Quarterly Newsletter Issue IX — July 2021
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2019 Banking and Capital Markets Outlook Reimagining Transformation 2 Brochure / Report Title Goes Here | Section Title Goes Here
2019 Banking and Capital Markets Outlook Reimagining transformation 2 Brochure / report title goes here | Section title goes here Table of contents Calmer waters: A decade after the financial crisis, the banking industry is on firmer ground 1 Regulation: A new era of global regulatory divergence 5 Technology: Creating a symphonic enterprise 8 Risk: Strengthening the core with new-age defenses 11 Retail banking: The digital leadership race 13 Corporate banking: Digitization and a new credit discipline 16 Transaction banking: Modernizing operations with a focus 18 on improving the client experience Investment banking: New client engagement models 19 and ecosystem orchestration Payments: The imperative to diversify growth, 22 bolster security, and restructure the organization Wealth management: Balancing business growth 24 with product rationalization and transparency Market infrastructure: Harnessing the power of data 26 and technologies to drive a competitive growth agenda 02 Calmer waters A decade after the financial crisis, the banking industry is on firmer ground The global banking system is not only bigger and more Total assets in the United States reached a peak of profitable but also more resilient than at any time in $17.5 trillion.2 Capital levels are up as well, with average tier 1 the last 10 years (figure 1). According to The Banker’s capital ratio standing at 13.14 percent. Return on equity Top 1000 World Banks Ranking for 2018, total assets (ROE) for the industry is at a post-crisis high of 11.83 percent.3 reached$124 trillion, while return on assets (ROA) stood at Efficiency ratios also are at their best. -
Financial Innovation and the Inequality Gap
Financial Innovation and the Inequality Gap Roxana Mihet ∗ Latest version here November 26, 2020 Abstract Information-based models of capital income inequality that link return hetero- geneity to investor sophistication levels need to assume an increase in data costs over time to generate widening inequality. Empirically, this assumption contra- dicts evidence that investment markets have become more informative over time, and theoretically, it also overlooks the possibility that poorer investors can avoid paying a large fixed cost for research, simply by buying shares in a fund. In this paper, I study the impact of financial innovation on capital income inequality in a theoretical framework where investors, heterogeneous in their sophistication, have a costly choice between not investing, investing through a fund of average quality, and searching for an informed fund. The model predicts that while financial inno- vation can make the investment sector more efficient and boost financial inclusion, some financial innovation also brings risks. For example, when the cost of financial data processing falls, more investors trade on information. This makes participa- tion less valuable for the uninformed marginal stock market participant, who is a poorer investor in some average fund and who exits the market altogether, fore- going the equity premium. The decrease in the participation of relatively poorer investors amplifies inequality. Empirically, this negative force has been very strong in the last 20 years and it can explain why, in spite of a dramatic reduction in data processing costs and fund fees, the US stock market has become less inclusive and more unequal and the participation rate has declined. -
Case Study of the Bank of America and Merrill Lynch Merger
CASE STUDY OF THE MERGER BETWEEN BANK OF AMERICA AND MERRILL LYNCH Robert J. Rhee† The financial crisis of 2008 has posed innumerable problems in law, policy, and economics. A key event in the history of the financial crisis was Bank of America‟s acquisition of Merrill Lynch. Along with the fire sale of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill Lynch confirmed the worst fears about the financial crisis. Before this acquisition, Bank of America had long desired a top tier investment banking business, and Merrill Lynch represented a strategic opportunity to acquire a troubled but premier franchise of significant scale.1 As the financial markets continued to unravel after execution of the merger agreement, this golden opportunity turned into a highly risky gamble. Merrill Lynch was losing money at an astonishing rate, an event sufficient for Bank of America to consider seriously invoking the merger agreement‟s material adverse change clause. 2 The deal ultimately closed, but only after the government threatened to fire Bank of America‟s management and board if the company attempted to terminate the deal. The government took this coercive action to save the financial system from complete collapse. The harm to the financial system from a broken deal, officials feared, would have been unthinkable. The board‟s motivation is less clear. Like many classic corporate law cases, the factors influencing the board and management were complex. This case study examines these complexities, which raise important, unresolved issues in corporate governance and management. In 2008, three major investment banks—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch—collapsed or were acquired under distress, and these events played a large part in triggering the global financial crisis.3 In March, Bear Stearns † Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law; J.D., The George Washington University; M.B.A., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton); B.A., University of Chicago. -
