DOCSLIB.ORG

Contents Welcome to This Week’S Edition 1

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Contents Welcome to This Week’S Edition 1 PLANNING, ENVIRONMENT & PROPERTY NEWSLETTER 30 April 2020 INTRODUCTION Jonathan Darby Contents Welcome to this week’s edition 1. INTRODUCTION of our Planning, Environment Jonathan Darby and Property newsletter. It has been another busy week for the 2. PROMISES TO KEEP: RECENT group, with the launch of our DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF new webinar series “39 from 39”. The inaugural PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL Planning law episode featured Richard Harwood David Sawtell QC, Celina Colquhoun and Daniel Stedman Jones discussing three Supreme Court cases, whilst 3. AIR QUALITY AND LOCKDOWN: SHORT today’s episode featured Damian Falkowski TERM HOPE BUT LONG TERM and David Sawtell on the topic of “Exiting the CHALLENGES lockdown – property and development disputes Rose Grogan and their resolution”. They have proven to be very popular and we have found this new format to 5. RIVERS OF SEWAGE, BLOATED MARES be an excellent means of connecting with many AND REDUNDANT SEX TOYS – LOCK familiar faces, as well as some new ones. Watch DOWN BITES? this space (https://www.39essex.com/category/ Stephen Tromans QC seminars/) for further episodes during the weeks commencing 11th and 18th May. As ever, we very 6. TILTED1? much welcome feedback, as well as suggestions Celina Colquhoun for future topics for discussion. 11. SIZEWELL C, OPPOSITION AND In this week’s edition we have articles from David PLANNING PROCESS Sawtell (on recent developments in the law of Stephen Tromans QC proprietary estoppel); Rose Grogan (on the impact of lockdown on air quality and some issues that 12. CONTRIBUTORS PLANNING, ENVIRONMENT & PROPERTY 30 April 2020 Page 2 may be coming down the line once the current number of recent decisions, even where the fact restrictions are lifted); Stephen Tromans QC pattern in the instant case they are advising on (first, revisiting his thoughts on the likely rise in does not involve a family farm. waste and other forms of environmental crime resulting from lock-down; second, updating us as One consistent theme is that the courts have been to Sizewell C); and Celina Colquhoun (reflecting on reluctant to impose rigid rules on the application where we are with the tilted balance in light of a of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel, either in recent judgment of Mr Justice Holgate). We hope respect of establishing liability or when considering that you enjoy the read! remedies. The Privy Council considered the issue at the end of 2019 in Mohammed v Gomez [2019] PROMISES TO KEEP: UKPC 46; 22 ITELR 652. Mr Gomez and others RECENT DEVELOPMENTS had erected houses on land belonging to Mr IN THE LAW OF Mohammed and his predecessors in title. Even PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL in the absence of an actual spoken promise that David Sawtell the land would be conveyed to them, it was held that they were entitled to a remedy. In standing In Habberfield v Habberfield by in silence and acquiescing in their conduct, [2019] EWCA Civ 890; 22 ITELR the landowner had represented that they had an 96, Lewison LJ quoted the poet Robert Frost’s interest in the land. The Board emphasised at words in ‘Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening’: [26] that it was doubtful how possible or useful it ‘The woods are lovely, dark and deep, was to draw “fine distinctions” between different categories of representation: “once one has moved But I have promises to keep.’ beyond claims based on specific contractual rights, there may be no clear division between the nature The point made in that case at [33] was that, and quality of any alleged verbal assurances, and “Underpinning the whole doctrine of proprietary the conduct of the respective parties in response.” estoppel is the idea that promises should be The uncertainty of any assurances given may not kept.” The circumstances in which promises necessarily be fatal to a claim. are made about the disposition of rights in land outside of a formal legal instrument are protean. Unconscionability is central to the doctrine, even Unsurprisingly, therefore, the doctrine has been if its precise contribution is hard to pin down called upon in cases ranging from the assertion of (see, for example, the discussion by Martin Dixon an easement against a local authority (as in Joyce in ‘Confining and defining proprietary estoppel: v Epsom and Ewell BC [2012] EWCA Civ 1398, or the role of unconscionability’ (2010) 30 Legal Crabb v Arun DC [1976] Ch 179), a development Studies 408-420). In Habberfield, the claimant agreement with echoes of an overage payment had worked on the family farm all her life relying on the grant of planning permission (Yeoman’s on the assurance that once her parents could Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55; no longer run the business it would be passed [2008] 1 WLR 1752) or a dispute arising from an to her. In 2008, her parents offered to make her invalid option to renew a lease (Taylor Fashions a partner in the business. This fell short of her Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, Old and expectation as she would not have overall control. Campbell Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Friendly Society The Court of Appeal rejected the submission that [1982] QB 133). Recently, however, the law reports the refusal of this offer meant that her equity was have been dominated by its use as an argument in extinguished. There are cases where a claim has agricultural businesses run by families, following failed because of things that have happened since Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 and Thorner v Major the expectation was created and the detriment [2009] UKHL 18; [2009] 1 WLR 776. Practitioners suffered: in most of these cases, however, the should be alive, however, to the trends shown in a PLANNING, ENVIRONMENT & PROPERTY 30 April 2020 Page 3 claimant received something in exchange for their arises.” The remedy may not even be proprietary: detriment. Lewison LJ made it plain that promises in Habberfield and Guest, as well as the earlier case lie at the foundation of the doctrine. In Habberfield, of Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463; [2017] 1 the claimant had not abandoned her expectations FLR 1286, the remedy was money. and her parents had not changed their position in the belief that she had no further claim upon them. Agricultural businesses have been part of the fact This should be contrasted with the first instance pattern for a number of the most recent cases decision in Horsford v Horsford [2020] EWHC 584 on proprietary estoppel, but they are far from (Ch). The defendant attempted to assert an equity being its only arena. The doctrine operates even arising out of proprietary estoppel as a defence though, as Robert Frost wrote, the parties have to a claim arising out of a partnership agreement litigated “without a farmhouse near”. Whether the that was entered into after the alleged equity claim is for money or an easement, John Mee’s arose. Mr M Rosen QC sitting as a Judge of the observation in his case comment on Joyce ((2013) Chancery Division rejected this. He noted that the 3 Conv. 156-164) as to the “open-textured nature effect of a later contract on an earlier promise of proprietary estoppel and the lack of clarity on the is a fact-sensitive one, citing Whittaker v Kinnear question of remedies” still rings true. [2011] EWHC (QB) 1479. The agreement in this case specifically dealt with the property where it AIR QUALITY AND was alleged the claim to a proprietary estoppel LOCKDOWN: SHORT TERM equity had arisen. At [165], he noted that any such HOPE BUT LONG TERM rights were extinguished by the contract: “When a CHALLENGES person has rights in respect of property, and then Rose Grogan enters into a contract which is inconsistent with the Over the last few years, much continued existence of those rights, the person is government and judicial time estopped from asserting those rights”. has been devoted to how to achieve compliance with EU limit values for nitrogen dioxide in the One further point that emerges from recent case shortest possible time (the legal test in Directive law is the flexibility of the remedy available to the 2008/50/EC). The UK is still not compliant with EU court. Neither reliance nor expectation emerged limit values for Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2), 10 years as the dominant paradigm in Habberfield, where after the deadline for compliance. This article it was noted at [68] that “there was no clear looks at the impact of lockdown on air quality and point of division between different categories of some issues that may be coming down the line proprietary estoppel claims”. In March 2020, the once the current restrictions are lifted. Court of Appeal re-affirmed this approach in Guest v Guest [2020] EWCA Civ 387, where Floyd LJ at Over the course of 2019, local authorities were [48] reflected on the academic debate as to the looking at how to implement local measures determination of the remedy and the refusal of the to achieve compliance with EU limit values for courts to engage in it: “The courts have preferred Nitrogen Dioxide (NO2). Some local authorities had to identify its aim or task as the fashioning of a announced measures, with cities such as Leeds remedy that is appropriate in all the circumstances planning to implement their clean air zones by as of the case to satisfy the equity that has arisen, and early as January 2020. Lockdown and pressures so to avoid an unconscionable result.” In refusing on local authorities to divert resources to the front the appeal, he noted at [75] that, “the courts have line of the pandemic has caused significant delays asked, in a first stage, whether an equity arises, to clean air zones.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Proprietary Estoppel
    UNIVERSITY OF THE WEST INDIES FACULTY OF LAW REAL PROPERTY I Worksheet 5 2018-2019 Proprietary Estoppel LEARNING OBJECTIVES By the end of this lesson, you should be able to:- Explain and apply the principles governing the doctrine of proprietary estoppel Required General Readings: Sampson Owusu, Commonwealth Caribbean Land Law, Ch. 6 and Ch. 7 Kevin and Susan Gray, Elements of Land Law (5th ed.), Chap. 9.2, pp. 1196 -1256 Neuberger, “The Stuffing of Minerva’s Owl? Taxonomy and Taxidermy in Equity” [2009] CLJ 537. Timothy Fancourt, QC, “Are All Estoppels Alike” available from https://www.chba.org.uk/for-members/library/overseas-seminars/3-non-financial THE DOCTRINE OF PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL • The term estoppel is used to refer to circumstances in which a person is prevented or estopped from denying the truth of a particular matter of fact or law - Roger Smith, Introduction to Land Law (p.30). • A proprietary estoppel may arise in the following cases: (i) Incomplete gifts (ii) Reasonable (common) expectation of acquisition of right (iii) Unilateral Mistake The equitable doctrine of proprietary estoppel intervenes to “restrain (or estop) the assertion of legal entitlement on the grounds of conscience.”1 According to Walker LJ in Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch. 210 at 255, “[t]he fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all elements of the doctrine.” The doctrine of proprietary estoppel operates to prevent the revocation of a right held by one person (B) based on an assurance given by another (A) which the first person (B) relied on and was led to believe was permanent.2 1 Ridall, p.
