ER-AN-O2N-2 Import into containment any new organism that is not 01/08 genetically modified

Application title: To import into containment plant and viroids

Applicant organisation: Plant Health & Environment Laboratory (PHEL), Investigation & Diagnostic Centre – MAF Biosecurity New Zealand

Please provide a brief summary of the purpose of the application (255 characters or less, including spaces)

To import and hold exotic plant viruses and viroids in containment, for research purposes

PLEASE CONTACT ERMA NEW ZEALAND BEFORE SUBMITTING YOUR APPLICATION

Please clearly identify any confidential information and attach as a separate appendix.

Please check and complete the following before submitting your application:

All sections completed Yes Appendices enclosed Yes/NA Confidential information identified and enclosed separately Yes/NA Copies of references attached Yes/NA Application signed and dated Yes Electronic copy of application e-mailed to Yes ERMA New Zealand

Signed: Date:

20 Customhouse Quay Cnr Waring Taylor and Customhouse Quay PO Box 131, Wellington Phone: 04 916 2426 Fax: 04 914 0433 Email: [email protected] Website: www.ermanz.govt.nz

ER-AN-O2N-2 01/08: Application to import into containment any new organism that is not genetically modified

Section One – Applicant details Name and details of the organisation making the application: Name: Plant Health & Environment Laboratory, Investigation & Diagnostic Centre – MAF Biosecurity New Zealand Postal Address: PO Box 2095, Auckland 1140 Physical Address: 231 Morrin Road, St Johns Phone: - Fax: - Email: Not applicable Name and details of the key contact person (if different from above): Name: Veronica Herrera Postal Address: Plant Health & Environment Laboratory Manager Physical Address: As above Phone: - Fax: - Email: - Name and details of a contact person in New Zealand, if the applicant is overseas: Name: Not applicable Postal Address: Physical Address: Phone: Fax: Email:

Note: The key contact person should have sufficient knowledge of the application to respond to queries from ERMA New Zealand staff.

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Section 2: Purpose of the application

Lay summary of the application (approximately 200 words)

Note: This summary should include a description of the organism(s), the purpose of the application or what you want to do with the organisms(s).

Use simple non-technical language

New Zealand has relatively few of the viruses and viroids that are associated with plants overseas. If introduced, diseases caused by these organisms could lead to economic losses in New Zealand's crops and might have unforeseen effects on native biota. To reduce the risks of introducing such diseases, imported plants must be sourced from disease-free areas or be inspected, tested and/or treated for the diseases of concern. New Zealand has surveillance programmes to enable the early detection and potential eradication of introduced diseases. For import, export and surveillance programmes, robust methods are required for the detection of micro-organisms associated with plants, and other materials crossing the border that could harbour pests and diseases. PHEL wishes to import and hold plant viruses and viroids in containment to facilitate the development and implementation of testing procedures for exotic diseases, thereby ensuring New Zealand‟s biosecurity. More specifically, access to these micro-organisms will improve New Zealand‟s general understanding of their biology as well as increasing the ability to identify exotic plant diseases by providing controls to ensure correct test performance, and enable the development of new diagnostic tests.

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Describe the background and aims of the project

Note: This section is intended to put the organism(s) in perspective of the wider project(s) that they will be used in. You may use more technical language but please make sure that any technical words are included in the Glossary.

