REPORT of the TASK FORCE ON THE FUTURE OF UMASS AMHERST

October 3, 2001

OUTLINE OF THE UMASS AMHERST TASK FORCE REPORT

I. THE CONTEXT OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT

II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF UMASS AMHERST

III. CLASSIFICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION • The Carnegie Foundation Classification (1994) • The Carnegie Foundation Classification (2000) • The Association of American (AAU)

IV. NATIONAL RATINGS OF UMASS AMHERST • US News and World Report • The National Research Council (NRC) • The Association of American Colleges (AAU) • The “Center” at the of Florida

V. FINANCIAL RESOURCES • A Comparison of Fiscal Resources with Peer Institutions • A Comparison of Fiscal Expenditures with Peer Institutions • Investment Decisions and Opportunities • Opportunities for Enhancing Revenue

VI. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1 Part One THE CONTEXT OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT

The decade of the nineties was a period of significant change — and at times upheaval – for the University of at Amherst (UMA). On several fronts the campus advanced its position as an important center for teaching, research and service to the public:

• The Board of Higher Education selected UMass Amherst in 1997 as the home of the statewide honors college — Commonwealth College. The first class was enrolled in 1999. • For the past two years, UMass Amherst has been named one of the institutions offering the best value for the money in the Kaplan/Newsweek college guide, and this year was also listed as a leading school supporting diversity. • The 1995 National Research Council (NRC) ranking of research doctoral programs placed UMass Amherst in the top 25% nationally in Linguistics, Materials Science, Psychology, Computer Sciences, Chemical Engineering, and Electrical Engineering. U.S. News and World Report also gave high marks to a number of programs, and ranked its schools of Education and Engineering the top 50 nationally. • The steady increase in one-year retention of freshmen students, rising from 75.6% for the group entering in 1990 to 83.5% in 1999. • The increase in mean combined SAT scores of entering freshmen, rising from 1078 in 1994 to 1133 in 1999. • The opening of the Knowles engineering building in 1991; the in 1993; the Conte Polymer Research Center in 1995; the Animal Care Facility and the Computer Science building in 1999; and the anticipated opening of ECS II (Engineering) in 2004 and Phase IA (teaching labs) of the Integrated Sciences Building (ISB) in 2006. • Successful completion of the first-ever Capital Campaign, and growth in annual giving from $10 million annually in 1990 to $25 million in 2000. • The establishment of the Pioneer Valley Life Sciences Initiative with Bay State Medical Center and the City of Springfield, and the overall commitment to the business community of the Pioneer Valley. • The number one ranking, amongst all state agencies, in giving to COMEC.

On the other hand, the campus faces many challenges. The campus, during the first six months of the year 2001, has suffered from problems of morale which can be attributed to several factors. (1) Chancellor David Scott’s announcement of his resignation on November 28, 2000. (2) Provost Cora Marrett’s announcement of her resignation on April 12, 2001. (3) Chancellor Scott’s announcement that there would be a $20 million shortfall in the fiscal year 2002 budget, and that such shortfall will require belt tightening by many parts of the campus, including the academic departments and schools. (4) The failure of the search for a Vice Chancellor for Research. (5) The anticipated downturn for the next several years in state support for public higher education as a result of a slower state economy and taxpayer approved state revenue reductions.

2 All of the above have led to expressions of deep concerns by the faculty about the future.

University of Massachusetts President William M. Bulger recognized that there is much that needs to be accomplished at UMass Amherst if we are to provide the quality of public education for the citizens of the Commonwealth to which we in the University System aspire.

Accordingly, President Bulger, on January 25, 2001, announced the formation of a Task Force to study the future of the Amherst campus with the following memo:

The President of the University of Massachusetts and its Board of Trustees share a common belief that the success and stature of the University System depend to a significant degree on the achievements of its campus at Amherst.

It is therefore a compelling goal of the President and the Board to support efforts to advance the quality and reputation of the University of Massachusetts Amherst such that it can assume its place nationally among the first rank of University campuses of the 21st century.

To achieve this goal, the President is appointing a task force to assess the opportunities and barriers to success and promote more effective functioning of the campus. It is his expectation that the report of this task force will inform and guide the search committee that will be charged with selecting a new Chancellor.

MEMBERS OF THE TASK FORCE

Aaron Lazare, M.D., Chancellor, University of Massachusetts Worcester, Chair Grace K. Fey, Chair, University of Massachusetts Board of Trustees Robert S. Karam, Trustee, University of Massachusetts Christy P. Mihos, Trustee, University of Massachusetts Robert Wagner, Provost, University of Massachusetts Lowell Jean F. MacCormack, Chancellor, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth John Cullinane of Dedham

WHY NOW?

The reasons for creating a Task Force to study UMA at this time were several-fold:

1. First and foremost, there was the imminent change in leadership at UMA with the resignation of Chancellor David Scott on June 30, 2001 after 8 years at the helm. At times of change in the senior leadership of many organizations, it is both common and sensible to engage in organizational reviews of goals and objectives, successes and failures, strengths and weaknesses, and changes in public expectations and in the marketplace. The findings of such a task force can provide useful knowledge to the search committee in determining appropriate candidates

3 and can provide the candidates with a better idea of the expectations of the President and the Board of Trustees of the University.

2. In addition, it was felt the Task Force might be able to identify for the President certain issues, the resolution of which can enhance the search process. More specifically there was a widespread view, on the campus and off, that the challenges facing UMass Amherst were of a nature, duration and scale that would make it difficult to attract the kind of Chancellor who could set a new course for the campus and mobilize the enthusiasm and support needed to help the institution achieve its potential. There was also a widespread belief that the very existence of interim leadership, irrespective of who fills these positions, contributes to a sense of an institution adrift. (The current interim positions include the Chancellor, Provost, and three of the five vice chancellor positions.) The President and Trustees therefore felt it was imperative to take the steps necessary to create an environment conducive to attracting high-caliber candidates for Chancellor and other leadership positions, and to signal that the period of interim leadership will be as brief as possible. The very presence of the Task Force and its visibility on the campus was hoped to communicate to the UMass Amherst academic community the commitment of the President and his Board of Trustees to the continued growth of the UMA campus.

3. Despite the many accomplishments and growth of the campus in recent years and its increasingly positive public perception, there was a deeply held belief on the part of the President and the Board of Trustees that much more could be accomplished (even with the existing resources) to greatly enhance the quality of education, research and other scholarly activity, and public service. There was the hope that the Task Force could shed some light on opportunities for increased accomplishments.

4. Across the nation, public universities have received smaller portions of their respective state budgets during the past decade than in previous years. This has been attributed to the states’ increasing support to K-12 initiatives, Medicaid, various needs for the elderly, and departments of corrections including the building of new prisons. The most successful public universities have grown during the past decade by diversifying their approaches to and sources of revenue; that is, capitalizing on their vast store of intellectual horsepower to identify and generate new sources of revenue beyond their core state support. The Task Force was expected to explore how UMA has been responding to the opportunities to sustain its core mission through revenue diversification.

SOURCES OF DATA FOR THE TASK FORCE

The Chair of the Task Force, Aaron Lazare, M.D. interviewed approximately 100 people during the period of January through June 2001. Sixty-five of these interviews were with a single person and 7 were in small groups. He was supported in this effort by Sandra Beling, MPA, who staffed all of the meetings. The interviewees included UMA administrators, all deans, a subcommittee of faculty union representatives, subcommittees

4 of the faculty senate, other faculty, students, alumni, legislators, high school teachers, guidance counselors, university vice presidents, university trustees, and members of the business community.

The results of the findings were discussed on several occasions with the rest of the Task Force for guidance and direction. If this report meets any of its intended purposes, it does so in reflection of the Task Force’s collective wisdom and experience. To the extent its’ survey of circumstances inadvertently deduces a conclusion not borne out by deeper analysis, the responsibility falls to the Task Force Chair who was relied upon to be their eyes and ears.

Numerous documents and articles were studied, most of which were recommended or supplied by constituents of the UMA campus community.

LIMITATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE

There are several limitations of this Task Force:

1. The sampling of those who were interviewed was limited given the size, complexity, broad impact and diversity of the campus.

2. The Task Force provides a global, “big picture” view of the campus. A more comprehensive analysis would require several teams of consultants with each team studying specialized areas.

3. The elicitation and interpretation of the data, particularly from interview, are influenced by the skills, experience and interests of the primary interviewer, Dr. Lazare. In appointing Chancellor Lazare as Task Force Chair, President Bulger sought to take advantage of the similarities of UMA and UMW as research institutions with a strong commitment to student education, to draw on his ten years experience as a UMass Chancellor, and in the hope that lessons learned in the growth and achievement of UMW under his tenure might have application to UMA. Both President Bulger and Chancellor Lazare are mindful of the distinctions in the missions, objectives and cultures of the respective campuses, but trust that that awareness and the interaction with the broader Task Force mitigate any resulting bias on the findings presented here.

ATHLETICS

The investment in athletics is an important function of UMass Amherst as well as in most university campuses. A fiscal look at the campus leaves it unclear whether spending on athletics is inconsistent with peers. It is clear that in athletics (like many others areas of the campus) offsetting revenue is not generated in sufficient quantity. The Task Force elected not to study athletics for two reasons: (1) There is a trustee committee dedicated to the study and oversight of athletics at the university. (2) The Task Force, because of limited time and manpower, could not do justice to the importance of the task.

5 Part Two A BRIEF HISTORY OF UMASS AMHERST

Volumes would be required to trace the long and rich evolution of the University’s flagship campus. The following brief survey only serves to reflect the common baseline understanding that informed the Task Force. Without an understanding of where the campus has been, it is difficult to impossible to determine future trajectory.

UMASS AMHERST AND ITS PREDECESSOR INSTITUTIONS

In 1863 the Massachusetts Agricultural College was established to provide children of working class families with access to higher education. Four faculty members greeted an entering class of 56 students in 1867, and the first degrees were awarded in 1871. Agricultural research opportunities were expanded in 1887 when the Hatch Act established the Agricultural Experiment Stations in connection with colleges and the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

The first graduate degrees at the Massachusetts Agricultural College followed in 1892. In 1914 the Cooperative Extension Service was established through the Smith-Lever Act as a partnership of researchers and educators who worked with citizens to translate the research to practical public application and to improve public access to the research base of the land-grant universities.

In 1931 the Massachusetts Agricultural College became the Massachusetts State College and expanded to serve the needs of the increasing number of women students. The University of Massachusetts, the successor institution in 1947, again expanded to meet the needs of servicemen enrolling through the G.I. bill.

Since World War II the University experienced rapid growth in its facilities, enrollment and number of programs. This growth reached its peak in the 1970’s and continued until the budget cuts and tuition increases of the late 1980’s and early 1990’s triggered an enrollment decline. Current enrollment stands at approximately 24,000. The University of Massachusetts Amherst main campus and field stations total over 4,000 acres with nearly10 million gross square feet of building space. It has now evolved into a research institution guided by the ideals of the Land Grant Act.

THE LAND GRANT HERITAGE

The Land Grant (Morrill) Act was signed into law in 1862 by President Lincoln and authorized the establishment of a land grant institution in each state. The legislation granted to each state 30,000 acres of public land for each Senator and Representative. Proceeds from the sale of these lands were to be invested in a perpetual endowment fund which would provide support for colleges of agriculture and mechanical arts in each of the states. The primary objective of the Morrill Act was to:

6 “…teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical arts in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the pursuits and professions of life.”