    [Show full text]
  • Imagereal Capture
    ARTICLES Patrick Parkinson* DOING EQUITY BETWEEN DE FACTO SPOUSES: FROM CALVERLEY V GREEN TO BAUMGARTNER 1. INTRODUCTION In some areas of law there are too few legal norms to deal adequately with the disputes which the courts must resolve. Judges are found appealing for the intervention of Parliament. In other areas, there are perhaps too many. A given set of facts may be analysed according to a variety of different principles, many of which lead to different results. The problems arising from the property disputes of de facto spouses· may be thought to fall into the former category. It is not unusual for judges to call for the intervention of Parliament when they feel compelled to a conclusion on the law which is at variance with their views of the merits. 2 The perceived inadequacies of the law in this area have led to statutory intervention in New South Wales 3 and in Victoria. 4 It is apparent, however, when one surveys the variety of legal categories in which these cases may be analysed that there are indeed a large number of legal norms available to do equity when de facto spouses break up. Pettitt v PettittS and Gissing v Gissing, 6 which discussed 'implied, resulting and constructive' trusts,7 gave birth to a number of different interpretations based on the common intention of the parties. Lord Denning MR founded on Lord Diplock's speech in Gissing to develop a 'constructive trust of a new model'. Canadian courts have * MA (Oxon) LLM (Illinois), Lecturer in Law, University of Sydney. The term is used to cover all relationships which resemble marriages.
    [Show full text]
  • The Negotiation Stage
    Part I The negotiation stage M02_HALS8786_02_SE_C02.indd 17 7/19/12 3:47 PM M02_HALS8786_02_SE_C02.indd 18 7/19/12 3:47 PM 2 Negotiating the contract Introduction Lord Atkin once remarked that: ‘Businessmen habitually . trust to luck or the good faith of the other party . .’.1 This comment2 provides more than an insight into the motivations of businessmen. It also implicitly acknowledges a limitation of the common law in policing the activities of contractors: the law no more ensures the good faith of your contractual partner than it guarantees your good fortune in business dealings. However, this might not be an accurate description of the purpose of the law relating to pre-contractual negotiations. In an important judgment that was notable for its attempt to place the legal principles under discussion in a broader doctrinal and comparative context Bingham LJ in the Court of Appeal observed that:3 In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith . It is in essence a principle of fair and open dealing . English law has, characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed piecemeal solutions to demonstrated problems of unfairness. This judgment makes it clear that the gap between civil and common-law jurisdictions is exaggerated by observations at too high a level of generality. While it is true to say that the common law does not explicitly adopt a principle of good faith, it is as obviously untrue to say that the common law encourages bad faith.
