554 Vol. 25, No. 3, 2005A the Middle EastSouth Asia, AfricaComparative and Studies of AND Duke University Press ITS NEIGHBORS I h tt n sa nCnrlAsia Central in and State The Militants: of Making The rcMcGlinchey Eric uei h 90.TdysIlms oeet yn en r a are means no by movements Islamist Today’s 1920s. the in authoritarian rule Islam Soviet against that mobilization for demonstrated basis the convincingly provided has Massell Gregory 1. Ap- Board. New Center Exchanges and on Research International the the Program and Security, Russian Kotkin, Studies to proaches International Stephen and Luong, Strategic Stephen Evered, for Jones Kyle Baev, Pauline Pavel thank Hanson, to wishes author The edr,frterpr,hv rudta h saitopsto a enatfiilycrafted artificially been has opposition Islamist the that argued have part, their for leaders, nytems eetrmne ht ept ee eae fSve ue sa ean a clear. remains is Islam lapse rule, Soviet of decades Asia. seven Central are in despite injured force that, were mobilizing dozens reminder powerful and recent died most people forty the than only more which to in Islam , of Tashkent, in banner March The the rule. applied authoritarian militancy, local with of struggle of their degrees array varying wide with Party, ut-Tahrir—have, a Renaissance Hizb Asia, Islamic and the Central Uzbekistan, In of opposition. Movement Islamic of movements—the language opposition potent unusually an provides Islam inBradLwsadpltclsinitSme utntn o xml,wieta the backlash. that Islamist write an example, sparked for has Huntington, culture Samuel Western scientist of political globalization and Western Lewis the Bernard in Islam. rian more, political and in variations more of and, causes Asia, root the South explain Africa, to Asia North seek Central I East, in world, Middle only not the to conflicts in interest state-society also theoretical in to but both import than of immediate states be and to theory authoritarian science mobilization some social Islamist in in differences militant these more Seeing and others. pronounced Islamist why more explain theories are these of explain movements few to mobilization, theories political Islamist devised in helpfully upsurge have differentiated recent scholars the rarely while different Thus, are many literature. oppose, science the social movements like the these in much states movements, authoritarian Islamist varied of markedly intensity and Variations and others. militancy, in extent, than regions the Asian in Central some in pronounced more significantly been htIlms oeet aereegdi eta sai h aeo h oitcol- Soviet the of wake the in Asia Central in reemerged have movements Islamist That coashv eoe osdrbeatnint h usino oiia sa.Histo- Islam. political of question the to attention considerable devoted have Scholars iingop r nraigytrigt h da fmltn sa nterefrsto efforts their political that in learned Islam have Kabul militant oppo- to of Kokand populations, from ideas Muslim Activists rule. the large authoritarian to with challenge turning world increasingly the are of groups regions other sition in as Asia, Central n 1 hti escer oee,i h esosbtentesaeadIlmhave Islam and state the between tensions why is however, clear, less is What rgr Massell, Gregory see opposition, equally Islamist Soviet-era can on opposi- more Islamist-based For here movements. Asian tion Central develop past I explain to logic applied be the and phenomenon, new etme 90 76;Sme utntn TeCaho Civi- lizations,” of Clash “The Huntington, Samuel 47–60; 1990, September Rage,” Muslim of Roots “The Lewis, Bernard 2. 1974). Press, University Princeton NJ: (Princeton, n eouinr taeisi oitCnrlAi,1919–1929 Asia, Central Soviet in Strategies Revolutionary and 2004 oeg Affairs Foreign ucd obnsadgnbattles gun and bombings suicide h urgt rltra:Mse Women Moslem Proletariat: Surrogate The 2(93:22–49. (1993): 72 2 eta sa political Asian Central tatcMonthly Atlantic , .St yas 1 ildi zeitn Terrorism Uzbekistan; in Killed Blamed,” “19 Mydans, Seth 3. fti c sntcmo oorpol It . abroad.” . . from people our exported to probably common not was is act method this and of character “The example, for ings, et antb xlie ihu reference without explained be cannot move- Islamist ments Asian Central in see we marked variation the mobilization, social to important context is international the while how, illustrate three, I section In contrast. in offer domestic-level I explanation the to compare hypotheses I leading two these section political In Asia. of Central spread in current Islam liter- the this for po- insights holds on the ature literature outline and the steps. Islam discuss four litical I in one proceed section I In this, Is- achieve political To in lam. variations local-level for nation the gain. is, movements Islamist rule militant this support popular and autocratic resonance greater more the lead- Asian ership, Central the its among and allies West newfound autocratic the to for problematically response And, a rule. is Is- Asia Political Central politics. in local lam decidedly of result is a however, varying movements, The Islamist the Asia. of Central spread strength in the Islam to political important of financial are foreign indeed and support, missionaries cultures foreign foreign of or variables, encroachment the international two they that these be find in I movements countries, Islamist com- a of Through parison . in have they than Uzbekistan violent—in more considerably and greater— be- proven have tensions Islam and why state the explain tween to seek More I variation. specifically, this In address others. directly in I essay than Islam this countries and some in state greater the is between conflict why into and insights militant more are few movements Islamist provide some why they is, That whole. undifferentiated an as opposition Islamist nevertheless treat they cause, the of part arguments capture may intervention civ- foreign of and clash ilizations these while however, lematically, ado the of said general, prosecutor Uzbek the Pakistan. Kadyrov, and Rashid , , Arabia, “extremists” Saudi foreign from of meddling the through hsatce nsm rvdsa expla- an provides sum, in article, This e okTimes York New 29 – 30 ,30March2004. March 2004 ahetbomb- Tashkent 3 .Ii. 5. Ibid., 5. in “Introduction,” Qutb, Sayyid 4. Road Prob- Idaaoi,I:Aeia rs,19) 6. 1990), Trust, American IN: (Indianapolis, h oprtv td fPltclIslam Political of Study Comparative The rgn n Clashes and Origins eta sa oiisadfrbodrinterna- relations. broader tional for and for politics Asian both Central presents finding this exploring implications by conclude the I four, section in Lastly, opposition. Islamist of militancy the and res- onance the both shape rule autocratic of degree in the differences how demonstrate I cases, and Kirghiz Uzbek the Comparing politics. domestic to rac—ainls,cmuim n de- gov- mocracy. and of forms communism, at Western man” ernance—nationalism, distinctly common of the hands saw of the they “humiliation what the to as ideal Islamic this contrasted e od vrothers.” over lords “some new men made a simply which introduced domination, of believed, form Qutb writers Sayyid Islamist like governments, nationalist postcolo- nial East’s Middle The servitude. independence brought postcolonial argued, they dom, hi etr n oitbces s“sterile,” “degenerate.” as and backers, “defeated,” Soviet with and Western along their governments, nationalist post- colonial East’s Middle the viewed Islamists century sa onre.PltclIlma rtcon- first as Southeast the Islam in and ceived Political African, countries. Mid- North Asian in mobiliza- Eastern, rule of autocratic dle of language opponents a for tion provided Asia, long Central to has recent though Islam, Political perdi oentimes.” modern have in that appeared ideologies chauvinistic and tionalist otne oisieIlmsstruhu the throughout world. Islamists inspire to have free continued others,” to become men men some all of . servitude the . from . life through of law, way Koranic Islamic “the to return a through that in hanged was 1966 government, Nasser Egypt’s by uho eta sa die t olwr:“The followers: its across advises Asia, active Central of for movement much Liberation), Islamist of an Party example, (the opposition. ut-Tahrir Islamist Hizb of wellspring the West remains the and Islam between contrast Qutb’s day i da,hwvr atclryhsbelief his particularly however, ideas, His . ubadhscneprre pointedly contemporaries his and Qutb 7 8 o ayshlr n sait to- Islamists and scholars many For 1950 inot nthe in Signposts a epnet h “na- the to response a was s 6 ub ena threat a as seen Qutb, .Ii. 8. Ibid., 8. 8–9. Ibid., 7. 8. Ibid., 6. 5 4 nta ffree- of Instead Mid-twentieth-

