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Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 1 Security

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The call to securitize against an external threat upholds the state and its population as sacred, manipulating international politics through the creation of subjective threats to be annihilated in the name of the sovereign Campbell,1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the University of Newcastle. Writing Security, 1998. (199 – 202)

Security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked, even in conventional understandings. Traditional discourses of international relations maintain that alliance is one where security is a goal to be achieved by a number of instrumentalities deployed by the state (defense and foreign policy, for example). But the linkage between the two can be understood in a different light, for just as Foreign Policy works to constitute the identity in whose name it operates, security functions to instantiate the subjectivity it purports to serve. Indeed, security (of which foreign policy/Foreign Policy is a part) is first and foremost a performative discourse constitutive of political order: after all, " se curing something requires its differentiation, classification and defi nition. It has, in short, to be identified."21 An invitation to this line of thought can be found in the later work of Michel Foucault, in which he explicitly addresses the issue of security and the state through the rubric of "governmental rationality."22 The incitement to Foucault's thinking was his observation that from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, political treatises that previously had been written as advice to the prince were now being presented as works on the "art jf government." The concern of these treatises was not confined to the requirements of a specific sovereign, but with the more general problematic of government: a problematic that included the government of souls and lives, of children, of oneself, and finally, of the state by the sovereign. This problematic of governance emerges at the intersection of central and centralizing power relationships (those located in principles of universality, law, citizenship, sovereignty), and individual and individualizing power relationships (such as the pastoral relationships of the Christian church and the welfare state).23 Accordingly, the state for Foucault is an ensemble of practices that are at one and the same time individualizing and totalizing: I don't think that we should consider the "modern state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization.24 Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclusion to The History of Sexuality, Volume I. There he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two complementary ways: through disciplines that produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maximize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was concerned with the social body's capacity to give life and propagate. Together, these relations of power meant that "there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of 'bio-power.' " This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the "theory of police." Developed in the seventeenth century, the "theory of police" signified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a governmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare's Compendium — an eighteenth-century French administrative work detailing the kingdom's police regulations — outlined twelve domains of concern for the police: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern, which was repeated in all treatises on the police, was that the police should be concerned with "everything pertaining to men's happiness," all social relations carried on between men, and all "living."27 As another treatise of the period declared: "The police's true object is man." The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution,

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1NC Shell production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, "Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity." In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending "the nation," ensuring the state's security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era that has seen the development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the "end of the cold war"), the paradox of risking indi vidual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logi cal extreme. Indeed, "the atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the under side of the power to guarantee an individual's continued existence." distinctive of the United States. Most important, though, it is at the intersection of the "microphysics" and "macrophysics" of power in the problematic of order that we can locate the concept of security. Security in this formulation is neither just an essential precondition of power nor its goal; security is a specific principle of political method and practice directed explicitly to "the ensemble of the population. This is not to suggest that "the population" exists in a prediscursive domain; on the contrary, "one of the great innovations in the tech niques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of 'pop - ulation' as an economic and political problem." The common effect of the theory of police and the waging of war in constituting the identity in whose name they operate highlights the way in which foreign policy/Foreign Policy establishes the general preconditions for a "coherent policy of order," particularly as it gives rise to a geography of evil.30 Indeed, the preoccupation of the texts of Foreign Policy with the prospects for order, and the concern of a range of cultural spokespersons in America with the dangers to order, manifest how this problematic is articulated in a variety of sites Furthermore, Foucault argues that from the eighteenth century onward, security becomes the central dynamic in governmental ratio nality, so that (as discussed in chapter 6) we live today, not in a narrowly defined and overtly repressive disciplinary society, but in a "society of security," in which practices of national security and practices of so cial security structure intensive and extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside/ outside, normal/pathological, civilized/barbaric, and so on. The theory of police and the shift from a sovereign's war to a popula tion's war thus not only changed the nature of "man" and war, it constituted the identity of "man" in the idea of the population, and articulated the dangers that might pose a threat to security. The ma jor implication of this argument is that the state is understood as hav ing no essence, no ontological status that exists prior to and is served by either police or war. Instead, "the state" is "the mobile effect of a multiple regime of governmentality," of which the practices of police, —— and foreign policy/Foreign Policy are all a part.

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The Affirmative practice and discourse constructs towards the middle east is a performance of racial power, even though the plan reduces pressure, the aff’s approach legitimizes colonialism and ensures constant intervention. Volbjorn 2004. Morten Valbjorn, 2004 Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture blind and culture blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” 63-4

From this perspective, it is irrelevant to discuss whether the Middle East should be regarded as a region like all the others, as it is the case in the IR mainstream, or as a region like no other, as the essentialists would claim. Rather, regions should be seen as social constructions that are produced through specific discursive practices just like the international system and its various actors. Instead of discussing what the Middle East is, the relational conception of culture regards the Middle East as an imaginary region, where, first and foremost, it is important to focus on how the Middle East has been constructed through discursive practices and how this has extensice consequences on its international relations. This focus characterizes Edward Said’s Orientalism (1995), one of the principal works dealing with the Middle East in applying a relational conception of culture. Despite his principle recognition of the mere existence of societies with a location southeast of the Mediterranean, Said almost completely refrains from dealing with what characterizes these societies. Instead, he focuses on how European and American contexts have described and imagined the Middle East and how a particular “orientalist” way of thinking has functioned as a filter through which the Middle East is constructed as a unique oriental cultural entity. Even through the orientalist representations of the Middle East should have less to do with the Middle east than with the orientalists’ own context, this does not mean that these representations are innocent or ineffectual. The European and American identity and way of performing power are thus closely interwoven with the conception of the Middle East as oriental and alien. The orientalist conception of the middle east functions as a constituting counterimage of European and American identity, of a so-called occidental culture whose supposedly democratic, rational, and enlightened character is contrasted by the depictions of a despotic, irrational, and barbaric Orient. According to Said, “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image”. But orientalism also formed a central element of “a western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient”. The French and British colonial representation of Middle Eastern Societies as passive, backward, and inferior justified and subsequently legitimized their colonization. This close connection between orientalist descriptions of the Middle East and different kinds of performance of power allegedly does not belong only to the past. According to Said, the situation of today bears a lot of resemblance to the time of British and French colonialism. He points to how U.S. military interventions, the Carter Doctrin, and the establishment of Rapid Deployment Forces often have been preceded by popular and academic discussions on the threat from “political Islam” and the like. As a consequence of this very different approach to international relations in the Middle East, subscribers to a relational conception of culture, instead of asking what makes the Middle Eastern international relations conflict-ridden, will ask how representations of the Middle East as an unstable “Arc of Crises”- to phrase Zigniew Brezezinski, President carter’s National Security Advisor – have made “the West” appear impressively peaceful, and made Western military engagement in this part of the world possible, necessary, and for the benefit of the people of the Middle East themselves.

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Security rhetoric furthers the perpetual threat of destruction and justifies unending, state-sanctioned violence. Coviello 2000 (Peter Coviello, assistant professor of English at Bowdoin College, Apocalypse From Now On, 2000)

Perhaps. But to claim that American culture is at present decisively postnuclear is not to say that the world we inhabit is in any way post-apocalyptic. Apocalypse, as I began by saying, changed – it did not go away. And here I want to hazard my second assertion: if, in the nuclear age of yesteryear, apocalypse signified an event threatening everyone and everything with (in Jacques Derrida’s suitably menacing phrase) “remainderless and a-symbolic destruction,” then in the postnuclear world apocalypse is an affair whose parameters are definitively local. In shape and in substance, apocalypse is defined now by the affliction it brings somewhere else, always to an “other” people whose very presence might then be written as a kind of dangerous contagion, threatening the safety and prosperity of a cherished “general population.” This fact seems to me to stand behind Susan Sontag’s incisive observation, from 1989, that, “Apocalypse is now a long running serial: not ‘Apocalypse Now’ but ‘Apocalypse from Now On.’” The decisive point here in the perpetuation of the threat of apocalypse (the point Sontag goes on, at length, to miss) is that the apocalypse is ever present because, as an element in a vast economy of power, it is ever useful. That is, though the perpetual threat of destruction – through the constant reproduction of the figure of the apocalypse – the agencies of power ensure their authority to act on and through the bodies of a particular population. No one turns this point more persuasively than Michel Foucault, who in the final chapter of his first volume of The History of Sexuality addressess himself to the problem of a power that is less repressive than productive, less life-threatening than, in his words, “life-administering.” Power, he contends, “exerts a positive influence on life … [and] endeavors to administer, optimize, and multiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations.” In his brief comments on what he calls “the atomic situation,” however, Foucault insists as well that the productiveness of modern power must not be mistaken for a uniform repudiation of violent or even lethal means. For as “managers of life and survival, of bodies and the race,” agencies of modern power presume to act “on the behalf of the existence of everyone.” Whatsoever might be construed as a threat to life and survival in this way serves to authorize any expression of force, no matter how invasive, or, indeed, potentially annihilating. “If genocide is indeed the dream of modern power,” Foucault writes, “this is not because of a recent return to the ancient right to kill’ it is because power is situated and exercised at the level of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population.” For a state that would arm itself not with the power to kill its population, but with a more comprehensive power over the patters and functioning of its collective life, the threat of an apocalyptic demise, nuclear or otherwise, seems a civic initiative that can scarcely be done without.

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The Alt is to Reject the Affirmatives Security Logic, allowing for actually political thought. Accepting their Descriptions and Responses colonizes the debate Neoclus, 2008. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government) The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether — to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. lt is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ’this is an insecure world' and reiteration of on_e fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we `want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con- stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end — as the political end — constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible — that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ’security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told — never could be told — what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,‘“ dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ’sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitirnises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.““ The mistake has been to think that there is a hole; and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision " of security in which it is re—rnapped or civilised or gendered or. humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary and consequently end up re— affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order; part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ’security’ helps consolidate the power of the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 8 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 9 existing forms of social domination and justifies the short—circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con- ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ’insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that ’securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.“’

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Chinese threats are grounded in US primacy’s demand of securitization versus a vague other—this logic creates a self fulfilling cycle of endless intervention Pan, 2004. Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations at Australian National University. Alternatives 29, 2004. Pages 310-313.

In 1630, John Winthrop, governor of the British-settled Massachusetts Bay Colony, described the Puritan mission as a moral beacon for the world: "For wee must Consider that wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill, the eies [eyes] of all people are uppon us." Couched in a highly metaphoric manner, the "city on the hill" message greatly galvanized the imagination of early European settlers in North America who had desperately needed some kind of certainty and assurance in the face of many initial difficulties and disappointments in the "New World." Surely there have been numerous U.S. constructions of "what we are," but this sense of "manifest destiny," discursively repeated and reconstructe{d time and again by leading U.S. politicians, social commentators, the popular press, and numerous school textbooks, has since become a pivotal part of U.S. self- consciousness. In 1992, Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote: America is a remarkable nation. We are, as Abraham Lincoln told Congress in December 1862, a nation that "cannot escape history" because we are "the last best hope of earth." The president said that his administration and Congress held the "power and . . . responsibility" to ensure that the hope America promised would be fulfilled. Today . . . America is still the last best hope of earth, and we still hold the power and bear the responsibility for its remaining so. This sentiment was echoed by Madeleine K. Albright, the former secretary of state, who once called the United States "the indispensable nation" and maintained that "we stand tall and hence see further than other nations." More recently, speaking of the U.S. role in the current war on terrorism. Vice President Dick Cheney said: "Only we can rally the world in a task of this complexity against an enemy so elusive and so resourceful. The United States and only the United States can see this effort through to victory." It is worth adding that Cheney, along with several other senior officials in the present Bush administration, is a founding member of the Project for the New American Century, a project designed to ensure U.S. security and global dominance in the twenty-first century. Needless to say, the United States is not unique in ethnocentric thinking. For centuries, China had assumed it was the center of the world. But what distinguishes U.S. from Chinese ethnocentric self- identities is that while the latter was based largely on the Confucian legacy, the former is sanctioned by more powerful regimes of truth, such as Christianity and modern science. For the early English Puritans, America was part of a divine plan and the settlers were the Chosen People blessed by covenant with God. With the advent of the scientific age, U.S. exceptionalism began taking on a secular, scientific dimension. Charles Darwin once argued that "the wonderful progress of the United States, as well as the character of the people, are the results of natural selection." The United States has since been construed as the manifestation of the law of nature, with its ideas and institutions described not as historically particular but as truly universal. For example, in his second inaugural address in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson declared that U.S. principles were "not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of a liberated mankind." In short, "The US is Utopia achieved." It represents the "End of History." What does this U.S. self-knowledge have to do with the way in which it comes to know others in general and China in particular? To put it simply, this self-knowledge is always a powerful analytical framework within which other societies are to be known. By envisioning a linear process of historical development with itself at its apex, the United States places other nations on a common evolutionary slope and sees them as inevitably traveling toward the end of history that is the United States. For example, as a vast, ancient nation on the other side of the Pacific, China is frequently taken as a mirror image of the U.S. self. As Michael Hunt points out,

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we imagine ourselves locked in a special relationship with the Chinese, whose apparent moderation and pragmatism mirror our own most prized attributes and validate our own longings for a world made over in our own image. If China with its old and radically different culture can be won, where can we not prevail? Yet, in a world of diversity, contingency, and unpredictability, which is irreducible to universal sameness or absolute certainty, this kind of U.S. knowledge of others often proves frustratingly elusive. In this context, rather than questioning the validity of their own universalist assumptions, the people of the United States believe that those who are different should be held responsible for the lack of universal sameness. Indeed, because "we" are universal, those who refuse or who are unable to become like "us" are no longer just "others," but are by definition the negation of universality, or the other. In this way, the other is always built into this universalized "American" self. Just as "Primitive ... is a category, not an object, of Western thought," so the threat of the other is not some kind of "external reality" discovered by U.S. strategic analysts, but a ready-made category of thought within this particular way of U.S. self- imagination. Consequently, there is always a need for the United States to find a specific other to fill into the totalized category of otherness. In the early days of American history, it was Europe, or the "Old World," that was invoked as its primary other, threatening to corrupt the "New World." Shortly after World War II, in the eyes of U.S. strategists, the Soviet Union emerged as a major deviance from, hence an archenemy of, their universal path toward progress via the free market and liberal democracy. And after the demise of the Soviet Union, the vacancy of other was to be filled by China, the "best candidate" the United States could find in the post-Cold War, unipolar world. Not until the September 11 attacks in New York and Washington had China's candidature been suspended, to be replaced by international terrorism in general and Saddam's Iraq in particular. At first glance, as the "China threat" literature has told us, China seems to fall perfectly into the "threat" category, particularly given its growing power. However, China's power as such does not speak for itself in terms of an emerging threat. By any reasonable measure, China remains a largely poor country edged with only a sliver of affluence along its coastal areas. Nor is China's sheer size a self-evident confirmation of the "China threat" thesis, as other countries like India, Brazil, and Australia are almost as big as China. Instead, China as a "threat" has much to do with the particular mode of U.S. self- imagination. As Steve Chan notes: China is an object of attention not only because of its huge size, ancient legacy, or current or projected relative national power. . . . The importance of China has to do with perceptions, especially those regarding the potential that Beijing will become an example, source, or model that contradicts Western liberalism as the reigning paradigm. In an era of supposed universalizing cosmopolitanism, China demonstrates the potency and persistence of nationalism, and embodies an alternative to Western and especially U.S. conceptions of democracy and capitalism. China is a reminder that history is not close to an end. Certainly, I do not deny China's potential for strategic misbehavior in the global context, nor do I claim the "essential peacefulness" of Chinese culture." Having said that, my main point here is that there is no such thing as "Chinese reality" that can automatically speak for itself, for example, as a "threat." Rather, the "China threat" is essentially a specifically social meaning given to China by its U.S. observers, a meaning that cannot be disconnected from the dominant U.S. self-construction. Thus, to fully understand the U.S. "China threat" argument, it is essential to recognize its autobiographical nature.

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Chinese threat construction assumes a knowable and essentially violent Chinese Other—this Western lens makes militarization and conflict inevitable. Pan, 2004. Pan, IR at Australian National University, 04[Chengxin, "The 'China Threat' in American Self- Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics," Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 29, no. 3 (2004)”] Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self- construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other, instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality. This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and "All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in general and the U.S. China studies field in particular. As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost by default, China emerges as an absolute other and a threat thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability . The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China,"

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The discourse used in historical representations of Afghanistan bolsters America’s need of securitization and peacebuilding. Crowe, 2007. L.A. Crowe, 2007, New York University. The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security- Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’ http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf

The historical production of particular myths of Afghanistan have relied on representations of the country in the West that are largely simplistic, ahistorical, and politically motivated. Afghanistan is a sort of “fuzzy dream” for most in the West: embodied in a series of fabricated images of war and poverty, de-contextualized photos without names or places, numbers and graphs claiming statistical quantification, and disjointed yet often repeated phrases and metaphors. A particular mythic representation of Afghanistan is being (and has been) proliferated in the international community, through media, history books, foreign policy documents, political commentators, academia, and virtually any other body of communication. The vigor with which particular discourses have materialized since 9/11 are representative of their link to the Wests militarized ‘War on Terror’ and more generally of the embedded relationship between political policies and militarized discourses which legitimate the West’s military engagement and development policies. That is, Afghanistan serves as an unfortunate example of the very real power of discourse and myth-making which affect the form that international engagement takes; this in turn reproduces those myths in a cycle of destructive imperial engagement. In trying to understand the current political situation in Afghanistan, and in attempting to formulate international policy in the region, it is vital that we are aware of the dominant narratives or ‘myths’ that are being produced, who it is that is producing them and for what purpose, and what is at stake in failing to interrogate them. Any policy that does not take the role of deliberately constructed narratives and the mediums throough which they are disseminated into account will not only continue to replicate them, perhaps unknowingly, but any “securitizing”, “peacebuilding” and “development” efforts built on these terms can never result in long-term success. The emancipatory possibilities of such a critical project of discourse deconstruction lie in: 1) understanding the raced/classed/gendered power hierarchies that are their foundation; 2) uncovering the nationalized militarization and the hypermasculinized and hyperfeminized normativities that are are embedded within these myths, and; 3) the recognition of the detrimental effect of the West’s ‘myths’ and configuring the reconceptualisation of policy alternatives through its contestation. By looking critically at what has become the common language of foreign engagement in Afghanistan, the foundation of historical narratives or ‘myths’ that perpetuate a certain image of Afghanistan, and which in turn results in very particular attitudes that imbue foreign policy, begin to be revealed. I will utilize two broad (and inextricably linked) categorizations which most accurately encapsulate the dominant strains of discourse to help clarify how this relationship is constructed and by thus identifying them as such attempt to de-bunk the myths they create. These ‘myths’ which have become normalized and banal in foreign policy, media, and some academic discourse I define as the ‘heroism’ discourse/myth and the ‘militarization’ discourse/myth.

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The United States has defined its own identity in relation to Afghanistan by demonizing it on the basis of perceived danger. The need to securitize comes from an ill-conceived perception of the other. Crowe, 2007. L.A. Crowe, 2007, New York University. The “Fuzzy Dream”: Discourse, Historical myths, and Militarized (in)Security- Interrogating dangerous myths of Afghanistan and the ‘West’ http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Crowe-loricrowe.pdf

Looking specifically at the relationship between the US and Afghanistan, the US has defined its own identity (as good, modern, normal, etc.) in relation to its difference from the Afghan ‘Other’, cultivating its demonization on the basis of perceived danger and moral valuations (superior/inferior) that are spatially constructed. Claims that the West is constructing a peaceful, democratic, and liberal nation (values claimed to be at the core of “our civilization, freedom, democracy and ways of life”) are motivated by the need to transform “their barbarism, inhumanity, low morality and style of life”.77 Eisenstein explains that ‘Others’ are constructed or fabricated in order to deal with the fear of not-knowing: “Creating the savage, or slave, or woman, or Arab allows made-up certainty rather than honest complex variability and unknowability.”78 Unfortunately, this is not a novel phenomenon unique to the contemporary situation in Afghanistan: articulations of security that rely on definitions of ‘otherness’ as threats to security, argues Campbell, replicates the logic of Christendom’s ‘evengelism of fear’. Obstructions to security/order/God become defined as irrational, abnormal, mad, etc. in need of rationalization, normalizations, punishment, moralization, etc.: “The state project of security replicates the church project of salvation”.79 As is commonly known, under Christendom it was such ‘discourses of danger’ that were instrumental in establishing its own authority and disciplining its followers. Similarly, by relying on discourses of danger to define who “we” are, who “we” are not, and who “they” are that we must fear, the state constructs enemies who’s elimination/domination is necessary to preserve the states own identity (and security): “All powers are geared against a single “alien.” And all the rationalizations are raging against the advent of “Evil.”80 Thus, the “war on terror”, or Afghanistan, or Iraq, becomes, in the words of Baudrillard, an endless war of prevention to “excorcise” “evil”; an ablation of a non-existant enemy masquarading as the leitmotiv for universal safety.81 These elements of oppositional binaries is closely related to the second element: contemporary discourse has developed from and further perpetuates a particular ideology that emmanates from a neo-liberal capitalist and imperial agenda that is founded upon neo-colonialist attitudes and assumptions. “The US campaign to ‘fight terrorism’, initiated after September 11th” explains Nahla Abdo “has crystallized all the ideological underpinnings of colonial and imperial policies towards the constructed ‘other’.” This emerges in the “heroism” myth mentioned above; for example, Debrix explains how narratives around humanitarianism serve an ideological purpose in that it “contributes to the reinforcement of neoliberal policies in ‘pathological’ regions of the international landscape.83 It also emerges in the militarization myth, insofar as neoliberal globalisation relies on the institutionalization of neo-colonialism and the commodification and (re)colonization of labor via militarized strategies of imperial politics. That is, as Agathangelou and Ling point out, “Neoliberal economics enables globalized militarization”.84 Embedded in this normalization of neo-colonial frames are the elements of linearity and thus assumed rationality of reasoning in the West. As Canada stepped up its role in direct combat operations (which included an increase of combat troops, fighter jets, and tanks with long-range firing capacities85), Stephen Harper appealed to troop morale on the ground in Afghanistan, stating: “Canada and the international community are determined to take a failed state and create a "democratic, prosperous and modern country."86 (my italics) Proposed solutions to the conflict(s) in Afghanistan have been framed and justified not only as ‘saving backwards Afghanistan’ but also as generously bringing it into the modern, capitalist, neoliberal age. Moreover, this element represents an continuity of colonial power, presenting the one correct truth or resolution, emmanating from the ‘objective gaze’ of the ‘problem-solving’ Western world. Representations of Afghanistan present Western voices as the authority and the potential progress such authority can bring to the ‘East’ as naturally desirable. This ‘rationality’ also presumes an inherent value of Western methodology (including statistical analysis, quantification of data, etc) and devalues alternative epistemologies including those of the Afghan people. This is problematic for several reasons: 1) It forecloses and discourages thinking “outside the box” and instead relies upon the “master’s tools” which include violent military force, the installation of a democratic regime, peacekeeping, and reconstruction and foreign aid – alternative strategies are deemed “radical”, “unworkable”, and

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The logic of Hegemonic preservation festishizes the US global role, necessitating a kill-to-save mentality Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005. The U.S. government's rhetoric of global security draws its power from simultaneously instantiating Schmitt's vision of the political as non-normative national self- preservation and the liberal vision of the political as normative civil relations. The consequence is not that this rhetoric disavows political antagonism within the nation, as Schmitt would have it (though there is an element of this), but that it disavows political antagonism on the global level. I argued above that the positing of a non- normative situation of national self-preservation, the same as that of a person being murdered, is insupportable due to the inescapable presence of a moral ideal in defining the nation's self and deciding what threatens it. This applies to all justifications of action grounded in national security. The U.S. rhetoric of security, however, lifts the paradox to a global level, and illustrates it more forcefully, by designating the global order's moral ideal, its "way of life" that is under threat, as civil relations, freedom and peace, but then making the fulcrum of this way of life an independent entity upon whose survival the world's way of life depends—the United States. Just as an aggressor puts himself outside of normativity by initiating violence, so is the victim not bound by any norms in defending his life. As the location of the self of the world order that must be preserved, the United States remains unobligated by the norms of this order as long as it is threatened by terrorism. So long as it struggles for the life of the world order, therefore, the United States remains external to this order, just as terrorism remains external to the world order so long as it threatens a universal state of war. Without the United States everyone is dead. Why should this be? The reason is that the United States fully embodies the values underlying world peace—"freedom, democracy, and free enterprise" (National Security 2002, i)—and is the key to their realization in the global domain. These values are [End Page 30] universal, desired by all and the standard for all. "[T]he United States must defend liberty and justice because these principles are right and true for all people everywhere" (National Security 2002, 3). The fact that the United States "possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" (1) cannot therefore be fortuitous. It cannot but derive from the very founding of the United States in universal principles of peace and its absolute instantiation of these principles. This results in "unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity" (1). In other words, the United States as a nation stands, by virtue of its internal constitution, at the forefront of world history in advancing human freedom. It is the subject of history. Its own principle of organization is the ultimate desire of humanity, and the development of this principle is always at its highest stage in and through the United States. For this reason, the values of the United States and its interests always coincide, and these in turn coincide with the interests of world peace and progress. The requirements of American security reflect "the union of our values and our national interests," and their effect is to "make the world not just safer but better" (1). The United States therefore is uniquely charged by history to maintain and advance world peace and universal freedom. America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace—a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom. (Bush 2004a) America can lead the cause of freedom because it is the cause of freedom. "American values and American interests lead in the same direction: We stand for human liberty" (Bush 2003b). For this reason, it has no "ambitions," no private national interests or aspirations that would run contrary to the interests of the world as a whole. It undertakes actions, like the invasion of Iraq, that further no motive but the cause of humanity as a whole. "We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of [End Page 31] that country to its own people" (Bush 2003a). In this way, the United States is distinct from all other nations, even though all of humanity espouses the same values. Only the United States can be depended upon for ensuring the endurance of these values because they are the sole basis of its existence. "Others might flag in the face of the inevitable ebb and flow of the campaign against terrorism. But the American people will not" (NSCT 2003, 29). Any threat to the existence of the United States is therefore a threat to the existence of the world order, which is to say, the values that make this order possible. It is not merely that the United States, as the most powerful nation of the free world, is the most capable of defending it. It is rather that the United States is the supreme agency advancing the underlying principle of the free order. The United States is the world order's fulcrum, and therefore the key to its existence and perpetuation. Without the United States, freedom, peace, civil relations among nations, and the possibility of civil society are all under threat of extinction. This is why the most abominable terrorists and tyrants single out the United States for their schemes and attacks. They know that the United States is the guardian of liberal values. In the rhetoric of security, therefore, the survival of the United States, its sheer existence, becomes the content of liberal values. In other words, what does it mean to espouse liberal values in the context of the present state of world affairs? It means to desire fervently and promote energetically the survival of the United States of America. When the world order struggles to preserve its "self," the self that it seeks to preserve, the primary location of its being, is the United States. Conferring this status upon the United States allows the rhetoric of security to insist upon a threat to the existence of the world order as a whole while confining the non-normative status that arises from this threat to the United States alone. The United States—as the self under threat—remains external to the normative relations by which the rest of the world continues to be bound. The United States is both a specific national existence struggling for its life and normativity itself, which makes it coextensive with the world order as a whole. For this reason, any challenge to U.S. world dominance would be a challenge to world peace and is thus impermissible. We read in The National Security Strategy that the United States [End Page 32] will "promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (National Security 2002, 1). And later, we find out what is meant by such a balance of power.

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Hegemony elevates security to a transcendental ideal—it creates a moral framework for violence that requires the elimination of all that is different or unpredictable. Der Derian 2003 [James Der Derian, Associate Professor of Political Science at University of Massachusetts Amherst, “Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, boundary, 2 30.3, 19-27]

From President Bush's opening lines of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS), the gap between rhetoric and reality takes on Browningesque proportions: "‘Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace—a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent'" (1). Regardless of authorial (or good) intentions, the NSS reads more like late—very late—nineteenth- century poetry than a strategic doctrine for the twenty-first century. The rhetoric of the White House favors and clearly intends to mobilize the moral clarity, nostalgic sentimentality, and uncontested dominance reminiscent of the last great empires against the ambiguities, complexities, and messiness of the current world disorder. However, the gulf between the nation's stated cause ("to help make the world not just safer but better" [1]) and defensive needs (to fight "a war against terrorists of global reach" [5]) is so vast that one detects what Nietzsche referred to as the "breath of empty space," that void between the world as it is and as we would wish it to be, which produces all kinds of metaphysical concoctions. In short shrift (thirty pages), the White House articulation of U.S. global objectives to the Congress elevates strategic discourse from a traditional, temporal calculation of means and ends, to the theological realm of monotheistic faith and monolithic truth. Relying more on aspiration than analysis, revelation than reason, the NSS is not grand but grandiose strategy. In pursuit of an impossible state of national security against terrorist evil, soldiers will need to be sacrificed, civil liberties curtailed, civilians collaterally damaged, regimes destroyed. But a nation's imperial overreach should exceed its fiduciary grasp: what's a full-spectrum dominance of the battle space for? Were this not an official White House doctrine, the contradictions of the NSS could be interpreted only as poetic irony. How else to comprehend the opening paragraph, which begins with "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world" and ends with "The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom" (1)? Perhaps the cabalistic Straussians that make up the defense intellectual brain trust of the Bush administration (among them, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, and William Kristol) have come up with a nuanced, indeed, anti-Machiavellian reading of Machiavelli that escapes the uninitiated. But so fixed is the NSS on the creation of a world in America's image that concepts such as balance of power and imminent threat, once rooted in historical, juridical, as well as reciprocal traditions, become free-floating signifiers. Few Europeans, "old" or "new," would recognize the balance of power principle deployed by the NSS to justify preemptive, unilateral, military action against not actual but "emerging" imminent threats (15). Defined by the eighteenth-century jurist Emerich de Vattel as a state of affairs in which no one preponderant power can lay down the law to others, the classical sense of balance of power is effectively inverted in principle by the NSS document and in practice by the go-it-alone statecraft of the United States. Balance of power is global suzerainty, and war is peace.