    [Show full text]
  • Carlton Smith Et Al V Esther Oakley
    BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN SUPREME COURT IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (CIVIL) Claim No. BVIHCV2009/0201 BETWEEN (1) CARLTON SMITH (2) ROSA SMITH Claimants -and- ESTHER OAKLEY Defendant Appearances: Mr. Terrence Neale of McW.Todman & Co. for the Claimants Mr. Robert Nader of Forbes Hare for the Defendant ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 2010: February 01, 12 2010: June 28 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Land law – dispute between family – land owned by daughter- house built by mother and stepfather with daughter’s permission- fixture-whatever is attached to the land becomes part of the land- daughter is legal owner of house and land - mother and stepfather claims compensation – doctrine of proprietary estoppel –was proprietary estoppel properly pleaded – ancillary issues The claimants are the stepfather and mother of the defendant. With the claimants’ assistance, the defendant bought a parcel of land. She gave the claimants’ permission to build a house on her land. The house was primarily built to help offer shelter to the Montserratian refugees after the Soufriere Volcano in Montserrat had erupted. However, this plan never materialized. Instead, the claimants lived in the upper floor of the house from the time it was built until August 2007 when they vacated it so that the defendant and her family who were taking up residence in the BVI could reside therein. The lower floor of the house is currently being occupied by a tenant of the claimants. The claimants still receive the rent and are still paying the bank for a loan which they took out to build the lower floor of the house. The claimants claimed that the defendant had orally agreed to pay them rent/compensation at the rate of $400 per month from 1 January 2008 in respect of her occupation of the upper floor of the house which was built.
    [Show full text]
  • Remedies in Proprietary Estoppel Claims: Where Are We Now?
    Remedies in proprietary estoppel claims: where are we now? Will East 15 June 2020 www.5sblaw.com 15 June 2020 Remedies in proprietary estoppel claims An overview • For a claimant in a proprietary estoppel case, establishing an equity is just the beginning: the court can grant relief in a myriad of ways and the claimant may not get what they were expecting. • Lively controversy (academic and judicial) about whether the remedy should be aimed at satisfying the claimant’s expectations or compensating for detriment • Four recent major Court of Appeal decisions: Davies v Davies, Moore v Moore, Habberfield v Habberfield, Guest v Guest • Evidence that court can and will cut down remedy as compared with claimant’s expectations • Numerous factors which can influence it to do so www.5sblaw.com 2 15 June 2020 Remedies in proprietary estoppel claims Recap on estoppel principles • Pithy statement by Lewison LJ in Davies v Davies [2016] EWCA Civ 463 at [38]. • Need (a) assurance of sufficient clarity (b) reliance by claimant on that assurance, (c) detriment to claimant in consequence of reasonable reliance (d) unconscionability • Detriment does not need to be financial, so long as it is something substantial. ‘Countervailing benefits’ can be taken into account in analysing the detriment. • Elements cannot be separated from each other; essence of doctrine is to do what is necessary to avoid an unconscionable result: Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159 at [52] and [56]. www.5sblaw.com 3 15 June 2020 Remedies in proprietary estoppel claims The portable palm tree ‘In deciding how to satisfy the equity the court has to exercise a broad judgmental discretion… However the discretion is not unfettered.
    [Show full text]
  • Yeoman's Row Management Ltd V Cobbe
    Promises, Promises… Proprietary Estoppel after Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe Ben McFarlane (Reader in Property Law, University of Oxford) 1. Summary 1.1 The reasoning of the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55, [2008] 1 WLR 1752, if accepted by lower courts, will have a very significant impact on the operation of proprietary estoppel. In particular, it seems that in a case where B relies on a non-contractual promise by A that A will give B a right in the future, it will no longer be possible for B to invoke the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. B’s protection, if any, will instead depend on constructive trust principles or unjust enrichment. After setting out the background to the decision of the House of Lords, this paper examines: (i) the reasoning of the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row and its potential impact; and (ii) the questions which may arise where B relies on constructive trust principles or unjust enrichment rather than on proprietary estoppel. For further discussion see McFarlane & Robertson [2008] LMCLQ 445 (forthcoming) and the updates page of the companion web-site to McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart, 2008): http://www.hartpub.co.uk/companion/propertylaw/updates.html. 2. Background to the House of Lords Decision The facts and claims 2.1 The appellant company (YRML) was the registered proprietor of a freehold of land in Knightsbridge with redevelopment potential. The company was controlled by Mr and Mrs Lisle-Mainwaring, who held a long lease over one of the 13 flats on the property.
