Appellant's Brief in Support of Appeal of Dismissal

Home , Equal Protection Clause, Governor of North Dakota

20140194 FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF SUPREME COURT JUNE 25, 2014 STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA IN THE SUPREME COURT STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

Paul J. Sorum )

Petitioner and Appellant ) SUPREME COURT

vs. ) No. 20140194

Jack Dalrymple, Governor of North Dakota )

Drew Wrigley, Lt. Governor of North Dakota )

Ryan Taylor, 2012 Dem. Candidate for Governor of ND )

Ellen Chaffee, 2012 Dem. Candidate for Lt. Gov. of ND )

Al Jaeger, North Dakota Secretary of State )

Respondents and Appellees )

(Ref. Burleigh County CASE NO. 08-2014-CV-0173)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

IN SUPPORT OF

APPEAL OF DISMISSAL

Brief By: Paul J. Sorum, Petitioner/Appellant 3501 Calypso Dr, Bismarck, North Dakota 58504 Phone: 701-219-5601

Table of Contents

Section Paragraph Nature and Facts of Case and Proceedings ...... 1

Legal Argument ...... 18

Discrimination is Severe and Pervasive ...... 51

Relief Requested ...... 65

II TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASE LAW

Citation Paragraph Ableman v. Booth, 62 US 506 - Supreme Court 1859 ...... 14 Francis v. Francis, 2014 ND 111 - ND: Supreme Court 2014 ...... 28 Gullickson v. Kline, 2004 ND 76, ¶ 16, 678 N.W.2d 138 ...... 28 Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F. 3d 130 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2008 ...... 51 James Valley Grain v. David, 2011 ND 160, 802 N.W.2d 158 ...... 1(3) Kiner v. Well, 71 N.W.2d 743, 750-51 (N.D. 1955) ...... 21, 22, 23, 24, 47, 48, 49 North Dakota Attorney General Opinion 2012-L-07...... 3, 6, 23, 26, 48 Parr v. Woodmen, 791 F. 2d 888 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1986 ...... 54, 55 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 US 833 - Supreme Court 1992 ...... 38 Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71 - Supreme Court 1971 ...... 41, 42 Riemers v. Jaeger, 2013 ND 30, 827 N.W.2d 330 . ... 4, 11, 13, 19, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 48, 49, 55 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920) ...... 41 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 - Supreme Court 1969 ...... 43 State ex rel. Sathre v. Moody, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558, 566 ...... 33 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 US 254 - Supreme Court 1986 ...... 39 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US 23 - Supreme Court 1968 ...... 46

III CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS and STATUTES

Law Paragraph North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) ... 1(3), 5, 6, 11, 19, 20, 23, 33, 37, 47, 48, 49, 55 North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-09-01(b)(1) ...... 64 North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-11-01 (3) and (4) ...... 49 North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-14-01 (2) ...... 37 North Dakota Constitution Article V, § 3 ...... 2, 19, 33, 37, 47, 48, 49, 55 North Dakota Constitution Article I, § 24 ...... 8 North Dakota Constitution Article V, § 7 ...... 9 North Dakota Constitution Article I, § 22 ...... 35 North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 4(c)(1)(E) ...... 57 Title 18 U.S. Code § 242 ...... 52 Title 18 U.S. Code § 1512(b) ...... 63 Title 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law ...... 53 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...... 55 U.S. Constitution § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment ...... 36

Nature and Facts of Case and Proceedings

1. On January 22, 2014, I, Paul J. Sorum, the above named Petitioner and Appellant,

filed a petition in South Central District Court for relief in the form a Writ of Mandamus

issued to Respondent Jack Dalrymple, Governor of North Dakota, and Respondent Al

Jaeger, North Dakota Secretary of State, as follows (emphasis added):

1. For those reasons which are set forth hereafter, issuance of an order

compelling Governor Jack Dalrymple to fulfill his Constitutional mandate to

faithfully execute North Dakota election law codified in N.D.C.C. Title § 16.1

with respect to the 2012 June Primary Election, and the 2012 November General

Election.

2. For those reasons which are set forth hereafter, declare that Jack Dalrymple

and Ryan Taylor and their respective Lt. Governor candidates were not

nominated in accordance with applicable North Dakota law and that the State

Canvassing Board should not have certified these candidates.

3. Issuance of an order compelling Secretary of State Al Jaeger to fulfill his

Constitutional mandate to faithfully execute and enforce North Dakota’s election

laws, specifically by removing the Republican and Democratic candidates for

Governor, Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor, from the June 12, 2012 ballot and

the November 6, 2012 General Election ballot and/or by declaring their

nominations and/or election to be null upon the grounds that these gubernatorial

1 candidates did not list and include their respective Lieutenant Governor

candidates on the same certificate of endorsement form as is required by

N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06 (2), which provisions state as follows: “If the petition or

certificate of endorsement is for the office of governor or lieutenant governor, the

petition or certificate must contain the names and other information required of

candidates for both those offices.” (emphasis added) This language is clear

and unambiguous, and the intent thereof is obvious and understandable. The use

of the words “must” in this statute indicates that the provisions are meant to be

mandatory. (See, e.g., James Valley Grain v. David, 2011 ND 160, 802 N.W.2d

158).