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The Aff’s Hegemonic discourse of “Global Instability” versus a stable US validate the Hierarchy of Dominant US Identity, returning to the geographies of exclusion. Daavid Campbell et. al. 7, Prof. of Geography @ Durham, ‘7 [Political Geography 26, “Performing security: The imaginative geographies of current US strategy,” 414-415] The concept of integration, invoked in different ways and in different measures by both Kagan and Barnett, is similarly at the heart of the current administration’s foreign and domestic policies. The former Director of Policy at the US State Department, Richard Haass, articulated the central tenets of the concept when he wondered: Is there a successor idea to containment? I think there is. It is the idea of integration. The goal of US foreign policy should be to persuade the other major powers to sign on to certain key ideas as to how the world should operate: opposition to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, support for free trade, democracy, markets. Integration is about locking them into these policies and then building institutions that lock them in even more (Haass in Lemann, 1 April 2002, emphasis added). That the US is no longer prepared to tolerate regimes that do not mirror its own democratic values and practices, and that it will seek to persuade such major powers to change their policies and behaviours to fit the American modus operandi, is not without historical precedent (Ambrosius, 2006). Nor does the differently imagined geography of integration replace completely previous Manichean conceptions of the world so familiar to Cold War politics. Rather, the proliferation of new terms of antipathy such as ‘axis of evil’, ‘rogue states’, and ‘terror cities’ demonstrate how integration goes hand in hand with e and is mutually constitutive of e new forms of division. Barnett’s divide between the globalised world and the non-integrat- ing gap is reflected and complemented by Kagan’s divide in ways of dealing with this state of affairs. Much of this imagined geography pivots on the idea of ‘the homeland’. Indeed, in the imaginations of the security analysts we highlight here, there is a direct relationship and tension between securing the homeland’s borders and challenging the sanctity of borders elsewhere (see Kaplan, 2003: 87). Appreciating this dynamic requires us to trace some of the recent articulations of US strategy. Since September 11th 2001 the US government and military have issued a number of documents outlining their security strategy. Each recites, reiterates and resignifies both earlier strategic statements as well each other, creating a sense of boundedness and fixity which naturalizes a specific view of the world. Initially there was The National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of Homeland Security, 2002), and then the much broader scope National Security Strategy (The White House, 2002b; see Der Derian, 2003). These were followed by the ‘‘National Strategy for Combating Terrorism’’ and particular plans for Military Strategy, Defense Strategy and the ‘‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’’ (Department of Defense, 2005a, 2005b; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004; The White House, 2002a). These are seen as an interlocking whole, where ‘‘the National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strat- egy (NSS) and implements the National Defense Strategy (NDS)’’ (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004: 1); and the ‘‘Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support’’ builds ‘‘upon the concept of an active, layered defense outlined in the National Defense Strategy’’ (Department of Defense, 2005b: iii; see also diagram on 6). The updated National Security Strategy (The White House, 2006) presents a further re- elaboration and re-stating of these principles. As with the understandings we highlighted previously, it should be noted that key elements of these strategies pre-date September 11. Significant in this continuity is the link between the Bush administration’s strategic view and the 1992 ‘‘Defense Planning Guidance’’ (DPG). Writ- ten for the administration of George H. W. Bush by Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby, the DPG was the first neoconservative security manifesto for the post-Cold War; a blue print for a one-superpower world in which the US had to be prepared to combat new regional threats and prevent the rise of a hegemonic competitor ( Tyler, 8 March 1992; see Mann, 2004: 198ff, 212). Initial versions of the DPG were deemed too controversial and were rewritten with input from then Defense Secretary Cheney and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Colin Powell (Tyler, 24 May 1992). Nonetheless, Cheney’s version still declared that, ‘‘we must maintain the mechanism for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role’’ (Cheney, 1993: 2).What we find in this is the kernel of the policies implemented in the administration of George W. Bush, reworked through the Clinton period by such organizations as PNAC (dis- cussed above). The assemblage of individuals and organizations e both inside and outside the formal state structures e running from the DPG, through PNAC to the plethora of Bush administration security texts cited above (all of which draw upon well-established US security dispositions in the post-World War II era) demonstrates the performative infrastructure through which certain ontological effects are established, and through which certain performances are made possible and can be understood.

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The 1ac’s cry of instability embeds the Middle east in a language of universalism, dooming us to a violent cycle of global intervention Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005.

Bush here invokes the recurrent American anxiety that Americans are too individualistic, too materialistic, and therefore lacking in solidarity and conviction. This is the worry that America has become a collection of self- centered consumers motivated by private wants rather than real agency. The war on terror allows America to show that this is not so, and to make it not so. Through the war on terror, Americans can manifest their agency and solidarity by empowering the U.S. government to fulfill their agency and solidarity by leading the world to peace. To do this, however, they must engage in the war themselves by recognizing the threat of terrorism and by feeling the fear for it, deeply. Only in this way can they redeem themselves from this fear through the moral struggle waged on their behalf by the government. Conversely, it is no accident that the Middle East is the source of the threat they must fear. Recall that Schmitt stipulates that the enemy is "the other, the stranger . . . existentially something different and alien" [End Page 36] (1996, 27). This is the irreducible enemy, whom one can only, if conflict arises, fight to the death. The Middle East can be cast as this sort of enemy because it can be easily endowed with characteristics that make it the antipode of the United States, intrinsically violent and irrational. But it is, at the same time, a region of peoples yearning for freedom who can be redeemed through their submission to moral order and brought into the fold of civilization. So in order to redeem the Middle East and ourselves from fear and violence, we must confront the Middle East for the foreseeable future with fear and violence. It is important to recognize that the rhetoric of security with its war on terrorism is not a program for action, but a discourse that justifies actions. The United States is not bound to take any specific action implied by its rhetoric. But this rhetoric gives the United States the prerogative to take whatever actions it decides upon for whatever purpose as long as these actions come within the rhetoric's purview. Judged by its own standards, the rhetoric of security is counterproductive. It increases fear while claiming that the goal is to eliminate fear. It increases insecurity by pronouncing ever broader areas of life to be in need of security. It increases political antagonism by justifying U.S. interests in a language of universalism. It increases enmity toward the United States by according the United States a special status over and above all other nations. The war against terror itself is a notional war that has no existence except as an umbrella term for various military and police actions. According to a report published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army, "the global war on terrorism as currently defined and waged is dangerously indiscriminate and ambitious" (Record 2003, 41). This assessment assumes that the actions comprehended under the rubric of the "war on terrorism" are designed to achieve a coherent military objective. The impossible "absolute security," feared by the report's author to be the "hopeless quest" of current policy (46), may be useless as a strategic objective, but it is eminently effective in organizing a rhetoric designed to justify an open-ended series of hegemonic actions. The rhetoric of security, then, provides the moral framework for U.S. political hegemony through its grounding in the idea of national agency and in the absolute opposition between the state of civility and the state of [End Page 37] war. Designating the United States as the embodiment of the world order's underlying principle and the guarantor of the world order's existence, this rhetoric places both the United States and terrorism outside the normative relations that should inhere within the world order as a whole. The United States is the supreme agent of the world's war against war; other nations must simply choose sides. As long as war threatens to dissolve the peaceful order of nations, these nations must submit to the politics of "the one, instead of the many." They must accept the United States as "something godlike," in that in questions of its own security—which are questions of the world's security—they can have no authority to influence or oppose its actions. These questions can be decided by the United States alone. Other nations must, for the foreseeable future, suspend their agency when it

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 19 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 20 comes to their existence. Therefore, the rhetoric of security allows the United States to totalize world politics within itself in a manner that extends from the relations among states down to the inner moral struggle experienced by every human being.

Link- North Korea

Understanding North Korea in a military terms like their relationship to US bases, provides legitimacy for defense experts to mask the construction of threat and whitewash the US’s responsibly in the nuclear crisis. Bleiker, 2003. Roland Bleiker,Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003, “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis”, International Affairs 79, n4]

A fundamental paradox emerges: on the one hand, an array of abstract acronyms and metaphors has removed our understanding of security issues further and further from the realities of conflict and war. On the other hand, we have become used to these distorting metaphors to the point that the language of defence analysis has become the most accepted—and by definition most credible and rational—way of assessing issues of security. The ensuing practices of political legitimization provides experts—those fluent in the techno- strategic language of abstraction—not only with the knowledge, but also with the moral authority to comment on issues of defence.67 Experts on military technologies have played an essential role in constructing North Korea as a threat and in reducing or eliminating from our purview the threat that emanates from the US and South Korea towards the North. The political debate over each side’s weapons potential, for instance, is articulated in highly technical terms. Even if non-experts manage to decipher the jargon- packed language in which defence issues are presented, they often lack the technical expertise to verify the claims thus advanced, even though those claims are used to legitimize important political decisions. As a result, the techno- strategic language of defence analysis has managed to place many important security issues beyond the reach of political and moral discussions.

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The affirmative presents a one sided vision of North Korea as and unpredictable rogue state. Bleiker, 2003. Roland Bleiker,Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, 2003, “A rogue is a rogue is a rogue: US foreign policy and the Korean nuclear crisis”, International Affairs 79, n4]

This article has examined the underlying patterns that shaped the two Korean nuclear crises of the last decade. In each case, in 1993–4 and in 2002–3, the crisis allegedly emerged suddenly and was largely attributed to North Korea’s problematic behaviour, most notably to its nuclear brinkmanship. But a more thorough analysis of the events reveals a far more complex picture. Given the deeply entrenched antagonistic Cold War atmosphere on the peninsula, the most recent crisis hardly comes as a surprise. Indeed, a crisis is always already present: the question is simply when and how it is perceived and represented as such. Responsibility for the nuclear crisis is equally blurred. North Korea undoubtedly bears a large part of it. Pyongyang has demonstrated repeatedly that it does not shy away from generating tension to promote its own interests, particularly when the survival of the regime is at stake. Even a primitive North Korean nuclear programme poses a grave threat to the region, not least because it could unleash a new nuclear arms race. But Pyongyang’s actions have not taken place in a vacuum. They occurred in response to internal as well as external circumstances. The central point to keep in mind here is that North Korea has been subject to over half a century of clear and repeated American nuclear threats. Few decision-makers and defence analysts realize the extent to which these threats have shaped the security dilemmas on the peninsula. If one steps back from the immediate and highly emotional ideological context that still dominates security interactions on the peninsula, then the attitude and behaviour of North Korea and the US bear striking similarities. Both have contributed a great deal to each other’s fears. Both have also used their fears to justify aggressive military postures. And both rely on a strikingly similar form of crisis diplomacy. But the ensuing interactive dynamics are largely hidden behind a rationalized security policy that presents threats in a one-dimensional manner. The image of North Korea as an evil and unpredictable rogue state is so deeply entrenched that any crisis can easily be attributed to Pyongyang’s problematic actions, even in the face of contradictory evidence. Keeping up this image, and the threat projections that are associated with it, requires constant work. The specialized discourse on security and national defence contributes to the performance of this task. It presents threats in a highly technical manner and in a jargon-ridden language that is inaccessible to all but a few military experts. As a result, a very subjective and largely one-sided interpretation of security dilemmas has come to be accepted as real and politically legitimate. [end page 736] Articles on defence issues usually end with policy recommendations. Not so this one, even though much could be said about a great many crucial issues, such as the possibility of involving China as a way of reaching a compromise between Pyongyang’s insistence on bilateral negotiations and Washington’s preference for a multilateral approach. But trying to identify the underlying patterns of Korea’s security dilemmas seems a big enough task on its own. This conclusion, then, takes on a more modest tone and merely draws attention to the type of mindset with which the challenges ahead may be approached more successfully. Required more than anything is what Gertrude Stein sought to capture through the metaphor that served as a model for the title of this article:80 the political and moral obligation to question the assumption that something is how it is and how it has always been; the need to replace old and highly problematic Cold War thinking patterns with new and more sensitive attempts to address the dilemmas of Korean security.

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Representations of North Korea are rooted in ideological hegemony not objective data David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, ‘8 [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290_index.html] Laclau and Mouffe’s (2001: chapter 2) concept of hegemony, which is used here, rely on a notion developed by Antonio Gramsci (1971). Gramsci broadened the traditional notion of hegemony beyond the view of mapping hegemony in terms of leadership and dominance, which are based on material capabilities, by introducing inter-subjective and ideological aspects into this concept. Accordingly, hegemony contains the ability of a class (bourgeois) to project the world view over another (workers, peasantry) in terms of the former, so that it is accepted as common sense or reality. His merit was to conceptualize hegemony in terms of power without the use of force to reach consent by the dominated class through education and, what he calls, the role of intellectuals (“men of letters”) such as philosophers, journalists and artists (Gramsci 1971: 5-43). The process of fixing meaning, that is, in terms of Laclau and Mouffe (2001: 105), when an element (sign with unfixed meaning) is transformed through articulation into a moment (sign with fixed meaning), is hegemonic, since it reduces the range of possibilities and excludes alternative meanings by determining the ways in which the signs are related to each other. That is to say, when meaning is fixed, i.e. hegemonized, it determines, what can be thought, said or done in a meaningful way. 13 Applied to this case, the exclusive character of a hegemonic discourse makes it unintelligible to make sense of North Korea’s nuclear program in terms of, for instance, energy needs, because – as it is argued – practices of problematization hegemonized the ways of thinking, acting and speaking about North Korea. Discursive hegemony can be regarded as the result of certain practices, in which a particular understanding or interpretation appears to be the natural order of things (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). This naturalization consolidates a specific idea, which is taken for granted by involved actors and makes sense of the(ir) world. As Hall (1998: 1055-7) argues, common sense resembles a hegemonic discourse, which is a dominant interpretation and representation of reality and therefore accepted to be the valid truth and knowledge. Referring to the productive character of discursive hegemony, the Six-Party Talks can be regarded as an outcome of the dominating interpretation of reality (cf. also Jackson 2005: 20; Cox 1983; Hajer 2005). The hegemonic discourse regarding North Korea provides the framework for a specific interpretation in which the words, actions or policies of it are attached with meaning, that is, are problematized. As Jacob Torfing argues “a discursive truth regime […] specifies the criteria for judging something to be true of false”, and further states, that within such a discursive framework the criteria for acknowledging something as true, right or good are negotiated and defined (Torfing 2005a: 14; 19; cf. also Mills 2004: 14-20). However, important to note is, if one is able to define this yardstick, not only one is able to define what is right, good or true, but also what kinds of action are possible. In other words, if you can mark someone or something with a specific label, then certain kinds of acts become feasible.14 Basically, it can be stated that discursive hegemony depends on the interpretation and representation by actors of real events since the interpretation of non-existent facts would not make sense. But the existence of real events does not necessarily have to be a prerequisite for hegemonizing interpretational and representational practices because actions do not need to be carried out, thus, to become a material fact, in order to be interpreted and represented in a certain way (Campbell 1998: 3). Suh Jae-Jung (2004: 155) gives an example of this practice. In 1999 US intelligence agencies indicated to preparing measures taken by North Korea to test fire a missile. Although the action was not yet executed, it was treated as a fact, which involved and enabled certain implications and material consequences such as the public criticism of North Korea, the issuance of statements, diplomatic activity and efforts to hegemonize and secure this certain kind of reality, i.e. to build a broad majority to confirm this view on North Korea. In other words, the practices of problematizing North Korea took place even before an action was done.

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Claims of Korean “instability” are rooted in exclusionary racism Tan See Seng, Prof of Security Studies @ IDSS Singapore, 2002 [July, “What Fear Hath Wrought: Missile Hysteria and The Writing of America, IDSS Commentary No. 28, http://www.sipri.org/contents/library/0210.pdf] Otherness, in Wolfowitz’s rendition, is also discursively constituted along a moral/immoral – or, alternatively, responsible/irresponsible – axis. Equally interesting is the notion that authoritarian or rogue-state leaders, besides lacking in rationality and viewing problem solving as a form of weakness, are “ruthless and avaricious” – an intentional, not accidental, choice of predicates. That (and here we are left to infer) “North Korea” or “Iraq” is ruled by such roguish elements can only mean that such states can, indeed they should, therefore be properly referred to as rogue states. Against these inscriptions of immorality or amorality stand, in diametric contrast, moral “America.” And here the unequal adoption by Wolfowitz’s discourse, in the case of “democracies,” of the analytical level of state/regime connotes that all America, and not only its leaders or certain individuals, is thereby kind, compassionate, altruistic – the polar opposite of all that rogue states, and possibly even China and Russia, represent. To be sure, nowhere in his words does Wolfowitz imply that there are as such no immoral or irresponsible Americans. Nor does he even hint that all citizens of rogue states are therefore roguish; political correctness, after all, is the norm in these enlightened times. But the discursive effect is such that we are left with the impression that leaders of rogue nations – Saddam Hussein, Kim Chong-il, and their ilk – epitomize the darkest of the dark metaphysics of human nature. And roguish as such are their foreign policies. In his evaluation of the missile threat from North Korea, the deputy CIA director asserted: Like everyone else, we knew the [Pyongyang] regime was brutal within its borders and a menace beyond. Its commando raids into South Korea and its assassination attempts against successive South Korean presidents – including the 1983 bombings in Rangoon that killed 21 people – were clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.62 Again, it bears reminding that the argument here does not refuse the historical “reality” and tragic consequences either of Pyongyang’s oppressive policies at home or its ruinous forays abroad. In terms of exclusionary practices, however, interpretive conclusions concerning the brutality of the Pyongyang regime cannot be separated from the morality axis on which this particular statement turns. What, for instance, is the effect created by the use of the opening phrase, “Like everyone else”? To who exactly does “everyone” refer? That this analysis is intelligible at all depends upon the presupposition that this particular reading – an American reading, to be precise – is universally accepted by one and all. But this is clearly not the case as implied by the vociferous and potentially violent tide of militant Muslims in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East, who hold Washington in contempt for the latter’s alleged “brutality” and “menace” toward, say, the Iraqis, (by proxy) the Palestinians, or (most recently) the Afghans. As such, the discursive effect of the preceding constructions is the naturalization of the Pyongyang regime as immoral, irresponsible, or just plain evil given the damning evidence of dastardly deeds that proffer “clear windows into the minds and morals of North Korean leaders.” Further, that the enumerated acts above were those perpetrated by Kim Il-song and not by his son, Kim Chong-il, seems not to matter in this analysis, although it is the latter Kim’s government with whom the Bush Administration must deal. This is not to imply that this intelligence estimate on Kim was essentially all caricature and thereby shorn of “truth.” The CIA official continues in his assessment: It is easy to caricature Kim Chong-il – either as a simple tyrant blind to his dilemma or as a technocratic champion of sweeping change. But the extreme views of him tend to be the product of bias, ignorance, or wishful thinking. The reality is more complex… Like his father, he has been shrewd enough to make bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy. He knows that proliferation is something we want to stop. Thus, Kim Chong-il has tried to drum up outside assistance by trading off international concerns about his missile programs and sales. He has – more subtly, of course – done much the same thing with foreign fears of renewed famine and the chaos that could accompany any unravelling of his regime.63 The evident attempt at nuance in the above analysis, however, does not preclude the continued deployment of representational practices along the axis of responsibility. “Like his father,” we are told, the “shrewd” Kim makes “bad behavior the keystone of his foreign policy” – an indication of chronic irresponsibility in North Korea’s international relations. We may note here the likely intrusive influence of another discourse, particularly that on nineteenth-century European diplomacy as it figures in American intellectual and popular culture. As historian Barbara Tuchman once noted, for most Americans the notion of diplomacy carries with it “all the wicked devices of the Old World, spheres of influence, balances of power, secret treatises, triple alliances”64 and other such forms of Machiavellian intrigue for which America, idealized as the New World – a seemingly virginal, innocent, and righteous identity – had no place. Indeed, just such a pristine identity is often adduced as the universal ideal to which all nations and peoples are presumed to aspire – a point made forcefully in the earlier cited “end of history” thesis popular in mainstream political debate at the close of the Cold War.65 In other words, what is good for America is obviously good for the whole world (or, at least those parts that are “rational,” “responsible,” “moral”). “Missile defense,” one congressman averred, “is for Americans, for Europeans, for Russians, and for all peace- loving peoples on the face of the Earth.”66 Without ignoring or denying North Korean complicity in the light of its sizeable transfers of missile technology to the Middle East, what those exclusionary practices produce is the materializing effect of a Pyongyang regime that, if anything, can be expected to harm the US at the slightest provocation – a representation of danger that finds easy resonance with American policymakers because of its familiarity rather than any likelihood of such an eventuation. Further, what is effaced or erased by the above statement are plausible illustrations of bad behaviour in American foreign policy: a policy orientation that, even by most orthodox accounts, has been realist – in both its prudential as well as Machiavellian aspects – throughout much of the Cold War period.67 Indeed, this effacement stands out starkly in the light of resistant discourses – mostly but not exclusively from European sources – which portray America as a rogue state68 given the apparent lack of “strategic restraint” in its post-Cold War foreign policy.69 Hence the tenuousness of such constructions of identity through excluding contradictions and tensions that are as much a part of Self as it is of the Other.

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Attempts to securitize North Korea fail, in attempting to understand their government and leadership we inherently misperceive the threat Hazel Smith, prof of IR @ Warwick, Ph.D from London School, Fulbright Scholar at Stanford, 12/16/2002, International Affairs Volume 76 Issue 3, Pages 593 - 617

The securitization paradigm differs from a straightforward security-based analysis because of the former’s overweening single-factor analysis and because of its heavy normative commitments. Although it accepts the classical security assump- tions that military power and military instruments are ultimately the only significant factors of analysis in respect to Korea, it goes further than this by sublimating all other issues, including DPRK economic, cultural and humani- tarian policies, within a military-based analysis. In addition, its inherent normative assumption is that the domestic and foreign politics of north Korea provide the root cause of all tensions on the Korean peninsula. The securitization paradigm permeates the literature on north Korea to a greater or lesser degree. It is most visible in the US think-tank community, where analysis coming from the American Enterprise Institute, the United States Institute for Peace and the Institute for International Economics is most overtly shaped by the paradigm. Two articles emanating from these institutes have shaped the policy debates in the United States and have also articulated the ‘common-sense’ view held by the US and international media.7 This ‘common- sensical’ view shapes all analysis of north Korea to the extent that scholarship representing a different position, however well supported by research, is sidelined or deemed questionable simply because it does not fit well with the sociological consensus of the research community.8 These assumptions are so pervasive that they also creep into analysis which does not overtly share the world-view of the securitization prism, with the tendency to accept, unless proved otherwise, the securitization view of north Korea. The securitization perspective portrays north Korean politics as mad in the sense of being irrational and unknowable and bad in the sense of the motivation and impetus for policy being ascribed to normatively unacceptable characteristics of the state and its leadership. That these two aspects of the paradigm are sometimes contradictory—if the state is mad, can it really be understood as bad in the sense of being consciously directed by an evil intent whose instigators could take responsibility for their actions?—is not a problem for the paradigm given that these are assumptions made prior to analysis. As long as these assumptions prove fruitful in solving research puzzles, at least within the Kuhnian theory of paradigms, they will continue to shape scientific enquiry. Nor do these paradig- matic assumptions need always to give rise to precisely the same conclusions. Kuhn informs us that paradigms shape research questions, acting as a filtering device to weed out assumptions which do not fit paradigmatic frameworks. They may thus narrow the theoretical agenda, but they also permit differing research outcomes within the confines of the paradigm’s fundamental assumptions. Thus, within the securitization paradigm we can find different strands —what I will call the ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ variants of the bad and mad perspectives.

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The accepted securitization paradigm for analyzing North Korea is not longer effective Hazel Smith, prof of IR @ Warwick, Ph.D from London School, Fulbright Scholar at Stanford, 12/16/2002, International Affairs Volume 76 Issue 3, Pages 593 - 617

Although the once pervasive epistemological notion of ‘paradigms’ has become a pretty old-fashioned idea in social science, it provides a useful analytical framework for the discussion here because it helps in the evaluation of how some- times ‘irrational’ and often unexamined assumptions shape research question and research outcomes.5 The Kuhnian argument is that within a scientific community dominant conceptual frameworks, which Kuhn calls paradigms, are constituted by sets of fundamental (that is, unquestioned) assumptions. A successful paradigm is one whose fundamental assumptions continue for some length of time to provide a fruitful base for problem-solving. Such assumptions are held to be true for as long as they consistently help solve research puzzles. Paradigmatic assumptions, by their nature, do not have to be either proved or falsified and can therefore be thought of as pre-theoretical. Paradigms are incommensurable with one another. Scholars working within the confines of one conceptual framework simply cannot directly communicate with scholars utilizing alternative paradigms. They literally ‘see’ different things, with paradigms acting as a kind of scientific filtering or selection mechanism which decides what is significant or important, prior to analysis taking place. Kuhn argues that paradigms can cope with anomalies, including facts that do not ‘fit’ the framework, but that they fall into ‘crisis’ when there are simply too many anomalies for the paradigm to continue to be persuasive. Kuhn argues that after crises we sometimes see a ‘paradigm shift’ or a ‘revolution’ in which the dominant paradigm is replaced by an alternative which is more successful in puzzle-solving. The intriguing and controversial nature of Kuhn’s approach is its insistence that paradigms are sociological as well as purely rational constructs. At its crudest, the paradigm is true because the community of researchers believes it to be true. When they cease believing, the paradigm ceases to provide an accept- able scientific framework for analysis. This does not mean, however, that any arbitrarily chosen set of assumptions can replace the previous paradigm. Paradigms do not arise as if by magic. There must be an alternative available, perhaps based on a body of research, which, although starting from within the dominant paradigm, repeatedly throws up conclusions which, precisely because they do not fit paradigmatic assumptions, are ignored or sidelined by the broader scientific community. Paradigm change is not a common occurrence, however. This is because dominant paradigms are powerful and can last for longer than their apparent utility might warrant. Given the Kuhnian framework, therefore, the argument in the present context would run as follows. The securitization paradigm for interpreting north Korean politics may have once been fruitful—for instance, during the Cold War—and it could hitherto cope with anomalies, including facts that did not ‘fit’ the overall framework. Now that these anomalies are both numerous and visible, the dominant paradigm is called into question as a useful and appropriate device for helping understand north Korean politics. There is a now a substantial alternative body of literature underpinned by sets of assumptions different from the securitization paradigm, but this ‘paradigm in waiting’ has not yet replaced the securitization paradigm. The alternative conceptual frameworks (paradigms) available to the dominant ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ options are what I shall call the ‘sad’ or ‘rational actor’ options; either of these, I will argue, forms a better puzzle-solving framework than the ‘mad’ or ‘bad’ approaches. The argument demonstrates, however, that paradigm shift away from the dominant perspective is not an automatic or easy process. Sociological factors, including the relative visibility of the scientific community working within this perspective, can serve to give the securitization paradigm a life of its own long after its utility has been called into question. This is evidenced by the continued dominance of the securi- tization perspective in the literature, irrespective of both the numerous anomalies and the available alternatives.

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The aff’s reductionist view of Iran produces a self-fulfilling prophesy - contrasting the free west to the enemy east. Majid Sharifi, PhD Candidate in Poli Sci @ Univ. of Florida, 3/12/2008 [For Presenatioan @ ISA Conference, “Imagined Enemies: US Iran Relations,” http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252035_index.html]

In regards to Iran’s relations with the West in general and the United States in particular, political pundits, who have extensively written on Iran, also have a reductionist worldview of good versus evil. From this reductionist worldview, the solution to confront Iran is also reductionistic. Generally, it is about two approaches— confronting Iran or containing Iran. However, both of these policies essentially presuppose Iran as an enemy, and this presupposition has become a productive self-fulfilled prophecy. 4For example, on the right, Michael Ledeen, argues that there is a natural contrast between the West as a freedom lover and Iran as “an enemy that never [hides] its intention to destroy or dominate us.” 3 Then Ledeen, off course, calls for an immediate confrontation with Iran before it is too late. On the left, Kenneth Pollack, former advisor to the National Security Council during both Clinton and Bush administrations, attempts to reveal the complexity of US-Iran relations by examining the historical circumstances that have helped construct what he labels as an Iranian “pathological nationalism.” Then he argues that since Iranians have already “mis-learned” their history, it is highly unlikely that the “truth” of history would be revealed to them, therefore, the U.S. must lead a multilateral policy to contain the Iranian menace. 4 In the same way, in the official state discourse in Iran, there are only two approaches to the U.S. For some, the best way to deal with the U.S. is to contain its inherent menace by not provoking it, but simultaneously not allowing it to expand its influence in Iran or the region. On the other hand, in a manner very similar to how, for example, Ledeen represents Iran, there are Iranian confrontationalists, who symbolize the U.S. as belligerent power that aims to exploit, corrupt, dominate, and destroy Iran or Islam. Labels such as “the Great Satan,” “the Arrogant America,” “Death to American,” “America the Bully (Amerikay-yah zoor gu),” “Murderous America (Amerika-yah Jani), etc. are abundant in their language. It appears that for confrontationalists on both sides, each is not only the most serious threat to the other, but also the most serious threat to the world. These two dominant approaches are reflected in the popular media too. 3 4 5For example, from Oct 10, to Nov. 11, 2007, I examined the front pages of the largest mainstream daily in Iran, the word “America” showed up in 48 titles, forty-six of which depicted American as a threat. In contrast, in the same period, the word “Iran” showed up in thirty-eight titles of the New York Times, thirty-six of which presupposed Iran as a negative force for both Iranians and Americans. In the final analysis, these representations and analyses are embedded in the construction of a simplistic worldview of good versus evil that cannot and have not contributed to reducing either tension or resolving the conflicts. Instead, they have reproduced themselves. Moreover, since both have used demonizing the other as a way of defeating their domestic rivals, for the past 29 years, these policies have had self-fulfilling prophecies. As such, in this research, I allow the empirical evidence to speak for itself. This does not mean that I am completely neutral in my values. It only means that I consciously try to analyze texts dialogically

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The Iranian state is ever shifting as the US policies of containment stay the same. Majid Sharifi, PhD Candidate in Poli Sci @ Univ. of Florida, 3/12/2008 [For Presenatioan @ ISA Conference, “Imagined Enemies: US Iran Relations,” http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p252035_index.html] In regards to the U.S., while Iranian confrontationalists represent the U.S. government as an evildoer out to destroy Iran and Islam by misleading its own people as well as intending to destroy Islam. From this perspective, this evildoer ought to be stopped if possible, and resisted at all necessary costs. This representation practice reproduces legitimacy for confrontationalists in Iran. Ironically, this is very similar to the way the U.S. Right tries to create legitimacy for itself. For confrontationalists in the United States, Iran provides, and has provided, a safe bet for constructing a good enemy, although the content of Iran as an enemy has been a shifting concept. It has ranged from being a threat for spreading fundamentalism to the threat of defeating Saddam Hussein and thus breaking the balance of power in the region, to threat of terrorism, Shi’ism, and nuclear proliferation. These shifting threats have been the only constant variable in imagining of Iran as an enemy. Even Iran’s nuclear threat has been a shifting concept. The threat began as Iran’s intension to rebuild its nuclear power plants, then it was shifted to Iran wanting to import nuclear fuel from Russian, which the U.S opposed then, but supports now. Recently, the threat of Iran has shifted from uranium enrichment to having the knowledge of enriching it. In other cases, for example, Iran was a threat because it had confrontational approaches to the Saudis, Egyptians, or the Gulf states, but nowadays Iran is a threat because it is building friendly relations with these states, therefore, it wants to dominate them. In other words, the content of Iran’s threat has been shifting, not because the material reality has changed, but because the representational practices of Iran in the U.S. has changed. What has remained constant has been the ontological view of Iran, which bars Iranian voices by labeling them as fundamentalists, ideologues, Islamists, irrational, evil, etc. Likewise, the discourse of Iranian confrontationalists bars U.S. voices by labeling them as various faces of evil. On the other hand, from the perspective of the Left in Iran and U.S., policies of containment are also embedded in the same ontological presuppositions, but their prescription are different.