The Plant Health & Environment Laboratory (PHEL) supports the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) Biosecurity New Zealand‟s activities in the identification of pests and diseases affecting plants and the environment. PHEL is responsible for the identification and/or validation of all suspected exotic, new and emerging pests and diseases of plants (including arable, horticultural & forestry crops, and species of amenity and environmental value) and arthropods affecting the environment and human health. PHEL covers all aspects of plant entomology (including insects, mites, molluscs and spiders), nematology, and pathology (including bacteria, fungi, phytoplasmas, viruses and viroids) and has specific skills and experience including: investigation and control of exotic plant pests and diseases affecting the economy, environment and human health; accreditation to ISO 17025 “General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories”; specialist facilities including containment laboratories and glasshouses; specialist reference collections; technical advice on plant pests and diseases; technical audit of accredited laboratories; and world-class diagnostic testing capabilities. Because of its physical, and until recently economic, isolation, New Zealand has relatively few of the plant pathogens that plague many crops overseas. If introduced, such pathogens (e.g. Plum pox ) would cause economic losses in New Zealand's crops and might have unforeseen effects on native biota (discussed further in Section 5). To reduce the risks of introducing such pathogens, MAF has introduced a series of measures such as sourcing material from pathogen-free areas or accredited offshore facilities, and pre- and post-export inspection, testing and treatment. MAF Biosecurity New Zealand also uses surveillance programmes to enable the early detection and potential eradication of organisms that have passed the border. For import, export and surveillance programmes, robust testing procedures are required for the detection of plant viruses and viroids. The types of research that will be done include investigations into diagnostics (e.g. biochemical, serological and molecular tests), plant pathology (e.g. in planta pathogenicity testing and biochemical studies), systematics and taxonomy. Access to these viruses and viroids will provide significant improvements to New Zealand‟s ability to identify plant pathogens by: 1. avoiding “false negatives” during diagnostic testing by providing confirmation of test performance; and 2. developing diagnostic tests and/or validating the performance of published methods. Isolates will be imported from culture collections or recognised subject-matter experts and where possible, will be identified to species prior to importation. In some instances isolates may require testing and examination in New Zealand to resolve their taxonomic identity. Viruses and viroids that are new organisms will also be isolated in New Zealand, e.g. during incursions, and may be held for subsequent research. Isolates may be imported

Page 4 of 21 ER-AN-O2N-2 01/08: Application to import into containment any new organism that is not genetically modified as pure cultures or growing in planta (e.g. infected seeds, cuttings, bulbs and other plant material) or on a substrate (e.g. soil, water, dead or living plant material) Appropriate controls will be taken to ensure viable virus and viroid material, including spores, are contained and do not leave the containment facility through any outlets including exhaust system, air filters and water discharge. While some organisms to be imported are capable of causing diseases in plants, with the containment standards and conditions provided at PHEL the likelihood of these organisms escaping from containment and infecting a susceptible plant is extremely low. The ability to diagnose the presence of exotic diseases at the border and during incursions in New Zealand, and to rule out exotic diseases in negative cases with suspicious symptoms, is essential to New Zealand‟s economy. Rapid diagnosis during incursions could mean the difference of the disease being confined to one or two production sites, rather than hundreds, providing both economic and environmental benefits.

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Section Three – Identification of the organism(s) to be imported

Complete this section separately for each new organism to be imported.

Identification of the organism to be imported

Latin binomial, including full taxonomic Where possible, all organisms will be authority: identified to species level prior to importation. Common name(s), if any: Not relevant. Type of organism (eg bacterium, virus, Viruses and viroids (limited to those capable fungus, plant, animal, animal cell): of infecting plants only). Taxonomic class, order and family: Plant viruses and viroids, including those described in the tables in Appendix 1. Strain(s) if relevant: Not relevant. Other information, including presence of We are not aware of any inseparable any inseparable or associated organisms associated with the micro-organisms in this and any related organisms present in New application. However, we accept that there Zealand: may be such organisms but the standard microbiological practises in our lab are sufficient to contain such organisms.

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Section Four – The proposed containment system

Describe the containment facility and the proposed containment system (physical and operational)

Question Answer Which MAF/ERMA Standard is this Facilities for Microorganisms and Cell Culture: containment facility approved under? 2007 or Containment Facilities for Plants: 2007 (the Standard). What physical containment level PC2 registered laboratory or plant house (AS/NZS 2243: 2002) is this containment facility registered to (where relevant)?