4. Issuance of an order compelling Secretary of State Al Jaeger to require the

State Canvassing Board to adjust and certify the results of November 2012

General Election for Governor and Lt. Governor of North Dakota after removing

the Republican candidates for Governor and Lt. Governor, Jack Dalrymple and

Drew Wrigley, and Democratic candidates for Governor and Lt. Governor, Ryan

Taylor and Ellen Chaffee, from the November 6, 2012 General Election ballot.

(See Pages 1-2 of Docket #1, Petition to the North Dakota District Court, South Central

Judicial District, Burleigh County for Writ of Mandamus)

2. In requesting this relief, this Appellant cited state law. The North Dakota State

Constitution Article V, § 3 states (emphasis added):

Section 3. The governor and the lieutenant governor must be elected on a joint ballot. Each vote cast for a candidate for governor is deemed cast also for the candidate for lieutenant governor running jointly with the candidate for governor... (N.D. Const. art. V, § 3)

3. In July of 2012, the North Dakota Attorney General Wayne Stenehjem issued an official opinion regarding 2012 Libertarian candidate for North Dakota governor, Roland

Riemers, stating (emphasis added):

Based on the foregoing, it is my opinion that the gubernatorial candidate for the Libertarian Party was not nominated for governor according to state law because the requirement of N.D. Const. art. V, § 3 for a joint ballot for governor and lieutenant governor was not satisfied. (See N.D. Att'y Gen. Op. 2012-L-07) (See Appendix E of Docket #1, Petition to the North Dakota District Court, South Central Judicial District, Burleigh County for Writ of Mandamus).

4. In deciding against an appeal from the Libertarian candidate for governor in 2012, the

North Dakota Supreme court wrote (emphasis added), “The Attorney General's interpretation of the mandatory constitutional requirement of N.D. Const. art. V, § 3 is persuasive, and the Secretary of State correctly applied that opinion.” Riemers v. Jaeger,

2013 ND 30, 827 N.W.2d 330. (See Appendix F of Docket #1, Petition to the North

Dakota District Court, South Central Judicial District, Burleigh County for Writ of

Mandamus)

5. The North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) states (emphasis added):

3 If the petition or certificate of endorsement is for the office of governor and lieutenant governor, the petition or certificate must contain the names and other information required of candidates for both those offices. If the petition or certificate of endorsement is mailed, it must be in the possession of the secretary of state before four p.m. of the sixty-fourth day before the primary election. N. D. C. C. § 16.1-11-06 (2)

6. This section of North Dakota election law was also referenced in the same Attorney

General’s Opinion which the North Dakota Supreme Court found "persuasive" (Att'y

Gen. Op. 2012-L-07) (emphasis added):

However, a plain reading of N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06(2) clearly reveals that “the petition or certificate must contain the names and other information required of candidates for both those offices.”

This language requires two things. First, the gubernatorial candidate’s certificate of endorsement or nominating petition should have mentioned the name of a candidate for Lieutenant Governor together with the ancillary information such as the appropriate address, telephone number, title of office, and party (which it did not). Second, a candidate for Lieutenant Governor would have had to file a certificate of endorsement or nominating petition together with all the required information including certain information regarding the candidate for Governor. This provision of the law was likewise not followed. Because, in this instance, there was no candidate for Lieutenant Governor on the primary election ballot and because the gubernatorial candidate for the Libertarian Party (who did appear on the primary election ballot) did not name a running mate and other pertinent information required of candidates for both those offices in the nominating petition or certificate of endorsement, the Libertarian Party candidate for Governor was not nominated in accordance with North Dakota law.

4 “North Dakota law generally differentiates between a primary election and a general election.”5 Persons properly nominated at a primary election in accordance with the provisions of N.D.C.C. ch. 16.1-11 are eligible as candidates to be voted for at the ensuing general election.6 However, because the gubernatorial candidate for this party was not nominated in accordance with N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06(2), he was not properly nominated and thus not eligible as a candidate for the ensuing November general election. Att'y Gen. Op. 2012-L-07.

7. Using the Attorney General’s standard which was the basis of the North Dakota

Supreme Court's binding decision in the Riemer's case, Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor

were not properly nominated as gubernatorial candidates in the 2012 Election Cycle and thus not eligible to be candidates for the November General Election since their respective certificates of endorsement or nominating petitions did not include the name of

a candidate for Lieutenant Governor (See Appendix #2).

8. ARTICLE I of the North Dakota State Constitution, entitled DECLARATION OF

RIGHTS, Section 24 states:

The provisions of this constitution are mandatory and prohibitory unless, by express words, they are declared to be otherwise. North Dakota Constitution Article I, § 24

9. ARTICLE V of the North Dakota State Constitution entitled EXECUTIVE BRANCH

Section 7 states:

5 The governor is the chief executive of the state. The governor shall have the responsibility to see that the state's business is well administered and that its laws are faithfully executed. North Dakota Constitution Article V, § 7

10. The Governor, Jack Dalrymple, did not fulfill his Constitutional mandate to faithfully execute North Dakota’s election laws, (N.D.C.C. § 16.1) in the 2012 gubernatorial election -- because state law prohibited him from being certified to be his party’s nominee on the June 2012 ballot and therefore state law disqualified him from the

November 6, 2012 General Election.