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The ‘proliferation’ metaphor is epistemologically bankrupt—their framing obscures the root cause of the spread of weapons, turning the case. Muttimer, 2000. David Mutimer, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at York University (Canada), 2000 ("The Proliferation Image," The Weapons State: Proliferation and the Framing of Security, Published by Lynne Rienner (Boulder, CO), ISBN 1555877877, p. 58-63) To this point I have discussed the various images through which weapons technology has been framed in general terms. The central argument of this book is that these technologies have been reframed in terms of “proliferation,” and that this has had particular practical and political consequences. To make this argument and to explore those consequences, it is necessary to fill in the “proliferation” frame in much more detail. This image joins together a number of discursive links to create a particular discursive construction of an international security problem. The central element of the image, the one that draws the others together into a single image, is proliferation itself. Before its appropriation by those concerned with the development of nuclear weapons following World War II, proliferation was commonly used (when it was commonly used) to talk of the reproduction of animals and plants. Animals—even human animals—proliferated by having children, usually a lot of children. Rabbits were particularly proliferous. This meaning is clearly reflected in the Oxford English Dictionary's definition [end page 58] of proliferous: “Producing offspring; procreative; prolific.” Initially, analysts and policymakers adopted the language of proliferation for the problem of an increase in the number of states with access to nuclear technology after controlled fission was developed in 1945. This act of discursive imagination yielded nuclear proliferation as a policy problem in the Cold War. Nuclear technology would “reproduce,” spawning an ever-growing “family” of nuclear nations. This image of nuclear proliferation underpinned the various solutions that were devised: the NPT and its attendant supplier groups, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Zangger Committee. We can see what sort of “thing” is made of nuclear proliferation by its being imagined as “proliferation” if we look more closely at the earlier use of proliferation—the familiar referent in terms of which this new and unfamiliar nuclear technology came to be understood. Animals produce offspring; they are procreative, that is, they are proliferous. To say that an animal proliferates is to say that it has young. Often, particularly when used for humans rather than for other animals, proliferation carries the connotation of excessive reproduction— humans proliferate when they have noticeably more than the accepted number of children rather than just when they have children. This implication is suggested in the Oxford English Dictionary's use of prolific in the definition I quoted earlier. Thus proliferation has two important entailments as the metaphor chosen to imagine the development of nuclear weapons. First, proliferation is a natural process that requires external intervention not to proceed but rather only for prevention (e.g., various forms of birth control). Second, the result of unchecked proliferation tends to be excessive growth in the originating organism. Both of these entailments are captured nicely in a use of the term proliferation in a discussion of metaphor by literary theorist Paul de Man: “Worse still, abstractions [tropes] are capable of infinite proliferation. They are like weeds, or like cancer; once you have begun using a single one, they will crop up everywhere.” 15 De Man's reference to cancer is rather ironic . Cell biologists have also adopted the language of proliferation to talk about the way in which cells in organisms multiply. 16 In particular, the language of proliferation is central to the study of cancers. The connection between cell proliferation and cancer throws the entailments of proliferation into stark relief. By itself, cell proliferation is a harmless, natural process—indeed, it is essential to life as we know it. This proliferation is managed by a series of biological control mechanisms that regulate the growth of cells so they faithfully reproduce what is coded into their genetic material. Once these mechanisms fail and the cells reproduce without control, cancers, often deadly to the organism as a whole, result. As Andrew Murray and Tim Hunt write in introducing the study of cell proliferation, “Without knowing the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly cell division, we cannot devise [end page 59] effective strategies to combat the uncontrolled cell divisions of the cancers that will kill one in six of us.” 17 Proliferation, as appropriated within the study of cancer, refers to an autonomous process of growth and spread, internally driven but externally controlled. Danger arises when the controls fail and the natural proliferation of cells produces excessive reproduction. When the language of proliferation was used in thinking about the development of nuclear technology after the discovery of controlled fission in the U. S. Manhattan Project, a

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Link- Prolif process similar to that which produces cancer was imagined as a result. 18 The U. S. nuclear program was the original technology that would multiply and spread. Such spread, when imagined as “proliferation,” is a natural process and is inevitable without active outside intervention. Once the development of nuclear technology is imagined as “proliferation,” this entailment of a natural process of spread leads to the expectation of inevitable growth in the number of nuclear powers. This, of course, is precisely what was expected. Because such a condition was considered dangerous and undesirable, attempts were made to establish external controls over the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Again, this follows from imagining the problem in terms of “proliferation.” Some form of external control is necessary to prevent the prolific growth of nuclear weapons outside the United States. Attempts to place such external, international controls on nuclear proliferation resulted in the NPT of 1970, which remains the principal mechanism of proliferation control. What are the implications of this image—with its understandings of autonomous, natural growth and external control—for the policy response to the development of nuclear technology? The first implication is that something imagined in terms of “proliferation” is seen to grow or multiply from a single source. Although animal reproduction involves two individuals, the father is quickly forgotten, and it is the mother who is proliferous. The budding of cells, which gives rise to the proliferation of some plants and, of course, cancers, begins with a single, or source, cell and spreads from there—in the case of a cancer, both to produce a single tumor and to create a number of separate tumors throughout the host body. Similarly, the problem of weapons proliferation is one of a source or sources proliferating, that is, reproducing by supplying the necessary technology to a new site of technological application. This form of imagining highlights the transmission process from source to recipient. Hence, the dominant response to nuclear proliferation has been the creation of supplier groups—the Zangger Committee and the NSG—that seek to control the spread of nuclear technology. In other words, to paraphrase Murray and Hunt, they attempt to provide the checks and balances that normally ensure orderly transfer and prevent the spread of nuclear technology resulting in the “cancer” of a prolific number of nuclear weapons. [end page 60] The second implication of the proliferation metaphor for the problem of nuclear weapons spread is an extreme technological determinism. Animal reproduction is an internally driven phenomenon, and so the metaphor of proliferation applied to the development of nuclear technology highlights the autonomy in the growth of that technology and its problematic weapons variant. It is worth recalling Frank Barnaby's words: “A country with a nuclear power program will inevitably acquire the technical knowledge and expertise, and will accumulate the fissile material necessary to produce nuclear weapons.” 19 In fact, the text from which this quotation is drawn presents an interesting example of the autonomy of the proliferation metaphor. The book is entitled How Nuclear Weapons Spread: Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in the 1990s. Notice that the weapons themselves spread; they are not spread by some form of external agent—say, a human being or a political institution. Under most circumstances such a title would be unnoticed, for the implications are so deeply ingrained in our conceptual system that they are not recognized as metaphorical. This image, by highlighting the technological and autonomous aspects of a process of spread, downplays or even hides important aspects of the relationship of nuclear weapons to international security. To begin with, the image hides the fact that nuclear weapons do not spread but are spread—and, in fact, are spread largely by the Western states. Second, the image downplays—to the point of hiding—any of the political, social, economic, and structural factors that tend to drive states and other actors both to supply and to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, the image downplays the politics of security and threat, naturalizing the security dilemma to the point that it is considered an automatic dynamic. The image of “proliferation” thus privileges a technical, apolitical policy by casting the problem as a technical one. The NPT controls and safeguards the movement of the technology of nuclear energy. The supporting supplier groups jointly impose controls on the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 29 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 30 Link- Prolif supply—that is, the outward flow—of this same technology. The goal in both cases is to stem or at least slow the outward movement of material and its attendant techniques. These entailments suggest that to reimagine another problem of weapons technology in terms of “proliferation” is to construct that problem as technologically autonomous and to privilege solutions that attempt to control this natural growth by means of interventions aimed at the constituent technologies. This is precisely the strategy institutionalized within the chemical weapons convention. The general obligations of the states party to the CWC—set out in its first article —are to refrain from developing, producing, or holding any CW; to refrain from using CW or making military preparations for their use; and to refrain from assisting anyone else from doing anything prohibited by the convention. 20 These obligations are usefully compared with those assumed by states in the first two articles [end page 61] of the NPT. 21 In both cases the obligations of states party are to refrain from producing or procuring the weapon in question and to forego transferring the weapon to others. The difference—and it is an important difference—is that in the case of the NPT, five nuclear weapon states do not have to renounce their nuclear weapons capability. Otherwise, the obligations are identical. More to the point than the initial obligations, however, are the practices each treaty institutionalizes to prevent the spread of weapons. In both cases direct international supervision and control are placed on precursor technologies to ensure that they do not “spread” to weapons. The NPT obliges all NNWSs party to place their nuclear industries under IAEA safeguards, and the NWSs party to the NPT have also placed their nonmilitary nuclear facilities under international safeguard. 22 These safeguards are an internationally monitored material accountancy, designed to ensure that all fissile material used to produce nuclear energy is accounted for throughout the nuclear fuel cycle—and thus has not been diverted to produce nuclear weapons. Similarly, the CWC establishes an extensive machinery to verify that chemicals from the chemical industries of the states party are not used to produce CW. The mechanics of the CW system vary from those of the nuclear safeguards, but the essentials do not. In both cases potential industrial sources of technological spread are declared to the international agency, which can then monitor those industries to ensure that the declarations are accurate and that the material of concern is properly accounted for. The CWC is therefore a “proliferation” control instrument, in the same way the 1989 and 1990 bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States over chemical weapons were “arms control” agreements. The centrality to the CWC regime of the practices monitoring chemical industries to ensure they are not used to spread chemical weapons marks it as an instrument to control proliferation, not one designed to achieve disarmament, for instance. Only in the context of a reimagining of the problem of chemical weapons from one of “arms control” or “disarmament” to one of “proliferation” did the CWC become possible. As chemical weapons came to be imagined as a “proliferation” problem in the late 1980s, the CWC as a nonproliferation agreement for chemical technology (but without the overtly discriminatory features of the nuclear NPT) became realizable. The end of the Cold War not only produced a limited arms control agreement between the superpowers concerning chemical weapons but, more important, created the conditions for realizing what reimagining in terms of the “proliferation” image made possible. A “proliferation” image produces a particular kind of object. It imagines a technology that reproduces naturally and autonomously, moving outward from an identifiable origin by relentlessly multiplying. The image [end page 62] imagines this technology as essentially benign but with the possibility of excess—reproduction is natural, expected, and even desirable, but prolific reproduction is dangerous. To permit the benign spread of technology while preventing the dangerous conclusion to that spread, external controls are required. Because the object of “proliferation” is imagined in this fashion, the forms of control that can be applied are constrained. Put another way, the particular imagination of the object of “proliferation” enables a specific series of control practices. The reverse is also true: creating given practices will construct the object of those practices in particular ways. The result is a neatly closed circle it is simple to reify—we face this particular problem with these practices; these practices are employed, so we are facing this problem. Read in either direction, the contingent becomes seen as the natural. What has happened since the late 1980s, particularly following the war in the Gulf, has been the reimagining of all forms of military technology in terms of the “proliferation” image and the embedding of that image in a series of control practices. Alternatively, a series of control practices has been established around the range of military technologies, which has constituted the object of those practices as a “proliferation” problem.

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Soft Power is not a neutral phenomenon aimed towards universal good – rather, soft power’s very attractiveness is the product of hegemonic and imperialist values with which the U.S. dominates the international system. Soft Power’s softness is the link – it attempts to deny the third world’s true interest by duping impoverished states to participate in the U.S. led international system.

Bilgin, 2008. Bilgin, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University and Elis, phd candidate, Department of International Relations, Ankara University, 2008, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis,” Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 2 / 2008 pp. 5-20

Perhaps Nye is not the best candidate for presenting such a critique, for he fails to inquire into his own core concept of ‘attraction’. This is rather unfortunate, because by doing so he replicates the essentialism of realist power analysis. Just as realist IR fails to look into the production of military power, Nye accepts as pre-given the stockpile of soft power, i.e. U.S. ‘attraction’, and focuses his account on the ways in which that stockpile could best be utilized. Admittedly, Nye assigns ‘two ontological statuses’ to attraction, as Mattern points out: “one as an essential condition and one as a result of social interaction”.42 Still, throughout his analysis, Nye relies on the former and fails to push the latter to its full conclusion. Even as he identifies the sources of soft power as “the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideas and policies”,43 Nye does not reflect upon how was it that U.S. cul ture, political ideas and policies came to be considered ‘attractive’ by the rest of the world.44 Nye’s silence on the production of soft power is somewhat surprising, as his agony over the decline of U.S. soft power during George W. Bush administration45 suggests his cognizance of its variability.46 Still, nowhere in his writings does Nye seek to inquire into the historical processes through which the ‘attractive ness’ of U.S. culture has been produced. Indeed, as Bially Mattern also points out, while Nye favors universal values over the parochial, he says “nothing about why universal values are the “right” ones or how one acquires such values”.47 Perhaps more importantly, Nye remains silent on the historical process through which par ticular values have come to be considered as universal and right and others have been rendered parochial and less right. An analysis of the attractiveness of U.S. culture and values that is historically and sociologically attentive to their produc tion would inquire into soft power in terms of U.S. ‘hegemony and domination’.48 Failing that, stating a preference for soft power while relying on essentialist notions of culture and identity communicates a benign picture of U.S. hegemony and does not allow the capturing of ‘not-so-soft’ aspects of soft power (see below).49 On one level, there are no surprises here. Nye is not interested in inquiring into how the opponents of the U.S. are relegated to silence through various expressions of soft power. As the sub-title of his book (Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics) indicates, his is an unabashedly unreflexive take on the best ways to further U.S. ‘success’.50 In offering a particular conception of soft power, Nye not only introduces a new concept; he also calls on the United States to make more efficient use of its existing stockpile of soft power. That the kind of soft power he calls for the United States to utilize is ‘not-so-soft’ insofar as its effects on the rest of the world are concerned does not seem to worry him.

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Soft power is colonialism masked in rhetoric and values – the affirmative effaces the violence of the political context of soft-power’s emergence, guaranteeing it is nothing more than an imperialist tool Bilgin, 2008. Bilgin, Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Bilkent University and Elis, phd candidate, Department of International Relations, Ankara University, 2008, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis,” Insight Turkey Vol. 10 / No. 2 / 2008 pp. 5-20

Lukes understands the ‘third face of power’ as those instances when “A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping, or determining his very wants”.52 Post-colonial peoples’ post-WWII rush towards sovereign statehood may be viewed as an example of the ‘third face of power’ whereby the international so ciety shaped their wants while their actual circumstances called for other forms of political community. That is to say, in Lukes’ framework, B does what A wants in apparent readiness contrary to its own interests. Put differently, by exercising soft power, A prevents B from recognizing its own ‘real interests’. While Nye’s attention to A’s ability to shape B’s wants seem to render his analy sis three-dimensional, his lack of curiosity into ‘not-so-soft’ expressions of U.S. power renders his (soft) power analysis two-and-a-half dimensional. This is mostly because Nye assumes that B’s ‘real interests’ are also served when it follows A’s lead. It is true that soft power does not involve physical coercion, but as Lukes reminded us, it is the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natu ral and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial.53 Going back to the example of North/South relations, power is involved not only when the South does not express its grievance because of the absence of opportunities to do so, but also when it seemingly has no grievances as a consequence of the prevalent system of ideas that depoliticizes its status within the international economic order.54 In a similar fashion, Nye is not interested in inquiring into the sources of U.S. ‘attraction’, for he considers the U.S.’s ability to shape the wants of others as befitting the latter’s ‘real interests’. Accordingly, he misses a ‘fundamental part of soft power’, what Bohas describes as “the early shaping of taste, collective imaginary and ideals which con stitutes a way of dominating other countries. This includes the reinforcing effect of the social process in favor of American power through goods and values”.55 As such, Nye’s analysis remains limited in regard to the third face of soft power, where the existing state of things is internalized by the actors, and the U.S.’s expression of power seems benign and in accordance with the ‘real interests’ of others. With the aim of rendering power analysis more realistic, we should open up to new research agendas as required by the multiple faces of power. Power is far too complex in its sources, effects and production to be reduced to one dimension.59 Indeed, power is diffused and enmeshed in the social world in which people live in such a way that there are no relations exempt from power.60 Since power shapes the formation of actors’ consciousness, no interest formation can be objective; defining what an actor’s ‘real interests’ are is not free of power relations. That is to say, not only the mobilization of bias and agenda-setting but also the produc tion and effects of all norms and values that shape human consciousness should be critically scrutinized. This, in turn, calls for not three- but four-dimensional power analysis – “Lukes plus Foucault” – as dubbed by Guzzini.62 Contra Lukes, whose three-dimensional power analysis rests on assumptions regarding (1) the possibility of uncovering power relations, and (2) B’s objective (‘real’) interests that A denies through various expressions of hard and soft power, Foucault main tains that ‘power and knowledge directly imply one another… [in that] there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’.63 The academic field of International Relations constitutes a supreme example of the workings of the ‘fourth face of power’.

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Link- Soft Power

Over the years, students of IR have studied international relations as an effect of power. It is only recently that they have begun to study power as an effect of international relations (as world politics) 64 and International Relations (as an academic field).65 However, as Booth reminds us, such silences, as with IR’s narrow conception of power, “are not natural, they are political. Things do not just happen in politics, they are made to happen, whether it is globalization or inequality. Grammar serves power”.66 One of the sites where the productive effects of grammar in the service of power is most vis ible is the ‘Third World’. This has been one of the central themes of postcolonial studies where “[f]rom Fanon to Jan Mahomed to Bhabha, the connecting theme is that Western representations construct meaning and ‘reality’ in the Third World. Concepts such as “progress”, “civilized” and “modern” powerfully shape the non-European world”.67 The ways in which grammar serves power becomes detectable through more realistic power analysis. More realistic power analysis requires looking at instances of:68 A getting B to do what it wants in the event of a visible conflict;a. A getting B to do what it wants in the absence of a visible articulation of b. grievances during a visible conflict; A getting B to do what it wants by shaping B’s wants and needs so that a visa. bile conflict does not occur; A getting B to do what it wants by constituting the field of knowledge d. through which B realizes its subjectivity.69 It is in this last sense that IR has been complicit in the ways in which grammar has served power. If “power rolls out of the mouths of men, as well as the barrels of guns”,70 it is high time for more realistic power analyses that reflect upon their own moment(s) and site(s) of production and expression.

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Attempts to combat terrorism are a vain extension of US exceptionalism, embedding militaristic notions of security in the pursuit of violent eradication Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005. The Bush administration perpetually affirms that the war against terrorism declared in response to the attacks of September 2001 is "different from any other war in our history" and will continue "for the foreseeable future."1 This affirmation, and indeed the very declaration of such a war, belongs to a rhetoric of security that predates the Bush administration and which this administration has intensified but not fundamentally altered. Rhetorically speaking, terrorism is the ideal enemy of the United States, more so than any alien civilization and perhaps even more so than the tyrannies of communism and fascism, terrorism's defeated sisters. This is because terrorism is depicted in U.S. rhetoric not as an immoral tactic employed in political struggle, but as an immoral condition that extinguishes the possibility of peaceful political deliberation. This condition is the state of war, in absolute moral opposition to the peaceful condition of civil society. As a state of war, terrorism portends the dissolution of the civil relations obtaining within and among nations, particularly liberal nations, and thus portends the dissolution of civilization itself. [End Page 13] Terrorism is therefore outside the world order, in the sense that it cannot be managed within this order since it is the very absence of civil order. For there to be a world order at all, terrorism must be eradicated. In prosecuting a world war against the state of war, the United States puts itself outside the world order as well. The Bush administration affirms, like the Clinton administration before it, that because the identity of the United States lies in the values that engender peace (freedom and democracy), the national interests of the United States always coincide with the interests of the world order. The United States is the animus of the world order and the power that sustains it. For this reason, any threat to the existence of the United States is a threat to world peace itself, and anything that the United States does to secure its existence is justified as necessary for the preservation of world peace. In this way, the existence of the United States stands at the center of world peace and liberal values, yet remains outside the purview of these values, since when under threat it is subject only to the extra-moral necessity of self-preservation. I will argue that the symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order lies at the foundation of the rhetoric of security by which the U.S. government justifies its hegemonic actions and policies. This rhetoric depicts a world in which helpless, vulnerable citizens can achieve agency only through the U.S. government, while terrorist individuals and organizations command magnitudes of destructive power previously held only by states. The moral-psychological discourse of agency and fear, freedom and enslavement invoked by this rhetoric is rooted in both classical liberalism and postwar U.S. foreign policy. The war of "freedom" against "fear" is a psychic struggle with no specific military enemies or objectives. It arises from the portrayal of the United States as an autarkic, ideally impermeable collective agent that reshapes the external world in its own image. The war of freedom against fear thereby justifies measures said to increase the defenses and internal security of the United States as well as measures said to spread freedom and democracy over the world. Now that the destructive capacity of warlike individuals can threaten the world order, the power of the United States must be deployed in equal measure to neutralize this threat throughout the world. The world as a [End Page 14] whole now comes within the purview of U.S. disciplinary action. Any manifestation of the state of war, terrorist activity, anywhere in the world, is now a threat to the existence of the United States and to world peace. There is no "clash of civilizations," but the Middle East, as the current site of the state of war, is the primary danger to the world and must be contained, controlled, and reshaped. The symmetrical externality of the United States and terrorism to the world order, then, allows its rhetoric to envision a historic opportunity for mankind—the final elimination of the state of war from human existence, and fear from the political psyche. This will be achieved, however, only by incorporating the world order into the United States for the foreseeable future.

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Their claims to knowledge about terrorism are not neutral or objective, but rather motivated in terms of the normative agenda of terrorism studies as a discipline. Burke, 2008. Burke, University of New South Wales, 2008[Anthony, “The end of terrorism studies”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Volume 1, Issue 1 April 2008 , pages 37 – 49]

Ever since the early works of Michel Foucault, we have known that no knowledge is neutral, however scientific its appearance. We now know, in contrast to the positivistic and instrumental assumptions of natural science, that knowledge is not a mirror of the real nor a tool that lies reliably in the hands of man. It was not what Francis Bacon foretold modern science to be: a vehicle for the restoration of man's 'empire over creation' (Bacon 1620/1952). Instead, we all too often find knowledge serving power as it conceals its political function within claims to objectivity and expertise. We find that it harbours secrets: its discourse of expertise and epistemological mastery, of policy rationality, sitting visibly above a silent bedrock of assumptions about the nature of culture, the political, the necessary and the good. These it reinforces, without making them audibleKnowledge, argued Foucault, is utterly intertwined with the exercise and production of power, but it is not a pre-existing knowledge that serves a pre-existing power, whose forms we understand and accept. Rather, through a series of complex and conflictual operations, it produces and limits the possibility for each, creates a working system of relations between them, and sets a machinery into operation. Knowledge classifies, imagines, orders and constructs. Foucault conceived this theory as one that could be applied across the human and social sciences. My interest, on the occasion of the inauguration of a journal entitled Critical Studies on Terrorism, is in a particular, global social field which terrorism and counter-terrorism as practices traverse, affect and transform. This social field intersects with a relatively new social science known as 'terrorism studies', one drawing its methodologies and assumptions from other social sciences (sociology, political science, security studies) and that claims an authoritative understanding of a relatively stable object. Of particular salience is the fact that terrorism studies is not dominated institutionally by universities so much as by think tanks, policy institutes, intelligence agencies, militaries, media organizations, and the ideological activity of political parties and ministers. The traditions of critical scholarship possible in the university here yield to a more immediate and pragmatic concern with effectiveness. Even as it asserts ontological certainty, the knowledge of terrorists and terrorism produced in such institutions is thoroughly engaged. What then, can this tell us about 'terrorism'? About (critical) 'terrorism studies'? What is the nature of this intellectual field and its object, terror? Critical terrorism studies has insinuated itself into an intellectual, institutional and political space shaped by 'terrorism' and 'counter-terrorism'. There it exists, uneasily and problematically, pulled back and forth between the disparate (and often antithetical) tasks of study, critique and policy. There it must consider its purposes, forms and functions; the kind of 'power' it wants its 'knowledge' to become. This, to me, means that - like terrorism itself - terrorism studies cannot ignore its normative impact. However, cautiously and reflexively, it must set out and pursue a normative agenda.

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The authority of realism depends on an interpretive coup de force that obliges us to avoid the enchantment of calculative thinking Campbell, 1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998, pg. 199-201

Bosnia is one such terrifying moment in which we have witnessed spectacular genocides, expulsions or deportations that so often ac company the foundation of states.” It is, moreover, a terrifying mo ment many have found “uninterpretable or indecipherable.” But do the concepts of “simulacrum,” “fiction,” “violence without a ground,” the absence of foundations,” and “mystique” offer an incisive understanding? Such notions would appear at first sight to confirm the worst fears of deconstruction’s detractors, that it is beyond reason and nothing more than (in Derrida’s words) “a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico- political-juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just and unjust.”45 But appearances at first sight can be deceptive, particularly if they themselves are motivated by a certain desire to go beyond reasoned argument and simply dismiss that which appears alien, foreign, and strange. For at least three reasons, to speak of the interpretive and performative basis of authority is not to advocate irrationalism, injustice, or any other form of licentious anarchy. The first reason is that within the frame of Derrida’s argument, the proposition that the interpretive and performative COUP de force gives birth to grounds that must be considered either “illegal” or “in-authentic” is rethought. To say that the foundation of authority cannot rest on anything but itself, that it is therefore violence without a ground, “is not to say that they [the grounds constituted in the coup de force] are in themselves unjust, in the sense of ‘illegal.’ They are neither legal nor illegal in their founding moment. They exceed the opposition between founded and unfounded, or between any foundationalism or anti~foundationalism”46The second reason is that just as the founding of the law, or any similar foundation of authority, exceeds the normal confines of either! or logic, so too the authority of reason as that which itself supposedly governs the logic of the either/or— for it is the powers of reason that are said to enable us to distinguish between the just and the unjust, and so on — exceeds these confines. Simply put (though this is very difficult to put simply), this is because reason cannot ground the authority of reason. In other words, the authority of reason itself—by which it is said that the argument above might be quasi-nihilistic, irrational, and so on — depends on a similar interpretive and performative coup de force.47 This feature of reason has been forgotten (or, better, it has become a silence walled up) because of the transformation of Leibnitz’s principle that “nothing is without reason” into the situation, identified by Heidegger, in which “the principle now says that every thing counts as existing when and only when it has been securely established as a calculable object for cognition.”48 This transformation-cum-deformation has meant the erosion of the distinction enabled by reason between “calculative thinking” and “reflective thinking.” But, Heidegger asks, “may we give up what is worthy of thought in favor of the recklessness of exclusively calculative thinking and its immense achievements? Or are we obliged to find paths upon which thinking is capable of responding to what is worthy of thought instead of, enchanted by calculative thinking, mindlessly passing over what is worthy of thought?”49

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The blending of environmental and national impacts supports a securitized logic of geopolitics, upholding the US as the only true global savior Gearóid Ó Tuathail, Professor of Government and International Affairs and Director of the Masters of Public and International Affairs program – Virginia Tech, Sept 1996. “AT THE END OF GEOPOLITICS?.” http://www.nvc.vt.edu/toalg/Website/Publish/papers/End.htm

Even within the much remarked upon emergence of "environmental security" and the sacred visions of green governmentalists like Al Gore, geography is post-territorial in-flowmations of ozone gases, acid rain, industrial pollution, topsoil erosion, smog emissions, rainforest depletions and toxic spills. Yet, the discourse of unveiled and primordial geographical regions persists also. In the place of Mackinder's natural seats of power, Gore presents the "great genetic treasure map" of the globe, twelve areas around the globe that "hold the greatest concentration of germplasm important to modern agriculture and world food production." Robert Kaplan's unsentimental journey to the "ends of the earth" where cartographic geographies are unravelling and fading has him disclosing a "real world" of themeless violence and chaos, a world where "[w]e are not in control." The specter of a second Cold War -- "a protracted struggle between ourselves and the demons of crime, population pressure, environmental degradation, disease and cultural conflict" -- haunt his thoughts. This equivocal environmentalization of strategic discourse (and visa versa) -- and the environmental strategic think tanks like the World Watch Institute which promote it -- deserve problematization as clusters of postmodern geopolitics, in this case congealments of geographical knowledge and green governmentality designed to re-charge the American polity with a circumscribed global environmental mission to save planet earth from destruction.

