ARSTRAT IO Newsletter s1

Information Operations Newsletter

Compiled by: Mr. Jeff Harley US Army Strategic Command G39, Information Operations Branch

The articles and information appearing herein are intended for educational and non-commercial purposes to promote discussion of research in the public interest. The views, opinions, and/or findings and recommendations contained in this summary are those of the original authors and should not be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the United States Government, U.S. Department of the Army, or U.S. Army Strategic Command.

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Page ii Table of Contents

Vol. 8, no. 11 (5 – 10 March 2008)

1. Al-Qaeda Is Losing the War of Minds 2. US Air Force Censors Blogs 3. Are Routers the Next Big Target for Hackers? 4. Announcement of the World Wide PSYOP Conference (WWPC) 5. The Psychological Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare 6. Exposing the Information Domain Myth - A New Concept for Air Force and Information Operations Doctrine 7. NATO Says Cyber Warfare Poses as Great a Threat as a Missile Attack 8. Cyber-Rebels in Cuba Defy State’s Limits 9. Air Force Official Wants 'Virtual' Cyber Command 10. Synchronizing Information: The Importance of New Media in Conflict 11. Analysis: Chinese Cyberattacks on Experts 12. Welcome to Cyberwar Country, USA 13. Last of VOA’s Wartime Transmitting Stations Goes Dark 14. US Troops Let Iraqis Take Charge in Civil Affairs 15. ‘New Breed’ of Soldiers Graduate in Afghan Army Ceremony 16. The Taliban’s information warfare

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Page iii Al-Qaeda Is Losing the War of Minds (opinion) By Peter Wehner Financial Times March 5, 2008 The US “surge” in Iraq has been so manifestly successful that no serious person can deny that gains have been made. Even Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have (grudgingly) conceded progress. Yet both Mrs Clinton and Mr Obama are quick to add that progress has been purely on the military side and that those gains are ephemeral. This fits with their broader narrative – that the war has been a disaster on every front. During a recent Democratic debate, for example, Mr Obama declared: “We are seeing al-Qaeda stronger now than at any time since 2001.” Mrs Clinton says President George W. Bush’s policies in Iraq have “emboldened our enemies”. We should leave Iraq, she says, so we can better focus on the threat of al-Qaeda. In fact, in large measure because of what is unfolding in Iraq, the tide within the Islamic world is beginning to run strongly against al-Qaeda – and this, in turn, may be the single most important ideological development in recent years. In November 2007 Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (“Dr Fadl”) published his book, Rationalizations on Jihad in Egypt and the World, in serialised form. Mr Sharif, who is Egyptian, argues that the use of violence to overthrow Islamic governments is religiously unlawful and practically harmful. He also recommends the formation of a special Islamic court to try Osama bin Laden and Ayman al- Zawahiri, al-Qaeda’s number two and its ideological leader, and calls the attacks on September 11 2001 a “catastrophe for all Muslims”. Mr Sharif’s words are significant because he was once a mentor to Mr Zawahiri. Mr Sharif, who wrote the book in a Cairo prison, is “a living legend within the global jihadist movement”, according to Jarret Brachman, a terrorism expert. Another important event occurred in October 2007, when Sheikh Abd Al-‘Aziz bin Abdallah Aal Al- Sheikh, the highest religious authority in Saudi Arabia, issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudi youth from engaging in jihad abroad. It states: “I urge my brothers the ulama [the top class of Muslim clergy] to clarify the truth to the public . . . to warn [youth] of the consequences of being drawn to arbitrary opinions and [religious] zeal that is not based on religious knowledge.” The target of the fatwa is obvious: Mr bin Laden. A month earlier Sheikh Salman al-Awdah, an influential Saudi cleric whom Mr bin Laden once lionised, wrote an “open letter” condemning Mr bin Laden. “Brother Osama, how much blood has been spilt? How many innocents among children, elderly, the weak, and women have been killed and made homeless in the name of al-Qaeda?” Sheikh Awdah wrote. “The ruin of an entire people, as is happening in Afghanistan and Iraq . . . cannot make Muslims happy.” These criticisms by prominent voices within the jihadist movement should be seen in the context of an even more significant development: the “Anbar Awakening” now spreading throughout Iraq. Just 18 months ago Anbar province was the stronghold of al-Qaeda in Iraq; today it is known as the birthplace of an Iraqi and Islamic grass-roots uprising against al-Qaeda as an organisation and bin Ladenism as an ideology. It is an extraordinary transformation: Iraqis en masse siding with America, the “infidel” and a western “occupying power”, to defeat Islamic militants. Not surprisingly, al-Qaeda’s stock is falling in much of the Arab and Islamic world. A recent survey found that in January less than a quarter of Pakistanis approved of Mr bin Laden, compared with 46 per cent last August, while backing for al-Qaeda fell from 33 per cent to 18 per cent. According to a July 2007 report from the Pew Global Attitudes Project, “large and growing numbers of Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere [are] rejecting Islamic extremism”. The percentage of Muslims saying suicide bombing is justified in the defence of Islam has declined in seven of the eight Arab countries where trend data are available. In Lebanon, for example, 34 per cent of

Muslims say such suicide bombings are often or sometimes justified; in 2002, 74 per cent expressed this view. We are also seeing large drops in support for Mr bin Laden. These have occurred since the Iraq war began. Since General David Petraeus put in place his counter-insurgency strategy early last year, al-Qaeda has been dealt punishing military blows. Iraqis continue to turn against al-Qaeda and so does more of the Arab and Muslim world. In the past half-year an important new front, led by prominent Islamic clerics, has been opened. Militarily, ideologically and in terms of popular support, these are bad days for Mr bin Laden and his jihadist jackals. If we continue to build on these developments, the Iraq war, once thought to be a colossal failure, could turn out be a positive and even a pivotal event in our struggle against militant Islam. Having paid a high cost in blood and treasure and having embraced the wrong strategy for far too long, we stayed in the fight, proving that America was not the “weak horse” Mr bin Laden believed it to be. Having stayed in the fight, we may prevail in it. The best way to subvert the appeal of bin Ladenism is to defeat those who take up the sword in its name. We are a long way from winning in Iraq. It remains a traumatised nation and the progress made can be lost. But the trajectory of events is at last in our favour and a good outcome is within our grasp. If we succeed it will have enormously positive effects beyond Iraq. Table of Contents

US Air Force Censors Blogs By Jason Mick, Daily Tech, 28 Feb 08 The U.S. Air Force has adopted an alarming new censorship policy that effectively bans blogs and blogging by troops using Air Force computers and networks. The U.S. Army has required that bloggers register with their chain of command, but has encouraged them to write appropriate postings. The Air Force, which did not adopt such a policy, now has turned to a much more restrictive policy that bans any site using the word "blog" in its URL. The Army reviews its soldiers blogs to be redacted for sensitive information before soldiers can publish them. This is meant to protect U.S. secrets from accidentally being exposed. However, soldiers are welcome to speak freely in their blogs and visit blog sites. The Air Force feels differently, and states that blogs and various other news entities are "not legitimate new sources." The new policy is partly due to new leadership. Before the Air Force's internet issues were handled individually by each major command. These separate units had the right to control their users' access as they saw fit, according The Air Force Times. Now the internet policy has been placed under Cyber Command, which now regulates the Air Force Network Operations Center (AFNOC) in its entirety. The new ban by the AFNOC's new leadership eliminates access to all sites hosted by popular provider Blogspot. Other blogs and news sites, not containing "blog" in their URL are additionally blocked based on "content reviews performed on the base, command, and AFNOC level" according to The Air Force Times. AFNOC utilizes the Blue Coat Software to categorize sites by content and speed the blocking process. Says Tech. Sgt. Christopher DeWitt, a Cyber Command spokesman, "Often, we block first, and then review exceptions." Maj. Henry Schott, A5 for Air Force Network Operations, tried to clarify the stance, stating, "The idea isn't to keep airmen in the dark -- they can still access news sources that are primary, official- use sources. Basically ... if it's a place like The New York Times, an established, reputable media outlet, then it's fairly cut and dry that that's a good source, an authorized source." Many, though feel that such decisions are highly subjective and that some blogs can provide as good or better news coverage, in some cases, than that of major news outlets. These people will likely point to the recent court rulings that have granted bloggers journalistic protection,

legitimizing their profession, at least from a legal standpoint. Others take offense with the new policy as it blocks materials that could be valuable for training and preparedness. One Air Force officer, who wished to remain unnamed, tells Wired the following story: "A couple of years back, I fought this issue concerning the Counterterrorism Blog. An [Air Force] professional education course website recommended it as a great source for daily worldwide [counterterrorism] news. However it had been banned, because it called itself a blog. And as we all know, all blogs are bad!" Content filtering is relatively widespread in the military, though not on this scale. Previously YouTube and MySpace were banned by the armed forces for taking up too much bandwidth. The Army has also been concerned with the large amount of leaked pictures, video, and information appearing online. Still many including Gen. David Petraeus, who commands U.S. forces in Iraq, have commended military bloggers and state that they're performing a vital function. Many in the Air Force are furious at the new policy. Writes one senior officer, "When I hear stuff this utterly stupid, it makes me want to scream ... Piles of torn out hair are accumulating around my desk as we speak. I'm certain that by blocking blogs for official use, our airmen will never, ever be able to read them on their own home computers, so we have indeed saved them from a contaminating influence. Sorry, didn't mean to drip sarcasm on your rug." While the Air Force spends $81M USD to publicize its new advances, an Air Force officer states that the regulation of blogs has undermined "some of their most credible advocates." He points to such sites as In From the Cold, a right-leaning military, intelligence and political affairs blog written by "Nathan Hale," the pseudonym for a former journalist and Air Force intelligence officer, who served for over two decades in the armed forces. He states, "The Air Force isn't getting the planes that they want because they are incapable of communicating their usefulness and applicability in this new war. Because Air Force officers talk more like corporate bureaucrats than cocky war fighters, no one is inspired or convinced of their pressing (and quite legitimate) need to modernize the force. Air Force bloggers spoke the lingo of someone heavily invested in the fight, because they operate outside the survival-minded careerist world of public affairs, with many of them penning blog posts from theater." The U.S. has been highly critical of other nations, such as China's internet censorship efforts, particularly attempts to silence bloggers. The new policies by the United States Air Force are certain to strike many as a bit hypocritical in this regard. Table of Contents

Are Routers the Next Big Target for Hackers? By Nathan McFeters, ZdNet blog, 4 Mar 08 I’ve recently seen a great Black Hat presentation by Felix (FX) Lindner and a blog posting by Petko D. Petkov (PDP) on the subject of hacking routers. What seems to be clear is that they are becoming a bigger target. PDP, of the gnucitizen group, recently hosted a “Router Hacking Challenge”, where the idea was to share various attacks against a wide array of routers. In a post to the Full Disclosure mailing list, PDP summarizes the findings: Here is a quick summary, in no particular order, of the types of vulnerabilities we are exhibiting: authentication bypass a-to-c attacks csrf (cross-site request forgeries) xss (cross-site scripting) call-jacking - like making your phone dial numbers or even survey room’s sound where the phone resides obfuscation/encryption deficiencies UPnP, DHCP and mDNS problems - although not officially reported, most devices are affected SNMP injection attacks due to poor SNMP creds

memory overwrites - well it is possible to overwrite the admin password while being in memory and therefore be able to login as admin stealing config files cross-file upload attacks - this is within the group of csrf attacks remote war-driving - way cool factory restore attacks information disclosure etc, etc, etc I had a chance to talk to PDP about the results of the challenge and what he sees in the near future with router hacking: Nate: PDP, there’s a lot of flaws that the challenge uncovered, were there a few that stood out to you as being the most impactful? PDP: Most of the flaws are quite impactful, but I like those that are different from the others; however, very often these are not the ones that are most severe. The authbypass bugs are most severe, as they give you full access to the device without the need to login. Personally, I like the call-jacking stuff and the SNMP injection stuff, but it could be because I was working on these as well so I might be a bit prejudice. Nate: Yeah, I read the pages you posted about call-jacking and SNMP injection, very cool stuff. Could you just give me a brief run through of the two attacks? PDP: The call-jacking is like the old days of phone phreaking. Basically, you can do all sorts of things with VOIP phones; however, not all attacks are related to breaking SIP. In the case of SNOM, the attack consists of exploiting a feature in the web interface which allows attackers to survey the sound in the room where the phone is located. This is pretty cool, and you can do that remotely if the device is visible on the Internet side or if you know where the device is inside and your trick someone to arrive on your malicious page. The SNMP injection and the SIP injection attacks are also very fun. We did not mention any SIP vulnerabilities, but there are few that we found that we are keeping private for now. As I mentioned, a great talk on the subject of hacking routers was also given at Black Hat Federal this year, by Felix (FX) Lindner. Felix and his company Recruity Labs, are currently working on a tool that will allow much more powerful monitoring, debugging, and post mortem crash analysis on the Cisco IOS than the currently accepted practices. Felix mentions the following in a whitepaper on the subject: Vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS are as common as with any other functionally rich and widely deployed operating system platform. The architecture of IOS; however, makes exploitation a non-trivial task. In the past, the common operating systems provide soft enough targets to maintain an ongoing stream of new vulnerabilities that could be used to break into the machines directly. Recently, the major operating system vendors, first and foremost Microsoft, increased code security significantly. Additionally exploit mitigation techniques and OS hardening have become the standard on all major platforms. Cisco IOS, therefore, moves further into the focus, as the benefits start to measure up to the effort required. Non-publicly operating groups will certainly follow an equivalent path, as infrastructure compromises are still highly rewarding and almost impossible to detect. During his talk at Black Hat Federal, Felix suggested that it’s not a question of if router hacking will become more prevalent, but when will it and more importantly, has it already. Table of Contents

Announcement of the World Wide PSYOP Conference (WWPC) 1. General. The Joint Staff, J39, Psychological Operations Division, in coordination with the Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), will host the 2008 WWPC at the National

conference Center, in Lansdowne Virginia, from 30 April 2008 to 3 May 2008. The focus of this conference is the employment of PSYOP in the international community. 2. Conference Schedule: The tentative, full conference schedule is attached. A. 30 April 1400-1800: Arrival and Check in for the Conference Center and the Conference 1400-1700: Select Meetings (Contact LTC Lilley to set up space) B. 1 May 0800-1700: Conference General Session 1700-1900: No Host Social C. 2 May 0800-1700: Conference General Session D. 3 May 0800-1200: Conference (U.S. Only) 1300-1600: Conference (Invitation only) NOTE 1: Activities on 30 APR – 2 MAY are open to all participants. Activities on 3 May are U.S. only and on the afternoon of 3 MAY are by invitation only. NOTE 2: Conference Center has a total of six break out rooms holding 50 each. Participants requiring a break out room at some time between 30 APR and 3 MAY, please contact LTC Lilley not later than 11 APR to schedule times and identify requirements. 3. Participants. All members of the PSYOP community are welcome to participate. Contractors must be sponsored by a DoD Command. If participation exceeds 350, the JMISC will work with sponsoring commands to establish quotas. 4. Classification. The classification of this conference will be held at an UNCLASSIFIED level from 30 APR to 2 MAY. A classification of SECRET will be available to briefers for 3 MAY. If there are requirements for classified meetings, other than on 3 MAY, contact LTC Lilley not later than 11 APR. Do not bring classified material to the Conference Center. 5. Registration. Registration is through online application process at https://resweb.passkey.com/go/WWPSYOP. The Conference fees of $50 are due at registration. Personnel staying at the National Conference Center will be charged $200 a day. This includes the room and three meals a day provided by the Conference Center. Personnel staying of site will be charged a day fee of $59 which covers three meals a day. Throughout the day the Conference Center provides coffee and drinks throughout the facility. Additionally, mid-morning and mid afternoon snacks will be provided. Registration closes 11 APR 08. 6. A Welcome packet with additional and updated information will be provided at sign in. 7. Dress for the conference is business casual, open collar. Service uniforms/ACU is optional. 8. Lodging. The National Conference Center is located near the Dulles International Airport and is in close proximity to several commercial lodging facilities. Attendees choosing not to stay at the National Conference Center are responsible for making their own hotel reservations. 300 rooms are being held at the National Conference Center, including five suites and two handicap accessible rooms. 9. Transportation. Transportation to and from the airport is available through the Conference Center shuttle at a cost of $20 each way. Parking is available at the Conference Center at no cost. 10. WWPC Website: Additional information and updates on the conference can be found after 1 MAR 08 at www.socom.mil/jmisc/wwpc08/ 11. Briefers. Briefers must provide electronic copies of their presentations not later than 28 APR 08. Briefers are responsible for correct classification of the material on their briefings. E-mail briefings to LTC Lilley or to Mr. Brown. 12. Security Clearances: For clearance verification to the SECRET level, please email your last name and SSN to Ms. Stout at [email protected] or to Ms. Rochelle at

[email protected]. Please reference the Worldwide PSYOP Conference on 3 MAY in the subject line. 13. Points of Contact (POC). Please include both POCs on all correspondence. LTC Michael Lilley: Phone Number is 703-746-1516. e-mail: [email protected] SIPR: [email protected] Mr Brown: Phone number is 703-746-1520. e-mail: [email protected] SIPR: [email protected] Table of Contents

