Ebook: from a Record & DNS to Zones
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Configuring DNS
Configuring DNS The Domain Name System (DNS) is a distributed database in which you can map hostnames to IP addresses through the DNS protocol from a DNS server. Each unique IP address can have an associated hostname. The Cisco IOS software maintains a cache of hostname-to-address mappings for use by the connect, telnet, and ping EXEC commands, and related Telnet support operations. This cache speeds the process of converting names to addresses. Note You can specify IPv4 and IPv6 addresses while performing various tasks in this feature. The resource record type AAAA is used to map a domain name to an IPv6 address. The IP6.ARPA domain is defined to look up a record given an IPv6 address. • Finding Feature Information, page 1 • Prerequisites for Configuring DNS, page 2 • Information About DNS, page 2 • How to Configure DNS, page 4 • Configuration Examples for DNS, page 13 • Additional References, page 14 • Feature Information for DNS, page 15 Finding Feature Information Your software release may not support all the features documented in this module. For the latest caveats and feature information, see Bug Search Tool and the release notes for your platform and software release. To find information about the features documented in this module, and to see a list of the releases in which each feature is supported, see the feature information table at the end of this module. Use Cisco Feature Navigator to find information about platform support and Cisco software image support. To access Cisco Feature Navigator, go to www.cisco.com/go/cfn. An account on Cisco.com is not required. -
V6.5 Data Sheet
Data Sheet Blue Prism Network Connectivity To ensure compatibility with evolving network infrastructures, Blue Prism can be deployed in environments that utilize IPv4 or IPv6 network protocols for all connections as well as those that use a hybrid approach, utilizing a combination of both protocols. This allows all Blue Prism components - Runtimes, Clients, Application Servers - to connect using the preferred or most suitable method. Resource connectivity When establishing connections to Runtime Resources, Blue Prism uses the name specified in the DNS. This is based on the machine name and can either the short name or the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN). If a Resource has both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in the DNS, the network adapter settings of the connecting device (Application Server, Interactive Client, or Resource) are used to determine which IP address should be used to establish the connection: 1. The connecting device defaults to an IPv6 connection. 2. If an IPv6 connection is not established within 1.5 seconds and if the connecting device has multiple IPv6 addresses listed in the DNS, a connection attempt is made using the next available IPv6 address. 3. If an IPv6 connection is not established, the connecting device automatically attempts to connect using IPv4. 4. If all available IPv4 addresses have been tried without success, the Resource is considered unreachable. Commercial in Confidence Page 1 of 3 ®Blue Prism is a registerd trademark of Blue Prism Limited 6.5 Data Sheet | Blue Prism Network Connectivity Resource connectivity The following diagram illustrates the logic used for connections to Runtime Resources. Commercial in Confidence Page 2 of 3 ®Blue Prism is a registerd trademark of Blue Prism Limited 6.5 Data Sheet | Blue Prism Network Connectivity Application Server connectivity Application Server connectivity Clients and Resources can connect to Application Servers using the host name, IPv4 address, or IPv6 address specified in the connection settings on the Server Configuration Details screen. -
Changing IP Address and Hostname for Cisco Unified Communications Manager and IM and Presence Service, Release 11.5(1) First Published
Changing IP Address and Hostname for Cisco Unified Communications Manager and IM and Presence Service, Release 11.5(1) First Published: Americas Headquarters Cisco Systems, Inc. 170 West Tasman Drive San Jose, CA 95134-1706 USA http://www.cisco.com Tel: 408 526-4000 800 553-NETS (6387) Fax: 408 527-0883 THE SPECIFICATIONS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRODUCTS IN THIS MANUAL ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. ALL STATEMENTS, INFORMATION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THIS MANUAL ARE BELIEVED TO BE ACCURATE BUT ARE PRESENTED WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED. USERS MUST TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR APPLICATION OF ANY PRODUCTS. THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR CISCO REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY. The Cisco implementation of TCP header compression is an adaptation of a program developed by the University of California, Berkeley (UCB) as part of UCB's public domain version of the UNIX operating system. All rights reserved. Copyright © 1981, Regents of the University of California. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY OTHER WARRANTY HEREIN, ALL DOCUMENT FILES AND SOFTWARE OF THESE SUPPLIERS ARE PROVIDED “AS IS" WITH ALL FAULTS. CISCO AND THE ABOVE-NAMED SUPPLIERS DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THOSE OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT OR ARISING FROM A COURSE OF DEALING, USAGE, OR TRADE PRACTICE. IN NO EVENT SHALL CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, LOST PROFITS OR LOSS OR DAMAGE TO DATA ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THIS MANUAL, EVEN IF CISCO OR ITS SUPPLIERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. -