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The institutionalization of environmental fears expands securitization into the social realm, constructing whole populations as threats to be eliminated while ignoring degradation’s true cause Barry Buzan et al, prof – Int’l Studes, University of Westminster, 1998. Security: A New Framework for Analysis. (Ole Waever, senior research fellow, COPRI, and Jaap de Wilde, lecturer – IR, University of Twente)

At first sight, there seems to be more room for natural hazards of the first type of threat: Nature threatens civilization, and this is securitized. Many societies are structurally exposed to recurring extreme natural events, such as earthquakes, volcanoes, cyclones, floods, droughts, and epidemics. They are vulnerable these events, and much of heir history is about this continuous struggle with nature. The risks involved are often explicitly securitized and institutionalized. In the Netherlands, for example, protection against the sea and flooding rivers is a high-ranking national interest; the same goes for protection against earthquakes in Japan. As soon as some form of securitization or politization occurs, however—that is, when some measure of human responsibilities replaces the role of fate of God—even this group of conflicts tends to develop a social character (the second type of threat). Following the river floods in the low countries in 1995, the debate in the Netherlands was about political responsibility for he dikes: Who was to blame, and what should be done? I Japan, following the Kobe earthquake in early 1995, designers of seismological early warning systems and of construction techniques, as well as governmental civil emergency plans, were under fire. Where the means to handle threats are thought to exist, the security logic works less against nature than against the failure of the human systems seen as responsible. Moreover, with links suspected between human activities and “natural” catastrophes, the distinction between natural and manmade hazards is becoming blurred. Therefore, except for cases in which people undergo natural hazards without any question, the logic that environment security is about “threats without enemies” (Prins 1993) is often misleading.

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As long as security acts remain enacted for the ‘preservation of the State’, the state is allowed to use its morphing doctrine of reason to override liberalism. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

The doctrine of reason of state holds that besides moral reason there is another reason independent of traditional (that is, Christian) values and according to which power should be wielded, not according to the dictates of good conscience and morality, but according to whatever is needed to maintain the state. The underlying logic here is order and security rather than ‘the good’, and the underlying basis of the exercise of power is necessity, The doctrine is thus founded on principles and assumptions seemingly antithetical to the liberal idea of liberty- in either the moral or the legal sense. Courses of action that would be condemned as immoral if conducted by individuals could be sanctioned when undertaken by the sovereign power. ‘When I talked of murdering or keeping the Pisans imprisones, I didn’t perhaps talk as a Christian: I talked according to the reason and practice of states’ Hence for Machiavelli, Romulus deserved to be excused for the death of his brother and his companion because ’what he did was done for the common good'? The doctrine of reason of state thus treats the sovereign as autonomous from morality; the state can engage in whatever actions it thinks right — ’contrary to truth, contrary to charity contrary to humanity contrary to religion'” — so long as they are necessary and performed for the public good. But this is to also suggest that the state might act beyond law and the legal limits on state power so long as it does so for 'the common good', the ’good of the people' or the 'preservation of the state'. ln being able to legitimate state power in all its guises the doctrine of reason of state was of enormous importance, becoming a weapon brandished in power games between princes and then states, eventually becoming the key ideological mechanism of international confrontation as the doctrine gradually morphed into ’interest of state', ’security of state' and, finally ’national security’.“ The doctrine identifies security — simultaneously of the people and the state (since these are always ideologically conflated) — as the definitive aspect of state power. Security becomes the overriding political interest, the principle above all other principles, and underpins interventions across the social realm in the name of reason of state. As such, the doctrine would therefore appear to be antithetical to liberalism if liberalism is identified as a doctrine which aims to tip the balance of power towards a principled defence of liberty rather than a demand for security at whatever cost. The doctrine would also appear to be antithetical to an argument which purports to root sovereignty in the people rather than the state, as Locke’s philosophy is often said to do. But in fact Locke’s argument is not an account of sovereignty at all. ‘Sovereignty’, in Locke’s work, is subsumed in typical liberal fashion under an alternative concept, prerogative, as exercised by the ’supreme power’,“ albeit ’incroach’d upon . . . by positive Laws'. In this context prerogative becomes a liberal synonym for reason of state, justified by the security function that resides ultimately with the state. Under- pinning Locke’s account of prerogative, then, is nothing less than a liberal argument for reason of state, and Locke adopts a range of strategies from the reason of state tradition, albeit without the claims about the irrelevance of good conscience, (It might be relevant to note that at the time of writing parts of the Two Treatises Locke was taking notes from Gabriel Naudé’s defence of reason of state in Considerations Politiques sur les Coups d’Estut, 1667,26 and that between 1681 and 1683 had shown a real interest in political conspiracies?) And out of this we can begin to trace what turns out to be nothing less than a liberal prioritizing of security.

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Security allows the soverign to act in the name of security, rather then rule of law. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

Locke’s Two Treatises thus performs a subtle but important ideo· logical twist. In contrast to the rooting of the security of good order in actions deemed ’necessary’ by the tyrannical Prince (Machiavelli) or the authoritarian state (Hobbes), Locke works such actions into the constitution, actions which he believes will not and should not be challenged so long as they are conducted in the name of security. Liberty is natural; security requires political authority. In positing the key function of the state as the protection of property rights, Locke's recodification off the relationship between politics and economics could hardly fail to point to security rather than liberty as the main liberal thematic. And this political production of security rests largely with the executive power; which maintains security through the criterion of necessity rather than the rule of law Indeed, the necessity of/for security allows the executive to act in ways that appear to be beyond the law. Far from being in opposition, the project of liberty supposedly announced with the onset of modern liberalism has been inextricably bound up - one might even say wrapped up - in the project of security. The argument that prerogative powers allow liberty to be lost ’for a time' and power to be exercised through some kind of authoritarian or dictatorial order in order that security might be preserved is indicative of the extent to which security had by the middle of the eighteenth century become the overriding theme for all writers working at the interface of politics, philosophy and law." Salas populi suprema Lex becomes the key.“ In an essay on obedience Hume suggests that: it is evident, that, when the execution of justice would be attended with very pemicious consequences, that virtue must be suspended, and give place to public utility in such extraordinary and such pressing emergencies . . . What govemor of a town makes any scruple of burning the suburbs, when they facilitate the approaches of the enemy? Or what general abstains from plundering a neutral country when the necessities of war require it, and he cannot otherwise subsist his army? The case is the i same with the duty of allegiance; and common sense teaches us that . . , duty must always, in extraordinary cases, when public ruin would evidently attend obedience, yield to the primary and original obligation. Salus populi suprema Lex.“ Rousseau comments that public order requires that ’provision is made for the public security by a particular act entrusting it to him who is most worthy’. This provision allows a ’suprerne ruler to ’silence all the laws and suspend for a moment the sovereign authority’, and is justified on the grounds that ’the people’s first intention is that the State shall not perish’." Similarly Adam Smith argues on the one hand against reason of state, on explicit liberal grounds: ’to hinder . . . the farmer from sending his goods at all times to the best market, is evidently to sacrifice the ordinary laws of justice . . . to a sort of reasons of state'. Yet he immediately corrunents that such a sacrifice is acceptable ’in cases of the most urgent necessity ."‘ Likewise The Federalist Papers suggests that the most powerful director of national conduct is safety: ’even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates’." What we find, then, is that the overlap between security and reason of state that animates the search for absolute sovereignty and which comes to the fore in supposed ’emergency situati0ns’ or ’states of P exception', is supported and legitimised rather than challenged liberalism.‘“ Far from disputing the priority of security; classical liberalism gave it a fundamental place in regimes supposedly founded on consent. Prerogative, and thus executive power seemingly outside l morality and law is not something to be dispensed with. Why? Because security is always paramount. Far from being confined to absolutism or authoritarian politics, the prioritising of security gained just as much ground within liberalism. This is not to suggest that liberalism’s commitment to liberty is some kind of ruse. Rather, it is to suggest that maybe liberalism’s central category is not liberty but security. Let’s push this idea a little further.

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Security is the justification for bourgeois capitalism once talks of laissez faire become policed (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

We are often and rightly told that security is intimately associated with the rise of the modem state. But we also need to note that it is equally intimately bound up with the rise of bourgeois property rights and a liberal order-building, and in later chapters we will see the extent of this intimacy. In this way liberalism's conception of security was intimately connected to its vision of political subjectivity centred 1 on the self-contained and property-owning individual. The reason liberty is wrapped in the concept of security, then, is because security is simultaneously wrapped in the question of property, giving us a triad of concepts which are usually run so close together that they are almost conflated ('liberty, security, property'), a triad found in Smith, j Blackstone, Paine, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man, and in various other formulations elsewhere.' Thus as liberalism generated a new conception of 'the economy' as its founding political act, a conception which integrated the wealth of nations, the world market and the labour of the population, its notion of liberty necessitated a particular vision of security: the ideological guarantee of the egoism of the independent and self-interested pursuit of property. It is for this reason Marx calls security 'the supreme concept of bourgeois society'.' Marx spotted that as the concept of bourgeois society, security plays a double role: The progress of social wealth,' says Storch 'begets this useful class of society . . . which performs the most wearisome, the vilest, the most disgusting functions, which, in a word takes on its shoulders all that is disagreeable and servile in life, and procures thus for other classes leisure, serenity of mind and conventional' (c'est bon, ca) 'dignity of character'. Storch then asks himself what the actual advantage is of this capitalist civilization, with its misery and its degradation of the masses, as compared with barbarism. He can find only one answer: security! One side of this double role, then, is that security is the ideological justification for 'civilisation' (that is, capitalism) as opposed to 'barbarism' (that is, non-capitalist modes of production); hence Locke's need to move from the 'state of nature' to the state of civil society. The other side is that security is what the bourgeois class demand once it has exploited, demoralised and degraded the bulk of humanity. For all the talk of 'laissez faire', the 'natural' phenomena of labour, wages and profit have to be policed and secured. Thus security entails the concept of police, guaranteeing as well as presupposing that society exists to secure the conservation of a particular kind of subjectivity (known as 'persons') and the rights and property associated with this subjectivity." The non-liberal and non-capitalist may be 'tolerated' - that other classically liberal concept which also functions as a regulatory power - but they will also be heavily policed ... for 'security reasons'? The new form of economic reason to which liberalism gave birth also gave new content to the idea of reason of state and thus a new rationale for state action: the 'free economy'

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Economic security secures the capital of society because it strengthens the sinews of capitalism (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

The notion of 'economic security', then, was easily applied to corporations and the capitalist system as a whole as much as to the individual worker. 'Worker security' slipped easily into 'corporate security' and turned to the advantage of the capitalist class, thereby strengthening the sinews of capital. And, moreover, the logic of security provided a means for reshaping capital and the behaviour of workers around a new regime. Kees Van tier Pijl has shown that while far from being the realisation of a clear-cut programme, Roosevelt's New Deal nonetheless 'consisted of a process of class formation in which various fractions, through intense struggles, successively were integrated into the new hegemonic coalition'." The logic of 'social security', as both theory and practice, was crucial to this new corporate-liberal synthesis, a liberal police power par excellence in being used to secure the existing state of corporate capital and fashion around it appropriate behaviour patterns on the part of its subjects and agents. As well as securing the state, 'social security' easily became a mechanism for simultaneously securing capital. According to Bruce Ackerman, the New Deal was a crucial moment in American constitutional history: in legitimising the activist state via a great act of popular sovereignty, the New Deal consolidated the foundations of activist government and so fundamentally altered America's constitutional politics.' We might add that security was central to this activist government, key to the new reformist politics and twentieth-century 'social' liberalism. In practical terms 'security' legitimised some limited working-class demands vis-a-vis the capital- and could thereby satisfy the demands of large numbers adicals and socialists. At the same time, however, it also satisfied middle-class desires and was turned to the advantage of corporations, jmating the latter's place in the modern polity. In theoretical terms, had become central to the dominant ideology, if not the dominant idea itself; the modern capitalist social formation had gone some way to becoming 'securitized'.

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Liberties and rights may be ignored because of necessity for security, but the assumption remains that in liberal society, polity is exercised within the boundaries of law (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

It was because of the value placed on security that virtually all political and legal theorists of the eighteenth century accepted that fundamental rights and liberties might be ’temporarily’ ignored on the grounds of necessity (’ternpora1iness’ being another rhetorical device to which we return m the chapter to follow). The widespread accept- ance meant that the central issue was not the acceptability of necessity or arbitrariness, but who was to determine when ’necessary’ or 'arbitrary' measures were required — the King, Parliament, the executive· and what those measures might be. ln England ’necessity lay at the heart of the disputes between parliament and the crown, in Spain ’necessity' was used to trump the privileges of the Cortes, in France the declaration of war on Spain in 1635 was made in accord- ance with ’the necessity of state’.‘°* What followed from this politically was the question of when necessity might be invoked and what might be entailed by this invocation. Liberalism used the principle of necessity as part of its own technology of security. In particular, l ’necessity’ came to play a crucial role in mediating the tension within liberalism between the idea of the rule of law and reason of state. Prerogative exists, we have seen Locke argue, because the legis- lature is not always in being and is usually too large and too slow. But he also suggests prerogative exists ’because it is impossible to foresee, and so by laws to provide for, all Accidents and Necessities’.‘"* Necessity is here placed on the same level as the legislature being in recess or being slow in generating law. Again, Locke casual is Locke furtive, for it is necessity rather than Parliamentary recess that creates the space for the key feature of prerogative: the latitude it provides to l the executive ’to do many things . . . which the laws do not prescribe'. As with Smith's suggestion that the ordinary laws of justice might be sacrificed 'in cases of the most urgent necessity’, it is necessity that provides the ground for actions of state which appear to be outside or beyond the law — ’necessity hath no law', as Cromwell put it.‘°‘ Necessity, conflated with the public good and actions taken for the ’welfare of the people', becomes a key constitutive moment of the exercise of prerogative and thus declarations of ’exception’. The key assumption now is that in a liberal polity prerogative is exercised within the rule of law — this is said to be what distinguishes it from absolutism or totalitarianism. This applies even when preroga- tive is transferred from the personalised power of the prince to the depersonalised power of the state. For Dicey for example, the rule of law ’means, in the first place, the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of arbitrary power', and so exclude[s] the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government'.1"5 This position is often traced back to Locke himself. In one major case Lord Roskill argued that:

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Using emergency measures in everyday society reveals that ‘emergency measures’ are used to secure social orders, rather than secure society from threats (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

One noticeable change was, however occurring. For all the talk about the need for such powers in times of ’wa.r’, the focus of the legislation was very clearly industrial disputes and labour revolts. The real story of emergency powers is much less a story of wartime responses, and much more a story of two interrelated processes. First, a broadening of the definition of emergency taking the notion well beyond military conflict and problems of ’terrorism’. And, second, a drastic increase in the scope of emergency powers As William Scheuerman has suggested, although there is no question that war- time experiences played a major part in the proliferation of emergency powers, from a broader historical perspective such a focus risks both overstating the novelty of wartime emergency powers and under- stating the manner in which emergency powers have been used for other purposes. In particular; it underplays the way emergency powers have been used in controlling labour and dealing with industrial unrest. On the one hand, the use of emergency power to crush labour unrest and socialist agitation built, albeit tenuously on the limited understanding of an emergency situation as one involving violent conflict. But on the other hand, such use of emergency authority as a political instrument against the labouring classes foreshadowed the Open employment of emergency power during peacetime’.“ Thus emergency powers _are politically more revealing when considered in terms of periods of 'peace’and the everyday functioning of civil society for they are then exposed as nothing less than a persistent attempt at the fabrication of order by imposing discipline on an oppositional labour movement and obedience on radical political organisations — for ’securing’ a particular social order generally rather than merely "securing’ it from extemal enemies. For example, the extensive powers granted by the EPA were immediately exercised during a miners’ strike of 1921, and then again in 1924 during a London Transport strike, for eight months during 1926 to manage the General Strike (even though the strike lasted only a few days), 1948 and 1949 during dock workers' 'strikes, 1955 during a railway strike, 1966 during a seamen's strike, 1970 during strikes by refuse collectors, dock workers and electricity workers, 1972 during the rniners’ strike and a dock workers' strike, 1973 during the strike by miners and Glasgow fireworkers, 1975 during a refuse collectors’ stri.ke in Glasgow and 1977-8 during a fireworkers' strike.“ Parallel to this use, the first prosecutions to follow on from a perceived ’ernergency’ in 1921 were of Communists.

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Constant fear for the purpose of security embeds the ideology of security in paranoia (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

It is this project of total war, total security and permanent Emergency that requires the constant reiteration of the existence of fear and danger. Key figures in the national security state such as Nitze and Acheson came to use the various drafts of NSC documents, and especially NSC-68, to simultaneously promote more aggressive foreign policies and to frighten Americans into supporting those policies By 1949 one Cold Warrior could openly employ a Kierke- gaurdian frame and state that the ’reign of insecurity’ means that ’anxiety is the official emotion of our time’.“ This anxiety permeated all the way through the national security state in the early Cold War and after. From panic over the Soviet Union to concern over the ’l0ss’ of China all the way down to ’the posture of the world’s most powerful state in the 1980s, a sumo wrestler, as it were, perched on a chair at the sight of a socialist Nicaraguan mouse appearing "on its doorstep" (which is to say, approximately the distance which separates London from Albania)’," the national security state has constantly exhibited one insecurity fear or anxiety after another, turning the entire social symbolic system surrounding national security into the alter image of a collectively anticipated spectacle of disaster." In peddling the fear of disintegration and crisis, the ideology of security is the paranoid style in politics writ large. Writing about this paranoid style, both Richard Hofstadter and E. H. Gombrich have noted that unlike the clinically paranoid person who sees the hostile and conspiratorial world in which he is living as directed against him, the spokespersons of the paranoid style find it directed against a nation, a culture, a way of life. In its most abstract mode this style involves the constant scanning of the social and political environment for signs confirming the wicked threat, and involves imaginative leaps conjuring up a vast and sinister conspiracy, a huge and hidden machinery of influence set in motion to undermine and destroy a way of life. The style also tends to be convinced that the nation is infused with a terror network of enemy agents taking over the institutions of civil society in a concerted effort to paralyse the resistance of loyal citizens.” If we see in paranoia a type of investment of a social formation, as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari suggest, then one can read a politics structured around security as deeply paranoid."° I have shown elsewhere how this style also operates with the metaphor of disease, with the health of the body politic supposedly being mined by the ’disease’ of communism; 'world communism is like a malignant parasite', says Kennan, ’which feeds only on diseased tissue' while the Soviet Union ’bear[s] within itself germs of creeping disease’.“ We might add here that such disease is also a form of dis-ease — a profound insecurity about the state, its mode of accumulation, and its place in world order. The ideology of national security is in this sense both hypochondriac and paranoid.

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The perception of US superiority causes other nations to accept the international order Pinar Bilgin, Ph.D, International Politics, 2008, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, pgs 5-23 “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?”

These scholars were not prepared to advocate a militarisation of politics. Instead they provided a ‘rationale rich in psychology and history’ as to why civilians in the ‘Third World’ suffered from a ‘post-colonial syndrome’ that led them to react against the ‘West’, whereas ‘a sense of security’ seemed to enable military leaders to ‘ accept the weakness of their countries in relation to the West’. Such ostensibly ‘scientific’ basis, in turn, allowed scholars to propagate ‘myths of Development that simultaneously supported the view of the military as models of democratic, non-authoritarian training while arguing that the militarization of politics was an undesirable failure of Third World politics’.30 Thus US-originated understandings and practices of ‘national security’ and ‘development’ were exported to ‘non-Western’ locales in a context characterised by the convergence of the US national security agenda of maintaining stability by way of encouraging military-led modernisation, and of the ‘non-Western’ actors’ agenda of seeking security through sovereign development. Whereas US policy makers and the scholarly community provided the logistical and conceptual back-up, local actors stepped in to shape domestic political processes in line with their own preferences. It is an ironic twist of history that those ostensibly ‘Western’ concepts such as ‘national security’, ‘sovereignty’ and ‘development’, which have helped make these ‘non-Western’ ‘realities’ are now found wanting in providing scholarly explanations of the very same ‘realities’.

This forces states into generic classification as junior-partners or enemies Pinar Bilgin, Ph.D, International Politics, 2008, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, pgs 5-23 “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?”

In those instances when they became the focal point of analyses, ‘non- Western’ states (and non-state actors) were slotted into one of the two roles that were available. Either they were considered as part of the ‘established paradigm, and assigned the role of junior-partners in the power game’ or they were labeled ‘trouble-makers’, thriving on ‘nuisance power’, fit for the exercise of counter-insurgency techniques discussed in the literature.36 Although this has begun to change in recent years, with more attention being paid to the insecurities of individuals, social groups and states in the developing world (as with the emergence of concerns about and the literature on ‘human security’), the inordinate amount of attention paid to ‘state failure’ should serve as a reminder of the persistence of the aforementioned dynamics (of putting ‘Western’ insecurities first when studying ostensibly ‘non-Western’ dynamics). For, although the shift in mainstream security analyses from purely military to broader ‘human security’ concerns may be considered a ‘good thing’, state ‘weakness’ is still portrayed as a problem by virtue of ‘weak’ states’ inability to prevent their territories from being used as a safe harbour by terrorists—not because those states fail to deliver the necessary goods and services to their citizens. So-called ‘strong’ states of the ‘non-West’, in turn, even when they fail to prioritise their citizens’ concerns, are not considered to be a problem as long as they remain attentive to ‘Western’ security interests.37

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The implied contrast of Western and non-Western dynamics creates conflict Pinar Bilgin, Ph.D, International Politics, 2008, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 1, pgs 5-23 “Thinking past ‘Western’ IR?”

Challenging students of International Relations to think past its ‘ethno- centric, masculinized, northern and top-down’ ways, Ken Booth encouraged them to question ‘the extent to which our sense of what we do as academics would have been different had the subject been founded in universities not by a Liberal MP in mid-Wales (David Davies) in the aftermath of the Great War, but instead by Dr Zungu, the admirable feminist medic she-Chief of the Zulus’.8 Booth’s words rest on assumptions of ‘difference’: that the ‘non-West’ offers a ‘different’ take on world politics—if only ‘we’ could find out more about it. Without wanting to underplay the importance of his point regarding the parochialism of universalism espoused by ‘Western’ IR (not to mention IR’s ethnocentric and masculinised take on world politics, which Booth also problematises), it is significant, for the purposes of the argument here, to consider the possibility that one’s efforts to think past ‘Western’ IR are not guaranteed to get one to a place where ‘different’ ways of thinking about and doing world politics preside.9 This is because ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ dynamics as well as their interpretations have, over the years, clashed and fused in far too many different ways— ways that are not always acknowledged. While the role played by the ‘West’ in inventing the ‘Third World’,10 the ‘Orient’11 and ‘Africa’12 is reasonably well documented, the former’s debts to the latter are little known.13 Franz Fanon reminds us that it is Europe that ‘is literally the creation of the Third World’ in the sense that it was ‘the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, Arabs, Indians and the yellow races’ that have fuelled its ‘opulence’.14 Likewise, Amartya Sen warns against ‘praising an imagined insularity’. ‘Given the cultural and intellectual interconnections in world history’, he writes, ‘the question of what is ‘‘Western’’ and what is not would be hard to decide.’ If the world has remained oblivious to such interconnections, this is partly because the ‘West’ has usurped not only the material resources of the ‘non- West’ but also its image of itself as a subject, as opposed to a mere object, of history.16 Particularly insightful for the argument here is Timothy Mitchell’s re-presentation of modernity not as a ‘stage’ but as a particular way of ‘staging’ history. Rejecting both representations of modernity as a product of the ‘West’, and the revisionist accounts that view modernity as a product of the encounter and interaction of the ‘West’ with the ‘non- West’, Mitchell makes a case for understanding it as a particular way of ‘staging’ history that erases the ‘plural genealogy and ecology’ of the overall process of the production of ‘modernity’. He writes: The identity claimed by the modern is contaminated. It issues from too many sources and depends upon, even as it refuses to recognize, forebears and forces that escape its control. To overlook these differences requires a constant representing of the homogenous unity of modernity’s space and time.17

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American freedom is the foundation for the modern world, but grounds nothing because of its ambiguity (Burke, Anthony, 05, 'Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War', Social Identities, 11:4, 315 – 343)

Freedom is thus a project, and a foundation. Freedom is a project that founds itself through myth. At this point Heller offers a salutory warning. 'Freedom became the foundation of the modern world', she writes inA Theory of Modernity, but 'it is the foundation that grounds nothing': Freedom is the foundation of the moderns, which means that every demonstration needs to have recourse to freedom, which on its part warrants the truth and goodness of the demonstrandum. Freedom is then taken for granted and constantly repeated as all traditions are, the arche at which all arguments stop, the limit that sets order and warrants certainty … the problem is however, that Freedom as the ultimate principle, as the arche of modernity, cannot perform one single task that an arche is supposed to perform … that freedom grounds means that everything is ungrounded … grounding starts anew every time. Every political act grounds itself; every life grounds itself … (Heller, 1999, p. 14) It may be, as Heller hints, that like the 'moderns' the Americans are 'sitting on a paradox' (p. 15), one that, in my view, becomes ever more paradoxical and dysfunctional as it is invoked and enacted in policy and action. It is also to build an endlessly repetitive structure of neurosis into the national culture, one that will recur and intensify with every crisis; that becomes the dominant narrative structure and psychological movement of the crisis and helps to drive its responses. This is to play out, in both social and geopolitical terms, what Erich Fromm called the 'ambiguity' of freedom dating from the Renaissance: that with modern man's new strength, freedom and power came isolation, anxiety and insecurity (Fromm, 2001, p. 41). Similarly Heller suggests that modernity, grounded on freedom which does not ground, is left not only without certainties but also becomes unable to resist certainties, whatever their source. (Heller, 1999, p. 15)

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Since freedom is security, it remains unbound by limits or morals because the existence of both freedom and security are the exercise of American powers. (Burke, Anthony, 05, 'Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War', Social Identities, 11:4, 315 – 343)

In all these thinkers we find that security is, in the words of R. N. Berki, 'not just an external (and therefore optional condition) for life and freedom but simply another word for life and freedom' (Berki, 1986, p 20). If freedom grounds the nation, security grounds (and thus limits and defines) freedom as sovereignty. The condition for freedom is a political and ontological membership of the state—politically through citizenship and ontologically through identity and consent. Identity secures through identification with the 'long story' (the metanarrative of birth and mission) and through existential alienation from the nation's enemies, itsOthers. Citizenship secures biopolitically by mapping the physical border onto the body as its boundary, by ordering bodies through acceptance or deportation, and by constructing desire and subjectivity with the metaphysics of belonging visible in any Presidential speech. This is without digressing into the complex and pervasive apparatuses of discipline, governmentality and biopolitics operative in every state (see Foucault, 1991; Campbell, 1992; Walker, 1997; Dillon, 1996). From this flows two crucial, defining limits on freedom. Firstly, freedom is militarised and insecure. Freedom is imagined and protected behind a wall of military force which the 'cosmopolitan' structures of the United Nations and international law have merely been able to limit and channel (but never put into absolute question on the way to some kind of 'perpetual peace'). Freedom may seek to secure itself defensively through deterrence or, as the Bush Administration has, through pre-emptive action to 'take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge' (Bush, Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy, West Point, 1 June 2002). Without prejudicing the profundity of the break between doctrines of defensive and pre-emptive force—and its destabilising impact on global security relations—they are in fact points on a single continuum that ultimately secures sovereignty, physically and existentially, through violence against and alienation from the Other. Real and imaginary threats coalesce, and their worlds are inevitably drawn more starkly distinguished and opposed, so that one may be crushed and the other be ever fearful of being crushed as it crushes. This is how the obvious threat of terrorist violence to Americans and westerners posed by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates could be expanded into a threat to 'civilisation' and 'freedom' itself, how anti-terrorist action could be expanded into a theoretically limitless 'war on terror', and how the threat could be multiplied and given such urgency that the President must say: 'We can't stop short. If we stop now— leaving terror camps intact and terror state unchecked—our sense of security would be false and temporary' (Bush, State of the Union Address, 2002). Secondly, freedom is exclusive and self-regarding. While the space of freedom may be global and missionary, it is not cosmopolitan and not universal. Bush's 'internationalist' rhetoric is deceptive here, for ultimately the existence and spread of freedom are functions of the exercise of American power and utterly self-referential. Freedom is something America brings to the world, for itself and from within itself. It is not a space in the world to which it submits, which binds it or presents any limits, moral, political or ethical. As Bush told the National Endowment for Democracy, when he announced the new 'forward strategy of freedom' in the Middle East: The advance of freedom is the calling of our time; it is the calling of our country. From the Fourteen Points to the Four Freedoms, to the Speech at Westminster, America has put our power at the service of principle. We believe that liberty is the design of nature; we believe that liberty is the direction of history … Working for the spread of freedom can be hard. Yet, America has accomplished hard tasks before … And as we meet the terror and violence of the world, we can be certain the author of freedom is not indifferent to the fate of freedom. (Bush, Remarks by the President at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce, 6 November 2003)

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The distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign states create the disorder in those identified at non- sovereign Roxanne Lynn Doty Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, 96, “Imperial Encounters,” 5-6

One may correctly question just what "sovereignty" signified in a situation in which the United States had "to take appropriate measures to assure the institution of necessary political, financial, economic, and agricultureal reforms and in general to participate in the defence and administration of the country" (ibid.: -j). All of the empirical referents that one might generally associate with the term sovereignty seemed to be missing. Do we then say that the Philippines were not sovereign? This would not seem to be an appropriate interpretation, given the overwhelming U.S. rhetorical concern with violating sovereignty. At one level it would make sense to follow Jackson and Rosberg and make the distinction between "positive" and "negative" sovereignty, suggesting that the Philippines possessed "negative" sovereignty only." Making this distinction may be analytically useful for some purposes, but I would suggest that it elides the inextricable link between positively sovereign states such as the United States and negatively sovereign states such as the Philippines. It marginalizes the importance of practices whereby positively sovereign states are actively engaged in producing the very conditions that cause negatively sovereign states to experience internal disorder and the inability to legitimize themselves to their own populations. This distinction, while complicating and in some respects enriching the concept of sovereignty, implies that it is possible to fix the meaning of sovereignty. While sovereignty may have multiple meanings, the presumption is that sovereignty is decidable, that it is possible to say what sovereignty is in any particular situation. Positive sovereignty is implicitly what sovereignty "really" is. Negative sovereignty, which is juridically based, applies to states that are less than real, "not yet substantial realities in the conduct of public officials and citizens" (Jackson and Rosberg 1987: z8). These criticisms notwithstanding, the positive/negative distinction is, however, significant and can be further scrutinized. What I want to suggest is that, at least in the case examined in this chapter, sovereignty was a floating signifier whose meaning was always deferred. This is most obvious in instances of "third world" sovereignty such as the Philippines, where any stable and decidable signfieds for sovereignty are conspicuously absent and the signifier sovereignty floats, unanchored. PRECOCIOUS CHILDREN, ADOLESCENT NATIONS . 97 It is perhaps less obvious in instances involving what Jackson and Rosberg would refer to as "empirical" -that is, "real"-states. Yet the positive/negative opposition opens up space within which to pursue the links between the two and to pose the question of what the practice of making this distinction does. Ashley and Walker suggest that the "word sovereignty is only spoken amid and in reply to a crisis of representation where paradoxes of space, time, and identity displace all certain referents and put ori- gins of truth and meaning in doubt" ('990: 383). The participants in this counterinsurgency discourse, while not articulating in explicit theoretical terms the positive sovereignty/negative sovereignty op- position, nonetheless through their practices did in fact make the same distinction Jackson and Rosberg later laid out in an explicit theoretical manner. This distinction permitted the preservation of a domain of sovereign being exemplified by the United States. The United States was the living norm of sovereignty, the center of the structure in need of no explicit formulation of what sovereignty signified. The United States was the nodal point around which the meaning of sovereignty was fixed. The deferral of sovereignty stopped with the United States. The United States (and the West more generally) simply was sovereign.