In the mid 1800’s when the Morrill Act took effect, the rural population in the U.S. was over 80% and there were few opportunities for rural citizens and farmers to obtain instruction in agriculture and other related areas. The land-grant concept provided children of working class families with access to higher education and combined traditional studies in arts and sciences with hands on practical training. President Lincoln, in his announcement of the signing said:

“The Land Grant University System is being built on behalf of the people, who have invested in these public institutions their hopes, their support and their confidence.”

Support in Congress for the Land-Grant Act was garnered because of the need to increase the efficiency of agricultural production for the nation, the need to educate farmers and help them earn a stable income and the need to find a fair plan to use and share the over one billion acres of the Western territory. Through the Land-Grant Act over 17.5 million acres was given to the states.

While the land-grant university was focusing on breaking down barriers between the university and society, segregation in the South still prevented African Americans from attending the original land-grant institutions. The Second Morrill Act in 1890 expanded the 1962 system of land grant universities to include institutions established to train African American teachers, and helped to establish land-grant universities in states that did not have an African American college.

UMass Amherst is one of 105 existing land-grant institutions in the United States and the only public land grant university in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

PRESIDENTS AND CHANCELLORS OF THE AMHERST CAMPUS

It is a central belief of the Task Force that strong and stable leadership are prerequisites to institutional growth and success. As this report serves to inform the search process for the next UMA Chancellor, it is worth reflecting on the periods of campus growth and development since 1863, and the strengths and weaknesses of campus leadership driving such outcomes. Twenty-two different Presidents and Chancellors have led the campus throughout its 137-year history.

Massachusetts Agricultural College Paul A. Chadbourne (1882-1883) Henry F. French (1864-1866) Henry H. Goodell (1883) Paul A. Chadbourne (1866-1867) James C. Greenough (1883-1886) William S. Clark (1867-1879) Henry H. Goodell (1886-1905) Levi Stockbridge (1879) William P. Brooks (1905-1906) Charles L. Flint (1879-1880) Kenyon L. Butterfield (1906-1924) Levi Stockbridge (1880-1882) Edward M. Lewis (1924-1927)

7 Massachusetts State College (1970-1971) Roscoe W. Thatcher (1927-1932) Randolph W. Bromery (1971-1979) Hugh P. Baker (1932-1946) (1979-1982) University of Massachusetts Loren Baritz (1982) Ralph Van Meter (1947-1954) (1982-1991) Jean P. Mather (1954-1960) Richard D. O’Brien (1991-1993) John W. Lederle (1960-1970) David K. Scott (1993-2001)

THE CURRENT 5-CAMPUS UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

In 1965 a second campus in Boston, which expanded to the Harbor Campus in 1974, joined the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The medical school campus in Worcester was authorized by the legislature in 1962 and admitted its first student in 1970. In 1970 the President’s Office moved from the Amherst campus and established a separate office in the state capital city, Boston. Even with this relocation of the University President, with separate line item appropriations from the legislature for each of the three campuses, the history, size and scope of the Amherst campus dominated the two fledgling campuses in public recognition and Board attention.

In 1989 the Board of Trustees commissioned a study to examine the future of the University of Massachusetts. The “Saxon Commission” report set the stage for the consolidation of the five campuses (the UMass campuses in Amherst, Boston and Worcester, the University of Lowell and Southeastern Massachusetts University) into the University of Massachusetts System. Meeting the new Executive Branch imperative to consolidate the governance structure of public higher education, legislation officially created the new 5-campus system along with a single President and Board of Trustees, and was signed into law in 1991 by Governor William F. Weld.

The new University presented a different governance environment for Amherst. Lowell and Dartmouth merged into the system with history, geography, political and board constituencies of their own. The continued development and evolution of Boston and Worcester found Amherst as the flagship of a five-campus system that it would lead but no longer dominate. The perception of the campus and the perception by the campus of this new governance arrangement has been a source of friction and frustration.

The Task Force Chair, an adoptive father of eight, occasionally thinks of UMass Amherst and the five campuses in terms of two family metaphors. (1) Each child at some time called me aside to ask whether we would be rich if we had only one child. My answer was “Which one do you have in mind?” (2) UMass Amherst is often though of as the first child, followed by two birth children (Boston and Worcester) followed by the adoption of two grown children (Lowell and Dartmouth). The parents moved to Boston and have been replaced by new parents (President and Board of Trustees) who have little connection to the first child. UMass Amherst, for many years an only child, now feels like the oldest child with the greatest responsibility while feeling most estranged from their new foster or adoptive parents.

8 Part Three CLASSIFICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

It was important for the Task Force on the Future of UMass Amherst (UMA) to develop a knowledge of the classification of universities in order to make sense out of the ratings based on such classifications. An understanding of classifications and ratings also provides perspective for decisions about the future of UMA– decisions that are both conceptual and practical. By conceptual, we mean what kind of institution UMA should be to best serve the needs of the Commonwealth and how it should function related to other public higher education campuses in Massachusetts. By practical, we refer to what UMA can achieve given current available fiscal resources, possible new sources of revenue, greater efficiency, and future leadership.

THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching in 1973 (and revised in 1994) devised a widely accepted taxonomy of institutions of higher education. For the purpose of this analysis, I list below the eight groupings of four-year institutions, which omit the associate degree colleges and specialized institutions (such as stand-alone medical schools). For the purpose of understanding the ratings of UMass Amherst, I will define only the first four on this list, the doctoral granting institutions which U.S. News and World Report refers to as the “National Universities.” UMass Amherst is categorized as a Research I doctoral granting university, one of 88 in the US.

Doctorate Granting Institutions (“National Universities” According the US News and World Report)

Research Universities I 88 Research Universities II 37

Doctoral Universities I 52 Doctoral Universities II 59

Masters (Comprehensive) Colleges and Universities Comprehensive Colleges and Universities I 439 Comprehensive Colleges and Universities I 93

Baccalaureate Colleges Baccalaureate (liberal arts colleges) I 163 Baccalaureate (liberal arts colleges) II 470

Source: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching

9

Definitions

Research I universities offer the following: • an extensive range of baccalaureate programs • a commitment to graduate education through the doctoral level • a high priority on research • award fifty or more doctoral degrees each year • receive $40 million or more annually in federal research support

Research II universities offer the following: These universities offer the same as above but receive between $15.5 and $40 million annual federal research support.

Doctoral I universities offer the following: Award 40 or more doctoral degrees annually in five or more disciplines No minimum amount of federal research support

Doctoral II universities offer the following: Award 10 or more doctoral degrees annually in three or more disciplines or 20 or more doctoral degrees annually in one or more disciplines. No minimum amount of federal research support

2000 CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATION

A recent change has been made in the Carnegie classification system. The four categories of Doctoral and Research universities have been renamed “Doctoral/Research/Extensive” and “Doctoral/Research/Intensive”.

Doctoral/Research Extensive are institutions that offer a wide range of baccalaureate programs and are committed to graduate education through the doctorate. They must award 50 or more doctoral degrees per year across at least 15 disciplines.

Doctoral/Research Intensive are institutions that award at least 10 doctoral degrees per year across three or more disciplines or at least 20 doctoral degrees per year overall.

“By grouping institutions in different ways, the foundation is hoping to help people think in new ways about the landscape of higher education. Along the way, it hopes to create a taxonomy that de-emphasizes the traditional race to be the ‘best’ college and looks instead to helping people find the best fit for their purpose.”1 This classification gives more weight to teaching and service while giving no weight to research. Many educators believe that the 1994 Carnegie Classification will persist in use because institutions strong in research, particularly Research I institutions, have so much in common.

1 Matrix, February 2001, page 55

10 ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES (AAU)

The Association of American Universities (AAU) is a prestigious group of 63 universities which assists members in (1) “developing national policy positions on issues that relate to academic research and graduate and professional education” and (2) providing them “with a forum for discussing a broad range of other institutional issues such as undergraduate education.” From time to time, the association elects new members with a required assent of 75% of its members. Many faculty and administrators on the Amherst campus aspire to membership to this prestigious group of member universities.

Sixty-one of the 63 AAU institutions are U.S. and two are Canadian (University of Toronto and McGill University). Fifty-eight of the 63 are Research I institutions. The remaining five include Catholic U. of America, which is Doctoral I, and four universities which are Research II: (Brandeis U., Rice U., Syracuse U., and Tulane). Forty-six AAU universities have medical schools and 17 have no medical schools. About half of the AAU universities are public. Twenty-three AAU members are Land Grant institutions.

Some Factors Reported to be Considered for AAU Membership

While there are no published criteria for membership in the AAU, conversations with leaders of member institutions suggest that the following factors are strongly influential:

• Federal Research and Development weighted per FTE faculty • Doctoral Degrees, total number weighted per FTE • Faculty Quality (averaged across all programs) • Faculty Awards in Arts and Humanities • Academy memberships, weighted per FTE • Post doctorates per FTE

The criteria listed above reflect achievements primarily at the graduate level.

11 AAU Members and Years of Admission

University at Stony Brook — State 2001 1904 University of New York 1900 Texas A & M University 2001 1900 University of California, Davis 1996 1900 University of California, Irvine 1996 1900 1995 1900 University of California, Santa Barbara 1995 The Catholic University of America 1900 Rutgers, The State University of New 1989 The 1900 Jersey The University of Wisconsin, Madison 1900 —State University of 1989 University of California, Berkeley 1900 of Chicago 1900 1985 1900 1985 University of Pennsylvania 1900 1985 1900 1985 Carnegie Mellon University 1982 University of California, San Diego 1982 University of California, Los Angeles 1974 1974 Case Western Reserve University 1969 University of Maryland, College Park 1969 1969 University of Southern California 1969 1966 University of Colorado, Boulder 1966 Michigan State University 1964 1958 1958 The Pennsylvania State University 1958 1958 New York University 1950 1950 1950 1941 1938 California Institute of Technology 1934 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1934 1933 University of Texas, Austin 1929 McGill University 1926 University of Toronto 1926 Washington University in St. Louis 1923 University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 1922 1917 The 1916 Indiana University 1909 1909 1909 University of Nebraska, Lincoln 1909 University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 1908 , Twin Cities 1908 , Columbia 1908

12 Part Four NATIONAL RATINGS OF UMASS AMHERST

A Task Force charged with “assessing the opportunities and barriers to success” in enabling UMA to “assume its place nationally among the first rank of University campuses of the 21st century” must first understand something of where UMA is currently measured.

Four different perspectives on ratings of institutional quality are described in the following section: (1) U.S. News and World Report, (2) National Research Council (NRC), (3) Association of American Universities (AAU), and (4) The Center at the University of Florida. The U.S. News and World Report ratings evaluate primarily undergraduate education while the other three ratings evaluate primarily research and graduate education.

In its self-assessments, UMA often compares itself to peer and aspirant institutions as approved by the Board of Trustees. They are listed below with AAU status noted. In the discussions which follow, the Task Force sometimes singles out the University of Connecticut for comparison because of its emerging rivalry with UMA (neighboring states, geographic proximity, possible competition for students, athletic rivalry, etc.).

We believe the faculty and administration of UMass Amherst as well as other educators would acknowledge that those peer and aspirant institutions with AAU status have currently surpassed UMA in relevant measures of accomplishments. For all practical purposes, therefore, we may regard both peer and aspirant schools as aspirant schools – except for the University of Connecticut, which should be regarded as a peer, not an aspirant institution.