Cloud Down Impacts on the US Economy 02
Emerging Risk Report 2018 Technology Cloud Down Impacts on the US economy 02 Lloyd’s of London disclaimer About Lloyd’s Lloyd's is the world's specialist insurance and This report has been co-produced by Lloyd's and AIR reinsurance market. Under our globally trusted name, for general information purposes only. While care has we act as the market's custodian. Backed by diverse been taken in gathering the data and preparing the global capital and excellent financial ratings, Lloyd's report Lloyd's does not make any representations or works with a global network to grow the insured world – warranties as to its accuracy or completeness and building resilience of local communities and expressly excludes to the maximum extent permitted by strengthening global economic growth. law all those that might otherwise be implied. With expertise earned over centuries, Lloyd's is the Lloyd's accepts no responsibility or liability for any loss foundation of the insurance industry and the future of it. or damage of any nature occasioned to any person as a Led by expert underwriters and brokers who cover more result of acting or refraining from acting as a result of, or than 200 territories, the Lloyd’s market develops the in reliance on, any statement, fact, figure or expression essential, complex and critical insurance needed to of opinion or belief contained in this report. This report underwrite human progress. does not constitute advice of any kind. About AIR Worldwide © Lloyd’s 2018 All rights reserved AIR Worldwide (AIR) provides risk modeling solutions that make individuals, businesses, and society more AIR disclaimer resilient to extreme events. -
Analyzing Third Party Service Dependencies in Modern Web Services: Have We Learned from the Mirai-Dyn Incident?
Analyzing Third Party Service Dependencies in Modern Web Services: Have We Learned from the Mirai-Dyn Incident? Aqsa Kashaf Vyas Sekar Yuvraj Agarwal Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University Carnegie Mellon University [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract the Mirai Dyn attack [24], GlobalSign revocation error incident in Many websites rely on third parties for services (e.g., DNS, CDN, 2016 [21] and the Amazon DNS DDoS attack in 2019 [50] affected etc.). However, it also exposes them to shared risks from attacks a significant number of popular web services. These incidents raise (e.g., Mirai DDoS attack [24]) or cascading failures (e.g., GlobalSign broader questions about the robustness of the web ecosystem: • revocation error [21]). Motivated by such incidents, we analyze Are these singular occurrences or are there other types of third- the prevalence and impact of third-party dependencies, focusing party services that are also potential Achilles’ heels for affecting on three critical infrastructure services: DNS, CDN, and certificate popular web-services? For example, as services are concentrated, revocation checking by CA. We analyze both direct (e.g., Twitter is there a single provider whose failure will have a significant uses Dyn) and indirect (e.g., Netflix uses Symantec as CA which impact on many websites critically dependent on it? uses Verisign for DNS) dependencies. We also take two snapshots • Are there hidden transitive or indirect dependencies between in 2016 and 2020 to understand -
Risk Report Back in October 2016, Dyn Encountered a Massive DNS Ddos Attack That Knocked
Dyn DNS Cyberattack By Bryce Kolton 12/7/2016 | INFO 312 Introduction On October 21st 2016, a terabit sized attack took down internet connectivity for users across the globe. Over three waves, millions of users were interrupted during main business hours. The attack targeted Dyn (pronounced “dine”), a company that in part provides Domain Name Service registration for websites. Companies affected included Amazon, BBC, CNN, Comcast, Fox, GitHub, Netflix, PayPal, Reddit, Starbucks, Twitter, Verizon, Visa, Wikia and hundreds more. Credit card terminals were inoperative, news sites unavailable, and users unable to reach some of the internet’s most popular websites. The internet ground to a halt for several hours, with major Fortune 500 companies among those affected. The focus of this risk management report will be the cyberattack at large; The background, causes, previous mitigations, response, still present risks, and recommendations after one of the largest cyberattacks ever recorded. Understanding the Domain Name Service As an illustrative example, let’s say you want to visit a new grocery store your friend just told you about, “Sya’s Grocery.” You know the name, but you need to find the physical address. By using a service like Google Maps, you can transcribe the human-readable name into the destination. The Domain Name Service works much the same way, but for URLs. When you type in “google.com,” your computer is clueless to the ‘real address’ it’s supposed to go to. That’s where DNS steps in: your device asks its closes DNS server “Who is ‘google.com’?” If the server doesn’t know, it’ll pass the request along until it finds a server that does. -