What other physical measures do you Physical measures in addition to the Standard propose to use to contain this Storage of viruses and viroids organism? Once imported the virus and viroid isolates will be maintained in a sealed receptacle (e.g. microfuge tube, vial, etc.) in a cabinet. The containers will be opened only to remove material as required to do experiments. In some instances (e.g. where it is not possible to obtain further samples), isolates may be maintained by inoculating plants either mechanically or using a suitable vector (e.g. , nematode, etc.). Storage and use of vectors Vectors such as and nematodes will be obtained as required, generally from the New Zealand environment. Colonies of vectors may be maintained by PHEL but will not be kept in the room as the virus and viroid isolates unless plants are to be deliberately exposed to the vectors. Vectors will be disposed of by pesticide treatment followed by autoclaving and/or incineration. Exposure of plants to viruses and viroids by mechanical inoculation Plants will only be mechanically inoculated with imported viruses or viroids using standard operating procedures designed to ensure that only the intended plants become infected, e.g. disposable gloves are used at all times, all infective material is prepared in a dedicated area which is decontaminated on completion of the transmission experiment, and infected plants are labelled appropriately and kept physically isolated from other plants.

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Exposure of plants to viruses and viroids by biological vectors Plants will only be exposed to imported viruses or viroids in the presence of the vector if contained within a growth chamber (or equivalent). The growth chamber will be vector- proof, designed to contain the vector thereby providing an additional level of isolation. Plants exposed to micro-organisms will be disposed of by autoclaving and/or incineration. What procedural or operational Procedural measures in addition to the measures do you propose to use to Standard contain this organism? Import of micro-organisms Viruses and viroids may be imported as pure isolates or growing in planta (e.g. infected seeds, cuttings, bulbs and other plant material) or on a substrate (e.g. dead or living plant material, soil or water). Imported samples will be clearly labelled and packaged so that containment is not breached accidentally during transit. Import of micro-organisms A weekly check is done as specified in the Containment Manual. Contingency plans The Containment Manual has specific procedures to be followed in the event of a breach of containment. This requires the notification of the facility‟s MAF Supervisor immediately if possible, and at least within 24 hours of noticing the breach of containment. All spills are managed in accordance with section 5 of the AS/NZS 2243.3: 2002 Standard. The building meets all current building and earthquake standards. Any other information relevant to the No. containment of the organism.

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Describe the characteristics of the organism to be imported that may influence its ability; to escape from containment, to form a self sustaining population, or to cause adverse effects. Refer to sample applications for guidance on how to answer these questions.

Question Answer attach copies of the references used in an appendix What are the characteristics of the Virus organism that may prevent/enable Plant viruses are obligate plant pathogens that have it to escape from containment? unipartite or multipartite ranging from 1-29 eg size, spore production, kilobases consisting of single or double stranded, DNA infectivity, seed/pollen or (more commonly) RNA (Hull, 2002; Descriptions of characteristics etc. Plant Viruses (2009)). The viral is enclosed by a protein coat and typically encodes two or more proteins. Translation (to produce protein) and transcription of the genome (to produce nucleic acid) takes place within the host cells using the host's biochemical “machinery”. Virus particles may be observed by transmission electron microscopy and may be isometric (c. 20-30 nm in diameter), geminate (twinned isometric particles), bacilliform (up to c. 30 nm wide and 300 nm long), rod-shaped (c. 20-25 nm in diameter and 100-300 nm long) or filamentous (c.12 nm in diameter and up to 1000 nm long. Viruses are not transmitted aerially and cannot penetrate plant cell walls unaided. Many are transmitted by a specific vector that feeds on the plant. The most common vectors are insects (aphids, beetles, hoppers, thrips and ), mites, nematodes and plasmodiophorid fungi. A few viruses can also be transmitted by seed and/or pollen. Viruses may also be transmitted during cultivation (e.g. infected planting material, and on contaminated tools and equipment). Experimentally some viruses can be transmitted mechanically to particular indicator plants and under specific laboratory conditions. Most plant viruses infect a few species within a single genus, some may infect a greater number of species in different families. Viroid Viroids are obligate plant pathogens that have a small (a few hundred bases), circular, single-stranded RNA genome (Hull, 2002; Descriptions of Plant Viruses (2009). The viroid genome does not code for any proteins and is not enclosed in the protein coat that is typical of viruses. Approximately 30 viroid species have been identified. They are not transmitted aerially