The Psychological Asymmetry of Islamist Warfare By Irwin J. Mansdorf and Mordechai Kedar, Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2008 U.S. military lawyers acknowledge that "civilians may not be used … to render an area immune from military operations… [or] to shield a defensive position, to hide military objectives, or to screen an attack. Neither may they be forced to leave their homes or shelters in order to disrupt the movement of an adversary."[1] Such restraint is not unique to the United States but also extends to Europe, Israel, and in the post-World War II era, many Asian countries as well. Increasingly, though, Israel's Arab foes and Islamist groups discount such constraints in order to seek psychological advantage against technologically superior foes. Western governments are challenged today by an enemy whose behavior is inspired by theological doctrines that not only disregard the Western concept of ethical combat but for whom the killing of civilians—on both sides of a conflict—also serves a vital purpose. Policymakers and military officials often discuss asymmetrical warfare in the context of strategies weak states or terrorist groups adopt to confront stronger military powers. Israel, for example, enjoys advantages in manpower and technology over its terrorist adversaries, such as Hamas and Hezbollah. But the ideology of Islamism has created a paradoxical form of asymmetric advantage for terror groups and states: By rejecting the entire Western concept of the rules of war, Islamist groups turn the adherence of Western military powers to restrictions on battlefield conduct into not just a disadvantage, but one that can be relied upon in a conflict, whether confronting U.S. peacekeepers in Mogadishu, NATO units in southern Afghanistan, or Israeli soldiers in Gaza. Accentuating the danger, not only terror groups but also states practice the Islamist way of war. Countries such as Iran have implemented these doctrines on the battlefield. During the Iran-Iraq war, for example, Tehran demonstrated a willingness to sacrifice tens of thousands of its own children and men to confront an enemy, and during the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Iran's proxy militia launched rockets at Israel and fought from within civilian populations as part of a strategy that sought both to kill Israeli civilians and to ensure that any Israeli self-defense would kill Lebanese civilians. A Different Type of Asymmetrical Warfare Most analysts acknowledge that Israel enjoys military superiority over its Arab neighbors,[2] a status preserved in part by the U.S. commitment to Israel's qualitative military edge relative to the Arab states.[3] Many Arab commentators and academics use this asymmetry for propaganda. Pro- Palestinian polemicist Edward Said juxtaposed "Israeli power" and "Palestinian powerlessness."[4] Nabil Ramlawi, the permanent observer for Palestine to the United Nations in Geneva wrote in 2002 of an alleged massacre in which Israel used "tanks and armoured vehicles, under a barrage of heavy gunfire from Apache gunships," and further committed a "long list of massacres" and "war crimes, State-sponsored terrorism and systematic human rights violations against the Palestinian people."[5] But Israel's technological edge does not mean that it enjoys every advantage in its battles with terror groups: While Israel subscribes to traditional restrictions on its battlefield

conduct, its Islamist and jihadi adversaries, who eschew international humanitarian law, enjoy an asymmetric advantage born of psychological impunity. The Israeli military faces a serious dilemma because it adheres to a specific moral code. Despite Arab propaganda to the contrary, Israeli military planners respect human life.[6] Tel Aviv University philosophy professor Asa Kasher and current Israel Defense Forces (IDF) intelligence chief Amos Yadlin write that, even when dealing with terrorists, Israeli soldiers conduct operations "in a manner that strictly protects human life and dignity by minimizing all collateral damage to individuals not directly involved in acts or activities of terror."[7] When trying to oust terrorists from Jenin in April 2002, for example, Israeli commanders decided to pursue a house-to-house ground strategy rather than employ the kind of airpower that would keep Israeli soldiers out of danger but would heighten the risk of collateral civilian casualties.[8] This decision cost the lives, in one incident, of thirteen IDF soldiers in an ambush in the Hawashin district on April 9.[9] The Israeli judiciary also provides a check on the military. Israeli courts regularly impose restrictions on military tactics, despite the "price paid by the limitations put on the army's actions."[10] Arab petitioners have a voice. Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz wrote that Israel's courts represent an "independent judiciary willing to stand up to its own government."[11] In 2004, the Israeli High Court of Justice ruled for petitioner Fatma al-Aju against the Israeli military in a case that called for the IDF to take into consideration obligations towards civilians, such as allowing medical teams to enter combat areas, and other humanitarian needs when planning military operations.[12] The court also sided with Palestinian Arabs regarding the routing of Israel's security barrier.[13] Arab states have no such judicial independence nor are their leaderships subject to the rule of law. Comparative prisoner treatment also highlights the discrepancy: The Israeli government provides access to and information about captured terrorists, opening itself to criticism of their treatment, [14] whereas neither Hamas nor Hezbollah even acknowledge whether captured Israelis are alive, let alone allow international monitors access to them. The result is an asymmetry in which Israel restricts itself in accordance with international law from indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets while groups such as Fatah, Hamas, and Hezbollah intentionally target Israeli civilians and employ their own civilians as human shields to deter an Israeli response. Avi Dichter, Israel's public security minister, spoke to this predicament in the context of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war: "You can [conduct military operations] in a short time; you can flood southern Lebanon with ground troops, and you can bomb villages without warning anyone, and it will be faster. But you'll kill a lot more innocent people and suffer a lot more casualties, and we don't intend to do either."[15] Maj.-Gen. Giora Eiland, Israel's national security advisor from 2005 to 2006, explained the Israeli decision-making process: "We are forced to kill someone only when four conditions are met: Number one, there is no way to arrest someone. Number two, the target is important enough. Number three, we do it when we believe that we can guarantee very few civilian casualties. And number four, we do it when we believe that there is no way that we can delay or postpone this operation, something that we consider as a ticking bomb."[16] Israel is further harmed by the invocation of international law to implicate the legitimacy of its fight against its adversaries. International law is routinely misconstrued by the media commentators and non-specialists who cite it. Some journalists, for example, describe Israeli treatment of Palestinian terrorists as a contravention of international law. This is misleading. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, among others, fail to meet the criteria required for full protection under the Geneva conventions.[17] More broadly, human rights groups selectively quote international law but fail to note that "protected persons" (i.e., citizens under occupation) may not participate in violent activities against the occupying power.[18] Despite rhetoric to the contrary, there is no "right of resistance" under international law to either civilians under occupation or irregular forces that purport to challenge an occupier.[19]

Conventional war between armies may favor Israel, but the fact that Islamists do not differentiate between civilians and legitimate combatants creates an asymmetry in favor of those who are eager to use any method available to advance their cause. Suicidal Ideology Islamists preach unquestioned obedience to God and the duty of men to sacrifice their lives for God. Saudi columnist Mozammel Haque, writing for the London Central Mosque, explained, "The sacrifice of life and wealth in the way of Allah is the zenith of a man's belief."[20] Despite the theological claim that man is free,[21] Islamists have a fatalistic approach to life.[22] If a person dies, it is because his predetermined day of death has arrived; the methods by which his life ends are beside the point.[23] Such beliefs contribute to a readiness among many combatants to have little or no fear of death. They cite the Qur'anic verse, "Their reward is with their Lord, and there shall no fear come upon them, neither shall they grieve."[24] Islamists preach istishhad,[25] voluntary martyrdom, which results in no pain upon death.[26] In addition, martyrs receive seventy-two virgins and can invite fifty relatives to paradise following their deaths. [27] The promised rewards make death materially better than life and encourage jihadis toward martyrdom. In practice, this means Islamist thinking finds no problem with what Western nations see as the immoral and unacceptable killing of civilians. If collateral damage occurs when, for example, Hamas fires upon soldiers from schools or ambulances, there is no fault: The civilians caught in the crossfire were destined to die. The Saudi exile Muhammad al-Massari explains that any civilian killed in an attack on the enemy "won't suffer [but instead] … becomes a martyr himself."[28] During the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, Hezbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah "apologized" for an attack on Nazareth that killed two Israeli Arab children—but said the two children should be considered "martyrs."[29] Many Islamist figures, for example, Zuhair Afaneh, president of the Islamic Society of Central Pennsylvania,[30] obfuscate the religious justification for war crimes by citing a Qur'anic verse: "Whosoever kills a human being for other than manslaughter or corruption in the earth, it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and whosoever saves the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind."[31] Other Islamists, though, cite alternate verses to abrogate this.[32] Perhaps not all these radicals have proper religious credentials,[33] but such theological imprecision is moot if their followers accept the legitimacy of their religious justifications. As a result, Islamist groups have conducted horrendous acts against civilians, including mass killings, [34] beheadings,[35] and the use of children in terror attacks.[36] Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, deputy chairman of the European Council for Fatwa and Research, explained, "If the Muslims' enemy attacks Muslim civilians, then it is permissible for us Muslims to apply the rule of reciprocity and attack the enemy civilians."[37] Egyptian Muslim scholar Yusuf al- Qaradawi, who heads the European Council for Fatwa and Research, added that "martyrdom operations … are not in any way included in the framework of prohibited terrorism, even if the victims include some civilians."[38] In July 2003, the London-based pan-Arabic newspaper Asharq al-Awsat reported that Qaradawi issued a religious ruling encouraging suicide attacks on Israelis regardless of whether they are civilian or military.[39] The acceptability of suicide missions has led several Islamic groups to boast that they "love death" in the same way that Jews and Christians love life.[40] Such sentiments extend even to young children, brainwashed to fight[41] despite international conventions against children participating in military combat.[42] The official Palestinian Authority television regularly encourages children to violence.[43] One clip instructed children, "How sweet is the fragrance of the shahids [martyrs]. How sweet is the fragrance of the earth. Its thirst quenched by the gush of blood flowing from the youthful body."[44] More recently, Hamas television featured a Mickey Mouse look-alike urging children to fight and, if necessary, die to extend Palestine to include all of Israel.[45]

Psychological Manipulation If Islamist theology provides the moral inspiration for the strategy of terrorism, psychological warfare helps secure its benefits in practice. Psychological warfare is "the planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives."[46] Although psychological operations are aimed at enemy soldiers and civilians, insofar as Islamists view their own civilians as part of the military equation, they become a mechanism to achieve tactical advantage. A call to jihad is compulsory conscription for all citizens to participate in military operations either by choice as a combatant or involuntarily as a victim. One jihadist publication aimed at women is specific: "The blood of our husbands and the body parts of our children are our sacrificial offering."[47] Psychologically, the expansion of Islamist groups' pool of participants to include mothers, children, and other civilians helps create a sense of strength, solidarity, and purpose beyond what a limited band of fighters could provide. Hezbollah, for example, was able to galvanize international outcry over civilian deaths after a July 30, 2006 Israeli strike on Kfar Qana, leading to demands for a halt in operations. Such tactics are not limited to irregular forces and paramilitaries. Where Islamist thinking shapes state military operations, the protection of civilians becomes irrelevant. Giora Eiland describes Iran as willing to sacrifice up to half of its population in order to fulfill what the leadership in Tehran sees as a religious imperative to destroy Israel.[48] And there is ample precedent for forced sacrifice in Iran: Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the Islamic Revolution and Supreme Leader of Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, called the deaths of thousands of children in human mine-sweeping operations a "divine blessing."[49] The German political scientist Matthias Küntzel describes how Iranian authorities gave young Iranians, some only twelve years old, plastic keys to paradise to hang around their necks.[50] Today, the Islamic Republic maintains "martyrdom-seeker" suicide units in the Iranian armed forces.[51] The willingness of Islamists to suffer collateral damage—and even to pursue tactics specifically designed to cause the deaths of their own civilians—does not nullify their ability to exploit civilian causalities in order to gain sympathy from both domestic and international public opinion. Extensive reports by the Israeli NGO Monitor continue to document how Israeli counterattacks, which result in Palestinian causalities, spark criticism of Israel by human rights organizations whose condemnations either ignore or minimize Israel's right to self-defense.[52] Although moral codes limit Israel's range of action, such restraint does not prevent exaggerated accusations of Israeli "war crimes." During Operation Defensive Shield in Jenin, sensational claims of a "massacre"[53] were trumpeted by the Palestinian Authority, the U.N., various NGOs, and in the European and, particularly, the British media.[54] The claims were later found to be without merit,[55] but at the time they served a vital psychological-operations purpose: to undermine the moral legitimacy of Israeli self-defence. Finally, the combination of standing armies and an alliance with or belief in Islamist ideology makes countries such as Syria and Iran a formidable challenge for Israel. Like terror organizations, they too pay little heed to the self-imposed restrictions of Western armies, but unlike most terror groups, they possess the manpower, weaponry, and finances to represent a far greater military threat. Conclusions How to balance military needs, international humanitarian law, and the reality of facing an enemy whose tactics are not restrained by accepted conventions are challenges to which Israel and other Western nations need to devote serious thought. The asymmetry of battle that Israel faces requires a rethinking of strategy to deal with threats from forces whose ideologies allow them not just to frustrate many Western military advantages but to use the openness of Western societies— especially their print and image media, and the organizations through which the Western penchant for self-criticism is expressed—to their own advantage. Ideology, including the perception of right

versus wrong, becomes part of the discussion. Ultimately, non-Islamists, such as Israel, need to win the ideological war as well as the military one. In the short-term, Israel can take the lead by repeatedly and forcefully asserting the moral high ground by pointing out that civilian causalities are never intentional but, given the cynical tactics of the enemies it must fight, are regrettably inevitable. Israeli spokespersons must further assert that the culpability for civilian casualties lies with the terrorists who have deliberately chosen to wage war against Israel from within civilian populations precisely because of the propaganda benefits of such tactics. While this is not likely to appease those who seek to paint Israel as a serial violator of human rights, the evidence will show that, given Israel's military arsenal, any premeditated policy of targeting civilians would most certainly have resulted in massively higher death tolls than have actually taken place. From a human rights perspective, the tables need to be turned by arguing that states such as Israel are victims of a capricious and cynical policy of civilian exploitation and that militant Islamists are intentional violators of international conventions that seek to protect civilian lives. In the long term, though, defeating an ideologically-based movement may not be possible without defeating the ideology itself. For Islamists, any move toward moderation will be a political tactic or a forced concession rather than an actual political or ideological reform or accommodation. What should Western societies do when fighting Islamist groups? In order to defeat the political ideology behind Islamism, Muslim civilians must develop a viable and practical alternative to the Islamist organizations that claim to represent the broader Muslim community.[56] While the ideology is immutable, if the civilian population withdraws its support, Islamist movements will be rendered impotent. Notes [1] USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide, Air Force pamphlet 14- 210 Intelligence, Feb. 1, 1998, section A4.2.1.2. [2] Mark A. Heller, "Assessing the Israeli-Palestinian Balance of Power," Strategic Assessment, Aug. 2000. [3] William Wunderle and Andre Briere, "Augmenting Israel's Qualitative Military Edge," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2008, pp. 49-58. [4] Edward Said, "Israel at Fifty: Palestine Has Not Disappeared," Le Monde Diplomatique, May 1998. [5] "Question of the Violation of Human Rights in the Occupied Arab Territories, Including Palestine," U.N. High Commission on Human Rights, Geneva, E/CN.4/2003/G/20, Dec. 17, 2002. [6] "Ethics," Israel Defense Forces website, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [7] Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, "Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: Principles," Philosophia, July 2006, pp. 75-84. [8] Yedi'ot Aharonot (Tel Aviv), Apr. 10, 2002. [9] "IV: Background: The Battle inside Jenin Refugee Camp," Jenin: IDF Military Operations: Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Territories, Human Rights Watch, May 2002. [10] Ayala Procaccia, "The Role of the Supreme Court in Israel in Protecting Human Rights," lecture at Boston University, Nov. 7, 2005. [11] The Harvard Crimson, Sept. 23, 2002. [12] Office of the State Attorney vs. Fatma al-Aju, judgment of the Israel High Court of Justice, HCJ 4764/04, May 30, 2004. [13] Beit Sourik Village Council vs. Government of Israel, judgment of the Israel High Court of Justice, HCJ 2056/04, June 30, 2004; The New York Times, Sept. 4, 2007. [14] The Palestine Monitor (Ramallah), Apr. 7, 2002. [15] The New York Times, July 26, 2006. [16] "Battle for the Holy Land, Program #2015," Frontline, PBS, Apr. 4, 2002. [17] Ted Lapkin, "Does Human Rights Law Apply to Terrorists?" Middle East Quarterly, Fall 2004, pp. 3-13. [18] See, for example, Article 68, "Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War," Aug. 12, 1949. [19] The New York Sun, Mar. 14, 2005. [20] Mozammel Haque, "Lesson of Hajj: Sacrifice on the Way of Allah," The Islamic Cultural Center and the London Center Mosque, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [21] Qur. 4:40. [22] Louis Gardet, in Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. 2, vol. IV (Leiden: Brill, 1960), s.v. "Al-Kada' wa'l-Kadar," pp. 365-7. [23] Marmaduke Pickthall, "The Untenable Charge of Fatalism against Muslims," 1927, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [24] Qur. 2:62. [25] E. Kohlberg, in Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. 2, vol. IX, s.v. "Shahid," pp. 203-7. [26] E. Tyan, in Encyclopedia of Islam, ed. 2, vol. II, s.v. "Djihad," pp. 538-40; "Sheikh ‘Ijlin Mosque in Gaza," Palestinian Authority TV, Palestinian Broadcasting Corporation, Aug. 17, 2001. [27] Boaz Ganor, "The Rationality of the Islamic Radical Suicide Attack Phenomenon," International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya, Mar. 21, 2007.