Configuring Smart Licensing
Configuring Smart Licensing • Prerequisites for Configuring Smart Licensing, on page 1 • Introduction to Smart Licensing, on page 1 • Connecting to CSSM, on page 2 • Linking Existing Licenses to CSSM, on page 4 • Configuring a Connection to CSSM and Setting Up the License Level, on page 4 • Registering a Device on CSSM, on page 14 • Monitoring Smart Licensing Configuration, on page 19 • Configuration Examples for Smart Licensing, on page 20 • Additional References, on page 26 • Feature History for Smart Licensing, on page 27 Prerequisites for Configuring Smart Licensing • Release requirements: Smart Licensing is supported from Cisco IOS XE Fuji 16.9.2 to Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.1. (Starting with Cisco IOS XE Amsterdam 17.3.2a, Smart Licensing Using Policy is supported.) • CSSM requirements: • Cisco Smart Account • One or more Virtual Account • User role with proper access rights • You should have accepted the Smart Software Licensing Agreement on CSSM to register devices. • Network reachability to https://tools.cisco.com. Introduction to Smart Licensing Cisco Smart Licensing is a flexible licensing model that provides you with an easier, faster, and more consistent way to purchase and manage software across the Cisco portfolio and across your organization. And it’s secure – you control what users can access. With Smart Licensing you get: Configuring Smart Licensing 1 Configuring Smart Licensing Overview of CSSM • Easy Activation: Smart Licensing establishes a pool of software licenses that can be used across the entire organization—no more PAKs (Product Activation Keys). • Unified Management: My Cisco Entitlements (MCE) provides a complete view into all of your Cisco products and services in an easy-to-use portal, so you always know what you have and what you are using. -
Waves of Cyber Attacks Hit Netflix, Spotify, Twitter
Waves of cyber attacks hit Netflix, Spotify, Twitter usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/10/21/cyber-attack-takes-down-east-coast-netflix-spotify-twitter/92507806/ 10/21/2016 If you live on the East Coast and had trouble accessing Twitter, Spotify Netflix, Amazon or Reddit Friday morning, you were not alone. USA TODAY SAN FRANCISCO — At least two successive waves of online attacks blocked multiple major websites Friday, at times making it impossible for many users on the East Coast to access Twitter, Spotify, Netflix, Amazon, Tumblr and Reddit. The first attacks appear to have begun around 7:10 am Friday, then resolved towards 9:30 am, but then a fresh wave began. The cause was a large-scale distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) against Internet performance company Dyn that blocked user access to many popular sites standstill. Dyn reported the sites going down at around 11:10 a.m. UTC, or roughly 7:10 a.m. ET, posting on its website that it "began monitoring and mitigating a DDoS attack against our Dyn Managed DNS infrastructure." In an update posted at 8:45 a.m. ET, the company confirmed the attack, noting that "this attack is mainly impacting US East and is impacting Managed DNS customers in this region. Our Engineers are continuing to work on mitigating this issue." White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said the Department of Homeland Security was “monitoring the situation" but that “at this point I don’t have any information about who may be responsible for this malicious activity.” It was unclear Friday if the attacks are focused on Dyn specifically or companies that it provides services to, said Carl Herberger, vice president of security at security company Radware. -
World-Wide Web Proxies
World-Wide Web Proxies Ari Luotonen, CERN Kevin Altis, Intel April 1994 Abstract 1.0 Introduction A WWW proxy server, proxy for short, provides access to The primary use of proxies is to allow access to the Web the Web for people on closed subnets who can only access from within a firewall (Fig. 1). A proxy is a special HTTP the Internet through a firewall machine. The hypertext [HTTP] server that typically runs on a firewall machine. server developed at CERN, cern_httpd, is capable of run- The proxy waits for a request from inside the firewall, for- ning as a proxy, providing seamless external access to wards the request to the remote server outside the firewall, HTTP, Gopher, WAIS and FTP. reads the response and then sends it back to the client. cern_httpd has had gateway features for a long time, but In the usual case, the same proxy is used by all the clients only this spring they were extended to support all the within a given subnet. This makes it possible for the proxy methods in the HTTP protocol used by WWW clients. Cli- to do efficient caching of documents that are requested by ents don’t lose any functionality by going through a proxy, a number of clients. except special processing they may have done for non- native Web protocols such as Gopher and FTP. The ability to cache documents also makes proxies attrac- tive to those not inside a firewall. Setting up a proxy server A brand new feature is caching performed by the proxy, is easy, and the most popular Web client programs already resulting in shorter response times after the first document have proxy support built in. -