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and cannot penetrate plant cell walls unaided; in general, they are transmitted naturally by seed or pollen. Only Tomato planta macho viroid is transmitted efficiently by an insect (Galindo et al., 1982). Viroids may also be transmitted during cultivation (e.g. infected planting material, and on contaminated tools and equipment). Experimentally some viroids can be transmitted mechanically in the same way as viruses. Most viroids have a restricted host range, infecting only one or a few plant species. How could this organism escape Escape of organisms during transport to from containment? containment facilities: ie what are the possible pathways As noted organisms will be packaged in accordance for escape? with Packaging Instruction No. 650 of the International Air Transport Association (IATA) Dangerous Goods How does the proposed containment regime address these Regulations (refer to section 8.8.4 of the Standard). pathways? These measures reduce the likelihood of escape during transport. Accidental/unintentional removal by authorised personal: Only authorised persons who have received training in containment protocols are permitted entry, thereby reducing the risk of escape of new organisms. All staff are required to remove their coats and gloves, and wash their hands and fingernails after working with these organisms, reducing the risk of accidental removal. Deliberate removal by unauthorised personal: Security measures in place (see above) mitigate the risk of unauthorised personal gaining access to the facility and being able to remove material. Escape from contaminated laboratory equipment and waste: Sterilisation of waste and equipment reduces the risk of organisms escaping. All organisms and biological waste are disposed of and/or treated according to the guidelines in the AS/NZS 2243.3: 2002 Standard. Escape due to a failure of containment barriers. All cultures of imported micro-organisms are stored in sealed receptacles in cabinets (e.g. micro-centrifuge tube, vial, etc.). It would require a breach of multiple containment barriers (vial, cabinet, building) before an organism is able to escape into the New Zealand environment.

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Escape from containment following natural disaster: A fire contingency plant has been lodged with the local fire brigade listing how to deal with a disaster so as to prevent or minimise the chance of organisms escaping.

If it were to escape, could this If containment were breached, it is unlikely that the organism establish a population micro-organisms would become established in New outside of containment in New Zealand since most plant pathogens require specific Zealand? conditions for transmission and for infection of a plant. ie what conditions are required Many of the specific vectors such as insects and for growth and reproduction? And nematodes are also not present in New Zealand. are those conditions present in Furthermore, many plant viruses and viroids are New Zealand? What factors might specific to a small number of plant species which often prevent this from occurring? have a restricted distribution in New Zealand. An organism would also be required to be present in sufficient numbers for the infection to be self- sustaining within the host population. Establishment would therefore be dependent on the mode of transmission, and the presence of suitable host plants and vectors in New Zealand. For example, Plum pox virus infects Prunus spp. (apricot, cherry, nectarine, peach & plum) (Glasa & Candresse, 2005) which are important horticultural species in New Zealand. It is spread by more than 20 aphid species (with varying efficiency), infected plant material, and possibly seed. The insect vectors of the virus are present in New Zealand. As with all virus and viroid infections there are no effective treatments for the disease in mature plants. Considering the mode of dispersal, this virus would have a moderate risk of establishment in New Zealand if containment were breached in areas where Prunus spp. were grown. Although its dissemination could be assisted by aphids, there are few susceptible hosts close to PHEL therefore it is unlikely that the virus would become established if containment were breached in the Auckland suburb in which PHEL is located. In contrast, a virus such as Ginger chlorotic fleck virus infects only Zingiber officinale (Thomas, 1988), a species which is not commercially cultivated and only rarely planted in New Zealand due to climatic and economic constraints. The virus has no known vectors and is spread only by infected plant material. Considering the rarity of the host and the mode of transmission, this virus has negligible risk of establishment in New Zealand if containment were breached in any location. Similarly Coleus blumei viroid 1 infects only Coleus blumei and has no known

