Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What People Really Think About Immigration

Report 12/2017

Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration

Henry Newman, Stephen Booth, Aarti Shankar

Open Europe | 1 About the Authors

Stephen Booth Director of Policy and Research Open Europe is a non-partisan and independent policy think tank. Our mission is to conduct rigorous analysis and produce recommendations on which to Aarti Shankar base the UK’s new relationship with the EU and its Policy Analyst trading relationships with the rest of the world. We aim to ensure that Government policy and public debate is rational and well informed. Acknowledgments Many thanks to the team at ICM for their work on In the wake of the UK’s vote to leave the EU, our the quantitative poll, and at Public First for conduct- programme of research and consultation will focus ing the focus groups. particularly on:

We are also grateful for the hard work of our interns, • The UK’s new relationship with the EU, including Dominic Walsh, Anders Jay, Hugo Stratton and Enea trade, security and political cooperation. Desideri, in helping to put together this report. • The most important opportunities for new trading relationships with nations outside the EU. • Productive international cooperation across areas Edited by Henry Newman, Director such as immigration, research and development, cross-border investment and financial services.

Our starting point is the promotion of democratically grounded economic, trade and investment policies which foster growth, employment and freedom under the rule of law. Guided by these free market and liberal principles, we are committed to an open Europe and an open Britain.

Offices Open Europe Open Europe Brussels Open Europe Berlin 7 Tufton Street Rue du Trône 61 Oranienburger Straße 27 London B-1050 10117 Berlin SW1P 3QN Brussels Germany

+44 (0)20 7197 2333 +32 (2) 540 86 25 +49 (0)30 2758 1365 www.openeurope.org.uk [email protected] [email protected] www.openeuropeberlin.de @OpenEurope 2 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope CONTENTS

Foreword 4 Methodology 8 Executive summary 10 1. Introduction 14 1.1 History of immigration to the UK 14 1.2 The politics of immigration in the UK 17 1.3 Immigration in the EU referendum campaign 18 2. Overall attitudes to immigration 21 2.1 Brexit overtakes immigration as the most important issue facing the UK 21 2.2 Public perceptions of immigration at national and local level 22 2.3 Little evidence of strong social concerns about immigration 25 2.4 Little support for an immigration system based on race and ethnic background 26 3. Skills, employment and the labour market 27 3.1 Remain and Leave voters are particularly open to immigrants with “socially useful” skills 27 3.2 Concerns about training for local workforce raised alongside discussions on skills shortages 28 3.3 Focus groups more likely to view immigration as symptomatic of an unfair labour market 29 4. Immigration and public services 30 4.1 National perceptions 30 4.2 Local perceptions 30 4.3 The public weigh immigration against other factors 32 5. Immigration and access to welfare 33 5.1 Polling findings reveal public consensus for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare 33 5.2 Focus groups believe “soft” UK benefits system fuels reliance on immigration 34 6. Immigration control – what would receive public consent? 36 6.1 Public support reducing immigration, but opinion of government target is mixed 36 6.2 Public support flexibility over reduction 37 6.3 Flexible and selective immigration systems attract stronger and more certain public support 38 6.4 Leave and Remain consensus for increasing criminal background checks on immigrants 39 6.5 Public largely unwilling to suffer negative economic consequences from reducing immigration 40 7. Conclusion 42 Annex I – Literature Review 45 Annex II – ICM poll questionnaire and results 50 Annex III – Public First focus group findings 66

Open Europe | 3 Chapter Heading

Foreword

4 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope The British people’s decision that the UK should leave the European Union in that historic referendum on 23 June 2016 has challenged politicians of all parties to map a way forward.

I believe that the referendum outcome must be acted upon – the UK must leave the European Union – and that we all need to start considering what UK policies we need post- Brexit.

One of the central issues, and a huge public concern, is the management of immigration. It affects our economy and labour market policies, our border controls and security and community life.

This publication, founded on detailed research by Open Europe, offers valuable insight into public attitudes to immigration. It is research we should take heed of and use to help shape a reasonable, fair policy on migration.

For some of the left or liberal wings of politics, addressing immigration policy has always been difficult. Aware that reducing or halting immigration has always been a siren call of some deeply unpleasant figures on the extreme right, they have shied away from it. And on the right, there is a body of opinion, certainly in the business community, that a ready supply of migrant workers helps to keep labour costs down, and provides for a more flexible and passive workforce. So elements of left and right have had their own reasons for sidestepping the question of immigration control.

Immigration is not easily separated from the UK’s economic needs or from public feelings about their identity. Immigration was one of the most significant concerns for voters in the 2010 and 2015 general elections. The failure of the major parties to address those concerns led to the rise of UKIP. Their presence challenge both Labour and the Conservatives in different ways.

I argued that for Labour to shy away from the questions and concerns raised by voters about immigration was an abdication of responsibility. What became very clear in the run up to the European Referendum, was that immigration would dominate public feeling. As YouGov pollster, Freddie Sayers, commented in April 2016: “A recent YouGov poll for ITN showed that 71% of people in the UK think that immigration over the past ten years has been too high – and that includes majorities of all political parties. Even 65% of Liberal Democrat voters – that most expansive, internationalist, Europhile group – think too many people are entering the country. If the coming referendum were only a decision on immigration, the Leave campaign would win by a landslide.”

This is just one reason that all parties would be wise to think ahead and consider future policy on migration. I believe that the UK, like many other countries, can agree a fair- minded, sensible policy on migration which accords with the best of British values of openness and tolerance.

The UK will require workers, students and visitors from abroad, for many years to come. The UK will also have many residents who choose to live abroad for part of their life, many in the European Union. So this issue requires balance and understanding, about people’s aspirations and about the needs of business.

This research shows the public understand this too. Their concern was not to end all immigration. But, by two to one, they support a fixed number of work permits being issued each year.

They recognise that migrants may need access to our NHS, but believe that benefits and the right to social housing should be earned.

Open Europe | 5 Foreword

The public also see a direct link between giving UK citizens the right skills to take jobs, and the need to import labour from abroad.

I believe the UK can reach a fair position, which controls migration, improves security at UK borders and reaches an amicable arrangement with the European Union 27. It is in our interests to do so.

I also have faith that we can agree a reasonable immigration policy that works for Britain, which the British people will support.

I therefore welcome this important, and challenging, research. I hope it encourages more of the debate we need on a topic that is central to the Brexit negotiations and life post-Brexit.

Rt Hon Caroline Flint MP Labour Member for Don Valley

6 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope As a first generation immigrant, I know firsthand that people choose this country because of its tolerance and opportunity. Britain is one of the most welcoming countries in the world, as evident from the diversity and number of people who choose to work and settle here.

Nevertheless, immigration has been a polarising issue in British politics for over a decade. Governments of all shades have failed to deliver immigration policies that have broad public support.

The referendum result has been used by people on both sides of the immigration debate to support their pre- existing agendas. Some have claimed it as a mandate to pull up the drawbridge regardless of the economic consequences. Others have labelled all Leave voters as nativist “Little Englanders”.

The vote in June 2016 was a referendum on EU membership, not on immigration. I believe that the vote for Brexit was a vote of confidence in a global, outward-looking United Kingdom.

Brexit is both a wake-up call and an opportunity for politicians to meaningfully reconnect with voters on a range of issues, including immigration. Part of becoming more global and outward-looking is the need to design and control our own migration policies and regulations.

As we decide our country’s future, it is important that we engage with how people really view the costs and benefits of immigration, not in caricatures. We need to examine the evidence.

Open Europe’s excellent research shows that the Brexit vote was not driven by xenophobia, nationalism or intolerance of immigrants. The British public are generally welcoming of people who come to the UK to work and make a positive contribution to our society. In particular they are very supportive of those coming to work in our public services, including as doctors, nurses, teachers and care workers.

However, the public wants change and they want greater confidence that their government is in control of who comes into the country. Our constituents recognise the value of immigrants to the economy and the vital work so many do in public services such as the NHS. But they also want politicians to tackle the pressure that immigration can place on public services in some areas. They feel that not enough investment is made in equipping British citizens to compete in an ever more competitive labour market.

Open Europe has a long tradition of producing high-quality research and analysis, such as this. These findings will be invaluable to Government and Parliamentarians as we design a post-Brexit immigration policy. This report provides us with an important reminder that the public has rational and reasonable concerns about immigration that public policy must address. That way we will be able to continue to welcome talented and hard-working people to this country.

Kemi Badenoch MP Conservative Member for Saffron Walden

Open Europe | 7 Chapter Heading

Methodology

8 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope The objective of this research is to understand what the public really thinks about immigration. Are their views as simplistic as is often claimed? How do related issues such as access to welfare, training for UK workers, and provision of public services feature in public thinking about immigration? Where do they draw the line when it comes to deciding who should be able to come to the UK?

Open Europe commissioned two public opinion studies in order to answer these questions. We took a mixed-method approach, carrying out both a large-scale quantitative poll, and a more targeted qualitative, focus group study.

The online poll, conducted by ICM, surveyed the opinions of 4,000 adults, aged 16 and over, across Great Britain.1 The strength of the online methodology is that it reduces social desirability bias associated with interview administer methods (such as telephone polling, or face-to face exchanges), giving us greater confidence that the views shared in the survey are honest. The large sample size also allowed us to undertake regional level analysis and comparisons. Research was conducted between 22 August and 4 September 2017.

Our poll aimed to test overall public attitudes to immigration at both the national and the local level. We also sought to test the public’s view on the relative importance of immigration on the state and quality of UK public services. Both of these issues were assessed using a series of slider scale questions, where respondents were asked to measure their position between the “positive” and “negative” statements on immigration at either end of the scale. Importantly, the statements were not mutually exclusive – this allowed respondents to express sympathy with both arguments.

Another key feature of our poll was the evaluation of public support for a variety of immigration control measures, including setting numerical targets, limiting access to welfare, and increasing criminal background checks on applicants. As part of this, we used Maximum Difference Scaling. This is a research approach that investigates the relative importance attached to particular attributes. We used this method to produce a hierarchy of public preferences on what factors to consider before allowing entry to immigrants.

The qualitative side of our research took the form of eight focus groups conducted by Public First. Groups were made up of participants from C1/C2 backgrounds2, all of whom were regular voters and most of whom had voted Leave in last year’s referendum. We focused on this section of the population in order to understand public concerns regarding a liberal immigration policy, and what form of immigration system would gain broad public consent in the UK. Each group lasted ninety minutes, and participants were not briefed in advance on the exact conversation topic. Discussions were semi-structured: the leader of the focus group directed conversation along certain key topics, but, as far as possible, let people speak for themselves without leading them excessively. In order to gather a wide spread of opinion within this demographic, four locations were chosen across the East Midlands, West Midlands, North East and North West: Long Eaton in Derbyshire, Rotherham in South Yorkshire, Darlington in County Durham and Stockport in Greater Manchester. The regions all voted to leave the EU in last year’s referendum.3 Two groups were conducted in each location. The first two groups were conducted in Long Eaton in July, with all others taking place in September.

1 Northern Ireland was not polled as part of the survey due to insufficient sample size. 2 According to the National Readership Survey (NRS) social grade model, the C1 category represents those in supervisory, clerical, and junior managerial, administrative, or professional occupations. The C2 category describes skilled manual workers. 3 While Greater Manchester voted to Leave, Stockport itself voted to Remain, by 52.3% to 47.7%.

Open Europe | 9 Chapter Heading

Executive Summary

10 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope In this paper – the first part of Open Europe’s Immigration Project – we set out to examine what the public really thinks about migration. Since the Leave vote in last year’s referendum, commentators and politicians have wrongly interpreted Brexit as a mandate simply to pull up the drawbridge. We found that people’s attitudes on immigration are far more nuanced and sophisticated than often is portrayed in political or media debate. In actual fact, the public support migration for specific jobs or of those who have key skills. And, contrary to what some have suggested, our evidence demonstrates that overall public attitudes towards immigration – and indeed Brexit - were not fuelled by racism or intolerance.

Open Europe combined a 4,000 person ICM poll across Great Britain with a series of focus groups in England conducted by Public First in the North East, North West, East Midlands, and West Midlands. Our results showed that the public want to see immigration controlled but that most people recognised both positive as well as negative aspects of immigration. The public also understood that migration both alleviates certain public policy issues and exacerbates them, and articulated that public policy issues have broader causes than just immigration.

The current immigration system faces a crisis of confidence with the Government’s net migration target dismissed as an unachievable “soundbite”. Brexit offers an opportunity to design new immigration policies that can command greater public support. While policy should be designed for the entire country, we found that Leave voters saw immigration as a more important issue facing the country than Remain voters. However, we found multiple areas of agreement between Leavers and Remainers. Our research provides an evidence base for a sensible conversation about post-Brexit immigration policy.

We found that the public:

• Has a clear preference for a system with greater controls on immigration over a simple reduction in numbers. 56% of the public agreed with “allowing immigrants to come to the UK as long as there are controls to make sure they will contribute to our society, economy and way of life”, versus 36% who preferred simply “reducing the numbers of people coming into the UK”. Even amongst Leave voters, a substantial minority (43%) chose control over reducing numbers. While immigration was an important driver of the Leave vote, it does not necessarily follow that all Leave voters support a highly restrictive immigration system.

• Has little specific support for the Government’s target of net migration in the tens of thousands a year, but wants numbers to come down. There is general support for reducing numbers but the public’s attachment to the “tens of thousands” net target appears to be based on the principle that “something is better than nothing”. Over half of respondents (53.9%) supported the target or thought it was not strict enough, but only 30% believed it was achievable. Even Remain voters were more likely to support the target than oppose it, by 38% to 27%. The target also attracts a strong degree of scepticism – focus groups participants saw it as a “soundbite,” and only three in ten poll respondents (30%) believed it is achievable. Altogether, a cap on numbers was less popular than a system which “allows immigrants to come and work, but restricts their access to benefits and public services”.

Open Europe | 11 Executive Summary

• Was far more concerned about a potential immigrant’s criminality than their race. Our poll found that factors such as race, religion or sexual orientation were by far the least important attributes of potential migrants for both Leave and Remain voters. Whether an immigrant has a criminal record was considered 10.7 times more important than their race and ethnic background, or 12.2 times more important than if they are from a Christian background. Of all the controls that could be put in place on immigration, there is overwhelming support for increased criminal background checks on those entering the UK, across both Leave and Remain voters – 80% of Leave voters and 73% of Remain voters believed that if such a policy existed, their concerns about immigration would be reduced. Equally, focus groups participants consistently mentioned increased background checks on new arrivals when asked about their ideal immigration system.

• Supported immigrants coming to the UK to work in specific roles, especially in socially-useful roles or where there is a skills shortage. Immigrants coming for every specific role we tested received a positive or neutral level of support from respondents. Only “general jobseeker” received net opposition. Public support seems more focused around whether roles are ‘socially useful,’ rather than a labour economist’s definition of high-skilled immigration. Care workers received slightly greater support (33% net positive) than entrepreneurs (27%) or computer programmers (27%). Bankers (1%) received comparable support to waiters (1%) and cleaners (0%). Doctors (61%) and nurses (57%) received strikingly positive levels of support – but at a comparable level to any occupation in which the UK has a “skill shortage” (58%). We also found that respondents rated whether a potential immigrants’ job is in an area where the UK has a skills shortage to be nearly six times (5.92) more important than if they are highly paid.

• Overwhelming supported only allowing people into the UK who have specific job offers (71% vs 15% disagree). This policy received overwhelming support from both Leave (81%) and Remain voters (68%). There is also a Leave – Remain consensus on allowing high-skilled migrants but restricting low-skilled immigration (75% support from Leavers and 65% from Remainers).

• Backed restricting immigrants’ access to welfare (74% support from Leavers and 63% from Remainers), among our poll respondents. Focus groups also consistently and without prompting called for reform of the welfare system to encourage UK unemployed people into work. They see a “soft” welfare system as contributing to the UK’s reliance on immigration. Our poll data also paints a nuanced picture of how restrictions on immigrants’ access to welfare should be managed, with respondents clearly distinguishing between ‘automatic’ and ‘earned’ welfare and social support.

• Held the view that immigration is not a discrete policy issue. Many respondents understood that certain public policy problems (e.g. a shortage of affordable housing, pressure on the NHS) are to a degree exacerbated or shaped by immigration, but also perceived stresses on public services as complicated and more than just a consequence of immigration. A greater share of the public believed pressures on GP services and social care are explained by government decisions and other factors than the effects of immigration. Respondents believed the government should pull other policy levers, including skills training, house building, and investment in services, and said that this would reduce their concerns about the impact of immigration.