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The concept of Islamic terror justifies the perception of a threat to US security Richard Jackson, Ph.D in conflict resolution, 2007, Government and Opposition, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 394–426, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse”

Another core narrative of the discourse is that ‘Islamic terrorism’ is motivated largely by religious or ‘sacred’ causes rather than politi- cal or ideological concerns. Typically, it asserts that ‘Islamic terrorists’ aim primarily to destroy Israel and the West, overthrow apostate regimes in Muslim lands, return the Muslim world to a true and pure form of Islam and re-establish an Islamic Caliphate. Shaul Mishal and Maoz Rosenthal for example, argue that Islamic extremists’ ‘more far-reaching goal is the replacement of the existing non-Islamic social and political order in the Arab nations with an Islamic state ruled by the Islamic law’.38 David Cook goes even further, suggesting that radical Muslims aim at ‘uniting all Muslims into one state, and domi- nating the world’.39 Associated with this discursive formulation of religiously motivated aims is the frequent portrayal of ‘Islamic terrorism’ as anti-modern, anti-secular and anti-democratic. Ranstorp suggests that, ‘the threat of secularization from foreign sources’ is the ‘catalyst for springing religious terrorists into action’; these groups are motivated by a ‘xenophobia against everything alien or secular’ and a ‘vehement rejection of western culture’.40 Similarly, Benjamin Barber argues that ‘These Jihadic warriors detest modernity – the secular, scientific, rational and commercial civilization created by the Enlightenment as it is defined . . . in its virtues (freedom, democracy, tolerance and diver- sity).’41 An extremely crass expression of this narrative, published in a prominent terrorism studies journal, states: ‘the Islamic world’s rejection of democracy and modernity as well as their ongoing Islamic resurgence and propensity to violence’ was because ‘the concept of nation-state and democracy is , to most contemporary Muslim nations, as alien to them as pork rinds’.42 Moreover, ‘Islamic terrorists’ are said to be motivated by a deep ‘hatred’ of America and the West, which is in turn caused by rage and a sense of impotence brought about by the failure of the Muslim world to achieve economic development and modernization, succes- sive military defeats by Israel and an inability to resist intrusive processes of globalization and secularization. Takeyh and Gvosdev suggest that ‘Radical Islamism is an ideology of wrath directed against an existing order’,43 while Bernard Lewis argues that ‘Islamic funda- mentalism has given an aim and a form to the otherwise aimless and formless resentment and anger of the Muslim masses at the forces that have devalued their traditional values and loyalties’.44 Consequently, it is assumed that ‘Part of the mission of jihad is thus to restore Muslims’ pride in the face of a humiliating New World Order.’45 Perhaps the most important narrative of ‘Islamic terrorism’, however, is that it poses a massive threat to the security of the West. In most texts, it is seen as self-evident that ‘Islamic terrorism’ remains ‘one of the most significant threats to the Western world in general and U.S. national security in particular’.46 Sageman, employing several of the primary ‘Islamic terrorism’ narratives, describes the threat thus: A new type of terrorism threatens the world, driven by networks of fanatics determined to inflict maximum civilian and economic damages on distant targets in pursuit of their extremist goals. Armed with modern technology, they are capable of devastating destruction worldwide. They target the West, but their operations mercilessly slaughter thousands of people . . .47

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***Impacts***

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Resisting This Colonialism is a Decision Rule: It’s Role in the Death and Destruction of the Vast Majority of the Planet Requires its Rejections Shaihk, 2007. Nermeen Shaikh, Asia Source 2007, [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” palgrave-journals]

t would probably be incorrect to assume that the principal impulse behind the imperial conquests of the 18th and 19th centuries was charity. Having conquered large parts of Africa and Asia for reasons other than goodwill, however, countries like England and France eventually did evince more benevolent aspirations; the civilizing mission itself was an act of goodwill. As Anatol Lieven (2007) points out, even 'the most ghastly European colonial project of all, King Leopold of Belgium's conquest of the Congo, professed benevolent goals: Belgian propaganda was all about bringing progress, railways and peace, and of course, ending slavery'. Whether or not there was a general agreement about what exactly it meant to be civilized, it is likely that there was a unanimous belief that being civilized was better than being uncivilized – morally, of course, but also in terms of what would enable the most in human life and potential. But what did the teaching of this civility entail, and what were some of the consequences of changes brought about by this benevolent intervention? In the realm of education, the spread of reason and the hierarchies created between different ways of knowing had at least one (no doubt unintended) effect. As Thomas Macaulay (1935) wrote in his famous Minute on Indian Education, We must at present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect. To that class we may leave it to refine the vernacular dialects of the country, to enrich those dialects with terms of science borrowed from the Western nomenclature, and to render them by degrees fit vehicles for conveying knowledge to the great mass of the population. This meant, minimally, that English (and other colonial languages elsewhere) became the language of instruction, explicitly creating a hierarchy between the vernacular languages and the colonial one. More than that, it meant instructing an elite class to learn and internalize the culture – in the most expansive sense of the term – of the colonizing country, the methodical acculturation of the local population through education. As Macaulay makes it clear, not only did the hierarchy exist at the level of language, it also affected 'taste, opinions, morals and intellect' – all essential ingredients of the civilizing process. Although, as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak points out, colonialism can always be interpreted as an 'enabling violation', it remains a violation: the systematic eradication of ways of thinking, speaking, and being. Pursuing this line of thought, Spivak has elsewhere drawn a parallel to a healthy child born of rape. The child is born, the English language disseminated (the enablement), and yet the rape, colonialism (the violation), remains reprehensible. And, like the child, its effects linger. The enablement cannot be advanced, therefore, as a justification of the violation. Even as vernacular languages, and all habits of mind and being associated with them, were denigrated or eradicated, some of the native population was taught a hegemonic – and foreign – language (English) (Spivak, 1999). Is it important to consider whether we will ever be able to hear – whether we should not hear – from the peoples whose languages and cultures were lost? The colonial legacy At the political and administrative levels, the governing structures colonial imperialists established in the colonies, many of which survive more or less intact, continue, in numerous cases, to have devastating consequences – even if largely unintended (though by no means always, given the venerable place of divide et impera in the arcana imperii). Mahmood Mamdani cites the banalization of political violence (between native and settler) in colonial Rwanda, together with the consolidation of ethnic identities in the wake of decolonization with the institution and maintenance of colonial forms of law and government. Belgian colonial administrators created extensive political and juridical distinctions between the Hutu and the Tutsi, whom they divided and named as two separate ethnic groups. These distinctions had concrete economic and legal implications: at the most basic level, ethnicity was marked on the identity cards the colonial authorities introduced and was used to distribute state resources. The violence of colonialism, Mamdani suggests, thus operated on two levels: on the one hand, there was the violence (determined by race) between the colonizer and the colonized; then, with the introduction of ethnic distinctions among the colonized population, with one group being designated indigenous (Hutu) and the other alien (Tutsi), the violence between native and settler was institutionalized within the colonized population itself. The Rwandan genocide of 1994, which Mamdani suggests was a 'metaphor for postcolonial political violence' (2001: 11; 2007), needs therefore to be understood as a natives' genocide – akin to and enabled by colonial violence against the native, and by the new institutionalized forms of ethnic differentiation among the colonized population introduced by the colonial state. It is not necessary to elaborate this point; for present purposes, it is sufficient to mark the

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significance (and persistence) of the colonial antecedents to contemporary political violence. The genocide in Rwanda need not exclusively have been the consequence of colonial identity formation, but does appear less opaque when presented in the historical context of colonial violence and administrative practices. Given the scale of the colonial intervention, good intentions should not become an excuse to overlook the unintended consequences. In this particular instance, rather than indulging fatuous theories about 'primordial' loyalties, the 'backwardness' of 'premodern' peoples, the African state as an aberration standing outside modernity, and so forth, it makes more sense to situate the Rwandan genocide within the logic of colonialism, which is of course not to advance reductive explanations but simply to historicize and contextualize contemporary events in the wake of such massive intervention. Comparable arguments have been made about the consolidation of Hindu and Muslim identities in colonial India, where the corresponding terms were 'native' Hindu and 'alien' Muslim (with particular focus on the nature and extent of the violence during the Partition) (Pandey, 1998), or the consolidation of Jewish and Arab identities in Palestine and the Mediterranean generally (Anidjar, 2003, 2007).

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The importance of US troops for Iraqi Stability is not Self Evident but seeped in a Racist description of the world – This Ideological Approach Ensures genocide and unending war* Batur, 2007. Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, 2007 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7] At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how capitalism met with orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind (VanderLippe 1999). Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” other—Eastern, Islamic societies as static, irrational, savage, fanatical, and inferior to the peaceful, rational, scientific “Occidental” Europe and the West (Said 1978). This is as an elastic construct, proving useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to Western economic expansion, political and cultural hegemony, and global domination for exploitation and absorption. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideological and cultural framework.” It segued into war and annihilation and genocide and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.” Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of Christian civilization is not new, going back to the Crusades, but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in recent debates regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. Through orientalist and the white racial frame, those who are subject to racial hatred and exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He cautions that “it is far from certain that [the President of Iran] Mr. Ahmadinejad plans any such cataclysmic events for August 22, but it would be wise to bear the possibility in mind.” Lewis argues that Muslims, unlike others, seek self- destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, Muslims in this mindset don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993,

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 55 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 56 Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each . . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). Lewis, like Pope Benedict, views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “ . . .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the annihilation of the excluded. Annihilation, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, genocide is the definitive point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the logic of the outcome of the exclusionary process, that it can conclude only in ultimate domination. War and genocide take place with compliant efficiency to serve the global racist ideology with dizzying frequency. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur.

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The US’s Colonial Discourse globalizes Racial Hierarchy – This is the DECIDING FACTOR in ALL War and Genocide Batur, 2007. Pinar Batur, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, 2007 [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7]

War and genocide are horrid, and taking them for granted is inhuman. In the 21st century, our problem is not only seeing them as natural and inevitable, but even worse: not seeing, not noticing, but ignoring them. Such act and thought, fueled by global racism, reveal that racial inequality has advanced from the establishment of racial hierarchy and institutionalization of segregation, to the confinement and exclusion, and elimination, of those considered inferior through genocide. In this trajectory, global racism manifests genocide. But this is not inevitable. This article, by examining global racism, explores the new terms of exclusion and the path to permanent war and genocide, to examine the integrality of genocide to the framework of global antiracist confrontation. Racist legitimization of inequality has changed from presupposed biological inferiority to assumed cultural inadequacy. This defines the new terms of impossibility of coexistence, much less equality. The Jim Crow racism of biological inferiority is now being replaced with a new and modern racism (Baker 1981; Ansell 1997) with “culture war” as the key to justify difference, hierarchy, and oppression. The ideology of “culture war” is becoming embedded in institutions, defining the workings of organizations, and is now defended by individuals who argue that they are not racist, but are not blind to the inherent differences between African-Americans/Arabs/Chinese, or whomever, and “us.” “Us” as a concept defines the power of a group to distinguish itself and to assign a superior value to its institutions, revealing certainty that affinity with “them” will be harmful to its existence (Hunter 1991; Buchanan 2002). How can we conceptualize this shift to examine what has changed over the past century and what has remained the same in a racist society? Joe Feagin examines this question with a theory of systemic racism to explore societal complexity of interconnected elements for longevity and adaptability of racism. He sees that systemic racism persists due to a “white racial frame,” defining and maintaining an “organized set of racialized ideas, stereotypes, emotions, and inclinations to discriminate” (Feagin 2006: 25). The white racial frame arranges the routine operation of racist institutions, which enables social and economic reproduction and amendment of racial privilege. It is this frame that defines the political and economic bases of cultural and historical legitimization. While the white racial frame is one of the components of systemic racism, it is attached to other terms of racial oppression to forge systemic coherency. It has altered over time from slavery to segregation to racial oppression and now frames “culture war,” or “clash of civilizations,” to legitimate the racist oppression of domination, exclusion, war, and genocide. The concept of “culture war” emerged to define opposing ideas in America regarding privacy, censorship, citizenship rights, and secularism, but it has been globalized through conflicts over immigration, nuclear power, and the “war on terrorism.” Its discourse and action articulate to flood the racial space of systemic racism. Racism is a process of defining and building communities and societies based on racialized hierarchy of power. The expansion of capitalism cast new formulas of divisions and oppositions, fostering inequality even while integrating all previous forms of oppressive hierarchical arrangements as long as they bolstered the need to maintain the structure and form of capitalist arrangements (Batur-VanderLippe 1996). In this context, the white racial frame, defining the terms of racist systems of oppression, enabled the globalization of racial space through the articulation of capitalism (Du Bois 1942; Winant 1994). The key to understanding this expansion is comprehension of the synergistic relationship between racist systems of oppression and the capitalist system of exploitation. Taken separately, these two systems would be unable to create such oppression independently. However, the synergy between them is devastating. In the age of industrial capitalism, this synergy manifested itself imperialism and colonialism. In the age of advanced capitalism, it is war and genocide. The capitalist system, by enabling and maintaining the connection between everyday life and the global, buttresses the processes of racial oppression, and synergy between racial oppression and capitalist exploitation begets violence. Etienne Balibar points out that the connection between everyday life and the global is established through thought, making global racism a way of thinking, enabling connections of “words with objects and words with images in order to create concepts” (Balibar 1994: 200). Yet, global racism is not only an articulation of thought, but also a way of knowing and acting, framed by both everyday and global experiences. Synergy between capitalism and racism as systems of oppression enables this perpetuation and destruction on the global level. As capitalism expanded and adapted to the particularities of spatial and temporal variables, global racism became part of its legitimization and accommodation, first in terms of colonialist arrangements. In colonized and colonizing

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lands, global racism has been perpetuated through racial ideologies and discriminatory practices under capitalism by the creation and recreation of connections among memory, knowledge, institutions, and construction of the future in thought and action. What makes racism global are the bridges connecting the particularities of everyday racist experiences to the universality of racist concepts and actions, maintained globally by myriad forms of prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Batur 1999, 2006). Under colonialism, colonizing and colonized societies were antagonistic opposites. Since colonizing society portrayed the colonized “other,” as the adversary and challenger of the “the ideal self,” not only identification but also segregation and containment were essential to racist policies. The terms of exclusion were set by the institutions that fostered and maintained segregation, but the intensity of exclusion, and redundancy, became more apparent in the age of advanced capitalism, as an extension of post-colonial discipline. The exclusionary measures when tested led to war, and genocide. Although, more often than not, genocide was perpetuated and fostered by the post-colonial institutions, rather than colonizing forces, the colonial identification of the “inferior other” led to segregation, then exclusion, then war and genocide. Violence glued them together into seamless continuity. Violence is integral to understanding global racism. Fanon (1963), in exploring colonial oppression, discusses how divisions created or reinforced by colonialism guarantee the perpetuation, and escalation, of violence for both the colonizer and colonized. Racial differentiations, cemented through the colonial relationship, are integral to the aggregation of violence during and after colonialism: “Manichaeism [division of the universe into opposites of good and evil] goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes” (Fanon 1963:42). Within this dehumanizing framework, Fanon argues that the violence resulting from the destruction of everyday life, sense of self and imagination under colonialism continues to infest the post-colonial existence by integrating colonized land into the violent destruction of a new “geography of hunger” and exploitation (Fanon 1963: 96). The “geography of hunger” marks the context and space in which oppression and exploitation continue. The historical maps drawn by colonialism now demarcate the boundaries of post-colonial arrangements. The white racial frame restructures this space to fit the imagery of symbolic racism, modifying it to fit the television screen, or making the evidence of the necessity of the politics of exclusion, and the violence of war and genocide, palatable enough for the front page of newspapers, spread out next to the morning breakfast cereal. Two examples of this “geography of hunger and exploitation” are Iraq and New Orleans.

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Impact- Self Full-Filling Prophecy

Their hyperbolized accounts of threats in an attempt to find security create an endless politics of war and fear thus creating a self-fulfilling prophecy Dillon and Reed 09 (IR professor @ Lancaster University; Lecturer @ King’s College London, “The Liberal Way of Killing: Killing to Make Live”)

There is, third, the additional critical attribute of contingency. It is this feature which does not merely add governing through contingency to the political rationalities and governmental technologies of contemporary liberal rule. It lends its own distinctive infection to them; one which has had a profound impact on the nature of liberal rule and war in relation, especially, to its current hyperbolicization of security and its newly problematized and proliferating accounts of dangers, threats and enemies. For if the biopolitical imperative is that of making life live, the martial expression of that imperative, the drive to liberal war, is preparedness to make war on the enemies of life. The biopoltiical imperative to make life live finds its expression today, however in making life live the emergency of its emergence; for that is what species life is now said to be. The liberal way of rule and war has thus become the preparedness to make war on whatever threatens life’s capacity to live the emergency of its emergence. For allied to the radical contingency of species existence is an account of species existence as a life of continuous complex adaptation and emergence. From the perspective of security and war, in particular, such a pluripotent life, characterized by its continuously unfolding potential, is a life that is continuously becoming-dangerous to itself, and to other life forms. Such danger is not merely actual; because life itself, here has become not merely actual. The emphasis in the problematization of danger which accompanies such a politics of life itself therefore also shifts dramatically from the actual to the virtual. Only this explains the astonishing degree to which the historically secure lives of the Atlantic basin have come to construe themselves, politically, as radically endangered by as many unknown as there are unknowable dangers; a point regularly and frankly admitted, officially, from terror to health mandarins, nationally and internationally. Many have observed that the societies of the Atlantic basin are now increasingly ruled by fear; that there is a politics of fear. But they interpret this politics of fear in political naïve ways, as the outcome of deliberate machination by political and economic elites. They may well be correct to some degree. But what is perfectly evident, also, is that the elites themselves are governed by the very grid of intelligibility furnished by the account of life as an emergency of emergence. It is not simply a matter, therefore, of leaders playing on fears. The leadership itself is in the grip of a conjugation of government and rule whose very generative principle of formation is permanent emergency. In other words, fear is no longer simply an affect open to regular manipulation by leadership cadres. It is, but it is not only that, and not even most importantly that. More importantly (because this is not a condition that can be resolved simply by ‘throwing the rascals out’) in the permanent emergency of emergence, fear becomes a generative principle of formation for rule. The emergency of emergence therefore poses a found crisis in western understandings of the political, and in the hopes and expectations invested in political as opposed to other forms of life. Given the wealth and given the vast military preponderance in weapons of mass destruction and other forms of global deployed military capabilities of the societies of the Atlantic basin, notably, of course, the United States, this poses a world crisis as well. In short, then, this complex adaptive emergent life exists in the permanent state of emergence. Its politics of security and war, which is to say its very foundational politics of rule as well, now revolve around this state of emergency. Here, that in virtue of which a ‘we’ comes to belong together, its very generative principle of formation (our shorthand definition of politics), has become this emergency. What happens, we also therefore ask of the biopoliticization of rule, when emergency becomes the generative principle of formation of community and rule? Our answer has already been given. Politics becomes subject to the urgent and compelling political

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 59 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 60 economy, the logistical and technical dynamics, of war. No longer a ‘we’ in virtue of abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by abiding by commonly agreed rules of government, it becomes a ‘we’ formed by the rule of the emergency itself; and that is where the political crisis, the crisis of the political itself is that a ‘we’ can belong together not only in terms of agreeing to abide by the rule of its generative principles of formation but also by the willingness to keep the nature of operation of those generative principles of formation under common deliberative scrutiny. You cannot, however, debate emergency. You can only interrogate the utile demand it makes on you, and all the episteme challenges it poses, acceding to those demands according both to how well you can come to know them, and how well you have also adapted you affects to suffering them, or perish. The very exigencies of emergency thus militate profoundly against the promise of ‘politics’ as it has been commonly understood in the western tradition; not simply as a matter of rule, but as a matter of self-rule in which it was possible to debate the nature of the self in terms of the good for and of the self. Note, also, how much the very idea of the self has disappeared from view in this conflation of life with species life. The only intelligence, the only self-knowledge, the only culture which qualifies in the permanence of this emergency is the utilitarian and instrumental technologies said to be necessary to endure it. We have been here before in the western tradition and we have experienced the challenges of this condition as tyranny (Arendt 1968). The emergency of emergence, the generative principle of formation, the referential matrix of contemporary biopolitics globally, is a newly formed, pervasive and insidiously complex, soft totalitarian regime of power relations made all the more difficult to contest precisely because, governing through the contingent emergency of emergence, it is a governing through the transactional freedoms of contingency

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Their dependence on the security logic transforms the ambiguity of life into a quest for truth and rationality, causing violence against the unknown and domesticating life. Der Derian, 93. James Der Derian, “The value of security: Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard,” The Political Subject of Violence, 1993, pp. 102-105 The desire for security is manifested as a collective resentment of difference that which is not us, not certain, not predictable . Complicit with a negative will to power is the fear-driven desire for protection from the unknown. Unlike the positive will to power which produces an aesthetic affirmation of difference, the search for truth produces a truncated life which conforms to the rationally knowable , to the causally sustainable. In The Gay Science Nietzsche asks of the reader: Look, isn't our need for knowledge precisely this need for the familiar, the will to uncover everything strange, unusual, and questionable, something that no longer disturbs us? Is it not the instinct of fear that bids us to know? And is the jubilation of those who obtain knowledge not the jubilation over the restoration of a sense of security?" The fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty combine to produce a domesticated life, in which causality and rationality become the highest sign of a sovereign self, the surest protection against contingent forces. The fear of fate assures a belief that everything reasonable is true, and everything true reasonable. In short, the security imperative produces and is sustained by the strategies of knowledge which seek to explain it. Nietzsche elucidates the nature of this generative relationship in The Twilight of the Idols: A safe life requires safe truths. The strange and the alien remain unexamined, the unknown becomes identified as evil , and evil provokes hostility - recycling the desire for security . The 'influence of timidity,' as Nietzsche puts it, creates a people who are willing to subordinate affirmative values to the 'necessities' of security : 'they fear change, transitoriness: this expresses a straitened soul, full of mistrust and evil experiences'." The point of Nietzsche's critical genealogy is to show the perilous conditions which created the security imperative - and the western metaphysics which perpetuate it - have diminished if not disappeared; yet the fear of life persists: 'Our century denies this perilousness, and does so with a good conscience: and yet it continues to drag along with it the old habits of Christian security, Christian enjoyment, recreation and evaluation." Nietzsche's worry is that the collective reaction against older, more primal fears has created an even worse danger: the tyranny of the herd, the lowering of man, the apathy of the last man which controls through conformity and rules through passivity. The security of the sovereign, rational self and state comes at the cost of ambiguity, uncertainty, paradox - all that makes life worthwhile. Nietzsche's lament for this lost life is captured at the end of Daybreak in a series of rhetorical questions:

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Securitization erodes the delineation between individual and nation, militarizing all through war—total annihilation becomes appropriate in the name of “state’s security” Campbell, 1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998, pg. 199-201 As invitation to this line of thought can be found in the later work of Michel Foucault, in which he explicitly addresses the issue of security and the state through the rubric of “governmental rationality.” The incitement to Foucault’s thinking was his observation that from the middle of the sixteenth century to the end of the eighteenth century, political treatises that previously had been written as advice to the prince were now being presented as works on the “art of government.” The concern of these treatises was not confined to the requirements of a specific sovereign, but with the more general problematic of government: a problematic that included the govern ment of souls and lives, of children, of oneself, and finally, of the state by the sovereign. This problematic of governance emerges at the intersection of central and centralizing power relationships (those located in principles of universality, law, citizenship, sovereignty), and individual and individualizing power relationships (such as the pastoral relationships of the Christian church and the welfare state).n Accordingly, the state for Foucault is an ensemble of practices that are at one and the same time individualizing and totalizing: I don’t think that we should consider the “modern state” as an en tity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very existence, but on the contrary as a very so phisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form, and submitted to a set of very specific patterns. In a way we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization.24 Foucault posited some direct and important connections between the individualizing and totalizing power relationships in the conclu- sion to The History of Sexuality, Volume I. There he argues that starting in the seventeenth century, power over life evolved in two com plementary ways: through disciplines that produced docile bodies, and through regulations and interventions directed at the social body. The former centered on the body as a machine and sought to maxi mize its potential in economic processes, while the latter was con cerned with the social body’s capacity to give life and propagate. To gether, these relations of power meant that “there was an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations, marking the beginning of an era of ‘bio-power.”’25 This era of bio-power saw the art of government develop an overtly constitutive orientation through the deployment of technologies concerned with the ethical boundaries of identity as much (if not more than) the territorial borders of the state. Foucault supported this argument by reference to the “theory of police.” Developed in the seventeenth century, the “theory of police” sig nified not an institution or mechanism internal to the state, but a gov ernmental technology that helped specify the domain of the state.26 In particular, Foucault noted that Delamare’s Compendium — an eighteenth-century French administrative work detailing the kingdom’s police regulations — outlined twelve domains of concern for the po lice: religion, morals, health, supplies, roads, town buildings, public safety, the liberal arts, trade, factories, the supply of labor, and the poor. The logic behind this ambit claim of concern, which was repeated in all treatises on the police, was that the police should be concerned with “everything pertaining to men’s happiness,” all social relations carried on between men, and all “living.” As another treatise of the period declared: “The police’s true object is man.” The theory of police, as an instance of the rationality behind the art of government, had therefore the constitution, production, and maintenance of identity as its major effect. Likewise, the conduct of war is linked to identity. As Foucault argues, “Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for the purpose of slaughter in the name of life necessity.” In other words, countries go to war, not for the purpose of defending their rulers, but for the purpose of defending “the nation,” ensuring the state’s security, or upholding the interests and values of the people. Moreover, in an era that has seen the

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development of a global system for the fighting of a nuclear war (the infrastructure of which remains intact despite the “end of the cold war”), the paradox of risking individual death for the sake of collective life has been pushed to its logical extreme. Indeed, “the atomic situation is now at the end of this process: the power to expose a whole population to death is the underside of the power to guarantee an individual’s continued existence.”