UMass Peer Institutions

Iowa State U. AAU Michigan State U. AAU Ohio State U. (Columbus) AAU Pennsylvania State U. (Univ. Park) AAU Rutgers (New Brunswick) AAU SUNY, Buffalo AAU SUNY, Stony Brook AAU U California Santa Barbara AAU U Colorado Boulder AAU U Connecticut (Storrs and Health Center) ------U Florida AAU U Maryland (College Park) AAU U Missouri – (Columbia) AAU U Nebraska – (Lincoln) AAU

13 UMass Aspirant Institutions

U of Arizona AAU U California, Berkeley AAU U California, Davis AAU U California, Irvine AAU U Illinois, Urbana/Champaign AAU U Minnesota, Twin Cities AAU U Wisconsin, Madison AAU

I. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT 2001

With its goal of providing a reliable college choice guide, U.S. News’ rankings are based primarily on an assessment of undergraduate education. (U.S. News’ ranking of graduate programs is also based on a “college choice” perspective.) For instance, its ratings are based on class size, graduation rate, and faculty resources whereas the National Research Council and AAU ratings are based on research funding and “scholarly quality of program faculty.” The U.S. News ratings are the most widely regarded undergraduate university ratings in the U.S. Those universities who are rated highly believe the US News ratings are valid, while those universities who believe their ratings should have been higher believe the US News methodology is flawed. The fact that 38 of the 51 highest rated universities are members of AAU provides some validation for the U.S. News ratings. A sounder conclusion may be that the best research universities provide the best undergraduate education.

NATIONAL UNIVERSITIES

U.S. News ranks institutions in different groupings, one of which is “national” universities.” This includes all Research I, Research II, Doctoral I and Doctoral II institutions according to the Carnegie Classification. By the US News count, there are 228 national universities. UMass Amherst is a Research I university, of which there are 88 out of the 228 national universities. Among the top rated 51 universities by US News, all but 11 were Research I. Those educational institutions not included in the National University group are the national liberal arts colleges, regional universities, and regional liberal arts colleges. None of the latter grants doctoral degrees. In effect, the 228 national universities with which UMA is being compared are the doctoral degree granting institutions.

14 US NEWS CRITERIA

The US News measurements fall into seven broad categories and each category accounts for a certain percent of the overall rating. The categories with their weighting are as follows: academic reputation 25% student selectivity 15% (acceptance rate, yield, high school class standing, SAT scores.) faculty resources 20% (faculty compensation, % faculty with terminal degree, % full time faculty, student/faculty ratio, class size) graduation and retention rate 20% (% of students who graduate within 6 years, % of freshman who return the following fall) financial resources 10% (average educational expenditures per student) average alumni giving 5% graduation rate performance 5%

In the year 2000 US News, UMass Amherst ranked 96 of 228 national universities. UMass Amherst tied , the University of New Hampshire, the , and Washington State University for ranks 47-51 in public universities. University of Connecticut ranked 38th, nine places ahead of UMass. OAPA estimated that UMA ranks somewhere between 51st and 60th among the 88 Research I institutions. US News rated UMass Amherst 65th on its measure of national reputation.

The public universities rated among the top 51 national universities (ratings included) are:

U.C. Berkley #20 U. Virginia #21 U. C. Los Angeles #25 U. Michigan #25 U. North Carolina #25 College of William and Mary #30 U.C. San Diego #31 Georgia Institute of Technology #35 University of Wisconsin #35 U.C. Davis #41 U.C. Irvine #41 University of Illinois #41 Penn State #44 U.C. Santa Barbara #45 University of Washington #45 U. Texas Austin #49

These are the universities to which UMass Amherst should aspire.

15 GRADUATE PROGRAMS

U.S. News ranks 37 graduate programs, and 134 separate specialties within graduate programs. For programs, rankings are published for only some of the institutions reviewed (typically the top 50 in that area, but in some cases only the top 20 or even fewer). For specialties, typically only the top 10 institutions are identified. UMass Amherst does not offer 12 of the 37 graduate programs ranked by U.S. News.

The table below summarizes U.S. News data over the past five years, indicating for each program offered at UMass Amherst its ranking in the most recent year for which U.S. News published data. If a program did not place in the top 50 (or other grouping as published by U.S. News), its rank is listed as “unk” (unknown), and the number of institutions for which a ranking was published is indicated. For example, Biological Sciences programs were last ranked in 1998; the UMass Amherst program did not appear among the top 25). In most cases U.S. News ranked graduate programs in their entirety; if the ranking applied only to the Master’s (M) program or doctoral (D) program, this is indicated.

U.S. NEWS RANKINGS OF UMASS AMHERST GRADUATE PROGRAMS (higher percentile is better)

Program Rank No. Ranked %tile Year

Audiology 36 116 69% 1999 Computer Science 21 135 84% 1998 Creative Writing 10 198 95% 1996 Drama (M) 48 102 53% 1996 Education 39 107 64% 2000 Engineering 45 122 63% 2000 English 39 137 72% 2000 Fine Arts (M) 55 185 70% 1996 History 55 132 58% 2000 Music (M) 73 205 64% 1996 Nursing (M) 59 269 78% 1999 Political Science 57 114 50% 2000 Psychology 45 322 86% 2000 Public Affairs (M) 65 252 74% 2000 Public Health 18 28 36% 1999 Sociology 38 108 65% 2000 Speech-Language Pathology (M) 30 221 86% 1999

16 In terms of specialties within disciplines, UMass Amherst has been ranked among the small number of top performers in six cases over the past five years:

Specialty Rank Year

Clinical Psychology (D) 28 2000 Chemistry: Polymer 1 1998 Computer Science: Artificial Intelligence 6 1998 Computer Science: Databases 13 1996 Education: Curriculum and Instruction 26 1997 Engineering: Computer 20 1997

SUMMARY AND FINDINGS

UMA, according to U.S. News, ranks 96th of 228 national universities but 65th in reputation and 47th among the 147 public universities. In the most recent graduate rankings for each discipline, nine programs ranked in the top third nationally.

It is of considerable interest that 40 of the top 51 US News universities are among the 88 Research One institutions. At the same time, 48 Research One institutions are not included in the top 51 US News universities. This means (1) that Research One institutions provide, for the most part, first rate undergraduate education and (2) that a university does not have to be a Research One institution to provide first rate undergraduate education. The same argument can be drawn from the relationship of the US News top 51 to AAU membership. Thirty-eight of the top 51 schools enjoy AAU membership. This means that, for the most part, AAU institutions, which are primarily research oriented by definition, provide outstanding undergraduate education. At the same time, a school does not have to be AAU to provide outstanding education.

17 II. RATINGS OF RESEARCH-DOCTORATE PROGRAMS BY THE NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC) (Based on an analysis by UMA Office of Academic Planning and Assessment [OAPA])

The National Research Council in 1982 and 1995 studied program quality among research-doctorate programs in the U.S. The UMA Office of Academic Planning and Assessment notes that “the NRC studies are widely acknowledged to be the most comprehensive and credible attempts to evaluate the relative strength of research- doctorate programs and are used by many third parties with an interest in assessing program strength.” The data for the 1995 study was compiled in 1993.

Rankings Based on 1995 Study

The most widely cited indicator in the NRC studies is the program ranking according to the “scholarly quality of program faculty,” based on a reputation survey of scholars in each ranked discipline nationwide. On this measure, the OAPA analysis found that one third of UMass Amherst programs ranked in the top third nationally, and just over half (55%) ranked in the top half of 274 institutions included in the study. In the aggregate, this would suggest that UMass Amherst was roughly average among the sample which included more than the Research I institutions. However, many institutions were rated in only a few programs. According to an analysis conducted by Webster and Skinner, UMass placed 49th among 110 institutions with 15 or more programs rated in the particular rating of “scholarly quality of program faculty” but 65.5 in the overall rating.

The following table shows the percentile rank for the top ten UMA programs (in terms of scholarly reputation of program faculty) among 274 institutions in the study, 169 public and 105 private.

Ten UMA programs (of 31 UMA programs rated): ranking in the top third nationally of 274 institutions

• Linguistics (top 10th percentile) • Materials Science: Polymer Science and Engineering (top 11th percentile) • Psychology (top 15th percentile) • Computer Sciences (top 17th percentile) • Chemical Engineering (top 23rd percentile) • Electrical Engineering (top 23rd percentile) • Cell and Developmental Biology (top 28th percentile) • Ecology, Evolution and Behavior (top 28th percentile) • Philosophy (top 28th percentile) • English (top 32nd percentile) Table I

18 III. RATINGS OF UMA COMPARED WITH AAU INSTITUTIONS

The Office of Institutional Research at UMA analyzes composite and individual scores believed to replicate the AAU methodology used in assessing the standing of universities. The analysis summarized here uses the most recent available data: the 1993 NRC data (scholarly quality of faculty); 1998 data for federal R&D expenditures, doctorates awarded, and post-doctorates; and 2000 data for academy memberships.

The Office of Institutional Research analysis includes all AAU and Research I institutions. Based on that analysis, UMA’s standing among its peers is a follows:

AAU/RESEARCH I COMPOSITE SCORES FOR UMA PEER INSTITUTIONS (sorted best to worst score)

Institution AAU Composite Score (1998 data)

U. California – Santa Barbara 1995 59.1 U. at Stony Brook – SUNY 2001 58.9 U. Colorado – Boulder 1966 51.5 Pennsylvania State U. – University Park 1958 46.8 U. Maryland – College Park 1969 45.1 U. Florida – Gainesville 1985 39.4 Rutgers U. – New Brunswick 1989 37.1 U. at Buffalo – SUNY 1989 35.6 Ohio State U. – Columbia 1916 35.0 U. Massachusetts – Amherst 33.4 U. Connecticut – Storrs & Health Center 26.9 Iowa State U. 1958 26.5 U. Missouri – Columbia 1908 23.6 Michigan State U. 1964 21.8 U. Nebraska – Lincoln 1909 13.0

All the UMass peer institutions except UConn are members of the AAU (SUNY Stony Brook was admitted May 2001). The four AAU institutions with scores lower than UMA have been AAU members for many years.

The OIR analysis also compared UMA and UConn with all current U.S. AAU members (including the two most recent members, SUNY Stony Brook and Texas A&M):

19 HYPOTHETICAL RANKINGS OF UMA AND UCONN IF BOTH JOINED THE CURRENT 61 U.S. AAU MEMBERS (N=63; lower is better)

UMass UConn Composite score* 53 59 Federal R & D per FTE 57 52 Doctorates per FTE* 53 55 Average Faculty Quality Ratings* 48 59 Faculty with Art and Humanities Awards* 27 33 Academy memberships per full-time faculty* 49 61 Post doctorates per full-time faculty 55 48

• Areas where UMass would rank higher than UConn

RANKINGS OF UMA, UCONN, AND LAST TWELVE INSTITUTIONS ADMITTED TO AAU (N=63; lower is better)

(Based on composite score)

Institution AAU Rank

U. California – Irvine 1996 23 Brandeis U. 1985 25 U. California – Davis 1996 26 U. California – Santa Barbara 1995 33 Emory U. 1995 34 U. at Stony Brook – SUNY 2001 35 U. Arizona 1985 37 Rice U. 1985 38 Texas A&M U. 2001 43 U. Florida – Gainesville 1985 48 Rutgers U. – New Brunswick 1989 50 U. at Buffalo – SUNY 1989 51 U. Massachusetts – Amherst 53 U. Connecticut – Storrs & Health Center 59

NON-AAU INSTITUTIONS WITH HIGHER COMPOSITE SCORES THAN UMASS AMHERST (13)

Looking again at all Research I institutions, OIR identified 13 non-AAU institutions with composite scores higher than UMA. In theory, these institutions would be considered for membership before UMA (note that some are specialized institutions that would not likely be considered for AAU membership).

