198 Chapter 7

CHAPTER 7 Allegiance and Rebellion II: The Italian Wars

The Italian Wars, with the irruption of the kings of France and Spain and the emperor into the state system of the peninsula, complicated questions of al- legiance for the military nobility throughout Italy. Many were faced with un- avoidable choices, on which could hang grave consequences for themselves and their families. These choices weighed most heavily on the barons of the kingdom of Naples and the castellans of Lombardy, the main areas of conten- tion among the ultramontane powers. The bulk of the military nobility in these regions harboured no great affection or loyalty towards the Sforza dukes of Mi- lan, Aragonese kings of Naples or Venetian patricians whose rule was chal- lenged. Accepting an ultramontane prince as their lord instead need not have occasioned them much moral anguish, provided they were left in possession of their lands. They might, indeed, hope that a non-resident prince would allow them a greater degree of autonomy. But there could be no guarantee that those who pledged their loyalty to an ultramontane prince would receive the bene- fits and the recognition they might have hoped for. Although the ideas, expec- tations and way of life of the Italian rural nobility had much in common with their German, French and Spanish counterparts who came to Italy as soldiers and officials, the ultramontanes generally assumed the air of conquerors, of superiority to Italians of whatever social rank. Members of different nations were often more conscious of their differences in language and customs than of any similarities in their values, and relations between the nobilities of the various nations were frequently imbued with mutual disparagement, rather than mutual respect. One of the characteristics associated with Italians in general by other na- tions was mutability, seen as infidelity. When the Spanish and French kings were at war, for a subject of one king to switch allegiance to the other was viewed as treachery. Italian nobles were not accustomed to seeing changes of allegiance in this light. Choices of allegiance were usually made on the basis of local politics, factions, family feuds and loyalties, as well as personal inter- ests, in the light of current political circumstances and the fortunes of war, not on the basis of which prince had the best right. These were the forces in play when families had divided allegiances, with some members serving one prince and some another; such divisions were rarely the outcome of calculated family strategies, a hedging of bets. Those who had pledged allegiance or service to one prince, but then changed their minds when circumstances changed could

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004282766_008 Allegiance and Rebellion II: The Italian Wars 199 consider they were making a rational choice, which might require some justi- fication but could be understood and accepted. Not that it always would be, particularly by the prince whose service they were leaving – but ultramontanes were more likely to condemn such behaviour, and to treat it as treachery or rebellion. What would prove to be the opening campaign of the Italian Wars was the expedition led by Charles VIII of France in 1494–5 to conquer the kingdom of Naples, which he claimed as the heir of the Angevins. Exiled Neapolitan bar- ons, including Antonello da Sanseverino, were prominent among the small group encouraging the king to launch this expedition. Letters Antonello wrote to barons in Naples, urging them to serve Charles, provided Alfonso II with a pretext to arrest several barons, including Guglielmo da Sanseverino, conte di Capaccio and his son, and Luigi Gesualdo, conte di Conza, and his sons and brother.1 Few Neapolitan barons fought for Ferrandino (who had succeeded to the throne abandoned to him by his father Alfonso); one of those who did was Alfonso d’Avalos, marchese di Pescara.2 His fortress of Monte San Giovanni re- fused to surrender to the invading French army and its defenders were massa- cred; Pescara himself defended the fortress of Castelnuovo in the city of Naples for Ferrandino. Charles was only in the kingdom for a few months and Ferran- dino soon recovered it; the French army left behind surrendered just over a year later. The second French conquest of Naples in 1501 – or rather of that half of the kingdom assigned to Louis XII in the agreement he had made with Fer- dinand of Aragon to divide it between them – lasted a little over two years, before the army was decisively defeated by the Spanish army commanded by Gonzalo da Córdoba. The Neapolitan exiles who had accompanied Charles had been eager to re- cover their estates, and the French barons with him avidly sought grants of lands from the king. But there was no influx of French barons, under Charles or during the later conquest under Louis XII, that permanently altered the com- position of the Neapolitan baronage. In general, the French who were granted baronial estates had no intention of settling in the kingdom, and were more than willing to convert their lands into cash, when they could find a buyer. The Angevin barons, as those who fought on the side of the French were known, were another matter: the problem they posed persisted for decades. Antonello da Sanseverino fought for the French holding out in the kingdom against Ferrandino’s reconquest, only making his own peace with the king, in

1 Carlo De Frede, L’impresa di Napoli di Carlo VIII. Commento ai primi due libri della Storia d’Italia del Guicciardini (Naples, 1982), 262–4. 2 The son of Iñigo d’Avalos.