Eric McGlinchey 555

State and 556 clash of civilisations is an inevitable matter. . . . spread, however imperfect, of Western forms of Make the preparations required for the con- governance, the deep causes of political Islam flict, since the Capitalist Western civilisation are unchanging. Being a Muslim, by nature, de- has knocked you down militarily, politically and mands a rejection of that which is rejected by economically; however they will never defeat the Koran and a return to the dar el-Islam,the you intellectually.”9 World of Islam.13 Hizb ut-Tahrir’s clash of civilizations ideas are mirrored in much of the current West- Rejecting Fundamentalism ern literature on political Islam. Bernard Lewis, This clash of civilizations hypothesis has not Comparative both a scholar of Middle Eastern history and gone unchallenged. Edward Said, for one, an adviser to the current Bush administration, equates the clash’s depiction of the West and Is- Studies of writes in his 1990 article, “The Roots of Mus- lam to a “cartoon-like world where Popeye and lim Rage,” that political Islam is “perhaps [an] Bluto bash each other mercilessly.”14 Dissenters South Asia, irrational but surely historic reaction of an an- such as Said argue that not all view Africa and the cient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, Western society as antagonistic. Moreover, clash our secular present, and the worldwide expan- critics argue, not all Westerners share the belief, sion of both.”10 Lewis’s thesis, popularized by expressed by U.S. undersecretary of defense Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s William Boykin, that the Judeo-Christian world “Clash of Civilizations,” has influenced schol- will be triumphant because its God is somehow ars working in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid, for “bigger.”15 example, though he does not predict an im- Boundaries between , polities, minent clash, notes of the divide between East and civilizations are blurry and provide at best and West: “There is a palpable cultural vacuum imperfect explanations of political variation. at the heart of Central Asia, which cannot be Indeed, Middle East scholars John Esposito filled by consumerism or imitations of Western and John Voll remind, lest we forget our own culture.”11 history, that the West’s path to democracy, Curiously, at a time when many in the a journey that is still incomplete, required a social sciences and in society more broadly wholesale “reconceptualization of premodern are attempting to leave behind beliefs of pri- traditions.”16 Moreover, while clash theorists ar- mordial identity, scholars and a wide array of gue that “civilizations are differentiated from practitioners of political Islam continue to ar- each other by history, language, culture, tradi- gue that not just nations but entire civilizations tion and, most important, ,”17 political are defined by immutable characteristics.12 Ac- scientist Paul Corcoran observes of a perhaps cording to this view, Islam and the West—West- not so different Western civilization: “From ern secularism, Western consumerism, West- the perspective of twenty-five hundred years of ern democracy—are, by nature, incompatible. Western political thinking, almost no one, until Thus, while political Islam itself may be rela- very recently, thought democracy to be a very tively new, spurred by globalization, the grow- good way of structuring political life.”18 ing encroachment of Western culture, and the