    [Show full text]
  • Proprietary Estoppel
    Proprietary Estoppel Key features PE is an equitable informal mode of creating any kind of interest in land. Ramsden v Dyson (1876), Kingsdown: “If a man, under a verbal agreement with a landlord for a certain interest in land, or … under an expectation, created or encouraged by the landlord, that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity will compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation.” Willmott v Barber, Fry initially laid out strict test (C makes mistake as to legal rights; C performs acts in reliance on mistake; D knows of the existence of his own inconsistent right; D knows of C’s mistake; D encouraged C’s mistake or abstained from asserting his legal rights). Oliver in Taylors Fashions said these are not strict rules – the modern broader question is whether in “all the circumstances … it was unconscionable for [D] to seek to take advantage of the mistake which, at the material time, everybody shared.” Cobbe and Thorner adopt this. PE, unlike other estoppel, can found a claim for an interest in land (a sword, not just a shield) – Crabb v Arun DC (1976) (Denning: “proprietary estoppel … does give rise to a cause of action”). PE can also be defence to O trying to enforce strict rights. PE is based on preventing unconscionable conduct - Taylors Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trsutees Co Ltd (1982) (Oliver: “equitable jurisdiction to interfere … where the assertion of strict legal rights is … unconscionable”) - Gillett v Holt (2001) (Walker: “the fundamental principle that equity is concerned to prevent unconscionable conduct permeates all the elements of the [PE] doctrine”) In a PE claim, after facts satisfying requirements arise, an inchoate equity arises (this entitles C to go to court); when C makes a claim, the court decides how best to use discretion to satisfy the equity.
    [Show full text]
  • Burrows 4Th Edn.Indb
    Consideration and Promissory Estoppel The Formation of a Contract 3 Consideration and Promissory Estoppel 1. CONSIDERATION In general, agreements or promises are contractually binding in English law only if supported by consideration. The requirement of consideration means that each party must receive or be promised something in return for giving or promising something. Consideration is, therefore, the legal description of the element of exchange and its practical effect is to ensure that gratuitous promises are not binding whereas bargains are. So if A promises B £1000, B cannot enforce that promise because B has provided no consideration (nothing in exchange) for it. It is traditional to defi ne consideration as a benefi t to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee. So in Currie v Misa (1875) LR 10 Ex 153, 162 Lush J stated, ‘A valuable consideration, in the sense of the law, may consist either in some right, interest, profi t, or benefi t accruing to the one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss, or respon- sibility, given, suffered, or undertaken by the other.’ This defi nition can be misleading unless one emphasises,http://www.pbookshop.com in line with the need for an exchange, that the detriment to the promisee must be requested by the promisor. So if A promises B £1000 and B, in reliance on receiving that money, buys a car, that may constitute detrimental reliance by B but B has not thereby provided any consideration for A’s promise. In contrast, if A promises B £1000 in return for B’s car (ie A requests the car), B’s transfer of the car, or promise to transfer it, is consideration for A’s promise.
    [Show full text]
  • 8 Proprietary Estoppel, Promises and Mistaken Belief
    8 Proprietary Estoppel, Promises and Mistaken Belief John Mee* Introduction he decision of the House of Lords in Yeoman’s Row Management Ltd v Cobbe1 represents a curious turn in the development of the law of Tproprietary estoppel. Taking its fi rst opportunity to pronounce upon the doctrine of proprietary estoppel since the seminal decision in Ramsden v Dyson in 1866,2 the House of Lords in Cobbe put forward an unexpectedly restrictive view of the scope of the doctrine. The case involved an experienced property developer, Cobbe, who had reached an agreement in principle with the owner of certain land under which Cobbe would pursue an application for planning permission in respect of the land and, if the planning permission were obtained, the land would be sold to Cobbe at an agreed price as part of an arrangement whereby he would develop the land and sell it on (although not all the details of the arrangement had been worked out). Both parties were aware that the agreement was binding only ‘in honour’. As it turned out, once the planning permission had been obtained through Cobbe’s extensive work, the land-owner sought to raise substantially the price Cobbe would have to pay for the land, ultimately triggering litigation between the parties. Cobbe’s proprietary estoppel claim failed in the House of Lords, although he did succeed in obtaining remuneration for his time and effort under restitutionary principles. While the actual result in Cobbe was regarded with approval by most commentators, the reasoning of both Lord Scott and Lord Walker (who gave the * Law Faculty, University College Cork.