[28] The New York Times, June 10, 2007. [29] Al-Manar (Beirut), July 20, 2006. [30] The Centre Daily Times (State College, Pa.), Oct. 6, 2001. [31] Qur. 5:32. [32] Qur. 2:194. [33] David Zeidan, "The Islamic Fundamentalist View of Life as a Perennial Battle," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Dec. 2001. [34] "Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000," Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [35] Timothy Furnish, "Beheading in the Name of Islam," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 51-7. [36] "Children as Combatants in PA Ideology," TV Archives-Video Library, Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem, Oct. 2000 - mid 2003, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [37] Sheikh Faysal Mawlawi, quoted in "Attacking Civilians in War Times: Juristic Approach," Islam Online Fatwa Bank, Oct. 29, 2002. [38] "Al-Qaradhawi Speaks in Favor of Suicide Operations at an Islamic Conference in Sweden," The Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series, no. 542, July 24, 2003. [39] Asharq al-Awsat (London), July 19, 2003. [40] Martin Kramer, "Ask Professor Esposito," Sandbox, Sept. 26, 2002. [41] The Forward (New York), Sept. 11, 1998; Justus Reid Weiner, "The Use of Palestinian Children in the Al-Aqsa Intifada," Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Nov. 1, 2000. [42] Children and Armed Conflict: International Standards for Action, Human Security Network and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict, New York, Apr. 22, 2003. [43] "PA Indoctrination of Children to Seek Heroic Death for Allah—Shahada," TV Archives-Video Library, Palestinian Media Watch, accessed on Oct. 17, 2007. [44] Palestinian Authority TV, June 28, 2006, video at Palestinian Media Watch website, accessed Oct. 17, 2007. [45] Fox News, May 7, 2007. [46] Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, Mar. 23, 1994). [47] BBC World News, Aug. 24, 2004. [48] The Jerusalem Post, Aug 24, 2006. [49] Matthias Küntzel, "Ahmadinejad's Demons: A Child of the Revolution Takes Over," The New Republic, Apr.14, 2006. [50] Ibid. [51] Ali Alfoneh, "Iran's Suicide Brigades," Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2007, pp. 37-44. [52] "Human Rights Watch in 2005: Political Bias against Israel Continues despite Wider Middle East Focus," NGO Monitor, Jerusalem, Apr. 6, 2006. [53] BBC World News, Apr. 18, 2002. [54] The Washington Times, May 1, 2002. [55] Richard Starr, "The Big Jenin Lie," The Daily Standard, May 8, 2002. [56] See, for example, M. Zuhdi Jasser. "Exposing the ‘Flying Imams,'" Middle East Quarterly, Winter 2008, pp. 3-11. Table of Contents

Exposing the Information Domain Myth - A New Concept for Air Force and Information Operations Doctrine Maj Geoffrey F. Weiss, Air & Space Power Journal, Spring 2008 Editorial Abstract: Within all military services, information remains mischaracterized as a “domain,” and all services have difficulty quantifying and establishing doctrine to exploit the warfighting advantages of information. At least within the US Air Force, the author asserts that a poor doctrinal structure and inadequate definitions of information operations contribute to the problem. He proposes a completely new doctrinal framework, along with recognition of cyberspace as the true domain, in order to begin solving these challenges. The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds. —John Maynard Keynes On 11 September 2001 (9/11), a small group of terrorists brought the most powerful nation on the earth to its knees and paralyzed much of the world. The US economy plunged into recession, the airline industry collapsed, and “soccer moms” rushed out to buy gas masks. The essence of this quintessential, asymmetric assault was not the use of aircraft as weapons or the horrific but nonetheless militarily insignificant results. Indeed, this was information warfare of the highest order. Years of planning, analysis of enemy psychology, assessment of physical vulnerabilities, training, operational security, and brutally efficient execution characterized this psychological

operation. The terrorists did not seek to seize territory or defeat the US military; rather, they intended that 9/11 send messages to multiple audiences: to sympathizers (“We are powerful, join us”); to the United States (“We can hurt you; remove your troops from our soil and change your policies”); and to the world (“Interfere with our agenda at your own peril, for you will be next”). As in ages past, information operations (IO) use messages as weapons, and the enemy currently has the advantage.1 Using weapons is fundamental to the military. Even before 9/11, the US military had begun the process of understanding and harnessing the products of the information revolution taking place throughout the world—a revolution fueled primarily by the advent of the microcomputer and improvements in data-transmission technologies. Whereas in the past, military forces sought to control lines of communication on the physical battlefield—highways, sea-lanes, airfields, and railroads—at present, information itself is the lifeblood of technologically based forces, and its lines of communication often flow through a domain known as cyberspace.2 But not all aspects of IO are technically based; neither are they new to warfare. The martial use of psychological influence has existed since the first caveman frightened his enemy with a howl or distracted him with a tossed rock. Millennia ago, Sun Tzu famously proclaimed that all warfare is based upon deception.3 However, the recent explosion of information technology has piqued our interest in IO. Information has become a valuable resource, a commodity, and a military necessity. Defense and exploitation of this resource has compelled military and civilian leaders alike to act quickly to establish an IO doctrinal framework. The US Air Force (USAF), as perhaps the most technologically centered branch of the armed services—having itself arisen from the achievement of controlled, powered flight—has relied upon the continuous advancement of scientific and technological innovation to remain the overwhelmingly effective fighting force it is today. Even so, rapid advances in information technology and its implications for warfare have obligated the USAF, like the rest of the military, to speed efforts to define and refine its own IO doctrine—to “weaponize” information. This has presented a challenge to doctrine writers as the USAF attempts to establish an effects-based approach to IO that is in concert with air and space power. Clearly the service must have doctrine that is well defined, expansive enough to accommodate the swiftness of change, and sufficiently flexible to assimilate future concepts and capabilities while still adequately treating timeless, nontechnical principles such as psychological operations (PSYOP) and military deception (MILDEC). Current USAF doctrine, for IO in particular, has not met this challenge, partly due to the fact that a necessary and proper delay occurs between analysis of theory/lessons learned and the codification of doctrine—but also because we have not adequately adapted the current structure of the doctrine. Furthermore, shortcomings exist in the definition of IO—arising from a mischaracterization of information itself—that have led to difficulty in understanding and employing IO at all levels of war. An examination of the vast body of writings on the subject of IO reveals near-universal agreement on two points. First, IO is an extremely significant aspect of national security and, by extension, military operations: we must use it to our advantage. Second, the United States cannot seem to get IO right, whether in doctrine, training, definition, employment, leadership, or some combination of these. The IO cognoscenti have prescribed a formidable array of procedural remedies or exhortations to “just do it,” but these have treated only symptoms—not the root problem. None have recommended a fundamental shift in definitions, characterization, and doctrinal architecture. Often the solution to an intractable problem requires a return to first principles, an examination and reformulation of basic beliefs, a system “reboot.” To make IO the weapon it needs to be, the USAF must lead the way and establish IO doctrine built correctly from the ground up. Basics of Doctrine Doctrine can arise from theory, lessons learned, or a study of exercises and experiments. Good doctrine is designed to be understandable and useful in the real world, at the level of warfare for which it is written. Doctrine can prove especially critical in areas that may be least intuitive: IO, for

example. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, defines air and space doctrine as “a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs, warfighting principles, and terminology that describes and guides the proper use of air and space forces in military operations.”4 Because doctrine influences the way the USAF organizes, trains, equips, and sustains its forces, it represents a significant factor not only in the way the service fights but also in terms of the requirements, planning, programming, and budgeting process. The USAF writes basic, operational, and tactical doctrine. The principles of basic doctrine, which reflect the service’s most fundamental and enduring beliefs or “elemental properties,” rarely change. Operational doctrine, which “describes more detailed organization of air and space forces and applies the principles of basic doctrine to military actions,” changes infrequently as well, but more often than basic doctrine since we derive insight from new technologies or lessons learned.5 AFDD 2-3, Irregular Warfare, serves as an example. By contrast, tactical doctrine entails frequent updates with routine innovation in tactics, techniques, and procedures. AFDD 1 plainly and properly states that “it must be emphasized that doctrine development is never complete.”6 Because its users own Air Force doctrine, each Airman must know it, look after it, and help fix it when required. Currently, the USAF publishes basic and operational doctrine in a series of documents arranged hierarchically and organized according to logical functional areas. This doctrinal structure embodies the architectural framework within which doctrine lives, changes, and grows (fig. 1).

Figure 1. Air Force doctrine today. (From “Doctrine Hierarchy,” Air Force Doctrine Center, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/Main.asp? [accessed 5 December 2007].) The USAF arranges doctrine in a classification hierarchy to facilitate its understanding and use, organizing doctrinal categories from general to specific in a series grouped according to function and similarity. Subcategories, though stemming from the same parent category, reflect fundamental differences that distinguish them from each other. For example, AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, and AFDD 2-1.4, Countersea Operations—both encompassed by AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare—differ in terms of target type. To maintain clarity, all doctrine must be logical and adhere to these basic principles. In general, this logically arranged USAF doctrine contains an impressive, time-tested body of wisdom and practical guidance. USAF operational doctrine extends from basic doctrine and begins

with the parent category (AFDD 2, Operations and Organization). Within AFDD 2 one finds the fundamental, “domain,” or core volumes of Air Force operations doctrine: AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare; AFDD 2-2, Space Operations; and AFDD 2-5, Information Operations. Although USAF “living” doctrine has expanded over the years, no significant change has occurred in the overall structure of the doctrine itself—a situation that presents problems when the USAF attempts to “fit” IO and the emerging domain of cyberspace into its body of doctrine. Origins of Information Operations Doctrine If we are to accept air forces as a military weapon, our first inclination is to fit it into the established theories and practices of warfare, with as little disruption as possible. Certainly this takes the least mental effort, and is therefore most inviting. But such an application is not necessarily most efficient. —Air Corps Tactical School, 1935 This epigraph illustrates how airpower itself suffered from the general tendency to force new concepts into old, familiar paradigms. Substitution of the word information for air forces yields much the same condition that exists today with respect to IO. This irony was not apparent to the USAF as it embarked on the task of codifying information-warfare lessons and principles into doctrine shortly after the first Gulf War. In 1995 the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force released Cornerstones of Information Warfare, the service’s first official publication on the subject.7 (Since then, the term information operations has replaced information warfare.) Though not doctrine, this document influenced all later IO publications. The USAF first published IO doctrine in 1998 with the release of AFDD 2-5. In the eyes of the doctrine writers, this original attempt contained a number of conceptual faults, prompting the appearance of a substantially revised edition in 2005.8 Ironically, the first edition did a better job of acknowledging the fundamental and universal nature of IO but awkwardly applied the doctrinal template of air warfare to IO principles, giving rise to such dissonant terminology as “offensive” and “defensive counter information.”9 Regrettably, both efforts have fallen short in articulating IO properly, but that is due to underlying problems with the characterization of information itself. Evidence of the Problem While the US military has a demonstrated capacity to dominate a situation with its technological supremacy and computer software, it has not yet mastered modern Information Warfare, where the most important software exists—between the ears of the local population. —Frank G. Hoffman Only a few documents trumpet our mastery of IO, but a myriad proclaim the opposite. According to Lt Col Charles Hardy of the US Army War College, “most senior military commanders . . . consistently state ‘we are losing the Information Operations fight.’” He also notes that “it is universally accepted that the United States Armed Forces . . . do not apply this element of national power effectively.”10 As an influence-operations program manager in Headquarters USAF (A3), this author witnessed numerous instances of confusion and deficiencies in understanding IO, from tactical to strategic levels. Unsure about what to do with operational-planning billets funded to perform IO, commanders used them for other functions or left them empty. Automated programming and budgeting capabilities as well as assessment tools proved ill suited to accommodate nontechnical influence capabilities, causing difficulties in justifying appropriate funding levels for these programs. In coordination sessions, representatives from the so-called core capabilities of IO—electronic warfare operations, influence operations, and network warfare operations—shared no common frame of reference in terms of operational integration, organization, manpower, training, procurement, or funding. Other than their status as “declared” brethren within IO, little similarity existed between the disciplines. In that regard, Maj Thomas Kardos of the US Army Command and General Staff College describes IO doctrine as “ill founded” and “mistakenly” drawing from too narrow a range of features.11 Similarly, in his assessment of IO in Iraq, Maj Norman Emery of the US Army laments that US forces’ inability to use IO has hampered efforts to quell the insurgency there and has given the enemy an information advantage.12 The Information Domain Myth We cannot get IO doctrine right because we mistakenly identify information as a domain, the latter defined by a standard dictionary as “a field or sphere of activity or influence.” Nor do we find an

acceptable definition of informationthat makes it a domain, the former term defined as something told (i.e., knowledge or data). Information is a resource, a weapon of war and peace. Bullets, bombs, tanks, and pilots are not domains, but they are important aspects of war fighting—as is information, which may take many forms. In its tangible form, information exists and travels in physical space—in its electronic form, it does so in cyberspace. It also exists within the subjective realm of the human mind. Thus, rather than constituting a domain, information resides in and moves across domains. Before we can create the intellectual framework required for the proper understanding and doctrinal classification of IO as well as develop the concept of a legitimate cyberspace domain, we must realize that no single information domain or “environment” exists. IO really involves using information to generate effects that, like information itself, apply to all domains. Once we acknowledge that information is not a domain and is not bounded by a particular domain, then by definition we cannot classify IO in a manner analogous to domain-based doctrine (i.e., air warfare and space operations); neither can we define it within them. From the first recognition of the power of information in modern war, a conscious effort emerged to establish it as a domain—a designation that ultimately led the USAF to juxtapose IO with air warfare and space operations, the subjects of the other domain doctrine documents.13 Dr. George Stein of the US Air War College first articulated many of the principles fundamental to IO today, including the notion of an “information environment” or “realm.”14 With this concept in mind, USAF doctrine writers established the subcategory IO for the domain of information. Though meant to highlight the importance of information alongside the air and space operational domains, this arrangement does not withstand honest intellectual analysis and ultimately has negative implications for understanding and applying IO. Current doctrine often presents IO as something the USAF does along with air and space operations; in fact, those operations often produceIO effects. The doctrine encourages war fighters to perceive a domain-based IO concept, but the ephemeral information domain defies intuitive grasp. Instead, by presenting IO separately from air and space, we give practitioners the mistaken impression that IO is “added in” or occurs “alongside” the other types of operations. Air and space operations are separate elements from IO (fig. 2). AFDD 2-5 also explains that IO is “integral to all Air Force operations and may support, or be supported by, air and space operations.”15

Figure 2. AFDD 2-5’s relationship with IO and air/space operations. (Adapted from AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 7, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_ Docs/afdd2-5.pdf.) Though true, this idea of mutual support and integration leaves out the fact that air and space operations can actually be IO (a point recognized clearly by early airpower theorists such as Billy Mitchell and Giulio Douhet, who asserted that the psychological effects of airpower on the enemy could prove decisive in war). Such diagrams and definitions leave the reader of doctrine with the impression that only network warfare operations, electronic warfare operations, and influence operations constitute IO. This is also incorrect. Properly understood, information and IO span

domains. Many air and space activities can be planned for informational effects, whether in terms of psychology, information itself, or information systems. Although it may take a monumental effort to eradicate the concept of the information domain, such a step is necessary to obtain a more accurate conceptualization of IO. References to the domain or environment of information have become ubiquitous. Even the 2007 edition of AFDD 2 states that “information is an environment in which some aspects of warfare can also be conducted,” going on to specifically designate information as a domain, like air and space.16 As daunting as the prospect of repudiating the information-domain paradigm may seem, the recent designation by the chief of staff and secretary of the Air Force of cyberspace as an official domain and its inclusion in the USAF mission statement provide the intellectual way ahead to make the change.17 Doctrine writers must recognize cyberspace as the true domain for the types of information associated with the information technological revolution. Defining Information Operations After defining information properly and thus intellectually unshackling ourselves, we may more closely examine the definition and composition of IO itself. AFDD 2-5 defines IO as “the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and network warfare operations, in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”18 By virtue of its narrowness, this description causes some problems. For example, under this definition, a strike mission to neutralize a fiber-optic relay station is not IO even though the effect it seeks to create entails disruption of adversarial decision making. A special operations forces team that captures and interrogates an enemy commander has seriously disrupted enemy decision making and added to friendly intelligence (refined information). Should not that be IO? Perhaps the perception that IO definitions were too broad motivated doctrine writers to define IO in this manner. Likely, they reasoned that more narrowly defining IO in terms of “nonkinetic” capabilities would facilitate understanding and application of IO as well as provide doctrinal treatment at long last for electronic warfare operations, network warfare operations, and influence operations. However, as currently defined, IO appears to be more of an orphanage for nonkinetic capabilities than a rational grouping based on true similarity. This “forced cohabitation” of concepts is not trivial since it fosters misconceptions about the nature of IO and places undue emphasis on capabilities rather than effects. Fundamentally, IO deals with effects—not capabilities or means. Therefore, many USAF capabilities that produce information effects are IO. This does not mean that everything is IO, but it does mean that we need a better, intuitive definition for IO that recognizes its broad nature and impact, not limited to a domain. IO fits squarely within the doctrinal concept of the effects-based approach to operations, which states that USAF operations focus upon objectives—not platforms, weapons, or methods.19 For example, a planner may decide to use a bomb, a computer virus, or PSYOP to disable an enemy radar system, so long as the effect remains the same. Other than the fact that these subcategories of IO do not specifically require the release of kinetic bombs and bullets, they are very different. One would be hard pressed to come up with an example of an actual IO plan that consisted only of some combination of influence operations, electronic warfare operations, and/or network warfare operations. More often, IO looks like any other operation—only the timing and/or means are tailored to achieve an IO effect. This accounts for the ongoing debate about whether a B-52 strike on an air defense command facility constitutes IO or air warfare. Intuition and logic say it must be both, but current doctrine suggests otherwise. The association of IO with specific capabilities versus effects presents a challenge for commanders who want to employ IO but are often unsure about how to combine influence operations, electronic warfare operations, or network warfare operations. Commanders and Airmen can easily overlook the IO aspects inherent in traditional applications of air and space power and may adopt a recipe approach to IO—a little electronic warfare operations here, a smidgen of network warfare operations there, and a dollop of influence operations just for good measure. In practice, because of its separate treatment from traditional, kinetic activities within air and space operations, IO