12 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope • Recognised by a narrow majority that immigration has both benefits and drawbacks. When asked to consider the impact of immigration on health services, 53% of respondents saw that migration both benefited the NHS and added to strains on it. We also found awareness of both positive and negative effects of immigration on the UK labour market. When asked whether they agree more with the idea that immigration “keeps some wages down, so some people earn less,” or that it “helps drive economic growth for the UK, which benefits everyone,” the greatest share of the public agreed equally with both (30%). However, focus groups reflected a strong belief that immigration was a key feature of an unfair labour market. In particular, that high immigration has held down wages and reduced training opportunities for local workers.

• Did not strongly support removing students from the immigration numbers. We found net public support for students coming to the UK (21%) but less support than for teachers (30%) or IT/computer programmers (27%). We also found respondents divided on whether students should be exempted from immigration controls with 36% in favour, and 40% opposing.

• Would oppose restricting immigration if it resulted in negative personal or national economic impacts. 50% agreed that substantially reducing immigration would have been the wrong course of action if it “directly contributed” to an economic recession. Yet 25% would stand by the reduction and a further 25% did not know. When asked about losing their own job or that of a close family member, 46% would think substantially reducing immigration wrong. However, 23% would still support it and 30% answered that they did not know. Overall, our figures suggest there is a group of between 20% and 44% of the country who would support a clamp-down on immigration, regardless of the personal or national consequences. However, our figures also demonstrate a significant level of uncertainty (21-30%) – this may because the consequences listed were too abstract, or respondents did not believe these were plausible trade-offs.

Open Europe | 13 Chapter Heading

1. Introduction

Immigration, along with the shadow cast by the 2008 financial crash, has been one of the defining issues of recent British politics. Although the 2016 EU referendum was not directly about immigration, it was a central issue in that campaign – but also in previous General Elections, stretching back to before Gordon Brown’s “bigoted woman” comment. In the wake of the Brexit vote, those calling for lower immigration claim to have the public’s support. However, public attitudes on any topic are never one dimensional.

Future immigration policy will be a crucial factor in how the UK is perceived around the world post-Brexit. It will be an important element in determining how open Britain remains to trade, innovation and investment. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU offers an important opportunity to reset the national debate about immigration and should allow the Government greater freedom to devise policies that can command public confidence. Importantly, the views of the country as a whole – both Remain and Leave voters – should inform future policy on immigration.

Our view is that the electorate deserves a more nuanced discussion about immigration that is not focussed solely on numbers and a blunt net immigration target. Immigration and how its negative and positive effects are felt by individuals depend on a range of factors. This includes the provision of public services, how the wider labour market functions, and how new arrivals integrate into British society.

1.1 History of immigration to the UK Net migration to the UK has increased in volume and diversified in origin over recent decades. Prior to the 1950s, most migration came from Ireland. In the post-war period, the UK began to receive greater immigration from Commonwealth countries.

The UK joined the European Economic Community, the precursor to the EU, in 1973. Early European treaties allowed for the free movement of workers from the limited number of member states of the European Community. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht established the European Union and introduced the concept of EU citizenship. This, and subsequent case law of the European Court of Justice, expanded the rights of free movement and residence of persons across the EU. Nevertheless, non-EU migration continued to account for the significant majority of overall net immigration to the UK. Net migration from the EU was in balance throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.

The new Labour government in 1997 reversed restrictions on Commonwealth immigration introduced by previous governments, which saw a big increase in the numbers of non- EU immigrants to the UK from this period. Meanwhile, immigration from the EU rose significantly in 2004, with the accession of eight Eastern and Central European Countries (A8)4. The UK was one of only three EU member states that chose not to impose transitional restrictions on free movement of citizens from the accession countries.

There was further sharp growth in immigration in 2013 and 2014, primarily from Southern European countries most adversely affected by the euro crisis. In 2014, transitional controls were lifted on the free movement of citizens from Bulgaria and Romania (A2) to the UK – these had been in place since their accession to the EU in 2007. This led to a significant increase in immigration from these countries: 46,000 Bulgarian and Romanian citizens migrated to the UK in 2014, a significant increase from 23,000 in the previous year.5

4 The EU A8 countries include Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 5 ONS, ‘Migration statistics quarterly report: May 2015’: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/ internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/2015-05-21

14 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Net Long-Term Internaǎonal Migraǎon to the UK, 1990 to year ending December 2016 (1000s) 300

250

200

150

100

-50

Non-EU Ciǎzens EU Ciǎzens

Source: ONS LTIM

Since the UK’s decision to Leave, EU migrants have continued to come to the UK but at a slower rate. Net EU migration for the year ending December 2016 is estimated at 133,000, a fall of 51,000 from the previous year, and the lowest level since March 2014. This change was primarily driven by a 36% increase in EU emigration, which rose to 117,000 in 2016 from 86,000 the year before. Migration figures for citizens from the 2004 Eastern and Central European accession countries (A8) saw the most significant changes: A8 emigration rose by 59% on the previous year, to 43,000, while immigration fell 34% to 48,000. A8 net migration for the year ending 2016 is estimated at 5,000, the lowest since their accession.

The fall in EU net migration may be driven by “push factors” associated with the Brexit vote, such as the uncertainty surrounding the status of EU citizens in the UK, or because the weakened British currency makes earning in sterling less attractive. Alternatively, “pull factors” such as the return to growth in the Eurozone, or increased opportunities in countries of origin, may be incentivising emigration.

Despite the slowdown in net immigration, the number of EU migrants in the UK continues to rise. Between July-September 2016 and July-September 2017 the number of EU nationals working in the UK increased by 112,000 to 2.38 million – a record high.6

Immigrants have diverse reasons for choosing to move to the UK. These vary both across but within broad nationality groupings. EU immigrants come to the UK primarily for work. Most arrive with a definite job, although labour immigration from the A8 is almost evenly split between those looking for work and those with definite employment. Recent provisional estimates by the ONS suggest there has been a significant year-on-year drop in the total number of EU citizens arriving looking for work (down 29,000 to 47,000 in the year ending March 2017). This may be due to increased uncertainty around the status of EU nationals following the Brexit vote.

By contrast, the largest subgroup of non-EU immigrants comes to the UK for formal study – this reflects the more restrictive requirements for non-EU immigrants to work in the UK. It should be noted that international student immigration has fallen significantly in the past year, from 160,000 to 136,000. This was primarily driven by a 20% fall in student arrivals from Asian countries between 2015 and 2016, from 80,000 to 64,000.

6 ONS, “UK and non-UK people in the labour market: November 2017”; https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/ employmentandemployeetypes/articles/ukandnonukpeopleinthelabourmarket/november2017

Open Europe | 15 Introduction

Distribuǎon of EU and non-EU immigrants by reason for immigraǎon (proporǎonate)

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% EU15 EU A8 EU A2 Non-EU

Deﬁnite job Looking for work Accompany/join Formal study Other No reason stated

Source: ONS LTIM 2016

The UK’s migrant population is predominantly concentrated in and around London. In 2016, 38% of the London population was born outside the UK, compared to a national average of 14%. Similarly, 23% of people living in London are of non-British nationality, compared to 9% across the UK as a whole. London has over twice as many non-British nationals per 100 people as the average for the whole of England, almost four times the figure for Wales and Northern Ireland, and around six times the figure for Wales. Of the nations, Wales has the lowest immigrant proportion of its population, both in terms of country of birth (6%) and nationality (4%).

Scotland 6.3%

N Ireland England 6.5% (incl. London)

9.9%

Wales 4%

London

23.3%

Source: ONS populaǎon by naǎonality 2016

16 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 1.2 The politics of immigration in the UK In the late 1990s, immigration was considered to be the most important issue facing the country by just 10% of the British electorate.7 By the late 2000s, the share of people saying it was the most important issue steadily increased to 40%, ranking it as a higher public priority than the NHS.8 In 2016 this had reached between 40% and 50%.9

The relaxation of restrictions on non-EU migration in the late 1990s was not preceded by a lengthy public debate about the economic desirability (or otherwise) of greater levels of immigration. In contrast to countries such as Germany, where the effects of its ageing demography and how migration might form part of the solution have been debated more widely, there was no such groundwork laid by Tony Blair’s Labour Government.

Meanwhile, the public was not prepared for the scale of new arrivals that followed the UK’s decision to open its labour market to the A8 in 2004. The numbers of migrants that would arrive from the A8 countries were also wildly underestimated by the government.

Blair actively encouraged opening the UK labour market to new EU arrivals, telling a CBI conference in April 2004: “There are half a million vacancies in our job market and our strong and growing economy needs migration to fill these vacancies.”10 Labour’s former European Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, later emphasised: “In 2004, as a Labour government, we were not only welcoming people to come into this country to work, we were sending out search parties for people and encouraging them, in some cases, to take up work in this country.”11

Against this backdrop, the United Kingdom Independence (UKIP) party rose to prominence in the 2000s by fusing together the issues of immigration and EU membership. UKIP’s vote share increased significantly in successive European elections, culminating in UKIP winning the greatest share of the vote in the 2014 European parliament election. The party initially only achieved representation at Westminster as a result of by-election victories, but nonetheless were perceived to have contributed to the Conservative’s failure to win a majority in 2010. In part to try to reduce the appeal of UKIP, former Prime Minister David Cameron promised an in-out referendum on EU membership if the Conservatives won a majority in the 2015 General Election. UKIP went on to win 12.6% in this election, but their party leader failed to get elected and they only returned one MP.

The 2005 Conservative election campaign had controls on immigration as a key policy pledge. Their manifesto criticised Labour for having “lost effective control of our borders,” and promised to set an unspecified “annual limit” on the overall numbers of immigrants arriving in Britain.12 Although the Conservatives lost the election, Labour subsequently made incremental moves to address public concerns. In 2007, Gordon Brown famously called for “British jobs for British workers,”13 And from 2008, the Labour government phased in a “points-style” immigration system for non-EEA immigrants.14

7 Economist/Ipsos MORI, ‘May 2017: Economist/Ipsos Mori Issues Index’, May 2017: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2017-06/ Issues%20Index_May2017.pdf 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Number10.gov.uk Web Archives, ‘PM speech on migration to the CBI’, 27 April 2004: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov. uk/20090102065338/http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page5708 11 Telegraph, ‘Labour ‘sent out search parties for immigrants’, Lord Mandelson admits’, 14 May 2013: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ immigration/10055613/Labour-sent-out-search-parties-for-immigrants-Lord-Mandelson-admits.html 12 See BBC, Conservative manifesto 2005: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_04_05_conservative_manifesto.pdf 13 The Daily Telegraph, ‘British worker for British jobs, says Brown’, 6 June 2007: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1553710/British- workers-for-British-jobs-says-Brown.html 14 BBC News, ‘Immigration points-based system compared’, 1 June 2006: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29594642

Open Europe | 17 Introduction

UKIP vote share in European elecǎons, 1994-2014

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

0% 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014

Source: House of Commons Library, UK elecǎons staǎsǎcs 1918-2017

In 2010, then Conservative party leader David Cameron committed to limit immigration levels to the “tens of thousands.” Subsequent Conservative-led governments have maintained this pledge, but have failed to deliver it. With the government unable to limit the free movement of EU nationals due to the obligations of EU membership, various steps were taken to restrict non-EU immigration – the share that the government could “control”. However, since 2010, non-EU net immigration alone has consistently been around or over 150,000. The target has become a quarterly reminder that government is unable to deliver its pledge, which can only further undermine public confidence in the system.

1.3 Immigration in the EU referendum campaign Immigration was not the only reason people voted Leave. Some polls found sovereignty to be a greater motivating factor.15 However, the issue was an important element in last year’s referendum campaign. It received widespread attention in the media, and featured as one of the four broad objectives of Cameron’s 2015-2016 renegotiation of Britain’s EU membership. Regaining the ability to control immigration was an important aspect of the Leave campaign.

The question of EU migrants’ access to welfare was central to Cameron’s renegotiation of the UK’s terms of EU membership, prior to the referendum. At the time, Open Europe research illustrated how the UK’s non-contributory welfare system, particularly in-work benefits, could boost the incomes of EU citizens working in low-paid jobs in the UK, significantly increasing the income deferential with their home countries. In a 2014 report, “How to save EU free movement: Make it fair to keep it free”, Open Europe suggested the adoption of an EU-wide mechanism that would allow member states to limit EU immigrants’ access to non-contributory welfare benefits for a set period of time, ranging from one to five years. Cameron adopted a number of these proposals ahead of his renegotiation, and argued that restricting immigrants’ access benefits would reduce pull factors to the UK. Other ideas included an “emergency brake” on the level of EU immigration to the UK.

15 Lord Ashcroft Polls, ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday…and why’, 24 June 2016: http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how- the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ ; ComRes, ‘Sunday Mirror post-referendum poll’, 25 June 2016: http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/ sunday-mirror-post-referendum-poll/

18 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Cameron’s renegotiation achieved compromises to allow the UK to restrict EU immigrants’ access to in-work benefits for the four years after they first arrive. It also achieved a reform of child benefits’ exports, allowing these to be indexed to the standard of living in the receiving country. However, these mechanisms proved difficult to explain during the campaign, and the wider renegotiation package was insufficient to meet the extent of public concern.

The on-the-ground picture of immigration to the UK in the lead up to the referendum provided important context for the vote. In May 2016, the ONS indicated a large rise in short-term EU migration. Using data on National Insurance numbers, it estimated total short- and long-term net migration from the EU reached between 600,000 to 800,000 in 2015 – around three times higher than the official long-term figure (260,000).16 It also suggested that around 1.5 million more EU immigrants had come to the UK over the previous five-year period than official long-term figures suggested.17 There was notable media reaction to this release, with The Sun’s front page splash reporting this as the “Great Migrant Swindle”.18

The final ONS quarterly report on migration statistics prior to the referendum estimated that immigration from the EU had risen to 270,000 in 2015, up 6,000 on the year before.19 This was framed by the official Vote Leave campaign as “adding a population the size of Oxford to the UK every year,”20 adopting an expression previously employed by the Conservative party. The same data showed overall net migration to the UK at 333,000.

Vote Leave’s campaign slogan of “take back control” was particularly effective in regard to immigration, and combined with pledges to spend the UK’s EU budget contribution on the NHS and public services. On the other side of the debate, Remain proponents in government and outside failed to make a positive case for immigration, arguing instead that voting to leave would not prove a “silver bullet” to solving high levels of immigration.21 The chairman of Britain Stronger in Europe, Lord Stuart Rose, had also suggested that restrictions on free movement could lead to an increase in wages22, which simply reinforced arguments that Vote Leave were making.

Writing after the referendum, Vote Leave’s chief strategist Dominic Cummings argued that “Without fifteen years of out of control immigration, our message of ‘take back control’ would not have had enough traction.” However, at the same time, the campaign was keen to distance itself from UKIP and its leader Nigel Farage because Vote Leave felt that UKIP’s message on immigration would put off the swing voters required to secure over 50% of the electorate. Cummings said, “Immigration was a baseball bat that just needed picking up at the right time and in the right way… The right way was via the NHS (unifying) – not ‘we want our country back’ of Farage (divisive).”23

Meanwhile, in recent years, UK tabloid articles have linked EU migration to crime. These have often focused on ease of entry under EU Freedom of Movement rules, and the difficulty in deporting criminals:

16 Office for National Statistics, ‘Note on the difference between National Insurance number registrations and the estimate of long-term international migration 2016”, 12 May 2016: https://www.ons.gov. uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/articles/ noteonthedifferencebetweennationalinsurancenumberregistrationsandtheestimateoflongterminternationalmigration/2016 17 Ibid. 18 Sky News, ‘Friday’s National Newspaper Front Pages’, 12 May 2016: http://news.sky.com/story/fridays-national-newspaper-front- pages-10279753 19 Office for National Statistics, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: May 2016’, 26 May 2016: https://www.ons.gov.uk/ peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/migrationstatisticsquarterlyreport/may2016 20 Vote Leave, ‘Statement by Boris Johnson on Immigration Statistics’, 26 May 2016: http://www.voteleavetakecontrol.org/boris_johnson_the_ only_way_to_take_back_control_of_immigration_is_to_vote_leave_on_23_june.html 21 Independent, ‘EU Referendum: Net migration to the UK rises to 333,000, new figures reveal’, 26 May 2016: http://www.independent.co.uk/ news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-net-migration-to-uk-rises-to-333000-new-figures-reveal-a7049521.html 22 See Parliament TV, Treasury Select Committee, 2 June 2016: http://www.parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/b2e04db8-1dd2- 4846-a765-010993724210 23 See Dominic Cummings’ blog, “On the referendum #21: Branching histories of the 2016 referendum and ‘the frogs before the storm’”, 9 January 2017: https://dominiccummings.com/2017/01/09/on-the-referendum-21-branching-histories-of-the-2016-referendum-and-the- frogs-before-the-storm-2/

Open Europe | 19 Introduction

“Poland’s top 10 criminals…on the run in the UK” (The Sun, 12 October 2013)24

“The migrants who commit 500 crimes a week but can’t be deported because they’re from the EU” (The Daily Mail, 11 April 2011)25

“Free to walk our streets, 1000 European criminals include rapists and drug dealer we should have deported when they were released from prison” (Daily Mail, 26 April 2016)26

During the referendum campaign, Vote Leave recognised and drew on this public concern, releasing a list of 50 criminals it argued the UK had been prevented from deporting due to EU rules.27

In the lead up to the referendum, public anxiety about immigration and potential threats to security may have been exacerbated by the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe. In the UK media, this was most often represented by asylum seekers, including those at the Sangatte refugee camp in Calais, trying to board trucks bound for the UK. The spring 2016 Global Attitudes Survey by Pew Research found that a majority of UK citizens (52%) believed refugees would increase the likelihood of terrorism in their country, although a strong minority (41%) disagreed.28 This was lower than the European average (59%), but, during the referendum, UKIP sought to exploit public concerns about the refugee crisis with their infamous “Breaking Point” poster29, while Vote Leave raised the prospect of Turkish accession to the EU. However unrealistic the prospect of Turkish accession or the fact that comparatively few refugees made the journey to the UK, the refugee crisis is certainly likely to have played into the wider perception that immigration was out of control.