    [Show full text]
  • The Bristol and Cardiff Planning, Environmental and Property Webinar 12 November 2020 Starting Shortly…
    The Bristol and Cardiff Planning, Environmental and Property Webinar 12 November 2020 Starting shortly…. Richard Harwood OBE QC David Sawtell Gethin Thomas Bristol and Cardiff webinar Glad to be sort of here Please use the Q&A box for questions Change of use Radical revolution? ‘Commercial, business and service’ CLASS A1: Shop (other than less than or equal to 280sqm, mostly CLASS D1: Clinics, health selling essential goods (including centres, creches, day nurseries, food) and at least 1km from a day centres similar shop CLASS D2: Gyms, indoor CLASS A2: Financial and recreations not involving professional services motorized vehicles or firearms CLASS A3: Café or CLASS E restaurant CLASS B1c: Industrial process which can be carried out in a residential area without causing detriment to the amenity of the area CLASS B1a: Office (other than A2) CLASS B1b: R&D of products or processes ‘Learning and non-residential institutions’ CLASS D1: Schools, non residential education and training centres, museums, public libraries, public halls, exhibition halls, places of worship, law courts CLASS F1 ‘Local community’ CLASS D2: Hall or meeting CLASS A1: Shop less than or place for the principal use of the equal to 280sqm, mostly selling local community essential goods (including food) and at least 1km from a similar shop CLASS F2 CLASS D2:Indoor or outdoor pools, skating rinks and outdoor sports or recreations not involving motorized vehicles or firearms Implications • From 1 September 2020 to 31 July 2021, permitted development rights enabling a change of use will continue to be applied based on the existing use classes, as they existed on 31 August 2020.
    [Show full text]
  • Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies, Second Edition
    LAW OF OBLIGATIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES Second Edition CP Cavendish Publishing Limited London • Sydney LAW OF OBLIGATIONS AND LEGAL REMEDIES Second Edition Geoffrey Samuel MA, LLB, PhD (Cantab) Dr (Maastricht) Professor of Law, Kent Law School University of Kent at Canterbury CP Cavendish Publishing Limited London • Sydney Second edition first published in Great Britain 2001 by Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, Wharton Street, London WC1X 9PX, United Kingdom Telephone: + 44 (0)20 7278 8000 Facsimile: + 44 (0)20 7278 8080 Email: [email protected] Website: www.cavendishpublishing.com © Samuel, G 2001 First edition 1996 Second edition 2001 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, except under the terms of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or under the terms of a licence issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1P 9HE, UK, without the permission in writing of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Samuel, Geoffrey, 1947– Law of Obligations and Legal Remedies – 2nd ed 1 Obligations (Law) – England 2 Obligations (Law) – Wales 3 Remedies (Law) – England 4 Remedies (Law) – Wales I Title II Obligations and legal remedies 346.4'2'02 ISBN 1 85941 566 0 Printed and bound in Great Britain PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION This book is, in some respects, a re-orientated version of our monograph Contractual and non-contractual obligations in English law published by Ars Aequi Libri in the Netherlands in 1992 (published also in a student edition: The English law of obligations in comparative context, 1991).
    [Show full text]
  • Australian Law Journal
    THE AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL VOLUME 84 January 2010 — December 2010 GENERAL EDITOR MR JUSTICE P W YOUNG AO PRODUCTION EDITOR CHERYLE KING ASSISTANT GENERAL EDITOR ANGELINA GOMEZ INDEX ALAN WALKER BA (Hons), DipLib THOMSON REUTERS 2010 Customer Service and Sales Inquiries Tel: 1300 304 195 Fax: 1300 304 196 Web: www.thomsonreuters.com.au/legal/ Email: [email protected] Editorial Inquiries Tel: 61 2 8587 7000 HEAD OFFICE Pyrmont NSW 2009 Tel: 61 2 8587 7000 Fax: 61 2 8587 7100 ISSN 0004-9611 Typeset by Thomson Reuters (Professional) Australia Ltd, Pyrmont, NSW Printed by Ligare Pty Ltd, Riverwood, NSW The Australian Law Journal — Vol 84 iii The mode of citation of this volume of the AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL will be: (2010) 84 ALJ TABLE OF CONTENTS AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL TABLE OF AUTHORS ........................................................................ v TABLE OF CASES............................................................................... ix AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL, VOL 84, No 1, January 2010 to No 12, December 2010 .................. 1-872 INDEX................................................................................................... 873 AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL REPORTS CASE REPORTERS ............................................................................. iv TABLE OF CASES REPORTED ......................................................... v CORRIGENDA ..................................................................................... vii AUSTRALIAN LAW JOURNAL REPORTS, VOL 83 ......................
    [Show full text]