tends to become marginalized, a situation that negatively affects budgeting, training, manpower, and employment. Another key disparity between the stated core capabilities of IO involves the technical versus nontechnical. Many military professionals would be surprised to learn that IO actually is not a product of the revolution in information technology! The coincidence of IO as a term with technical advancement in information technology has led to the specious conclusion that they are one and the same. But IO does not necessarily concern itself with computers and disk drives. PSYOP and MILDEC, for example, can rely upon very low-tech methods yet remain effective. The constituent elements of IO differ in more ways than their technological basis. Influence operations consist of operations security, MILDEC, PSYOP, public affairs, counterintelligence, and counterpropaganda. “Subjective” in nature (i.e., they target the human mind as well as the perceptions and decision making of the enemy or a population), these operations employ varied means in any medium. In contrast, electronic warfare operations—based on exploiting electromagnetic technology for combat effects—are “objective” in nature, employing specific technical means to generate effects in any domain, whether air, space, or cyberspace. However, simply being nonkinetic does not equate to information, and electronic warfare operations share little in common with influence operations. Finally, network warfare operations are quite different from influence operations and electronic warfare operations. Though technologically centered, they more narrowly focus upon computer systems and networks. In application, network warfare operations differ significantly from influence operations or electronic warfare operations, bearing little resemblance to traditional air and space operations and functioning squarely in the realm of cyberspace. The incompatibility among IO elements as currently defined indicates that something is clearly amiss. Beginning with the information domain myth and extending throughout the capabilities of IO and into the emerging domain of cyberspace, the evidence points directly to a pressing need for a remedy. But what form should the cure take? A New Doctrinal Architecture Sometimes the solutions will require acknowledgement of past mistakes, and acceptance of insights for which none of our learning has prepared us. —Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser The solution to these doctrinal challenges lies not within the content per se but in the doctrine’s definitions and construction. The framework of USAF operations doctrine needs an overhaul to add flexibility, logically place capabilities, and allow for future doctrinal growth. Toward those ends, this article makes the following specific recommendations: (1) eliminate the concept of information as a domain, redefine IO, and establish it as a fundamental, effects-based approach to the operations concept under AFDD 2; (2) define and institute two broad subcategories of operations doctrine known as objective and subjective operations to create doctrinal “space” for treatment of all conceivable types of operations, especially influence operations; and (3) create a new operational- domain category within AFDD 2 known as cyberspace operations. Until we define IO properly, no one will recognize its full power. Information is not a domain, and IO is more than a laundry list of nonkinetic capabilities. It involves the generation of combat effects created by objective or subjective operations within the air, space, or cyberspace domains. Therefore, the following serves as a proper definition for USAF IO: the integrated employment of Air Force capabilities to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary information, information systems, perceptions, and/or decision making while protecting our own. This definition adds the word information and recognizes that information systems also affect perceptions and all decision making. This definition and placement offer a key benefit by ending the confusion and debate over what constitutes IO. A bomber can execute a doctrinally sound strategic-attack mission that generates IO effects. Special operations forces can perform foreign internal defense and IO at the same time. Some people may argue that this definition is too broad and not prescriptive enough. On the contrary, IO is a broad concept; artificially defining it more explicitly constitutes a disservice to everyone who uses it. In recognition of its broad applicability, IO should move doctrinally “above” the domain-based categories as a direct adjunct to AFDD 2. Given the status of

intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as an essential aspect of IO with ties to all three domains, it should be a subcategory of IO (fig. 3).

Figure 3. Operational doctrine, information operations, and objective and subjective categories This new definition will facilitate IO planning and employment. Commanders will still appoint an individual to supervise an IO planning cell; however, the IO team will not be restricted to an arbitrary set of disciplines. Instead, its members will identify the effects and outcomes that IO can produce, and through coordination and integration with every element of the effort—proceeding from strategy to task—they will apportion the forces and define the tasks required to carry out the commander’s intent. The second recommendation entails creating categories of operational doctrine designated as objective operations and subjective operations (see fig. 3). Our dictionary defines objective as “having to do with a known or perceived object as distinguished from something existing only in the mind.” Many air, space, and even cyberspace operations are objective in nature—that is, we conduct them in the physical world against physical targets. This author defines objective operations as the subset of all operations conducted to achieve primary effects in the physical world and/or against objects perceived or known, as opposed to operations designed to influence the human mind. In contrast, our dictionary defines subjective as “of, affected by, or produced by the mind.” We conduct subjective operations across all physical domains to achieve cognitive effects. This author defines such operations as the subset of all operations conducted to achieve primary effects in the cognitive domain and to influence the perceptions, emotions, and/or reasoning of a human target or targets. Creation of these classifications necessarily recognizes that military operations in the physical and cognitive domains differ sufficiently to warrant separate treatment. The objective operations/subjective operations doctrinal construct establishes a comprehensive doctrinal framework and creates an architecture in which the former constituent IO capabilities can find their proper place. More significantly, it elevates subjective operations from deep within the doctrinal hierarchy; divorces them from the objective, techno-centric disciplines of electronic warfare operations and network warfare operations; and imbues them with the visibility needed for appropriate understanding. We have not readily understood the importance of subjective operations to warfare in the technological age, but now more than ever, with direct combat against an identifiable enemy an increasingly difficult proposition, the ability to influence adversaries and communicate truthfully to friends and allies has become essential. Indeed, AFDD 2 sagaciously states that “there is a psychological component to almost every set of effects and this component is often among the most important in terms of achieving objectives, especially at the operational and strategic levels” (emphasis in original).20 Figure 4 illustrates the proposed structure of a doctrinal category of subjective operations. Influence operations and a new subcategory—strategic communications—become the key elements of subjective operations. Influence operations are simplified to two main elements—MILDEC, which targets the mind of an individual decision maker, and PSYOP, which targets an adversary populace or group. Influence operations do not necessarily depend upon specialized hardware or advanced technology. But they do depend upon the ability of the influence operations planner—aided by

accurate intelligence and human-factors analysis—to get into the mind of the target(s) and creatively produce operations that result in the desired effect (normally an action or inaction). The other currently defined capabilities of influence operations—operations security, counterintelligence, public affairs, and counterpropaganda—are logically redistributed. Operations security falls within the parent IO category since it applies across all operations and domains. Counterintelligence appears within intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance as a natural counterpoint to intelligence. Counterpropaganda comes under the parent category of subjective operations because it can be conducted by PSYOP and public affairs, for example. Public affairs becomes the cornerstone of strategic communications. Like MILDEC and PSYOP, public affairs also targets the mind—but with truthful, credible information. Though AFDD 2-5 lists public affairs as an element of influence operations, the USAF public affairs community has understandably disassociated itself from “influence” and has created an Office of Strategic Communications, which merges public affairs with multimedia operations such as videography, photography, and broadcasting. Maj Gen Erwin Lessel III, former director of this office, notes that strategic communications depend upon truthfulness to establish credibility with all audiences, stressing that “there is a difference between wanting to inform people or influence them, and there are appropriate ways to do both.”21 Thus, the subcategories of public affairs and multimedia operations become the fundamental elements of the strategic communications category. This framework is more consistent with the requirement to maintain appropriate separation between influence in the form of MILDEC and PSYOP and to inform through strategic communications. These changes result in a doctrinal category of subjective operations that is complete and complementary to objective operations.

Figure 4. Structure of subjective operations Figure 5 illustrates the structure of the objective operations category. These operations consist of all operational categories and their supporting functions (e.g., combat support and weather operations) that function in physical domains against objective target sets (e.g., destroying a bridge, protecting a network, launching a satellite, transporting troops, etc.). As a cosmetic change, air warfare is renamed air operations for the sake of consistency. As an objective operation that spans domains, electronic warfare operations assume an appropriate position alongside the domain categories under objective operations. This designation eliminates the arbitrary placement of these operations as an IO core capability and establishes the doctrinal flexibility to accommodate future doctrine on directed energy.22 At the same time, proper treatment of network warfare operations requires implementation of the final recommendation—creation of a domain-based operational category of cyberspace operations.

Figure 5. Structure of objective operations Creation of the doctrinal classification of cyberspace operations represents a significant and necessary part of this proposal (see fig. 5). In 2005 the secretary and chief of staff of the Air Force redefined the service’s mission as “deliver[ing] sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—to fly and fight in Air, Space, and Cyberspace” (emphasis added). Furthermore, the secretary decreed that “defending and fighting in the Cyber Domain is absolutely critical to maintain operations in Ground, Sea, Air and Space.”23 This author defines cyberspace operations as the employment of Air Force capabilities to defend and exploit electromagnetic information processing, storage, and transmission systems for military effect. Computers and networks are the gateways for cyberspace, so network warfare operations logically belong within cyberspace operations. Network warfare operations establish cyber dominance, just as air and space operations establish air and space dominance. In the final analysis, this proposal amounts to nothing if the end results do not translate into positive, meaningful effects for the war fighter. Figure 6 illustrates how each operational concept relates to the overall operation, maximizes its own unique capabilities, and integrates them to produce synergistic effects across the full spectrum of operations. The principle resembles that of the joint force—each service specializes along functional lines to build maximum power and then integrates that power into the joint force.

Figure 6. Operational model for integrated effects IO is that subset of all operations that generate information effects or use information as a tool to realize objectives. All the elements of IO are visible and present in this model, thus allowing for proper focus and emphasis on each critical piece and discouraging the tendency to paint IO with a broad brush as a monolithic concept—a practice that has watered down its efficacy by marginalizing its constituent elements. With the focus on effects and the elimination of artificial associations, planners are free to combine capabilities in the most efficient manner, resulting in synergy and economy of force. Without question, the implications of these recommendations extend beyond IO and USAF doctrine. In order for this proposal to have any enduring effect, adoption and standardization will have to take place within the entire government and military community, including the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff, and sister services. Even then, we would need a great deal of intellectual

effort to flesh out the new IO doctrine and set up conceptual foundations for objective operations, subjective operations, and cyberspace operations. Although it is never too late to get the doctrine right, the sooner we do so, the better. Every day that passes brings further ossification to a body of IO doctrine that remains confusing and ineffective to the war fighter. Conclusion The information domain myth and current doctrinal treatment of IO have led to uncertainty about what IO is and its relationship to the other elements of operations. Logical analysis reveals IO as a broader, more fundamental concept than we currently acknowledge. The solution to this quandary starts with refutation of the idea of information as a domain, which enables us to redefine IO and establish it as a more fundamental component of operations doctrine—a key supporting function to all operations rather than another domain-based category such as air, space, or cyberspace operations. Furthermore, the institution of a broader doctrinal architecture—as represented by the parent categories of subjective and objective operations—creates the room within doctrine to establish visibility and promote development of traditional operational concepts as well as those that target the cognitive domain. Instead of an information environment, we can speak of the subjective environment, and everyone will understand that the effects and objectives are cognitive and perceptual. Implementation will naturally lead to improvements in funding, organizing, training, and equipping our forces to produce war-winning results. Lastly, creating a cyberspace domain puts the finishing touch on a long-overdue doctrinal renovation that should stand the test of time. By reforming doctrine in this manner, war fighters of the future will better understand IO and IO-related doctrine, creating a more efficient and effective force across the entire spectrum of warfare. Our forces will have the knowledge and tools to turn the tide on our adversaries and, hopefully, give critics of IO much less to write about. Notes 1. Here, the term messages refers not to specifics such as e-mail, radio signals, or memoranda but to the general idea of any information transmission/reception by any means. For example, a carrier strike force sends a “message” because it creates perceptions in those observing it. The message is the information conveyed by the action or inaction of forces under our control and can include deception and psychological operations. 2. Many definitions of cyberspace exist, but perhaps the best is also the simplest and least constraining. Appropriately enough, one can find this term defined in an online dictionary as the “realm of electronic communication.” Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/cyberspace. Perhaps a better definition would be “the domain in which information moves or resides while in electromagnetic form.” Examples of cyberspace include fiber-optic transmission lines, wireless signals, magnetic or optical storage devices, or computer chips. 3. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963), 66. 4. Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, 17 November 2003, ix, https://www.doctrine .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd1.pdf. 5. Ibid., 7. 6. Ibid., 3. 7. Cornerstones of Information Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1995), http://www.c4i.org/ cornerstones.html; see also Maj James L. Griffith, “United States Air Force Information Operations Doctrine: Is It Relevant?” (thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 49. 8. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, [i] (“Summary of Revisions”), https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdc privateweb/AFDD_Page_HTML/Doctrine_Docs/afdd2-5.pdf. 9. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 5 August 1998, v, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afd2_ 5.pdf (accessed 30 August 2006). 10. Lt Col Charles K. Hardy, “Information Operations as an Element of National Power: A Practitioner’s Perspective on Why the United States Can’t Get It Right,” strategy research project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2005), 1, http://www.strategicstudies institute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil126.pdf. 11. Maj Thomas J. Kardos, “Information Superiority: Seeking Command of the Cyber-Sea” (thesis, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2000), 5. 12. Maj Norman Emery, “Information Operations in Iraq,” Military Review 84, no. 3 (May–June 2004): 11, http://calldp. leavenworth. army.mil/eng_mr/2006080808030243/2004/03_May_Jun/04_emery.pdf#xml=/scripts/cqcgi.exe/@ss_prod.env? CQ_SESSION_KEY=WSOMSUNSXHEQ&CQ_QH=124697&CQDC=5&CQ_PDF_HIGHLIGHT=YES&CQ_CUR_ DOCUMENT=9. 13. Generally attributed to the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, ca. 1991. 14. Griffith, “United States Air Force Information Operations Doctrine,” 47–48. 15. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1. 16. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April 2007, 21, https://www.doctrine.af.mil/afdcprivateweb/AFDD_Page_ HTML/Doctrine_Docs/AFDD2.pdf.

17. SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Cyber Summit Begins at Pentagon Nov. 16,” Air Force Print News, 15 November 2006, http://www. af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123032005 (accessed 17 November 2006). 18. AFDD 2-5, Information Operations, 11 January 2005, 1. 19. AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, 13. 20. Ibid., 90. 21. SSgt Julie Weckerlein, “Strategic Communication Applies to Every Airman,” Air Force Print News, 20 September 2006, http://www.af.mil/news/story_print.asp?storyID=123027426 (accessed 17 November 2006). 22. For example, directed-energy weapons may operate and cause effects in air or space and from air or space; therefore, electronic warfare operations must not be a subcategory under air or space operations. They must remain separate. By placing electronic warfare operations outside the other domain-based doctrine categories, we are free to include doctrine on their use in any domain. 23. Secretary Michael W. Wynne and Gen T. Michael Moseley, “SECAF/CSAF Letter to Airmen: Mission Statement,” 7 December 2005, http://www.af.mil/library/viewpoints/jvp.asp?id=192; and Michael W. Wynne, “Cyberspace as a Domain in Which the Air Force Flies and Fights” (remarks to the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Integration Conference, Crystal City, VA, 2 November 2006), http://www.af.mil/library/speeches/speech.asp?id=283 (accessed 17 November 2006). Table of Contents

NATO Says Cyber Warfare Poses as Great a Threat as a Missile Attack By Bobbie Johnson, The Guardian, March 6 2008 NATO is treating the threat of cyber warfare as seriously as the risk of a missile strike, according to a senior official. A London conference was told that online espionage and internet-based terrorism now represent some of the gravest threats to global security. Suleyman Anil, who is in charge of protecting NATO against computer attacks, said: "Cyber defence is now mentioned at the highest level along with missile defence and energy security. "We have seen more of these attacks and we don't think this problem will disappear soon. Unless globally supported measures are taken, it can become a global problem." Anil, who is head of NATO's computer incident response centre, told the E-Crime congress in London that the cost of hi-tech strikes on government communications was falling, while the amount of damage they could inflict grew. Among the chief threats is cyber terrorism, in which attempts are made to shut down online communication networks or use the internet to attack official institutions. Although some have warned of the possible threat since the 1980s, it is only in recent years that the issue has made it onto the radar of governments around the world. But Anil also warned of rogue nations who could sponsor internet-based attacks on NATO members. "There are nations who are not just working on defence capabilities, but who have attack capabilities - and that brings a new dimension to the whole issue," he said. The annual E-Crime congress is one the largest gatherings of those who work to combat cyber crime. Delegates included banking experts, police and IT industry luminaries, all keen to discover new ways to fight online crime. The prospect of internet-based warfare has come to the fore after a series of high-profile international attacks. Last year, it emerged that a gang of hackers, believed to be from China, had infiltrated computer systems at the Pentagon and launched attacks on government networks in Britain, Germany, India and Australia. US officials, who have labelled the group Titan Rain, have accused them of operating under the auspices of officials in Beijing. Another strike in Estonia, which has one of the most hi-tech governments in the world, was initially blamed on hackers backed by the Russian authorities. However only one teenager, an Estonian, has been arrested in connection with the incident so far. To coincide with the congress, shadow home secretary David Davis will today announce Conservative proposals on online crime - including the creation of a new post of cyber security minister. The Tory plans also outline the reinstitution of a national hi-tech crimes police squad, and

forming a dedicated unit inside the Crown Prosecution Service for dealing with computer crime cases. "Cybercrime is a growing and serious threat to individuals, business and government. It is a problem that will continue to escalate as technology changes," said Davis. Kevin Poulsen, a former hacker who is now an editor with technology magazine Wired, has accused politicians and the media of overplaying the fear factor. "In some ways, Estonia's attacks were less sophisticated than previous 'cyberwars' - like those between Israeli and Palestinian hackers, India and Pakistan, China and the US," he said. "Even those attacks fell short of a cyber war, at least as experts have defined the term. I'm sceptical that real cyber war, or cyber terrorism, will ever take place." Despite the lack of hard evidence on the nature or identities of cyber terrorists, however, the threat is deemed serious enough for the White House to allocate $6bn (£3bn) for strengthening its systems against attack. Those plans have been characterised by critics as a potential invasion of civil liberties. Bush administration officials say they are a necessary defensive measure. Homeland security secretary Michael Chertoff has called it "one area where we have significant work to do". Table of Contents

Cyber-Rebels in Cuba Defy State’s Limits By James C. Mckinley Jr., New York Times, 6 March 2008 HAVANA — A growing underground network of young people armed with computer memory sticks, digital cameras and clandestine Internet hookups has been mounting some challenges to the Cuban government in recent months, spreading news that the official state media try to suppress. Last month, students at a prestigious computer science university videotaped an ugly confrontation they had with Ricardo Alarcón, the president of the National Assembly. Mr. Alarcón seemed flummoxed when students grilled him on why they could not travel abroad, stay at hotels, earn better wages or use search engines like Google. The video spread like wildfire through Havana, passed from person to person, and seriously damaged Mr. Alarcón’s reputation in some circles. Something similar happened in late January when officials tried to impose a tax on the tips and wages of employees of foreign companies. Workers erupted in jeers and shouts when told about the new tax, a moment caught on a cellphone camera and passed along by memory sticks. “It passes from flash drive to flash drive,” said Ariel, 33, a computer programmer, who, like almost everyone else interviewed for this article, asked that his last name not be used for fear of political persecution. “This is going to get out of the government’s hands because the technology is moving so rapidly.” Cuban officials have long limited the public’s access to the Internet and digital videos, tearing down unauthorized satellite dishes and keeping down the number of Internet cafes open to Cubans. Only one Internet cafe remains open in Old Havana, down from three a few years ago. Hidden in a small room in the depths of the Capitol building, the state-owned cafe charges a third of the average Cuban’s monthly salary — about $5 — to use a computer for an hour. The other two former Internet cafes in central Havana have been converted into “postal services” that let Cubans send e-mail messages over a closed network on the island with no links to the Internet. “It’s a sort of telegraph service,” said one young man, shrugging as he waited in line to use the computers at a former Internet cafe on O’Reilly Street. Yet the government’s attempts to control access are increasingly ineffective. Young people here say there is a thriving black market giving thousands of people an underground connection to the world outside the Communist country.