11. It is logical and reasonable to consider the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision in

Riemers v. Jaeger to be a binding precedent in the instant case. There were four

candidates for governor including Libertarian Roland Riemers, this Appellant, and

Republican and Democratic candidates for Governor, Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor.

If, after the primary election, the court applies N.D. Const. art. V, § 3 and N.D.C.C. §

16.1-11-06(2) to one gubernatorial candidate after the Primary Election in 2012, it must

apply these laws to all candidates to avoid violating the Fourteenth Amendment of the

U.S. Constitution.

12. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, guarantees citizens equal protection under the law, “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State

6 deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

13. In citing something other than legal precedent in dismissing this Appellant's petition to the court, Judge Jorgensen wrongfully dismissed the case by basing his decision on the minority concurring decision in Riemers v. Jaeger rather than the actual legally binding

decision in Riemers v. Jaeger (See Riemers v. Jaeger, 2013 ND 30, 827 N.W.2d 330).

14. In doing so, Judge Jorgensen has abused his power by operating outside of his jurisdiction and has violated this Appellant's Constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law. In Ableman v. Booth, the U.S. Supreme Court defines the limits of the judicial process:

… No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence. … The Constitution of the United States, with all the powers conferred by it on the General Government, and surrendered by the States, was the voluntary act of the people of the several States, deliberately done, for their own protection and safety against injustice from one another. And their anxiety to preserve it in full force, in all its powers, and to guard against resistance to or evasion of its authority, on the part of a State, is proved by the clause which requires that the members of the State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers of the several States, (as well as those of the General Government,) shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this Constitution.

7 Ableman v. Booth, 62 US 506 - Supreme Court 1859

15. Judge Jorgensen's actions in his decision were hostile and damaging to this Appellant

and this Appellant's running mate Michael Coachman. There is no rational justification

for treating this Appellant differently than the other candidates under the law. The only objective differences between this Appellant and the other Gubernatorial candidates in

the 2012 election are the following:

1. This Appellant was an independent candidate for governor on the 2012 General

Election ballot.

2. This Appellant's running mate, Michael Coachman, is an African American.

16. Judge Jorgensen's actions have treated this Appellant and his running mate as a

different class of candidates by denying us our Constitutional rights to equal protection

under the law. Mr. Jorgensen's decision is an act of invidious discrimination.

17. For these reasons, this Appellant requests the lower court's order to dismiss this

Appellant's petition for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus be reversed. This Appellant

requests the court to issue this Appellant's Writ of Mandamus as quoted above.

8 Legal Argument

18. In his order to dismiss Civil Case Number 08-2014-CV-00173, Judge Jorgensen stated (emphasis added):

Plaintiff Paul J. Sorum petitions the Court to issues a writ of mandamus to alter the results of the 2012 June Primary Election and the 2012 November General Election because the Certificate of Endorsement form prepared and authorized by the Secretary of State's office did not comply with the law. Specifically, Sorum requests this Court issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary of State to remove the Republican and Democratic candidates from the ballot, and then recalculate the election accordingly.

Sorum v. Dalrymple, Civil Case Number 08-2014-CV-00173.

19. This statement is not correct. This Appellant's request for relief was not because the

"Certificate of Endorsement form prepared and authorized by the Secretary of State's office did not comply with the law." This Appellant's petition to the court for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus was because gubernatorial candidates Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor filed nominating certificates which did not comply with North Dakota

Constitution Article V, § 3 and N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06(2). Al Jaeger, as Secretary of

State, wrongfully certified candidates Dalrymple, Wrigley, Taylor and Chaffee for the

June Primary and November General election ballots for governor and lieutenant governor thereby invalidating the results of the 2012 gubernatorial election.

9 20. Further, this Appellant petitioned the court for the above mentioned writ of

mandamus because the Libertarian candidate for governor was taken off the ballot after

the Primary election by the North Dakota Supreme Court for the exact same violation of

N.D. Const. art. V, § 3 and N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06(2) as was committed by gubernatorial

candidates Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor.

21. Judge Jorgensen further states in his order to dismiss this Appellant's petition

(emphasis added):

Here, Mr. Sorum has presented an affidavit to the Court in compliance with rule 32-34-02. However, he has not demonstrated to the Court that he has a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the above named parties. Timing is determinative in deciphering the rights of their technical nature, are mandatory prior to an election. Kiner v. Well, 71 N.W.2d 743, 750-51 (N.D. 1955). However, if enforcement is sought after an election, the rules are merely directory. Id. This Court affirms the importance of this rule, as the North Dakota Supreme Court has previously held, "[t]he reason behind this rule is that the will of the people freely and intelligently expressed ought to not to be defeated because of the mistake of an officer or any technical fault." Id. At 750 (citing City of Fargo v. Sathre, 76 N.D. 341, 36 N.W.2d 39, 47-48).