24 See The Sun: https://www.thesun.co.uk/archives/news/1060597/polands-top-10-criminals-on-the-run-in-uk/ 25 See The Daily Mail: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1375648/EU-migrants-commit-500-crimes-week-deported.html 26 See The Daily Mail: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3558603/Freed-walk-streets-1-000-European-criminals-including-rapists- drugs-dealers-deported-released-prison.html 27 The Guardian, ‘Vote Leave lists 50 criminals it says EU has stopped UK deporting’, 7 June 2016: https://www.theguardian.com/ politics/2016/jun/07/vote-leave-lists-50-criminals-it-says-eu-has-stopped-uk-deporting 28 Pew Research, ‘European opinion of the refugee crisis in five charts’, 16 September 2016: http://www.pewresearch.org/fact- tank/2016/09/16/european-opinions-of-the-refugee-crisis-in-5-charts/ 29 See UKIP’s tweet: https://twitter.com/ukip/status/743421601081884673?lang=en

20 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 2. Overall attitudes to immigration Our results illustrate that public attitudes on immigration are more nuanced and sophisticated than often is portrayed in political or media debate – most of the public recognise some positive and negative consequences of immigration. In contrast to polling in previous years, immigration was not considered the most important topic on the public agenda, although our data suggests that it has become tightly bound, in the public’s mind, with topics such as “the EU” and “Brexit.” At both national and local level, a high share of respondents recognised both benefits and drawbacks to immigration, although public opinion tended more towards its negative impacts when considered at the local level. Importantly, our data shows little evidence of a cultural aversion to immigration, with factors such as race, religion, and ethnic background consistently ranked as the least important criteria to consider when designing an immigration system. By contrast, the public’s primary concerns are whether potential immigrants have a criminal record, whether they have a specific job offer, and whether their job is in area where the UK has a skills shortage.

2.1 Brexit overtakes immigration as the most important issue facing the UK Amongst our polling respondents, immigration was ranked as the fourth most important issue facing the country. A third of the public (34%) placed it in the top three most pressing issues. Overall, “Brexit”, “Health/the NHS” and “Crime, terrorism and national security” ranked more highly among the public’s concerns.

What are the three most important issues facing the UK today?

Brexit Health/the NHS Crime, terrorism and naǎonal security Immigraǎon The economy Unemployment and the cost of living Housing The environment/climate change Welfare and pensions Educaǎon, including student debt None of the above Don't know Other (please specify)

0510 15 20 25 30

% (Most important)

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q4

Leave voters were significantly more likely to rank immigration as a top-three issue facing the country (53% of Leave voters, against 15% of Remain voters), and 20% classed it as the most important issue (against 4% of Remain voters).

Open Europe | 21 Overall Attitudes to Immigration

Although not clear to what extent, it is likely that in the run up to the EU referendum, and since then, the issues of “immigration”, “the economy” and “Brexit” are considered by the public to be related to one another, if not indivisible. This may account for immigration being ranked fourth and the economy and cost of living fifth and sixth in our poll results.

The findings from our focus groups support this theory, with participants frequently presenting “the EU” and “immigration” as linked. Most Leave voting participants in the groups said their decision was driven by a need to “take back control” from the EU – but when pushed on what areas the UK should regain control over, groups consistently cited immigration. However, when prompted, Leave voters in all groups immediately said they would not have voted differently if the UK was able, as a member, to apply tighter immigration controls on EU citizens.

“I didn’t vote on immigration. I had concerns about immigration, but I didn’t vote purely on immigration” (male, Darlington)

2.2 Public perceptions of immigration at national and local level As shown earlier, immigration to the UK increased significantly over the past two decades. It is little surprise therefore that the general perception amongst the public is that immigration is on the rise, even if the actual pace has slowed slightly over the last 12 months. Seven in ten (71%) of our poll respondents think that the number of immigrants entering the UK has increased over the last five years, with 45% saying the number has increased significantly. One in five (20%) feel numbers have stayed about the same and just one in twenty (5%) think the number has decreased.

A majority of respondents, however, significantlyoverestimated the UK’s foreign- born population. ONS figures for 2016 suggest 14% of the current UK resident population were born abroad, but only one in ten respondents (10%) gave an estimate approaching this (+/- 2%). Of the remaining nine in every ten respondents, seven overestimated the figure (70%) and two underestimated it (19%). The mean estimate was that 33% of the UK population is foreign-born. Interestingly, those with the highest qualifications were more likely than the average respondent to underestimate the foreign-born population (27% of those with degrees or higher underestimated the UK’s foreign-born population, compared to the average of 19%).

There is little evidence that the public base their estimate of the total national immigrant population on evidence from their regional environment. Only the mean national estimate from respondents in London reflected data on the regional population; the average respondent in all other locations tended to overestimate significantly as compared to their local indicator. Across all regions, estimates for the national figure were noticeably similar, clustering around 30% – there was a nine-point range in the mean national estimates across regions (29-38%). However, the foreign- born regional population varies significant across different parts of the UK (between 6-38% as a share of the regional population).

22 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Respondents' esǎmates of UK foreign-born populaǎon, by real regional foreign-born populaǎon (%)

0 TotalLondonNorth North West East East South South Yorkshire Scotland Wales West East Midlands Midlands East West and the Humber Mean naǎonal esǎmate True regional ﬁgure

Source: ICM for Open Europe Q11; ONS populaǎon by country of birth 2016

When asked to think about their local area, a significant majority of people (58%) said immigration had affected their area; but, notably, over a third (37%) said immigration had not affected their area. Of those who said immigration had affected their local area, more said it had done so slightly (34%) than significantly (23%). There is significant variation by region here, with 63% feeling affected in both London and the East of England, but only 46% in Wales and 51% in the North East. But local perceptions of the effect of immigration do not appear directly linked to local migration flows: no trend is apparent between the percentage of respondents in a region who believe that immigration has affected their local area, and net migration figures for that region. For instance, while 63% of respondents in both London and the East of England believed immigration has affected their local area, net migration to London is around 6 times higher than to East England. Similarly, the proportion of respondents from the North East who thought immigration had affected their local area was five percentage points higher than that of Welsh respondents, despite both areas receiving near identical net migration in 2016.

Percepǎon of net impact on local area from immigraǎon, by 2016 net migraǎon to region

100 140,000 ed

ev 90 120,000 80 2016 d-

70 100,000

60 80,000 50 to region inmi 60,000 40 has aﬀected their local area aǎon 30 40,000

aǎon 20

20,000 Net migr 10 immigr rcentage of local respondents who beli

Pe 0 0 London North North West East East South South Yorkshire Scotland Wales West East Midlands Midlands East West and the Humber

% believing local area aﬀected 2016 net migraǎon to region

Source: ICM for Open Europe Q6; ONS local area migraǎon indicators 2016

Open Europe | 23 Overall Attitudes to Immigration

2.3 Little evidence of strong social concerns about immigration Our polling data suggests that social and cultural concerns about immigration are slightly stronger at the national level than at the local level. 27% of our respondents strongly agreed that UK traditions and values are being diluted by immigration, against 17% who strongly supported the opposite view that the UK benefits from increased diversity from immigration (see question 8, Annex II). Compared to the impact of immigration on other national issues, including the NHS, wages, and jobs, the question of social and cultural values attracted the highest level of strong negative sentiment.

While opinion tends towards the negative social impact of immigration at the local level as well, this is less pronounced (see question 9, Annex II). 20% of those who believed immigration has affected their local area strongly agreed that immigrants have changed their local environment so they “don’t recognise it.” 13% strongly agreed with the positive statement that immigrants have helped to establish new businesses in their local area, and a third (33%) agreed equally with both statements. Compared to the effect of immigration on other local issues such as schools, GP services and local jobs, the social impact of immigration attracted the lowest level of negative sentiment.

Consider on a 1-5 scale how immigraǎon aﬀects the UK on a naǎonal level

1. The UK beneﬁts 5. UK tradiǎons from the increased 17 16 24 17 27 and values are diversity that being diluted by immigraǎon brings immigraǎon

1 2 3 4 5

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q8

Consider on a 1-5 scale how immigraǎon to the UK aﬀects you on a personal level

1. Immigrants have 5. Immigrants helped to establish have changed my new shops, 13 17 33 18 20 area so much I restaurants and don't recognise it businesses in my anymore area 1 2 3 4 5

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q9

24 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 2.4 Little support for an immigration system based on race and ethnic background When our national poll tested which criteria should be considered as part of a future immigration system,factors such as the race, ethnic background, and religion of immigrants were consistently ranked as least important.

What are the most important factors that should be considered before admiǞng future immigrants to the UK?

Whether they have a criminal record 84.2 Whether they have a specific job offer in the UK 73.2 Whether their job is in an area where the UK has a skills shortage 69.3 What the likelihood is of them claiming benefits 61.4 The number of dependents intending to join them in the UK 59.3 Whether they are highly educated or have good qualificaǎons 57.8 Whether they speak fluent English 53.5 Whether they intend to permanently sele in the UK 44.3 Whether they are healthy 27.1 Whether they intend to leave aer a few years 20.1 What the likelihood is of them having children while living in the UK 17.2 Whether they are from the EU 13.5 Whether they are highly paid 11.7 Whether they are young and fit 11.4 What their race or ethnic background is 7.9 Whether they are from a Chrisǎan background 6.9 What their sexuality is 3.2

0102030405060708090100

Importance scores

Source: ICM for Open Europe

Our data contradicts the view of some commentators30 that xenophobia, racism and intolerance were major drivers of the referendum result. According to our results, the public’s primary considerations on immigration are instead whether potential immigrants have a criminal record, whether they have a specific job offer, and whether their job is in an area where the UK has a skills shortage. Across both Leave and Remain voters, an immigrant’s sexuality, religious background, and race and ethnicity are considered the least important factors in determining entry.

The public as a whole considers whether an immigrant has a criminal record to be 10.7 times more important than their race and ethnic background, 12.2 times more important than whether they are from a Christian background, and 26.3 times more important than their sexuality. Similarly, whether they speak fluent English is seen as 6.8 times more important than race or ethnic background, and 7.8 times more important than whether they are from a Christian background. It is also interesting that our respondents attach little importance to whether a potential immigrant is of EU nationality: whether an immigrant is from the EU is 6.2 times less important than if they have a criminal record, 5.4 times less important than whether they have a specific job offer in the UK, and 5.1 times less important than if they work in an area of UK skills shortage.

30 See Polly Toynbee in the Guardian, ‘Brexit supporters have unleashed furies even they can’t control’, 13 June 2016: https://www. theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/13/brexit-supporters-leave-vote-right; Mark Leonard in Project Syndicate, ‘Theresa May’s Nasty Britain’, 25 October 2016: https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/theresa-may-british-nativism-by-mark-leonard-2016- 10?barrier=accessreg; Zach Beauchamp in Vox, ‘Brexit isn’t about economics. It’s about xenophobia”, 24 June 2016: https://www.vox. com/2016/6/25/12029786/brexit-uk-eu-immigration-xenophobia

Open Europe | 25 Overall Attitudes to Immigration

The data also shows a clear drop-off in factor of importance halfway down the chart. This would suggest that the respondents tend to view criteria such as an immigrant’s health, salary, ethnic or racial background and their likelihood of having children as non-essential features in determining entry. Interestingly, significant importance is not attached to immigrants with high salaries: whether a potential immigrant is highly paid is nearly six times (5.9) less important than whether their job is in an area where the UK has a skills shortage.

Local-level evidence from our focus groups also showed very little public concern over the race or ethnic background of immigrants to the UK. 31 When prompted, participants tended to ascribe their concerns about immigration to the impact on public services, local wages, and access to welfare – most groups rarely raised racial or cultural concerns of their own accord, and said culture and country of origin were not important. As an example, when focus groups in Long-Eaton were asked whether they would support a Trump-style ban on immigrants from particular countries, all participants rejected this system for the UK.

31 Rotherham was an outlier - cultural concerns about immigration were raised in this location. We believe this primarily reflects location- specific community relations: a 2012 investigative report uncovered large-scale child abuse in Rotherham, with perpetrators predominantly of Pakistani origin. Equally, attendees showed some hostility to “Slovakians” in the community. Local estimates suggest Rotherham has a Roma population, predominantly from Slovakia, of around 4,000 – this represents the town’s second largest ethnic minority population.

26 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 3. Skills, employment and the labour market Results from our national poll showed the public are generally in favour of immigrants coming to work in the UK, although some roles clearly enjoy greater support than others. There was overwhelming support for jobs with a high degree of “social usefulness,” such as doctors and nurses. Interestingly, “social usefulness” appears a greater indicator of public support than traditional classifications of high- and low-skilled employment. Carers (33% net support) were viewed more positively than entrepreneurs and computer programmers (27% net support each), and bankers (1% net support) were rated as popular as waiters (1%) and cleaners (0%) (see question 7, Annex II).

However, evidence from the local-level focus groups revealed concerns that high immigration has a negative effect on the local workforce. The Vote Leave campaign slogan of “take back control” appeared to resonate with this section of the public, with focus group participants proactively advancing the idea the UK needs greater ‘control’ over migration. Equally, issues raised by the Leave campaign about the wider impact of immigration on skills training for the local workforce and wage pressures on low-paid workers32 were raised unprompted in most focus groups. This was usually in reference to personal experience and other anecdotal evidence.

3.1 Remain and Leave voters are particularly open to immigrants with “socially useful” skills Previous opinion studies consistently suggested that the public favour high-skilled immigration, and would seek to reduce low-skilled immigration. However, when asked to think about immigrants performing specific roles, our polling results demonstrate the public are widely supportive of immigration.Immigrants with attributes in both high- and low-skilled occupations all received net positive or neutral support – although the general order of preference does still show greater support for high- skilled immigrants. Only general jobseekers received net negative support (-25%).

How would you feel about immigrants with skills in the following professions coming to live and work in the UK?

Doctor/surgeon (high) 61 Skill shortage occupaǎon 58 Nurse (upper middle) 57 Academic/professor (high) 45 Engineer (high) 44 Care worker (lower middle) 33 Teacher (high) 30 Entrepreneur (high) 27 IT/Computer programmer (high) 27 Student 21 Fruit picker (low) 16 Construcǎon worker/builder (upper middle) 15 Childcare worker/nanny (lower middle/low) 13 Waiter/waitress (low) 1 Banker (high) 1 Cleaner (low) 0 General jobseeker -25 -30-20 -100 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Total net support

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q7

32 Vote Leave, ‘Restoring public trust in immigration policy - a points-based non-discriminatory immigration system,’ 1 June 2016: http://www. voteleavetakecontrol.org/restoring_public_trust_in_immigration_policy_a_points_based_non_discriminatory_immigration_system.html

Open Europe | 27 Skills, Employment and the Labour Market

Our poll demonstrates that immigrants coming to work in what could be considered “socially useful” occupations attracted greatest public support. Respondents expressed very strong net support for doctors/surgeons (61%), nurses (57%), and any occupation for which the UK has a skills shortage (58%). There is also strong net support for care workers (33%) and teachers (30%).