Technological Change and Financial Innovation in Banking: Some Implications for Fintech
A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Frame, W. Scott; Wall, Larry D.; White, Lawrence J. Working Paper Technological change and financial innovation in banking: Some implications for fintech Working Paper, No. 2018-11 Provided in Cooperation with: Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Suggested Citation: Frame, W. Scott; Wall, Larry D.; White, Lawrence J. (2018) : Technological change and financial innovation in banking: Some implications for fintech, Working Paper, No. 2018-11, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Atlanta, GA, http://dx.doi.org/10.29338/wp2018-11 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200533 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of ATLANTA WORKING PAPER SERIES Technological Change and Financial Innovation in Banking: Some Implications for Fintech W. -
Financial Innovation in the 21St Century: Evidence from U.S
Financial Innovation in the 21st Century: Evidence from U.S. Patenting1 Josh Lerner Amit Seru Nicholas Short Yuan Sun August 7, 2020 Patents provide a window into the evolution of financial innovation over the past two decades. We first highlight the growth and importance of these awards in the 21st century. The dramatic surge in financial patenting has been driven largely by information technology and other non-financial firms, while banks and other financial institutions have narrowed the scope of their innovations. These shifts have been an accompanied by a decline in the links between patent awards and academic knowledge, and shifts in the geographic location of innovation, especially within incumbent firms. 1 [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]. All authors are affiliated with Harvard University except for Seru, who is at Stanford University. Lerner and Seru are affiliates of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Harvard Business School’s Division of Research and Doctoral Programs provided financial support for this project. We thank Howell Jackson, Adam Jaffe, Andy Toole, and seminar participants at Stanford Law School for helpful comments. Rick Townsend kindly allowed us to use the patent-venture capital mapping. Patrick Clapp, Amin Gulamali, Stephen Moon, Mahlon Reihman, Kathleen Ryan, Rhys Sevier, and James Zeitler provided excellent research assistance. Lerner has received compensation for consulting with financial institutions. All errors and omissions are our own. 1 1. Introduction The extent and consequences of innovation in the finance industry has been a subject of intense skepticism since the global financial crisis (GFC). -
The Rise of Fintech in the Middle East an Analysis of the Emergence of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates
The Rise of FinTech in the Middle East An Analysis of the Emergence of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates JACKSON MUELLER AND MICHAEL S. PIWOWAR ABOUT US ABOUT THE MILKEN INSTITUTE The Milken Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan think tank. For the past three decades, the Milken Institute has served as a catalyst for practical, scalable solutions to global challenges by connecting human, financial, and educational resources to those who need them. Guided by a conviction that the best ideas, under-resourced, cannot succeed, we conduct research and analysis and convene top experts, innovators, and influencers from different backgrounds and competing viewpoints. We leverage this expertise and insight to construct programs and policy initiatives. These activities are designed to help people build meaningful lives, in which they can experience health and well-being, pursue effective education and gainful employment, and access the resources required to create ever- expanding opportunities for themselves and their broader communities. ABOUT THE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS The Milken Institute Center for Financial Markets conducts research and constructs programs designed to facilitate the smooth and efficient operation of financial markets to help ensure that they are fair and available to those who need them when they need them. CONTENTS 3 Executive Summary 4 Introduction 4 Setting the Foundation for FinTech Development 5 Growing Domestic and Regional Customer Base 6 Positive Growth Trends and Established Payments Presence 9 The Emerging -
When Banks Act As Regulators Within a Regime of Privilege