IP-Based Iot Device Detection
IP-Based IoT Device Detection Hang Guo and John Heidemann USC/Information Sciences Institute August 20, 2018 IoT S&P’18 1 IoT Devices Cause Record-Breaking DDoS Attacks 2016-09-20: 620 Gb/s attack against cybersecurity blog KrebsOnSecurity.com 2016-09-23: Est 1 Tb/s attack on French cloud-computing provider OVH 2016-10-21: Est 1 Tb/s attack against DNS provider Dyn - Last about 5 and a half hours in total, affect 69 services Airbnb FiveThirtyEight Overstock.com Slack WWE Network Amazon.com Fox News PayPal SoundCloud Xbox Live Ancestry.com The Guardian Pinterest Squarespace Yammer The A.V. Club GitHub Pixlr Spotify Yelp BBC V Grubhub PlayStation Network Starbucks Zillow The Boston Globe ulHBOne Qualtrics Storify Box Herokurable Quora Swedish Government Business Insider HostGator IoT Reddit Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency Dev CNN iHeartRadio Roblox ices B Tumblr Comcast Imgur Ruby Lane rokTwilioe CrunchBase Indiegogo RuneScape Twitterthe In DirecTV Mashable SaneBox Verizon Communicationsterne The Elder Scrolls Online NHL Seamless Visa t ! Electronic Arts Netflix Second Life Vox Media Etsy The New York Times Shopify Walgreens The Wall Street Journal Wikia Wired 2 Wix.com Motivation • Vulnerable IoT devices threaten the security of Internet ecosystem • To understand these threats requires knowledge IoT devices. – Such as locations, distribution and growth • These knowledge help guide the design and deployment of future IoT security solutions – Reveal the scale of IoT security problem, the problem’s growth and distribution 3 Contributions • A new method to detect IoT devices from observations of Internet traffic. • Apply our method to real-world network traffic – Find at least 35 IoT devices on a college campus and 60 in customers of an IXP. -
Mozilla's Attachment to Open Public Consultation Survey
European Commission’s Open Public Consultation on eIDAS Attachment to Mozilla’s Survey Response 1 October, 2020 About Mozilla 1 Feedback on QWACs in the eIDAS Regulation 2 Historical Background of QWACs and TLS Certification 4 TLS server certificates are not the correct place to store QWAC identity information. 5 Proposed Technical Alternatives to TLS binding in eIDAS 6 ntQWACs 7 Non-TLS QWAC Delivery Mechanisms 8 Additional Transparency and Security Concerns with the EU TSP List 9 Lack of Transparency 9 Irregular Audits 9 Insufficient Risk Management 9 Recommendations 10 Appendix A: Relevant Language from the eIDAS Regulation 11 Appendix B - Bringing Openness to Identity White Paper 13 About Mozilla Mozilla is the Corporation behind the Firefox web browser and the Pocket “read-it-later” application; products that are used by hundreds of millions of individuals around the world. Mozilla’s parent is a not-for-profit foundation that focuses on fuelling a healthy internet. Finally, Mozilla is a global community of thousands of contributors and developers who work together to keep the internet open and accessible for all. 1 Since its founding in 1998, Mozilla has championed human-rights-compliant innovation as well as choice, control, and privacy for people on the internet. According to Mozilla, the internet is a global public resource that should remain open and accessible to all. As stated in our Manifesto, we believe individuals' security and privacy on the internet are fundamental and must not be treated as optional. We have worked hard to actualise this belief for the billions of users on the web by actively leading and participating in the creation of web standards that drive the internet. -
Defending the DNS Infrastructure
l USE CASE l Defending the DNS Infrastructure The DNS (Domain Name System) Challenge protocol is a critical part of the A good example of the devastating effects an attack targeting DNS infrastructure can have was the well-publicized Mirai botnet Internet’s control plane, providing name campaigned against DYN at the end of 2016. resolution functionality and supporting DYN, now a part of Oracle, is a provider of DNS services to a number other capabilities that are taken for of well-known Internet brands, and when its infrastructure was hit by a number of massive DDoS attacks in a very short period of time, millions granted such as load-balancing and of users could no longer reach the web properties of those brands. internet traffic management. The Although the DDoS attacks did not target the web servers and availability of DNS is key for anyone infrastructure of the affected companies directly their URL’s could not be resolved into IP addresses. As a result and for all practical purposes, providing services or content across these websites were not reachable by users and appeared to be down. the Internet; if the DNS infrastructure The attack against DYN DNS infrastructure used an application- is unavailable or slow, the user layer DDoS vector known as “water-torture” where the Mirai botnet generated DNS queries for millions of random hosts such as aaaa. experience would be impacted to the Netflix.com, bb.Netflix.com, ccccc.Netflix.com and so on. This put a huge point of “no internet service”. load on the Authoritative DNS infrastructure, in this case provided by DYN, causing it to become unavailable for genuine user queries.