9. Hizb ut-Tahrir, The Inevitability of the Clash of president has been seen “carrying a marked-up ar- 14. Edward Said, “The Clash of Ignorance,” Nation,22 Civilisation (London: Al-Khilafah, 2002), 63, www ticle by Mr. Lewis among his briefing papers.” Peter October 2001, www.thenation.com. .hizb-ut-tahrir.org/english/books/clashofcivilisation/ Waldman, “Containing Jihad: A Historian’s Take on Is- 15. “Rumsfeld Praises Army General Who Ridicules Is- clashofcivilisation.pdf. lam Steers U.S. in Terrorism Fight,” Wall Street Jour- lam as ‘Satan,’” New York Times, 17 October 2003. nal,3February2004. 10. Bernard Lewis, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” 16. John O. Voll and John L. Esposito, “Islam’s Demo- Atlantic Monthly, September 1990, www 11. Ahmed Rashid, “The New Struggle in Central Asia: cratic Essence,” Middle East Quarterly, September .theatlantic.com/issues/90sep/rage.htm. Lewis has A Primer for the Baffled,” World Policy Journal,Win- 1994, www.meforum.org. met privately with Bush political strategist Karl Rove, ter 2000–2001, 33. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Vice 17. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations,” 25. 12. For more on the academic side of this debate, President Dick Cheney. Emphasizing Lewis’s influence see Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations 18. Paul E. Corcoran, “The Limits of Democratic The- on U.S. foreign policy, the Wall Street Journal refers (New York: Blackwell, 1986). ory,” in Democratic Theory and Practice, ed. G. Dun- to the retired Princeton professor’s ideas as the can (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), “Lewis Doctrine.” As David Frum, Bush’s former 13. Qutb, “Introduction.” 13–24. Quoted in Voll and Esposito, “Islam’s Demo- speechwriter, noted to the Wall Street Journal,the cratic Essence.” rhp.SeEi clnhy Pyn o Patronage: for “Paying McGlinchey, lead- Eric Nazarbaev See and erships. Akaev authoritarian the opin- of public like Kazakh dis- overwhelming and an demonstrates example, Kirghiz for ion, of analysis My 21. www.meforum.org/meq. 1994, Democracy,” Only Muslim the Is Turkey “Why soci- Lewis, Bernard Muslim e.g., other See, eties. in than reform rather political exceptionalism of of harbinger a but example an case Turkish as the it address see do theorists Clash 20. The Thought,” Muslim Islam? Enlightened Liberal of Sources Is “What Filali-Ansary, Abdou 19. ietercretatoiainleaderships, reform. authoritarian democratic support strongly current their dis- like overwhelmingly they while Muslims, Asian oti h a nterror.” sup- on “stalwart war the his in for port Karimov, Islam defense Uzbek leader, U.S. the thanked example, Rumsfeld Donald for secretary February Tashkent, for his to distaste On visit this autocrats. shared same always these Western not the has leaders, world authoritarian their port democ- of supportive racy. is Muslim, though so- ciety, Turkish a values. antidemocratic everywhere of not predictor is Islam democracy, of antee Muslims.” of that history richness the the characterized and have diversity the “ignore to is undifferentiated an can into Islam distilled claim be to and strains thought, multiple Islamic within are Abdou there scholar writes, Moroccan Filali-Ansary as Indeed, Islamic and worlds. Western the between the divide is actuality, blurry in what, challenge empirical that many realities the overlook we demand ories the- civilization of world’s with Clash liberalization. Western experience political the protracted and ignore troubled to own theories is do, civilizations often of so clash as Mus- societies, in reform lim political of possibility the clude edrhphdmd opors nimprov- in progress rights. human ing no made Uzbek had the leadership concluded itself Department State aln ua ihsrecord” rights human palling “ap- Uzbekistan’s on experts Nations United Watch the briefed Rights Human after weeks only Democracy 20 dl,wieCnrlAin ontsup- not do Asians Central while Oddly, guar- no are beliefs Judeo-Christian as Just pre- to for instructive, are critiques Such n,a uvyrsac eel,Central reveals, research survey as And, 42:19–33. 14(2): ideEs Quarterly East Middle 24 ned eorc activists democracy Indeed, 22 hspas came praise This ora of Journal 23 ,March n fe the after and 21 civilization HwMsisVe eorc:Eiec from Evidence Democracy: Asia,” Central View Muslims reject Rose, “How Richard to dictatorship.” either endorse likely to or more democracy person a Muslim make of a not form “being does other that moreover, any and, than believe government” better Kirghiz is and “democracy that Muslim of of percent study 61 Rose’s that demonstrates opinion public Richard the Kirghiz and Kazakh democracy, Regarding of 2003). (PhD question University, Asia” Princeton Central Post-Soviet diss., in Change Regime upr’i a nTro, 4Fbur 2004, ‘Stalwart February 24 Terror,” for on War Uzbekistan in “USA’s Support’ Thanks Reports, International Rumsfeld Monitoring BBC 22. 2004 19 ora fDemocracy of Journal eso,i o oe ae nwihteWs and West the which in cases more, num- not if equal of, bers are of clash there the hypothesis, to civilizations move- conform Islamist seemingly that militant ments growing mul- of are cases there tiple Although Islam. de- political uniformity, fines for not Variation, distaste rule. equal autocratic and reform support democratic strong for expressed Central have Asia and South East and Middle the in Muslims the- ories, clash for and problematic Central Similarly and Asia. East South Middle the fundamental- in regimes even ist and illiberal with sided West has democratic When the outcomes. expedient, geopolitically political of determinative religion often is that evidence theories little is there clash both), inter- elide (and or liberalization relations political national of one is tion ques- the whether the of Regardless of Islam. binaries and West simple the than more world considerably complex a abroad, suggests Islam and reality States empirical political United the of in both spread abound the for hypotheses ayadpplrgvrmn nteMiddle the in government East.” democ- to popular United but and the Islam racy to see opposed region “not the as States in many that understand- able is it writes, Khan Institute Muqtedar scholar Brookings and scientist political tion, iiaycoup. military the in and acquiescence Haq, America’s Zia-ul Pakistan’s for support U.S. bia, Ara- Iran’s Saudi with relations in American Intelli- steady coup, involvement Central Agency’s the nondemo- gence of intervention: South- history U.S. and long a Central cratic to and point Asia East east Middle the in nsot lhuhcaho civilizations of clash although short, In 26 25 3(02:102–11. (2002): 13 ie hshsoyo interven- of history this Given web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document? NCmiso nHmnRgt, aur 2004, January Rights,” hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/29/global7127 Human the on of Commission Session UN Sixtieth the to Briefing Count- er-Terrorism: and Rights “Human Watch, Rights Human 23. 9d74a9d3b717d69358ccff3b35459c17. 09d8b10b74e5c07e6f8f9b90fc408315& 26.Ibid.,81. 80–81. 2003, Policy,” U.S. Democ- of Role Muslim The for racy: “Prospects Khan, Muqtedar 25. Grade Rights,” Failing on Uzbekistan Gives “U.S. Slevin, Peter 24. 1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA& 1992 ahntnPost Washington Algerian 1953 md5= 1Jnay2004. January 11 , ideEs Policy East Middle docnum= m= txt.htm. Eric McGlinchey 557 ,Fall

State and Islam in Central Asia 558 Islam comfortably meet and where the bound- eign Islamic activists are visible, working openly ary between the two is imperceptible. with neighborhood communities and, much If not a clash of civilizations though, what like Christian missionary groups, establishing then explains the recent increase in political Is- schools that incorporate religious teaching lam in regions like Central Asia and the Middle along with general education, a substantial por- East? In the remainder of the essay I discuss two tion of foreign aid, particularly aid to what state alternative theories to the clash of civilizations: leaders label “radical” Islam, occurs outside of (1) the idea that the growth of political Islam is public view. Thus, the measures that we do the product of radical intervention on the part have of foreign actors promoting Islamist move- Comparative of transnational Islamist activists, and (2)the ments are incomplete and, when reported by hypothesis that the upsurge in political Islam governments, often biased. Studies of is a grassroots response to local authoritarian The Kirghiz and Uzbek governments, as rule. The first hypothesis views political Islam well as the leaderships in Kazakhstan and Tajik- South Asia, as something that is alien, fomented by radicals istan, have all claimed that the activities of for- Africa and the from the outside. The second hypothesis—the eign “extremists” threaten domestic security. logic that I argue is driving the growth of Is- Kirghiz president Askar Akaev, addressing a Middle East lamism in Central Asia—sees political Islam as roundtable meeting on Central Asian security indigenous, varied, and instrumental—as a ra- at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzer- tional and powerful strategy for opposing auto- land, in January 2000, for example, concluded cratic rule. that foreign terrorists training in and their spread of religious extremism to Cen- Foreign Extremists tral Asia “is one of the key factors that may in- Evidence from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Cen- fluence stability and security in our region.”29 tral Asia, and now Iraq confirms that for- Also speaking at Davos, the Kazakh prime min- eign nationals are active in promoting a wide ister, Kasymzhomart Tokaev, added, “If Islamic spectrum of Islamist-based mobilization move- radicalism spreads throughout Central Asia, all ments. Al Qaeda, to take but one example, the peace plans will be endangered.”30 The has supported militant Islamist movements in Tajik president, Emomali Rakhmonov, address- Afghanistan, Central Asia, Lebanon, Jordan, ing foreign news agencies prior to his Decem- Malaysia, Pakistan,27 and now in Iraq.28 Thus, ber 2002 trip to Washington, DC, reminded his it is understandable that leaders the world over American hosts that his country has long been publicly denounce the intervention of foreign on the “frontline” and that “it took the Septem- Islamists in domestic affairs. What is less under- ber 11 events for the world to realize the massive standable, however, is the claim these leaders terrorist threat coming from the Afghan Tal- often make—that the spread of political Islam iban regime.”31 In his 2002 New Year’s Eve ad- is a direct product of foreign intervention and dress to the nation, the Uzbek president, Islam not a domestic response to local authoritarian Karimov, warned of a “huge evil—international rule. terrorism, extremism and fanaticism, which has Gauging the extent of foreign Islamic ac- been posing a threat to our peaceful and calm tivity in a country is difficult. While many for- life over the past few years.”32