“Social usefulness” appears a stronger indicator of public support than traditional labour market skills classifications. According to our poll, bankers (1%) receive comparable net public support to waiters (1%) and cleaners (0%) (although disapproval of immigrants coming to work as bankers may have more to do with the regard with which the profession is held since the 2008 financial crisis). Similarly, care workers receive greater support (33%) than entrepreneurs (27%) and computer programmers (27%).

When Leave voters’ responses are taken separately, our findings show that the “social usefulness” narrative still applies. Once again, very strong net support is recorded for immigrant doctors (50%), nurses (43%) and those working in skills shortage occupations. Even among lower-paid “socially useful” occupations, such as care workers and teachers, Leave voters show positive net support. Among Remain voters, all occupations received net positive support, with the exception of general jobseekers (marginal net negative support of -3%).

3.2 Concerns about training for local workforce raised alongside discussions on skills shortages Evidence from our focus groups also demonstrates public support for immigrants coming to fill job vacancies in important and valued sectors. However, participants often expressed concern that high immigration tended to reduce skills-training for the local workforce. In particular, a recent government decision to cut training bursaries for UK nursing students had a high degree of cut-through. Groups in two locations raised the issue of nursing bursary cuts unprompted, with another group mentioning it once asked whether a new UK immigration system should accept nurses. For many focus group participants, this government decision was particularly symbolic of a system that uses immigration as a substitute for training the local population:

“It’s almost to me like the government went: there’s a bottomless supply of nurses from all over the world happy to come over here, why should we pay to train our own folk. To me that’s fundamentally wrong… They’re depriving many people of a decent career…because there’s a much cheaper option…where are we going long- term with an attitude like that?” (male, Stockport)

“They were saying there’s over 40,000, or more, nurses positions, and they can’t fill them because people can’t go through the qualifications to get to be a nurse even these days because it means going to university…They took away the bursaries, didn’t they? So it means you have to pay the sky-high fees” (male and female, Darlington)

“There are not enough university places for nurses…you can’t fill the amount of roles with the amount of people coming out of uni” (female, Stockport)

This concern was also reflected in our polling study: 43% of respondents showed strong or slight support for the statement “easy access to immigrant labour means employers do not invest enough in training UK workers.” A quarter of respondents (25%) agreed strongly with this statement, and rejected the view that immigrants help to fill jobs in areas where the UK has a skills shortage.

28 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 3.3 Focus groups more likely to view immigration as symptomatic of an unfair labour market Our national-level poll finds that the public as a whole believes immigration creates both winners and losers across the economy and the labour market (see question 8, Annex II). A strong majority (64%) showed some sympathy with arguments that immigration both “helps drive economic growth for the UK, which benefits everyone” and “keeps some wages down, so some people earn less.” Similarly, 62% show some agreement with both the idea that “immigrants help grow the economy by creating/ filling jobs” and that “immigrants take jobs and make it harder for British people to find work.” Respondents were more polarised on the question of whether immigrants “are doing jobs that unemployed British people should be doing,” or whether they “help fill jobs British people don’t want to do”, but a narrow majority still showed some sympathy with both statements (55%).

However, among focus group participants, there was a strong belief that immigration was a key feature of an unfair labour market. In particular, the idea that large-scale immigration had artificially held down wages was frequently and spontaneously raised across various locations:

“I think that if there isn’t that big a pool of cheap labour coming in, then firms will have to put wages up” (male, Stockport)

“They [immigrants] are suppressing wages… because they’re quite happy to have a low wage…therefore then people’s wages are generally being supressed. That’s bad for the economy” (male, Stockport)

“Everyone’s trying to undercut everyone else…We did used to do those jobs… anything from a dustbin man to working in a field” (female, Darlington)

The impact on wages was usually raised in response to questions on whether reducing immigration would have a negative impact on the economy, and what factors best explained their concerns about immigration. Some previous research has shown that immigration does have a negative effect on the wages of those at the lower end of the income distribution, even if the aggregate effect on UK wages is marginal.33

The concept of fairness was also raised in all focus groups through support for an “Australian point system.” UKIP has advocated an Australian-style Points Based System since 2014, and Vote Leave promoted a similar system during the referendum campaign. But this was usually raised by our participants without prompting, and with reference to personal or family experience. Support for the Australian system stemmed from the belief that it prevented immigrants from becoming “a burden” by only allowing entry to people “who can contribute.” Participants also generally showed preference for “tougher” and more self-interested immigration systems:

“It seems odd that places like America and Canada can put a system in place…and restrict immigration…they only get the people they want” (male, Long Eaton)

On the whole, focus groups responses reflected immigration concerns that were mainly to do with long-term adverse effects on the local workforce.

33 Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, ‘The effect of immigration along the distribution of wages’, 2013: http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpb21/Cpapers/ Review%20of%20Economic%20Studies-2013-Dustmann-145-73.pdf

Open Europe | 29 4. Immigration and public services Previous opinion studies have recognised strong public concern about the impact of immigration on the provision and quality of public services in the UK. In the 2015 NatCen British Social Attitudes survey, Professor John Curtice argued, “It is the belief that immigration puts pressure on public services that now appears to be the driving force behind public concern about the level of immigration into Britain.”34 This issue also featured prominently in the referendum campaign, notably with the Vote Leave argument that funding for the NHS could increase if the UK voted to leave the EU.

Findings from our national poll demonstrate the public believe immigration has a two-fold impact on public services. The public as a whole recognised that immigrants can both increase demand on public services, and contribute to the financing and provisions of services. Furthermore, they recognised that increased pressure in sectors such as the NHS and local education is unlikely to be uniquely a product of immigration. Many of those polled believed that public policy problems (i.e. a shortage of affordable housing, pressure on the NHS) are to a degree exacerbated or shaped by immigration, many also understood that stresses on public services are complicated and partly a consequence of additional factors, whether under-investment, political decisions, or an ageing population.

4.1 National perceptions Our poll respondents were asked to measure their perception of the national impact of immigration on a 1-5 scale, between “positive” and “negative” statements at either end. They were asked to assess its impact on the NHS, wages, the labour market, and British culture (see question 8, Annex II).

Across all fields, a majority of respondents recognised both the positive and negative effects of immigration on the UK (53-64% of respondents selected 2,3 or 4 on the 1-5 scale). However, the level of balance on questions of public services should not be overstated – around a quarter (23%) of respondents strongly agreed that the NHS depends on immigrant doctors and nurses to provide healthcare. An equal proportion (24%) strongly agreed that increased immigration puts too much strain on the NHS. A narrow majority (53%) showed sympathy with both views (selected 2, 3, or 4 on the 1-5 scale).

4.2 Local perceptions Only respondents that said their local area had been affected by immigration (in question 6 of our poll) were asked to provide their view on the local impact of immigration, along the same 1-5 scale. Given the general discourse on immigration, it may be that those who felt their environment has been affected were primarily those who perceived a negative effect. Questions probed their perception of the impact of immigration on their local healthcare services, schools, jobs and local culture (see question 9, Annex II).

34 NatCen, ‘Big majority believe immigration increases pressure on schools and hospitals,’ 3 July 2016: http://www.natcen.ac.uk/news-media/ press-releases/2016/june/big-majority-believe-immigration-increases-pressure-on-schools-and-hospitals/

30 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Our poll shows the public are more concerned about the local impact of immigration, than about the effect on the country as a whole – although this is contrary to previous opinion studies,35 we only asked those who had already said they felt immigration had affected their local area.This group tended more towards “anti-immigration” sentiment at the local level than at the national level. However, as illustrated earlier, social and cultural concerns were the exception to this trend: 27% strongly agreed with the idea that UK traditions and values are being diluted by immigration, and, separately 20% of those asked strongly believed immigrants have changed their local area so much they can’t recognise it.

On healthcare services in particular, this group expressed greater concern towards the impact of immigration at the local level, likely due to more direct experience of local level issues. 39% of respondents strongly or slightly agreed with the statement that increased immigration places too much strain on the NHS nationally, while 45% of respondents strongly or slightly agreed with the view that immigration means increased wait-times for local medical appointments. Similarly, while the mean response to the effect of immigration on the NHS fell at the midpoint of the positive- negative scale, the mean response to the impact on local health services tended more towards the negative:

Mean response: Immigraǎon and the NHS as a naǎonal concern (3.02)

The NHS Increased depends on immigraǎon doctors and 12345 puts too nurses to provide much strain healthcare on the NHS Pro-immigraǎon Anǎ-immigraǎon

Source: OE calculaǎon of ICM for Open Europe, Q8

Mean response: Immigraǎon and local medical services (3.3)

Immigraǎon has Immigraǎon brought more meansI have doctors and 12345 to wait nurses to my longer for a hospital/GP medical Pro-immigraǎon surgery Anǎ-immigraǎon appointment

Source: OE calculaǎon of ICM for Open Europe, Q9

Of all local issues that respondents were asked to consider, greatest concern was expressed towards the negative impact of immigration on schools. On most local issues, the largest group of respondents – around three in ten – placed themselves at the midpoint between the “positive” and “negative” effect of immigration. However, on the issue of local schools, the largest group strongly believed that immigration had a negative effect: 30% strongly agreed with the statement that immigration to the local area had increased class sizes and made it harder to get into a good school, against 13% who strongly agreed with the view that immigration brought diversity to local schools. It is important to note that these are not directly comparable statements. If we had instead posed the “pro-immigration” statement “immigration has brought more teachers to the UK”, this may have changed the balance of opinion.

35 Migration Observatory, ‘UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern’, 28 November 2017: http://www. migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/ ; LSE blog, ‘Perceptions and reality: Ten things we should know about attitudes to immigration in the UK’, 26 November 2014: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/ politicsandpolicy/perceptions-and-reality-ten-things-we-should-know-about-attitudes-to-immigration-in-the-uk/

Open Europe | 31 Immigration and Public Services

4.3 The public weigh immigration against other factors All poll respondents were asked whether increased pressure on public services was primarily a product of increased immigration, or of other factors such as under- investment and political decisions. Questions focused on healthcare services, housing, crime, education and social care (see question 10, Annex II).

Averaging responses across all issues, a slightly greater share of the public strongly attributes pressure on services to under-investment (26%) than immigration (23.5%). For our respondents, strains on GP services and social care are in particular less associated with immigration. 22% of respondents strongly agree that high immigration means it takes longer to get a GP appointment, against 29% who strongly agree that the UK needs to train more doctors and nurses. Similarly, 20% strongly agree that high immigration creates strain on social care for the elderly, against 28% who strongly believe the UK’s ageing population increased demand on social care services.

Crime is the only issue where respondents attribute pressure on services more to immigration than under-investment, although there is only a marginal difference. 26% strongly agreed that immigration has level to more crime in the UK, against 23% who strongly agreed that the police need the right resources and power to fight crime. Therefore, in all but one service area, under-investment and other factors equal or outweigh the impact of immigration in explaining pressures. This particular concern about the relationship between immigration and crime is reflected in other results from both our poll and our local focus group data, and will be discussed further in section 6.

32 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope 5. Immigration and access to welfare The relationship between immigration and access to welfare has featured prominently in UK public debate in recent years. There is a widespread assumption that the UK’s attractiveness to immigrants is increased by its non-contributory welfare system, which stands in contrast to many other state systems in the EU.

Our polling and focus group results reveal two sides to the perceived relationship between immigration and welfare. Our national survey demonstrates a Leave/Remain consensus for introducing greater restrictions on immigrants’ access to welfare and some public services – although a distinction is clearly made between ‘automatic’ and ‘earned’ welfare and social support. But at the local-level, focus group participants drew a link between the UK’s reliance on low-skilled immigration, and a welfare system that is seen as “soft at handing out benefits” to unemployed British citizens.

5.1 Polling findings reveal public consensus for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare Our polling results found a strong consensus among Leave and Remain voters for restricting immigrants’ access to welfare. 65% of all respondents believed a policy that allows immigrants to come and work, but restricts their access to benefits and public services, would be the right approach to controlling immigration. A significant majority of Leave voters (74%) and Remain voters (63%) agreed. Similarly, six in ten respondents (62%) believed limiting immigrants’ access to benefits and social services would reduce their concerns about immigration. Again, this view is shared by a majority of both Leave (75%) and Remain (54%) voters.

Importantly, the public have a nuanced view on how restrictions should be managed, and distinguish between ‘automatic’ and ‘earned’ welfare, social support and public services.

At what point do you think migrants to the UK should be enǎtled to the following beneﬁts and services? Immediately Aer living in Aer working Aer working Should only be Don’t know % upon arrival % the UK for at and paying tax and paying tax available to least 1 year, in the UK for 1 in the UK for 5 Briǎsh ciǎzens working or not year % years % % % Emergency 40 10 18 14 11 8 healthcare State school places 29 9 22 17 14 9 for their children Healthcare for 25 9 22 21 15 8 children and dependents GP services (non- 24 11 27 18 13 8 emergency healthcare) Child beneﬁts 7 8 21 30 26 7

Council housing 5 7 19 33 26 9

Unemployment 3 8 20 35 27 7 beneﬁts State pension 3 4 10 37 38 8 payments

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q16

Open Europe | 33 Immigration and Access to Welfare

Four in ten (40%) believed access to emergency healthcare should be granted immediately upon arrival. While it is striking that fewer than half consider state emergency healthcare an ‘automatic right’, it may be that respondents preferred an insurance scheme or other private emergency healthcare for immigrants – a number of focus groups raised health insurance requirements as a key element of their ideal immigration system.

A majority of the public regard access to council housing, and employment and child benefits as ‘earned’ rights, with most believing immigrants should only be granted these benefits after five years of income tax and national insurance contributions.

A plurality supported immediate access to state education for the children of immigrants (29%), and to healthcare for children and other dependents (25%) – particular public sympathy towards unrestricted access for children was expected. But opinion is notably more divided on these issues: in both cases a greater share of the public believed these should only be available after working and paying tax in the UK for a period of time (either 1 or 5 years).

Around a third of the public believed access to child benefits (30%), council housing (33%) and unemployment benefits (35%) should only be available after working and contributing taxes for five years. If you include those who said access should be contingent on one year’s work and tax payment, a majority of the public view these as “earned” welfare support.

Only state pension payments are considered by a plurality to be a reserved right for British citizens (38%) – although an almost equivalent group believe this too should be available after five years’ tax contribution in the UK (37%). In this case the public are seemingly very liberal – at present, the full UK state pension is only available after 30 years of National Insurance contributions or credits. It is possible that respondents believe access to state pensions after five years would only be in proportion to years worked, or that they are unaware of the details of the current system.

Responses from both Scotland and London – traditionally considered more liberal on social issues, and with a majority Remain vote – follow the national trend across all categories in distinguishing between ‘automatic’ and ‘earned’ access.

5.2 Focus groups believe “soft” UK benefits system fuels reliance on immigration Our focus group findings reveal another side to the debate, with all groups arguing that immigration is in part fuelled by a “soft” welfare system that created “no incentive” for British unemployed people to seek out and retain work. On most occasions the topic was raised in response to a question from the focus group leader on whether the UK would suffer from a reduction in immigration, but the issue of “lazy” British welfare recipients was never prompted. Groups in all four locations felt that immigration “reflected our lack of work ethic,” and that reducing immigration would push “lazy” people on welfare support back into work:

“The government is too soft at handing out benefits…the Poles are doing jobs that [British] people don’t want to do” (female, Rotherham)

“I think we’ve got enough people already in this country to do those things…it’s just we’ve got too lazy a society, too many people used to handouts and benefits” (male, Darlington)

“The British can’t hack it [manual labour jobs]…Our people are so bloody entitled” (female, Stockport)

34 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope “We’ve got to get this work ethic back in Britain…we’ve got to return to a bit more self-sufficiency” (male, Stockport)

“We need to get our people off the dole and working” (male, Stockport)

“If I wanted to, I could just sit back and claim benefits. There’s too many like that in my generation. There’s jobs but they’d rather get money for doing nothing” (female, Darlington)

“There are too many people that known how to play the system” (female, Long Eaton)

One woman in Stockport who ran a large distribution centre for an online retailer expressed anger that so many jobs were filled by Eastern Europeans when she knew local people who had spent years on benefits.

When it was put to one focus group in Darlington that UK unemployment is currently at a record low of 5%, participants did not change their view, usually using anecdotal evidence to argue that the UK’s welfare system means “work doesn’t pay.”

Those without personal experience of welfare dependency (generally those with a higher educational attainment and often Remain voters) were initially unwilling to believe arguments of “lazy” benefit recipients. But they often changed their view by the end of the sessions, persuaded by the anecdotal evidence of other participants.

This is not to say that participants did not also believe the UK’s welfare system functioned as a pull-factor for some immigrants:

“I saw a programme the other night and this chap had come over here from Romania, was working on the black [economy] and was sending hundreds in benefits back there” (female, Stockport).