20

Institution Composite Score

U. California – San Francisco 83.7 Rockefeller U. 72.7 Yeshiva U. 66.0 U. Alabama – Birmingham 56.5 Georgia Institute of Technology 51.3 Oregon State U. 43.7 U. Utah 42.3 Tufts U. 42.0 North Carolina State U. 38.3 U. Miami 35.0 Georgetown U. 35.0 Boston U. 34.8 U. Illinois – Chicago 34.0 U. Massachusetts – Amherst 33.4

FINDINGS

All twelve of the institutions most recently admitted to the AAU (since 1985) had higher composite scores than UMA. There are, in addition, 13 institutions which are not members of AAU have higher composite scores than UMA. If UMass and UConn were members of the AAU, they would rank 53rd and 59th, respectively, among the 61 current U.S. members on purported criteria.

IV. THE CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

The Center at the University of Florida, under the leadership of John V. Lombardi (former university president), embarked on a program to measure university performance. They developed a structure for identifying some key characteristics of top research universities in the U.S. The Center lists nine measures:

• Total research expenditures • Federal research expenditures • Endowment assets • Annual giving • National Academy Members • Prestigious Faculty awards • Doctoral Degrees Granted • Postdoctoral appointees • Median SAT of the Entering Fall Class

It should be noted that, unlike the AAU methodology, The Center’s approach does not scale research expenditures and other variables to the number of faculty but rather to the

21 campus, thus making institutional size an important unstated factor in its rankings. The Center analyzed only those universities that have at least $20 million in research expenditures. They grouped 47 public universities into nine groupings using the nine criteria listed above. UMA was not ranked as being among the top 47. UConn did not appear in the ratings.

In more recent ratings to be published around August 2001 and based on FY 1999 data, UMA has no measures that rank it in the top 50 of all universities, but three measures rank it in the 25-50 range among public universities.

Among all pubic universities, UMass Amherst has the following ratings: (lower is better)

• Total research expenditures 68 • Federal research expenditures 69 • Endowment assets 129 • Annual giving 101 • National Academy Members 33 • Prestigious Faculty awards 32 • Doctoral Degrees Granted 32 • Postdoctoral appointees ? • Median SAT of the Entering Fall Class 65

From the above data, UMA’s greatest strength is its faculty and its greatest weakness is its endowment assets.

22 Part Five FINANCIAL RESOURCES

It is essential in assessing UMass Amherst’s current standing and future prospects to carefully examine its resources. While leadership, campus morale, external support and other factors are all important, ultimately the campus’s future success will rely on its ability to generate adequate resources to make the right investments at the right time.

From this perspective there are several threshold questions: What financial resources are available to the campus leadership? How do these compare with peer campuses? How can these resources be increased? How are these resources being used? How does this relate to peer campuses?

The Task Force began its work with no preconceived notions about the campus’s revenue base or spending decisions. During the campus interviews remarks about the tightness of budgets and a general sense of resources spread too thin were common, but it was difficult from this kind of anecdotal evidence to determine whether the problem was insufficient resources, ineffective use of resources, or both. The Task Force obtained a budget office report of revenues and expenditures at UMass Amherst and a group of peer institutions. The Task Force report relies on this data together with a report written by Professor Craig L. Moore on the campus budget and submitted on April 2001 to the Program and Budget Council of the Faculty Senate.

The resulting analysis from the budget office (referred to here as the “Peer Study”) was based on the institutions’ standard financial reports to the federal government and their audited financial statements. It attempted to compensate for known problems that make apples-to-apples comparisons difficult (understanding that such compensating adjustments are subjective and subject to challenge):

• It examined the six approved peer institutions without the costs of medical or veterinary schools embedded in the fiscal structure, since medical schools dramatically alter a university’s cost structure. The six institutions were Rutgers, University of California at Santa Barbara, University of Colorado at Boulder, University of Connecticut, University of Maryland at College Park, and University of Nebraska at Lincoln. Of these, all are Research I institutions; all but UC Santa Barbara are flagship campuses; all but UConn are members of the AAU; and all but the University of Colorado are Land Grant institutions. The comparisons were, therefore, with a group of universities in very much the same business as UMass Amherst.

• It looked at revenues of all sources and types, and spending in all categories. Some activities were excluded (in terms of both revenues and expenditures) in an effort to permit a level playing field for comparison of the core business. Excluded activities were self-funding auxiliary enterprises (such as dining halls and dormitories); sponsored research (although research overhead funds were counted); and university system-level activities.

23

• To account for differences in institutional size, all revenues and expenditures were scaled to the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) students (understanding that some analysis might have lead to differing conclusions if done on a headcount basis).

• The Peer Study also took measures to try and compare state revenues on an “apples- to-apple” basis. To do this, state appropriations for all institutions were adjusted by any tuition revenue remitted to the state, by any employee benefits paid by the state, and by the cost of any state-mandated tuition waivers. The result was intended to indicate the net state support for each university.

1. THE AVAILABILITY OF RESOURCES

Universities have two basic types of revenue: general operating revenues (to support ongoing programs and activities); and revenues to support the construction and renovation of facilities (called plant, or capital funds). Table 1 shows operating and capital revenues for all seven institutions. With respect to general operating revenues UMass Amherst was slightly above the peer average. But capital revenues were lower than all but one of the peers, and 60% below the peer average. Overall, in FY99 UMass Amherst’s total revenues per FTE student placed it near the middle of its peers, $450 (about 2%) less than the peer average. Revenues would have had to increase by about $10 million for UMass Amherst to equal the peer average per FTE, or reduce its enrollment by over 500 FTE (without losing FTE related revenue).

Table 1. Revenues per FTE Student UMass Amherst and Six Peer Institutions, FY 1999

Operating Capital TOTAL Rutgers $20,037 $814 $20,851 UC Santa Barbara $15,841 $284 $16,125 U Colorado, Boulder $14,534 $886 $15,420 UConn $20,160 $4,970 $25,130 U Maryland, College Park $21,750 $925 $22,675 U Nebraska, Lincoln $15,816 $715 $16,531

Peer Average $18,023 $1,432 $19,455

UMass Amherst $18,434 $571 $19,005

Difference from average (Dollars per FTE) $411 ($861) ($450) Difference from average (Percent) 2.3% -60.1% -2.3%

Sources: IPEDS and audited financial statements

UMass Amherst may be even further behind its peers if we adjust for regional differences in the cost of living. The Northeast corridor and southern California have relatively high costs of living compared with the South, Midwest and Rocky Mountain regions. If one focuses on the four peers in the “high cost” areas (Rutgers. UC Santa Barbara, UConn and U Maryland), UMass Amherst falls behind the average by more than 10%. UMass Amherst would then have to increase its revenue by more than $47 million in order to equal the average. It would take an additional $40 million in annual revenue to bring UMass Amherst’s revenues per FTE up to the level of the next highest peer, Rutgers. It

24 would take more than $132 million in additional revenue to bring UMass Amherst even with UConn (including its capital investment). Conversely, if the data were adjusted for the extraordinary capital commitment to UConn, UMass would be doing better than both the Peer Average Operating and Total revenues.

Where the Money Comes From. There are substantial differences between UMA and its peers in the sources of its money. As Figure 1 shows, UMass Amherst is significantly above the average in the dollars it receives from tuition and fees, and significantly below for state support and gifts and endowments. To reach the peer average, UMass Amherst’s state support would have to increase by nearly $8 million, and gift and endowment income would have to increase by more than $10 million, or reduce 400-500 FTE without losing state support or gift/endowment income.

UMass Amherst Revenues per FTE, Compared to Peer Average (FY 1999)

$800

$589 $600

$400

$200 $59

$-

$(200)

$(265) $(400) $(359)

$(475) $(600) Tuition & Fees Gov't Grant Overhead, Sales & Services State Support Gift, Endowment & Fed'l Financial Aid, Other Plant Support Other

2. HOW RESOURCES ARE USED

A university’s pattern of expenditures provides a roadmap of sorts to its priorities and aspirations. One expects that it will invest its money in areas deemed most important to its future, so that over time it can become better at what it does and more responsive to society’s needs. There is therefore much to be learned from the comparison of UMass Amherst’s expenditures with those of other institutions with similar missions and activities.

As with revenues, the campus’s total spending on an FTE basis appeared on the low side of average for the peer group. (Note that the analysis did not account for the possibly higher cost of living in Western Massachusetts. The campus’s actual buying power may be lower, especially compared to such institutions as the University of Nebraska and the University of Colorado). Figure 2 shows UMass Amherst’s spending per FTE student as

25 compared to the peer average for each of nine categories of expenditure. It is clear that, while the campus’s total spending was not far from the peer average, some differences by category were significant.

Low Investment: Capital Projects and the “Academic Core”. The greatest differences between UMass Amherst and its peers are in the areas of capital projects and what one might call the “academic core” (the combination of instruction, non-sponsored research and service with academic support activities such as libraries, instructional technology, and some kinds of advising). Spending on new facilities and renovations was more than 27% lower than the peer average, and lower than any of the peers except UC Santa Barbara (a relatively new campus) and the University of Nebraska (where, one might assume, construction costs are considerably lower than in Western Massachusetts). This finding is consistent with the earlier observation that UMass Amherst’s capital revenues are substantially below the peer average. Interestingly, the difference is less for capital expenditures than for capital revenues: the Peer Study also shows that the campus spends more of its operating budget on capital purposes than its peers, apparently in an effort to make up for low capital revenues. To equal the peer average for capital expenditures, UMass Amherst would have had to spend an additional $15 million in FY 1999, or reduce FTE enrollment by 700.

Figure 2. UMass Amherst Expenditures per FTE, Compared to Peer Average (FY 1999)

$600 $464

$400 $351 $249 $200 $104

$- $(27)

$(200) $(159) $(213)

$(400) $(325)

$(600)

$(658) $(800) Financial Aid Athletics Operation & Student Quasi- Institutional Academic Instruction, Capital Maintenance Services Endowment Support Support Research, Projects of Plant Service

As might be expected, spending on core academic activities represents the largest single area of investment at all seven institutions, representing on average about 58% of spending for the peers (vs. 56% for UMass Amherst). UMass Amherst’s spending per FTE was about 5% lower than the peer average, and the campus would have had to spend almost $12 million more in FY 1999 to equal the average of its peers, or spend the same amount on 550 fewer FTE’s.

26 High Investment: Financial Aid, Athletics, Operations & Maintenance. On the other end of the scale, spending per FTE at UMass Amherst is higher than the peer average in three areas: financial aid, athletics, and operation and maintenance of plant (O&M). UMass Amherst’s spending on financial aid is higher than any of the peers except Rutgers, and nearly 30% higher than the average. The campus could spend $10 million less on financial aid and still roughly equal the peer average. Especially interesting is the Peer Study’s examination of the sources of funding for financial aid. On a per-student basis, UMass Amherst receives more from the federal government but less from the state government than the peer average. It also spends almost twice as much from institutional funds as do the peers (see Figure 3).

The Peer Study’s comparison of spending on athletics attempted to account for differences in the ways in which athletics programs are supported on different campuses (as auxiliaries, through student fees, etc.). The comparison tried to identify the net subsidy for athletics from each campus’s operating budget. After such adjustments, support of athletics at UMass Amherst is more than the peer average. The difference between the campus and its peers may be explained in partly its’ Title IX commitment and by the scope of UMass Amherst’s program: it sponsors more intercollegiate teams (27) than any of the peers but Rutgers, with which it is tied. Recent reductions in ticket revenue, especially for basketball, may also be a factor.

The campus also has relatively high spending on Operations and Maintenance, 18% more than the peer average. Some campus officials suggest that this may be due in part to the relatively poor general state of campus facilities, which results in higher ongoing maintenance costs. Others suggest that there are significant inefficiencies in the delivery of services.