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Securitization necessitates the construction of otherness, the basis for exclusion. Campbell, 1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998,

What has been and remains central to the logic of sociomedical discourse is thus not the biological nature of disease, but a sense that disease is always from somewhere else. As Sontag notes, “There is a link between imagining disease and imagining foreignness.” Indeed, when syphilis reached epidemic proportions in fifteenth- century Europe, “it was the ‘French pox’ to the English, morbus Germanicus to the Parisians, the Naples sickness to the Florentines, [and] the Chinese disease to the Japanese.”62 But “foreignness” does not necessar ily coincide with places distant and removed: the foreign can also re side within, something that is evident when (as in the United States) disease is more readily diagnosed in the elderly, the poor, or the working class, even when other groups exhibit many more identifi ably biological pathologies.63 In the same manner, we can note how various groups within American and European domestic society have been constituted as marginal through the figurations of sociomedical discourse. Women, blacks, and Jews have at one time or another all been understood as uniquely susceptible to certain disorders. Women were diagnosed as exhibiting a high incidence of hysteria; Jews in general were believed to be prone to psychological disorders; Jewish men were thought to menstruate like women and thus be a source of social “pollution”; blacks were overwhelmingly considered insane. And for each of these groups, sexuality was medicalized as pathol ogy and indicted as a threat to the integrity of the body politic.TM In sum, two things are particularly striking about these examples of the historical operation of sociomedical discourse. First, it has often been able to function either without any empirical referent from which its valuations are theoretically derived, or it has accomplished its task in direct contradistinction to available empirical sources. The moral characteristics of leprosy lived on after its demise; neither women, nor blacks, nor Jews were any more vulnerable to psychological dis orders than any other groups; and Jewish men certainly did not men struate.65 Second, the modes of representation through which these groups are marked as social dangers effectively blend and fuse vari ous stigmata of difference, such that each figuration of difference func tions not as an image derived from a correspondence relationship but as an indicator of the various images with which it has some per ceived affinity. Or, as Hayden White suggests of metaphor generally, it “functions as a symbol, rather than as a sign: which is to say that it does not give us either a description or an icon of the thing it repre sents, but tells us what images to look for in our culturally encoded experience in order to determine how we should feel about the thing represented ~“66 In other words, by conflating the stigmata of difference, the tropes and metaphors of sociomedical discourse call to mind certain sensa tions, dispositions, impressions, and given the negative valence of such representations — doubts, concerns, anxieties, and suspicions to be associated with those groups that are the objects of attention. We need only consider contemporary representations of AIDS—in which iconography associated with syphilis, homosexuals, Africans, drug addicts, and inner-city residents is melded into an all-encompassing discursive formation so as to inscribe a boundary between the het erosexual, non—IV-drug-using, white community (i.e., those who are “normal”) and those at risk— to appreciate the continued saliency of these representations.67 Indeed, the boundary-producing effects of the discourse surrounding AIDS took a literal turn when the U.S. Immi gration and Naturalization Service overruled the Health and Human Services Department and reinstated the presence of HIV as grounds for excluding tourists and immigrants from the United States. With over one million Americans already infected with this virus, such an exclusion “conveys the message that the danger is outside the U.S., is a foreigner, a stranger.”68

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The drive to protect justifies endless warfare in the name of American ideals Noorani, 2005. Yaseen Noorani is a Lecturer in Arabic Literature, Islamic and Middle East Studies, University of Edinburgh. “The Rhetoric of Security,” The New Centennial Review 5.1, 2005. The relationship between the United States and the world order, then, is similar to the relationship in Hobbes between the Leviathan and the civil society that it embodies and represents. The individual members of this civil society are collectively the author of all of the acts of the Leviathan. Yet they have no authority to influence or oppose the actions of the Leviathan, because they have contracted with each other to give over all of their powers to it. The Leviathan itself remains outside their social contract. Similarly, insofar as the United States embodies the normativity of the world order and ensures its existence, the members of this order have implicitly agreed to its protection of their civil existence, since this is the only rational thing to do. Therefore, when America's own existence is at stake, they cannot question the decisions it takes to preserve itself, even when these decisions impinge on their own autonomy.15 The externality of the United States to the world order, its national status as the agent of freedom, means that it must both enhance its independence and autonomy, and reshape the world in its own image. "We are protected from attack only by vigorous action abroad, and increased vigilance at home" (Bush 2002a). Enhancing its own agency means making itself more free, but what this requires is increased self-discipline. The United States must become more impervious to fear and external coercion by eliminating its internal vulnerabilities to them. The effect of this imperative is to provide justification for bringing an ever greater number of domains of national life within the purview of national security. At the same time, the United States must make the world more like itself by [End Page 33] spreading freedom abroad. "We know that free peoples embrace progress and life, instead of becoming the recruits for murderous ideologies" (Bush 2004b). This requires the strengthening of American military power and the use of this power against enemies. "We have learned that terrorist attacks are not caused by the use of strength; they are invited by the perception of weakness" (Bush 2003c). The primary field for the exercise of U.S. power in reshaping the world is the Middle East, because this is the region most engulfed in the state of war. The Middle East thereby remains outside of the world order and threatens its dissolution. The Middle East will either become a place of progress and peace, or it will be an exporter of violence and terror that takes more lives in America and in other free nations. The triumph of democracy and tolerance in Iraq, in Afghanistan and beyond would be a grave setback for international terrorism.... Everywhere that freedom takes hold, terror will retreat. (Bush 2003c) In other words, the Middle East can either become a reflection of the United States or remain its polar opposite. In the latter mode, however, it mirrors the United States more fully, though inversely. As a state of war outside the world order, it has the capacity to transform the world just as the United States does. Just as the United States exports peace and freedom, in the form of military conquests and economic goods, the Middle East exports violence and terror. Whereas the United States is free of "ambitions" in its actions, the terrorists of the Middle East are driven by "hateful ambitions." The Middle East, in effect, signifies the absence of all the values embodied by the United States, and herein lies its supreme danger. Yet it is in no way irredeemable. Once the Middle East is reshaped into a lesser replica of the United States, it will take its humble position in the world order. The taming of the Middle East, therefore, requires intensive military action there, but also requires preventing the Middle East and its state of war from penetrating the borders of the United States. Reshaping the world order goes beyond this as well: it entails the disciplining of the members of this order, whose tendencies toward laxity and fragmentation provide openings for terrorism. The United States must [End Page 34] bring the world into ever greater conformity with the values that will preserve and advance the world. This means not only securing cooperation for U.S. military and police actions by "convincing or compelling states to accept their sovereign responsibilities" (National Security 2002, 6), but reorganizing the world according to the principles of free enterprise and free trade. Political antagonism can be eliminated through its transformation into economic competition. "We have our best chance since the rise of the nation-state in the seventeenth century to build a world where the great powers compete in peace instead of prepare for war" (Bush 2002b). A world order based on economic competition instead of military competition enables the reign of the politics of civil relations, leading to peace and prosperity for all. In this order, no nation will need any longer to worry about the politics of self-preservation—that is, no nation but the United States.

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US Leadership Ensures Destruction – We Only Believe it is Stabilizing Because We Refuse to Question it Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 231-2]

Yet the first act in America's 'forward strategy of freedom' was to invade and attempt to subjugate Iraq, suggesting that, if 'peace' is its object, i ts means is war : the engine of history is violence, on an enormous and tragic scale, and violence is ultimately its only meaning. This we can glimpse in 'Toward a Pacific Union', a deeply disingenuous chapter of Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man. This text divides the earth between a 'post-historical' world of affluent developed democracies where 'the old rules of power-politics have decreasing relevance', and a world still 'stuck in history' and 'riven with a variety of religious, national and ideological conflicts'. The two worlds will maintain 'parallel but separate existences' and interact only along axes of threat, disturbance and crucial strategic interest: oil, immigration, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Because 'the relationship between democracies and nondemocracies will still be characterised by mutual distrust and fear', writes Fukuyama, the 'post-historical half must still make use of realist methods when dealing with the part still in history ... force will still be the ultima ratio in their relations'. For all the book's Kantian pretensions, Fukuyama naturalises war and coercion as the dominant mode of dealing with billions of people defined only through their lack of 'development' and 'freedom'. Furthermore, in his advocacy of the 'traditional moralism of American foreign policy' and his dismissal of the United Nations in favour of a NATO-style 'league of truly free states ... capable of much more forceful action to protect its collective security against threats arising from the non-democratic part of the world' we can see an early premonition of the historicist unilateralism of the Bush administration. 72 In this light, we can see the invasion of Iraq as continuing a long process of 'world- historical' violence that stretches back to Columbus' discovery of the Americas, and the subsequent politics of genocide, warfare and dispossession through which the modem United States was created and then expanded - initially with the colonisation of the Philippines and coercive trade relationships with China and Japan, and eventually to the self-declared role Luce had argued so forcefully for: guarantor of global economic and strategic order after 1945. This role involved the hideous destruction of Vietnam and Cambodia, 'interventions' in Chile, El Salvador, Panama, Nicaragua and Afghanistan (or an ever more destructive 'strategic' involvement in the Persian Gulf that saw the United States first building up Iraq as a formidable regional military power, and then punishing its people with a 14-year sanctions regime that caused the deaths of at least 200,000 people), all of which we are meant to accept as proof of America's benign intentions, of America putting its 'power at the service of principle'. They are merely history working itself out, the 'design of nature' writing its bliss on the world.73 The bliss 'freedom' offers us, however, is the bliss of the graveyard, stretching endlessly into a world marked not by historical perfection or democratic peace, but by the eternal recurrence of tragedy, as ends endlessly disappear in the means of permanent war and permanent terror. This is how we must understand both the prolonged trauma visited on the people of Iraq since 1990, and the inflammatory impact the US invasion will have on the new phenomenon of global antiWestern terrorism. American exceptionalism has deluded US policymakers into believing that they are the only actors who write history, who know where it is heading, and how it will play out, and that in its service it is they (and no-one else) who assume an unlimited freedom to act. As a senior adviser to Bush told a journalist in 2002: 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . . We're history's actors."

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Security measures often justify the revival of fascist society because fascism is liberal capitalism’s double. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

A final introductory word on fascism. A number of writers have noted that there is a real Schmittian logic underpinning security politics: that casting an issue as one of 'security' tends to situate that issue within the logic of threat and decision, of friend and enemy, and so magnifies the dangers and ratchets up the strategic fears and insecurities that encourage the construction of a certain kind of political reason centred on the violent clampdown of the moment of decision." 'Speaking and writing about security is never innocent', says Jef Huysmans, 'it always risks contributing to the opening of a window of opportunity for a "fascist mobilisation".' Events since 11 September 2001, bear witness to this. It seems abundantly clear that any revival of fascism would now come through the mobilisation of society in the name of security." This potential for fascist mobilisation underlines once more that far from being a distinct political force outside of liberalism and capital, fascism is in fact liberal capitalism's doppelganger. The lesson of the twentieth century is that the crises of liberalism, more often than not expressed as crises threatening the security of the state and the social order of capital, reveal the potential for the rehabilitation of fascism; thriving in the crises of liberalism, the fascist potential within liberal democracy has always been more dangerous than the fascist tendency against democracy." The critique of security being developed here is intended as a reminder of the authoritarian, reactionary and fascist potential within the capitalist order and one of its key political categories.

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The Current view of international security is based on civilized/uncivilized binaries. We assume Iraq is a breeding ground for conflict. The affirmative resists colonialism by examining the historical contexts of US occupation. Tarak Barkawi, Prof. in Interenational Security @ Univ. of Cambridge, Mark Laffey, Prof. in International Politics @ Univ. of London, ‘6 [Review of International Studies 32, “The postcolonial moment in security studies,” p. 344-6] What was true of European economic and military power was also true of the constitution of European identities, which required an imaginary non-Western‘other’.109 The West is defined through a series of contrasts regarding rationality, progress, and development in which the non-West is generally found lacking. To take an example from the initial period of European expansion, Western thinkers used the notion of the ‘state of nature’ to distinguish between their civilisation and those they encountered in the Western Hemisphere after 1492. The ‘state of nature’ was itself a Eurocentric interpretation of these peoples which located civilization and law in Europe even as Europe set about destroying these peoples and their civilisations. This metaphor, a core notion in Western political thought, only became possible as a result of Europe’s imperial encounter with aboriginal peoples.110 At the same time, it enabled and legitimated European dispossession and appropriation of land, resources and populations. In this way, the ‘state of nature’ played its role in producing a world sharply divided between Western have-lots and non-Western have-nots. This idea has continuing significance in political theory and in discussions of contemporary security issues such as failed states and new wars, discussions which reproduce Eurocentric understandings of world politics.111 Contemporary violence in Africa is often explained in terms of a lack of those institutions and attributes associated with European modernity, such as sovereignty, rather than as a consequence of long histories of colonial and postcolonial interaction with the West. Part of the significance of the postcolonial rupture signaled in the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 is that it forces us to recover these processes of mutual constitution and their significance for how we make sense of security relations and world politics more generally. For many, the War on Terror is a clash between the West and the Islamic world. Al-Qaeda, bin Laden and his allies are conceived as ‘Islamic fundamentalists’ with a passionate hatred of everything Western. The problem with this way of framing the conflict is that it ignores the long history of interconnection and mutual constitution out of which bin Laden’s ideas and organization were produced. Currents of Western, Arab and Islamic cultures and histories, modern technologies and communications, and the policies of various regimes and great powers combined to form crystallizations, amongst them bin Laden’s and Al-Qaeda’s particular way of being modern. Attempting to disaggregate these phenomena and squeeze them into boxes marked ‘Islam’ and ‘the West’ will not aid understanding of the dynamics of the War on Terror. More importantly, policies derived from such binary understandings may create the very conditions that crystallize future bin Ladens and Al-Qaedas. Bin Laden’s ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and the Al-Qaeda organization are in fact modern, hybrid creations of Islam’s encounter with the West.112 Two of the key figures behind contemporary Islamic thinking, Sayyid Qutb and his brother Muhammad, who was bin Laden’s teacher at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia, viewed the West as suffering from a ‘great spiritual famine’.113 Much of their thought is a reaction against Western modernity and an attempt to outline a new, Islamic modernity, for they did not want the same fate to befall their societies. The West was not only an initial impetus to their ideology, they also utilized a variety of quintessentially Western ideas. Qutb was influenced in particular by Marxism- Leninism, taking the concept of a revolutionary vanguard and the idea that the world could be remade through an act of will, both important intellectual bases of Al-Qaeda. His notion that Islam could serve as a universal ideology of emancipation in modern conditions is a distinctive combination of Islamic and Enlightenment thinking.114 The Al-Qaeda organization itself is even more obviously of the modern world, rather than simply a product of ‘Islam’. It is a contemporary, global and networked enterprise, with a flattened hierarchy and cellular structure. It is comfortable with computer technology and modern communications. Al- Qaeda also has direct debts to US foreign policy. Bin Laden’s central role and his organization developed out of the US supported resistance to the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.115 It is through diverse forms of interaction between peoples and places around the world that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ and Al-Qaeda came into

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existence ; they were mutually constituted out of hierarchical relations of interconnection. Our point here is not to provide a full account of Al-Qaeda but rather to highlight in an initial way the kinds of research questions as well as the larger research agenda opened up for security studies by a focus on the mutual constitution of the strong and the weak, amid relations of domination and subordination. For security studies after Eurocentrism, the history and politics of warfare and struggle between what we now call the global North and the global South must become a major focus for inquiry. Especially in the age of the War on Terror, with its avowedly colonial projects and rhetorics in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, there needs to be greater attention to the histories and processes of imperial subjugation and the resistance it has so regularly generated. The imperial character of great powers – in all its dimensions – directs inquiry to the constitutive relationship between core and periphery, and in so doing to a reconceptualisation of what a great power is in security studies. This involves explicit recognition and analysis of the many ways in which political, economic and military power is produced out of relations between the strong and the weak , relations that are as necessary as they are contested. The insight of mutual constitution is no less applicable to the character and nature of the weak themselves, as for Al-Qaeda. They too are formed out of their relations with the powerful.

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Our criticism’s a performative political resistance allows for the creation of a new mode of politics—the securitization inherent in the affirmative’s representations offers a unique place in which to deconstruct subjectivity Campbell, 1998. David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998, Even more important, his understanding of power emphasizes the of freedom presupposed by the existence of disciplinary and normalizing practices. Put simply, there cannot be relations of power unless subjects are in the first instance free: the need to institute neg ative and constraining power practices comes about only because without them freedom would abound. Were there no possibility of freedom, subjects would not act in ways that required containment so as to effect order.37 Freedom, though, is not the absence of power. On the contrary, because it is only through power that subjects exer cise their agency, freedom and power cannot be separated. As Fou cault maintains: At the very heart of the power relationship, and constantly provok ing it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of free - dom. Rather than speaking of an essential freedom, it would be better to speak of an “agonism” — of a relationship which is at the same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to--face confmnta - lion which paralyzes both sides than a permanent provocation.38 The political possibilities enabled by this permanent provocation of power and freedom can be specified in more detail by thinking in terms of the predominance of the “bio-power” discussed above. In this sense, because the governmental practices of biopolitics in West ern nations have been increasingly directed toward modes of being and forms of life — such that sexual conduct has become an object of concern, individual health has been figured as a domain of discipline, and the family has been transformed into an instrument of govern ment — the ongoing agonism between those practices and the free dom they seek to contain means that individuals have articulated a series of counterdemands drawn from those new fields of concern. For example, as the state continues to prosecute people according to sexual orientation, human rights activists have proclaimed the right of gays to enter into formal marriages, adopt children, and receive the same health and insurance benefits granted to their straight coun terparts. These claims are a consequence of the permanent provoca - tion of power and freedom in biopolitics, and stand as testament to the “strategic reversibility” of power relations: if the terms of govern mental practices can be made into focal points for resistances, then the “history of government as the ‘conduct of conduct’ is interwoven with the history of dissenting ‘counterconducts.”’39 Indeed, the emer gence of the state as the major articulation of “the political” has in volved an unceasing agonism between those in office and those they rule. State intervention in everyday life has long incited popular col lective action, the result of which has been both resistance to the state and new claims upon the state. In particular, “the core of what we now call ‘citizenship’ . . . consists of multiple bargains hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means of state action, especially the making of war.”40 In more recent times, constituencies associated with women’s, youth, ecological, and peace movements (among others) have also issued claims on society.41 These resistances are evidence that the break with the discur sive/nondiscursive dichotomy central to the logic of interpretation undergirding this analysis is (to put it in conventional terms) not only theoretically licensed; it is empirically warranted. Indeed, expanding the interpretive imagination so as to enlarge the categories through which we understand the constitution of “the political” has been a necessary precondition for making sense of Foreign Policy’s concern for the ethical borders of identity in America. Accordingly, there are manifest political implications that flow from theorizing identity As Judith Butler concluded: “The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.”42

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Our criticism proceeds the affirmative- the racialized logic of securitization upon which the plan relies is the root of their harms claims -- You have an ethical obligation to oppose this frame. Roxanne Doty, Prof. of Political Science @ ASU [Woot], 1996 [Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Reprsentations in North-South Relations, p. 166-71]

One of the deadly traces that has been deposited in our current "reality" and that figures prominently in this study is "race." The inventory of this trace has been systematically ignored by international relations scholarship. It seems fair to suggest that most international relations scholars as well as makers of foreign policy would suggest that "race" is not even a relevant issue in global politics. Some might concede that while "race" may have been a significant factor internationally during particular historical periods-as a justification for colonialism, for example - "we" are past that now. The racial hierarchy that once prevailed internationally simply no longer exists. To dwell upon "race" as an international issue is an unproductive, needless rehash of history. Adlai Stevenson rather crudely summed up this position when he complained that he was impatiently waiting for the time "when the last black-faced comedian has quit preaching about colonialism so the United Nations could move on to the more crucial issues like disarmament" (quoted in Noer 1985: 84). This view is unfortunately, although subtly, reflected in the very definition of the field of international relations, whose central problems and categories have been framed in such a way as to preclude investigation into categories such as "race" that do not fit neatly within the bounds of prevailing conceptions of theory and explanation and the legitimate methods with which to pursue them. As Walker (1989) points out, current international relations research agendas are framed within an understanding that presumes certain ontological issues have been resolved. Having already resolved the questions of the "real" and relevant entities, international relations scholars generally proceed to analyze the world with an eye toward becoming a "real science." What has been defined as "real" and relevant has not included race. As this study suggests, however, racialized identities historically have been inextricably linked with power, agency, reason, morality, and understandings of "self" and "other."' When we invoke these terms in certain contexts, we also silently invoke traces of previous racial distinctions. For example, Goldberg (1993: 164) suggests that the conceptual division of the world whereby the "third world" is the world of tradition, irrationality, overpopulation, disorder, and chaos assumes a racial character that perpetuates, both conceptually and actually, relations of domination, subjugation, and exclusion. Excluding the issue of representation enables the continuation of this and obscures the important relationship between representation, power, and agency. The issue of agency in international affairs appears in the literature in various ways, ranging from classical realism's subjectivist privileging of human agents to neorealism's behavioralist privileging of the state as agent to the more recent focus on the "agent-structure problem" by proponents of structuration theory (e.g., Wendt [19871, Dessler 119891). What these accounts have in common is their exclusion of the issue of representation. The presumption is made that agency ultimately refers back to some prediscursive subject, even if that subject is socially constructed within the context of political, social, and economic structures. In contrast, the cases examined in this study suggest that the question of agency is one of how practices of representation create meaning and identities and thereby create the very possibility for agency. As Judith Butler (1990: 142-49) makes clear and as the empirical cases examined here suggest, identity and agency are both effects, not preexisting conditions of being. Such an antiessentialist understanding does not depend upon foundational categories -an inner psychological self, for example. Rather, identity is reconceptualized as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being constructed through signifying practices that expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity as such. For example, through a process of repetition, U.S. and British discourses constructed as natural and given the

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 72 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 73 oppositional dichotomy between the uncivilized, barbaric "other" and the civilized, democratic "self" even while they both engaged in the oppression and brutalization of "others." The Spector of the "other" was always within the "self." The proliferation of discourse in times of crisis illustrates an attempt to expel the "other," to make natural and unproblematic the boundaries between the inside and the outside. This in turn suggests that identity and therefore the agency that is connected with identity are inextricably linked to representational practices. It follows that any meaningful discussion of agency must perforce be a discussion of representation. The representational practices that construct particular identities have serious ramifications for agency. While this study suggests that "race" historically has been a central marker of identity, it also suggests that identity construction takes place along several dimensions. Racial categories often have worked together with gendered categories as well as with analogies to parent/child oppositions and animal metaphors. Each of these dimensions has varying significance at different times and enables a wide variety of practices. In examining the construction of racialized identities, it is not enough to suggest that social identities are constructed on the basis of shared understandings within a community: shared understandings regarding institutional rules, social norms, and selfexpectations of individuals in that community. It is not enough to examine the shared social criteria by which one identity is distinguished from another. Two additional elements must be considered: power and truth. "Race" has not just been about certain rules and resources facilitating the agency of some social groups and denying or placing severe limitations on the agency of other social groups. Though it has been about these things, this is only one aspect of what "race" has historically been about. "Race" has most fundamentally been about being human. Racist discourses historically have constructed different kinds and degrees of humanness through representational practices that have claimed to be and have been accepted as "true" and accurate representations of "reality." Racist discourses highlight, perhaps more than any other, the inextricable link between power and truth or power and knowledge. A theory of agency in international relations, if it is to incorporate issues such as "race," must address the relationship between power and truth. This realization in turn implies a reconceptualization of power and how it works that transcends those present in existing theories of international relations. The cases examined in this study attest to the importance of representational practices and the power that inheres in them. The infinity of traces that leave no inventory continue to play a significant part in contemporary constructions of "reality." This is not to suggest that representations have been static. Static implies the possibility of fixedness, when what I mean to suggest is an inherent fragility and instability to the meanings and identities that have been constructed in the various discourses I examined. For example, to characterize the South as "uncivilized" or "unfit for self-government" is no longer an acceptable representation. This is not, however, because the meanings of these terms were at one time fixed and stable. As I illustrated, what these signifiers signified was always deferred. Partial fixation was the result of their being anchored by some exemplary mode of being that was itself constructed at the power/ knowledge nexus: the white male at the turn of the century, the United States after World War II. Bhabha stresses "the wide range of the stereotype, from the loyal servant to Satan, from the loved to the hated; a shifting of subject positions in the circulation of colonial power" (1983: 31). The shifting subject positions-from uncivilized native to quasi state to traditional "man" and society, for example -are all partial fixations that have enabled the exercise of various and multiple forms of power. Nor do previous oppositions entirely disappear. What remains is an infinity of traces from prior representations that themselves have been founded not on pure presences but on differance. "The present becomes the sign of the sign, the trace of the trace," Derrida writes (1982: 24). Differance makes possible the chain of differing and deferring (the continuity) as well as the endless substitution (the discontinuity) of names that are inscribed and reinscribed as pure presence, the center of the structure that itself escapes structurality. North-South relations have been constituted as a structure of deferral. The center of the structure (alternatively white man, modern man, the United States, the West, real states) has never been absolutely present outside a system of differences. It has itself been constituted as trace-the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, refers itself (ibid.). Because the center is not a fixed locus but a function in which an infinite number of sign substitutions come into play, the domain and play of signification is extended indefinitely (Derrida 1978: z8o). This both opens up and limits possibilities, generates alternative sites of meanings and political resistances that give rise to practices of reinscription that seek to reaffirm identities and relationships. The inherently incomplete and open nature of discourse makes this reaffirmation an ongoing and never finally completed project. In this study I have sought, through an engagement with various discourses in which claims to truth have been staked, to challenge the validity of the structures of meaning and to make visible their complicity with practices of power and domination. By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, political, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 73 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 74 ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of structures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer-attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations.

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Exilic intellectualism accommodates those suffering oppression by showing respect for all humanity Shampa BISWAS, Prof – Politics, Whitman, 2007 "Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist" Millennium 36 (1)

The kind of globalism that Said advocates involves a felt and sympathetic awareness of an in- and co- habited world. In an interview with Bruce Robbins, Said is at pains to underscore that the rootlessness and exilic marginality he promotes are not detached, distant positions that exclude ‘sympathetic identification with a people suffering oppression ... [e]specially when that oppression is caused by one’s own community or one’s own polity’.47 The exilic orientation ‘involves the crossing of barriers, the traversing of borders, the accommodation with various cultures, not so much in order to belong to them but at least so as to be able to feel the accents and inflections of their experience’.48 It is a globalism that is very much linked to Said’s unabashed defence of ‘humanism’. At the heart of this defence is a commitment to an aware and felt ethic of ‘humanity’ that emerges from a sense of ‘worldliness’ (i.e. a sense of ‘the real historical world’49) and knowledge of difference. A central defining pole of (Said’s) humanism, says Akeel Bilgrami in the foreword to Said’s posthumously published collection of essays in Humanism and Democratic Criticism, is ‘the yearning to show regard for all that is human, for what is human wherever it may be found and however remote it may be from the more vivid presence of the parochial’.50 Said himself criticises the rampant use of the word ‘human’ in much of the current discourse on ‘humanitarian intervention’, which, as he points out, is conducted largely by visiting violence on distant humans.51 His humanism is an attempt to retrieve the humanity of those distant humans by developing a genuinely globalist ethic. This globalist ethic is not based on a crass abstract universalism, but is very much a concrete, grounded ethic that takes the local seriously.

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The genuine alternative to Orientalism and Eurocentricism is reading contrapuntally- this shows an understanding of the complexities of global societies (Shampa Biswas, 07, Millennium Journal of International Studies, SAGE, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals”, p.117-133)

As Mufti points out with respect to Said’s work, while the whole can only be comprehended contingently ‘from one possible location within it or a trajectory through it’,54 ‘(t)he genuine alternative to (the) universalism of contemporary Eurocentric thought is not a retreat into the local, into so many localities, but rather a general account of the play of the particular in the universalizing processes of capitalist-imperial modernity’.55 Indeed, as Mufti also suggests, what Said offers is a rethinking of the local. Recalling his commentary on the exilic orientation as pushing one’s scholarly perspective towards the margins from which a more expansive view of the global is available, one may understand Said’s attempts to rescue the ‘marginalized perspective of the minority as one from which to rethink and remake universalist (ethical, political, cultural) claims, thus displacing its assignation as the site of the local’.56 What Said is offering us here, then, is a felt commitment to the concrete and the situated, especially via the lived experiences of those most marginalised by contemporary global politics. This may yield to IR scholars a reconfigured ‘area studies’ (shorn of its calculating, Cold- War, strategic logics) or perhaps ‘place studies’, providing concrete sites to think the global empirically and carefully.57 What indeed would it mean for IR scholars to ‘represent all those people and issues that are routinely forgotten or swept under the rug’58 – refugees, poor migrants, asylum seekers, sweatshop workers, enemy combatants – to build their understandings of the global less from state-centric institutions of world politics and more from the concrete ‘spaces of exception’ in Georgio Agamben’s words, where the least state- protected bodies reside? The question then is how one understands the global in a way that remains sensitive to context and perspective. What method does Said offer for abandoning the skewed historiography, the parochial universalism and its uniform theory of progress and the Orientalism which has been the legacy of Eurocentric scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences and cultivating a ‘sense of multiple worlds and complex interacting traditions’?59 Contrapuntal readings, Said suggests, are such an ‘attempt at a globalized (not total) description’,60 readings that offer just such a method for crafting an understanding of global politics as inhabited by multiple and overlapping worlds.61 It is a method that responds to ‘Eurocentrism as an epistemological problem’ – ‘the social and cultural force of (the) idea of Europe in intellectual life, as in the phenomenal world of global power relations’.62 To read contrapuntally, Said argues, is to show a historical awareness of the complex interdependence through which the global has been constituted. As he explains more broadly of the massively knotted and complex histories of special but nevertheless overlapping and interconnected experiences – of women, of Westerners, of Blacks, of national states and cultures – there is no particular intellectual reason for granting each and all of them an ideal and essentially separate status … we must be able to think through and interpret together experiences that are discrepant, each with its particular agenda and pace of development, its own internal formations, its internal coherence and system of external relationships, all of them co-existing and interacting with others.63 Said argues that a ‘post-imperial intellectual attitude’ requires looking at different experiences contrapuntally, ‘as making up a set of … intertwined and overlapping histories’.64 This would mean re- reading the cultural archive ‘with a simultaneous awareness both of the metropolitan history that is narrated and of those other histories against which (and together with which) the dominating discourse acts’.65

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 76 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 77 Alternative Extension The only way to move beyond security is to find a new way of thinking and socializing. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether — to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. lt is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ’this is an insecure world' and reiteration of on_e fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we `want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all encompassing that it marginalises all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The con- stant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end — as the political end — constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible — that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ’security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told — never could be told — what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,‘“ dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ’sectors’ to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitirnises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole.““ The mistake has been to think that there is a hole; and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision " of security in which it is re—rnapped or civilised or gendered or. humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary and consequently end up re— affirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order; part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ’security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short—circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a different con- ception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 77 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 78 recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ’insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that ’securitizing’ an issue does not mean dealing with it politically but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.”