“They come over to use our benefits system…They come on holiday to use the NHS” (male, Darlington)

“I don’t blame them. I think it’s our benefits system that lets us down, because they’re letting them in to this country when they’ve not got a job” (female, Stockport)

But the idea that introducing tougher welfare conditionality for British citizens would “force” some unemployed people into work and reduce the need for low-skilled immigration held strongest sway among this segment of the population. This also reinforces our finding that hostility towards immigration in the UK has little to do with hostility towards immigrants per se.

Open Europe | 35 6. Immigration control – what would receive public consent? Both the government and the opposition have signalled their commitment to ending EU free movement after the UK’s exit from the bloc in 2019. The UK will therefore need to begin designing its own immigration policy. In doing so, the government must ensure to build a system that reflects and responds to concerns on immigration, and gains public consent. This will mean not merely designing an immigration policy for Leave voters or Remain voters: it will be important to look beyond divisions and reflect points of consensus.

Our results found some openness to the current “tens of thousands” migration target, in the absence of other measures for control. However, many believe this is impractical, and the UK will need a more flexible mechanism for managing immigration. There is a strong Leave/Remain consensus for increased criminal background checks on those coming to the UK – this was also consistently and spontaneously raised in focus groups as one element of an ideal immigration system.

While our data suggests the public as a whole is largely unwilling to suffer significant negative economic consequences from reduced immigration, there was a high degree of uncertainty when considering such a trade-off. Evidence from the focus groups suggests some do not believe these are realistic consequences of reducing immigration.

6.1 Public support reducing immigration, but opinion of government target is mixed Polling data shows the public remains open to the government’s “tens of thousands” annual net-migration target, signalling that the public as a whole does want to see a reduction in numbers. In the absence of other measures for control, any policy that signals greater restriction is likely to generate a positive response.

Our data shows 44% of respondents believed the target is desirable, against 25% who considered it undesirable. Interestingly, of those who believed it undesirable, 38% believed it is too high and that the country needs even less immigration. Therefore over half of our respondents (53.9%) considered the target either appropriate or not strict enough. This puts public approval of the policy’s principle at over double that of public opposition. Even among Remain voters, there is greater support for the target than disagreement with it, by 38% to 27%.

But it is important to note that almost a third of all respondents (30%) did not know what they thought, highlighting an important degree of public hesitance towards, or ambivalence regarding, the instrument. This figure stays around 20-40% across all age groups and regions, and party affiliations (although it is lower among Conservative (19%) and UKIP voters (18%)).

Half our respondents (50%) believed the target is unachievable, and a further fifth (21%) did not know if it was – only 30% believed it could be met. Interestingly, almost half (45%) of those who see the target as desirable also believe it is unachievable. The public appear to believe that in the absence of other forms of control, “something is better than nothing.”

36 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope In focus groups, the target received some limited support in Darlington, but most participants were sceptical of it. Some were aware that the government had repeatedly failed to deliver the target, which therefore reinforced their scepticism of government promises – “It was soundbites…There was no policy, no plan to get it down” (male, Rotherham). Others believed it was a blunt and inflexible instrument:

“You can’t just set a number and then say that’s the right amount. You need to look at what people bring with them” (male, Stockport)

“Who are the tens of thousands…You could get a hundred thousand people that don’t work” (female, Stockport)

“It’s not about the cap; it’s about filling the roles that we need” (female, Stockport)

“It puts you in constraints. You can’t make objective decisions about the skills that we need” (male, Rotherham)

6.2 Public support flexibility over reduction Our poll found that a majority of the public (56%) supported a system which allows immigrants to come to the UK on the condition that social and economic controls are in place, over a system that simply reduces the total number of immigrants coming to the UK (36%). This was the case across all regions surveyed (between 52-61% in favour of control over reduction), with Wales (61%) and London (59%) recording highest support for control over reduction. Equally, all age groups favoured control, with the greatest support from both 75+ (69%) and 16-25 (60%).

A er Brexit, the Government will be able to control immigraǎon from the EU. Is it more important to you that the Government prioriǎses: (%)

Allowing immigrants to come to the UK as long as there is control to make sure they will contribute to our society, economy and way of life (56%)

Reducing the numbers of people coming into the UK (36%)

Don't know (8%)

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q13

Open Europe | 37 Immigration Control – What Would Receive Public Consent?

The polarisation between Leave and Remain voters on this point was particularly stark: a significant majority of Remain voters support controls (73%) over a flat reduction in number (20%). This is in line with the aggregate, but support for the more liberal option was almost 20 percentage points higher in this group than the national average. On the other hand, a majority of Leave voters took the opposite position: 52% believed it is more important to reduce the number of entrants, against 43% who favour controls. It is notable, however, that the majority is slight, with a margin of less than 10%. Our results suggest that Leave voters are torn: not all Leave voters wanted a flat reduction in numbers; a large proportion were willing to back a more flexible mechanism for controlling immigration.

6.3 Flexible and selective immigration systems attract stronger and more certain public support

Which of the following policies do you thinkit would be right for the government to adopt to help to control immigraǎon? Right Wrong Don’t know % approach % approach % It only allows immigrants to come if they have a specific job 71 15 14 offer in the UK It allows high-skilled immigraǎon, but sets a limit on the 67 18 15 number of low-skilled immigrants coming to the UK It allows immigrants to come and work, but restricts their 65 21 14 access to benefits and public services It sets a numerical target or a cap for overall immigraǎon 55 25 19

It oﬀers a ﬁxed number of work permits to immigrants every 54 26 20 year It sets a numerical target or a cap for overall net migraǎon 53 25 22

It exempts students from its immigraǎon controls 36 40 24

It restricts immigraǎon for family reuniﬁcaǎon (for example a 36 42 22 foreign husband joining their Briǎsh wife)

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q14

While the public support almost all suggestions put forward in our poll for controlling immigration,flexible measures that take into account immigrants’ employment, skills and access to welfare attract a stronger and more certain degree of support than commitments to fixed reductions in immigration.

Respondents showed greatest support for a system that only allows entry to people with specific job offers in the UK, with 71% in favour of such a measure, against 15% who disagreed, and 14% who did not know. This policy received overwhelming support from both Leave (81%) and Remain voters (68%).

In line with previous public opinion studies, our polling results also showed a high level of support (67%) for a system that allows high-skilled immigration, but restricts low- skilled. This is over three times the level of opposition (18%). A very strong majority of Leave (75%) and Remain (65%) voters would once again back this measure. We did not test public opinion towards “socially useful” occupations as part of this question.

Strong support (65%) was also registered for a system that allows immigrants to come and work, but restricts their access to welfare. Again, a significant majority of both Leave (74%) and Remain voters (63%) believed this would be the right approach.

38 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope By contrast, support for policies such as caps and targets attracted notably narrower majorities of support (53-55%), with around a quarter of respondents opposed to them (25-26%) and, importantly, a fifth (19-20%) who were unsure.

Only restricting family immigration received marginally greater opposition – 42% think this would be the wrong approach to control immigration, against 36% who support it and 22% who are unsure (presenting this statement in the context of reunifying a husband and wife may have affected responses).

Interestingly, our respondents tended not to favour a policy that excludes students from immigration controls, by 40% to 36%. This is contrary to most other public opinion studies on attitudes towards student immigration: a 2017 survey by ComRes for Universities UK found that only 26% of the British public consider international students as immigrants when thinking about government immigration policy.36 Similarly, a recent British Future publication found that only 24% the public would prefer a decrease in the numbers of students coming to live in the UK.37 Our decision to frame the question in terms of “exemptions” from control, rather than “openness” to international students may in part explain our results. We also did not provide any additional context for respondents, which other surveys may have done. Furthermore, other data from our poll demonstrates that the public as a whole did value the skills that students bring (21% net support for immigrant students), although they were notably more open towards high- skilled and socially useful immigration (see question 7, Annex II).

6.4 Leave and Remain consensus for increasing criminal background checks on immigrants Three-quarters of the public (74%) believed increasing criminal background checks on those entering the UK would reduce their concern about immigration, according to our poll. An overwhelming majority of both Leave (80%) and Remain (73%) voters agreed with this. When tested against other potential methods of addressing immigration concerns, including greater investment in public services and improved training for the local workforce, this was the most popular policy (see question 15, Annex II).

Considering only those for whom immigration is a top-three national priority, exactly three-quarters believed increased criminal checks would reduce their concerns. The same is true for 77% of people who say immigration has affected their local area.

Similarly, when focus group participants were asked an open question on their design for a perfect immigration system, groups in all locations voluntarily cited increased criminal background checks. It is interesting to note that this was put forward as a logical measure to ensure safety and security: there was no indication that participants thought immigrants were more likely to commit crime, nor that criminal background checks were only relevant for those coming from particular countries. To explain their reasoning, the groups tended to draw on examples that they had heard in the media.

“They should definitely be vetted – so regarding terrorism, criminal records, that sort of thing. There was a chap from Poland, he had been convicted of murder over there, came over here, murdered somebody over here” (male, Stockport)

“They should be screened to make sure they have no criminal record. We shouldn’t just let anybody in. I’m not sure….I’ve heard about this in the media…I’m not sure whether that’s in place yet” (male, Rotherham)

“[Criminal backgrounds] should be checked instantly…people shouldn’t slip through the net” (male, Darlington)

36 ComRes, ‘Universities UK – International Students Poll’, 12 April 2017: http://www.comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ Universities-UK-Public-Perceptions-of-International-Students-Survey-Data-Tables.pdf 37 British Future, ‘Time to get it right: Finding consensus on Britain’s future immigration policy’, 4 September 2017, p20

Open Europe | 39 Immigration Control – What Would Receive Public Consent?

6.5 Public largely unwilling to suffer negative economic consequences from reducing immigration Our poll results suggest a sizeable share of the public was averse to reducing immigration substantially if it results in negative personal or national economic impacts.

Imagine the UK succeeded in substa nǎally reducing immigraǎon. If the following actually happened as a result of lower immigraǎon, would you consider reducing immigraǎon to have been the right or wrong course of acǎon? It was the right It was the Don’t know (%) course of acǎon wrong course of (%) acǎon (%) It directly contributed to an economic recession 25 50 25

It contributed to a situaǎon in which you or a close 23 46 30 family member lost your/their job It contributed to a rise in tax, such as income tax, NI or 29 46 25 VAT It contributed to a rise in food prices, prices in the 28 49 23 shops, and cost of services It contributed to a rise in state pension age 31 44 26

It meant there were fewer doctors and nurses 20 59 21

Other countries adopted a ǎt-for-tat measure, limiǎng 44 32 24 the number of Briǎsh people who could go and live abroad

Source: ICM for Open Europe, Q17

A majority opposed lower immigration if it was found to have led to fewer healthcare staff (59%) or an economic recession (50%). Considering only those for whom the government net migration target is desirable, opposition remained at a similarly high level (57% and 48% respectively).

In all cases, a ‘hardcore’ group of between 20% and 44% continued to support a clamp- down on immigration, regardless of the consequences whether personal or national. Of those who considered immigration a top-three national concern, this group was particularly strong: two-fifths (40%) believed a reduction in numbers would be worth it even if the UK suffered an economic recession (against 33% who think it would be a mistake). A similar share supported a reduction even if it led to higher taxes (42%, against 33%), prices (42%, against 35%), or a higher state pension age (46%, against 29%).

A plurality of all respondents believed immigration curbs would have been the right course of action if it led to other countries being less open to UK citizens (44%). This jumped to 62% among Leave voters.

However, it is worth noting that the public are very uncertain about these trade-offs. Across all components of this question, the share of respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ is significant - between 21-30%. ICM suggest ‘don’t know’ answers tend to account for around 10% on average across polling surveys – our figures therefore indicate a significant level of public uncertainty in assessing such complex scenarios. This may be because the consequences listed were too abstract, or the public was unwilling to believe these are plausible trade-offs.

40 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Indeed, our focus groups suggested that Leave voters were particularly likely to reject the idea that these were plausible trade-offs. Participants were willing to accept there may be some short-term negative economic effect from leaving the EU – “There might be a dip for a while” (male, Rotherham). But, when asked whether reducing immigration would hurt the economy, the majority of Leave voters in all groups believed this was not a realistic possibility – most thought that the UK would be able to manage, and argued, unprompted, that it would provide an opportunity to push “lazy” British unemployed people to re-enter the workforce. Interestingly, several people in different locations referred to the idea that British people had done these jobs before and could do so again:

“We’ve always managed before. We used to do the jobs that tatey-picking ourselves” (male, Darlington)

“We used to do those jobs – anything from a dustbin man to working in a field” (male, Rotherham)

“We’ve got to return to a bit more self-sufficiency” (male, Stockport)

“There as so many lazy [British] people who can work but don’t” (female, Darlington)

Open Europe | 41 Chapter Heading

Conclusion

42 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope This report is the first output of an Open Europe project focusing on immigration. This paper intends to examine public views around immigration, paint a more detailed picture of the public’s concerns regarding immigration, and understand what new policies would receive broad public consent. In a subsequent report, we will outline substantive policy proposals for a new UK immigration system. Our results have shown that a continued system of free movement post-Brexit would not receive broad public support. The public as a whole want a reduction in immigration numbers, with targets and caps still generating majority support. But, given the crisis of confidence in the current system, it is not clear to what extent the focus on numbers is linked to a perceived lack of control over migration issues. In the absence of other forms of managing immigration, the public may believe “something is better than nothing.” Our research shows that more selective and responsive instruments (i.e. that assess job offers, skill levels, or restrict access to benefits) receive both stronger and more solid support from the general public. A significant minority of Leave voters (43%) would also back a flexible system of control over a flat reduction in the number of immigrants to the UK. A strong majority of both Leave and Remain voters supported increased criminal background checks on those coming to the UK. There is also strong support for the introduction of a work permit system to ensure only those with a confirmed job offer come. The Australian system had particular cut-through, with a majority of focus group participants in all locations believing it ensured no immigrant became a “burden”. Our data shows no significant support for an immigration system that assessed entry on the basis of factors such as race, religion or country of origin - these were consistently ranked the least important criteria to consider. There is also, on the whole, little support for allowing EU immigrants preferential access to the UK, with many focus group participants volunteering their desire for a “global” immigration system that does not discriminate between countries of origin. There may be strong public support for offering a more open immigration route to those coming to work in “socially useful” jobs, such as doctors or nurses in the NHS, or any immigrant with skills in areas where the UK has a skills shortage. However, creating tiers of entry based on classic labour market definitions of high and low-skilled roles may not correctly respond to public concerns. Pay was not a fundamental public concern. Importantly, immigration policy is only one part of the solution to addressing public concerns. There is a general recognition that public policy problems – such as pressure on the NHS or schools – may be exacerbated by immigration, but have other important causes which governments ought to address. The public as a whole wants the government to use other policy levers to address these issues, for example by improving skills levels, arguing that this would reduce their concerns about the impact of immigration. Our research showed that the public believe access to benefits, welfare and public services by migrants ought to be restricted – with certain benefits only available after working several years or even gaining citizenship. The focus groups also revealed substantial support for reforming, what is considered as, the UK’s “soft” welfare system to ensure in adequately incentivises work. In the opinion of many of our focus group respondents, high levels of immigration have allowed business (and government) to neglect UK workers. As they see it, UK workers have not been offered the right skills training to compete for jobs which migrants are able to secure. And, the ‘generous’ UK welfare system, in their view, means that too many are on long-term benefits rather than in employment. At Conservative Party Conference in 2011, David Cameron spoke about immigration and welfare reform as “two sides of the same coin.” Our focus group research suggests that some of the public see these two policy issues as deeply intertwined. It may also point to wider public support for appropriate welfare reforms. Immigration remains an issue of significant public interest. Following last year’s referendum, it is often seen as a divisive and polarising topic. However, our results show that a consensus can be found on how to address some of the public’s key concerns. Brexit offers a unique opportunity to engage with them, and design an immigration system that can command broad public support.

Open Europe | 43 Chapter Heading

Annex

Annex I – Literature Review 45

Annex II – ICM poll questionnaire and results 50

Annex III – Public First focus group findings 66

44 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Annex I – Literature Review This section reviews other public opinion research conducted on immigration following the 2016 EU referendum.

What did the referendum vote tell us about public attitudes to immigration? Public opinion data collected shortly after the referendum vote found that the driving factor behind the decision to leave was the principle that Britain should be free to make its own decisions and laws.38 Both June polls found roughly half of Leave voters cited sovereign decision-making as their principal motivation (49% and 53% respectively), significantly ahead of controlling immigration, cited by roughly a third (33% and 34% respectively).