27 3. INVESTMENTS: PAST DECISIONS, FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES

The current pattern of expenditures at UMass Amherst is the product of investment decisions made over time. While there are always constraints on new revenues, campus officials point out that substantial reallocation has occurred within the existing budget, especially since the financial upheavals of the late eighties and early nineties. Over the course of the decade, for example, four separate retirement incentive programs have been implemented, resulting in the central recovery and subsequent reinvestment of millions of dollars. As another example, even though the total faculty has been reduced by some 260 positions since 1990, faculty hiring has not stopped. In fact, roughly 1,000 faculty positions have been filled since 1985. About three-quarters of the faculty members now on campus have been hired in the past fifteen years.

Each time a faculty member is hired, or a building is connected to the I.S. campus network, or a new financial aid program is created, a decision is being made about the future of the campus. These investments, and countless others like them, will determine whether UMass Amherst can realize its full potential and rise through the ranks of the great universities. It is therefore important to view campus spending as a process of change. With this in mind, the Task Force examined recent campus investment decisions and also the potential for investment in the future.

Recent Investments: “Strategic Action.” The Task Force was provided with copies of Chancellor Scott’s planning documents (“Strategic Action” and subsequent additions), which served as a framework for his spending decisions during the period FY 1996-01. While many opinions were expressed about these plans during the campus interviews, there seemed to be widespread agreement that Chancellor Scott had effectively implemented the spending priorities laid out in this plan.

Documents generated by the UMass Amherst Budget Office described the allocation of new or centrally reallocated money during each of these years, as summarized below. Over these six years, the campus made centrally directed spending decisions of nearly $100 million. An unknown, but presumably substantial, sum was also invested by vice chancellors, deans and others within their existing budgets.

If one examines the central investment decisions, several observations can be made. First, roughly half of the total was committed to salary increases (most to fund collective bargaining agreements and comparable increases for non-unionized employees). Salary increases have historically been determined and funded (in their initial year) by the Commonwealth, so decisions about salaries (vs. decisions about the number and type of employees) cannot really be said to been under the control of the Amherst campus chancellor. Second, the campus reported some other allocations that can be viewed as “non-discretionary”: utility rate increases, legislative earmarking, assessments for central services, etc. There remain, however, almost $50 million in allocations over this period which were within the control of the campus.

28 Campus Spending (Central Allocations) FY96-01 (in thousands)

FY 96 FY 97 FY 98 FY 99 FY 00 FY 01 Total "Major Initiatives" Academic "Core" $ 1,262 $ 1,173 $ 2,783 $ 1,045 $ 805 $ 2,024 $ 9,092 Other $ 1,802 $ 977 $ 1,258 $ 1,110 $ 1,890 $ 7,037

Technology $ 1,330 $ 1,379 $ 2,864 $ 1,907 $ 1,443 $ 8,923

Infrastructure $ 1,750 $ 2,100 $ 2,000 $ 1,600 $ 1,200 $ 8,650

Financial Aid $ 760 $ 400 $ 3,090 $ 1,196 $ 2,335 $ 960 $ 8,741

Salaries $ 4,586 $ 6,883 $ 9,385 $ 7,031 $ 6,550 $ 11,316 $ 45,751

Other Discretionary $ 2,919 $ 265 $ 1,125 $ 522 $ 4,831 Non-Discretionary $ 1,488 $ 1,307 $ 663 $ 360 $ 1,542 $ 5,360

TOTAL $ 11,329 $ 14,266 $ 22,427 $ 16,431 $ 15,447 $ 18,485 $ 98,385

These discretionary investments were roughly evenly divided among the academic “core” (instruction, research, service, and academic support), technology (networking, PeopleSoft, etc.), infrastructure (repairs, renewal, etc.), and financial aid (both need- based and merit-based), with the remaining quarter spent for various other purposes.

The importance — and effectiveness — of a planning context for investment is demonstrated if one looks at the Peer Study data in light of the spending decisions summarized above. Consistently, over a period of years, spending at UMass Amherst was directed at a few priorities: technology, financial aid, and infrastructure. Other activities, especially in the core academic and academic support areas, received less emphasis. The extent to which these planned investments drove change can be seen in Figure 4, which compares the proportion of available money invested in key areas with the proportion of the existing base budget devoted to those same purposes.

So, for example, the campus spent half again as much of its “new” money on financial aid from FY96-99 as it had in prior years. This disproportionately large new investment at least partly explains why campus spending was high in this area when compared with the peer average in FY99. On the other hand, during this period the campus put only about a third as much of its new money into the academic core as it had in the past, a decision that must have contributed to the below average showing compared with the peers. With respect to infrastructure, new investment was almost twice the base, but the starting point compared to peers was apparently so low that it would take many more years to make up the difference.

29

Implications for the Future. The point here is not to pass judgment on the wisdom of past campus spending decisions, but rather to illustrate that a consistent, coherent strategy can drive change, and that UMass Amherst has demonstrated its ability to do so. This realization is crucial when thinking about the campus’s future.

The next Chancellor will be in a position to shape his or her own plan. It is evident from the Peer Study and from the analysis of recent spending that significant opportunities exist, even within the existing resource base, to affect the future course of the campus. Important decisions will be made: whether to continue the strong emphasis on funding financial aid and technology from the institutional operating budget; how much of the deficit in capital funding can reasonably be shouldered by the operating budget; what are the prospects for instructional and research excellence if the academic core commands a declining share of campus resources, to cite only a few.

The urgency of such decisions was clear in the campus interviews and from planning work already underway on the campus. The Task Force was provided with a copy of a report issued a year ago by the Academic Affairs Financial Planning Committee (AAFPC), a group organized by the Provost to consider financial issues affecting academic excellence. That group projected nearly 500 faculty vacancies between 2001 and 2010, representing a key opportunity for the campus. The AAFPC also found, however, that faculty positions are being left unfilled because the vacancy savings must be used to meet a variety of “unfunded mandates” and other costs for which funding is not provided by the institution. The AAFPC’s conclusion was that, without a change in institutional spending priorities, only a little more than half of the projected faculty vacancies could be filled over the next decade. By 2010, the AAFPC feared base faculty at UMass Amherst could shrink to roughly 870, compared with 1,090 today and 1,350 in 1990. The Task Force was not in a position to conduct its own evaluation of these

30 findings, but the overall trend described by the AAFPC is not inconsistent with the results of the Peer Study and the analysis of recent spending decisions. It is clear that the question of the future size and composition of the faculty must be at the center of the next phase of campus planning.

Opportunities for Revenue Growth. The Task Force found widespread agreement on the campus that the institution’s standing is not likely to improve in any significant way if revenues do not grow beyond the projected incremental rate. Indeed, it makes sense, given the findings of the Peer Study, to conclude that UMass Amherst will find it difficult to move through the ranks of its competitors if its revenues remain at or below average. A key question is therefore how to build new revenues.

Some on the campus expressed the view that additional funding should be sought in the form of a substantial increase in the state appropriation (along the lines of the “special allocation” advocated by Chancellor Scott). But even the most enthusiastic supporters of this idea seem to acknowledge that, given the Commonwealth’s other obligations and the recently approved tax cut, major increases in the regular state appropriation are not likely.

Last year, the Provost appointed another planning group to examine the potential for new revenue sources capable of supporting the academic core (with implications, as well, for the campus as a whole). The Committee on Revenue Development (CRD) undertook a comprehensive review of possibilities for new revenue sources, with a special focus on the conditions necessary for the success of each possible strategy. The CRD’s report, issued in March, was provided to the Task Force, as was subsequent analysis performed by staff in the Provost’s Office.

Some of the CRD’s findings are summarized in the following table, “Feasibility and Revenue Potential for Selected Initiatives.” The table arrays twenty or so possible sources of new revenue according to two considerations: 1) the amount of new revenue likely to be generated; and 2) the feasibility, or likelihood of success, of the new source (sometimes within the context of specific conditions or assumptions). The Task Force did not make its own evaluation of the CRD’s work, but the kind of thinking represented in the “feasibility” table seems important to any serious effort to develop new revenue sources for the campus.

A few observations seem especially important from the Task Force’s perspective:

• First, the CRD identified only two potential revenue sources with both substantial likely pay-offs and reasonable likelihood of success: large-scale distance learning programs and continued growth in endowed chairs. Both judgements rely on important assumptions. In the case of distance learning significant up-front investments are assumed, as are adequate faculty and faculty incentives. In the case of endowed chairs, it is assumed that the successful state matching program will continue. Otherwise, the CRD found that other revenue ideas either had more modest absolute revenue potential, were less likely to be successful, or both, suggesting caution when projecting additional revenue potential.

31

Feasibility and Revenue Potential for Selected Initiatives

Substantial Potential Revenue Moderate Potential Revenue Modest Potential Revenue

Distance Learning (large Distance Learning (niche programs) programs) • Assumes significant up-front investment • Assumes significant up-front • Assumes adequate faculty, incentives

investment • Concerns re quality control, marketing y l e • Assumes adequate faculty, • Pay-off ramps up over time k i incentives L y

l • Concerns re quality control, Alumni Fundraising b

a marketing • Assumes department-based efforts n o • Pay-off ramps up over time • Assumes reorganization of Development s a

e • Assumes appropriate faculty incentives

R Endowed Chairs • Assumes continued state match

Major Gifts (capital and Joint Ventures/Economic Development Tax on Development Activity (Gifts) programmatic) • Restricted, not general, revenues • Not popular with donors • From external (non-alumni) • Assumes adequate faculty/incentives • Doesn’t actually create revenue donors • Assumes reorganization of Targeted Faculty Recruitment Revision of Sabbatical Policy

Development • High grant-producing fields • Offer 75% pay for full year e l b • Depends on new allocations for faculty i s s Business Centers o

P Commercial Ventures/Intellectual Property • Consolidate administrative support for (CVIP) clusters of departments • Assumes adequate faculty/incentives • Expensive to implement • Pay-off occurs after 6-8 years

Major Increases in State Shift Faculty Salaries to Grants Retirement Incentive Program Appropriation • Not permitted by most agencies • Already utilized repeatedly • Reduces competitive advantage • Expensive without State participation Regulatory Relief • Facilities Four Course/Four Credit Curriculum Increase Indirect Cost Recovery Rate

• Outsourcing • Expensive to implement • Already pursued y l e • Personnel & collective bargaining • Requires faculty leadership, incentives • Subject to federal audit k i l n

U UMass Central Cost Relief

Tuition Retention

Derived in part from the Report of the Provost’s Committee on Revenue Development, University of Massachusetts Amherst (March 7, 2001)

32

• Second, a number of potential revenue sources — including some of those with higher potential pay-offs and/or chances of success — rely on the availability of faculty and faculty incentives. In addition to major distance learning programs, the CRD identified “niche” distance learning programs, increased alumni fundraising, targeted recruitment in high grant-producing fields, commercial ventures, shifting of faculty salaries to grants, and realignment to a four course/four credit curriculum as all relying on faculty participation. This consideration is especially critical in light of the faculty trends cited above.

• Third, some of these ideas are already under development. Campus officials report that expansion of distance learning programs is ongoing; that endowed chairs are being aggressively and successfully pursued; that some recent relief from state regulations governing facilities is having positive impact; that a tax on development activity is being implemented; that business centers are under active development, with several pilot projects; and so on. Many other cost-reduction and revenue enhancement strategies have been implemented over the past decade. The situation seems therefore to be one in which the emphasis should be on encouraging ongoing innovation, and addressing specific obstacles blocking further progress.

