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INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW Issues Paper 6 Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’S Duty of Good Faith the LAW COMMISSIONS – HOW WE CONSULT

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INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW Issues Paper 6 Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’S Duty of Good Faith the LAW COMMISSIONS – HOW WE CONSULT The Law Commission and The Scottish Law Commission INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW Issues Paper 6 Damages for Late Payment and the Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith THE LAW COMMISSIONS – HOW WE CONSULT About the Law Commissions: The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission were set up by the Law Commissions Act 1965 for the purpose of promoting the reform of the law. The Law Commissioners are: The Rt Hon Lord Justice Munby (Chairman), Professor Elizabeth Cooke, David Hertzell, Professor Jeremy Horder and Frances Patterson QC. The Chief Executive is Mark Ormerod CB. The Scottish Law Commissioners are: The Hon Lord Drummond Young (Chairman), Laura J Dunlop QC, Professor George L Gretton, Patrick Layden QC, TD and Professor Hector L MacQueen. The Chief Executive is Malcolm McMillan. Topic: We ask whether a policyholder should be able to claim damages from their insurer for the late or non-payment of an insurance claim. We consider whether this might be achieved by reform of the insurer’s post-contract duty of good faith. We welcome views on our provisional recommendations. Geographical scope: England and Wales, Scotland. Duration of the consultation: from 24 March 2010 to 24 June 2010. How to respond Please send your responses either – By email to: [email protected] or By post to: Martyn Naylor, Law Commission, Steel House, 11 Tothill Street, London SW1H 9LJ Tel: 020 3334 0286 / Fax: 020 3334 0201 If you send your comments by post, it would be helpful if, where possible, you also send them to us electronically (in any commonly used format). After the consultation: In the light of the responses, we will work towards a full Consultation Paper, which we hope to publish in early 2011. Freedom of information: We will treat all responses as public documents in accordance with the Freedom of Information Act. We may attribute comments and include a list of all respondents’ names in each of our publications. If you wish to submit a confidential response, you should contact us before sending it. PLEASE NOTE – We will disregard automatic confidentiality statements generated by an IT system. Code of Practice: We are a signatory to the Government’s Code of Practice on Consultation, available at: http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file47158.pdf. Availability: You can view or download this paper free of charge from our websites at: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/insurance_contract.htm or http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cpinsurance_issue6.pdf. ii THE LAW COMMISSION THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION Joint Review of Insurance Contract Law Issues Paper 6 DAMAGES FOR LATE PAYMENT AND THE INSURER’S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH CONTENTS Page SUMMARY v LIST OF TERMS USED IN THIS PAPER xii PART 1: INTRODUCTION 1 PART 2: DAMAGES FOR LATE PAYMENT IN ENGLISH LAW 5 PART 3: DAMAGES FOR LATE PAYMENT IN SCOTS LAW 22 PART 4: GOOD FAITH IN INSURANCE CONTRACTS 29 PART 5: OTHER REMEDIES 50 PART 6: THE FINANCIAL OMBUDSMAN SERVICE 62 PART 7: OVERVIEW OF COMPARATIVE LAW 68 PART 8: THE CASE FOR REFORM 72 PART 9: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 80 PART 10: LIST OF CONSULTATION QUESTIONS 91 APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE LAW 93 iii iv DAMAGES FOR LATE PAYMENT AND THE INSURER’S DUTY OF GOOD FAITH SUMMARY S.1 In this Issues Paper we consider whether a policyholder should be entitled to damages where the insurer has refused to pay a valid insurance claim, or has paid only after considerable delay. In England and Wales, a policyholder who has not been paid a valid claim is entitled to sue the insurer for the money owed, plus interest. However, the policyholder is not entitled to damages for any further loss suffered through the delay in receiving the money. S.2 This has proved controversial. By contrast, in Scotland (and in most other common law jurisdictions) damages are payable, provided that the loss is considered foreseeable at the time the contract is made. S.3 This Issues Paper sets out our preliminary thinking. Its purpose is to promote discussion before we formulate our proposals. We seek responses by 24 June 2010, to the address on page 1 of the paper. S.4 Here we focus on the insurer’s obligations. Later this year we plan to publish a further issues paper, looking at the insured’s duty to act in good faith after an insurance contract has been formed. THE DECISION IN SPRUNG S.5 The English case of Sprung v Royal Insurance (UK) Ltd illustrates the problems.1 Mr Sprung bought an insurance policy to protect his factory against “sudden and unforeseen damage”. In April 1986, vandals broke into the factory and caused considerable damage. Mr Sprung’s insurers rejected his subsequent claim. In difficult trading conditions, Mr Sprung lacked the financial resources to carry out repairs himself and he was not able to raise a loan. Six months later Mr Sprung was out of business. S.6 Mr Sprung started proceedings against his insurers. Four years later, in March 1990, the insurers abandoned their defence and Mr Sprung was awarded an indemnity for his damaged property, plus simple interest and costs. The judge found that the claim should have been paid by 31 October 1986. As it had not, Mr Sprung had suffered an uninsured loss of £75,000 for the lost opportunity to sell his business. However, the Court of Appeal held that Mr Sprung was not entitled to claim this further loss, as it was not a claim recognised in law. Sprung compared to ordinary contract law principles S.7 In Part 2, we argue that the decision in Sprung is out of line with the principles of ordinary contract law. 1 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep IR 111; [1997] CLC 70. v S.8 The general rule in England is that if one party breaks a contract, the other party may claim damages for the actual loss suffered, provided that it was foreseeable at the time the contract was made. This is subject to three main limitations: (1) The victim of the breach of contract must prove actual financial loss; (2) The victim must take reasonable steps to mitigate the loss; (3) The level of damages may be limited (or expanded) by the express provisions of the contract. S.9 In 1854, in Hadley v Baxendale,2 the House of Lords defined which losses are “foreseeable” in contract law. There are two kinds: (1) Those which may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, that is “according to the normal course of things”; and (2) Those arising from any special circumstances which were communicated at the time the contract was made. S.10 At one stage, it was suggested that damages were not necessarily payable for breach of an obligation to pay. It was also suggested that damages were not payable to claimants who failed to mitigate their losses because (like Mr Sprung) they lacked the financial means to do so. However, the law in these areas has now changed. Sprung is left looking increasingly isolated and anomalous. Why insurance is an exception S.11 The English courts have held that insurance is an exception to the rule that the party breaking a contract should pay damages for foreseeable losses. This is based on the fiction that an insurer’s primary obligation is to “hold the insured harmless”. In other words, the insurer is said to promise that the loss will not occur. If it does, the insurer is then liable to pay the amount of the claim as damages. Thus an insurance payment is not a primary obligation to pay money, but a secondary obligation to pay damages. It is said that English law does not recognise an obligation to pay damages for a failure to pay damages. S.12 An insurance contract is treated as analogous to a contract with a security firm, in which the security firm undertakes to prevent a break-in. However, if the security firm broke its promise, the courts would look at all foreseeable loss including, possibly, the effects of business interruption. Insurance law goes one step further. Insurance is treated as if the contract with the security firm had included a clause to limit any damages for breach to a specified amount. In these hypothetical circumstances, if the security firm paid the agreed damages late, the law would respect the parties’ agreement to limit damages. It would not award the property owner additional damages for the loss caused by the late payment of the agreed damages. 2 (1854) 9 Exch 341. vi S.13 The English courts are also reluctant to find that insurance policies contain terms, whether express or implied, requiring insurers to assess and pay claims expeditiously. This contrasts with the position in Scotland and other common law jurisdictions. Conclusion on Sprung S.14 In Part 2 we argue that the “hold harmless” analysis is a complex and unrealistic way to characterise an insurance contract. Unlike a security firm, an insurer is in no position to prevent a loss. Buying insurance does not make a fire, flood or theft less likely. Instead, policyholders buy a promise that if something does go wrong, the insurer will provide the payment specified in the contract. There is nothing in most indemnity contracts to suggest that the parties have put their minds to what the position would be if the insurers failed to make the expected payment, or to limit damages in those circumstances. S.15 We tentatively conclude that the insurer’s primary obligation should be to pay valid claims. If the insurer fails in this obligation, then normal contract principles should apply.
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