27. Steven Simon, “The New Terrorism,” Brookings 30. Ibid. 32. “Uzbekistan Keeps Threat of Terrorism from Review 21 (2003): 18–24. the Door—Leader’s New Year Message,” BBC Mon- 31. Luc Perrot, “Help Us or Face More Terrorism, itoring International Reports, 1 January 2003 (from 28. Walter Pincus, “Terror Suspect’s Ambitions Worry Tajikistan’s Rakhmonov Tells West,” Agence France Uzbek Television first channel, 31 December 2002), U.S. Officials; Zarqawi May Be Looking beyond Iraq,” Presse, 2 December 2002, web.lexis-nexis.com/ web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document? m= Washington Post,3March2004. universe/document? m= a63e45d912ff5f617788ed407f52ef94& docnum= a59a0143b54482d9bca3d06c12616f62& docnum= 29. Konstantin Pribytkov and Alexander Stepanenko, 1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA& md5= 8&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA& md5= “Kyrgyz, Kazakh Statesmen Speak of Religious Ex- 9a2bad580e11dd779c85cba8e5e2cd9a. d4700676a83b77da1e07856191e0033c. tremism Spread,” Itar-Tass, 28 January 2000, web. lexis-nexis.com/universe/document? m= 12a9aab00d7f572346250fde93da48a9& docnum= 1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA& md5= 3a1e47342d890ed912393a9b6be8bf0f. oetcRoso oiia Islam Political of Roots Domestic the and Variation ie nSuiAai.I eta sa oee,the however, Asia, Central In term Arabia. Saudi prac- Islam in Sunni ticed of form strict the is Wahhabism 33. .htm. www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24443 2003,” port La- Re- Freedom and Religious Rights International “Uzbekistan: Human bor, State, of Department U.S. 34. extremism. h oetcroso saitopposition. Islamist explanation— of roots domestic causal the alternative to forced an be confront would leaders blamed, Asian be Central cannot then meddling foreign if Af- all, intervention. ter outside with Islam political growth in the link to is gov- pronouncements these ernment of intent the course, is Of Central society. in Asian however, admirers won establish, has Islam not political why do What numbers Asia. Central these in hold taken have Islam politi- cal of ideas foreign that demonstrate arrests Islam. extremist foreign, depicted is as press, state the in what, to adherents activists “Wahhabis”— label leaders of Asian Central arrests whom widespread by backed been igo–ae xrms ru ibut- Hizb group United Tahrir. and extremist Jordan the Kingdom–based thought of sympathizers are country’s be prisoners to the political of thousand thousand six five estimated an r w huadHz tThi ciit nits in there activists country. ut-Tahrir that Hizb estimates thousand two Affairs are Religious on tee ol xetti epnet emr rless or more be to response this expect we would secularism, Western encroaching re- to a argues, sponse Lewis Bernard as indeed, Is- were political lam if is, That Asia. similar Central have across affects things would all structures expect, these that would politi- equal, we of such, As rise Islam. the cal for explanations roots, structural their at for- are, and arguments intervention civilizations eign of would clash theory the either Both predict. than consider- complex is more Islam political ably real- Asian local for- Central of the and ity hypotheses, civilizations intervention of eign clash for Troubling ahzr eearse vratnmnhspan ten-month in a over arrested were pathizers 2002 Wahhabi lhuha etacuemaue these measure, crude a best at Although have moreover, pronouncements, These 34 36 . 35 nTajikistan In ssotadfrayfr freligious of form any for shorthand is nKrysa,teSaeCommit- State the Kyrgyzstan, In 142 ibu-arrsym- ut-Tahrir Hizb 33 nUzbekistan, In .htm. www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/27209 2003,” port La- Re- Freedom and Religious International Rights “Kyrgyzstan: bor, Human State, of Department U.S. 36. .htm. www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24437 2003,” Re-port Freedom La- Religious and International Rights “Tajikistan: Human bor, State, of Department U.S. 35. ysa sagal mn h es cieo all of active least the among arguably Kyr- is in gyzstan movement Islamist the states. time, same Asian the Central At the of authoritarian the least Kyrgyzstan, in the active most been been ex- have not ample, for groups, has opposition this Prodemocracy case. Asia, Curi- Central increased? in rule ously, authoritarian not as would crease Indeed, odd. seem all glance first might at rule authoritarian of degree the and tion society. will in Islam be political pronounced more the the local state, authoritarian to more response the a rule: foremost authoritarian Central and first in are movements Asia Islamist argue, specif- I More ically, states. Asian Central individual of politics domestic reality—the local consid- more and erably salient more a mediated have ables vari- the structural these in however, Crucially, movements region. Islamist of popularity the to contributed West- indeed with have uneasiness culture consumer real ern a pros- as and well political ideas as of Foreign elytizing spread Asia. the Central in on Islam role causal no have had intervention foreign and cultures flicting intervention. leaderships foreigner restricted whose most have states Asian Central Soviet post- move- those among Islamist marked most of been has growth opposite ments the the true; Just proven free. has most been have foreign where actors areas those been in Islam pronounced political most of resonance the has more- over, Neither, complete. nor uniform Cen- been neither has The culture Western reality. of rejection Asian Asian tral Central by free- out is however, most borne predictions, the these of enjoy Neither doms. those foreigners in where strongest be areas to would Islam we prose- political Islamists, and expect foreign aid radical of by product lytizing a were po- Islam if litical Similarly, society. Islamic across uniform poiin o utIlms poiin in- opposition, Islamist just not opposition, h aslln ewe saitopposi- Islamist between link causal The con- that importantly, mean, not does This

Eric McGlinchey 559

State and Islam in Central Asia 560 Islamist opposition movements in Central Asia. Opposition movements gravitate to those In Uzbekistan, the exact opposite prevails— strategies that they perceive as most effective. democracy-based opposition movements are Democratic strategies are viable in authoritar- weak while Islamist opposition movements are ian states that allow some degree of dialogue strong. and contestation. Through dialogue and po- These varying forms of opposition, as I de- litical contestation opposition movements can tail in section three, result from the varying na- nurture the hope that, someday, they too may tures of Uzbek and Kirghiz authoritarian rule. win power. In states where political contesta- More specifically, domestic opposition groups tion is brutally suppressed, however, opposition Comparative adjust their strategies according to the degree movements maintain no such hope. Instead, of contestation allowed under a given authori- revolutionary change is seen as the only viable Studies of tarian regime. In authoritarian states where lim- strategy for effecting political change. Thus, ited contestation is allowed, where opposition while the clash of civilizations and the interven- South Asia, groups can find voice in Parliament or in the tion of foreign activists have, perhaps, provided Africa and the press, these opposition groups are more likely the ideas and ideology of political Islam, the to see their interests as best served by lobby- prominence of political Islam is by no means Middle East ing for incremental reform and liberalization uniform across the region but, rather, varies in within the existing institutional context. In to- response to the local nature of authoritarian talitarian states, in contrast, where contestation rule.40 is not allowed and where the opposition is fully disenfranchised from the political system, op- Contestation and position movements are more likely to press for Political Islam in Central Asia revolutionary change.37 More specifically, the No Central Asian state is democratic. In its an- Islamist call to revolution will find greater res- nual Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Free- onance in highly authoritarian regimes that ex- dom House has consistently rated all Central clude all political competition within state insti- Asian states as not free.41 Within this broad cat- tutions and the press than in states that, even to egory of not free or not democratic, however, sig- a limited extent, allow some contestation.38 nificant variation exists in the nature of authori- The transitions literature, to the extent tarian rule and, most important, in the extent of that it does address nondemocratic politi- political contestation. For example, the Kirghiz cal outcomes, tends to lump these outcomes and, more recently, the Tajik leaderships have into a nondifferentiated residual category of been careful to allow the opposition some de- “authoritarianism.”39 As I illustrate here in the gree of voice, particularly in the national parlia- case of Central Asia, however, nondemocratic ments and in the news media. The Uzbek lead- states, like democratic states, vary and these ership, in contrast, has effectively barred the variations have profound consequences. More domestic opposition from all government of- specifically, I argue that variations in the type of fices, from national and local newspapers, and authoritarian rule lead to variations in the na- from the electronic media. As I next illustrate, ture of domestic political opposition. these differing degrees of political contestation