An insight into what the British public would interpret as a successful exit agreement may also clarify the drivers of the vote to Leave. Upholding the findings of the above studies, an August 2016 YouGov poll shows that 64% of respondents agreed a deal that involved adopting WTO trade terms, with no integration for the UK within EU structures like the Single Market, would respect the result of the referendum.39 However, only 32% believed such a deal would be good for Britain, suggesting that the decision to leave had relatively less to do with national economic interests. By contrast, the poll found that a Canada-style deal – interpreted as entailing some preferential trading measures (though notably, not necessarily for financial services), but no contributory requirements and no automatic right for EU citizens to live and work in the UK – was seen both to respect the vote (by 65% to 10%) and to be beneficial for Britain (by 50% to 24%). Interestingly, financial contributions to the EU emerged post-vote as a strong consideration, with 44% of respondents believing it would be preferable to exit without a deal rather than continued payments to the EU (against 28% who believe it is a price worth paying and 13% who would be fine with it).

None of this is to say that immigration is not considered a key concern by the British public. Another YouGov poll from last year showed that 70% of survey respondents thought immigration has been too high over the past ten years, with almost half (44%) saying it has been “much too high”.40 A separate poll in August last year found that 40% of Leave voters view immigration as the most important issue facing Britain (with only 5% of Remain voters in agreement). 63% of all respondents believed the current number of immigrants coming to Britain should be reduced.41

38 Lord Ashcroft Polls, ‘How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday…and why’, 24 June 2016: http://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how- the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/ ; ComRes, ‘Sunday Mirror post-referendum poll’, 25 June 2016: http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/ sunday-mirror-post-referendum-poll/ 39 YouGov, ‘Canada option is the most popular type of Brexit deal’, 18 August 2016: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/18/majority-people- think-freedom-movement-fair-price-/ 40 YouGov, ‘If voters designed a points-based system’, 26 August 2016: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/26/one-five-say-uk-should-not- admit-single-migrant-tu/ 41 YouGov, YouGov, Policy Exchange and Birkbeck University survey results’, August 2016: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/08/26/one-five- say-uk-should-not-admit-single-migrant-tu/

Open Europe | 45 Annex I – Literature Review

Yet public perception of immigration is neither static nor homogenous, varying both over time and in relation to different aspects of British life. For instance, a global study conducted by Ipsos Mori this year finds 40% of Britons think immigration has had a positive impact on the country, double the score recorded in their 2011 survey (19%).42 47% also said immigration has been good for the economy, up 20 percent points since 2011 (27%). In both instances, Britain ranked among the most positive countries polled, in second and third position respectively. But immigration concerns persist – particularly regarding the impact on public services – even if these have fallen in recent years. 58% in Britain are concerned by the pressure immigration has put on public services, although this has fallen from the over three-quarters (76%) recorded in 2011; 45% of Britons think there are too many immigrants in the country, though this is significantly down since 2011 (71%); and 34% think immigration has made it harder for British nationals to get a job, yet this is almost half the 2011 score (62%). Interestingly, these downwards trends in opinion come during a period in which net migration to the UK actually increased.

In all, the post-referendum attitude to immigration was summarised by an ICM study for British Future, which found that majorities amongst both Leave and Remain voters feel the need for a “sensible policy to manage immigration” while preserving its economic benefits and the UK’s tradition of acceptance (74% total – 84% of Leave voters, 69% of Remain voters).43

What sort of immigration controls do the British public want to see put in place? Post-referendum insight into public expectations for future EU immigration shows, above all, strong support for European immigrants already settled in the UK to be given leave to stay. Polling immediately after the vote, an ICM study for British Future found 84% of the public (including majorities among both Leave and UKIP voters) thought resident EU immigrants should be allowed to stay, with any new rules applying only to new immigrants.44 A September poll by Lord Ashcroft supported this finding, showing that 77% of the public (80% of Remain voters and 76% of Leave voters) would consider the UK had left the EU and had honoured the referendum result if existing foreign nationals from EU countries currently living and working in the UK were allowed to stay.45 However, a poll last July on Brexit expectations by ComRes found over a quarter of the British public (27%) expect that at least some EU citizens currently resident in the UK will be required to leave when Britain leaves the EU, with 10% thinking this will be the case for most EU citizens.46

42 Ipsos MORI, ‘Global views on immigration and the refugee crisis’, 14 September 2017: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/ documents/2017-09/Global_Advisor_Immigration.pdf 43 British Future, ‘What next after Brexit? Immigration and integration in post-referendum Britain’, August 2016, p13 44 British Future, ‘Let EU migrants stay, say the British public, plus voices from business and politics’, 3 July 2016: http://www.britishfuture.org/ articles/15131/ 45 Lord Ashcroft Polls, ‘The new blueprint: The Conservative agenda in post-Brexit Britain’, September 2016, p8 46 ComRes, ‘BBC News Brexit expectations poll’, 14 July 2016: http://www.comresglobal.com/polls/bbc-news-brexit-expectations-poll/

46 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Further public opinion research has been conducted to ascertain British priorities for a new immigration system. For instance, ComRes has conducted a recent study on who the British public consider an immigrant. It found that the three groups most thought of as immigrants were refugees coming to escape persecution (69%), unskilled labourers from outside the UK (64%), and a woman/man coming to the UK to live with their partner (59%).47 At the other end of the spectrum, only 4% thought of returning UK citizens as immigrants, and only 10% believed a tourist from outside the EU qualified as an immigrant. The study also aimed to draw a distinction between EU and non-EU professionals and students, with results showing only marginal differences in public perception: 41% considered a university researcher, academic or scientist from outside the UK coming to work in a UK university to be an immigrant, with 38% believing the same for a researcher, academic or scientist from the EU. Similarly, 26% considered an international student coming to study in the UK qualified as an immigrant, with 25% believing the same for an EU student. The public seemed most torn on high-skilled workers from outside the UK, with 50% considering them to be immigrants.

Public preferences on migrant skillsets are complicated, and in some cases, incompatible. Immigration of high-skilled workers appears comparatively uncontroversial, with over four fifths of Britons wanting to retain or increase high- skilled immigration to Britain from EU (86%) or non-EU (84%) countries (against only 15% and 16% wanting to see it reduced, respectively).48 The public particularly favour an increase in immigrant healthcare professionals (46%), scientists/researchers (44%) and engineers (35%).49 On the other hand, while there is public consensus for a reduction in low-skilled immigration to Britain (64% prefer a decrease in the numbers of low-skilled immigrants from the EU, and 67% from non-EU countries), respondents held a more sceptical response when asked more specific questions about particular occupations.50 For instance, a majority would prefer the number of immigrants coming to work as waiters, care workers, construction staff, and fruit pickers either to increase or remain the same, with greatest support for care workers (75%).51 Similarly, attitudes towards skill levels in and of themselves do not offer enough information on public opinion towards immigration: for instance, when particular skills were qualified by an indication of their current availability in the UK labour market, public responses shifted. According to an August YouGov poll, the vast majority of people think that whether a person has skills in short supply is an important consideration for a new immigration system (84% for blue collar jobs and 80% for white collar jobs), but this drops to just over half for people with skills that are not in short supply (57% for blue collar jobs and 54% for white collar jobs).52 An Ipsos Mori survey conducted at the same time also found that British respondents were the most likely of all 22 nations polled in this study to say priority should be reserved for high-skilled workers who can fill domestic labour shortages in particular professions (61%), although the UK has fallen to third place in the most recent iteration of this survey.53

47 ComRes, ‘Universities UK – international students poll’, March 2017: http://www.comresglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/ Universities-UK-Public-Perceptions-of-International-Students-Survey-Data-Tables.pdf 48 British Future, ‘Time to get it right: Finding consensus on Britain’s future immigration policy’, September 2017, p20 49 Ibid., p21 50 Ibid., p20 51 Ibid., p23. 52 YouGov, ‘If voters designed a points-based system’, 26 August 2016 53 Ipsos MORI, ‘Global study shows many around the world uncomfortable with levels of immigration’, 11 August 2016:https://www.ipsos.com/ ipsos-mori/en-uk/global-study-shows-many-around-world-uncomfortable-levels-immigration ; Ipsos MORI, ‘Global views on immigration and the refugee crisis’, 14 September 2017: https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/ct/news/documents/2017-09/Global_Advisor_ Immigration.pdf

Open Europe | 47 Annex I – Literature Review

Other areas of consideration for a new immigration system include criminality, education level, work status and country of origin. Criminality was ranked top of public concerns in a YouGov poll from August last year, with 83% of people saying whether a migrant had a record of violent crimes was “very important,” as did 62% for minor or non-violent crimes. 54 Furthermore, 84% of people believed proficiency in English is important, along with 81% who considered a migrant’s education level is a significant factor. Three quarters of respondents (76%) were keen to ensure an immigrant already has a job lined up before arriving in the UK. The poll also highlighted some public sensitivities over countries of origin, with at least one in five people saying that the UK should not admit a single migrant from Turkey, Romania, Nigeria, Egypt or Pakistan. Other areas for consideration according to the public include whether or not a migrant intends to bring accompanying family members (73% considered this important), their existing wealth (60%), their age (53%), and even their IQ (53%). The only unimportant factor was a migrant’s religion, with only 31% considering this significant.

These findings are largely supported by the latest NatCen British Social Attitudes survey, which found that, in order to come and live in the UK, 87% believe immigrants should speak English, 81% believe they must have work skills that the UK needs, and 74% believe they must have good educational qualifications.55 Interestingly, this survey also revealed British concern over the capacity for immigrants to successfully integrate, with 84% believing immigrants should be committed to the way of life in Britain in order to come. 38% believe cultural life in Britain is undermined by immigration (up from 32% in 2002) – although the plurality (43%) believe immigration has enriched British culture (largely stable compared with 44% in 2002). Once again, however, religion was not of high importance to most respondents, with only 16% believing it was important for immigrants to come from a Christian background.

Little has yet been considered in terms of migrant access to public services, the distinction between skills and earnings when discussing skilled and unskilled work, and migrant rights (although the latest NatCen report finds 74% of people want EU and non-EU immigrants to be treated the same, including 62% of Remain voters and 89% of Leave voters).56

54 YouGov, ‘If voters designed a points-based system’, 26 August 2016 55 NatCen, ‘British Social Attitudes 34: Immigration’, 2017: http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/media/39148/bsa34_immigration_final.pdf 56 What UK Thinks, ‘What do voters want from Brexit?’, November 2016, p10.

48 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope What compromises are the public willing to make (or not) in order to be able to control immigration? Post-referendum polls have also tried to discover whether the public prioritises trade or immigration in a future UK-EU deal, but a succession of surveys have shown how unclear public opinion is on this trade-off. Polling immediately after the referendum vote found that 44% felt that it was more important that “Britain keeps its access to the common market in Europe,” against 40% who believed that it was more important that “Britain gets complete control over its immigration policies.”57 Subsequently, a July ComRes poll found public favour for prioritising trade had increased, with most Britons believing maintaining access to the single market should be the Government’s priority when negotiating the UK’s withdrawal from the EU (66%), against just a third said who said this of restricting free movement (31%).58 However, a July ORB-Independent poll showed how divisive this issue remained between Remain and Leave voters: it found 76% of Remain voters thought that continued access to the single market is more important than reducing immigration from the EU, with only 20% of Leave voters agreeing.59 More recent polling shows most now believe that a trade-off between free trade and immigration control is a “false choice”: A March YouGov study found the plurality of respondents (40%) believe it is possible for the UK to both control EU immigration and maintain free trade with the EU, while a British Future report last month found almost half of respondents agree that the government should achieve a “compromise that balances the economy and immigration control” in negotiations.60

Surveys that structured the choice as a compromise rather than a trade-off have failed to arrive at more conclusive findings. A YouGov poll last August found that 52% of people considered allowing EU citizens the right to live and work in Britain would be acceptable in order to secure a free trade agreement with the EU, against 33% who believed it an unacceptable compromise.61 Yet, a later NatCen study on what voters want from Brexit found that while 90% of people are in favour of free trade with the EU, the public were near evenly split on whether Britain should allow EU citizens free right to live and work in the UK in return for UK firms to trade freely with the EU (49% said Britain should, against 51% who said they shouldn’t).62

When discussed at a lower level of aggregation, public preferences are more concrete. For instance, an August YouGov poll for PolicyExchange and Birkbeck University found the British public are unwilling to take a hit to personal finances in order to achieve lower immigration. The study found 62% of all voters would prefer to pay nothing and keep net immigration figures at the (notional) current level of 185000, with only 15% agreeing to pay 5% of their income to reduce the number to zero.63 However, the plurality of Leave voters would pay 5% of their income to eliminate immigration, as opposed to paying nothing to keep immigration levels at their current rate (35% against 30%). A more recent study by Opinium for the Social Market Foundation found that a minority of the British public believe it is important to reduce immigration significantly if it results in higher taxes (24% of all respondents), bigger cuts in public spending (22%), or a higher state pension age (21%).64 However, of those who agree with the overall opinion that it is important to reduce immigration significantly even if the economy slows and the deficit gets bigger, 60% believe higher taxes would be a price worth paying. 55% believe the same of bigger cuts in public spending, and 52% of a higher state pension age.

57 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research, ‘GQR poll for TUC’, June 2016: https://gqrr.app.box.com/s/xb5sfzo19btsn74vawnmu7mn033p1ary 58 ComRes, ‘BBC News Brexit expectations poll’, 14 July 2016 59 Independent, ‘Don’t control immigration at the expense of losing single market access, voters tell politicians - poll’, 8 July 2016: http:// www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/dont-control-eu-immigration-at-the-expense-of-losing-single-market-access-poll-brexit- europe-7127626.html 60 YouGov, ‘Attitudes to Brexit: Everything we know so far’, 29 March 2017: https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/03/29/attitudes-brexit-everything- we-know-so-far/ ; British Future, ‘Time to get it right: Finding consensus on Britain’s future immigration policy’, September 2017, p19 61 YouGov, ‘If voters designed a points-based system’, 26 August 2016 62 What UK Thinks, ‘What do voters want from Brexit?’, November 2016, p11 63 YouGov, YouGov, Policy Exchange and Birkbeck University survey results’, August 2016 64 Social Market Foundation, ‘Social Market Foundation: Immigration briefing’, 5 June 2017: http://www.smf.co.uk/wp-content/ uploads/2017/06/SMF-Opinium-Immigration-Briefing.pdf

Open Europe | 49 Annex II – ICM poll questionnaire and results • This topline presents the findings from public opinion research conducted by ICM on behalf of Open Europe between 22 August and 4 September 2017.

• ICM interviewed a representative sample of 4,000 GB adults aged 16+ online.

• To ensure a representative sample, demographic quotas were set. At the analysis stage data have been weighted to the known profile of GB adults aged 16+.

• A sample size of 4,000 produces data accurate to plus or minus (+/-) 1.5 percentage points at the 95 per cent confidence level.

• Results are based on all respondents (4,000) unless otherwise stated.

• An asterisk (*) denotes a value that is greater than zero but less than one.

• Where results do not sum to 100%, this may be due to multiple responses, computer rounding or the exclusion of don’t knows/not stated.

• Conducted in accordance with ISO 20252 and ISO 27001, the international standards for market research and information security management.

Main Questionnaire Q4. What are the three most important issues facing the UK today? Please choose the three most important issues from the list below, in order of preference. [MC, force three; randomise order]

% (Most important)

Brexit 24 Health/the NHS 21 Crime, terrorism and national security 14 Immigration 12 The economy 8 Unemployment and the cost of living 5 Housing 5 The environment/climate change 3 Welfare and pensions 3 Education, including student debt 2 Other (please specify) * None of the above 1 Don’t know 1

50 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope % (selected in top 3) Health/the NHS 60 Brexit 52 Crime, terrorism and national security 46 Immigration 34 The economy 29 Unemployment and the cost of living 21 Housing 18 Welfare and pensions 16 The environment/climate change 10 Education, including student debt 10 Other (please specify) 1 None of the above 1 Don’t know 1

Q5. Thinking about the UK overall, what is your impression of how immigration has changed over the last five years? If you aren’t sure, please choose the answer closest to your impression.

Over the last five years, would you say the number of immigrants entering the UK has… [SC]

% NET: Increased 71 Increased significantly 45 Increased slightly 26 Stayed about the same 20 Decreased slightly 4 Decreased significantly 1 NET: Decreased 5 Don’t know 5

Q6. And thinking now about your local area, would you say that immigration to the UK has…[SC]

% NET: Affected 58 Significantly affected your area 23 Slightly affected your area 34 Not really affected your area 31 Not affected your area at all 6 NET: Not affected 37 Don’t know 5

Open Europe | 51 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Q7. Irrespective of whether or not there is a current or specific need, how would you feel about immigrants with skills in each of the following professions coming to live and work in the UK? Would you strongly support their arrival here, tend to support it, neither support nor oppose it, tend to oppose it or strongly oppose their coming here?