• Finally, many of the most promising sources of new revenue will come on line gradually, in some cases over a period of years (even if all obstacles to implementation are overcome). Distance learning, economic development and commercial ventures, faculty recruitment in high-grant areas, and other ideas are not likely to address immediate or short-term campus revenue needs.

33 Part Six FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS

UMass Amherst begins the next phase of its growth process with several assets including:

• A strong faculty commitment to and “love” for the campus. • A significant number of nationally distinguished faculty, departments, and schools. • Ten programs that rate in the top third of 274 institutions rated by the National Research Council according to 1995 data. • A strong commitment to education • Research funding that places it among 88 universities in the category of Research I. • Participation in the five campus consortium of distinguished schools in Western Massachusetts. • Land grant status. • An excellent reputation, especially outside of Massachusetts. • An attractive geographic location. • A location near a large city (Springfield) with no competing universities of its size and scope in Massachusetts. • Low tuition together with a reputation as a “best buy” in education. • A track record of having 80 percent of its graduates remain in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts • An alumni base of 180,000

UMass Amherst also begins this phase of its growth with several challenges including:

• A location two hours from the capital city of Massachusetts. • A location in a state with strong and numerous prestigious private universities. • A perceived estrangement from university and state governance. • A plant seriously in need of refurbishing. • A state appropriation somewhat lower than most of its peers. • A leadership and management infrastructure which has yet to generate support among the faculty and staff. • An expectation that resources are to received rather than earned • A diffuse sense of mission. • The lack of a planning process that most of the faculty understand or embrace. • Overall low campus morale.

The re-growth process for the new millennium begins with the recruitment of a new chancellor, a process that usually takes at least one year. Recruiting an outstanding leader is the single most important step toward achieving the goal of becoming one of the nation’s leading public universities.

Much needs to be accomplished in the months ahead to make this an attractive position for a promising leader. The Task Force recommends, in this regard, using this document

34 as a starting point for the campus to understand, review, and build a consensus (to the degree possible) as to the campus’ strengths, weaknesses, and tasks for future growth. It welcomes elaborations, modifications, and disagreements with some of the facts and conclusions described in this document. The Task Force believes that developing such a consensus together with a communal sense of hope for the future will enhance the desirability of the job of Chancellor and will increase the likelihood of choosing an outstanding leader who can lead this campus to the next level of excellence.

The Task Force will present in the following pages 12 recommendations for consideration to foster future growth. These recommendations are not the goals, mission, or objectives of the campus. These are for the campus to decide. These recommendations, rather, describe the organizational prerequisites for beginning a strategic process. The topics are listed below.

• The Relationship of the Campus to Governance • Developing a Senior Management Team • Business-like (Performance-Based) Aspects of the University • Attending to the Stakeholders. • Articulating a Clarity of Mission and Objectives • Reaffirming That UMass Amherst is the University’s Flagship Campus • UMass Amherst as a • Reorganizing Schools and Departments • Opportunities For Revenue Generation, Expense Reduction, and Reallocation of Resources • Addressing Incivility on Campus • Raising a substantial amount of money for the new Chancellor’s use for Academic Development. • Searching for a New Chancellor

RELATIONSHIP OF THE CAMPUS TO GOVERNANCE

The university campus at Amherst has approximately 50% of the students and receives approximately 50% of the budget of the five-campus university system. A campus of this size, located further from the Commonwealth’s and the University’s executive city (Boston) than any of the other four campuses, needs to perceive it is receiving appropriate support and oversight from governance. It needs to perceive itself and be perceived widely as the Commonwealth’s predominant public university, not simply the “University Of Western Massachusetts.”

The key relationships necessary to ensure an optimal relationship of the campus to governance are the relationships of the Chancellor to the President of the University and to the Board of Trustees. (The board serves all five campuses.) The Chancellor is the face and the voice of the campus. He or she speaks to the President and the Board of Trustees on behalf of the campus. The Chancellor simultaneously speaks to the campus on behalf of the President and the Board of Trustees. In addition, the Chancellor’s key managers, usually designated as Vice Chancellors, deal directly with the President’s office and with

35 committees of the Board of Trustees, and reciprocally, carry the University System’s imperatives back to the campus. These are the people who determine the relationship of the campus to governance. Governance needs to perceive the campus and its leaders as competent, loyal, trustworthy, and respectful. These relationships need to be nurtured and reinforced on an ongoing basis. The faculty need not actively engage the President and the Board of Trustees. The faculty should, however, hold the Chancellor and Vice Chancellors accountable for effective relations with governance.

The University President and Trustees may consider additional ways to enhance the perception of the relationship between the campus and governance. The Task Force offers the following possibilities for consideration: (1) strengthen the “adopt a campus” trustee subgroup through longer terms and more regular consultations with the Office of the President (2) appoint a designated liaison person from the President’s office to work with and visit the Amherst campus on a regular basis, (3) encourage the Governor to make more trustee appointments from Western Massachusetts, (4) hold more Board of Trustee meetings on the Amherst campus.

The question also arises as to how the chancellor and other members of the campus should relate to state officials from the executive and legislative branches. While it is important for the University President to be consulted in advance of and have the opportunity to direct all major negotiations between the campus and state government, the campus should have the opportunity to inform representatives of state government as to the status of the university, its contributions to the Commonwealth and to seek ways to more effectively serve the Commonwealth. The campus’ good works and positive perception by state government will facilitate the University President’s task.

The new chancellor must have full confidence that he/she will enjoy a strong, trusting, and supportive relationships with governance.

DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE SENIOR MANAGEMENT TEAM

The University of Massachusetts Amherst is a complex organization whose revenue budget is $558 million per year including unrestricted funds of approximately $324 million for general operations. It operates a plant of enormous size and need. It serves the educational and housing needs of 25,000 students and relates to approximately 180,000 alumni. It must generate revenues from an increasing variety of sources: state, federal, and private and spend it wisely to further the mission. The heart of the organization, the faculty, are in the unusual position of having academic freedom to speak freely and assurance of a lifetime position (tenure). Their involvement in a consultative role for many administrative and organizational matters is very important since their productivity and professional fulfillment is at stake. Yet they have little responsibility for outcomes. It is the administrative leadership who is held accountable, without clear concomitant authority, to make things happen.

Given such responsibilities and limitations of authority, the chancellor, if he or she is to succeed, must create an administrative team of sufficient depth, of uncommon wisdom,

36 and with the ability to work together in order to produce the desired results while freeing the Chancellor from having to make every decision. Members of the management team must embrace, and be perceived as having embraced, the campus mission as much as any member of the faculty. They must help devise systems of operational incentives and rewards to achieve campus goals. They must “think out of the box” with new ideas while being fully aware of the risks involved. They must propose new ways to generate revenues, and facilitate faculty participation in generating revenues for reinvestment in mission-based activities. They must have the trust of the President’s office and the Board of Trustees. They must earn the respect of the faculty, students, families, legislators and state agencies in their own right.

Without such an administrative team, the campus will become bogged down in an atmosphere of “cannot do” or “no, no, no.” The faculty will become demoralized. Reasonable risks will be avoided. Intellectual productivity will be diminished. There will be a diminished pride in the campus. A successful candidate for Chancellor must have a track record of being able to select outstanding people to work with him or her, to delegate authority to them and to lead such a group in a team effort to further the mission of the campus.

BUSINESS-LIKE (PERFORMANCE-BASED) ASPECTS OF THE UNIVERSITY

The Task Force believes that for a campus to grow in productivity and stature, it must function in a business-like manner while maintaining the strengths of an academic culture. (“Performance based” can substitute for “business-like). In successful businesses and academic institutions, there is a mission, a set of objectives, a set of strategies, and outcomes which are measurable. Benchmarks are used by both to measure efficiency. Both institutions invest money and other resources to generate money or other tokens of value. There are three major differences between for-profit businesses and universities.

1. The ultimate measurement of success in business is financial profit, while the ultimate measurement of success in universities is defined by the mission which usually includes education, research, and public service. When universities generate money from various investments, the proceeds are directed towards the mission

2. A second difference between a for-profit business and the university is the presence of shareholders in business whose primary interest is the financial “bottom line.” For universities, there are stakeholders who constitute (particularly in a public university) a more heterogeneous group in terms of roles and expectations. Stakeholders for a public university include students, their parents, alumni, faculty, administration, local and statewide business, taxpayers and state government. What they expect is very important to the success of the public university.

3. Finally, the nature of the work force differs between for-profit business and universities. The major difference is the presence of tenured faculty in universities

37 who are usually more central to the functioning of the university than the typical work force is to many business organizations. The relationship of tenured faculty to administration (leadership and management) may be likened to the relationship of the legislative branch of government to the executive branch. In order for significant change to occur, both groups must develop a consensus.

The Task Force strongly supports the campus determining, as any business does, a set of measurables against which it can be judged. The measurables are both financial (to assess the solvency, reserves, etc.) and mission related. There are, for example, numerous measurements which can be used to evaluate success in undergraduate education, graduate education and research. In the natural sciences, one can measure a department, school, or campus by perception of peers, honors and awards for faculty, visiting professorships, participation in study groups for certain funding agencies, memberships in distinguished societies, amount of external funding, funding sources, numbers of refereed articles in selected journals, citations of articles, impact of articles (citations per article). For undergraduate education, one can measure admission criteria, student/faculty ratio, classroom size, use of graduate assistants, freshman retention rate, graduation rate, special fellowships and national honors to graduates, alumni giving, and various student ratings as to the quality of faculty/student interaction, stature of faculty as measured by national awards and student ratings.

John V. Lombardi, former President of the University of Florida, is one of the leading advocates for measurement. He argues in “University Improvement: The Permanent Challenge” for the centrality of measurement of what the organization seeks and the rewarding of successful accomplishments by fiscal support. He further describes the relationship of management to performance and management to governance.

“Management is the final element in this conversation. Universities for the most part do not have management; they have governance. Governance is the political process that balances the various competing interests of the institution through a complicated and lengthy process. The characteristic of university governance is consensus. Consensus for a university normally results in modest and superficial change in the general operations of the institution, especially in terms of money and incentives….

To improve, the university must have management. It must have direction. The institution must consult, it must listen, and it must respond to all the information, opinion, and advice from its many constituents, but it must nonetheless act, and it often must act without complete consensus. It must choose a direction, it must discuss this direction with the institution’s many constituencies and then, after making whatever changes emerge from the discussion, the university must act to manage the process of improvement. The process that leads to significant institutional improvement has some important characteristics. Management must drive performance based on clear, open and explicit measurement of quality and productivity. Management must reward improvement…. Absent either of these two elements from the management structure, the improvement will become very difficult to implement.”

38 The administrative leadership of a campus is answerable to the President and ultimately the Board of Trustees. They must approve of the direction of management and the methods of achievement. Lombardi comments on this critical relationship:

“Finally, the management must have the support and commitment of its board. Improvement requires enhanced performance. Enhanced performance requires that people work harder and better [or more effectively] than they did before. Some of those asked to work harder and better [or more effectively] will not do so. Some of those asked will. The university must reward those who perform at significantly higher levels of quality and productivity. This is true of groups (colleges and departments) and individuals (faculty and staff). Those who do not work harder or better [or more effectively] will find endless reasons to resist a system that rewards those who do work harder or better [or more effectively]. The university offers a wide range of mechanisms for such resistance. If the board does not support the management, then the system will fail and governance will overwhelm management. When governance replaces management, the improvement program will slow, falter, and quietly die.”