Private Policies and Public Power When Banks Act as Regulators within a Regime of Privilege Brian Knight and Trace Mitchell MERCATUS WORKING PAPER All studies in the Mercatus Working Paper series have followed a rigorous process of academic evaluation, including (except where otherwise noted) at least one double-blind peer review. Working Papers present an author’s provisional findings, which, upon further consideration and revision, are likely to be republished in an academic journal. The opinions expressed in Mercatus Working Papers are the authors’ and do not represent official positions of the Mercatus Center or George Mason University. Brian Knight and Trace Mitchell. “Private Policies and Public Power: When Banks Act as Regulators within a Regime of Privilege.” Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, October 2019. Abstract An emerging trend in financial services is banks’ increasingly common refusal to do business with industries for political reasons rather than for traditional business justifications. Banks’ refusals are often explained by a desire to make a difference or send a message. While this desire may not raise a concern in most cases, banks are not like most other businesses. Banks enjoy an extensive regime of privilege provided by federal and state governments that includes barriers to market entry and exit, more favorable regulatory treatment than nonbank competitors in some areas, and direct and privileged access to services provided by the government. This paper asks whether this public power, granted to banks for the purposes of facilitating lawful commerce, is being misused when banks try to regulate downstream markets through withholding services and what, if anything, should be done to address these actions by banks. -
Brian 73334 74470 Bank of America’S Brian Moynihan
IA.coverA1.REVISE2.qxd 7/10/09 1:15 PM Page 1 IRISHIRISHAugust/September 2009 AMERICA AMERICACanada $4.95 U.S.$3.95 THE GLORY DAYS OF IRISH IN BASEBALL JUSTICE ROBERTS’ IRISH FAMILY MEMORIES OF THE GREAT HUNGER THE WALL STREET 50 HONORING THE IRISH IN FINANCE The Life DISPLAY UNTIL SEPT. 30, 2009 08 of Brian 74470 73334 Bank of America’s Brian Moynihan on family, Ireland and 09 what the future holds > AIF-Left 7/9/09 12:08 PM Page 1 AIF-Left 7/9/09 12:08 PM Page 2 MutualofAmerica 7/6/09 11:15 AM Page 1 WaterfordAD 7/10/09 2:06 PM Page 1 IA.38-41.rev.qxd 7/10/09 7:36 PM Page 38 38 IRISH AMERICA AUGUST / SEPTEMBER 2008 IA.38-41.rev.qxd 7/10/09 7:36 PM Page 39 WAL L STREET50 KEYNOTE SPEAKER THE LIFE OF Brian Bank of America’s Brian Moynihan says “It doesn’t all break your way all the time, so you’ve got to just power through it.” e has the look of an athlete, com- “He has proved in difficult environments he is pact with broad shoulders. He also very capable,” said Anthony DiNovi, co-president of has something of a pre-game Boston private-equity firm Thomas H. Lee Partners focus, a quiet intensity, and gives LP, in a Wall Street Journal article by Dan the impression, even as he Fitzpatrick and Suzanne Craig. The article addressed answers questions, that he has his Moynihan’s emergence as a right-hand man and eye on the ball and he’s not forget- potential successor to Bank of America Corp. -
Remarks Before the Fintech and the Future of Finance Conference, April
Remarks By Thomas J. Curry Comptroller of the Currency At Fintech and the Future of Finance Conference Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University April 28, 2017 Evanston, Illinois Thank you for that introduction. It’s a pleasure to be in the Chicago area again to discuss financial innovation and, more specifically, the convergence of emerging financial technology and traditional financial services. It’s an exciting time to be in banking. All over the United States, and around the world, bankers and other entrepreneurs are figuring out how to adapt their businesses to the changes taking place in the financial services industry. Some banks are creating their own versions of financial technology innovations, while others are expanding their collaborative relationships with—or simply acquiring—companies that offer new technology or services that complement the banks’ existing business plans. In my short time with you today, I would like to share my perspective on where financial innovation is today, the potential I see for fintech to improve the lives of ordinary Americans and improve businesses’ bottom lines, and what the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is doing to encourage responsible innovation within the federal banking system. 1 First, I’d like to tell you a bit about the agency I’ve been privileged to lead for the last five years as Comptroller of the Currency. Financial professionals understand the agency’s role in administering the federal banking system, chartering and supervising national banks and federal savings associations, and, when necessary, taking enforcement actions against institutions and individuals for failures in compliance or safety and soundness. -