TOTAL: Strongly Tend to Neither/ Tend to Strongly TOTAL: DK support support support nor oppose oppose oppose % % % % % % % %

Doctor/surgeon 70 37 33 17 5 5 9 4

Banker 31 12 19 35 16 14 30 5

Engineer 57 24 34 25 7 6 13 4

Care worker for the 52 22 29 26 10 9 19 4 elderly and disabled

Nurse 68 34 34 18 6 5 11 4

Academic/Professor 58 25 33 25 7 6 13 4

Waiter/waitress 32 12 21 32 17 15 31 4

Teacher 50 21 29 26 11 8 20 4

Childcare worker/ 39 14 24 31 15 11 26 4 nanny

IT/Computer 46 17 28 32 11 8 19 4 programmer

Construction worker/ 41 15 26 30 15 11 26 4 builder

Fruit picker 41 15 25 30 13 12 25 4

Entrepreneur/person coming to start a new 46 17 29 31 10 9 19 4 business

Cleaner 33 12 20 30 17 16 33 4

Any occupation in which the UK has a 67 31 36 21 5 5 9 4 skills shortage

Student 43 17 26 32 12 10 22 4

General jobseeker 22 9 13 27 20 27 47 4

*Net support figures used in report refer to total support – total oppose

52 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Q8. We are going to show you a series of pairs of statements expressing different points of view on immigration on a national level. Please move the slider towards the view you most agree with. [SC per pair]

STATEMENT PAIRS ON FIVE POINT SCALE, SLIDER TO START AT MIDPOINT. RANDOMISE ORDER IN WHICH PAIRS APPEAR AND RANDOMISE STATEMENTS WITHIN PAIRS.

1 - The NHS depends on 5 - Increased immigration immigrant doctors and nurses to 2 3 4 puts too much strain on provide healthcare the NHS

% 23 15 23 15 24 5 - Immigrants are doing 1 - Immigrants help fill jobs jobs that unemployed 2 3 4 British people don’t want to do British people should be doing % 20 16 23 16 26 5 - Easy access to 1 - Immigrants help to fill jobs in immigrant labour means areas where the UK has a skills 2 3 4 employers don’t invest in shortage training UK workers % 16 17 25 18 25

5 - Immigrants take jobs 1 - Immigrants help grow the 2 3 4 and make it harder for economy by creating/filling jobs British people to find work

% 17 18 27 17 21

1 - Immigration helps drive 5 - Immigration keeps economic growth for the UK, 2 3 4 some wages down, so which benefits everyone some people earn less

% 13 15 30 19 22

1 - The UK benefits from 5 - UK traditions and the increased diversity that 2 3 4 values are being diluted immigration brings by immigration

% 17 16 24 17 27

Open Europe | 53 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

ASK IF AREA AFFECTED BY IMMIGRATION: Q6 = 1 or 2

Q9. Now we would like you to think about how immigration to the UK affects you on a personal level.

We are going to show you a series of pairs of statements expressing different points of view of immigration. Please move the slider towards the view you most agree with. [SC per pair]

STATEMENT PAIRS ON FIVE POINT SCALE, SLIDER TO START AT MIDPOINT. RANDOMISE ORDER IN WHICH PAIRS APPEAR AND RANDOMISE STATEMENTS WITHIN PAIRS.

Base: All who feel their area has been affected by immigration (2,293)

1 - Immigration has brought 5 - Immigration means I have more doctors and nurses to 2 3 4 to wait longer for a medical my local hospital/GP surgery appointment

% 14 14 26 19 26 1 - Immigrants have helped 5 - Immigrants have changed to establish new shops, 2 3 4 my area so much, I don’t restaurants and businesses in recognise it any more my area % 13 17 33 18 20

1 - Immigrants have taken up 5 - Jobs in the local area are local jobs that could not be 2 3 4 much harder to get as a result previously filled of immigration

% 13 14 33 18 23

1 - Immigration means there’s 5 - Getting into good local more diversity in schools and schools has got harder, and 2 3 4 children learn about different class sizes are bigger as a result cultures of immigration into this area

% 13 13 26 18 30

5 - I know unemployed 1 - I know immigrants who British people in my local area work hard to the benefit of 2 3 4 who should be doing jobs my local area immigrants are doing

% 16 15 28 16 25

54 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope ASK ALL Q10. Many people think public services, like the NHS, schools and council services are under pressure and not delivering the quality they expect.

We would like you to consider what impact you think immigration has had on the quality of services, and consider whether immigration or other explanations, such as spending cuts or government decisions, are more important.

We are going to show pairs of statements. Please move the slider towards the view you most agree with. [SC per pair]

SLIDER WITH STATEMENT AT EACH END. RANDOMISE ORDER IN WHICH PAIRS APPEAR AND RANDOMISE STATEMENTS WITHIN PAIRS.

5 – The NHS is under strain 1 – High immigration puts because of our ageing stresses on NHS hospital beds 2 3 4 population and/or government and waiting lists decisions

% 24 13 23 15 25

1 – High numbers of 5 – The UK needs to train immigrants means it takes 2 3 4 more doctors and increase the longer to get a GP appointment number of GP surgeries

% 22 12 20 16 29

1 – Immigrants applying for 5 – The UK needs to build council housing means waiting 2 3 4 more affordable housing lists are too long

% 26 12 19 14 28 5 – Police need the right 1 – Immigration has led to 2 3 4 resources and powers to fight more crime in the UK crime % 26 15 21 15 23

5 – The UK needs to invest 1 – More immigrants has led to more in primary and secondary larger class sizes, which lowers 2 3 4 schools, and employ more the quality of education teachers

% 23 15 23 17 23

1- High levels of immigration 5 – The UK has an ageing has put a strain on social care 2 3 4 population, which means there’s for the elderly more demand for social care

% 20 11 21 19 28

Open Europe | 55 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Q11. Out of every 100 people living in this country at the moment, how many do you think were born outside the UK? If you are not sure exactly, please give your best guess. [ANALYSIS NOTE: 2016 ONS figure = 14%]

% NET: Overestimate (17+) 70 NET: Within +/- 2% (12-16) 10 NET: Underestimate (<11) 19 Mean average guess 33

Q12. ‘Net migration’ is calculated by taking the total number of immigrants entering the UK and subtracting the total number of people leaving the UK.

The government has stated its intention to limit net migration into the UK to ‘the tens of thousands’ of people per year (i.e. less than 100,000). In your opinion, is this target desirable or undesirable? [SC]

% Desirable 44 Undesirable 25 Don’t know 30

ASK WHO ALL ANSWERED UNDESIRABLE (Q12=2) Q12b. You said you feel this target is undesirable. Which of the following reasons do you agree with most (you can select more than one) [MC]

Base: All who feel the cap is undesirable (1,016) %

It needs to be more flexible – so the UK can choose the right sort of migrants 38

It is too high – the country needs less net migration 38

Net migration isn’t a sensible tool for setting a target, immigration would be a more accurate measure 20

It is not high enough – the country needs higher net migration 17

None of the above 5

56 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope ASK ALL

12c. In 2016 net migration into the UK was 248,000. In 2015 it was 333,000 and in 2014 it was 318,000. The government has stated its intention to limit net migration into the UK to ‘the tens of thousands’ of people per year (i.e. less than 100,000). Do you think the government’s target is achievable or unachievable? [SC]

% Achievable 30 Unachievable 50 Don’t know 21

Q13. After Brexit, the Government will be able to control immigration from the EU. Is it more important to you that the Government prioritises: [SC]

% Allowing immigrants to come to the UK as long as there is control to make sure they will contribute to our society, 56 economy and way of life.

Reducing the numbers of people coming into the UK 36

Don’t know 8

Open Europe | 57 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Q14. Which of the following policies do you think would it be right for the Government to adopt to help to control immigration? [SC PER STATEMENT A-H, RANDOMISE]

Right Wrong Don’t approach approach know % % %

It offers a fixed number of work permits to 54 26 20 immigrants every year

It sets a numerical target or a cap for overall 53 25 22 net migration

It sets a numerical target or a cap for overall 55 25 19 immigration

It allows high-skilled immigration, but sets a limit on the number of low-skilled immigrants 67 18 15 coming to the UK

It only allows immigrants to come if they have 71 15 14 a specific job offer in the UK

It allows immigrants to come and work, but restricts their access to benefits and public 65 21 14 services

It exempts students from its immigration 36 40 24 controls

It restricts immigration for family reunification (for example a foreign husband joining their 36 42 22 British wife)

58 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Q15. If each of the following policies were introduced by a government, would your concerns about immigration be reduced or not? [SC PER STATEMENT A- F, RANDOMISE]

Would not Would affect my Don’t reduce my concerns know % concerns % %

Greater investment in local public services 43 38 19 in areas where immigration is highest

Ensuring that immigrants register with a local council to know which areas of 47 36 17 the country are particularly affected by immigration.

Introducing more criminal background 74 18 8 checks on immigrants coming to the UK

Restricting immigrants’ access to benefits (such as child benefits) and services such as 62 25 13 council housing

More training for British people to ensure they have the right skills so immigration is 67 22 11 needed less

More training to help immigrants integrate into British society (i.e. compulsory English 53 35 12 language lessons)

Open Europe | 59 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Q16. At what point do you think migrants to the UK should be entitled to the following benefits and services? [SC per statement A-H]

Carousel [RANDOMISE]:

After After After living working working Should in the and and only be Immediately UK for paying paying available DK upon at least tax in tax in to British % arrival % 1 year, the UK the UK citizens working for 1 for 5 % or not % year % years %

Emergency 40 10 18 14 11 8 healthcare

GP services (non- emergency 24 11 27 18 13 8 healthcare) Healthcare for children and 25 9 22 21 15 8 dependents

Council housing 5 7 19 33 26 9

State school places for their 29 9 22 17 14 9 children

Child benefits 7 8 21 30 26 7

State pension 3 4 10 37 38 8 payments

Unemployment 3 8 20 35 27 7 benefits

60 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Q17. Imagine that in a few years’ time the UK succeeded in substantially reducing immigration.

This might have negative consequences for Britain. If the following actually happened as a result of lower immigration, would you consider reducing immigration to have been the right or the wrong course of action? [SC per statement a-g, RANDOMISE]

It was It was the the right Don’t wrong course of know % course of action % action %

It directly contributed to an economic 25 50 25 recession

It contributed to a situation in which you or a close member of your family lost your/ 23 46 30 their job

It contributed to a rise in tax, such as 29 46 25 income tax, national insurance or VAT

It contributed to a rise in food prices, 28 49 23 prices in the shops, and cost of services

It contributed to a rise in state pension age 31 44 26

It meant there were fewer doctors and 20 59 21 nurses

Other countries adopted a tit-for-tat measure, limiting the number of British 44 32 24 people who could go and live abroad.

Open Europe | 61 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Media consumption ASK ALL Q18. Which, if any, of the following newspapers do you regularly read, either in paper format or online? [MC]

% Daily Mail 23 Metro 16 The Sun 14 The Guardian 13 Daily Mirror 9 Daily Telegraph 9 The Times 7 Daily Express 6 Evening Standard 6 The i newspaper 4 Daily Star 3 Financial Times 3 Daily Record 2 Daily Post 1 The Herald 1 The Scotsman 1 Western Mail 1 Other 5 None of these 36 Don’t know 1

Q19. And which, if any, of the following sources do you use to gain information on news and current affairs? [MC, ROTATE]

% bbc.co.uk 49 NET: Social media 45 Facebook 39 Rolling news (e.g. BBC News Channel, Sky News) 32 skynews.co.uk 18 Twitter 16 Instagram 10 Snapchat 8 Other (please specify) 6 None of these 15 Don’t know 1

62 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Final demographics Thank you very much for taking part in this survey. Before you go, please answer a few final demographic questions…

ASK ALL Q20. On 23 June 2016, the UK held a referendum on its membership of the European Union. Did you vote in that referendum? [SC]

% Yes 84 No, but I was eligible to vote 10 No, I was not eligible to vote 4 Prefer not to say 2

ASK ALL WHO VOTED IN THE EU REFERENDUM (Q20=1)

Q21. How did you vote in the EU referendum on 23 June 2016? [SC, rotate]

Base: All who voted (3,341) % I voted for the UK to leave the EU 52 I voted for the UK to remain in the EU 47 Prefer not to say 2

ASK ALL Q22. Please think back, very carefully, to the last general election on June th8 2017. Which party did you actually vote for? Was it the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats, UKIP, for another party, or did you not manage to vote on that occasion?

% Labour 36 Conservative 33 Liberal Democrat 6 UKIP 4 SNP 3 Green 2 Plaid Cymru * Other 1 Can’t remember/refuse 4 Did not vote 11

Open Europe | 63 Annex II – ICM Poll Questionnaire and Results

Q24. Which of these best describes your ethnic background? [SC]

% White – British/English/Welsh/Scottish/Northern Irish 86 White – Irish 1 White – Any other white background 4 Mixed – White and Black Caribbean 1 Mixed – White and Black African * Mixed – White and Asian 1 Mixed – any other Mixed background * Asian or Asian British – Indian 1 Asian or Asian British – Pakistani 1 Asian or Asian British – Bangladeshi * Asian or Asian British – Chinese 1 Asian or Asian British – any other Asian background * Black or Black British – Caribbean 1 Black or Black British – African 1 Black or Black British – any other Black background * Other ethnic group – Arab * Other ethnic group – other * NET: White 91 NET: BME 8 Don’t know * Prefer not to say 1

Q25. What is your religion (if any)?

% Christian (including Church of England, Catholic, 49 Protestant and all other Christian denominations) Muslim 2 Buddhist 1 Jewish 1 Hindu 1 Sikh * Other 2 NET: Any religion 55 No religion 42 Don’t know/prefer not to say 3

64 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Q26. Do you speak any languages other than English at home/with your family? If so, which? [MC]

% NET: Any other language 15 French 3 German 2 Spanish 2 Welsh 1 Italian 1 Polish 1 Urdu 1 Hindi 1 Arabic 1 Punjabi 1 Cantonese 1 Bengali (with Sylheti and Chatgaya) 1 Lithuanian * Gujarati * Portuguese * Romanian * Scots Gaelic * Mandarin * Turkish * Malay (inc. Indonesian) * Tagalog/Filipino * Somali * Tamil * Persian/Farsi * Other – please specify 3 None – only English 83 Prefer not to say 1

Q27. What is the highest level of qualification you have achieved? Please only select qualifications which you have already completed. [SC]

% No formal qualifications 5 GCSE/Standard/O Level or equivalent 25 A Levels/Highers/IB or equivalent 18 Apprenticeship 3 BTEC/NVQ/HND or other vocational qualification 17 Bachelors degree/degree equivalent 23 Masters or other postgraduate degree 6 Doctorate 1 Prefer not to say 1

Open Europe | 65 Annex III – Public First focus group findings

Context Polls have consistently shown that immigration was a key factor in driving the “Leave” vote. But by having a set of extended conversations with voters, this research has thrown light on fundamental attitudes and values shaping these opinions and set out possible pathways for future policy. Focus groups are well suited to this type of work. Public First’s research aimed to probe the public’s fundamental, underlying attitudes to immigration in the post-Brexit context.

To give us a broad spread of opinion, four locations were used for this research; Long Eaton in Derbyshire, Rotherham in South Yorkshire, Darlington in County Durham and Stockport in Greater Manchester.

The groups were made up of C1/C2 regular voters, most of whom had chosen Leave last year. This is “just about managing” England - provincial, lower-middle-class and upper- working class. These people have jobs like junior civil service posts, clerical roles and skilled trades, like being an electrician or a firefighter. These social categories make up 48% of the UK population. But they dominate bellwether parliamentary seats in places like the Midlands and the North West. Ages were evenly distributed, as was Labour/Tory voting at the last election. The first set of groups took place in July, while the final three took place in the run-up to the Prime Minister’s Florence speech in September when she indicated that free movement would continue for a minimum of two years following Brexit in March 2019.

Conversations were split into four main sections. A warm-up set of questions asking about what people were most concerned about locally and nationally; a section asking about attitudes to immigration and Brexit generally, a section probing what kind of immigration system they would like to see for the UK and finally a section when the group was split into two and asked to design a new immigration system from scratch.

