(Jerusalem, 1998). The book was presentsuch bills.Now, without even thesubject of AssociatedPress bulletins changingthe law, theyhave been al- when it came out,and a book reviewon lowed on theKnesset's agenda. itcan be foundat theHebron Institute for 3. UriRam, "Post-Nationalist Pasts: Politicaland ReligiousStudies Web siteat The Case of Israel," Social Science His- http://www.hebron.com. tory22, no. 4 (Summer1989), pp. 513-45. 15. Yedi'otAharonot, 19 April1999 4. See Ilan Pappe, "Post-ZionistCri- [in Hebrew].For an analysisof Israeli tiqueon Israeland thePalestinians," parts textbooksand curricula,see Eli Podeh, 1-3,JPS 26, no. 2 (Winter1997), pp. ThePortrayal of theArab-Israeli Conflict 29-41; 26, no. 3 (Spring1997), pp. 37-43; in IsraeliHistory and CivicsTextbooks, 26, no. 4 (Summer1997), pp. 60-69. 1953-95 (Jerusalem:Truman Institute, 5. In the 1996elections, 6,000 Jews 1997) [in Hebrew]. votedfor Hadash, which represented 16. Interviewwith the Ministry of Edu- such an option.About 12,000 voted for cationdirector general, Yedi'ot Aharonot, Hadash in the 1999elections. 9 September1998 [in Hebrew]. 6. AfterRabin's assassination, the 17. Ibid. "Peace Index,"which measures general 18. Underthe Israeli system, teachers supportfor the peace process,reached its can choose fromseveral approved kits zenith,73.1%, but aftera seriesof terrorist forclassroom use. attacksin Israeliurban centers, it declined 19. New YorkTimes, 14 August1999. to 58.1%,its nadir. It has sinceremained ThroughoutSeptember 1999, the Israeli steady,between 58% and 62%.This index presswas fullof debateon thebooks has been trackedby all of thedaily press mentionedin thisreport by EthanBron- since 1994. ner,particularly a book entitledThe 7. Ha'aretz, 4 June 1996 [in Hebrew]. TwentiethCentury, by EyalNaveh, com- 8. The documentwas finalizedon 22 missionedby theMinistry of Educationin January1997. SeeJPS 26, no. 3 (Spring 1999. 1997),pp. 160-62. 20. See myreview in JPS 27, no. 4 9. For theofficial text of theParis Pro- (Summer1998), pp. 99-105. tocol,seeJPS 23,no. 4 (Summer1994), 21. HaAretz, 29 March1998 [in pp. 103-18. Hebrew]. 10. See, forinstance, the issue of Na- 22. These attitudeshave ben analyzed tiv 2, no. 67 (March1999) [in Hebrew], by OrenYiftachel, The Research on the whichis devotedto thequestion of the Arab Minorityin Israel and Its Relations Palestinianstate. withthe Jewish Majority: Survey and 11. The Messiah's Donkey (Tel Aviv: Analysis(Givat Haviva: Institute for Peace Yedi'otAharonot, 1997). Research,1993) [in Hebrew].

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