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vectors (Robinson, 2001). Therefore the risk of establishment in New Zealand if containment were breached is negligible. Other viroids do have slightly wider host ranges, e.g. Coconut cadang-cadang viroid infects eight species in the Palmae family (Rodriguez & Randles, 2003) but with the exception of Tomato planta macho viroid, none are normally vectored actively. If a population did establish could Eradication of such species if containment were it be eradicated? How? breached would depend on the micro-organism causing Would it be noticed immediately? significant detectable symptoms and the availability of How would such a population be a specific and sensitive laboratory test for detection of identified? an infection. The latter requirement is, of course, one of the main reasons for this application. Additional information No additional information.

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Section Five – Identification and assessment of effects Identify and assess the effects of the organism. Look primarily at the effects if the organism remains in containment, but also consider what might happen if the organism were to escape. If the organism were to escape think about what additional things would need to occur for these effects to be realised. What are the beneficial effects of the organism(s) and the application? These benefits must be relevant to the purpose and scope of the application The ability to import into containment viroids and viruses will allow research to be conducted on these organisms, increasing scientific knowledge and the expertise of researchers. This will lead to increases in the capability of New Zealand researchers and organisations as well as providing worthwhile knowledge and applications. Access to reference material of plant viruses and viroids will significantly improve New Zealand‟s ability to identify exotic plant pathogens in quarantine or surveillance samples thereby preventing their entry or assisting their control by: a) avoiding “false negatives” during diagnostic testing by providing confirmation of test performance; and b) developing diagnostic tests and/or validating the performance of published methods. The improvements in New Zealand‟s ability to identify exotic plant pathogens will lead to the following benefits: Improved import and export testing abilities; Improved surveillance programmes; Opportunity to increase scientific knowledge and expertise of researchers and diagnosticians; Protection and assurance of the unique disease-free status of the New Zealand plant-based industries; Protection of native flora from exotic plant diseases; Protection of the economy from a severe exotic disease outbreak and consequently leading to a reduction in exports and more expensive imports of plants and plant products; and Rapid diagnosis of suspected exotic plant diseases without having to depend on overseas laboratories. What adverse effects could this organism have on the environment? For all stages of the life cycle Disease/damage to native and introduced valued flora These effects could have further implications including reductions in genetic diversity, and ecosystem health. The magnitude of damage would be dependent on whether a micro- organism could form a self-sustaining population and whether it could be eradicated. There are no “native” species of plant viruses or viroids and the susceptibility of indigenous plants to species of viruses and viroids not already in New Zealand is unknown. However, some introduced viruses have moved from exotic plant hosts to infect indigenous species, e.g. Cucumber infects Corynocarpus laevigatus, Myosotidium hortensia and Sicyos sp. (Pearson et al., 2006). It is reasonable to assume that were a new virus with a wide host range to become established in New Zealand it might infect indigenous species closely related to its hosts overseas. For example, Potato