37. By totalitarian states, I mean states in which 39. Several authors have faulted the transitions liter- however, Hafez’s study focuses exclusively on Is- power is monopolized by a single party and rein- ature for failing to address nondemocratic outcomes. lamist opposition. Thus, although Hafez and I stress forced by absolute control over the media and the See, e.g., Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transi- similar dynamics of repression and political exclu- military. For more on the totalitarian state, see Carl tion Paradigm,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2002): 5–21; sion, my findings suggest that Islamist opposition— Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dicta- and Michael McFaul, “The Fourth Wave of Democracy be it moderate or militant—is unlikely in regimes torship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1965). and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the such as Kyrgyzstan that allow some degree of po- Postcommunist World,” World Politics, January 2002, litical participation and public voice. Here, demands 38. For a similar argument, see Jeff Goodwin, No 212–44. for electoral reform and political liberalization, rather Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Move- than Islamist ideology, pattern social mobilization ments, 1945–1991 (New York: Cambridge University 40. Mohammed M. Hafez forwards a similar causal- and opposition. Press, 2001). ity in his compelling study of militant opposition in Algeria and Egypt (Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Mus- 41. For more on the Freedom House scores and Free- lims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic dom House’s methodology, see www.freedomhouse World [Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003]). In con- .org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls. trast to the opposition groups analyzed in this article, a,2 ac 03,8. 2003), (War- March 20 2003” saw, February 2 Referendum Constitutional Republic “Kyrgyz Report, Assessment Human Political Rights and Institutions Democratic Eu- for in Co-operation quoted rope/Office and Constitution, Security Kirghiz for Organization the in of 63.2 Article 43. parliament. active more a tolerate either or will promote executive new Kyrgyzstan’s in- that little yet dication as is there Bakiev, Kurmanbek replace- with his ment to and Akaev led Askar President which of uprisings, ousting the 2005 March the Despite 42. Islam Political and Ethnicity, Kyrgyzstan—Contestation, euisblne otepltclopposition. political these the to of belonged one-third deputies than more affiliation, party members thirty-three politi- the the of and of competition Thus, dissent. for cal venue a does compari- nevertheless provide in president, the pale of those powers to son formal its while exam- for ple, po- Parliament, of The degree contestation. admirable litical an what, is afford Asia, press, Central Kirghiz for the as well as ment, we h Primn]adohrbace of power.” branches state other and [Parliament] the tween be- disagreement insurmountable an crisis by another of caused event the in or Minister; the of Prime office the to nominee a the accept to in liament] [Par- the referendum; by refusals a [subsequent] three pres- by of event the decided so by “If dismissed ident: be can that Parliament stipulates the Constitution Kirghiz amended rl oa h igi eiltr evsa the president. at the of serves pleasure legislature Kirghiz the Today con- trol. political executive-dominated to balances way and gave exec- checks to Kyrgyzstan’s power, counterweight utive strong a proved early ment the liberaliza- past of in period the tion brief over a Following authoritarian more decade. less become than de- has to Asia, rather likely Central most in and appeared mocratize West that the country of the darling the once Kyrgyzstan, Kyrgyzstan. in muted movement opposition comparatively Islamist Islam the to political and of Uzbekistan rise in the to central been have ieeeuierl rmwti h omlin- formal the within from criti- rule can executive they cize because MPs, opposition These infiaty oee,teKrhzparlia- Kirghiz the however, Significantly, 2000 – 43 2005 alaetwoepesda expressed who Parliament 1990 nwihteParlia- the which in s 42 ned h recently the Indeed, 02 www.navi.kz/oldnavi/articles/war240102a .shtml. 2002, Criticism”), for kritiku” Ulugbek za (“Payment “Rasplata see Otorbaev, case, Kubat Beknazarov and the Babkulov on more For 46. legislature. expense the the of at powers to won presidential content strong appears has maintain branch, it executive the that of now control opposition, Kyrgyzstan’s 45. 20. 2000), (Warsaw, April 2000” 10 March Parliamentary 12 and February Republic 20 Elections, “Kyrgyz OSCE/ODIHR, 44. 44 aldt ics enzrvsimprisonment, Beknazarov’s discuss an to At deputies called parliamentary society. of in Kirghiz meeting both in emergency sparked and it Parliament protest of the wave the is how- ever, arrest, Beknazarov’s surrounding stances ad oCiawstnaon otreason. to tantamount was China border- to disputed lands cede to decision president’s January 2002 in imprisoned was example, one take to be would that Uzbekistan. influence in unimaginable political are a oppositionists Kirghiz be- ensured when though, Even bars, activities. hind their for jailed been been have oppositionists not Kirghiz several has risk; without rule executive challenging licly lddta enzrvsars a politically con- was motivated. State arrest of Beknazarov’s Erke- Department that cluded Abdygany U.S. the Parliament, and baev, Kirghiz the speaker of the both charges, official in these lenging work his to mid- back the with dating power,” Beknazarov of charged “abuses officially state The n o hlsl revolution. wholesale the for ing press- in Uzbekistan, in as opposition in- Islamist than, of case existing rather the to framework sought within stitutional not from than change often achieve more has op- political position Kirghiz the investment, this institutions. Given state in existing investment of acceptance opposition’s its and Kirghiz the to led political national the debate. in voice real a maintains opposition parliamentary this that ensure over, more- outlets, media do Kirghiz Uzbekistan Independent not. in colleagues their that political a efficacy enjoy government, state of stitutions alaetdpt zme Beknazarov, Azimbek deputy Parliament hsaiiypbil ocnetpwrhas power contest to publicly ability This fe eetdysaigta h Kirghiz the that stating repeatedly after 1990 Navigator 47 oetligta h circum- the than telling More sargoa rsctr Chal- prosecutor. regional a as s 4January 24 , ay20,www.eurasianet.org. 2002, Jan- uary 9 Kyrgyzstan,” in Struggle Executive-Legislative on Attention Focuses Arrest “MP’s Khamidov, see Erke- Alisher charges, Beknazarov on the more of interpretation For baev’s krikiku.” and za Babkulov “Rasplata see Otorbaev, Beknazarov, against offi- charges the cial on more For www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18374.htm. Human 2003), Democracy, March 31 of Labor, Bureau and Rights, State, of Dept. Practices—2002” (U.S. Republic, Rights “Kirghiz Human on see interpreta- Reports case, State’s Country Beknazarov of the Department of tion U.S. the For 47. 45 rne,pub- Granted, 46