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***AT Perm***

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Only a conscious disengagement from the securitized mindset before action can prevent cooption David Campbell, professor of international politics at the university of Newcastle, Writing Security, 1998, pg. 202

Furthermore, Foucault argues that from the eighteenth century onward, security becomes the central dynamic in governmental rationality, so that (as discussed in chapter 6) we live today, not in a narrowly defined and overtly repressive disciplinary society, but in a “society of security,” in which practices of national security and practices of social security structure intensive and extensive power relations, and constitute the ethical boundaries and territorial borders of inside! outside, normal/pathological, civilized/barbaric, and so on23 The theory of police and the shift from a sovereign’s war to a popula tion’s war thus not only changed the nature of “man” and war, it constituted the identity of “man” in the idea of the population, and articulated the dangers that might pose a threat to security. The ma jor implication of this argument is that the state is understood as having no essence, no ontological status that exists prior to and is served by either police or war. Instead, “the state” is “the mobile effect of a multiple regime of governmentality,” of which the practices of police, war, and foreign policy/Foreign Policy are all a part.34 Rethinking security and government in these terms is one of the preconditions necessary to suggest some of the political implications of this study. Specifically, it has been the purpose of this book to argue that we can interpret the cold war as an important moment in the production and reproduction of American identity in ways consonant with the logic of a “society of security” To this end, the analysis of the texts of Foreign Policy in chapter 1, the consideration of Eisenhower’s security policies in chapter 6, and the examination of the in - terpretation of danger surrounding “the war on drugs” in chapter 7, demonstrated that even when these issues are represented in terms of national security and territorial boundaries, and even when these issues are written in the depoliticizing mode of policy discourse, they all constitute “the ensemble of the population” in terms of social se curity and ethical borders. Likewise, Foucault’s argument underpins the fact that these developments are not peculiar to the post—World War II period.

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Perm can’t solve – Realism can’t conceptualize itself. Linklater, Senior Lecturer in Politics Monash University, 1990 [Andrew, Beyond Realism and Marxism, pp 14-15]

Although some realists and rationalist have argued for the transformation of world politics, most nevertheless emphasize the limited opportunities for significant reform. On these grounds, most members of these traditions have been dismissive of the revolutionist tradition. As noted above, several recent attempts to apply critical theory to international relations accept the realist’s point that Marxism and critical sociology failed to recognize the importance of international systemic constraints. From the perspective of critical theory, however, realism can only be true if the species is unfree. What realism offers is an account of historical circumstances which human subject have yet to bring under their collective control. What it does not possess is an account of the modes of political intervention which would enable human beings to take control of their international history. That is the ultimate task facing the critical theory of international relations. An inquiry into the alternative forms of foreign policy behavior cannot be divorced from the question of how to construct a post-realism analysis of international relations. Rationalism and critical theory of world politics have a similar approach to this problem. Both reject the method of analyzing the states-system as if it were a domain apart. Both regard the abstraction of the state-system as a barrier to understanding one of the crucial dimensions of international relations: the universalization of the basic principles of international order, and the universalizastion of the demand for the self-determination respectively. As for Waltz’s realism, the problem is not that it fails as an account of the reproduction of the states-system, or that it errs by emphasizing the need for a technically-rational dimension of foreign policy. The issue is whether the decision to abstract the states-system from other domains ignores the existence of actual or potential logics of system- modification which may strengthen the bond of international community; and it is whether the preoccupation with the systemic reproduction ends in a practice which suppresses the tendencies inherent in alternative logics. Consequently, although realism succeeds in explaining the necessitous character of international relations it fails to explicate its role in reproducing the power relations which it regards as the objective foundation for the “impossibility theorem.”

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Liberty is sacrificed for security- commitment to security allows authoritarian and absolutist encroachments on liberty. (Mark Neocleous, 08, “Critique of Security”, Brunel University in the Department of Government)

Although liberalism set itself against the theorists of absolutism who invoked security as part of the justification of authoritarian state power, and those police scientists which sought the complete regulation of all spheres of social life ('police' as 'policy'), liberalism continued to share with cameralists and absolutists a key commitment to security. While this commitment may have led to the identification of different threats to security and to different political projects for the shaping of the modem state, the value of security remained the same. The difference between absolutism and cameralism on the one hand and liberalism on the other is not that where one stresses security the other stresses liberty; the difference does not lie in the tipping of a mythical 'balance' between liberty and security in one direction rather than another. Rather, the difference lies in the fact that absolutists and cameralists saw no need to identify security with liberty. But this identification of liberty with security also has a problematic flip side, one which takes us into the argument in the chapters to follow. Holmes points out that no theory with security as its central concern can be dogmatically anti-statist. But then most liberals would in reply point out that they have never set themselves up as dogmatically anti-statist anyway. The real problem is that the commitment to security leaves liberalism with virtually no defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, so long as these are conducted in the name of security. At the very minimal level, this becomes the basis for distinctly non-liberal and authoritarian interventions into the lives and liberties of citizens, as Dean notes." But 'non-liberal intervention' does not go far enough to capture the authoritarian and brutal ways in which liberalism is happy to allow liberties and lives to be destroyed in the name of security; the way, that is, that the most illiberal actions of state can be carried out by means of one of liberalism's most Liberalism and the technique of security fundamental terms. This has been most starkly illustrated in the liberal T. defence of torture during the 'war on tenor'. The best-known example of this is Alan Dershowitz's demand that judges should be allowed to issue 'torture warrants' in the 'ticking bomb' case on the grounds that security must never be compromised." Michael Ignatieff's 'lesser evil' position also allows for 'justifiable exceptions' to any ban on torture.' 'Torture', it should be noted, does not for Ignatieff include simple forms of 'coercion' such as sleep deprivation, permanent light or darkness, disorienting noise, isolation. (It surely says a lot about a person's politics arid moral assumptions that sleep deprivation or isolating a human being from all human contact counts as merely 'coercive' rather than a form of torture.)

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Assumptions are a-priori to questions of politics—before we can formulate questions concerning what we must do- we must first understand the how and why. Jayan Nayar, shape-shifter, horse whisperer, 1999 (“SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity” Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems Fall, 1999) Lexis

The description of the continuities of violence in Section II in many ways is familiar to those who adopt a critical perspective of the world. "We" are accustomed to narrating human wrongs in this way. The failures and betrayals, the victims and perpetrators, are familiar to our critical understanding. From this position of judgment, commonly held within the "mainstream" of the "non-mainstream," there is also a familiarity of solutions commonly advocated for transformation; the "marketplace" for critique is a thriving one as evidenced by the abundance of literature in this respect. Despite this proliferation of enlightenment and the profession of so many good ideas, however, "things" appear to remain as they are, or, worse still, deteriorate. And so, the cycle of critique, proposals for transformation and disappointment continues. Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization)--the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering.

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Language effects international politics- Globalization’s mode of operation shows that the reality-making scripts of the aff are pretextualized interpretations. Timothy Luke, university distinguished professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2003, Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World, p. 118-20

To comprehend fully how nonanarchic codes, collectives, and commodities interact in the culture and space generated by the transnational polity, one must indicate how globalization is operating concursively now, in the early twenty-first century. These disclosures are important to understand fully how the reticulations of power and knowledge work in most locales through what Baudrillard has identified as “the system of objects” in local, national, and global markets. All of these terms, however, are mutable in their meanings, and they are constantly evolving, everyday in fact, in new objectifications of the systems at play in capitalism, nationalism, technology, and urbanization. Immense collectives of concursive activity underpin everyday life by paralleling discursive formations under contemporary conditions of world power. As agent/structure assemblies in motion, most events are difficult, if not entirely impossible, to divide with infinite declensions of cause and effect, form and substance, act and actor, even though the ontologies of realism declare things to be otherwise. Nonetheless, these methodological presumptions impair one’s ability to understand what actually seems to happen in the realms of foreign and domestic affairs. All too often, the sovereign “we” does not choose to act decisively in this or that manner. Rather, concursive networks of indecisive, unchosen action and reaction emerge everywhere all the time, as the April 1, 2001 incident over the South China Sea indicates. The need for notions like concursivity becomes more pressing with modernity. Becoming modern means coexisting with many complex nonhuman objects, processes, and structures at the coincidence of inside and outside (Latour 1999). These structures, processes, and objects, in turn, situate individuals and groups amidst ongoing activities with their own unique meanings and goals that usually occur without reflection. Rather than seeking out crises to account for these networks of interaction, it makes more sense to dive into ordinary events. The quotidian dimension of materiale, system, and artifact is where another web of international relations really gels. Diplomatic incidents reveal disruptions, but the disruptive is remarkable only inasmuch as it demarcates extraordinary aberrations in bigger ordinary patterns. Thus, studies of concursivity implicitly must accept the merits of Onuf’s claims about language, namely that “people use words to represent deeds and they can use words, and words alone, to perform deeds” (1989, 82), while at the same time reversing Onuf’s conceptual polarities in an effort to understand how people perform deeds, and then see how deeds alone can be used to represent and enact words. This is real interdependence: discursivity plus concursivity. Michael J. Shapiro’s insights (1989) about interpretation are suggestive indicators of other patterns and presences in the workings of the world. Reality-making scripts are, at the same time, scriptedness made-real, something that pretextualizes practices and institutions for textual interpretation. Realities are not just there to be read uncritically in their empirical richness. They are wrought from scripted practices and then written in accord with practical scripts. As the operations of the American and Chinese militaries on April 1, 2001, illustrate, subjectivity spoken and acted congeals in objects and processes that henceforth coexist with subjects. This chapter has pushed out into the open, if only as glimpses, those often undetected strings of critically significant dark matter behind the visible spectrum of discursive formulations and their politics. Discursive analysis shows how language is acting, organizes action, or prevents action in international politics, while considerations of concursivity show how action might be another language. Actions can eventuate or instantiate different languages, and actions might short-circuit language. Discursive politics, therefore, can only take place when it is reticulated through systems of political concourse that are, in turn, always at once inoperative and conflictual, national and transnational, exploitative and emancipatory, at the coincide of inside and outside.

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They oversimplify our framework—we’re an analysis of the way that representations and language shape and interact the political structure– our evidence all proves that this is a superior explanatory framework than simple realist analysis. Timothy Luke, university distinguished professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2003, Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World, p. 104-05

How will international relations unfold in a world with an increasingly globalized economy, many more hollowed-out states, and only one obvious superpower? The regents of neorealist international politics push the traditional primacy of man, the state, and war to account for the present, but this pitch is marred by inconsistencies, presumptions, and inaccuracies. Even so, the institutional grip of mainstream neorealist analysis, as a discursive formation or power/knowledge bloc, on the conduct of international political analysis continues to be quite strong. Can discourse occur without concourse? Is concursivity an integral part of discourse, and discursivity an inseparable part of concourse? Running to-and-fro, the original root meaning of “discourse,” requires some running together, which is the original meaning of “concourse.” And running together entails measures of tacking to-and-fro. Reexamining many international incidents may reveal much about transsocial and transnational concursiveness. Indeed, the breadth and depth of ordinary events need to be more carefully explained to show how eventuation occurs, concurs, and recurs. One must wonder then whether discursive analysis often slips into its own metaphysics of presence, forgetting the vital anchor points into institutionalized structures of action that enable discursive engagements to unfold, as the proponents of discursive analysis have proclaimed. A concern with discursivity, textuality, and language must not ignore how these forces occlude extradiscursivity, subtextuality, and the prelinguistic, which are all equally necessary for accounting for the development of world affairs. Often these matters are presumed away in structures and systems held in the background. The discourses of danger that generate today’s security problematics, for example, also throw forth signs of their coincident concourses for conduct. Even conflict requires collaboration to eventuate how security and insecurity are experienced, effected, or effaced in practices. Discursive approaches to explaining international politics are quite important in accounting for who dominates whom around the globe (Shapiro 1989). Language clearly is a type of action. Speaking organizes activity. And listening, interpreting, and comprehending are all critically significant forms of behavior that shape how countries and corporations interact worldwide. Yet discursive interrelations usually presume many ongoing work relations that make words of discourse inescapable, natural, or routine. It is these occluded connections of interdependent practice that need to be brought out into the open with more complete theoretical articulations of the concursivity that ordinarily underpins discursivity. Such dark matter can be detected in the materiale held by naturalized “black boxes” into which inputs flow and from which outputs come: embedded practices, big sociotechnical systems, and collaborative regimes (Luke 1989). Amid the shadows cast by such structures, concursive practices shape the bulk of behavior between countries under most circumstances. War and peace are both complex sets of practices that require as much ongoing tit-for-tat behavior as they take conflict to occur (Luke 199 la). In war, offense must meet defense, attacks frame counterattacks, and strategic invention always emerges from strategic convention. Without thrust and parry, parry and thrust, war cannot “be made.” Likewise, peace develops as collaboration in action as parties “make peace,” and then “keep the peace” through comediating at many different levels of concursive collaboration, cointerpretation, and cooperation in their activities (Luke 1993).

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Additionally, the kritik comes prior to the case—imperial practices are dependent on representations. The imperialist discourse constructs the reality under which politics operates—placing representations first is necessary to escape dominant modes of thinking. Roxanne Lynn Doty, 1996, Professor of Poli Sci @ Arizona State University, Imperial Encounters, p 171 By examining the ways in which structures of meaning have been associated with imperial practices, I have suggested that the construction of meaning and the construction of social, po litical, and economic power are inextricably linked. This suggests an ethical dimension to making meaning and an ethical imperative that is incumbent upon those who toil in the construction of struc tures of meaning. This is especially urgent in North-South relations today: one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace. The political stakes raised by this analysis revolve around the question of being able to "get beyond" the representations or speak outside of the discourses that historically have constructed the North and the South. I do not believe that there are any pure alternatives by which we can escape the infinity of traces to which Gramsci refers. Nor do I wish to suggest that we are always hopelessly imprisoned in a dominant and all-pervasive discourse. Before this question can be answered-indeed, before we can even proceed to attempt an answer—attention must be given to the politics of representation. The price that international relations scholarship pays for its inatten tion to the issue of representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral of its responsibility and com plicity in dominant representations.

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Questions of representations come first – the way we discuss policy is more important than policy itself. Roxanne Lynn Doty, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Arizona State University, 1996 (Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations, University of Minnesota Press, Borderlines Series, ISBN 0816627622, p. 5-6) This study begins with the premise that representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area of inquiry. International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as "truth." The goal of analyzing these practices is not to reveal essential truths that have been obscured, but rather to examine how certain representations underlie the production of knowledge and identities and how these representations make various courses of action possible. As Said (1979: 21) notes, there is no such thing as a delivered presence, but there is a re-presence, or representation. Such an assertion does not deny the existence of the material world, but rather suggests that material objects and subjects are constituted as such within discourse. So, for example, when U.S. troops march into Grenada, this is certainly "real," though the march of troops across a piece of geographic space is itself singularly uninteresting and socially irrelevant outside of the representations that produce meaning. It is only when "American" is attached to the troops and "Grenada" to the geographic space that meaning is created. What the physical behavior itself is, though, is still far from certain until discursive practices constitute it as an "invasion," a "show of force," a "training exercise," a "rescue," and so on. What is "really" going on in such a situation is inextricably linked to the discourse within which it is located. To attempt a neat separation between discursive and nondiscursive practices, understanding the former as purely linguistic, assumes a series of dichotomies—thought/reality, appearance/essence, mind/matter, word/world, subjective/objective—that a critical genealogy calls into question. Against this, the perspective taken here affirms the material and performative character of discourse. 6 In suggesting that global politics, and specifically the aspect that has to do with relations between the North and the South, is linked to representational practices I am suggesting that the issues and concerns that constitute these relations occur within a "reality" whose content has for the most part been defined by the representational practices of the "first world." Focusing on discursive practices enables [end page 5] one to examine how the processes that produce "truth" and "knowledge" work and how they are articulated with the exercise of political, military, and economic power.

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***Realism***

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Realism is dead – it relies on an outdate conception of state and lives on only as an institution without any an intellectual grounding. James Der Derian (“A VIRTUAL THEORY OF GLOBAL POLITICS, MIMETIC WAR, AND THE SPECTRAL STATE” journal of the theoretical humanities 4:2 1999)

The sovereign state, having outlived its original purpose to end feudal and religious violence and bring order to the seventeenth- century Cosmopolis, has become equally spectral-dependent in its violent effects, haunting world polities and international politics with the white-sheet rhetoric of fear and insecurity. It is not difficult to find empirical support for Derrida’s theoretical suspensions of disbelief. Take, for example, current mimetic conjuring for the exorcism of internal spirits by invocations of external evils, like drugs, immigration, and Islam; black magic shows of virtual violence through the simulacrum of war games; and "humanitarian" intervention (like the UN in Bosnia - but not Rwanda) for performative acts of deterrence and compellence. Moreover. Derrida takes the critique of sovereignty afield, going beyond his usual concern with logocentrism to explore how the haunting of politics has moved from the bounded text of geopolitical specters to the practically borderless electromagnetic spectrum: “And if this important frontier is being displaced, it is because the medium in which it is instituted, namely, the medium of the media themselves (news. the press- telecommunications. techno-telediscursivity. techno-teleiconicity. that which in general assures and determines the spacing of public space, the very possibility of the revelation and the phenomenality of the political), this element itself is neither living nor dead, present nor absent: it speetralizes. It does not belong to ontology, to the discourse of Being of beings, or to the essence of life or death. It requires, then, what we call, to save time and space rather than just to make up a word, hauntology.” Nietzsche and Derrida offer a penetrating critique of sovereignty, vet ... it lives, most demonstrably in international theory and diplomatic state-craft, as, no less, the realist perspective. What do we mean by "realism"? It encompasses a world-view in which sovereign states, struggling for power under conditions of anarchy, do what they must to maintain and promote their own self-interests. But what do "we" mean by "realism"? We realists constituted by and representing disciplinary schools of thought, diplomatic corps, intelligence bureau depict things as they really are, rather than as idealists might wish them to be. And what do "we" mean by "realism"? We mean what we say and say what we mean. in that transparent way of correspondence that provides the veridical, deadly discourses of realism, like mutual assured destruction assures our security. or "we had to destroy the village in order to save it." But with the end of the Cold War, and pace Nietzsche, why beat a dead horse? Precisely because realism does death so well, by refusing to acknowledge not only its ongoing complicity in tine death of others but also the fact that it gave up the ghost a long time ago. How many times, after how many "revolutionary" transitions, have we heard that sovereignty is at bay, at an end, dead? There is always the easy deflection, that sovereignty is an "essentially contested concept," - a "convenient fiction." that changes with the times. But the frequency of such death-notices, from politicians, military strategists and pundits, as well as academicians, leads one to suspect that something other than funerary oration, philosophical speculation, or a topic for it special issue is at work. Is there a darker, even gothic side to the sovereign state, a bidden power which resides in its recurrent morbidity? Take a look at some of the principle necroses. Realism has built a life out of the transformation of fictions, like the immutability of human nature and the apopoditic threat of anarchy, into facticity. With a little digging, realism conies to resemble nothing so much as the undead, a perverse mimesis of the living other, haunting international politics through the objectification of power, the fetishisation of weaponry, the idealization of the state, the virtualization of violence, and the globalization of new media. Now the fact of its own dealth lives on as a powerful fiction, as the morbid customs, characteristics, and habits of the living dead.

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Their evidence’s just a flawed series of assertions, ignoring realism’s social construction. Only an interrogation of the politics of securitzation can avoid reentrenching bias. David Mutimer, assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at York University. The Weapons State, 2000. (125 – 129) The notion of interest, or more precisely, the national interest, is central to the discipline of international relations. Disciplinary lore tells of the founding of international relations in the debate between realists and idealists. The first figure in this debate, at least on the victorious realist side, is E. H. Carr, whose realist critique of idealism focused on idealism's assumption of a harmony of interest, particularly the assumption that all states have a common interest in peace that could be relied on to found an institutionalized international peace. 22 In place of the harmony of interests, the early realists placed the national interest at the heart of their theory of world politics. As Arnold Wolfers wrote in 1952, "Statesmen, publicists and scholars who wish to be considered realists, as many do today, are inclined to insist that the foreign policy they advocate is dictated by the national interest."23 What, then, is this concept of interest to which realists appeal? Ironically, despite the importance of interest to realism, the concept is poorly theorized in realist writings; nevertheless, it is possible to read from their usage of the term the understandings that inform it. The place to begin such an investigation is with Hans Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, in which Morgenthau argues that the "main signpost that helps po litical realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. This concept provides the link between reason trying to understand international politics and the facts to be understood." 24 Furthermore, the "concept of interest defined as power imposes intellectual discipline upon the observer, infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible."25 Interests, then, play a crucial role in the realist understanding of international relations, as they provide the possibility for a theoretical understanding of international politics, tying together the analyst and the empirical universe she is trying to comprehend. This is a crucial concept indeed. Morgenthau defines interest simply in terms of power, so to gain further insight into his use of the term we must see what he means by power—notoriously, a concept perhaps even more ill defined than is interest in realist writing. To begin, Morgenthau argues that the notion of "in terest defined as power" is universally valid but that the content of that power varies historically. 26 When he sets out that content, however, the space for variation is limited indeed, with the most fundamental elements of national power—geography, national resources, and industrial capacity—variable only over a tremendous time span. Interest, defined in terms of this understanding of power, is very stable— necessarily so given the analytic weight the realist puts on it. Furthermore, despite the fact that Morgenthau defines power as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men," the elements of national power are notably nonrelational. They are conceived as attributes of particular nations rather than as char- acteristics of relationships between them. If interests are defined as power and power is a set of attributes, how does the national interest dictate policy? The answer must be that policy should seek to protect or augment those elements of power—that, in other words, national interests and national security are one and the same to re alists. This is the position Wolfers adopts, and it is reinforced by Kenneth Waltz's conception of national interests in Theory of International Politics, the defining neorealist text: " To say that a country acts according to its na tional interest means that, having examined its security requirements, it tries to meet them. That is simple; it is also important."27 Waltz may be right that his equation of interest and security is simple, but he is less con vincing about "important." Wolfers drew very different conclusions from the equation almost 30 years before Waltz. In a very vague and general way "national interest" does suggest a policy which can be distinguished from several others which may present themselves as alternatives. It indicates that the policy is designed to promote demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, sub-national groups or mankind as a whole. It emphasizes that the policy subordinates other interests to those of the nation. But beyond this it has very little meaning.2® Simple and banal might have been a better conclusion for Waltz. Following the publication of Waltz's book, the neorealist position was the focus of a number of sustained critiques. The critique that shared the most with the neorealists was initially organized around the concept of the regime. How did this neoliberal alternative to neorealism conceive of interests, and did it advance the concept beyond the realist simplicity? The standard reference work for regime analysis is Stephen Krasner's edited collection, International Regimes, in particular the introductory chapter by the editor. Krasner locates interests in the regimes research program: "This project began with a simple causal schematic. It assumed that regimes could be conceived as intervening variables standing between basic causal variables (most prominently, power and interests) and outcome and behavior."29 For regime theorists, interests are basic causal variables—autonomously discovered factors that give rise to the outcomes of concern to analysts. The question that remains for both neorealists and neoliberals is, where do these interests come from? Robert Keohane, the leading neoliberal theorist, confronted this problem, at least as far as it affects neorealist thinking Sophisticated contemporary thinkers in the Realist tradition, such as Gilpin, Krasner, and Waltz, understand that interests cannot be derived simply on the basis of rational calculation, from the external positions of states, and that this is particularly true of great powers, on which, ironically, Structural Realism focuses its principal attentions. Realist analysis has to retreat to a "fall-back position": that, given state interests, whose origins are not predicted by the theory, patterns of outcomes in world politics will be determined by the overall distribution of power among states.30 The best the realist tradition can produce, then, is to take state inter ests as given. As Jutta Weldes notes in her critique of the realist conception of interests, "The realist 'national interest' rests upon the assumption that an independent reality is directly accessible both to statesmen and to ana lysts."31 Regime theorists advanced a little on realists, for although they began by treating interests as basic causal variables that entirely preceded theory, one of the conclusions of their work—which has informed later neoliberal thinking—was that "once principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures [i.e., regimes] were entrenched they may alter the egoist interests and power configurations [the basic causal variables] which led to their creation in the first place."32 The implication of this conclusion in neoliberal thinking is that interests do not exist prior to practice but emerge out of practice—in the same way I argue

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throughout this book that objects and identities emerge out of practice. Despite its being the implication of their own work, neoliberals are not comfortable with this conclusion because, ultimately, it requires embracing the epistemological break between the empirical universe and our knowledge of that universe that is at the heart of postpositivist con ceptions of social life. Keohane argues, for instance, that "under different systemic conditions states will define their self-interests differently,"33 Self-interests, according to this formulation, are not inherent or

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When using the state as the starting point for its analysis, realism is unable to account for the accelerating of change present in modernity – in our virtual world, looking at discourses and their implications is a better tool. James Der Derian (“A VIRTUAL THEORY OF GLOBAL POLITICS, MIMETIC WAR, AND THE SPECTRAL STATE” journal of the theoretical humanities 4:2 1999)

In war, diplomacy, and the media, the real morphs with the virtual. Not even the state, the foundation of Real politick, is immune from virtualization. Sovereignty, the primary means by which the supreme power and legitimate violence of the state is territorially fixed, declared once, many-times dead, now seems only able to regain its vigor virtually, through media spawns which oppose ordered, identical "heres" to external, alien "out-theres" through representations which are real in time, not space. Instant scandals, catastrophic accidents, "live-feed" wars, and quick-in, quick-out interventions into still-born or moribund states provide the ephemeral. virtual seuiblartce of sovereignty. Once upon a space, war was the ultimate reality-check of international politics; now, seamlessly integrating battlefield simulations and public dissimulations through the convergence of PC and TV, war is virtualized and commoditized as pure war, infowar, netwar, cyherwar. For the intractable problems of post-Cold War politics, the technical fix has acquired a new lustre: primetime as well as C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence ) networks bring us "virtual war"; beltway think-tanks and information technology industries promote a "virtual diplomacy." And, according to a recent Time cover-story on high-finance, money verges toward the virtual: one financial expert emphatically states that "the distinction between software and money is disappearing." to which a Citibank executive responds "it's revolutionary - and we should be scared as hell." To be sure, questions of power and identity, space and borders, legitimacy and meaning will continue to be framed by the necessitous narratives of personal and public security couched in the legal imperative of sovereignty. But in the new hyper-realms of global politics produced by economic penetration, technological acceleration, and new media, these questions now entail virtual investigations. Will the sovereign state become so spectral as to disappear all together, one more unholy relic for the museum of modernity? Or will it re- emerge in global, virtual forms? Does globalization enhance the prospects of a democratic peace? Or does virtu-alit ion assure the continuation of war by other means? Has Clausewitz been repudiated - or merely brought up to speed? Is virtuality replacing the reality of war? Is it the harbinger of a new world order, or a brave new world? Most importantly, will processes of virtualization help to close or to further open the gulf between those who have the technology and those who do not? New thinking often lags behind transitions driven by new technologies, and, as Albert Einstein famously remarked about the atom bomb, the results can be catastrophic. The virtual technologies of new media warrant a commensurate critical scrutiny. New media, generally identified as digitized, interactive, networked forms of communication, now exercise a global effect if not ubiquitous presence, through instant video-feeds, satellite link-ups, TI-T3 links, overhead surveillance, global mapping, distributed computer simulations, programmed trading, and movies with Arnold Sehwarzenegger in them. Virtual media represent the most penetrating and sharpest - to the point of invisibility - edge of globalization. The power of virtuality lies in its ability to collapse distance, between here and there, near and far, fact and fiction. Moreover, the virtual effect of bringing "there" here in near real-time and with near- verisimilitude adds a strategic as well as comparative advantage to the production of violence - what one futurist at a recent military conference referred to as the "fifth dimension" of global warfare. However, like all complex systems, there is potential for catastrophe, from what organizational theorists call negitive synergy, of the sort that produced a Three Mile Island or a Chernobyl. The spatialist, materialist - that is, realist - bias of thinking in international theory renders it less than adequate for a critical inquiry into the temporal, representational, deterritorial, and potentially dangerous powers of virtual technologies. Semiotic, critical, and discourse theories offer a better perspective, having led the way in tracing the reconfiguration of power into new representational, immaterial forms. They have helped us to under-stand how acts of inscription and the production of information tan reify consciousness, float signifiers, and render concepts undecidable. However, as the realities of international politics increasingly are generated, mediated and simulated by successive technical means of reproduction, there is not so much a distancing from some original, truth-bearing source as there is an implosion, where meaning disappears into a media black hole of insignificance. As the globalization and virtualization of new media sunder meaning from conventional moorings, and set information adrift as it moves with alacrity and celerity from phenomenal to virtual forms, one searches for new modes of understanding. Attenuated by cant and deemed too popular for serious scholarship, the virtual has already become an academic taboo. All the more reason, I believe, to extend the reach of critical approaches. Derrida and Nietzsche are valuable because they provide a philosophical perspective which links public space with a responsive as well as responsible private space

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Realism destroys our ability to defuse conflict -- demands fatalism and submission – is a DA to their framework. Timothy Luke, university distinguished professor of political science at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 2003, Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed World, p. 107-08

Once the concursivity of relating internationally is recognized, it seems apparent that international relations is, at worst, commotion, or perhaps, at best, interoperationality, cooperativity, or coperformativity. In any case, it is not a random motion of conflicting and colliding bodies. Concursive constructs confound the Cartesian predicates of modern agency. That is, a reasoning self spatializes cognition and action around an “inside” and an “outside.” As Ashley asserts, this maneuver imposes the expectation that there shall be an absolute boundary between “inside” and “outside,” whereby the former term is privileged (1989, 290). Concursivity, however, implicitly implodes this spatialization with what coincides at their elisions and congruencies. The facts of inside and identity with outside and otherness are increasingly infested by the artifacts of the coincide. Cooperativity assumes that boundaries are fused, ordered, or broken as selves and others interact, often without privilege, hierarchy, or differentiation, between the internal and external. Onsidedness, offsidedness, and residedness easily mingle centers and boundaries beyond clear demarcations at the “coincidedness” of insidedness/outsidedness. How different and discontinuous is an “other” who watches the same CNN feeds, drives the same Toyota trucks, eats the same ConAgra grains, plans the same Euro-Disney vacation, fears the same ozone holes, and worries about the same bioengineered clones? Likewise, how identifiable and continuous is “a self’ whose sharp boundaries and hierarchical order of its decisionistic ego must calculate its desires in euros, yens, or US dollars; calories, BTUs, or kilojoules; M.D., J.D., or Ph.D.; beef, pork or chicken? Today’s sterile division of scholarship on foreign affairs into disparate disciplinary domains that are beholden to various analytical cliques pledging loyalty to realism, structuralism, or idealism is quite problematic. Such divisions continuously confuse many phenomena in their common modes of interpretation. Indeed, these disciplinary divisions spin around particular words —like “discourse, “ “data, “ “description,” and “globalization” or “environment,” “economy,” and “explanation”—until they become disturbing chokepoints in the free flow of professional analysis. As everyone listens to these “readymade phrases all day,” as Pierre Bourdieu worries, the precepts of realism can easily become a “doxosophy,” or “a whole philosophy and a whole worldview which engender fatalism and submission” (1984, 57). Few moves can be more disarming than the discursive reduction of the world into such preprocessed categories, because those confusions then circulate widely in political rhetorics, economic arguments, and cultural controversies. Alone, this discursive reduction turns such concepts into key strategic assets for anyone who is intent upon prevailing in these cultural struggles, and their doxic effects on politics must not be discounted.