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virus T infects 46 species in eight families (in particular the Chenopodiaceae, Leguminosae and Solanaceae) (Salazar & Harrison, 1978) and one might expect that related indigenous plants such as Solanum laciniatum would be susceptible. Potato virus T is usually latent but occasionally produces a mild leaf mottle (Salazar & Harrison, 1978), therefore the effects on the environment would be likely to be limited. In contrast, Coconut cadang-cadang viroid is estimated to have killed more than 40 million coconut (Cocos nucifera) trees since it was first recognized in the Philippines (Hadidi et al., 2003). The viroid infects eight species, all in the family Palmae: betel nut palm (Areca catechu), buri palm (Corypha elata), Manila palm (Adonidia merrillii), oil palm (Elaies guineensis), palmera (Chrysalidocarpus lutescens), royal palm (Oreodoxa regia), Macarthur palm (Ptycosperma macarthuri) and date palm (Phoenix dactylifera) (Hadidi et al., 2003; Rodriguez & Randles, 2003). However, 44 species in 12 other families are not susceptible. It is not known whether New Zealand‟s indigenous Nikau palm (Rhapalostylis sapida) is susceptible to infection by Coconut cadang-cadang viroid. The majority of and viroid species have a narrow host range, e.g. Coleus blumei viroid 1 and Ginger chlorotic fleck virus infect only one host species (Thomas, 1988; Robinson, 2001), and would not be expected to infect indigenous species. Long term adverse effects would only occur if an organism escaped containment and formed a self-sustaining population. What adverse effects could this organism have on public health? For all stages of the life cycle Plant viruses and viroids do not infect humans and are not known to have any potential adverse effect on human health. Measures to prevent contact with micro-organisms are a requirement of working in the containment facility, e.g. wearing protective clothing such as eye wear and laboratory coats. What adverse effects could this organism have on the relationship of Māori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water, sites, waahi tapu, valued flora and fauna and other taonga (taking into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi)? The potential adverse effects to the environment and economy caused by the escape of organisms from containment have been addressed elsewhere in this section. If an adverse effect were to occur to native and/or valued species through an escape from containment, there would be likely flow-on effects to the mauri (life essence) of those species and the role of Māori as kaitiaki (guardians/stewards) in the maintenance and management of mauri. However, as described earlier, the nature of containment and likelihood of suitable environment conditions are such that the risk of escape and subsequent infection are essentially nil. Local Māori groups (namely Ngati Paoa Whanau Trust Board, Ngai Tai Umupuia Te Waka Totara Trust, and Ngati Whatua o Orakei Corporate Ltd) were informed of this application in April 2009.

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Are there any other potential adverse effects (including effects on New Zealand‟s international obligations, society and community or the market economy)? 1) Decreased yield and quality of production from plant-based industries if a new disease established, potentially leading to reduced domestic and export sales; and 2) Loss of access to export markets if a new disease were to become established or suspected but could not be confirmed/ruled-out by testing. The economic impacts vary depending on the micro-organism and the industry affected. For example, Plum pox virus is a destructive disease of Prunus (apricot, cherry, nectarine, peach & plum) (Glasa & Candresse, 2005). Such plants are important horticultural crops in New Zealand. In 2007, 22,407 tonnes of stonefruit worth $74.3 million were grown on 2,325 hectares, 43% of this area is in Otago with a slightly smaller amount in Hawke's Bay (Aitken et al., 2007). Plum pox virus is spread by more than 20 aphid species (with varying efficiency), infected plant material, and possibly seed. The insect vectors are present in New Zealand and there are no effective treatments for the disease. In Europe, c. 100 million stonefruit trees are infected with Plum pox virus and susceptible cultivars may have 80-100% yield losses. The virus was found in Canada in 2000 and it was estimated that if it became widespread it would cost CA$114 million over 25 years because of decreased fruit quality and yield, loss of markets and restrictions on plant exports (see: http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/plaveg/pestrava/ppv/queste.shtml). Considering the mode of dispersal, this virus would have a moderate risk of establishment in New Zealand if containment were breached in areas where Prunus spp. were grown commonly. Although its dissemination could be assisted by aphids, there are no commercial Prunus orchards close to PHEL and only a few individual plants of susceptible species. Therefore it is unlikely that the virus would become established if containment were breached in the Auckland suburb in which PHEL is located. In contrast, some viruses and viroids may cause little or no adverse economic effects. For example, Salazar & Harrison (1978) reported that Potato virus T was “reported only from potato (Solanum tuberosum) in which it is usually latent, but occasionally produces a mild leaf mottle”. Similarly Lucerne Australian latent virus “occurs symptomlessly in lucerne (Medicago sativa)” in Australia and New Zealand (Jones & Forster, 1980). While Coleus blumei viroid 1 is reported to cause “slight chlorosis or purple pigmentation in leaves of some Coleus blumei cultivars, but is symptomless in others (Robinson, 2001). Are there any ethical considerations associated with the organism(s) to be imported or the proposed research? We do not consider that there are any ethical considerations associated with the micro- organisms to be imported for the proposed research.