People who have smuggled in satellite dishes provide illegal connections to the Internet for a fee or download movies to sell on discs. Others exploit the connections to the Web of foreign businesses and state-run enterprises. Employees with the ability to connect to the Internet often sell their passwords and identification numbers for use in the middle of the night. Hotels catering to tourists provide Internet services, and Cubans also exploit those conduits to the Web. Even the country’s top computer science school, the University of Information Sciences, set in a campus once used by Cuba’s spy services, has become a hotbed of cyber-rebels. Students download everything from the latest American television shows to articles and videos criticizing the government, and pass them quickly around the island. “There is a whole underground market of this stuff,” Ariel said. The video of Mr. Alarcón’s clash with students was leaked to the BBC and CNN, giving the world a rare glimpse of the discontent among the young with the system. His answers to the questions seemed evasive. Asked about the ban on travel, Mr. Alarcón suggested that if everyone who wished to were allowed to travel, there would not be enough airspace for the planes. Another event many people witnessed through the digital underground was the arrival in the United States of Carlos Otero, a popular television personality and humorist in Cuba who defected in December while on a trip to Toronto. Illegal antennas caught signals from Miami television stations, which youths turned into digital videos and shared. Though the event smacked more of celebrity news than politics, it would never have been shown on the official media. Some young journalists have also started blogs and Internet news sites, using servers in other countries, and their reports are reaching people through the digital underground. Yoani Sánchez, 32, and her husband, Reinaldo Escobar, 60, established Consenso desde Cuba , a Web site based in Germany. Ms. Sánchez has attracted a considerable following with her blog, Generación Y, in which she has artfully written gentle critiques of the government by describing her daily life in Cuba. Ms. Sánchez and her husband said they believed strongly in using their names with articles despite the possible political repercussions. Shortly before Raúl Castro was elected president last week to replace his ailing brother, Fidel, Ms. Sánchez wrote a piece describing what sort of president she wanted. She said the country did not need a soldier, a charismatic leader or a great speaker, but “a pragmatic housewife” who favored freedom of speech and open elections. Writing later about Raúl Castro’s first speech as president, she criticized his vague promises of change, saying they were as clear as the Rosetta Stone was when it was first found. Both essays would be impossible to publish in Cuba. “The Internet has become the only terrain that is not regulated,” she said in an interview. Because Ms. Sánchez, like most Cubans, can get online for only a few minutes at a time, she writes almost all her essays beforehand, then goes to the one Internet cafe, signs on, updates her Web site, copies some key pages that interest her and walks out with everything on a memory stick. Friends copy the information, and it passes from hand to hand. “It’s a solid underground,” she said. “The government cannot control the information.” It is spread by readers like Ricardo, 28, a philosophy student at the University of Havana who sells memory sticks to other students. European friends buy blank flash drives, and others carry them into Cuba, where the drives available through normal channels are very expensive and scarce. Like many young Cubans, Ricardo plays a game of cat and mouse with the authorities. He doubts that the government will ever let ordinary citizens have access to the Internet in their homes. “That’s far too dangerous,” he said. “Daddy State doesn’t want you to get informed, so it preventively keeps you from surfing.”

Pedro, a midlevel official with a government agency, said he often surfed Web sites like the BBC and The Miami Herald at work, searching for another view of the news besides the ones presented in the state-controlled media. He predicted that the 10,000 students studying the Internet and programming at the University of Information Sciences would transform the country over time, opening up more and more avenues of information. “We are training an army of information specialists,” he said. Table of Contents

Air Force Official Wants 'Virtual' Cyber Command By Joseph Morton, Omaha World-Herald March 6, 2008 WASHINGTON -- Even as cities across the country try to land the permanent home of a new Cyber Command, Air Force Secretary Michael Wynne on Wednesday downplayed the role of such a central base of operations. Wynne told the Senate Armed Services Committee he has asked that the Cyber Command "become virtual" and is encouraging its commander to look at business models in the private sector. "We've said we don't want you to be the standard, pro-forma command that you might see from the Napoleonic era," Wynne said. "We think we should go into the information age, so we asked them to look at Accenture and Amazon and companies like that to see how they operate and minimize the headquarters." Bellevue has lobbied for locating the new command at Offutt Air Force Base. Offutt already is the headquarters for U.S. Strategic Command, the militarywide command in charge of cyberspace operations. The Air Force is making it clear that the new command will include cyberspecialists spread around the country. The idea of a dispersed network of cybergeeks staying in touch electronically is logical to a certain extent, Sen. Ben Nelson, a member of the committee, said in an interview. But the Nebraska Democrat also said it's important to have a brick-and-mortar facility for upper- level commanders. "Having the basic command with the senior people in it in one location does have some merit," Nelson said. "You walk next door and talk to each other and don't have to do it through e-mail." Wynne updated the senators on his timetable for selecting a location. Officials will evaluate the locations seeking the headquarters from July until November, when they will select four finalists. They aim to make their final choice the following month, he said. Communities are anxious to host the headquarters because it would bring hundreds of jobs and help attract high-tech, private defense companies. Wynne said the Air Force has been contacted by 16 states interested in hosting the new command. For now, the Cyber Command is getting organized at a provisional location at Barksdale Air Force Base near Shreveport, La. Barksdale is one of the locations vying for the permanent headquarters. Nelson and others on the Armed Service Committee also questioned why Air Force commanders suggest that they need $20 billion a year more than proposed in President Bush's budget to replace aging fighters, bombers and cargo aircraft. Nelson said it's a flawed process when the White House requests inadequate funding and leaves it up to Congress to make up the difference. But he said lawmakers will probably provide the Air Force with more money than proposed by Bush. Nelson said he agrees with Air Force commanders that the growth of the other military services puts a strain on the Air Force, which provides transportation and support in the field. "It may not be as much as they're asking for per year," Nelson said, "but clearly additional planes are going to be necessary."

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Synchronizing Information: The Importance of New Media in Conflict By Matt Armstrong, USC Center for Public Diplomacy, 6 Mar 2008 The effectiveness of information campaigns today will more often dictate a victory than how well bullets and bombs are put on a target. Putting information on target is more important when dealing with an asymmetric adversary that cannot – and does not need to – match the military or economic power of the United States and her allies. Insurgents and terrorists increasingly leverage New Media to shape perceptions around the globe to be attractive to some and intimidating to others. New Media collapses traditional concepts of time and space as information moves around the world in an instant. Unlike traditional media, search engines and the web in general, enable information, factual or not, to be quickly and easily accessed long after it was created. The result is a shift in the purpose of physical engagement to increasingly incorporate the information effect of words and deeds. Thus, the purpose of improvised explosive devices, for example, is not to kill or maim Americans but to replay images of David sticking it to Goliath. The U.S. military is actively and aggressively revising its role in shaping its own narrative in cyberspace, but this is falling short. While the U.S. is finally coming to grips with the centrality of information and perceptions, it remains confused as to how to use information effectively. American responses seem to stem from the belief that the message and the messenger we are countering are the same without regard for the target audience, intent, or how the message fits into a larger narrative, which perhaps mirrors our own perception of information as propaganda. The link between the propaganda of deeds and the propaganda of words is very real and is increasingly established not in traditional media but online through instant and persistent media that reaches a growing audience. The U.S. needs to master this link in real time in order to win the information war and ultimately the physical one. The American Firewall Bifurcating the means to inform and counter adversarial messages challenges our effectiveness in telling our story. The uniquely American firewall between conversations with overseas audiences and domestic audiences limits our ability to create a discourse with foes and their base, allies, "swing-voters," and the domestic public. The result is a foreign policy shaped more through unanswered adversarial narratives rather than American narratives. This fear of being overheard in America has done more to neuter U.S. responses and to encourage the creation of new information functions than anything else. The American response has been to allow the development of an information architecture that cares more about how a broadcast, flyer, or message will play in Iowa than in the primary center of gravity of the fight: the minds of the support base of our adversary. In 2008, the Defense Department (DoD) will look into how the National Security Act of 1947 should be modified to adapt to 21st Century conflict. In February, the Defense Sciences Board on Strategic Communication released its report. While the DoD-sponsored report has yet to be written, the DSB report incompletely addresses the functional, institutional, and bureaucratic barriers to the necessary synchronization across the whole of government. Defense Leads Because It Has To The different working philosophies of the State Department and DoD pose another challenge to the promotion of the U.S. narrative. The State Department’s Public Diplomacy is configured to influence over an extended period of years or decades. Rarely is it intended to shift ideas and perceptions over months or even weeks. This is a problem in the 24/7 global information environment that hinders State’s ability to be effective. DoD runs by a different clock. DoD influence operations – such as Public Affairs, Information Operations and Psychological Operations – work proactively and frequently as part of a

multifaceted approach to shape outcomes both during and immediately after an event. The extended DoD timeline includes State-like longue durée approaches, but it mostly operates in the “here and now” because of the need to respond to the current battlefield. While the focus on the “now” allows DoD to make better use of New Media, there are other, institutional, challenges to the effectiveness of its information campaigns. Within DoD there is a separation mimicking the distinction between Public Affairs (PA) and Public Diplomacy. PA views any contact with Information Operations (IO) to be “dirty” and “tainting”. In practice, IO is used before something is public but after the media gets wind of it, IO drops it and PA picks up the issue and starts from scratch. The result is an informational strategy that falters from the start because handoffs from one group to the other, if they occur at all, are incomplete and disconnected. Capacity problems at State and the disappearance of the United States Information Agency, the two civilian organizations traditionally charged with U.S. public information and persuasion campaigns further compelled the military to step up and respond to the battlefield of today and tomorrow. It is DoD, more often than State, that is now in the “last three feet” of engagement with foreign publics, either directly or in the media. The Secretary of Defense is asked more frequently than the Secretary of State about resurrecting the United States Information Agency. Furthermore, as the Bush Administration has intentionally shifted the virtual ownership of the wars on to the military, today news from the field comes primarily from uniformed personnel. Weaponizing Information A famous dead Prussian once said that war is a continuation of politics by other means, but the reality today is that war is not part of political intercourse with foes but an orchestrated, if loosely, effort to gain strategic influence over friends, foes, and neutrals. YouTube, blogs, SMS and traditional media, make every GI Joe and Jihadi a communicator, public diplomat, and persuader. Our adversaries understand and exploit this reality. Writing to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri stated that “we are in a battle, and that more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media [sic].” The U.S. military as reluctant heir to the information throne in an online world has several inherent challenges. First, operating in the environment of New Media requires awareness and agility inconsistent with the current organizational culture of the military. For example, in Iraq the military broke through the bureaucratic red-tape and started posting videos on YouTube. However, this small “victory” was incomplete: the group that uploaded to YouTube was still not permitted to view YouTube. In effect, they were posting information they were not authorized to see. These passive publications were without any or very little context and did not readily fit into larger and active narratives. On occasion these videos, such as those of Al-Qaeda recruiting child soldiers or using the mentally handicapped as human bombs, are released through sterile public affairs briefings because active management of information is considered “influence” and a violation of the "statutory responsibility to factually and accurately inform various publics without intent to propagandize or manipulate public opinion." But not giving information the necessary context and inserting it into a synchronized narrative is self-muting in the New Media environment. The U.S. might not be able to prevent our enemies from disseminating information, but we could and must engage them in the information sphere. Without engagement "actions are often abandoned to interpretation" and are left "hanging outside the narrative to be picked up." Too often they are placed within a context of the listener’s choosing or risk cooption by a third-party to reinforce an alternative narrative. There is a two-fold need to create the right capability for managing information. First, there is the underlying requirement to understand the enemy, his message, and its effect. Sun Tzu wrote of the need to know the enemy and yourself. In traditional warfighting this is well understood. In the informational world, it is still a lesson being learned. The necessary shift is underway in the military. The new Operations manual of the U.S. Army, FM 3-0 includes a chapter titled Information Effects. Leading this revision is Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, the former chief spokesman and Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects for the

mission in Iraq. LTG Caldwell understands the power of information and lays out the requirements for credibility and effectiveness in a simple meme, the “Four B’s”: Be Honest, Be Open, Be Relevant, and Be Ready. To be effective, the U.S. military, as America’s de facto leading public diplomat, must be proactive, agile, adaptable, and, most of all, credible. Actions and words must be focused locally and globally at the same time. This solution is not changing precision-guided munitions into precision-guided media, but participating in a discourse with a global audience in a grammar that resonates with all. This is ultimately a leadership challenge. While entrusting "strategic corporals" to carry weapons and high-explosives, lack of proper training and experience in working with information causes many leaders to dread their role as perception managers and they react by ignoring it. Yet the media is hardly a threat compared to an uninformed soldier, an unanswered attack or subversion, and a misinformed public. The military must drop its zero-defect mentality. While it is better to be accurate than rapid, silence is not golden and concedes the advantage to the adversary. At the level of engagement, LTG Caldwell has another simple meme to encourage the strategic corporal, the Four E’s: Encourage, Educate, Empower (e.g. underwrite mistakes), and Equip (e.g. provide YouTube access). Unfamiliarity with the power of persuasion without force impedes these processes as leaders are unsure how to handle information. Fortunately, doctrine is evolving that will be used to train and guide future engagements in the psychological struggle in which adversaries are participating while our forces are not. Communications “target practice” to develop these skills could help overcome this aversion and lack of understanding. When “expert” ribbons are awarded for achievements in this category, invariably abilities will quickly improve. Authorization to declassify material must be accelerated or revamped so as not to automatically classify everything. Further, permission to release material must be moved closer to the point of collection. Three months to release a diary of an Al-Qaeda leader that revealed his organization’s decline (a release that was done in the Blogger Roundtable) or nearly as long for the child soldier videos mentioned earlier is excessive, unnecessary, and costly to mission success. Thinking before Engaging Edward R. Murrow, the only chief of the United States Information Agency who regularly attended National Security Council Meetings, famously stated that public diplomacy must not only be in on the “crash landings” but also at the “take-offs.” This is true of any attempt to persuade or compel, which are the goals of both foreign policy and military operations. It is essential that the information effects of what we do are considered from the outset, including the impact of information campaigns. Increasing ambiguity through obfuscation is bound to be detrimental rather than advantageous. Truth must be used generously and misinformation sparingly in the struggle for the people’s minds and wills because legitimacy and trust cannot be achieved through lies and force. Increasing ambiguity through obfuscation is bound to be detrimental rather than advantageous. Truth must be used generously and misinformation sparingly in the struggle for the people’s minds and wills because legitimacy and trust cannot be achieved through lies and force. The modern, "rugged communication landscape" requires finesse and a persistent voice to achieve credibility and influence over target audiences. The decentralization of distribution hubs has democraticized information, with individuals contributing their own “soda straw” view of events and being selective in their media consumption. The U.S. has excessively, and unnecessarily, restrained itself in the “war of ideas”. Contemporary American information bureaucracies are not adapted to current realities. Today, states are marginalized as information is increasingly democraticized, and produced and acted upon by individuals and groups in a kind of “market of loyalties.” Without an institutional cultural shift, American word pairs associated with shaping perceptions – “public diplomacy”, “strategic communications”, “public affairs”, “information operations” and the rest – are quaint silos of

excellence that continue to lack the synchronicity required to be effective today. Failing to understand this means it is increasingly likely that those with diverging opinions will become motivated and empowered to take extreme, kinetic actions against the U.S. and her interests. Embracing this new reality can enhance the probability that the U.S. and her allies, along with the noble values they represent, will ultimately prevail. Empowering the military to respond is the second best option available, but without a civilian agency to “own” the effort, it is the only viable one. Table of Contents

Analysis: Chinese Cyberattacks on Experts By Shaun Waterman, UPI, March 6, 2008 Defense-related think tanks and contractors, as well as the Pentagon and other U.S. agencies, were the target of repeated computer network intrusions last year apparently originating in China, the Department of Defense said this week. In its annual report to lawmakers on China's military power, the department said the intrusions "appeared to originate in" China but added, "It is unclear if these intrusions were conducted by, or with the endorsement of" the Chinese government or military. The report gave few details, but one China expert who works in the private sector told United Press International that in the last 18 months, China scholars who have close links to the U.S. government have been the repeated targets of sophisticated hacking attempts, using malicious software packages called Trojan horses hidden in e-mail attachments. "Almost every think tank in Washington has dealt with this," said the expert, who did not want to be named because of the ongoing investigations into the intrusions. "I personally have received more than two dozen" such e-mails, which arrive purportedly sent by other China-watchers. "They would spoof the addresses to make it look like the e-mail was coming from someone I knew and give the attachment a name … designed to catch my attention," said the expert. The e-mails varied in sophistication. "The vast majority are fairly primitive," said the expert, "littered with 'Chinglish' misspellings" or other obvious errors. But one purporting to come from a U.S. Air Force e-mail account was "very legitimate looking," said the expert, adding, "I would have opened the attachment, but fortunately it was on a subject I wasn't interested in." If the attachment is opened, the Trojan horse software hidden inside is designed to bury itself deep in the computer's operating system and begin covertly exporting data from the target's calendar, contacts and e-mail folders to an Internet address in China, the expert said. "This was a comprehensive intelligence-gathering effort by the Chinese, aimed at (China-watchers) with one foot in the government," said the expert. "People who likely have unclassified but still sensitive material on their computers." At the RAND Corp., a think tank with historic links to the U.S. Air Force, the expert said, the infections were buried so deep that the FBI physically removed some computer hardware. A statement from RAND Chief Information Officer Woody Stoeger confirmed that the think tank "has faced periodic attacks on our computer systems as have many organizations across the nation." Stoeger added RAND was "vigilant in guarding against (such) attacks" but declined to comment in any more detail about their nature or where they might have originated from. Because of the geographically dispersed nature of the Internet and the ability of hackers to launch attacks and intrusion efforts from "slave" computers they have secretly taken control of, attribution has been highlighted as one of the biggest problems for U.S. military planners developing cyberwar strategies. Nonetheless, defense officials said the language used in the report was the most direct used so far by the administration and had been carefully chosen.