Eric McGlinchey 561

State and Islam in Central Asia 562 opposition MP Topchubek Turganaliev repeat- the group’s extremist views. Nevertheless, the edly called on President Akaev to resign. Par- radical group remains active, and, in 2000,one liamentary deputy Doronbek Sadyrbaev added hundred fifty of its members were temporar- that if Beknazarov were to remain in jail, all MPs ily detained.52 In 2001 this number increased should “leave the country before it is too late.”48 to four hundred.53 In the first eight months Matching the opposition MPs’ indignation in of 2003, the Kirghiz state began investigations the Parliament building, Beknazarov support- into a further 1,650 Islamist “agitators.”54 The ers gathered outside and warned that if the op- overwhelming majority of these arrests and in- position deputy were not freed, they were pre- vestigations have been concentrated in the Fer- Comparative pared for “even more decisive action.”49 gana Valley, among the Uzbek populations of The protestors’ warnings proved the Jalalabad and Osh. Studies of true. Demonstrations quickly spread from the Of course, incarceration rates alone do capital to other regions, and, on 17 March not establish that Islamist movements have South Asia, 2002, Kirghiz interior police shot and killed gained in popularity. The level of Islamist op- Africa and the five Beknazarov supporters in the southern position, for example, may have remained con- Jalalabad oblast. Confronted with growing con- stant between 1999 and 2002 while the Kirghiz Middle East demnation for the killings and fearing further state simply became more aggressive in its pur- protests, the Akaev government released Bek- suit of perceived agitators. Hizb ut-Tahrir and nazarov on 19 March. Restored to his seat in other Islamist opposition groups, alas, do not Parliament and now the head of a new coalition, release their member lists. As such, establish- the Movement for the Resignation of (Pres- ing a definitive measure of changes in the ident) Akaev, Beknazarov and his colleagues Islamist opposition is difficult. Nevertheless, would lead a popular opposition movement despite these imperfect measures, that Islamist that culminated in the March 2005 protests and opposition movements have gained more sup- Akaev’s subsequent resignation.50 port among Kyrgyzstan’s minority Uzbek pop- As the Beknazarov example illustrates, ulation is increasingly clear. Just as cross-state Kirghiz opposition movements can effectively variations in political Islam in Central Asia can challenge authoritarian rule using the indepen- be explained by differences in the nature of au- dent media and existing political institutions. thoritarianism, so too is within-state variation Revolutionary, antiestablishment strategies, for the product of local differences in autocratic example, the strategies of political Islam, are, rule. More directly stated, the Akaev regime as a result, of little attraction to mainstream proved far less welcoming of minority Uzbek Kirghiz opposition. This is not to say, however, political contestation than it has been of ethnic that Islamist movements do not exist in Kyrgyzs- Kirghiz contestation. tan. Indeed, political Islam has made inroads Kyrgyzstan’s minority Uzbek’s are dispro- among some portions of Kirghiz society. portionately underrepresented in state institu- The Kirghiz government estimates that tions. Ethnic held only 5 out of the five thousand members of the radical Hizb 2000–2005 Parliament’s 105 seats, and the Uz- ut-Tahrir Islamist party are active in southern bek language, unlike Russian, is not an offi- Kyrgyzstan.51 Like other governments in Cen- cial state language—this despite the fact that tral Asia, Russia, and Germany, the Kirghiz gov- Uzbeks, who constitute more than 20 percent ernment has banned Hizb ut-Tahrir because of of the Kirghiz population, are a larger minority

48. Babkulov and Otorbaev, “Rasplata za krikiku.” 52. Charles Carson, “Kyrgyzstan: Hizb ut-Tahrir Ac- cused of Increased Militancy,” Radio Free Europe/Ra- 49. Ibid. dio Liberty, 3 March 2003. 50. For more on the Movement for the Resignation 53. Ibid. of Akaev, see Charles Carlson, “Kyrgyzstan: Embattled Opposition Mulls Election Strategy,” Radio Free Eu- 54. A. Galich, “Islam . . . s listovkoi” (“Islam . . . with a rope, Radio Liberty, 25 August 2003. Leaflet”), Slovo Kyrgyzstana (Word of Kyrgyzstan), 15 August 2003. 51. Roman Streshnev, “Voenno-politicheskoe obzore- nie” (“Political Military Review”), Krasnaia zvezda (Red Star), 28 October 2003. web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document? ayo ol racss 4Mrh20 (from 2000 March Sum- 24 Broadcasts, BBC Ethnic World Parliament,” “Age, of see mary Newly-Elected data, of parliamentary Profile the For 55. nteehiiyadcmoiino h Kirghiz the of composition and ethnicity figures the on For bb210cda42598b2fae4953e73dd1e7c9. 668662b6999452ece1a3ccff6b7af962& 1&wchp=dGLbVlb-zSkVA& er ae,ti ubrhddopdto dropped had Three number percent. speech. this of later, freedom years enjoyed they that n rwn saitopsto mn minor- among opposition Islamist growing population and titular broader the among position state. the of overthrow to seek that move- ments Islamist to ut-Tahrir, Hizb as such groups revolutionary to drawn insti- increasingly are political tutions, existing within from change polit- ical achieve to opportunities few ethnic with is Accordingly, Uzbeks, it population. titular than the Uzbeks for ethnic Kyrgyzstan’s for se- vere more is rule Authoritarian is understandable. Islam political the of to ideology Kyr- attracted antiestablishment is Southern population that Uzbek gyzstan’s parliament, in national underrepresentation the their with combined In ple, years. recent state in Kirghiz eroded the has oppose openly to that ability sense their clearly Islam, political to drawn been most has that population the Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbeks, reveal, southern speech of freedom on disenfran- data the As and population. Uzbek alienation the among of chisement sense growing a otenKyrgyzstan. of much southern of heritage Uzbek culturally the re- is ality, in what, ignoring while culture champi- Kirghiz oned protested, Nationhood.” Uzbeks “Kirghiz celebrations, of twenty- Both years commemorate hundred to two holiday national Simi- a Osh. city, Road August in Silk larly, the of founding of the anniversary thousandth three com- the to memorate celebration a sponsored regime Akaev of October feelings In exclusion. Uzbek ethnic exacerbated have further moreover, nationalism, Kirghiz promote hnaeehi . ethnic are than lv Kyrgyzstana Slovo 80 hs ie ucmsltl saitop- Islamist outcomes—little mixed These alienation of sense growing this Given document further moreover, data, Survey 57 ecn fUbk uvydreported surveyed Uzbeks of percent ihe,2 ac 2000), March 21 Bishkek, , 2003 md5= rsdn ke declared Akaev President , 56 2002 55 docnum= o xml,the example, for , eetefrsto efforts Recent m= 1999 o exam- for , uut20,www.eurasianet.org. 26 2003, Tension,” August Interethnic of Source Potential a tivities Fes- ‘Statehood’ “Kyrgyzstan Saipjanov, Ahmedjan 56. 2002, June www.eurasianet.org. 26 Uzbeks Kyrgyzstan,” Southern “Ethnic in Unrest Khamidov, Stoke Alisher see population, 50 iiatIslam Militant and Rule Uzbekistan—Totalitarian saitopsto aisivreywt politi- contestation. with cal inversely varies the opposition of Islamist strength the case that Kirghiz short, in The demonstrates, support. less find poli- ideologies revolutionary contest institutions, existing can through opposition tics the re- where In ideologies. gions revolutionary to re- turn In people absent, is level. contestation substate meaningful where the po- gions at of varies resonance Islam the litical Kyrgyzstan politi- In of Islam. logic cal local the Uzbeks—illustrate ity nUbksa’ December participate Uzbekistan’s to in allowed were no parties elections, opposition contest to able Party—were Peo- ple’s the and opposition Communists of two Party parties—the which in ballot parliamentary overthrow to effort rule. dictatorial an Karimov’s in Move- Uzbekistan, Islamic of militant ment the to and party ut- Tahrir Hizb radical the nonstate to notably to most institutions, turned have of number oppositionists institu- growing Uzbek a any governance, in state of matter, tion in that for power or, contesting Parliament from Prevented dis- political course. opposition meaningful in Uzbek participate the cannot col- Kyrgyzstan, their in Unlike exile. leagues into tor- forced jailed, and routinely tured, are they na- elections, contesting tional from Uzbek would-be prevented are oppositionists only Not force. terroriz- police a ing over notoriously, most perhaps and, economy, elec- the of portions large parliamentary media, the tions, contest (pro-pres- parties which idential) over control monopoly tains main- Karimov, Islam president, heavy-handed k en stotalitarianism. as define political Brzezin- ski what Zbigniew and approaches Friedrich Carl scientists rule state Uzbek ncnrs otespring the to contrast In 1999 8 rerc n Brzezinski, and Friedrich 58. see methodology, survey its and Brif. www.brif.kz. agency Brif polling on the more Department by For conducted U.S. and the State by of Sur- commissioned sets. data were these analyzing veys begun just have I 57. ship 58 ,21–27. parliamentary 2000 Uzbekistan’s Kirghiz oaiainDictator- Totalitarian