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Section Six – Additional information Additional Information Y/N If yes, explain Do any of the organism(s) need Y Many of the micro-organisms included in approvals under any other New this application have been declared as Zealand legislation? “unwanted organisms‟ under the Biosecurity Act 1993. Multiplication of such micro-organisms requires approval by a Chief Technical Officer (Section 53 (2) of the Biosecurity Act). PHEL has approval to do such work unless the organism is a „high-impact pest‟ (e.g. Plum pox virus) in which case specific approval from a Chief Technical Officer must be obtained. Does New Zealand have any N New Zealand does not have any international obligations relating to international obligations relating to any of (any of) the organism(s)? the micro-organism(s) within the scope of this application. Have any of the new organism(s) in Y The Ministry of Agiculture and Forestry this application previously been obtained ERMA approval to import isolates considered in New Zealand or of viruses and viroids in dried plant elsewhere? What was the outcome? material in 2002. The ERMA New Zealand register record for this approval is NOC01004. This new application is to permit importation of isolates of plant viruses and viroids in a wider range of substrates (e.g. infected seeds, environmental samples, etc.), and to allow a broader scope of experiments (e.g. in planta pathogenicity testing).

Is there any additional information N Importation of virus vector which are not that you consider relevant to this already present in New Zealand is outside application that has not already been the scope of this application. included? There is no further information that we consider relevant to this application.

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Provide a glossary of scientific and technical terms used in the application: Obligate pathogen: a pathogen which requires its host for multiplication and which can not multiply in vitro in the absence of its host, e.g. phytoplasmas, viroids and viruses. List of appendices: Appendix 1: Plant Viruses and Viroids Recognised by the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses List of references: Fauquet C.M., Mayo M.A., Maniloff J., Desselberger, U. and Ball, L.A. (2005). Virus Taxonomy: Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. Eighth Report Of The International Committee On Taxonomy Of Viruses. Elsevier Academic Press, London, UK. Descriptions of Plant Viruses (2009). http://www.dpvweb.net/intro/index.php. Accessed on 16/01/09. Galindo, J, Smith, DR, Diener, TO (1982). Etiology of planta macho, a viroid disease of tomato. Phytopathology 72, 49-54. Glasa, M, Candresse, T (2005). Plum pox virus. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=410. Accessed on 16/01/09. Hadidi, A, Flores, R, Randles, JW, Semancik, JS (2003). Viroids. CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, Australia. Hull, R. (2002). Matthews‟ Plant Virology. Elsevier Academic Press, London, United Kingdom. Jones, AT, Forster, RLS (1980). Lucerne Australian latent virus. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=225. Accessed on 16/01/09. Aitken, AG, Hewett, EW, Wallace, BD (2007). Freshfacts: New Zealand Horticulture, 2007. www.hortresearch.co.nz/files/aboutus/factsandfigs/ff2007.pdf Pearson, MN, Clover, GRG, Guy, PL, Fletcher, JD, Beever, RE (2006). A review of the plant virus, viroid and mollicute records for New Zealand. Australasian Plant Pathology 35, 217–252. Robinson, DJ (2001). Coleus blumei viroid 1. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=379. Accessed on 16/01/09. Rodriguez, MJB, Randles, JW (2003). Coconut cadang-cadang viroid. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=402. Accessed on 16/01/09. Salazar, LF, Harrison, BD (1978). Potato virus T. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=187. Accessed on 16/01/09. Thomas, JE (1998).Ginger chlorotic fleck virus. http://www.dpvweb.net/dpv/showdpv.php?dpvno=328. Accessed on 16/01/09.