The language in the report had been "coordinated through a multiagency process" involving the National Security Council, the director of national intelligence and the State Department, Pentagon Asian affairs spokesman Maj. Stewart Upton told UPI. He called it "the strongest language yet from the (Department of Defense) about these intrusions." "While we're not able to definitively label them as the work of the (People's Liberation Army, as the Chinese military calls itself) or the Chinese government, the techniques that are used, the way these intrusions are conducted are certainly very consistent with what you would need if you were going to actually carry out cyberwarfare," Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia David Sedney said Monday at a briefing for reporters. He added that the intrusions "are certainly the kinds of things that espionage agencies would do," adding that developing cyberwar capacities like the ability to employ Trojan horse software was "consistent with a lot of writings we see from Chinese military and Chinese military theorists." Sedney said the report was careful to distinguish between intrusions to copy and remove data, "which we know have been happening," and actual attacks to destroy or alter data, "which are things that can happen and can use the (same cyberwar) techniques" and capabilities. He said the process was different from someone breaking into a house and stealing the furniture. "It's more like if someone went into your house and took a picture and left what was there, but then they went off … with the image of it." "Large amounts of data have been taken out in these intrusions," he said. "That doesn't mean that that data has been destroyed, but it could have been. It doesn't mean it's been altered, but it could have been." Some military officials say it is this last possibility -- that U.S. government data could be corrupted or altered without the knowledge of officials entrusted with it -- that troubles them the most about potential cyberconflicts. Table of Contents

Welcome to Cyberwar Country, USA By Marty Graham, Wired.com, 02.11.08 BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, Louisiana -- When a reporter enters the Air Force office of William Lord, a smile comes quickly to the two-star general's face as he darts from behind his immaculate desk to shake hands. Then, as an afterthought, he steps back and shuts his laptop as though holstering a sidearm. Lord, boyish and enthusiastic, is a new kind of Air Force warrior -- the provisional chief of the service's first new major command since the early 1990s, the Cyber Command. With thousands of posts and enough bandwidth to choke a horse, the Cyber Command is dedicated to the proposition that the next war will be fought in the electromagnetic spectrum, and that computers are military weapons. In a windowless building across the base, Lord's cyber warriors are already perched 24 hours a day before banks of monitors, scanning Air Force networks for signs of hostile incursion. "We have to change the way we think about warriors of the future," Lord enthuses, raising his jaw while a B-52 traces the sky outside his windows. "So if they can't run three miles with a pack on their backs but they can shut down a SCADA system, we need to have a culture where they fit in." But before Lord and his geek warriors can settle in for the wars of the future, the general has to survive a battle of a decidedly different nature: a political and cultural tug of war over where the Cyber Command will set up its permanent headquarters. And that, for Lord and the Air Force, is where things get trickier than a Chinese Trojan horse. With billions of dollars in contracts and millions in local spending on the line, 15 military towns from Hampton, Virginia, to Yuba City, California, are vying to win the Cyber Command, throwing in offers of land, academic and research tie-ins, and, in one case, an $11 million building with a moat. At a time when Cold War-era commands laden with aging aircraft are shriveling, the nascent Cyber

Command is universally seen as a future-proof bet for expansion, in an era etched with portents of cyberwar. Russian Hackers and Chinese Cyberspies The news is everywhere. When Russian hackers were blamed for a wave of denial-of-service attacks against Estonian websites last spring, President Bush voiced concern that the United States would face the same risk. The national intelligence director, Michael McConnell, recently claimed a computer attack against a single U.S. bank could cause more economic harm than 9/11, and called for more National Security Agency surveillance of the internet. A CIA official followed up with a tale about cyber attackers causing multi-city power failures overseas. Some in the military believe Chinese cyberspies have already penetrated unclassified Pentagon computers. Where buzz flows, money follows, and the investment in info-war comes as the Air Force cuts back personnel elsewhere to fund new aircraft: The service just finished phasing out 20,000 enlisted men and women, with plans to dump 20,000 more by 2011. The effect of military cutbacks on the surrounding communities can be devastating. "If you gain or lose a unit in a place where the military is already a major employer, it has a huge impact," says Chris Erickson, a New Mexico State University professor. Unofficial estimates say 10,000 military and ancillary jobs could clump around the 500 posts at the Cyber Command's permanent headquarters. The governors of California, New Mexico and Louisiana are pitching their locales directly to the secretary of the Air Force. In December, Louisiana governor Bobby Jindal took advantage of a meeting with President Bush on Katrina recovery to lobby for the Cyber Command. A dozen congressional delegations have weighed in as well. Lord is feeling the heat. "Oh Lord," the general sighs, "there's congressional pressure." Location, Location, Location "It would sure be nice to have it here," says Tammy Frank, manager of the Waffle House in Bossier, Louisiana, outside Barksdale's gates. She pushes her hair behind her ears and leans on the cash register. "My (preteen) son is into computers, and it will be easier for him to find a good job and stay here." The Cyber Command was provisionally established on Barksdale's 22,000 acres in October, at the edge of a black lake stitched with swamp trees that narrow just above the water line. The placement was good news for Bossier, which took it as a sign that Louisiana would win the permanent command, too. A military town for generations, this sprawling suburb-opolis has about 58,000 residents, including 7,000 active-duty and reserve personnel. Across the Red River in Shreveport, downtown buildings are crumbling and half-abandoned -- but Bossier is thriving. Now realtors are touting proximity to the Cyber Command as a selling point for houses, while local residents hope permanent placement will boost the local economy, and perhaps even infuse the town with high-tech esprit. To persuade the Air Force of Bossier's potential as a Deep South Silicon Valley, city officials broke ground last month on a "Cyber Innovation Center," a $100 million office complex abutting Barksdale. The consortium paid $4.7 million for a 64-acre parcel, and they've raised $50 million from state and local government and another $50 million from the federal government for a complex of buildings, starting with an $11 million, 120,000-square-foot cyberfortress. Renderings show a moat and huge, silvery wedges of metal jutting outward from the building's base. There's a jet in the design, pointed toward the sky. Built-In Force Protection "The building has force protection designed into it," says Craig Spohn, who's heading the development. "It can withstand a multitude of attacks." Spohn ambles with a limp across a newly cleared patch of an old pecan grove that will house the gleaming redoubt. The trees remaining on the land are leafless in the bright winter haze, and a B- 52 floats through the sky beyond, headed for the strip at Barksdale. The sight of the 47-year old

planes coming and going is so common here that only out-of-town visitors and aviation enthusiasts still stare at them. Spohn follows it with his eyes. A lanky, gray-haired man in a nice suit, Spohn came back to work directly from arthroscopic knee surgery, and shows off fresh stitches in three holes on his left knee. He has personal reasons for wanting to win the Cyber Command. "My dad is retired Air Force," he says. "I moved wet and warm to Barksdale, and I love it here. There were no jobs for me when I left. And I eventually returned with a job working for SAIC. "There are a lot of us who want to come back," he adds. "Tell the Nation That the Age of Cyberwarfare Is Here" The Cyber Command is rooted in a historic vision statement penned in 2005 by the secretary of the Air Force, Michael Wynne, and co-signed by the Air Force chief of staff. In the 21st century, Wynne wrote, America's enemies would contest America in a new range of theaters, and the armed forces must be ready to meet them and, if necessary, "destroy them" there. Henceforth, he vowed, the Air Force would "fly and fight in air, space and cyberspace." "Tell the nation," Wynne reiterated in a speech last September, "that the age of cyberwarfare is here." "Our mission is to control cyberspace both for attacks and defense," says Lord's boss, Lt. Gen. Robert Elder -- a three-star general who totes a Blackberry and holds a Ph.D. in electrical engineering. Wearing a green flight suit with no brass, bars or Bronze Star in sight, Elder relaxes in a leather chair away from his desk, and lays out the vision, which amounts to nothing less than a complete transformation of the Air Force. "We have to learn to plan years out for operations, security defense and integration, to plan how to deter attacks, how to posture to prevent attacks, and we have to stay very current," Elder says. The new command, only the 10th in Air Force history, means a single leadership for a number of pieces already in place under different wings. Cyber warriors are already being trained at Hurlburt Air Force Base in Florida, while Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio holds the defense portion. Predator reconnaissance UAVs are flown out of Nevada, and Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska has a cluster of information and intelligence wings. No one knows how many people will ultimately be incorporated into the Cyber Command. The Air Force's other nine commands range in size from slightly over 14,000 personnel in the Special Ops Command to 167,000 in the Air Combat Command. A recent Network World article, quoting Elder, reports the Cyber Command will have 5,000 to 10,000 people. But the Air Force now disavows that number, confirming only that about 500 airmen and airwomen will be stationed at the Cyber Command headquarters itself. Unified Command, Single Commander The important thing, the Air Force says, is that under a unified command, decisions about how to use all the pieces -- and control of the budget, more than $2 billion the first year -- will be in the hands of a single commander instead of being spread out as they are now. "It makes us nimble," says Elder. "It means we can react quickly to change." But, he cautions, there's no plan to consolidate all those pieces in one location. Such a move would run counter to Air Force policies of decentralized commands. Not everyone is enthusiastic about the reorganization. Defense expert John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, says the Cyber Command's mission is murky. "There's been so much gee-whiz flackery to this," Pike says. "They've got the whole thing tarted up, and it's hard to tell what they're actually doing." Pike says the Cyber Command may be part of a secret Air Force plan to prepare for war against China, already suspected of trying to hack Department of Defense networks. He says the new command's defensive mission is muddled and duplicative: The NSA already defends military

networks. As for civilian infrastructures like the internet and power grid, they're privately owned, and the Air Force has no jurisdiction over them. Lord concedes that the Air Force can't do much on its own to protect civilian systems. "We're worrying about the ability of someone to interrupt Wall Street and crash the economy," he says. "We're having a hard time getting Wall Street to work with us." On the offensive side, though, everything is on the table, from jamming an enemy's radar to infiltrating its command-and-control networks. Someday, the Cyber Command may be able to hack an enemy's security and radar systems, improving the chances of bombs hitting home. "It's the entire electromagnetic spectrum," says Lord. "Many of the elements that form (Cyber Command) come from our communications and intel operations. The internet is obviously part, but it also includes things like cellphone frequencies, high-power microwaves and directed-energy components. "What if we could spoof the enemy, to get them to operate on a set of assumptions by altering their data?" Lord asks. "We talk about being able to change the enemy's behavior without a kinetic application. Weapons of mass disruption." Cold War Sites Compete for the Code War When the Cyber Command was formally announced in September, the competition began immediately. Rural Yuba City, California -- the home of Beale Air Force Base -- rounded up 53 signatures from the state's congressional delegation, including Sen. Dianne Feinstein, to try to plant the Cyber Command on California's fertile soil. In a newspaper interview, community leader Ron Bartoli touted Yuba's access to Silicon Valley, which lies about 170 miles away, and argued that cyberwarfare is consistent with Golden State values. "It's computers, it's green, it's everything California says they want." Eight hundred miles away in San Antonio, U.S. Rep. Ciro Rodriguez (D-Texas) was explaining the high-tech acumen of his community. "The robust cyber-security research community in San Antonio has transformed the Alamo City into a national leader on the subject," he said in a statement. In the Rockies, Colorado Springs came late to the party, but offered the coolest location: inside Cheyenne Mountain, which once served as headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), but is now used mostly for training. In the heartland, architecture students at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln held an exhibition to come up with potential building designs for the Cyber Command, producing 13 detailed drawings resembling bunkers, platforms and a burnished black wedge. "I believe the ... proposals may play a provocative role in the future planning of such a free-standing facility," architecture professor Chris Ford said in a press release. Nebraska has long held a unique post in America's defensive footing, and it's mounting a particularly hungry bid for the Cyber Command. In 1948, Offutt Air Force Base was selected for the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command, the linchpin of America's nuclear strategy. Square in the middle of the North American continent, the site was out of reach of existing bombers and missiles. Now called the U.S. Strategic Command, the drab, concrete headquarters building still anchors Offutt to the nuclear era, with three above-ground floors and four more underground housing a 14,000-square-foot command center that directs all U.S. nuclear forces. It's designed with its own power generator and food supply, so it can be sealed off in the event of a nuclear attack. Comparisons between nuclear and cyberweapons might seem strained, but there's at least one commonality. Scholars exploring the ethics of wielding logic bombs, Trojan horses, worms and bots in wartime often find themselves treading on ground tilled by an earlier generation of Cold War nuclear gamesmen. "There are lots of unknowns with a cyberattack," says Neil Rowe, a professor at the Center for Information Security Research at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, who rejects cyberattacks as

a legitimate tool of war. "The potential for collateral damage is worse than nuclear technology.... With cyber, it can spread through the civilian infrastructure and affect far more civilians." No Geographic Edge But ethical concerns aren't weighing down the rainmakers wooing the Cyber Command; they're more concerned with local families and future investment. And without the geographic edge that landed the Strategic Air Command in their backyard a half-century ago, community leaders in Omaha and nearby Bellevue are finding new ways to tempt the decision makers in Washington. "We've offered a package that includes land, facilities, and a demographic of strong academics and industrial consortium," says Megan Lucas, president of the Bellevue Chamber of Commerce. "We have the infrastructure, dual power grids and dark fiber." Lucas is a key organizer in the region's yearlong campaign to land the Cyber Command at Offutt. Smart and straightforward, Lucas is so well-known among Offutt staff that they keep track of her schedule, and when the previous base commander, then-Brig. Gen. T. C. Jones, left Offutt, he designated her his honorary wingman. A photo of Lucas in her black-leather bomber jacket hangs outside the headquarters office. Lucas and other local leaders persuaded the Omaha Development Foundation to put together a purchase of 136 acres of snow-crunched land immediately south of the base for expansion. Bellevue's entire economic engine and its community are wrapped around Offutt, she says. Nearly half the people in the town of 49,000 are active-duty or retired military. Talk of the Cyber Command has gotten around in Bellevue. In the lounge at the Leopard Lanes bowling alley, a Desert Storm veteran named Jim Chappell runs the karaoke machine on weekends. He says he's heard about the competition. "Maybe Offutt will get it, they're wired for it," he says, lighting a cigarette with his father's Zippo. "That's how dealing with the government is. You have to spend money to attract it. But there's plenty of money and work here either way. "It's all political, where they decide to put it," says Lucas. "We're clearly the best situated and equipped. But that doesn't mean we'll get it." "We Are Our Own Worst Enemy" Inside the Air Force Network Operations Center at Barksdale, a tan, windowless building in the northwest corner of the base, the cyberwar is in full pitch. But the internet jihadists and Chinese hacker troops the Cyber Command is expecting so far haven't materialized. Spammers are the enemy today. Airmen and women sit at rows of computer tables staring at Dell-branded LCD monitors. On one wall, a huge screen is slashed into quadrants with maps and coordinates, while in the next room, more personnel watch a similar display showing sports and news channels. "Because you're here, we've put this up instead of the classified information that was up there," Lt. Col. Ken Vantiger says. "As soon as you leave, we'll go back to classified operations. Capt. Scott Hinck, crew commander at the center, works the defensive side of the room, monitoring what's being done at Barksdale, and what's coming in from Lackland. He says it's pretty clear where their greatest vulnerability lies. "We are our own worst enemy," Hinck says. "Our network connects more than a million Air Force users, and you can only do so much to secure your software." Air Force users are forbidden, both by direct order and by a government firewall, from using Hotmail, Yahoo, Gmail, Facebook, MySpace, Flickr and dozens of other sites, Hinck says. "Social network sites are such a security liability, not just for attacks, but for the information people post about themselves.... We have direct evidence (correlating) the release of information to responsive attacks and changes in the enemy's strategies." Even with the restrictions, Air Force network users still get plenty of attacks from phishers, malicious e-mail and hostile "Click Here" links, Hinck says. "We fended off eight attacks in the last hour."