The Task Force inserted the expression “or more effectively” in the above paragraph because it believes one does not always have to work harder to be effective. One can be more effective by being thoughtful, creative, and innovative. As we mentioned above, the end product in educational institutions is not financial profit but rather a wide range of mission driven products such as the quality of education, the quality and impact of research, and the contributions to the region, the state and the nation.

ATTENDING TO THE STAKEHOLDERS

The Task Force previously mentioned the importance of stakeholders of the university. These include the students, faculty, administration, alumni, their families, local and regional industry, all taxpayers, the Office of the President of the University, the University Board of Trustees, and representatives of state government. All of these groups receive the benefits of the university and offer political, economic, and psychological support for the university. If the university engages these groups, learns of their expectations, and profits from their wisdom, the campus can more effectively be perceived throughout the Commonwealth as their flagship public university.

President Bulger’s public appearances, his visits to high schools, the campus’ reaching out to local business and its outstanding fundraising drive for COMEC are important steps in reaching out to stakeholders. There are many more opportunities for strengthening interactions with stakeholders such as alumni and elected and appointed members of state government.

The campus’ ability to generate resources, achieve it objectives, gain respect of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will depend on its positive relationships to its stakeholders.

ARTICULATING A CLARITY OF MISSION AND OBJECTIVES

39 The Task Force found it difficult to discern the mission of UMass Amherst. In questioning various faculty members and groups of faculty, we elicited uncertainty and confusion over the nature of the mission. Many of the faculty failed to mention education as they struggled to articulate the mission.

The Task Force found it difficult to find a mission statement in various written documents including those on the web. There was, however, frequent reference to vision. One such statement, dating back to 1992 includes headings of access, excellence, innovation, economic development and global competitiveness, public service, and quality of life.

A later document states: “A vision statement which comes closer to capturing the spirit of the emerging strategic planning, thinking, and commentaries might read as follows:”

“As the flagship, public Land Grant-Research University of the Commonwealth, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst is dedicated to creating a Commonwealth of Learning. It will strive to achieve the greatest human potential among its students, faculty, staff and alumni, and through them and its integrative programs in teaching and learning, in research, discovery and creative endeavors, and in outreach and public service, to create a better and wiser world. It will continuously strive to attain preeminence and serve as a model of excellence for others to emulate. The University will continue its historic commitment to removing barriers: barriers to access, barriers between liberal and professional education and between different areas of knowledge; between the University and society; between different cultures; between different groups- - faculty, students, staff, administrators; between administrative structures, the organization of the University and the physical structures. The University will be integrative in all that it strives to do.”

This vision statement is eloquent and idealistic, as it ought to be; but it lacks the simplicity, directness, and power of a mission statement which the campus seems to lack. The Task Force recommends the development of such a mission statement followed by a series of objectives which lend themselves to measurements of various aspects of the mission. This can be followed by a series of values which capture some of the ideals in the above vision statement.

The mission statement and accompanying objectives should be understood and accepted by the campus as a whole – faculty, students, administration. It might be useful to have input in its development from the stakeholders such as the President’s Office, Board of Trustees, faculty, employees, legislators, alumni, parents, and business community. All of these groups have a stake in the success of the campus. These are the people who pay the bills, give or withhold legislative and financial support, and contribute to the development office. Such a process would be enlightening for the campus and would enlarge the family of UMass Amherst.

Strategic decisions including resource allocations should follow the mission. We believe that much of the tensions on campus regarding resource allocations result from lack of agreement on mission and objectives.

40 The Task Force believes that if the campus is to achieve the University President’s and Board of Trustees’ charge:

“to advance the quality and reputation of the University of Massachusetts Amherst such that it can assume its place nationally among the first rank of University campuses of the 21st century” its mission must include achieving excellence in all academic areas it pursues and national distinction in some. If it attempts to do everything for everybody, or more than its resources will allow, it will never be more than average.

REAFFIRMING THAT UMASS AMHERST IS THE UNIVERSITY’S FLAGSHIP CAMPUS

The University of Massachusetts at Amherst bears the heritage of being the flagship campus of the university system. Many of the faculty are aware of this designation and yet are uncertain of its meaning or whether the governance of the current five campus university is committed to this designation. There is, furthermore, the concern on campus by many faculty that there has been a “homogenization” of purpose or lack of differentiation among the four undergraduate university campuses of the University of Massachusetts.

An important rationale for a flagship campus was well articulated in the Massachusetts Senate budget narrative of 1982.

It is expected that UMass Amherst particularly will provide extensive and critical leadership on a system wide basis that will lead to enhanced academic quality, increased faculty depth and excellence, and imaginative, diversified, and cogent programming. The Committee is convinced – and the experience of other states supports the idea – that it is necessary to take particular care to preserve and enhance the university segment of a public system. It is often the academic reputation of the programs and faculty of the “flagship” institution that is used to judge the reputation and image of a state’s public system as a whole. In addition, the Committee feels it is important to sustain the academic quality and leadership which has resulted from decades of support. The Committee, however, expects UMass Amherst to be more aggressive in working with other colleges and universities in the system. (Italics by the Task Force)

Another rationale for reaffirming the University of Massachusetts Amherst as the flagship campus is the concept of specialization and division of labor. There are inadequate resources in the university system to provide the breadth and depth of educational and research activities simultaneously at all four campuses. If the university is committed to providing such breath and depth for the students of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and to attaining national stature, it must reaffirm for Amherst its flagship status.

The other three undergraduate campuses can aspire to and achieve a quality of undergraduate education equal to or better than the flagship campus but without the depth

41 and breath of faculty and courses. These campuses can surpass and have surpassed the flagship campus in particular areas of study. Examples of outstanding campuses that are not flagship campuses of their university system or state include the University of California at Santa Barbara, Michigan State, and Texas A&M.

It is often said that the Commonwealth does not need to have an outstanding public flagship campus because it already has Harvard and MIT. Yet, Maryland has an excellent public flagship campus (U.Maryland, College Park) despite its proximity to Johns Hopkins. New Jersey has an excellent public flagship campus (Rutgers) despite its proximity to Princeton. New York has excellent public flagship campuses (SUNY Stonybrook and Buffalo) despite the presence of Columbia, Cornell, and NYU. California has six outstanding public campuses (Berkeley, UCLA, San Diego, Davis, Irvine, Santa Barbara) despite the presence of Stanford and the California Institute of Technology.

Finally, the very language of the President’s charge to the Task Force speaks to the assumption of a flagship campus.

“The President of the University of Massachusetts and its Board of Trustees share a common belief that the success and stature of the University System depend to a significant degree on the achievements of its campus at Amherst.

The Task Force recommends that university governance reaffirm its designation of the University of Massachusetts as the flagship campus of the university system. Such an action will enhance the morale of the campus, increase the university’s expectations of the campus, set the stage for a clarification of campus mission and objectives, and facilitate the search for a chancellor.

The campus also needs to redefine what it means for it to be a lead campus rather than “the dominant campus”. Like the eldest sibling, UMA must recognize and demonstrate that it does not act only for itself, but has the capacity and responsibility to set the direction for its sister campuses… and sometimes that requires sacrifice for the good of the family. UMA must find itself celebrating rather than envying programmatic growth on other campuses and find a way to work through them to expand its statewide reach and influence.

UMASS AMHERST AS A RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

The question often arises as to why an excellent university needs to do research and other scholarly activities which increase the cost of operating the university. Why cannot the faculty commit itself solely to teaching? The answer to this question is several-fold. (1) A special kind of undergraduate education is provided on a research oriented campus. Research educators are creating knowledge, and they teach from this perspective. (A group of 25 engineering executives who comprise the advisory group for the School of Engineering spontaneously commented to the Task Force on the high quality of the bachelor degree graduates from UMA to which they attributed the research orientation.) When students take advantage of the opportunities of a research/educational campus, they

42 are propelled into the workplace or to graduate study with excellent analytic skills, training and confidence. (2) Research is necessary for the education of PhD candidates, a vital need for the Commonwealth in this knowledge-based society. Most of the PhD graduates from UMass Amherst reside in the Commonwealth whereas most PhD graduates from Harvard and MIT reside in other states. (3) A research atmosphere on a university campus attracts outstanding educators who desire to be close to the source of created knowledge. (4) Research conducted at universities generates external funding which directly enhances the economy of the region. In addition, university research attracts industry to its region. We see, for example, the effect of MIT on the Boston Area, UMass Lowell on its region, UMass Worcester on the economy of Central Massachusetts, and UMass Amherst on Western Massachusetts. UMass Amherst is the only comprehensive research university, public or private, west of route 128. (5) The national image of a university and the value of its degree are determined in large part by the scholarly and research accomplishments of its faculty. (6) A significant amount of research conducted at public universities directly addresses problems of the state. The University of Massachusetts at Worcester, for example, has designated a major portion of its research activities to partnerships with state agencies under the name “Commonwealth Medicine.” An obvious potential niche for UMass Amherst, for example, is research in K-12 education.

Research and scholarly activities are not limited to the natural and social sciences. There is and must be research and scholarly activities in the arts and the humanities which inform and enhance education in these disciplines. Such research and scholarly activities are less apt to generate external funding. These subjects are, however, critical to the education of our students, the recruitment of outstanding faculty and the reputation of the campus.

A public research university is an investment of its state. The payoff to this investment is the superior education of its citizens and the enhanced economy of the state. Some states such as California, New York, and Texas have more than one public research university. If Massachusetts is to have a dominant public research campus, for all the reasons described above, this campus must be UMass Amherst. The alternative is to allow the campus to become homogenized with the other university campuses, state schools and community colleges. The latter groups of institutions can serve the citizens of the Commonwealth by providing excellent education but cannot achieve the goals of the research institution as described above.

There is always the concern that by pursuing research, the campus stakeholders (legislators, parents, students, etc.) will conclude that education has taken second place in priorities. The state’s public university must always keep undergraduate education as its highest priority because most of the students it serves are undergraduates. Outstanding research institutions succeed every day in providing outstanding undergraduate education in many of our national universities. Evidence for such a statement can be found in the U.S. News and World Report ratings which measure quality of undergraduate education and not research productivity. Among its 51 best “educational” schools are 40 Research I universities and 38 AAU universities. On the other hand, some great research

43 institutions have given low priority to undergraduate education. UMass Amherst cannot make such a serious mistake.

UMass Amherst is not in a position to compete with the great U.S. public and private universities for research funding and productivity at this time. It must, therefore, strategically decide where to invest, where to grow, and where not to grow. Research growth will depend on reorganizing or even closing some departments and/or schools, reallocating funds, saving funds by greater administrative efficiencies, and generating new funds through development, intellectual properties, and other entrepreneurial activities.

There are many outstanding, nationally distinguished research faculty on the Amherst campus who are wondering what kind of professional future they have at the university. They need to be engaged in the process of change. They need commitments for renovation, construction, and recruitment that will not be broken. They need to hear plans for reenergizing the search for a vice chancellor for research after the new chancellor is recruited. Their hopes for an academically productive future need to be sustained. All of this will take careful planning and prioritization. The loss of a significant number of these senior faculty and their younger recruits could set the campus back many years.

REORGANIZING SCHOOLS AND DEPARTMENTS

During the Task Force’s interviews with the deans and faculty, there was overwhelming interest, support, and willingness to reorganize schools and departments for greater intellectual productivity. At the same time, there was considerable reluctance to engage is such a process for several reasons. (1) Such an endeavor had been discussed on many occasions in the past with no tangible action. (2) The reorganization would be seen by faculty and deans as an attempt by administration to further reduce the academic budget. (3) There was considerable anxiety over who would make the decisions for reorganization. (4) There is already considerable interdepartmental and inter-school collaboration.