Each group lasted ninety minutes. Our objective was to work out what people’s concerns were with immigration, the extent to which this dictated their decision on Brexit, and what sort of immigration system they might accept in the future. We probed whether they would accept a more liberal immigration system than the one it appears the Government is lining up to create. As far as possible, we let people speak for themselves without leading them or excessively “educating” them in the room by putting strong, complex arguments to them early on. Initially, we let people talk as they wished about immigration and Brexit and only put arguments to them at the end of the group when we could be sure that we had heard their real views – informed or otherwise – in advance. At the very end of the groups, we asked people to split into two groups to design their preferred immigration system. This was to work out what it is they really cared about – and to work out what, if anything, they responded best to – both from the moderator and, more importantly, from others in the room.

We summarise the key findings and draw some conclusions below.

66 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Key findings Immigration was a decisive factor in almost all Leave votes. The most frequent answer when people were asked about why the country voted to Leave was “to take back control”. People had quite a pure sense of the importance of accountability and self- government. But when they were asked what they wanted to take control over, easily the most common specific answer was “immigration”.

Public attitudes and discourse about immigration aren’t really about immigrants. The overwhelming hostility to continued large-scale immigration, especially from the EU, relates only weakly to hostility to immigrants. We encountered racism or nativism very rarely. A better way to understand it is that immigration for our groups was associated with a labour market and benefits system they see as dysfunctional, and because of stagnant wages has failed to improve living standards for many people over the last decade. Our attendees were angry and perplexed by a system which seemed to endorse “idleness” among some benefit claimants while drawing in workers from other countries. On the one hand, they wanted those able to work to be forced to do so. But on the other, they also thought - and, importantly, expected - that turning off the immigration tap would make employers improve wages and conditions for British workers, rather than preferring to ship in what they saw as pliable immigrants willing to work for low pay and in inferior conditions. For most of our attendees, it was self-evident that more workers did not create more demand, but instead created more competition for jobs that already existed. The view of most economists - that immigration increases output – was not how they understood the issue at all.

There is widespread support for “useful” immigration, which is a better term than “highly- skilled” immigration. When it was suggested that we should allow in brain surgeons, the only negative reaction was that doctors should be able to speak English. When it came to low-skilled occupations, there was more support for bringing in care workers than there was for baristas working in coffee shops or warehouse staff. The concept for our groups of “socially-useful” meant more than skill levels in driving support for people being let in. But even here there was a strong sense that more should be done to train British-born workers. This was especially true when it came to nurses - where there was a very high widespread belief that abolishing bursaries had made it more difficult for British people to train for that job.

Cultural factors don’t matter as much as other ones – especially to the under-50s. Some of our attendees exhibited clichéd anti-immigrant views – but that was rare. Instead, the focus was on what people from across the world had to offer in terms of useful skills, though a willingness to integrate and follow British norms once they got here was particularly important in one area (Rotherham). Country of origin was hardly mentioned outside of specific worries about security. (Two of the groups took place in the days following the Parsons Green bombing).

People have a much more highly-developed understanding of immigration than polling suggests. Their rationale and discourse when discussing this topic is based on their direct experience. They talked using anecdotes, not data, but that is not to say that their views always lacked sophistication or insight. And the suggestion that Leave voters had been conned, or were racists, often provoked fury. But there was a widespread sense that no one had been truthful with them in the referendum.

Open Europe | 67 Annex III – Public First Focus Group Findings

Remain voters have more in common with their Leave voting neighbours than that which separates them. People expressed a desire for the Government to “get on with it” when it came to implementing Brexit. Sympathy for benefit claimants and a willingness to suggest that there were some jobs which British people just could not do was more common the higher the educational and social status of the attendee - which often mapped directly to voting Remain. But that wasn’t always the case. Controlling for age, education and occupation, attitudes were broadly similar. Generally, those with a higher education level - often Remain voters - were less likely to believe that benefit claimants were “scroungers”. But by the end of the sessions they had often been persuaded by other participants to change their views.

Concerns about pressure on public services and housing are real. The housing crisis is no longer just a London thing. Immigration is seen as having a large amount to do with this. But concern about public services is to degree tempered by the knowledge that “useful” immigrants play a large role in staffing the NHS.

People think the cap is impractical and unlikely to be adhered to. There was much ridicule of the Cameron/May “tens of thousands, not hundreds of thousands” position. People thought it was a meaningless soundbite. They wanted a reduction in numbers, but were also interested in a system that accurately reflected Britain’s ability to absorb immigrants at a given time, and whether those migrants had the right characteristics.

Support for something like an “Australian points system” or one based on work permits is overwhelming. The direct antipodean comparison is potent. Many of our attendees had family who had moved to Australia under this system, or had even attempted it themselves. Others had watched popular BBC daytime programme “Wanted Down Under” which follows British people considering doing the same. They saw the idea that migrants needed a useful skill or a firm job offer, the absence of a criminal record and an ability to speak English as key components of any new post-Brexit system, along with no right to claim benefits straightaway. The idea that migrants could become “a burden” provoked serious hostility.

Conclusions and recommendations There is little point in anyone seeking popular assent advocating continued free movement of EU movement in post-Brexit Britain. Our C1s and C2s represent the electoral bedrock of England. There simply is no chance of such a policy receiving support in key seats like North West marginals, in the East Midlands or provincial towns like Darlington. These people have seen wages stagnate and living standards deteriorate for the best part of a decade. They see immigration as a key feature of a labour market which is nowadays stacked against them and people like them. They worry that their children will have a less comfortable life than they did. It’s also highly likely that the Leave voters we spoke to will see transitional arrangements which perpetuate free movement as a betrayal. Unemployment may be near an all-time low but that has not translated into a belief that fewer people are abusing the system which these people feel they subsidise. Instead, it may have helped develop the sense that long periods spent on out-of-work benefits are a lifestyle choice, rather than an inability to find a job on the part of people who actually want one.

At the same time, pressure on wages and on living standards has made those who do work even more resentful of those who don’t. The current political economy of the UK is seen as a problem, not something which must be preserved.

68 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope We believe that the only way popular assent could be secured for continuing high– level immigration would be to neutralise the specific features of the current system which people most dislike. This would certainly mean using new-found Brexit freedoms to deal with issues such as migrants claiming Child Benefit for children who live in other countries, and tax credits.

But our attendees also wanted measures which impacted on British-born people too. Many saw immigration as something which had only benefited “shareholders” rather than wage- earners. By far the most important move would be an even stronger introduction of welfare conditionality for long-term British residents.

For immigrants, a new system which meant “you can only get out if you put it in” would be phenomenally popular, as would enforcing criminal records checks. Time and time again, the Australian points system was mentioned as the alternative they preferred in that ensured that only people “who can contribute” are allowed to come and work here. Those who did not how this worked in practical terms were quickly persuaded by those who did.

What went on during the groups

What is on people’s minds?

We began the focus groups with an open discussion on what people had seen and heard in the news recently – and the issues facing the country that they thought were most important. They were also asked how they got their news. By far the most important medium to them was digital, especially the BBC news app for mobile devices and social media, most of all Facebook. This was to ease people into the discussion and also to understand how they see the world. None of the groups had been briefed that they were there to discuss anything other than “current affairs”.

Groups generally said they had noticed major foreign stories such as floods, earthquakes and North Korean missile tests. Key local issues ranged from HS2 in Derbyshire to crime levels and hospital closures. The importance of the NHS was a very powerful, constant theme through the groups. But throughout the period that the groups took place, Brexit was seen as the key national domestic story which people were interested in.

When people spoke about Brexit in this initial phase, attitudes swung between exasperation and impatience. But there was no clear-cut divide between those who had voted Leave and those who chose Remain. Remainers appeared just as likely as Leavers to demand that the Government “just gets on with it”. There was also a wearied impatience about ministerial squabbling - several groups took place immediately after Boris Johnson’s Daily Telegraph essay and in the run-up to the Prime Minister’s Florence speech.

When they were asked about how they expected things to change for their family, for their area and for the country over the next five years the general mood was deep pessimism. People were worried about housing, the NHS, tuition fees for their children, utility and supermarket bills and the state of their local community - for example, the general tattiness of town centres. (“I’ve told my kids to go, if they get a chance to move abroad, they should take it”, late 30s woman, Rotherham.) There was little sense that things were getting better at any level or in any part of their lives.

Open Europe | 69 Annex III – Public First Focus Group Findings

Public attitudes to Europe There was one overwhelming answer to the question of why Britain voted “out” last year - to take back control. This was often said using exactly those words, showing both the abiding impact of the Leave campaign’s language and the way that it accurately built upon instincts which were already there. People spoke about the importance of controlling our own laws and of having accountability over politicians. (“We want to govern ourselves, we shouldn’t have politicians telling us what to do who we can’t get rid of,” man, early 40s, Darlington.) But when asked what they wanted most of all to take back control of, by far the most common answer was immigration. It was cited much more often than all other answers - such as “silly” EU regulations - combined. Immigration and the EU were seen as inextricably linked. When asked whether this was a vote against the EU or immigration, attendees saw the two issues as essentially the same; with a high level of understanding that freedom of movement was a fundamental aspect of EU membership. (“We voted to take back control so we could decide who came here”, man, late 50s, Stockport.)

When leavers were asked if they regretted their choice, not one of them said so. A perception that many saw their votes as racist prompted real annoyance and even anger. (“That’s the thing that really makes me angry - the idea that we’re stupid and we’re racist,” woman, late 30s, Rotherham. “I hate it - especially when someone on the telly tells me I’ve got it wrong,” woman, late 30s, Rotherham.) Asked whether they thought leaving would hurt the economy, the most common answer was that it might in the short-term. (“There might be a dip for a while,” man, 40s, Rotherham.) But any damage would be temporary and probably compensated-for by the common view that large amounts of cash would flow back into the UK. When asked specifically whether cutting immigration would hurt the economy, the universal answer from Leave voters was “no”. They were sceptical that there would be any long-term price to be paid. (“We always managed before. We used to do the jobs like tatey-picking ourselves,” man, mid 60s, Darlington; “How much worse could it be?”, woman early 40s, Stockport; “I think that if there isn’t that big pool of cheap labour coming in, then firms will have to put wages up”, man, early 40s, Stockport.)

The current immigration system - what people thought about it No one thought the cap was a good idea - neither those who were instinctively hostile to large scale immigration because of its impact, nor the smaller group who were more open-minded about the benefits of immigration but wanted a different system instead of a cap.

The first set of people were well aware of previous promises to reduce net immigration to below 100,000 and that the target had been missed every year since it was first mentioned. This fed into their general cynicism when it came to promises made by any government. The second set of people saw it as a blunt instrument which failed to reflect how the “need” for immigrants in certain jobs might change year by year. In other words, the cap is a policy which hardly anyone would now feel comfortable supporting. It is either never going to be delivered or will fail to deliver the right benefits. (“You can’t just set a number and then say that’s the right amount. You need to look at what people bring with them,” man, mid 30s, Stockport.)

When it came to what lay behind their concerns about immigration, culture and country of origin were the least important factors - apart from in one location, Rotherham. Instead it was jobs and wages which produced the most vehement responses. On wages, one very common response was a belief that large amounts of immigration had helped keep wages low wages. (“I haven’t had a pay rise in ten years,” man, mid 40s, Darlington, working in the private sector.)

70 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope If British residents on benefits had not already been mentioned, it came up when the groups were asked if their concerns were based around jobs. (“There are too many people that know how to play the system”, late 40s woman, Long Eaton; “I see it on a daily basis – [people] quite clearly taking the piss”, early 20s man, Long Eaton). This same response was in every group we held. (“If I wanted to, I could just sit back and claim benefits. There’s too many like that in my generation. There’s jobs but they’d rather get money for doing nothing,” early 20s woman, Darlington.) As one attendee - a woman in her late 20s - at the second group in Stockport said, “Our people are so bloody entitled”. Her husband was a manager at a giant distribution centre for an internet retailer. They were angry that so many jobs there - picking and packing orders - were done by Poles and Lithuanians when everyone knew local people who had spent years on benefits. To be clear: in these groups, welfare gradually emerged as the most important irritant in the immigration system for people. They argued that low-skilled immigration on the scale we have seen should not be necessary if we “forced” the “British” unemployed into work through a tougher welfare system. They also blamed an excessively generous system for attracting what they considered to be the “wrong” sort of people to Britain. (“I saw a programme the other night and this chap had come over here from Romania, was working on the black [economy] and was sending hundreds in benefits back there”, woman, 60s, Stockport.) In Rotherham, concerns about cultural impact were much more pronounced. We believe that this is because of two factors. Firstly, the continuing impact of the 2012 taxi driver abuse scandal in the town and the suggestion that up to 1,400 girls may have been targeted by abusers who overwhelmingly came from the local Muslim community, itself mostly Pakistani. The second factor is that South Yorkshire area has become a destination for Roma from A8 countries, most of them from Slovakia. Attendees at the Rotherham groups spoke with general hostility about “Slovakians” living in the area, who are believed to number at least 4,000. They were seen having little in common with more-affluent, better-integrated Poles and other central Europeans – let alone with the established local community. It would not be unfair to say that community relations have been and are tenser in Rotherham than in many places in England. Attendees in Rotherham were most adamant about the importance of immigrants integrating and “acting like we do”. They were also most insistent about topics like immigrants learning English and most worried about the impact on public services. But even here, there was no hostility to, say, Poles simply for being Polish. Several participants spoke warmly about the Poles they knew at work.

A future immigration system We then ran through a series of measures which and asked the groups to comment on whether they thought they were a good idea or not.

Suggestions that generally met a positive response:

● A points system ● Immigration to fill particularly important posts ● More high-skilled immigration, less low-skilled ● No welfare for new arrivals ● No entry without a job - ie work permits ● No entry without money

Suggestions that generally met a negative response ● Only from certain countries

Open Europe | 71 Annex III – Public First Focus Group Findings

The points system was the overwhelming favourite. People readily quoted the example of their own experience or that of relatives who had either explored emigrating to Australia or, less frequently, Canada where a similar scheme was believed to operate. There was also a large number of people who had watched the daytime programme “Wanted Down Under” which has run over 11 series of 24 episodes each on BBC One since 2007. Attendees liked the Australian system because it prevented immigrants from being “a burden” and forced them to be self-reliant. But there was support for any country which was perceived to be “tougher” and more self-interested on immigration. (“It seems odd that places like America and Canada can put a system in place…and restrict immigration… they only get the people they want”, man, 60s, Long Eaton.) There was generally support for the idea that immigration should be allowed to fill particularly important jobs. But that was mingled with demands for British people to be able to get those skills. The best example was nurses. There was widespread knowledge that training bursaries for nurses had been cut. “Why don’t we train our own people,” was a very common refrain. (“I think the nursing system is broken,” woman, 50s, Darlington.) But another important finding was the perceived “usefulness” of jobs being the key to the support which people showed for immigrants being allowed in to do them. So the suggestion that immigrants should be allowed to take jobs in a low-skilled area like social care got a much more positive reaction than a suggestion that they should be allowed to take posts such as in the hospitality industry. When the interviewer pushed back and suggested that allowing the Government to set quotas or assign points to particular industries or occupations would mean creating and funding a large bureaucracy to make such decisions, it did little to shake attendees’ views that this was the right thing to do. But it was also clear that no one in the groups had actually considered the actual, practical details of how such a policy would work. When pressed again, there was outright hostility to the suggestion that it was wrong of government to make such decisions at all, in effect that it was wrong to ask the government to actively manage the labour market. The assumption was that this was what the government was there for. They want and expect government to intervene to make the labour market work for them and their communities. A laissez-faire, internationalist approach would probably be the worst strategy that anyone seeking to shape this debate could adopt.

Last words Finally, we asked whether the UK would regret a major reduction in immigration. Virtually no one said yes. The next set of questions prompted similar responses made earlier in each session. Asked whether we needed people to work in cafes, warehouses etc., the most vehement comments related to the alleged idleness of British nationals themselves. Asked whether British nationals would actually do these jobs, the most forceful responses were that if benefits were cut, then people would have little choice but to do so. Very few agreed that cutting immigration will make the British themselves poorer, far more common was the view that it would actually increase wages and improve conditions. (“I think companies will pay more if there are fewer immigrants so we could be better off,” man, 30s, Darlington; “If we stop paying all these benefits, I’m sure we’ll be richer,” woman, 60s, Stockport). Finally, asked what message this sends to the rest of the world, the answer usually was that it would tell them the British were no longer “a soft touch” and we had caught up with countries like Australia and Canada which practice more supposedly- rigorous immigration schemes. (“We need to be responsible for ourselves,” woman, 60s, Stockport; “If you don’t like what we’re doing, then you have them,” man, 30s, Rotherham.) As to what message it sends to immigrants already here, no one suggested that they should “go home”. A common view was “if they’re here, they’re here”; “we draw a line.”

72 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope Open Europe | 73 Chapter Heading

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74 | Beyond the Westminster Bubble: What people really think about immigration www.openeurope.org.uk @openeurope