Eric McGlinchey 563

State and Islam in Central Asia 564 vote.59 Moreover, in addition to being excluded government, in contrast to the other Central from organs of state power, the opposition Asian leaderships, has had to confront frequent is also denied a voice in the national me- armed attacks carried out by Islamists. Uzbek dia. Describing this absolute state control over soldiers, for example, have repeatedly clashed the press, the Geneva-based media watchdog, with armed militants from the Islamic Move- Cimera, writes, “Despite the large number of ment of Uzbekistan seeking to cross the Kirghiz- newspapers and a relatively developed elec- Uzbek border. Moreover, the Islamic Movement tronic media network, there is not a single inde- of Uzbekistan, according to the U.S. Depart- pendent newspaper, television or radio station ment of State, is “believed to have been respon- Comparative that can offer an alternative view to that of offi- sible for five car bombs in Tashkent in Febru- cial news and analysis.”60 ary 1999,” which killed sixteen people.65 More Studies of It is not only the opposition, however, recently, suicide bombers targeted public build- that is denied a voice in Uzbekistan. Members ings in and Tashkent in March 2004 South Asia, of nongovernmental organizations and human and the U.S. and Israeli embassies as well as Africa and the rights groups are also intimidated and denied the Uzbek chief prosecutor’s office in July 2004. legal status. In April 2001, Tashkent police com- The Tashkent bombings and subsequent gun Middle East mitted Elena Urlaeva, a member of the Human battles between militants and government secu- Rights Society of Uzbekistan, to a psychiatric rity forces left more than forty people dead. hospital.61 At the time of her arrest, Urlaeva was The Uzbek government has responded organizing protests against the rerouting of a severely to these attacks, indiscriminately jailing city road through private homes in Tashkent.62 those whom it suspects of links to Hizb ut-Tahrir While Urlaeva was ultimately released, other ac- and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The tivists have faired less well. Emim Usmam, a pop- U.S. Department of State estimates that five ular writer and champion of minority Uyghur thousand Islamists were in Uzbek jails in 2002,66 interests, and Shovruk Ruzimuradov, a human this compared to four Islamists in Kirghiz jails rights proponent, both died while in police cus- for the same period.67 Suicide bombings and tody in 2001.63 comparative incarceration rates, admittedly, are As the Karimov government’s harsh re- imperfect measures of the strength of political sponse to the May 2005 street protests in Islam. New research, including what will be a Andijan illustrates, political contestation tol- four-year longitudinal survey to be conducted erated in states like Kyrgyzstan is brutally re- in four Central Asian states, promises to provide pressed in highly authoritarian Uzbekistan.64 a clearer picture of the varying resonance of po- Barred from traditional—and as we saw in the litical Islam in the region.68 Indeed, exploratory Kirghiz case—moderating avenues for political interviews of government elites conducted dissent, a growing number of Uzbek opposition- in preparation for this study demonstrate a ists have turned to militant Islamist movements much stronger perceived threat of political Is- in the hopes of destabilizing President Kari- lam in Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan.69 The mov’s totalitarian regime. Indeed, the Uzbek Uzbek leadership, moreover, fearing a growing