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APPENDIX 1

PLANT VIRUSES RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON TAXONOMY OF VIRUSES1

Family Genus Number of species2 Alfamovirus 1 (0) 6 (0) 3 (0) 16 (0) 1 (0) Bunyaviridae Tospovirus 8 (6) 18 (5) 8 (4) (CsVMV-like) 2 (0) (PVCV-like) 1 (0) (SbCMV-like) 3 (0) (RTBV-like) 1 (0) 6 (5) 8 (4) 8 (2) Unassigned genus 5 (0) Comoviridae 15 (0) 3 (0) 32 (0) Flexiviridae 8 (3) 3 (1) 35 (29) 3 (0) 1 (0) 28 (18) 4 (0) 4 (1) Unassigned genus 6 (0) 117 (54) 4 (1) 11(6) 1 (0) Luteoviridae 1 (0) 5 (0) 9 (0) Unassigned genus 11 (0)

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Family Genus Number of species2 Metavirus 3 (0) 3 (0) 1 (0) Unassigned genus 1 (0) Alphacryptovirus 16 (10) Betacryptovirus 4 (1) Unassigned genus 1 (0) 6 (0) 3 (1) Macluravirus 3 (1) 111 (86) 3 (0) 3 (0) Unassigned genus 3 (0) Pseudovirus 15 (0) Sirevirus 5 (0) Unassigned genus 1 (0) 8 (0) 2 (0) 3 (1) 8 (0) Nucleorhabdovirus 7 (0) Unassigned genus 59 (0) Sequiviridae 2 (1) 3 (0) 2 (0) 1 (0) Carmovirus 14 (8) 3 (3) 1 (0) Necrovirus 6 (2) 1 (1) 15 (1) Unassigned genus 0 (0) 1 (1) 3 (2) 23 (0) Unassigned genus 1 (0)

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Family Genus Number of species2 Unassigned family 2 (2) 2 (2) Endornavirus 4 (0) 5 (0) 4 (0) 1 (0) Ophiovirus 5 (1) 3 (0) 2 (0) 4 (0) 3 (2) Sobemovirus 13 (4) Tenuivirus 6 (5) 22 (1) 3 (0) Umbravirus 7 (3) Varicosavirus 1 (1) Unassigned genus 16 (0) Total species 844 (280) Total present in NZ 200 (estimated) Total new organisms 924

1Fauquet C.M., Mayo M.A., Maniloff J., Desselberger, U. and Ball, L.A. (2005). Virus Taxonomy: Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. Eighth Report of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses. Elsevier Academic Press, London, UK. 2Number of confirmed species (number of tentative species in brackets)

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PLANT VIROIDS RECOGNISED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON TAXONOMY OF VIRUSES1

Family Genus Species Avsunviroidae Avsunviroid Avocado sunblotch viroid3 Pelamoviroid Chrysanthemum chlorotic mottle viroid Peach latent mosaic viroid Pospiviroidae Apscaviroid Apple dimple fruit viroid Apple fruit crinkle viroid2 Apple scar skin viroid Australian grapevine viroid Citrus viroid III Citrus bent leaf viroid Citrus viroid original source2 Grapevine yellow speckle viroid 1 Grapevine yellow speckle viroid 2 Pear blister canker viroid Cocadviroid Citrus viroid IV Coconut cadang-cadang viroid Coconut tinangaja viroid Hop latent viroid3 Coleviroid Coleus blumei viroid 1 Coleus blumei viroid 2 Coleus blumei viroid 3 Hostuviroid Hop stunt viroid Pospiviroid Chrysanthemum stunt viroid3 Citrus exocortis viroid3 Columnea latent viroid Iresine viroid 1 Mexican papita viroid Potato spindle tuber viroid 3 Tomato chlorotic dwarf viroid Tomato apical stunt viroid Tomato planta macho viroid Unassigned family Unassigned genus Blueberry mosaic viroid-like RNA Burdock stunt viroid Eggplant latent viroid Nicotiana glutinosa stunt viroid Pigeon pea mosaic mottle viroid Tomato bunchy top viroid

1Fauquet C.M., Mayo M.A., Maniloff J., Desselberger, U. and Ball, L.A. (2005). Virus Taxonomy: Classification and Nomenclature of Viruses. Eighth Report of the International Committee on Taxonomy of Viruses. Elsevier Academic Press, London, UK. 2Tentative species are underlined 3Species present in New Zealand (not new organisms)

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