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A New Monetary Policy What Caused This Crisis? Put Simply, It Was a Chain Reaction That Began with Service Or Refinance Their Mortgages When the Bubble Burst

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A New Monetary Policy What Caused This Crisis? Put Simply, It Was a Chain Reaction That Began with Service Or Refinance Their Mortgages When the Bubble Burst 2/1/07 3/1/07 4/2/07 5/1/07 6/1/07 7/2/07 8/1/07 9/3/07 10/1/07 11/1/07 12/3/07 1/1/08 2/1/08 3/3/08 4/1/08 5/1/08 6/2/08 7/1/08 8/1/08 9/1/08 10/1/08 11/1/08 12/2/08 1/2/09 2/2/09 FEBRUARY 2007 MARCH 2007 APRIL 2007 MAY 2007 JUNE 2007 JULY 2007 AUGUST 2007 SEPTEMBER 2007 OCTOBER 2007 NOVEMBER 2007 DECEMBER 2007 JANUARY 2008 FEBRUARY 2008 MARCH 2008 APRIL 2008 MAY 2008 JUNE 2008 JULY 2008 AUGUST 2008 SEPTEMBER 2008 OCTOBER 2008 NOVEMBER 2008 DECEMBER 2008 JANUARY 2009 FEBRUARY 2009 MARCH 2009 APRIL 2009 MAY 2009 JUNE 2009 JULY 2009 AUGUST 2009 SEPTEMBER 2009 OCTOBER 2009 NOVEMBER 2009 DECEMBER 2009 JANUARY 2010 FEBRUARY 2010 MARCH 2010 APRIL 2010 MAY 2010 JUNE 2010 JULY 2010 AUGUST 2010 SEPTEMBER 2010 OCTOBER 2010 NOVEMBER 2010 DECEMBER 2010 JANUARY 2011 FEBRUARY 2011 MARCH 2011 FEB 5 Mortgage Lenders Network MAR 20 People’s Choice Home APR 3 New Century Financial, the JUL 6 In a surprise move, Peter AUG 7 American Home Mortgage, SEP 14 One of England’s largest OCT 1 Swiss bank UBS announces NOV 5 Citigroup CEO Chuck Prince DEC 3 Moody’s announces it JAN 8 Jimmy Cayne, the CEO of FEB 8 Deutsche Bank reports MAR 10 Rumors spread on APR 1 Deutsche Bank reveals that MAY 13 The Financial Times JUN 2 Wachovia’s CEO Kennedy JUL 8 An SEC report criticizes AUG 7–9 Citigroup pays a $100 SEP 7 The US government OCT 3 A revised bailout plan is NOV 4 Barack Obama is elected DEC 8 Despite a $27 billion loss in JAN 8 The Bank of England cuts its FEB 6 US unemployment figures MAR 2 AIG declares a fourth- APR 2 G20 leaders meet in MAY 4 A US Federal Reserve JUN 1 General Motors becomes JUL 1 To date, AIG has received AUG 4 Reports emerge that the SEP 1 Eurozone unemployment OCT 6 The Reserve Bank of NOV 4 The US Senate unanimously DEC 1 The unemployment rate JAN 4 Dubai names its tallest FEB 8 The DJIA closes below MAR 2 AIG agrees to sell its Asian APR 5 Jobless benefits temporarily MAY 1 A series of austerity JUN 1 The US national debt tops JUL 8 Fannie Mae and Freddie AUG 17 President Obama hosts SEP 2 The European Union OCT 1 The Irish government NOV 1 The Commerce Department DEC 3 Trustees for Madoff victims JAN 3 The Ohio school pension FEB 4 Bank of America revises MAR 7 The SEC charges former USA, the 15th largest subprime Loan files for bankruptcy. largest subprime lender in the US, Wuffli, the CEO of Swiss bank UBS, one of the largest retail mortgage retail mortgage lenders, Northern a $3.7 billion writedown followed resigns after an announcement that will further lower its ratings on Bear Stearns, resigns. Cayne has profits of $9.4 billion for 2007 and Wall Street that Bear Stearns it will write down $3.9 billion in the releases a writedowns table Thompson resigns in the wake of rating agencies for not properly million fine and UBS pays a $150 effectively takes control of signed into law as the Emergency 44th President of the United States. 2008, Merrill Lynch rushes through interest rate to 1.5% ­— the lowest reach 7.6%. quarter loss of $60 billion — the London to discuss the crisis. They survey reports that mortgage the largest manufacturing company nearly $175 billion in aid from the Goldman Sachs CEO reportedly told is reported at 9.5%, the highest Australia raises the main interest votes to extend unemployment in Europe is at 9.8% in October, a building Burj Kalifa, in a nod to the 10,000 amid growing fears about the life insurance business to British expire for approximately 200,000 measures is proposed in Greece, $13 trillion for the first time in the Mac are delisted from NYSE a conference to discuss strategy to Central Bank announces that announces it will inject an additional says the economy grew faster than sue JPMorgan Chase for $6.4 billion, fund sues Wells Fargo over losses its SEC financial filings for 2009 Goldman Sachs director Rajat Gupta lender in the US, files for bankruptcy. files for bankruptcy and defaults on resigns over declining profits due lenders, files for bankruptcy. Rock, seeks emergency liquidity by the resignation of the head of Citigroup may have to write down up some mortgage-related securities, personally lost over $900 million, seems to have dodged the worst of is experiencing severe liquidity first quarter. showing worldwide bank write-offs $708 million in subprime losses. managing conflicts of interest when million fine to settle