59. The two opposition parties that sought to par- 62. Ibid. 67. U.S. Bureau of Democracy, “Kyrgyzstan.” ticipate—Erk and Berlik—were denied registration by 63. Gregory Gleason, “Uzbekistan,” Nations in Transit 68. This research is part of a four-year study, “The the Uzbek Central Election Committee. See Galima (New York: Freedom House, 2002), 424. Effect of the Internet on Society: Incorporating Cen- Bukharbayeva, “Uzbeks Vote for New Parliament tral Asia into the Global Perspective,” National Sci- under Intense Security,” Agence France Press,5 64. Independent organizations such as Human Rights ence Foundation Award no. 0326101. For more on this December 1999, available in LexisNexis. Watch estimate that Uzbek government forces killed project, see www.depts.washington.edu/caict/index between 500 and 750 protestors. See Human Rights 60. Shahida Tulaganova, Report on the Media Sit- .shtml. Surveys will be conducted in Uzbekistan, Kyr- Watch, “Uzbekistan: Andijan Crisis Aftermath,” www uation in Uzbekistan (London: Cimera, 2001), 3. gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. .hrw.org/campaigns/uzbekistan/andijan, and “Bullets www.cimera.org/files/reports/ Were Falling Like Rain: The , May 13, 69. Author interviews with Kurmanbek Dykanbaev, Cimera MediaUzbekistan2001.pdf. 2005,” www.hrw.org/reports/2005/uzbekistan0605. chairman of the Association of Local Self-Governance 61. Human Rights Watch, “Uzbekistan: Dissident (Bishkek, Kyrygzstan, 16 March 2004), and with Ab- 65. U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global in Psychiatric Detention” (New York, 12 April 2001), dulkhai Abdullaev, vice rector of the Tashkent Islamic Terrorism, 2002, April 2003, 109. www.hrw.org/press/2001/04/uzbekistan041201.htm. University under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Re- 66. U.S. Bureau of Democracy, “Uzbekistan.” public of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 20 March 2004). ocuin n Implications and Conclusions aefrAga prtos”2 ac 2004. March as 29 Uzbek Operations,” Afghan Using for Still Base Forces “US Press, Associated 72. and Bombs Uzbek 2004. in March 29 Shootouts,” Killed “Nineteen Reuters, 71. Abdullaev. Abdulkhai with interview Author 70. oto n rvnsalfrso meaningful of contestation. forms political all prevents and control totalitarian maintains leadership long Karimov as the effect as little have likely will Islam of dia- logue the shape to efforts demonstrate, Tashkent recent the March as However, understandable. is lam a scret oee,oems usinthe question must one however, correct, is say rlAincutisi,t ag ere the contestation. political degree, of peaceful intolerance large regime’s a Karimov the Cen- to of product other is, in countries Asian than tral Uzbekistan in Islam mil- itant of presence its stronger markedly without The not causes. is deplorable, while Islam, Mil- itant shoppers. and policemen merchants not were bazaar, the attacks at their of target women the were and bombers suicide March the ingly, Reveal- hus- extremism. Islamist of with charged imprisonment bands distraught the of capital protesting site Uzbek the women the been of has frequently center that the in bazaar, location Chorsu Tashkent’s a in out carried were aino tlrneadreligion.” and “tolerance popu- on lation the educate to designed shows weekly television nationwide airs and prepares Islamic University Tashkent the imams, current for exams attestation conducting and imams future Uzbek- istan’s Repub- training to the addition In of Uzbekistan. of Ministers lic of Cabinet University the Islamic under Tashkent the opened ment directly to In did, begun, religion. predecessor manage Soviet has its as movement, much opposition Islamist h ol tpa ohn oaheetermis- their goals.” achieve guided to nothing at those stop against would “impor-who cooperation the continued emphasized of and tance violence” of “senseless act a as attacks the condemned Boucher Richard spokesman Department State U.S. ings, March the after Hours h oenetscl o oeatIs- tolerant for call government’s The 2004 ucd obnsadsotnsin shootings and bombings suicide 72 ftelgcotie nti es- this in outlined logic the If 1999 71 2004 h ac bombings March The h aio govern- Karimov the ahetbomb- Tashkent 70 .htm. www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/23630 2003), Affairs, Eurasian January and European of Bureau DC: ington, (Wash- 2002” Eurasia—FY and with Activities to Cooperative Assistance Government “U.S. Af- and Eurasian 15683.htm; and www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/ European 2002), December 9 of fairs, Bureau DC: (Wash- “U.S.ington, 2002” see Year Uzbekistan, Uzbekistan—Fiscal to to aid Assistance U.S. on statistics For 73. ber Following be change. policy would welcome a reform media hu- and programs, relief, manitarian education toward and engagement support military U.S. government-to-government from of away unproductive. reorientation be a would Rather, with regime relations Karimov all the of though, itself Significantly, divesting America’s Uzbekistan. in rights administra- human abuses Bush past of the criticism tempered of tion’s light in particularly od rm$ from fold, May with- support. its fully draw to were Washington if authoritarian equally remain not the would that government suggest Karimov to evidence little is engage- there U.S. ment, to prior authoritarian harshly late was the in Asia growing 1990 Central administration’s in prod- concerns Clinton strategic the the development, of recent uct a oppres- is of rule, history sive its unlike States, with United partnership the Uzbekistan’s benefit. be little pragmatically per- of may while attractive, ethically regimes, haps repressive with relations suspending course, Wash- Of prevent. threats to hopes very ington the encourage govern- might Karimov ment the with partnership that U.S. possible the is con- it then political prohibited, are of testation when forms root moderate compar- takes more Uzbek other, Islam and political Kirghiz suggests, the Islam. ison as militant if of is, spread That the sta- limits furthers and Uzbekistan bility like regimes pressive op- with cooperation continued which to extent ze iiay euiy n a enforcement law support. and security, military, Uzbek to devoted figures—was Department’s interprets State one the how of on one-half depending aid, to total the one-third aid—between this of inin lion 2001 2005 .Tu,js steKrmvgovernment Karimov the as just Thus, s. ahntnssrn eucaino the of denunciation strong Washington’s 2002 74 ..adt zeitnicesdfour- increased Uzbekistan to aid U.S. , nia ascedsre applause, deserves massacre Andijan In 85 . 2003 73 h ags igecomponent single largest The ilo in million steUie ttsstepped States United the as , 2001 oprtv ciiiswt uai—Y2002.” Eurasia—FY and with Activities to Cooperative Assistance Government “U.S. commodities.” De- humanitarian Defense donated privately “U.S. and for excess calls partment million Department State $78 the additional what was enforcement. an million law received $79 and Uzbekistan million, security $297 at of targeted total directly a of Out 74. o$ to 11 297 Septem- mil-

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State and Islam in Central Asia 566 down military operations in Afghanistan, Amer- ican aid to Uzbekistan dropped to $86 mil- lion.75 Military and security support, however, at more than $30 million, remained the largest component of U.S. assistance.76 Military aid, while often directed toward laudable goals such as increased border security and narcotics interdiction, can readily be ap- propriated for coercive ends.77 Aid for humani- Comparative tarian assistance, education support, and media reform, though it too can be captured by rul- Studies of ing elites for questionable, often self-enriching, ends, rarely increases the coercive capacity of South Asia, autocratic states. As demonstrated by the peace- Africa and the ful revolution in 2004 that brought Mikheil Saakashvili, a Columbia University Law School Middle East graduate, to power in Georgia, along with his U.S.-educated Georgian cabinet officials, aid for education programs can, over time, create a reformist domestic opposition capable of over- throwing authoritarian rule.78 Granted, scholar- ships to support study at Western universities, along with humanitarian aid and support for media reform, may only marginally better the odds for political liberalization in post-Soviet Central Asia. This long shot, however, is bet- ter than aiding those coercive institutions that, I have argued here, give rise to an equally coercive militant Islam.

75. “U.S. Assistance to Uzbekistan—Fiscal Year 2003” 77. For more on how states can apply military aid (Washington, DC: Bureau of European and Eurasian to domestic oppression, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, Affairs, 17 February 2004), www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/ “Arms Transfers, Military Coups and Military Rule in fs/29494.htm. Developing States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 733–56. 76. Ibid. 78. All four members of the new Georgian leadership were supported by the U.S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.