There has been considerable reorganization of departments, centers, and institutes at UMass Worcester during the past three years. This reorganization of research units has greatly enhanced faculty recruitment because of clarity of focus and leadership of the new unit. It has also led to some movement of faculty from one unit to another. Equally as important, these changes have enhanced a sense of hope and excitement in the faculty based on the belief that UMass Medical School is on the cutting edge nationally for future research.

The reader should keep in mind that making such changes at the medical school at this time is far easier than making such changes at UMass Amherst for several reasons: the completion of a new research building, a financial plan which includes the recruitment of new faculty, the singular focus on the life sciences, and an effective decision making group consisting of 14 research leaders, the Director of Research and the Chancellor. The group is advisory to the Chancellor.

44 The Task Force supports the reorganization (including possible closings) of schools and departments at the University of Massachusetts Amherst in order to increase scholarly productivity for each dollar spent. This need for academic reorganization is the result of the natural evolution of a discipline as new knowledge is acquired, as new organizing principles are discovered, and as new interdisciplinary collaborations evolve.

Such a reorganization should be undertaken at UMass Amherst under three conditions: (1) that any financial savings be reinvested and not diverted from the academic system, (2) that the campus use an outside consulting group which is knowledgeable about academic structures in the U.S. and which promises to command the respect of the campus, and (3) the consulting group vet their ideas with the deans, department chairs, and faculty before making their final recommendations to the chancellor and provost. We believe it best to await the arrival of the new chancellor before embarking on this ambitious project. Campus confidence in the wisdom and fairness of the new Chancellor will be critical for the success of any major reorganization.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR REVENUE GENERATION, EXPENSE REDUCTION, AND REALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

How much money the campus can generate, how much expenses can be reduced, and how such funds can be wisely allocated and reallocated will determine the future of the University of Massachusetts at Amherst. Although this is stating the obvious, still, it needs to be said. The Task Force believes that opportunities for generating new funds, reducing expenses, and reallocating funds are significant although such activities will take more time than the campus might wish.

The Provost’s Committee on Revenue Development on 5/16/01 prepared a document detailing multiple opportunities for revenue generation. The discussion below highlights the major opportunities for fiscal enhancement from the perspective of the Task Force.

Generating new funds (1) One constant refrain has been to search for new funds from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This is thought to be attainable through increased funding to the university, tuition retention, perhaps just for the Amherst campus, or possibly for a limited purpose (i.e. technology, facility renewal). The Commonwealth does not have excess funds and so there is no reason to be optimistic. The arguments that can be marshaled for receiving more funds include: the state of the physical plant, the campus funding in comparison to peer flagship campuses, and the growth of the regional competitor, the University of Connecticut.

A more radical approach to tuition retention would be to scale tuition and fees according to the means of the students and their families. (The average family income of a UMass Amherst student is $75,000 to $80,000.) Weighing access and financial aid (made possible by those who can afford larger tuition/fees) is worth exploring particularly if the quality of education equals or surpasses some of the private universities in the Commonwealth.

45

Such arguments for enhanced state dollars or a restructuring of the setting of tuition and fees can be enhanced by the presence of an effective new chancellor, the strengthening of relationships with the local business community, an enhanced relationship with the 180,000 alumni, legislative relationships not limited the Amherst region, and a compelling case statement, forcefully delivered, as to the value of UMass Amherst, the flagship campus, to the Commonwealth.

It may be that the Commonwealth will be most receptive in helping UMass Amherst through the Office of the President only after it delivers in enhanced contributions to the Commonwealth, a growing national reputation, and a more effective case statement as the state’s only public flagship campus.

(2) There is a perception that must be tested that there is a significant opportunity to generate new funds from the development office, particularly from the 180,000 alumni. Currently, the percent of alumni who contribute is 15% (compared to 19% from UConn). Out of $20 million the development office raised during the past year from all sources, only $300,000 was discretionary. If development could generate $100 in unrestricted cash for each alumnus and alumna, the campus would generate $18 million in unrestricted, ready available funds. Such a potential can be realized only through a dynamic working relationship between an outstanding development officer and the chancellor. Together, they need to connect with the alumni as well as with the business community that profits from UMass’ graduates whom they hire. UMass Amherst’s recent ascent to leadership in the statewide COMEC drive is a major step towards becoming an integral part of the community.

(3) The campus needs to capitalize on its intellectual strength and identify entrepreneurial activities to generate funds. The campus culture would be well served to recognize mission based revenue generation as a core value equal to the access mission -- as an enabler of the access mission. Recognition, reward and infrastructure need to be developed along these lines. Efforts towards the sale of licenses and royalties from intellectual properties, distance learning and the possibility of selling mission related services to the Commonwealth and other organizations will require a balancing of the many missions of the University – and one which does not always relegate revenue generation to a lesser role or value.

Reducing Expenses There is a pervasive sense on campus that resources are spread too thin, and that the institution is trying to do too many things with too few resources. This sense is exacerbated by continuing high levels of enrollment, driven in part by the good news of strong admissions trends. This may be an appropriate time to think about reducing the span of activity on campus, including careful management of enrollment.

Another perceived opportunity to reduce expenses is to examine various functions of the campus for cost efficiency and effectiveness. The budgetary sacred cow needs be put out to pasture.

46 Campus leaders were critical of many areas of operations which they regarded as ineffective, tardy, and non-service oriented. Operations and maintenance and Facilities Planning and Physical Plant are two areas, frequently cited, worthy of a more expert and thorough review.

Reallocating Funds Earlier in this report, we described various opportunities for reallocating funds to areas that are perceived to be more central to the core mission. The data comes from (1) comparisons between UMass and peer campuses as determined by a study executed by the budget office. (2) A history of spending as reported by Craig L. Moore to the Faculty Senate.

Based on fiscal year 1999 data, spending on financial aid at UMass Amherst is higher than the peer average. In addition, UMass Amherst spends much more from institutional funds than its peers. Financial aid for out of state students alone should be carefully reviewed for its contribution to the campus mission. UMass Amherst’s subsidy for athletics should be reviewed in the context of what it contributes to campus spirit, culture and support. UMass Amherst spends more on Operations and Maintenance than the peer average. At the same time, UMass Amherst appears to be spending less than its peers on core academic activity.

Based on Professor Moore’s fiscal analysis of UMass Amherst between fiscal year 1994 to 2000, the budget for academic affairs increased by 21.3%, student affairs (mostly financial aid) grew by 64.8 %, advancement grew by 50.9%. Academic affairs experienced “a significantly lower percent increase than any of the other major budgetary divisions.” Campus funds for financial aid have increased from $3.3 million in FY 1990 to $17.4 million in FY 2000.

It is beyond the scope of this Task Force to reconcile the history and rationale for allocations that appear to vary significantly above campus peers while appearing to under-support the identified core academic mission. If, however, the campus is reducing support for the core product of the campus, which we presume is an outstanding education, the alternative resource priorities need to be clearly identified and their relative merit towards the campus mission needs to justify their continuation.

Projected faculty vacancies represent an enormous opportunity for the campus, but only if they are wisely used. Over the past decade, as the size of the faculty base has steadily declined, it has been difficult for academic leaders to move resources into areas of emerging importance. But now is the time to make a clear-headed evaluation of what is strong, and what could be strong, and to put in place a plan for faculty vacancies that will maximize their effective use.

ADDRESSING INCIVILITY ON CAMPUS

Stories abound from faculty, campus administrators, legislators, state house administrators, trustees and the president’s office about campus behaviors they regard as

47 insensitive, insulting, inappropriate, offensive, or uncivil. Such behaviors include inhospitable behavior toward campus guests, insulting speakers such as the campus chancellor and university president, destroying public property in the state house and the campus dormitory, verbally attacking and threatening faculty for verbalizing their points of view, public verbal confrontations between two campus administrative leaders, and an important member of the campus administration sending an inflammatory letter about campus problems to a wide audience including the media without prior discussions with the chancellor..

Such behaviors are sporadic and infrequent. Yet that is all that it takes to offend, to show disrespect. Imagine a 60-minute meeting with a new acquaintance. Following 59 minutes of creative, warm, engaging behaviors, a disrespectful comment is made. In the end, the entire meeting is viewed as disrespectful.

The fact that so many people took the opportunity to present such behaviors to the Task Force confirms their importance. The inevitable consequences of insults, disrespect, humiliations and the like are hurt feelings, grudges, and even vengeance, reactions that can last a lifetime. The campus is largely unaware of the importance and consequence of these infrequent behaviors. One member of the faculty, in discussing such behaviors, expressed guilt that he did not do more to stop such events when they occurred. Other faculty members were appreciative of having such behaviors pointed out by the Task Force. Still other faculty members dismissed such behaviors as traditional campus expressions of free speech.

The Task Force believes the campus must become more sensitive to the importance of civility if it intends to win the much-needed support from its stakeholders. It further believes that freedom of expression, so vital to a university experience, is compatible with respectful behavior that preserves the dignity of others.

RAISING A SUBSTANCIAL AMOUNT OF MONEY FOR THE NEW CHANCELLOR’S USE IN ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENT.

The Task Force recommends initiating a special fund raising drive to commence with the onset of the search process. The goal would be to rally the faculty, alumni, parents of students, business community, and trustees, under the leadership of the University President, to develop a special fund designated for use by the new Chancellor for academic development. This could send the message that academic achievement is central to the campus. The fund might symbolize new leadership, new growth, and new hope at the millennium. It may also help restore the morale of the faculty, many of whom feel they have been forgotten. It would communicate the support of governance for the campus. Finally, such a fund would enhance the search process for the new Chancellor.

The President of the University and the Chair of this task force have committed to make the first contributions to this fund - $1000 each.

48 SEARCHING FOR A NEW CHANCELLOR

Much of the suggestions for recruiting a new chancellor emerge from the findings described above.

• The new chancellor must have demonstrated academic experience. Selecting someone with executive experience from another field, without relevant academic exposure, would be a high-risk proposition. Furthermore, it could be immediately disruptive to the faculty who are in need of healing.

• The new chancellor must have a track record of administrative success with a proven ability to recruit and retain outstanding people who work well together as a team.

• The new chancellor should have a passion to achieve excellence and an interest in and vision for the future of higher education in the United States.

• The new chancellor should be committed to a mission that can be supported by and shared with the campus and many of the constituents/stakeholders.

• The new chancellor should be committed to performance-based leadership.

• The new chancellor should have the following traits: integrity of character, honesty, commitment to keeping promises, the capacity to listen and be appropriately influenced by what he/she hears, the ability to relate with and communicate to various constituent groups, a passion for excellence and the energy to match the passion, appropriate assertiveness, comfort in the public arena, an ability to take pride in the accomplishments of others and has a strong work ethic. Such traits are consistent with effective fundraising.

• The campus should feel pride in their chancellor.

CONCLUSIONS

The University of Massachusetts at Amherst can be proud of its many accomplishments. Its greatest strength is its faculty who account for the national reputation of many departments and schools. Yet, it can be so much more. It aspires to the University President’s goal of becoming one of the nations leading public universities.

The campus can point with pride to being one of 88 Research I universities. Yet by all measures, it is in the third quartile of this group. The campus can point with pride on being close to achieving membership in the 63 AAU universities. Yet, that goal remains elusive with about 12 schools with higher ratings waiting in line.

At the millennium, the campus has the opportunity to renew itself through new leadership, management, mission, performance-based incentives, reorganization, revenue generation and management, and responsiveness to stakeholders. In such endeavors, it

49 has the full support of the University President and Board of Trustees. The campus must decide at this juncture whether it proceeds in the mode of “business as usual” or whether it regards this moment as an unusual opportunity to be seized and realized.

50