Definitive Proxy Statement ¨ Definitive Additional Materials ¨ Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14A-12
Table of Contents UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION Washington, D.C. 20549 SCHEDULE 14A (Rule 14a-101) INFORMATION REQUIRED IN PROXY STATEMENT SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION Proxy Statement Pursuant to Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Amendment No. ) Filed by the Registrant x Filed by a Party other than the Registrant ¨ Check the appropriate box: ¨ Preliminary Proxy Statement ¨ Confidential, for Use of the Commission Only (as permitted by Rule 14a-6(e)(2)) x Definitive Proxy Statement ¨ Definitive Additional Materials ¨ Soliciting Material Pursuant to §240.14a-12 Bank of America Corporation (Name of Registrant as Specified in its Charter) (Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if Other Than the Registrant) PAYMENT OF FILING FEE (Check the appropriate box): x No fee required. ¨ Fee computed on table below per Exchange Act Rules 14a-6(i)(1) and 0-11. 1) Title of each class of securities to which transaction applies: 2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies: 3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined): 4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction: 5) Total fee paid: ¨ Fee paid previously with preliminary materials. ¨ Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was previously paid. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the Form or Schedule and the date of its filing. -
Fintech in India: Present Status and Looming Issues
FinTech in India: present status and looming issues Susan Thomas IGIDR, Bombay 31 October, 2019 Structure of this talk I What is FinTech I Governing framework: Information, Payments, Business models and the role of technology I The FinTech industry in India I Policy status, Looking forward What is FinTech Definition I Financial Stability Board (2017): “...technologically enabled financial innovation that could result in new business models, applications, processes, or products with an associated material effect on financial markets and institutions and the provision of financial services.” (Emphasis added) Same functions; New mechanisms of delivering finance. Classifying financial functions and delivery Traditional (FSB, 2017) – 1. payments, clearing and settlement 2. deposits, lending and capital raising 3. investment management and market support 4. insurance FinTech (Schindler, 2017) – 1. distributed ledger technology 2. machine learning and online marketplace lending, 3. equity crowdfunding 4. insurance FinTech 5. robo-advice Classifying financial functions and delivery Traditional (FSB, 2017) – 1. payments, clearing and settlement 2. deposits, lending and capital raising 3. investment management and market support 4. insurance FinTech (Schindler, 2017) – 1. distributed ledger technology 2. machine learning and online marketplace lending, 3. equity crowdfunding 4. insurance FinTech 5. robo-advice Key take-aways I Goals of FinTech: Higher financial inclusion; competition to existing financial firms. I How can competition make a material impact on existing financial firms? Through a focus on function vs. (institutional) form (Merton and Bodie, 2005) I FinTech is about new business models that disrupt existing business models by: I Identifying functions in finance and I Uses technology to deliver functions separately Key take-aways I Goals of FinTech: Higher financial inclusion; competition to existing financial firms. -
Fintech and Disruptive Innovation in Financial Markets
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development DAF/COMP/WD(2019)55 Unclassified English - Or. English 4 June 2019 DIRECTORATE FOR FINANCIAL AND ENTERPRISE AFFAIRS COMPETITION COMMITTEE Digital Disruption in Financial Markets – Note by the United States 5 June 2019 This document reproduces a written contribution from the United States submitted for Item 5 of the 131st OECD Competition committee meeting on 5-7 June 2019. More documents related to this discussion can be found at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/digital-disruption-in-financial-markets.htm Please contact Mr. Antonio Capobianco if you have any questions about this document [E-mail: [email protected]]. JT03448375 This document, as well as any data and map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. 2 │ DAF/COMP/WD(2019)55 United States 1. Introduction 1. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) submit this paper as part of the Competition Committee’s review of disruptive innovation involving financial technology. In this paper, we present relevant competition law and policy experiences of the DOJ and FTC as well as relevant aspects of the FTC’s consumer protection work. To provide broader context on issues outside the purview of this Committee, we also include views from a U.S. Department of the Treasury report on innovation in financial services and note that there are a number of efforts in other international forums on these issues outside the area of competition law and policy.