Sorum v. Dalrymple, Civil Case Number 08-2014-CV-00173.

22. In citing this interpretation of Kiner v. Well and in stating this Appellant "has not demonstrated to the Court that he has a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a writ of

10 mandamus against the above named parties", Judge Jorgensen is ignoring the legally binding precedence in Riemers v. Jaeger.

23. In upholding the lower court's decision to remove Libertarian gubernatorial candidate

Roland Riemers from the ballot after the Primary election, the court found that the

Attorney General's opinion that N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06 (2) is an essential part of the election and should be enforced at all times - even after an election - to be "persuasive."

The Attorney General’s opinion (See North Dakota Attorney General Opinion 2012-L-

07) included a specific discussion on his strict interpretation as to the requirements of the state’s election laws (emphasis added):

… Second, even if this rule of construction would be deemed to apply to a

primary election, it provides an exception that keeps post-primary election

provisions mandatory if they affect an essential element of the election. Kiner v.

Well, 71 N.W.2d at 744. The mandatory provisions in N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06

requiring the naming of a gubernatorial running mate and N.D. Const. art. V, § 3

requiring joint ballots and joint candidacies for Governor and Lieutenant

Governor are essential elements of the primary and general elections since these

offices are meant to be campaigned for jointly and elected jointly. Consequently,

it is necessary that these statutory and constitutional requirements be considered

as mandatory at all times.

North Dakota Attorney General Opinion 2012-L-07

11 24. Judge Jorgensen's interpretation of Kiner v. Well conflicts with the interpretation accepted by this court in the identical situation in Riemers v. Jaeger.

25. By citing this court's legally binding decision in Riemers v. Jaeger, this Appellant has demonstrated to the court that he does have a clear legal right to justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus against the above named parties -- the Attorney General's opinion and arguments used in the binding precedent of Riemers v. Jaeger is undeniable evidence of that clear legal right.

26. Judge Jorgensen, in his Order to Dismiss, refers to the minority concurring opinion in

Riemers v. Jaeger stating, “… Chief Justice VandeWalle's concurring opinion illuminates the issue at hand in the current petition before the Court. Id. In his concurrence, the Chief

Justice indicated even if sufficient evidence was entered into the record: "I would nevertheless conclude that Riemers is not entitled to the relief because his petition for that relief came too late. The appropriate time to request the relief to have the Republican and

Democratic nominees' names removed from the ballot was before the primary election, not after the electorate had voted in that election." (See Riemers v. Jaeger, 2013 ND 30,

827 N.W.2d 330 and N.D. Attorney General Opinion 2012-L-07)

27. What Justice VandeWalle was suggesting in Riemers v. Jaeger would have been impossible for Riemers to do since Riemers was appealing his case in response to a legal action taken against him after the Primary Election was held. In quoting VandeWalle's concurring decision, Judge Jorgensen, in the instant case, is suggesting a similar judicial

12 process where by this Appellant could not have possibly presented his case before the

Primary election since the knowledge of Mr. Dalrymple's and Mr. Taylor's failure to comply with state election law was not known until it was exposed in Riemer's appeal hearing in front of this court on the same day as the general election in November of

2012 - too late to bring this case in front of the court according to Justice VandeWalle and Judge Jorgensen.

28. In Francis v. Francis, the North Dakota Supreme Court stated:

Although the district court has broad discretion over the conduct of a hearing, "when the court employs a procedure which fails to afford a party a meaningful and reasonable opportunity to present evidence on the relevant issues, the court has abused its discretion and violated the party's due process rights." Gullickson v. Kline, 2004 ND 76, ¶ 16, 678 N.W.2d 138 (reversing a district court order when the overall tenor and tone of the hearing denied a party the opportunity to present evidence and challenge allegations, resulting in a denial of due process).

Francis v. Francis, 2014 ND 111 - ND: Supreme Court 2014

29. Judge Jorgensen has failed to afford this Appellant a meaningful and reasonable opportunity to present evidence on the relevant issues. Judge Jorgensen, in his decision, has violated this Appellant's due process rights.

30. By ignoring the legally binding opinion of the majority in Riemers v. Jaeger, where gubernatorial candidate Roland Riemers was removed from the ballot after the primary election for the same violations of election law committed by Jack Dalrymple and Ryan

13 Taylor, Judge Jorgenson has maliciously denied this Appellant's and this Appellant's

lieutenant governor candidate's rights to due process and equal protection under the law.

Judge Jorgensen's actions in ignoring legally binding precedent were arbitrary and

capricious.

31. In addition to his misleading statements about the Riemers v. Jaeger decision,

Jorgensen erroneously concludes, "After reviewing the previous holdings of the North

Dakota Supreme Court with regards to the determinative nature of timely petitions in

election matters, this Court finds Sorum has failed to demonstrate there is a clear legal

right to have the names of the candidates removed from the ballot years following the

2012 election." This statement is false.

32. Again, Jorgensen fails to acknowledge the majority decision in Riemers v. Jaeger

which provides the opposite conclusion. Further, this Appellant did not bring this action

"years later." This Appellant brought this action on January 4, 2013 under Original

Jurisdiction. This Appellant was denied access to this court at that time. (See Appendix

#3 and Appendix #4).