allegations Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Economic Stabilization Act by In his victory speech, he states that payment of $3.7 billion in employee rate in 315 years. largest quarterly loss in US history. pledge $1.1 trillion to fight the demand rose in the first quarter in US history to file for Chapter 11 federal government, which now has employees not to make high-profile level in 10 years. The figure is later rate by 25 basis points to 3.25%, payments for the 1.3 million figure that is later revised to 9.9%. leader of neighboring Abu Dhabi European debt crisis. insurer Prudential for $35.5 billion Americans. which persuades Germany to sign on nation’s history. When compared Euronext. overhaul Fannie Mae and Freddie economic growth in the Eurozone $16 billion into its faltering banking expected, 2% in the second quarter. claiming the bank enabled his Ponzi in Wachovia’s securities-lending and 2010 due to unexpected losses and Galleon Group founder Raj $8.4 billion in loan repayments. to the bank’s activity in the US from the Bank of England. This is the its investment banking division. to $11 billion in bad debt primarily following concerns about rapid since he was heavily invested in the subprime crisis. problems. Investor anxieties become totaling almost $450 billion since assigning ratings to products such that they engaged in deceptive placing the companies under the President Bush, establishing the “if the financial crisis taught us bonuses just before the Bank of FEB 10 Secretary of the Treasury Total support to date from the US crisis, with an additional $750 for the first time since early 2007, bankruptcy protection. an 80% stake in the company. purchases until the backlash against revised to 9.8%. becoming the first major economy unemployed Americans who would Analysts expect this rate to peak at who oversaw the bailout in late to repay its bailout debt. The deal to a $110 billion bailout package. against the GDP, the debt amounts Mac by creating a comprehensive reached 1% in the second quarter system. scheme. program. WF acquired Wachovia in of $6.6 billion from consumer Rajaratnam with insider trading. FEB 13 ResMae Mortgage subprime market. AUG 9 BNP Paribas SA, France’s first major incident of the financial UBS was heavily involved with from subprime losses. deterioration in the US housing Bear Stearns stock. a self-fulfilling prophecy as the APR 7 The Concise Oxford English January 2007. JUN 16 Lehman Brothers reports as mortgage-backed securities, sales practices and misrepresented conservatorship of the Federal Troubled Asset Relief Program anything it is that we cannot have America takeover, and despite JAN 10 Unemployment in the Timothy Geithner speaks about government is $130 billion. billion for the International despite tightened standards for high Wall Street bonuses dies down. to raise rates in the wake of the otherwise lose their benefits by the 11% before turning around. 2009. FEB 12 Fourth-quarter Eurozone hits a regulatory roadblock and APR 10 Former Lehman CEO Dick The measures cause a backlash in to about 89.4% of the total US JUL 22 President Obama signs a reform proposal that protects alone. This is the fastest rate in four NOV 1 Lawsuits are filed against December 2008. credit cards and financial reform Corporation files for bankruptcy. APR 4 CNN Money reveals that biggest bank, freezes assets on three crisis in the UK. collateralized debt obligations market. Pools of lower-quality bonds FEB 13 Data from the Financial company’s stock price plunges over Dictionary announces it will include a $2.8 billion second-quarter loss, citing instances in some agencies auction-rate securities that Housing Finance Agency. (TARP). The bill gives the Treasury a thriving Wall Street while Main benefitting from taxpayer United States jumps to 7.2%, the the new administration’s plans to Monetary Fund, $250 billion for home loans by banks. JUN 3 Eurozone GDP experiences JUL 2 June unemployment is SEP 5 Fannie Mae and Freddie crisis—a move that came earlier end of the year. The Senate also GDP comes in at a disappointing is delayed, and eventually falls Fuld and other former executives Greece, resulting in several days of economy. bill to extend unemployment benefits taxpayers, instituting tough years and increased the annual GDP OCT 20 The Wall Street Journal JPMorgan Chase and HSBC DEC 6 US and South Korea agree legislation. MAR 7 HCA, the largest hospital subprime loans have five times JUL 17 Two Bear Stearns hedge investment funds that had capital of (CDOs) and credit default swaps, NOV 13 Bank of America says it were packaged and exported all over JAN 17 Lehman Brothers Services Agency, the Japanese the next few days.
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