Hoping For Too Much? It's a heady time for the Cyber Command. The Air Force just graduated its first group of electronic warriors in December from a 38-day training program at Hurlburt Air Force Base in Florida. The graduates came from both officer and enlisted ranks, according to 1st Lt. Ashley Connor, a spokeswoman with the base. Cyber warriors first train with the 229th Information Operations Squadron in Vermont, then come to Hurlburt for further training with the 39th Information Operations Squadron. Hurlburt expects to graduate about a hundred warriors a year, Connor says. With the troops arriving, Lord has a tight deadline to get the new command headquarters running at its permanent location by October 2008, with the operation fully established by 2009. The short list of top contenders for the Cyber Command is expected from the secretary of the Air Force in February, and the Air Force brass is watching the heated battle with a mix of awe and dismay. "All the locations came forward on their own," says Ed Gulick, spokesman for the secretary of the Air Force. "The Air Force has not solicited them." Lord's boss, Elder, says he appreciates the efforts of the communities competing for the command, but he's concerned that they're expecting too much from it. "This will be a good deal for the community where it is set up," he says. "It will attract contractor presence. But not an industry -- manufacturing jobs." "I worry that they are looking at this as the opposite of BRAC," Elder adds, referring to the Base Realignment and Closure process that's mostly shrinking bases and chipping into base-reliant communities. "It's not going to be on that scale." Windfall or not, Barksdale-booster Spohn is confident that his community will prevail in the ersatz cyberwar. He even has plans to build an additional 380,000 square feet of offices to house educational, research and manufacturing operations near the base. While everyone is taciturn publicly, he's convinced he's seen winks and nods from Air Force bigwigs. "In as many ways as they can tell us they're committed, they've told us," Spohn says. Lapsing into military-speak, he adds, "My confidence is high." Table of Contents

Last of VOA’s Wartime Transmitting Stations Goes Dark By James E. O'Neal, Radio World, 3.01.2008 The Voice of America’s Delano shortwave transmitting station is difficult to ignore. Even though it’s set back nearly two miles from California’s Route 99, the massive metal antenna structures rising from the almond groves and citrus orchards can’t help but command the attention of motorists. The sheer size of the installation makes it appear intriguingly close to the highway, yet few motorists ever stop to investigate. After the sun sets, the station begs attention with the bluish- white pulsing of strobe lights and red beacons, too numerous to even begin counting from a moving car. If locals in the nearby town of Delano are asked about the steel appurtenances and the lights, most answer that it’s some sort of government facility. Perhaps there’s a little secrecy involved — some kind of a big radio station maybe, or something to do with radar, or a cold war left-over. Should an extra-curious motorist decide to exit the main highway and meander along the series of right-angled section-line byways leading to 11015 Melcher Road, he or she can’t help but be impressed by the bulk of the buff-colored building and the acres of antennas spreading out around it. Most would-be visitors get no closer than the station’s mail box. The operation is fenced and gated, with special permission needed to enter. Few of those living in Delano have ever been past that gate, and as with most government facilities, there’s something of a mystery about what goes on inside the compound, which occupies almost a square mile of the San Joaquin Valley.

The main structure was large at its inception and has grown over the years, standing now at some 26,000 square feet. Close by are a cluster of smaller outbuildings interspersed with large satellite dishes. Stretching far behind these masonry structures are the acres and acres of large antennas — immense Sterba curtain arrays and the more conventional rhombics, all connected to the building by a switching bay and open wire feeders. No one in Delano takes much notice of the station. It’s been there, just west of the downtown area, longer than most people can remember. The buildings and antennas are like the highways and railroad tracks that punctuate and define Delano — they’re just there and they’ve always been there. In the fall of 2007, the ebb and flow of daily patterns around the station changed rather abruptly. For the first time in nearly 63 years, the station is now strangely quiet. Save for an occasional lizard or cotton tail, the parking lot is vacant. There’s no roar from massive cooling blowers, no amplified voices in the control room booming in from Washington, no “dawn patrol” antenna and feeder inspections, no morning runs into town for coffee, rolls or breakfast burritos by station employees. There will be no more invisible thunderbolts generated by the station to slam into the ionosphere and rain down on the other side of the world. Instead of the megawatts they were designed for, the heavy feeders connecting the facility to the Southern California Edison grid now only carry a small trickle of electricity — just enough to keep the lights on. After 23,000 days of continuous transmissions, the station is empty and silent. This past July, its management authority, the Broadcasting Board of Governors, made the decision to shut it down permanently at the end of October. Among the VOA’s international broadcasting assets, Delano is unique. It’s the last of three such stations hastily constructed under extreme wartime restrictions and shortages for the express purpose of providing permanent shortwave broadcasting capability for the Office of War Information, the VOA’s precursor organization. Before the gigantic transmitters are removed for service elsewhere, or the tons and tons of steel antennas are hauled away as just so much scrap metal, it seems appropriate to pay tribute to the station’s architects and the generations of those worked there by offering up a little history and a few facts about the facility. For starters the Delano Transmitting Station wasn’t even supposed to be located there. It was built under the watchful eye of an engineer who had earlier been occupied by building bigger and bigger radio transmitters for a quack medical doctor. Even though it was constructed for government purposes, a private entity, CBS (the Columbia Broadcasting System at the time) was solely responsible for building the station and keeping it running, even down to obtaining call signs that were representative of that network. During its first year of operation, the Delano station unknowingly found its way into the midst of the super-secret project to build the world’s first atomic bomb. The stated purpose of Delano was for transmitting wartime news from America to the Pacific Ocean nations during World War II. Afterwards, it lived on, performing a similar mission for the duration of the Cold War and beyond. HOW IT ALL BEGAN To get a better grasp on Delano’s unique history, we have to go back to the first days after America’s entry into the Second World War. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States government had no international broadcasting facilities, or any real interest in reaching out to the world by radio. It had been reasoned that this was something best left to the commercial broadcasting entities. In sharp contrast were the scores of HF transmitters that Hitler and Hirohito had been keeping busy, spreading their version of the facts to anyone within reach of a shortwave set.

Pearl Harbor changed the U.S. perspective on many fronts, and in early 1942 the international broadcasting imbalance began to change with the establishment of the Office of War Information (OWI) and construction of the first radio studios expressly for government use. To get the message out, these studios were linked by AT&T Long Lines to shortwave transmitters owned by the likes of General Electric, Westinghouse, RCA, Crosley and virtually anyone else with an HF transmitter and a commercial shortwave broadcasting license. However, the founding fathers of this first generation of U.S. international broadcasting knew that this was not good enough. Permanent transmitting facilities would have to be constructed solely for the government’s purpose, and there would have to be more powerful transmitters than those that could be rented or leased. R.J. Rockwell, director of broadcasting engineering for the Crosley Corporation, recalled the meeting that spearheaded that effort. “In a drastic effort to remedy the situation, the Board of War Communications called a council of war in Washington. All interested parties were invited — international licensees, equipment manufacturers, representatives of the Federal Communications Commission, Office of War Information, Office of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA), the Department of State, and others — to determine how soon existing facilities could be augmented and new facilities added, and what powers could be attained. As a result of this and subsequent meetings, it was decided that, within one year, a total of 32 transmitters could be in operation and at the disposal of OWI and CIAA.” ENGINEERING FOR THE GOAT GLAND MAN The organization searched for an engineering presence to head up this massive and very demanding effort — someone who understood high power transmitters and radio broadcasting. That quest ended with the eventual appointment of one James Oliver Weldon to the position of the OWI’s Chief of Communication Facilities Bureau. Weldon’s credentials were unique, as at that time there were only a handful of engineers with experience in high power transmitters and antennas, and most of these were fully occupied with critical wartime jobs and defense-related research. Weldon’s knowledge of high power operations, however, had not come from such conventional and orthodox directions as say, the 500 kW WLW station in Cincinnati or RCA’s vast Long Island international communications facility. Weldon was 33 years old then and had been plucked from his work at the Federal Telephone and Radio Corporation in designing several 50 kW New York City stations. Just a few years before, Weldon’s small consulting firm located in Del Rio, Texas had been kept busy catering to the demands of the notorious Doctor John Romulus Brinkley — aka “The Goat Gland Man,” (or more simply “Doctor”) — for a progressively louder and more potent radio station. In a world before Viagra, Brinkley catered to the victims of impotence, offering male rejuvenation through the surgical implantation of testicular tissue taken from a particular breed of goat. At a time when many in this country were facing starvation due to the Great Depression, this unique type of quackery made Brinkley a multimillionaire. His success in locating new patients was greatly enhanced by the power of radio. Weldon first consulted for Brinkley in connection with the Doctor’s first radio enterprise, a 1 kW station located in Milford, Kan. However Brinkley’s rather questionable medical practices and battles with authorities eventually resulted in the loss of this station license and prompted a relocation of the Doctor’s clinic southward to Del Rio. While exhausting his appeals, Brinkley had been busy cutting a deal with high Mexican officials, and secured permission to construct a new radio transmitter just across the Rio Grande, and out of the reach of the U.S. government. Weldon made the move to Texas too and was tasked with putting the new station on the air, and eventually expanding its power to more than 500,000 watts. Brinkley’s XER/XERA became known as “The Sunshine Station Between The Nations” and Weldon made radio engineering history by constructing

the first-ever high-power Doherty amplifier and installing an early “flattop” directional antenna to focus the Doctor’s RF away from Mexico and into the heartland of America. What the Doctor did with his station did not really concern Weldon. He loved radio engineering and was a workaholic of the first order, choosing to build stations over listening to them. The experience gained in constructing the giant transmitter in northern Mexico was to prove invaluable in Weldon’s new position with the OWI. Once he made the move to Washington, Weldon’s first priority was in creating the needed permanent transmission facilities for the United States government. CBS, NBC and the Crosley Corporation all agreed to take part in this mission, with their respective engineering departments constructing and operating stations to OWI specifications. The government would run interference as necessary to ensure that any roadblocks to the project were removed and that the necessary equipment would be made available during this period of wartime shortages. As part of the arrangement, Crosley would continue to operate that company’s existing shortwave station which was co-located with WLW transmitter plant in Mason, Ohio until a new free-standing facility could be built in nearby Bethany. NBC/RCA would assume the task of building a shortwave plant in northern California, and CBS would construct a sister station near Los Angeles. AN EASY PROJECT? For the CBS engineering unit in Los Angles, on first appearance, the construction of an OWI shortwave station seemed to be an easy project — possibly no more than the purchasing some additional real estate near their existing KNX transmitter, putting up a few rhombic antennas per Weldon’s specifications, along with a building to house some government-provided transmitters, and then staffing the operation with some members of IBEW Local 40. That would be it. After some preliminary east coast meetings in early October of 1943, the project went into high gear. Lester Bowman, who was based at the CBS Columbia Square operation in Hollywood, drew the card to spearhead the effort to locate property and build the southern California shortwave station. He had been with the CBS for some time, and in 1943 wore the title of Western Division Engineer. Bowman was remembered by his associates as a hard driving and successful manager. He would eventually head up all of CBS’s west coast radio and television engineering operations. During the east coast kickoff meetings, it was established that CBS would work in liaison with the Defense Plant Corporation (DPC), which had been charted by Congress in 1938 in anticipation of the America’s entry into war, and served as front end organization for expansion of military-related production. When the war began, it became the DPC’s job to facilitate the construction of facilities that were deemed to be in “the public interest.” Bowman and representatives from DPC got the ball rolling on by contacting an L.A. real estate firm specializing in commercial property. It was not long, however, before the CBS engineering personnel found out that their part of the OWI transmitting station project might not be quite so easy as first imagined. For starters, Weldon had laid down some very specific criteria for the stations:  they were to be sited at least three miles from the coast  there must be no mountain peaks exceeding three degrees above the horizon within line-of- site from the transmitter location  the real estate parcel for each had to be one mile long in the east-to-west direction and one- half mile in the north-south dimension  the site would have to accommodate 150-foot high antenna masts (later changed to 170 feet)  cost for land acquisition could not exceed $400 per acre 50 CYCLE POWER Not mentioned in Weldon’s criteria was additional factor in the location of the station — availability of electrical power, and as the southern California OWI team soon realized, not all power is created equal. In anticipation of the construction of the California station, a priority order had been placed

for three RCA 50 kW transmitters and a behemoth Federal Telephone and Radio Corporation 200 kW machine (it required one of the RCAs as a dedicated driver stage), and a not inconsequential amount of electricity would be needed for their operation. A concern that was not so obvious was the frequency of the available power source. It may come as a surprise, but for a time the entire Los Angeles area was supplied with 50 cycle (Hz) power. Although a move to put the region on 60 Hz power started in the 1930s, pockets of 50 Hz distribution existed for many years thereafter. (It’s reported that as late as 1949, the power being supplied to Mt. Wilson was 50 cycle and early television transmitter installations there depended on rotary converters for 60 cycle power.) As the original plans were to locate the southern California OWI shortwave station within the confines of Los Angeles, transmitters had been ordered with 60 cycle power supplies. While 50 cycle power supply components could be retrofitted, wartime shortages would likely have slowed things considerably. THE OIL BOOM Another factor put several other prospective sites off limits. This was a direct result of the wartime demand for petroleum products. To supply the needed fuel supplies for the military, drilling rigs and oil wells were springing up all over southern California. By late 1943, property that had at one time been considered worthless in terms of development was now selling and leasing at a premium. MOVING OUT OF L.A. As a station site within the environs of Los Angeles seemed more and more of impossibility, Bowman and his team extended their search to include neighboring Orange County. This area was basically farm country then, with little commercial development and a population of less than 150,000. Some potential sites were identified, but before they could be claimed, objections to the planned 170-foot antenna masts were voiced. Even in a region as wide open and sparsely populated as Orange County, military aviation training fields were popping up like weeds. By the time 1943 drew to a close, Bowman’s group had investigated more than 40 sites, with each being rejected for one reason or another. A LETTER FROM THE UNION The coming of the new year brought little joy and encouragement for the CBS group. Their project was really no further along than it had been in October. Compounding Bowman’s worries was an early January letter from the business manager of the IBEW local representing CBS Columbia Square technicians. As the OWI project shortwave project was not swathed in a lot of wartime secrecy, the union was aware of it and of the ever widening search for a transmitter site. The letter to Bowman warned of some rather dire consequences if the station were to be built outside of greater Los Angeles. “From its inception, such a project would be cursed by the shortage of skilled labor. Not long ago contractors who had undertaken jobs in these areas (remote from Los Angeles) were offering $2.20 per hour for building and construction tradesman, with a guarantee of all the overtime that they could work. They had much difficulty in manning the jobs. “Once the construction had been completed you would be faced with an even more difficult problem when you attempted to secure engineering personnel. As you know, almost the entire Pacific Coast area is classified by the WNC as a Number One Shortage Area, with broadcast technicians considered a craft in which a critical shortage exists.” The letter went on to warn Bowman that radio stations in the more remote parts of California were experiencing extreme difficulties in attracting and keeping qualified personnel and: “…that no man, trained in radio, will desert the metropolitan areas where work can always be had in one of the many war industries, to bury himself in some such out-of-the-way place.” Undaunted, Bowman continued his search for a place to build the new station.

DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT, DOCUMENT! As ground for the CBS OWI transmitter plant was scheduled to have been broken no later than the fall of 1943, concern arose in the network’s New York headquarters that someone might be called to task over the amount of time that was passing without tangible results. This prompted a letter from CBS’s director of radio engineering, William Lodge, instructing Bowman to create a document for the record, should there ever be any questions about the efforts to get the facility constructed. Bowman complied, producing a five-page single spaced typewritten letter to Lodge. It described all of trials and tribulations befalling Bowman in his search for a suitable piece of real estate. This document, 60-odd years later, makes it much easier to follow the initial twists and turns on the road to getting the Delano station built. THE SEARCH EXPANDS AGAIN With any hope of locating the station within commuting distance of Los Angeles gone, Bowman’s search moved out further and further. He even investigated — without success — Mojave Desert acreage near Barstow for a site that met Weldon’s criteria. However this didn’t pan out either. After the Mojave trip, proximity to the greater Los Angeles area didn’t seem to matter anymore, so the exploration team decided to travel north. Land some distance from Bakersfield was examined, but rejected as too mountainous. Areas closer to that city had already been staked out for oil prospecting. By now Bowman’s team was more than 100 miles from downtown L.A., so what difference could another 25 or 30 miles make? They continued north past the small towns of Cawelo and McFarland, finally stopping with a surveyor in the small town of Delano on January 27. The next day, C. R. Jacobs, a CBS staffer working with Bowman, fired off a terse telegram to CBS management in New York. “SPENT THURSDAY JANUARY 27 IN BAKERSFIELD AREA FOUND PROPERTY APPROXIMATELY FIVE MILES WEST OF DELANO IN VICINITY OF SECTION 13 TOWNSHIP 25 SOUTH RANGE 24 EAST KERN COUNTY WHICH CAN BE HAD AT $50 PER ACRE OR LESS STOP APPROXIMATELY 145 MILES FROM HOLLYWOOD OFFICE STOP DELANO POPULATION 5000 STOP NO OBSTRUCTIONS 360 DEGREES STOP WIRE REACTIONS TODAY SURE INCLUDING WELDONS APPROVAL. AM STARTING ACQUISITION AND WILL ADVISE WITHIN A FEW DAYS IF ANY COMPLICATIONS SHOULD ARISE STOP NBC STARTED CONSTRUCTION JANUARY 27 STOP BEST REGARDS.” C R JACOBS (The NBC reference is to the parallel project being staged by that network — the construction of the OWI’s Northern California shortwave at Dixon.) Initially, the presence of an emergency landing field some five miles away from the proposed Delano site created strong opposition from the Army and the CAA (Civil Aeronautics Administration). However, Bowman’s mind was made up that Delano was going to be the home to the CBS shortwave station. A special meeting to resolve differences was set up on Feb. 15. Weldon had been briefed on the Army and CAA opposition, and he prepared a telegram to be read at the meeting. It described the necessity for constructing the overdue station and also played on patriotic sympathies. “THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION AND THE COORDINATOR OF INTERAMERICAN AFFAIRS AND THE ARMED FORCED RADIO SERVICE OF THE ARMY ARE CRITICALLY IN NEED OF ADDITIONAL HIGH POWERED BROADCAST TRANSMITTERS ON THE PACIFIC COAST FOR CONDUCTION (sic) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MILITARY EFFORT IN THE PACIFIC AND IN THE CASE OF THE ARMED FORCES RADIO SERVICE FOR BROADCASTING PROGRAMS TO THE AMERICAN TROOPS SCATTERED OVER THAT AREA.… THE WAR EFFORT IS DEFINITELY CRIPPLED BY THE FACT THAT SUCH FACILITIES ARE NOT IN

OPERATION AT THE PRESENT TIME….I HOPE THAT THE COMMITTEE WILL CONSIDER THIS PROJECT AS AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE WAR EFFORT AND GIVE DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE NECESSITY OF PROMPT APPROVAL” J O WELDON CHIEF COMMUNICATION FACILITIIES BUREAU OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION After the reading of the telegram, all opposition was dropped and Delano was given a green light. RECORD CONSTRUCTION In what seems nothing less than miraculous today, ground was first broken on the station project in May of 1944, and by that November, the first transmitter was delivering current to a 170-foot- high rhombic. Not long after Delano went on the air, Jack Quinn, a CBS engineer who had previously worked at General Electric’s KGEI shortwave station near San Francisco, was assigned to Delano in the capacity of engineering supervisor. He remembered the area then as more or less the end of the earth. “There were no farms, no nothing, just arid desert — miles and miles of white alkali soil,” he recalled. “It was really worthless real estate. Maybe $60 an acre. Of course that was before the irrigation canals were built, bringing water from Northern California.” Badlands or not Delano became the first of the three OWI stations to go on the air, beating NBC’s efforts at Dixon and those of Crosley at Bethany, Ohio. Anticipating the day when the station would start operations, CBS, some months before had requested FCC call signs that reflected the network’s operating presence. These were KCBA, KCBF and KCBR. DELANO AND THE BOMB For reasons unknown today, the use of harmonic filtering in large transmitter output stages 60 or 70 years ago was not commonplace. Quinn, who would remain with the Delano station until 1952, recalled that the early transmitters there were not so equipped. “The Federal and the RCA transmitters didn’t have filters; they just weren’t used then.” In less than a year, this absence of harmonic energy trapping was to create problems in the most secret project of the war — the Manhattan Project’s testing of the world’s first atomic bomb at a secret New Mexico desert site, nearly 1,000 miles east of Delano. That test, conducted in the predawn hours of July 16, 1945, relied on HF radio for communications between various observation posts. This radio communication system had been checked out and was functioning well as the minutes and seconds leading up to mankind’s first nuclear blast ticked off. However, at a most inappropriate time (and completely unknown to the station’s operators) Delano butted in. As recorded in one account of the atomic test: “The final countdown began at 5:10 a.m. with a crashing rendition of the ‘Star Spangled Banner.’ Just as (Kenneth) Bainbridge (a Manhattan Project scientist) gave the signal to Sam Allison (another Manhattan Project scientist and the countdown announcer) in the control center, radio station KCBA in Delano, California, crossed wave lengths with the Trinity frequency. The station, operated by the Office of War Information, was opening its morning Voice of America broadcast to Latin America. The National Anthem provided stirring accompaniment for Allison as intoned the announcement: ‘It is now zero minus twenty minutes.’” Following the sign-on at Delano, the OWI had scheduled musical programming. “The Voice of America program now punctuated Allison’s countdown with rapturous background music. Ken Greisen, lying next to I.I. Rabi (both bomb scientists) listened dreamily to the waltz from Tchaikovsky’s Serenade for Strings. The violins seemed to rise in crescendo with Allison’s excited blurts.”

NO VSWR WORRIES The Federal transmitter at Delano also lacked other niceties taken for granted today. One of these was VSWR indication and a circuit for shutdown should there be a problem in this area. Large stations with multiple antennas and transmission lines rely on frequent inspections to catch little problems before they can mushroom. Delano was no exception. At Delano, early in the day, before the valley sun beat down too fiercely, an operator would venture outside to make a routine examination of the various antenna elements and feeders. On one such occasion, the technician spotted a downed transmission line that had apparently failed during the nighttime operating schedule. There had been no alarms in the control room and it was business as usual. However instead of launching words and music from Washington to the world, the Federal 200 kilowatter spent the hours dumping its RF energy directly into the ground. When the downed feeder was being lifted back to its normal position, a large mass of glass was found, the result of the intense heat generated in the transmitter load that the desert sand provided. Quinn remembers another heating effect provided by the Federal. “The transmitter was just plain brute force, with unshielded open wire balanced 600 ohm lines,” Quinn recollected. “The tank circuit consisted of two huge parallel three- or four-inch diameter water-cooled tuned lines approximately 15-feet long, with one having a variable shorting bar for tuning. There was a copper hairpin output loop which coupled directly to the transmission line and it went out the window to the switching bay. As a demonstration of how open this arrangement was, when there was arcing, I would go in alongside this output lines — maybe six-feet away — and have the operators close the interlocked glass door and turn the transmitter on. Almost immediately you could feel both feet heating up. Then the heat would slowly creep up your legs. When it almost reached the groin area you’d flag the operator to shut it down. After power was removed your legs were still hot to the touch for some minutes, before they cooled down to normal!” (Later transmitters installed at Delano did concern themselves with VSWR and included measuring devices. For those of us who have spent our careers with slightly more modest transmitters and operating powers, it’s instructive to run the numbers for reflected power on a good day from one of Delano’s 250,000 Watt transmitters. Assuming a reasonable VSWR of 1:5, or 4 percent reflected power, this is about a 0.18 dB loss, or only some 10,000 Watts arriving back at the transmitter!) A ‘SLIGHTLY ILLEGAL’ HAM RIG Historically, many radio engineers and technicians were licensed as radio amateurs before beginning their professional careers. Such was the case with many of the operators at Delano. Most of the ham fraternity is content with loading their rigs, generally limited to a few hundred watts, into dipoles, beams or sloppers. However, when there was time for idle talk among hams at Delano it often turned speculative. Just what kind of signal might they deliver to their brethren on the other side of the planet, if only they had a transmitter the likes of the Federal and an antenna with 20 dB or so of gain like the station’s giant co-linear curtain array? One day, the temptation for experimentation proved too strong. Quinn remembers that occasion well. “I’ll never forget connecting one of those curtains to the 200 KW transmitter, and connecting the station RCA AR88 receiver to another and calling CQ just once,” said Quinn. “This was at noon and there was absolutely no propagation to Japan at my home station until 5 p.m. There must have been a thousand JA’s calling back with S-9+ signals. Amazing what a good antenna and lots of power will do.” Eventually more modern and better behaved transmitters replaced the start-up Federal and RCAs. The first upgrade, saw two massive “walk-in” General Electric 100 kW machines were installed in wings located to the north and south of the control room.

During the 1960s, three much more modern 250 kW transmitters manufactured by Collins were added to the HF arsenal. This expansion necessitated “blowing out” the front of the building and creating another wing to accommodate this additional 750 kW of HF capacity. The GEs, along with the Federal and the RCAs were eventually displaced by four much more compact and efficient Brown Boveri 250 kilowatt units. A PLACE CALLED PIXLEY During the same decade in which the building was modified for the Collins “autotune” transmitters, Delano received funding and a mandate to expand operations to another campus. This was located some 20 miles away, near the tiny town of Pixley. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis prompted the government to take another look at emergency preparedness and one of the areas examined was connectivity between Washington and Delano. Since its inception, Delano had been linked to VOA studios by AT&T Long Lines copper. Even though the communications giant had its own emergency preparedness plans, it was thought that U.S. VOA stations should have a work-around if, for some reason, AT&T couldn’t deliver. Communications satellites were in their infancy then, so the only logical backup linkage was by HF radio. For Delano, the funding provided for the purchase of an isolated tract of land near Pixley. There, a large HF receiving station was constructed. It included numerous rhombic antennas and racks full of Racal “digitally-tuned” shortwave receivers. The Pixley facility was linked to Delano with a single-hop microwave system. Fortunately, the operation never had to be used during the remaining years of The Cold War. HF BROADCASTING BEGINS TO FADE In moving with the times, the VOA linked its relay stations via satellite and Delano, in addition to serving as an HF transmitting facility, became a gateway to the Pacific Ocean Region satellites. This was expanded in the early 1990s by the addition of video capacity in order to push television programming from the Worldnet side of the VOA’s parent organization, the United States Information Agency. This involved not only the installation of additional high power amplifiers and video exciters, but also standards conversion equipment needed to turn the 525-line NTSC programming produced in Washington into 625-line PAL required by most of the Pacific Rim countries. For a time too, the Delano facility was also used to increase the reach of the BBC’s worldwide shortwave broadcasting. In a sort of “trade-out” arrangement, BBC programming targeted to the Pacific was transmitted by Delano and, in turn, the BBC transmitted VOA programming to Europe from its HF broadcasting facility in Woofferton, England. However, times change. Both the “Beeb” and the VOA have deemphasized program placement via HF radio, relying more and more on retransmission by existing AM and FM broadcasters in countries they wish to reach. The Internet has also come into its own as a conduit for international “broadcasting.” In 1979, the Dixon facility was the first of these pioneer OWI/VOA stations to be silenced. It was initially placed in mothball status, coming back to life for a five year stint in 1983. It was completely decommissioned some years later. The Bethany, Ohio station was next to go, transmitting its last VOA programming in late 1994. The clock finally ran out for Delano on the evening of Saturday, October 27 at 8:30 local time. (Measured from the UTC reference, that was 3:30 a.m. the following day — October 28). There was no special observance or program to honor the station’s nearly 63 years of continuous broadcasting to the world. The final transmission, done at 5,890 mHz, was nothing out of the ordinary — just a scheduled program in the Thai language. Special thanks are due the following individuals who assisted in researching and preparing this article: Victoria Brimmer Richard O’Brien Jack Quinn

Kathy Stewart Charles Stinger James Weldon George Woodard ------References: Crawford, Bill and Fowler, Gene; Border Radio, Austin, Texas; Limelight Editions, 1990. Lamont, Lansing; Day of Trinity, New York; Atheneum, 1965. Quinn, Jack; recollection of early VOA operations, personal correspondence to the author, Aug. 31, 2007. Rockwell, R.J.; “OWI 200-kw H-F Transmitters at Bethany, Ohio;” Communications magazine, Nov. and Dec. 1944. Weldon, J.O.; A 500,000 Watt High Efficiency Broadcast Transmitter, unpublished manuscript, circa 1939-1940. Wulff, Fred; A Brief Technical History of the VOA Network; The Old Timer’s Bulletin (Antique Wireless Association publication), vol. 36, no. 4; Nov., 1995. Broadcasting Yearbook - 1947 “Powerful Delano Shortwave Broadcast Carries Nation’s Propaganda Punches;” The Bakersfield Californian, June 15, 1949, p. 24. “From The Hearts Of America To The Hearts Of The World – a booming voice speaks up for freedom;” Delano Record: Magazine News of Delano; April 22, 1958. Correspondence and memoranda from Columbia Broadcasting System radio station files. Table of Contents

US Troops Let Iraqis Take Charge in Civil Affairs By James Warden, Stars and Stripes March 9, 2008 BAGHDAD — Rahma Mahmood had a medical problem that her family wanted cured. The 2-year- old girl had a growth on her mouth that had fused part of her lips together, and the family feared that the necessary operation was beyond the capabilities of an Iraqi hospital. Naturally, they turned to the Americans. Soldiers with the Iraqi army told Rahma’s family about an American-run center just outside Camp Liberty. The girl’s father and grandmother took her from their home in Amria, on the west side of Baghdad, to the building Thursday. But when they arrived, it wasn’t the Americans who greeted them. Iraqis performed a brief security check on the family as soon as they arrived. And when they went inside, it was an Iraqi man to whom they explained their dilemma. Throughout the process, they worked almost exclusively with their own countrymen. Americans are shifting many civil affairs duties to Iraqis just as they have been handing over combat roles to local forces in order to build the locals’ authority, as demonstrated Thursday at this Civil Military Operations Center in Baghdad. A handful of Iraqis welcomed their fellow citizens to the center, then walked them through the steps they needed to solve their particular problems with minimal American interference. The problems they solve are varied. Many Iraqis stop by to make claims for damages caused by coalition forces. Some, like Rahma’s family, want help for medical problems and need assistance getting it. Others seek information on relatives in American custody. “We solve a lot of problems here in this place,” said “Clyde,” a 48-year-old interpreter working with the U.S. military. All the interpreters fear for their safety and many live in this building for protection. They do not disclose their real names or allow photos to be taken of them. Yet all are extremely pleased with the work they’ve been doing. “Saif,” a 22-year-old interpreter, described the feeling he gets when relatives cry happy tears after learning that their loved ones have been captured by the Americans — not killed by a rival Iraqi faction. “I’m proud of myself, so proud, we do a good thing for Iraqi people,” Saif said. The U.S. soldiers are there for two key reasons: Security and authority. A group of soldiers always accompanies the civil affairs team to the building so that those looking for help won’t need to worry about danger.

The American presence also tells the people coming in that they can trust the Iraqis helping them. In the past, those with information on detainees have tried to sell the information to the families — especially the identification number that lets families track their loved one through the system. But that still means letting the Iraqis take charge as much as possible. In one circumstance, a Shiite man, escorted by a Sunni friend, came to make a claim for a wreck involving a contractor. Contractors normally handle their own claims, but the government covers this particular company. So “Clyde” told them about the documents they’d need in this case, and the two men happily agreed to return later with the paperwork. The U.S. soldiers never once entered the room where the three men were talking. “These guys have been here for years. I’ve been here for three weeks,” said Sgt. Paul Toepke, a 26-year-old reservist with Company A, 432nd Civil Affairs Battalion out of Green Bay, Wis. “I’m doing my job by not doing my job.” Despite the emphasis on Iraqis helping Iraqis, the Americans must still step in at key stages in the process. Rahma’s family could only get to this hospital, run by an outside agency, with an official letter from Toepke allowing them to cross through checkpoints into the Green Zone. Still, both U.S. soldiers and Iraqis are calling this operation a success. The center had 14,205 visitors between April 28 and Feb. 25, including this year’s peak of 165 on Jan. 2. “It’s word of mouth that people are hearing all the way out here,” Toepke said, pointing to northern Iraq on a map. “We don’t do advertising.” But while the Americans let the interpreters handle as much as possible, they couldn’t remain completely aloof from little Rahma. They handed her a stuffed animal nearly as big as she was, and both Iraqis and Americans made sure she got plenty of attention. Table of Contents

‘New Breed’ of Soldiers Graduate in Afghan Army Ceremony By Spc. Micah E. Clare, USA, American Forces Press Service, 7 Mar 08 CAMP CLARK, Afghanistan, March 7, 2008 – A graduation ceremony for a new breed of Afghan National Army soldiers was held here Feb. 27 as a sign of a renewed shift of focus to the part of the fight against insurgents in Afghanistan that doesn’t involve combat. More than 30 Afghan army 203rd Corps soldiers graduated from a 14-day course called Afghan Information Dissemination Operations course, or AIDO, where they learned skills useful for dealing with media, taking population surveys, engaging face to face with local leaders, providing humanitarian aid and conducting loudspeaker operations. “The information age has changed the face of war,” said U.S. Army Staff Sgt. Zachary Kramer, a mobile tactical trainer from 324th Psychological Operations Company. “Now these AIDO soldiers are trained and able to go out and tell the Afghans the truth that the (Afghan government) and security forces are for the civilians and their safety.” Most of the soldiers who volunteered for service in Information Dissemination Operations already had experienced protecting the people they serve as Afghan army infantrymen, Kramer explained. “We expected them to be mature soldiers,” he said. They also had to be able to read and write fluently in either Dari or Pashto, the two major languages of Afghanistan, to be able to interact with their country’s ethnically diverse population. Interacting face to face with this population is an important part of winning them over, Afghan Col. Sayed Waqifshah, the religious and cultural advisor to 203rd Corps, said. “The soldier’s job is to fight the enemy,” he explained. “This doesn’t always mean shooting them. While all AIDO soldiers are good fighters, fighting is what tears us as a people apart. It is much better for us to go to our people and talk with them first.” The soldiers’ final training task was to handle a humanitarian-aid drop to area residents, where they proved their proficiency and dedication to their new job.

“These classes were a necessity,” Shaw said. “AIDO will be a great asset to the ANA and the future of Afghanistan.” Table of Contents

The Taliban’s information warfare A comparative analysis of NATO Information Operations (Info Ops) and Taliban Information Activities By Thomas Elkjer Nissen, Royal Danish Defence College, December 2007 Both the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Taliban strive to win the battle of perceptions in Afghanistan as well as to positively infl uence the wider world opinion. They both achieve this through the use of information as a tool, but there the similarities end: There are major differences in how this is done, by which means it is done, and with which effect. These differences encompass political, doctrinal, legal, moral and ethical aspects that add up to an asymmetric warfare not only on how physical warfare is waged in Afghanistan, but also on how information “warfare” or Information Operations are conducted. It is inherent that there will be differences in an asymmetric war such as we see in Afghanistan; although ISAF is getting up to speed on the kinetic part of the asymmetry, it has not yet determined how to handle asymmetry in the information war. It is these differences in the information war that this brief will focus on.

The Taliban's Information Warfare.pdf

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