33. Judge Jorgenson's assertion that enforcing North Dakota Constitution article V, § 3

and North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06(2) after an election is not possible not only conflicts with the recent precedent in Riemers v. Jaeger, it also conflicts with other precedents presented in this Appellants brief (See Document #1, pp. 12-17).

14 One of the most remarkable precedents ignored by Judge Jorgensen is State ex rel. Sathre

v. Moody -- a case precedent where a candidate for governor of North Dakota should not

have been certified for the Primary or General Election ballot because he did not meet the

state’s constitutional requirement to be listed on the General Election ballot. In this cited

precedent, a sitting North Dakota governor that was removed from office after the general

election for violating North Dakota’s constitutional requirements for being certified for

the gubernatorial ballot. (see State ex rel. Sathre v. Moody, 65 N.D. 340, 258 N.W. 558,

566)

34. Not only does Judge Jorgensen's order to dismiss this Appellant's petition to the

Court contradict the multiple legal precedents cited by this Appellant, but Judge

Jorgensen's decision violates the North Dakota Constitution and the U.S. Constitution.

35. The North Dakota Constitution in Article I, Entitled “Declaration of Rights”, Section

22, states, “All laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation.” See North

Dakota Constitution Article I, § 22.

36. Further, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, guarantees

citizens equal protection under the law, “No State shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny

to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” (See U.S.

Constitution § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment)

37. By enforcing of the state’s election laws, North Dakota Constitution article V, § 3

and North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06(2), with respect to one candidate for

governor, Mr. Riemers, and by not applying those same laws to gubernatorial candidates

Jack Dalrymple and Ryan Taylor, Judge Jorgensen has violated both Article I of the State

Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by denying this gubernatorial candidate Appellant and his lieutenant governor running mate their right to

due process and equal protection under the law. By violating this Appellant's right to

equal protection under the law, Judge Jorgensen has also violated North Dakota Century

Code North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-14-01(2) Official Oppression - Elections - Civil

Rights, "A person acting or purporting to act in an official capacity or taking advantage

of such actual or purported capacity is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if, knowing that

his conduct is illegal, he: … 2. Denies or impedes another in the exercise or enjoyment of

any right, privilege, power, or immunity".

38. Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent. Courts cite stare decisis when an

issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Generally,

courts will adhere to the previous ruling:

Indeed, the very concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.

Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US 833 - Supreme Court 1992.

39. The doctrine of precedent is rarely overruled:

… every successful proponent of overruling precedent has borne the heavy

burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate that

the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. In the case

of grand jury discrimination, we have been offered no reason to believe that any

such metamorphosis has rendered the Court's long commitment to a rule of

reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable

to serious reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such a rule is as

compelling today as it was at its inception.

Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 US 254 - Supreme Court 1986.

40. The term "jurisdiction" is really synonymous with the word "power". Any court possesses jurisdiction over matters only to the extent granted to it by the Constitution, or legislation of the sovereignty on behalf of which it functions.

41. By violating this Appellant's Constitutional right's, Judge Jorgensen has abused his power and exceeded his jurisdiction. In Reed v. Reed, the U.S. Supreme Court articulates the definition of how and when the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection

Clause is violated:

The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the

17 objective of that statute. A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920). … The objective of § 15-312 clearly is to establish degrees of entitlement of various classes of persons in accordance with their varying degrees and kinds of relationship to the intestate. Regardless of their sex, persons within any one of the enumerated classes of that section are similarly situated with respect to that objective. By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause. Royster Guano Co. v.Virginia, supra.

42. In Reed v. Reed, the issue of proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause was accomplished "by providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are thus similarly situated, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause." (See Reed v. Reed, 404 US 71 - Supreme Court 1971).

43. In Shapiro v. Thompson, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined a violation of the

Equal Protection clause as an act of Invidious Discrimination:

On reargument, appellees' central contention is that the statutory prohibition of benefits to residents of less than a year creates a classification which constitutes an invidious discrimination denying them equal protection of the laws.[6] We agree. The interests which appellants assert are promoted by the classification either may not constitutionally be promoted by government or are not compelling governmental interests.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 US 618 - Supreme Court 1969.

44. The four gubernatorial candidates in the 2012 election were all similarly situated with the only difference between this Appellant and the Democratic and Republican candidates being the following:

1. This Appellant was an independent candidate for Governor of North Dakota

on 2012 General Election ballot.

2. This Appellant's running mate, Michael Coachman, is an African American.

45. The fact that the two characteristics listed above are the only significant differences between this Appellant and the other gubernatorial candidates in the 2012 election is obvious and undeniable. Judge Jorgensen has irrationally ignored legal precedent in the instant case in response to these two irrelevant differences. He has denied this Appellant and, by extension, his running mate of their Constitutional right to equal protection under the law. This is clearly and logically an act of Invidious Discrimination.

46. In Williams v. Rhodes, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a violation of the

Equal Protection Clause is not permitted in relation to state-wide elections:

19 We therefore hold that no State can pass a law regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's command that "No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws." … But we have also held many times that "invidious" distinctions cannot be enacted without a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 US 23 - Supreme Court 1968.

47. In his Opposition position brief, Douglas Bahr of the Attorney General's office refers to Kiner v. Well in reference to whether Constitution Article V, § 3 and North Dakota

Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) should be enforced after an election stating:

"Sorum has not and cannot meet his burden of showing he has a "clear legal right"

to the requested relief. … The North Dakota Supreme Court has repeatedly stated

that after an election the provisions of election laws should be directory only,

unless the provisions affect and essential element of the election or obstructs the

free and intelligent casting of the vote." (see Kiner v. Well, 71 N.W.2d at 744)

48. In Riemers v. Jaeger (see Riemers v. Jaeger, 2013 ND 30, 827 N.W.2d 330), Mr.

Bahr submitted the Attorney General's Opinion as his argument and testimony which argued the exact opposite interpretation of Kiner v. Well (See North Dakota Attorney

General Opinion 2012-L-07) with regard to whether Constitution Article V, § 3 and

North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) should be enforced after an election stating

(emphasis added):

20 … Second, even if this rule of construction would be deemed to apply to a

primary election, it provides an exception that keeps post-primary election

provisions mandatory if they affect an essential element of the election. Kiner v.

Well, 71 N.W.2d at 744. The mandatory provisions in N.D.C.C. § 16.1-11-06

requiring the naming of a gubernatorial running mate and North Dakota

Constitution Article V, § 3 requiring joint ballots and joint candidacies for

Governor and Lieutenant Governor are essential elements of the primary and

general elections since these offices are meant to be campaigned for jointly and

elected jointly. Consequently, it is necessary that these statutory and constitutional

requirements be considered as mandatory at all times.

North Dakota Attorney General Opinion 2012-L-07

49. By arguing that Constitution Article V, § 3 and North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-

11-06 (2) are essential parts of the primary and general election according to Kiner v.

Well in Riemers v. Jaeger, but then arguing that Constitution Article V, § 3 and North

Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) are not essential parts of the primary and general election according to Kiner v. Well in Sorum v. Dalrymple, Mr. Bahr has committed perjury according to the North Dakota Century Code:

12.1-11-01. Perjury. 3. If in the course of one or more official proceedings, the defendant made a statement under oath or equivalent affirmation inconsistent with another statement made by the defendant under oath or equivalent affirmation to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, both having been made within the period of the statute of limitations, … the defendant may be convicted under this section only if each of such statements was material to the official proceeding in which it was

21 made. 4. For purposes of this section, "false statement under oath or equivalent affirmation" includes a writing made in accordance with chapter 31-14.

North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-11-01 (3) and (4).

50. Mr. Bahr of the Attorney General's office committed perjury in order to ensure that this Appellant's rights and the rights of his running mate, Michael Coachman, would be violated for the purposes of stopping them from taking office (and gainful employment) as Governor and Lieutenant Governor of North Dakota.

Discrimination is Severe and Pervasive

51. This Appellant is a member of a protected class by association. In Holcomb v. Iona

College, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, set the standards for determining if someone is a member of a protected class by association.

… The burden of establishing a prima facie case of alleged disparate treatment “is not onerous.”

…

We resolve that question today, and hold that an employer may violate Title VII if it takes action against an employee because of the employee's association with a person of another race. This Court has never ruled on the question of whether Title VII applies in these circumstances. Holcomb alleges that he was discriminated against, not solely because of his own race, but as a result of his marriage to a black woman. Holcomb v. Iona College, 521 F. 3d 130 - Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 2008.

52. By operating outside of his jurisdiction and by denying this Appellant and by extension his running mate, Michael Coachman, of their constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law, Judge Jorgensen has violated federal law under Title 18 of the federal code (emphasis added):

18 U.S. Code § 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, … to the deprivation of any rights, … protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, … by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; … Title 18 U.S. Code § 242.

53. In violating the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law of this Appellant, Judge Jorgensen has violated federal law under Title 42 of the

federal code (emphasis added):

Title 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law (a) Statement of equal rights All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws … (c) Protection against impairment The rights protected by this section are protected against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law. Title 42 U.S. Code § 1981 - Equal rights under the law.

54. As part of a protected class, this Appellant and his running mate, Michael Coachman,

have been undoubtedly denied employment by the state of North Dakota because of

Judge Jorgensen's invidious discrimination. In Parr v. Woodmen, the United States Court

of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit stated (emphasis added):

Second, the EEOC, which Congress charged with interpreting, administering, and enforcing Title VII, has consistently held that an employer who takes adverse action against an employee or a potential employee because of an interracial association violates Title VII. … The EEOC's interpretation of Title VII is to be accorded "great deference." … Finally, while we have noted that section 1981 and Title VII are not coextensive in coverage, this court has held that when the two statutes are used as parallel bases of relief, their legal elements are identical. … Thus, it would be inconsistent to hold that Parr could state a claim of discrimination based upon an interracial marriage pursuant to section 1981, but not Title VII.

Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F. 2d 888 - Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit 1986

55. If Constitution Article V, § 3 and North Dakota Century Code § 16.1-11-06 (2) were

followed as they were in the decision in Riemers v. Jaeger, both this Appellant and his

running mate, Michael Coachman, would be gainfully employed by that state of North

Dakota. As a member of a protected class and according to the precedent of Parr v.

Woodmen, both Judge Jorgensen and Douglas Bahr of the North Dakota Attorney

General's office are in violation of title VII of the federal code:

UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES

24 SEC. 2000e-2. [Section 703] (a) Employer practices It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual … because of such individual’s race, color, …; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify … applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities …, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

56. The invidious discrimination employed by Judge Jorgensen during the hearing in

Sorum v. Dalrymple was severe and pervasive. In a letter to the court dated May 22,

2014, this Appellant's running mate, Michael Coachman, provides a description of the hearing on March 3, 2014 (see Appendixes #5 and #6):

Michael C. Coachman 405 Barrett Avenue Larimore, ND 58251

RE: Appeal of Sorum v. Dalrymple, Civil Number 08-2014-CV-00173

South Central District Court, State of North Dakota 514 East Thayer Ave. Bismarck, ND 58502

25 Dear District Court,

On March 3, 2014, at the Morton County Courthouse, at 8:30 AM, Paul Sorum and I, Michael C. Coachman, attended the court hearing for Civil Number 08- 2014-CV-00173. As we waited for the start of the hearing, we noticed the opposing attorney from the North Dakota Attorney General's office had not arrived. It was apparent that Douglas Bahr from the Attorney General's office was not going to show up. My thought at that time was that the Attorney General's office did not want to show up and make oral argument defending their opposition brief which contained numerous contradictions to their testimony in the Riemers case - the legally binding precedent in Sorum v. Dalrymple.

At 8:31 AM, The judge then came into the courtroom from the right. He then glanced in my direction as he came through the door. His face went from momentarily serious to surprise with a miss step as he then proceeded to the bench. At that point, Judge Jorgensen turned on his computer and began fumbling with his mouse. He kept looking at the time and at me while he continued to fumble with his computer. Within five minutes he asked the court recorder, are you having computer problems? She responded, "No I'm not." He then turned to his computer off and rebooted. It seemed to me that he was stalling for time.

Judge Jorgensen then made the statement, “we will give the opposing counsel 5 minutes to show up.” Within a few minutes he asked the court recorder to step into the next room to try to call the Attorney General's office. She then got up, stepped into the next room leaving the door open. I could hear her as she called the office of the Attorney General and she then made a second call possibly to a cell phone where she received no answer. She then came back in and informed the judge that she could not locate him. I was perplexed on why a court would call an attorney of this stature when he fails to show up for a hearing! I was able to verify the case online and find the court time a few days in advance of the hearing and I live four hours away. I said to myself, "I am certain they don't normally do this!" I am certain that if Paul Sorum or I did not show up for the hearing, the court would not try to call us to get us to the hearing.

The judge then continued on his computer with what appeared to be a bewildered look on his face as he was continued to look up information on his computer. At approximately 8:42 AM he reluctantly started the hearing stating, "If they don't like my decision, they can appeal it!" He asked Paul Sorum to introduce himself for the record, which he did. Paul Sorum added that his running mate, Michael Coachman was sitting next to him. The judge responded with a look of slight dismay and frustration as he proceeded with the hearing.

The Attorney General's office did not show up for the hearing and I felt uneasy with the demeanor and actions of the judge. Later, I was surprised to learn that

26 Judge Jorgensen granted the Attorney General's office five days to request another hearing.

My understanding of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedures is that a defendant who does not show up for a hearing should expect a decision that favors the Plaintiff or in this case the Petitioner. Rule 4 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure state the following standard:

RULE 4. PERSONS SUBJECT TO JURISDICTION; PROCESS; SERVICE (c) Process. (1) Contents of Summons. The summons must: … (E) notify the defendant that, if the defendant fails to appear and defend, default judgment will be rendered against the defendant for the relief demanded in the complaint; North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedures Rule 4(c)(1)(E)

With this rule as the standard for a fair process, I am certain that if Paul Sorum and I missed the hearing that Judge Jorgensen would not have offered to reschedule the hearing. It would be difficult to imagine that anyone would dispute this assumption given the North Dakota's Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4(c)(1)(E). The question is: Why did Judge Jorgensen give the Attorney General's office such unprecedented bias in this hearing even though they failed to appear for the hearing?

The biased approach Judge Jorgensen is deeply disturbing and unjust. I later learned Judge Jorgensen's decision in Sorum v. Dalrymple was not based on the majority decision in the Riemers case (the legally binding decision that took Riemers off the ballot after the Primary election for the same violation of election law that was committed by Dalrymple and Taylor) but was based on the minority concurring decision. Judge Jorgensen's decision to ignore precedent is an outrageous violation of our right to equal protection under the law.

I realize that there are no African Americans in any elected office in the North Dakota Legislature or in North Dakota's Executive branch or in North Dakota's Judicial branch. If North Dakota's election laws were applied equally to all 2012 gubernatorial candidates in this case, without a doubt, I would be North Dakota's first African American Lieutenant Governor. Judge Jorgensen has gone to extraordinary measures to make sure that does not happen.

Not only has Judge Jorgensen stopped me from my rightful employment as Lieutenant Governor for the state of North Dakota, but Judge Jorgensen has committed a shameful and very public act of discrimination.

27 My rights and Paul Sorum's rights to due process and equal protection were violated by Judge Jorgensen. This action is deeply disturbing and I demand that Jorgensen's decision be reversed and Paul Sorum's petition to the court for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus be approved by the court.

Sincerely,

Michael C. Coachman

57. This appellant confirms Michael Coachman's account of the hearing on March 3,

2014 is accurate. The actions Judge Jorgensen before, during, and after the hearing were biased in favor of the Attorney General's office and the hearing's procedure deviated significantly from the standards set in the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court abused its discretion by failing to properly apply North Dakota Rules of

Civil Procedures Rule 4(c)(1)(E).

58. What happened after the hearing on March 3, 2014 is just as disturbing as what

transpired during the hearing. After missing the hearing, Douglas Bahr of the Attorney

General's office wrote a letter to Judge Jorgensen fraudulently blaming his failure to

appear at the hearing on this Appellant (See Appendix 8, or P. 3 of Docket #26 Letter to

Judge Jorgensen from Petitioner with Attachments).

59. In his letter, Mr. Bahr alleges that this Appellant misled him on the amended

notification of hearing that this Appellant sent to him dated February 11, 2014. In the

28 notice, this petitioner stated the new hearing date and time would be March 3rd, 2014 at

9:00 AM at the Morton County Courthouse.

60. Mr. Bahr in his letter to Judge Jorgensen, dated March 3rd, 2014, stated, "I appropriately and reasonably relied on Mr. Sorum’s Notice. As you can see from the attached notice, at two different places the notice identified the starting time of the

hearing as 9:00 am. I apologize for any inconvenience to the court for me not being at the

hearing at 8:30 am, but trust the Court understands my reliance on Mr. Sorum’s

inaccurate notice." (See Appendix #8)

61. Later, the Burleigh County Clerk of Courts office confirmed the time of the hearing

was changed on February 25, 2014 by the court’s office and no notification of the change

was made. This Appellant had the same disadvantage as Mr. Bahr concerning the lack of

notification yet this Appellant, a non-lawyer, was able to check the courts calendar and

arrive on time.

62. Mr. Bahr's false accusations regarding this Appellant were abusive and hostile. It is

not possible to imagine that a seasoned attorney was unable to check the courts schedule

online for such an important case. Such an assertion is unreasonable and outrageous. In

making his fraudulent charges against this Appellant, Mr. Bahr violated numerous

provisions of North Dakota's Rules of Professional Conduct (See Appendix #8). Mr.

Bahr's letter to Judge Jorgensen was intended to intimidate and marginalize this

Appellant in the eyes of Judge Jorgensen and to avoid substantive oral arguments on the

29 merits of this Appellant's petition to the court. Further, Mr. Bahr was tying to avoid attending a hearing on this Appellant's petition to the court.

63. It is logical to conclude that Mr. Bahr was engaged in invidious discrimination against this Appellant and this Appellant's running mate Michael Coachman by entering false and slanderous accusations about this Appellant into the court record in the instant case. Sometime after June 6, 2014, Mr. Bahr's letter was illegally removed from the official record of the instant case by an unknown person (See Appendix #8). Mr. Bahr has potentially violated Title 18 of the U.S. Code (emphasis added):

18 U.S. Code § 1512(b) - Tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant (b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation, threatens, or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to— (1) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person in an official proceeding; (2) cause or induce any person to— (A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or other object, from an official proceeding; (B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; … or (3) hinder, delay, or prevent the communication to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense or a violation of conditions of probation [1] supervised release, [1]parole, or release pending judicial proceedings;

30 shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.

Title 18 U.S. Code § 1512(b)

64. Whoever has removed Mr. Bahr's letter to Judge Jorgensen from the record in the instant case has also violated North Dakota Century Code 12.1-09 Tampering and

Unlawful Influence:

CHAPTER 12.1-09 TAMPERING AND UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE 12.1-09-01. Tampering with witnesses and informants in proceedings. 1. A person is guilty of a class C felony if he uses force, threat, deception, or bribery (emphasis added): a. With intent to influence another's testimony in an official proceeding; or b. With intent to induce or otherwise cause another: (1) To withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing from an official proceeding, whether or not the other person would be legally privileged to do so;

North Dakota Century Code § 12.1-09-01(b)(1)

31 Relief Requested

65. For the before mentioned reasons, this Appellant requests that Judge Donald

Jorgensen's order to dismiss this Appellant's petition to the court be reversed. This

Appellant requests the Court to approve and issue this Appellant's Writ of Mandamus as requested in the lower court (See Pages 1-2 of Docket #1, Petition to the North Dakota

District Court, South Central Judicial District, Burleigh County for Writ of Mandamus)

Dated this 24th day of June, 2014,

______

Paul J. Sorum

Appellant

3501 Calypso Dr Bismarck, ND 58504 Phone: 701-219-5601 [email protected]