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The Critique’s Obsession with Representations Blocks ANY Productive Change to International Relations - It Creates an Unavoidable epistemological crisis Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 67-8]]

As mentioned before, the relational perspective is a critique of both the neglect of the issue of Otherness by the IR mainstream and the way in which proponents of an essentialist approach relate to the Other. For this reason, it would be natural to assume that proponents of this second attempt to "culturalize" the study of international relations would be particularly keen to address the question of how to acknowledge cultural diversity without committing the sins of orientalism. Indeed, this is also what Said is stressing in the introduction to Orientalism: The most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or nonrepressive and non-manipulative perspective. (1995: 24) However, he then goes on to add that " these are all tasks left embarrassingly incomplete in this study" (Said, 1995: 24). Looking at other analyses based on a relational conception of culture, it becomes apparent that the latter remark is very telling for this kind of understanding of culture as a whole (e.g. Doty, 1993: 315). Despite a blank rejection of the universalism of IR mainstream and, at least in principle, a recognition of the existence of different Others who are not only projections of own fantasies and desires, in practice, proponents of this alternative approach nonetheless usually leave the question of how to address and approach the actual cultural Other unanswered . This might very well be an unintended outcome of the previously mentioned radical constructivism associated with this approach. Thus, by stressing how the representation of the Other is intimately related to the construction of identities or a subtle way of performing power, one risks being caught in a kind of epistemological and moral crisis, characterized by a nagging doubt about whether it really is possible to gain any knowledge of Others or if we are just projecting our own fantasies, and by a pronounced fear that our representations are silencing voices so that we unwittingly are taking part in a subtle performance of power (Hastrup, 1992: 54). In merely dealing with the relationship between the representcr and his representations, these dilemmas can be "avoided." However, at the same time one writes off the opportunity to relate to cultural diversity as anything but discursive products of one's own fantasies and projections. This is precisely the critique that supporters of the relational understanding of culture have been facing. From this perspective, it appears less surprising that Said has had so much more to offer on the dynamics of Western representations of the Middle East than on real alternatives to the orientalist depiction of the region. Unfortunately, this second bid for a culturalistic approach to the study of international relations is not only aligned with a number of very welcome critical qualities that may enrich the study of international relations. It is also related to a problematic tendency to overreac t when it comes to addressing the prevalent Blindness to the Self within IR mainstream and among subscribers to the essentialist conception of culture. Thus, aspirations of promoting a larger self consciousness in the study of international relation end up becoming self-centeredness, just as the attempt to promote a larger sensitivity toward the Other in reality becomes oversensitivity to saying anything substantial when it comes to actual Other. This is problematic, partly because we are left without any real idea as to how to approach actual Middle Eastern international relations rather than Western representations of these; and partly because there is the risk of losing sight of the material and very concrete consequences that specific representations may engender (Krishna, 1993). Also, the proponents of this second "culturalistic" alternative seem to be better at asking important and critical questions than at offering attractive answers.

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The Alternative Irresponsibly Wishes Way the Real Possibility of Conflict for Metaphysical Idealism Wimal Dissanayake, @ University of Hawaii, ‘6 [China Media Research 2.4, “Postcolonial Theory and Asian Communication Theory: Toward a Creative Dialogue,” http://www.chinamediaresearch.net/vol2no4/060401_Wimal_Dissanayake.pdf]

There is no doubt that the writings of Fanon, Said, Spivak, Bhabha and their followers have made a significant contribution to the shaping of the field of colonial studies. However, at the same time, their writings brought with them several problems and dilemmas that need to be addressed. Critics of postcolonial theory maintain that it is too much tied to Eurocentric ideas, most notably poststructuralism, lacks a political vision, pays inadequate attention to questions of history, is far more preoccupied with problems and debates in the metropolitan academe than the stark realities of the colonized countries, displays an elitism especially in the impenetrable prose fashioned by some of the theorists such as Bhabha and Spivak. Let us take the question of politics. Terry Eagleton (1994) says that “within postcolonial thinking we are allowed to talk about cultural differences but not —or not much—about economic exploitation” (p. 12). Ella Shohat (1992) makes the point that the term postcolonial as used in Western centers of learning serves to distance more politically relevant terms such as imperialism and geopoltics. Commentators such as Ajaz Ahmad, Arif Dirlik, E. San Juan, Benita Perry, Ngui Wa Thongo and Neil Lazarus make a strong case for postcolonial theory to draw on the conceptual resources of Marxism. For example, Aijaz Ahmad, lamenting the fact that postcolonial theorists ignore history, especially the struggle for survival of colonized peoples, makes the following observation: “within this context, speaking with virtually mindless pleasure of transnational cultural hybridity, and politics of contingency, amounts, in effect, to endorsing the cultural claims of transnational capital itself. . . . it is not at all clear how the celebration of a postcolonial, transnational, electronically produced cultural hybridity is to be squared with the systematic decay of countries and continents, and with decreasing chances for substantial proportions of the global population to obtain conditions of bare survival , let alone electronic literacy and gadgetry (San Juan, 1998, p. 123). Here, Ahmad is drawing attention to not only the shallow politics linked to postcolonial theory but also to the deficiencies in highly valorized concepts such as hybridity by postcolonial theorists. Similarly, E. San Juan points out the absence of a sense of history and the day-to-day problems experienced by colonized peoples in their struggles, for instance. If postcolonial theory is to be representative and effective, these problems should be addressed. San Juan (1998) makes the following observation: “Postcolonial theory, in brief, can be read as metaphysical idealism masking its counterrevolutionary telos by denying its own worldly interests and genealogy. It occludes its own historical determinacy by deploying psychoanalytical and linguistic conceptual frameworks that take market/exchange relations for granted” (p. 126). He goes on to make the comment that “lacking the dialectical mediation of the part to the whole that historical materialism considers imperative for theorizing the possibilities for change and the sublation of historically specific contradictions, postcolonial orthodoxy dissolves mediations and generates exactly the predicament that it claims to prevent: the antinomy of transcendentlizing idealism and mechanical determinism” (p. 128).

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The Critique Homogenizes all Descriptions as Imperial - Recentering a Static Interpretation of the World Raka Shome, Prof. in Comm. @ ASU, Radha S. Hegde, Prof. of Culture & Comm @ NYU, ‘2 [Communication Theory 12.3, “Postcolonial Approaches to Communication: Charting the Terrain, Engaging the Intersections,” p. 256-7] Our discussion of postcolonial studies, so far, has been (deliberately) Anglo/Euro centered. That is, we have focused, for the main part, on the emergence of this intellectual area in relation to the time frame of European and Anglo colonialisms. This is, of course, necessary because European/Anglo modernities continue to remain one of the dominant forms of colonial modernities and hence their legacy and responsibility must be confronted. But there is more to the story of postcolonial studies and there is more to the scope of this intellectual area. For instance, the historical relation between Japan and Korea, and Japan's economic stronghold in several parts of Asia, constitute important examples of colonial dominance produced by modernities outside of Euro/Anglo modernity. Recent scholarship within postcolonial studies has thus rightly begun insisting on the need to examine such other modernities that are not framed by the historical time of Europe. Scholars such as Tani Barlow (1997), San Juan Jr. (1999) and Timothy Mitchell (2000) have emphasized the importance of forging other lexicon through which to understand modernities that are not modeled on the European framework. For instance, Barlow (1997) argues that "if colonialism is said, in a categorical sense, to be best exemplified by the British Raj, and all other forms of colonialism are understood in reference to that historical model, then not only are all other formations derivative but conditions fundamentally unlike that originary design might indeed by inconceivable or unseeable" (p. 5). Clearly there is a danger in normalizing one historical time or one narrative of modernity as being constitutive of colonialism. Clearly there is a risk, at some level, of recentering the very narrative of European modernity that postcolonial studies aim to unsettle. In recent times, postcolonial studies has shown a growing engagement with other forms of colonial and national modernities that were forged through other histories and other geographies. Such work is desirable and necessary. This diversity that needs to occur in postcolonial studies cannot, however, eclipse the story of European modernity or deny its geopolitical and global dominance. For at the end, as Dilip Gaonkar (1999, p. 13) has suggested, no discourse or interrogation of "alternative modernities" or "other modernities" can escape acknowledging the dominance of Western modernity given that Western modernity has traveled through cultural and economic relations, practices, and institutional arrangements to the rest of the world. Thus, even to think about, and resurrect, stories of other modernities is, at some level, to think through and against Western modernities (pp. 13-14). The need for exploring other modernities, the need for embracing diverse perspectives on colonialisms that can remain sensitive to different contexts and times of colonialism, means that rigorous postcolonial scholarship must remain attentive to the context of colonialism. Taking postcolonial theories that emerged out of a study of a particular context of modernity or a particular historical time and mechanically applying them to other contexts and times can be problematic. It can be problematic because this can reproduce a dangerous acontextualism that is sometimes seen in postcolonial studies (especially, scholarship that comes out of literary studies where the "text" and "narrative" of colonialism become everything while the historical context disappears in the background). Additionally, such acontextualism can flatten the story of modernities by implicitly denying any change in its relations from one time to another, from one context to another. So, for example, the theoretical perspective that Edward Said (1978) described as "Orientalism" works well to understand colonial formations in earlier times when the WestEast, North-South, divide was still clear. But it does not work as well in contemporary times, in which the lines separating the East from the West, and the North from the South, are increasingly becoming porous under conditions of globalization. Similarly, the diasporic politics of "third space" or "border lives" produced by migratory waves of decolonization, that was cogently theorized by Homi Bhabha (1990, 1994), has more relevance to understanding postcolonial formations that emerged out of British colonialism, which saw massive territorial displacements of migrants into metropolitan centers. But the theory of "third space" does not work as well in regards to understanding the various diasporic politics of contemporary times which are not always predicated on the migrations of colonized people.

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Orienttalists Knowledge is not Neccesiarly Bad – We Must Determine the Political Outcome of the Knowledge [i.e. the plan]

Edmund Burke, Prof. @ Univ. of UCSC, ’98 [Theory and Society 27.4, “Orientalism and World History: Representing Middle Eastern Nationalism and Islamism in the Twentieth Century,” jstor] Said argues that because all knowledge is the product of its age and necessarily contingent, there can be no knowledge unaffected by the auspices under which it comes to be. If this premise is accepted, it follows that there can be no knowledge that is fully objective: thus, orientalism has no privileged claim to truth. However, Said and his supporters go further, arguing that because orientalism as a species of discourse was fatally entangled with imperialism, the knowledge it produced was inevitably distorted, if not willfully racist. While there is much truth in these observations, they are lacking in complexity. Certainly, orientalism as a discourse could not but reflect the views of the ambient culture in which it flourished. Thus some orientalists did place themselves in the service of European empires; the fortunes of the field were frequently linked to imperialism; and European assumptions of superiority to non- Europeans and of the progressive role of imperialism were widespread. On the other hand, it is important to note that some orientalists opposed imperialism or wrote favorably about Islamic culture and society; that some Middle Eastern nationalists were themselves inspired by Western orientalist writings; and that nationalist and Muslim theological positions have their own biases and assumptions. It is undeniable that as a species of Enlightenment discourse, oriental- ism has been a carrier of basic Western notions of the European self and the non-Western other that generated unfalsifiable propositions about the superiority of Europeans to non-Europeans. In this way, orientalists participated in the elaboration of modern European cul- tural identity. However, it is only as a result of the subsequent development of Western thought that it is possible to raise these criticisms. We can now see that modernity was a global process rather than a manifestation of European genius. This does not mean that orientalism's claim to scientific status is void, but that like other forms of human knowledge, it is both contingent and subject to constant critique and reformulation as a function of changing perspectives on the past. It is only through the evaluation of these issues that one can understand orientalism as a form of intellectual inquiry.' I return to this discussion in the conclusion.

They are Overly Pessimistic – Orientalism is not necessarily Colonialist – Its Still Leaves Room for Political Struggle

Edmund Burke, Prof. @ Univ. of UCSC, ’98 [Theory and Society 27.4, “Orientalism and World History: Representing Middle Eastern Nationalism and Islamism in the Twentieth Century,” jstor] Is is now time to rethink Said's central insight -that European knowledge of the Islamic other sprang from a desire to facilitate colonial domination, and by extension the post-Enlightenment state's efforts to quantify, map, and control. First, we can note that the knowledge-power relations involved were basic to the liberal project as it emerged in Europe, and not necessarily an expression of forms of colonial knowledge. Then there's the question of power. For, if Said gives us orientalism as a discourse of power, he fails to endow it with a politics . If power is located everywhere, then it is nowhere, and an ahistorical pessimism is justified. Crucially , critics of orientalism have no explanation for nationalism and the end of empire. The way out lies in reconceiving the Enlightenment project and in relocating nationalism in the complex genealogy of modernity. While the Enlightenment had a repressive Foucauldian, knowledge-power strand, it is important to recognize that it also had a progressive and revolutionary strand, and was thus the bearer of a promise of human liberation based upon the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, the abolition of slavery, and the idea of human rights.30 The interaction of these two strands of Enlightenment thought and politics did much to shape the political and social as well as cultural struggles of post- revolutionary Europe. Anti-colonial nationalism (and thus Islam- ism) is the child of this dual heritage as well.

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Turn: The Critique is a Stereotype of The Aff – We Productively use Representations to End Foreign Interference – This is Substantially More productive Than the Narssitic Criticism Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. 65-6]

The reason why the problems concerning Blindness to the Self is also relevant in this connection is not due to any lack of awareness of the representer's place in representations of Otherness. Rather, the problem is to be found in the manner in which this issue is addressed. The thorough self-consciousness associated with the relational conception of culture is thus brought about by means of a radical constructivism, which, at least in its most outspoken versions, seems to replace a possibly naïve subject/object separation by an almost solipsistic subjectivism equivalent to Wight's "subject = fi" formula in the above. This radical constructivism is quite evident among IR's "dissident thoughts" and can also be recognized in statements by Said such as: "Orientalism responded more to the culture that produced it than to its putative object, which was also produced by the West" (1995: 22). However, first does it make sense to perceive representation as part of either a construction of identities or of some kind of subtle performance of power, and, second, is it really possible to represent the Other at one's own discretion? With regard to the first question, the almost unambiguously negative and rather monolithic depiction of "Western" representations of the Middle East that can to be found among proponents of the relational conception of culture seems to some extent to be based on a rather problematic stereotyping, far from the more balanced accounts by, for instance, Rodinson (1974, 1987). By presenting the orientalist scholarship in a very stereotyped and caricatured way, Said, for instance, almost ends up doing to the orientalists what he accuses orientalist scholarship of having done to Middle Eastern societies (Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, it is anything but obvious that representations produced as part of the performance of power must necessarily be regarded as unreliable and without value as such. Halliday, among others, criticized this understanding and argued that the relationship between the origin and the validity of a discovery is more ambiguous than one might think: "the very fact of trying to subjugate a country would to some degree involve producing an accurate picture of it" (1995: 213). Regarding the second question, advocates of the relational conception of culture easily leave the impression that the way the Other is represented almost exclusively depends on the representer while the represented appears more or less as an empty and passive object onto which all kinds of conceivable fantasies and ideas can be projected. However, Bhabha, for instance, suggested that instead of regarding the representation of Otherness as a "hegemonic monologue" where the Other is a passive object on which all thinkable fantasies and conceptions can be projected-such as it sometimes seems to he the case in the works of, for example, Said and Campbell-we might rather think of it as a hybrid dialogue, though seldom equal nor without power plays (Bhabha, 1997; Keyman, 1997; Brimnes, 2000). Furthermore, the representation of Otherness has often had far more ambiguous effects than what this approach's advocates usually would acknowledge. Sadiq al-Azm, for example, coined therefore the notion of "Orientalism in reverse." Here, the classic essentialist and problematic Orient/Occident discourse allegedly used to legitimize imperialism is reversed and applied to the struggle for an end of foreign interference. In the Middle Eastern context, this is visible in Arab Nationalism, as well as among radical Islamist movements, in which the criticism of foreign (in)direct influence is often based on the argument of an allegedly unique Islamic or Arab culture (Azm, 2000). When advocates of the relational conception of culture seek to counter the prevailing lack of selfconsciousness within the universalist IR mainstream, as well as among proponents of the essentialist conception, it thus seems that they unintentionally have turned into what most of all appears as a narcissist self-centeredness. Apparently they lack enough concern for how the representation of Otherness is not only about the representer's projections, desires, fantasies, and so on. This kind of (over)reaction also seems to influence their ability to relate to Otherness in a more substantial way.

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Security Means Human Emancipation not Mere Survival - Providing Safety Create Opportunities For Flourishing Ken Booth, Prof. of IR @ Wales, ‘5 [Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p. 22] The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that some degree of insecurity, as a life determining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure, to that extent their life choices and chances are taken away ; this is because of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from domineering threats - whether these are the lack of food for one’s children or organizing to resist a foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities. Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up space in people’s lives. This allows for individual and collective human becoming - the capacity to have some choice about living differently - consistent with the same but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusions follow from this. First, security can be understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second, security is synonymous simply with survival. One can survive without being secure (the experience of refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example). Security is therefore more than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus, the plus being the possibility to explore human becoming, As an instrumental value, security is sought because it frees people(s) to some degree to do other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a level of security - and security is always relative - gives to individuals and groups some time , energy, and scope to chose to be or become, other than merely survival as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

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The Plan Imminent Critique of Current Nuclear Posture is Vital to Critical Security - The Alternative Frees Policy From Difficult Question for the Sake of Archimedian Kritik. Jeroen Gunning, Lecturer in International Politics @ Univ. of Wales, ‘7 [Government and Opposition 42.3, “A Case for Critical Terrorism Studies?” p. Blackwell-synergy] The notion of emancipation also crystallizes the need for policy engagement. For, unless a ‘critical’ field seeks to be policy relevant, which, as Cox rightly observes, means combining ‘critical’ and ‘problem-solving’ approaches, it does not fulfil its ‘emancipatory’ potential.94 One of the temptations of ‘critical’ approaches is to remain mired in critique and deconstruction without moving beyond this to reconstruction and policy relevance.Vital as such critiques are, the challenge of a critically constituted field is also to engage with policy makers – and ‘terrorists’ – and work towards the realization of new paradigms, new practices, and a transformation, however modestly, of political structures . That, after all, is the original meaning of the notion of ‘immanent critique’ that has historically underpinned the ‘critical’ project and which, in Booth's words, involves ‘the discovery of the latent potentials in situations on which to build political and social progress’, as opposed to putting forward utopian arguments that are not realizable. Or, as Booth wryly observes, ‘ this means building with one's feet firmly on the ground , not constructing castles in the air’ and asking ‘what it means for real people in real places’.96 Rather than simply critiquing the status quo, or noting the problems that come from an un-problematized acceptance of the state, a ‘critical’ approach must, in my view, also concern itself with offering concrete a lternative s. Even while historicizing the state and oppositional violence, and challenging the state's role in reproducing oppositional violence, it must wrestle with the fact that ‘the concept of the modern state and sovereignty embodies a coherent response to many of the central problems of political life’, and in particular to ‘the place of violence in political life’. Even while ‘de- essentializing and deconstructing claims about security’, it must concern itself with ‘hows ecurity is to be redefined’, and in particular on what theoretical basis.97 Whether because those critical of the status quo are wary of becoming co-opted by the structures of power (and their emphasis on instrumental rationality),98 or because policy makers have, for obvious reasons (including the failure of many ‘critical’ scholars to offer policy relevant advice), a greater affinity with ‘traditional’ scholars, the role of ‘expert adviser’ is more often than not filled by ‘traditional’ scholars.99 The result is that policy makers are insufficiently challenged to question the basis of their policies and develop new policies based on immanent critiques. A notable exception is the readiness of European Union officials to enlist the services of both ‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ scholars to advise the EU on how better to understand processes of radicalization.100 But this would have been impossible if more critically oriented scholars such as Horgan and Silke had not been ready to cooperate with the EU. Striving to be policy relevant does not mean that one has to accept the validity of the term ‘terrorism’ or stop investigating the political interests behind it. Nor does it mean that each piece of research must have policy relevance or that one has to limit one's research to what is relevant for the state, since the ‘critical turn’ implies a move beyond state-centric perspectives. End-users could, and should, thus include both state and non-state actors such as the Foreign Office and the Muslim Council of Britain and Hizb ut-Tahrir; the Northern Ireland Office and the IRA and the Ulster Unionists; the Israeli government and Hamas and Fatah (as long as the overarching principle is to reduce the political use of terror, whoever the perpetrator). It does mean, though, that a critically constituted field must work hard to bring together all the fragmented voices from beyond the ‘terrorism field’, to maximize both the field's rigour and its policy relevance. Whether a critically constituted ‘terrorism studies’ will attract the fragmented voices from outside the field depends largely on how broadly the term ‘critical’ is defined. Those who assume ‘critical’ to mean ‘Critical Theory’ or ‘poststructuralist’ may not feel comfortable identifying with it if they do not themselves subscribe to such a narrowly defined ‘critical’ approach. Rather, to maximize its inclusiveness, I would follow Williams and Krause's approach to ‘critical security studies’, which they define simply as bringing together ‘many perspectives that have been considered outside of the mainstream of the discipline’.101 This means refraining from establishing new criteria of inclusion/exclusion beyond the (normative) expectation that scholars self-reflexively question their conceptual framework, the origins of this framework, their methodologies and dichotomies; and that they historicize both the state and ‘terrorism’, and consider the security and context of all, which implies among other things an attempt at empathy and cross-cultural understanding.102 Anything more normative would limit the ability of such a field to create a genuinely interdisciplinary, non- partisan and innovative framework, and exclude valuable insights borne of a broadly ‘critical’ approach, such as those from conflict resolution studies who, despite working within a ‘traditional’ framework, offer important insights by moving beyond a narrow military understanding of security to a broader understanding of human security and placing violence in its wider social context.103 Thus, a poststructuralist has no greater claim to be part of this ‘critical’ field than a realist who looks beyond the state at the interaction between the violent group and their wider social constituency.104

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The Aff’s Immament Critique of Currenet Nuclear Doctrine is More Effective Than Their Imaginary Archimedean Position Richard Wyn Jones, Prof. of International Politics @ Aberystywyth, ’99 [Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory, p. 77]

The work of the first generation of critical theorists does not offer much specific guidance in the task of outlining what emancipation might mean in practice. but the preceding discussion of their work suggests three points that those attempting to overcome this failing should bear in mind. First, and most obviously, visions of concrete utopias must be consistent with whatever deeper notions of the grounding of emancipatory potential are deployed. Thus, for example, if the possibility of emancipation is grounded in the economic realm, then, logically, depictions of a more emancipated order cannot simply concentrate on (narrowly defined) political institutions. Second, descriptions-indeed, prescriptions-of a more emancipated order must focus on realizable utopias. Critical theorists must not lose sight of the fact that the coherence of their project is dependent on their utilization of the critical potential of immanence. If they succumb to the temptation of suggesting a blueprint for an emancipated order that is unrelated to the possibilities inherent in the present-a tendency that Marx and Engels argued was characteristic of "utopian socialists" such as Robert Owen (Marx and Engels 1948: 44-46)- then critical theorists have no way of justifying their arguments epistemologically. After all, to justify a utopia that is not already present in some fonn within the prevailing order requires the existence of an Archimedean point according to whose standards this utopia might be envisioned-a possibility rejected by critical theorists. Thus immanent critique (understood in broad terms) remains a vital part of the melatheoretical armory of critical theory. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that a vision of an emancipated order that is not based on immanent potential will be politically efficacious. Unless anchored in a realistic assessment of actually existing possibilities, emancipatory ideas are hardly likely to convince their target audience (whoever they might be) that progressive change is not only desirable but also plausible and achievable, and therefore worth the effort or risk of trying to secure. Thus, for both epistemological and purely instrumental reasons, concrete utopias must be based on practices that have some basis in preexisting behavior.

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Kritiks of State-Centered Security Sacrifice the Most Important Political Actor - Loss Options Far outweighs the danger of Legitimation Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 364]

I hesitate to say what I have to say on this subject because it seems to me to be so utterly obvious. States and state-like organizations – such as guerilla groups – are useful for many collective purposes, including making war and preparing for war. As IR specialists, we therefore need to study the state and take it seriously as a social phenomenon. However, I keep running across reminders that many don’t share this view. The best evidence is the way in which the term ‘state-centered approaches’ – a quick phrase with a subtle pe- jorative effect – is used. The debate of the 1990s has developed to the point where one understands immediately, without further reading, that the study of states is a ‘no-no’. I find this a major ingredient in a mindless fad. Consider its place in the work of the Copenhagen school. The ‘referent object’ is a key notion in the Copenhagen school’s conceptual apparatus – that ‘thing’ whose security is at stake. Buzan et al. pedagogically point out the need to break away from the traditional fixation upon the state as the referent object of security. However, as I read on in the book I get the impression that Buzan and his colleagues are not really that convinced of this themselves – they keep referring to the state nevertheless. Other Copenhagen writings confirm this impression. Indeed, studies of the state have not disap- peared even among researchers who style themselves as critical or who some- how subscribe to a ‘new security studies’ agenda. The upshot is that their views on the role of the state are inconsistent. The Copenhagen school will probably claim to have put this critique to rest. However, it is hard to read the argument in the 1997 article where the discus- sion is perhaps best presented, then absorb the text in the multi-authored 1997 book and still claim to have found consistency. On the one hand, the Copenhagen authors warn against ‘state-centrism’ and build a complicated reasoning on identity as a replacement for the state; on the other hand, they continue to reason quite conventionally about states (as, for instance, in the security-complex theory). Hence, their position on the state is at best mis- leading, at worst confused. In this, they reflect the general picture in the field of IR itself. After a long pe- riod of neglect, two very different things started happening – sometime be- tween 1975 and 1985 – with the idea of the state. What took place was a strange and deep bifurcation of research. On one side, there was what may be termed the ‘rediscovery of the state’, which began with the efforts of Charles Tilly and others but is perhaps best shown in the work of Theda Skocpol. On the other, there was the attack on state-centered thinking coming from the happy trashers of everything traditional in IR studies, the early post- modernists. Currently, the postmodernists seem – regrettably – to have won out, because there is continuing paranoia about the state in studies of international politics. To be politically correct these days, one must disavow state-centrism. At the same time, the state continues to be there, as it is in the work of people as di- verse as Buzan, Wendt, and Walt. Better than most of their work, however, is the research by Kal Holsti on the vagaries of the state and its relationship to war – a piece of mainstream work. Though hardly the first to make this ar-gument, Holsti shows convincingly that internal wars are now by far the most important kind of war. This point has been used to argue that interstate rela- tions have decreased in significance. If we compare two categories of relations, intrastate and interstate, that is of course true in relative quantitative terms. However, one must not overlook what those wars are about: the control of the state apparatus and its territory. Internal wars testify not to the disappearance of the state, but to its continuing importance. Hence, the state must continue to be a central object of our work in IR, not least in security studies. We should study the state – conceived as a penetrated state – specifically because it performs essential security functions that are rarely performed by other types of organization, such as being: • the major collective unit processing notions of threat; • the mantle that cloaks the exercise of elite power; • the organizational expression that gives shape to communal ‘identity’ and ‘culture’; • the chief agglomeration of competence to deal with issue areas crossing ju- risdictional boundaries; • the manager of territory/geographical space – including functioning as a ‘receptacle’ for income; and • the legitimizer of authorized action and possession. Recognizing the problems of state-focused approaches belongs to the beginner’s lessons in IR. There is the danger of legitimizing the state as such by placing it at the center of research, and of legitimizing thereby the repression and injustice which on a massive scale have been and still are perpetrated in its name around the globe. Some draw the conclusion on this basis that states should not be studied, a stance which is obviously unwarranted and pointless. The state is an instrument of power on

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AT- Security: State Focus

a scale beyond most other instruments of power. For this reason alone, keeping a watch on how it is used should be a top priority for social scientists. The mobilization – the assumption of the mantle – of state power by more or less arbitrarily chosen (or self-selected) individuals or groups, to act on behalf of all, is something which requires continual problematization, not least when it is done vis-à-vis other collectivities. The state is also the instrument of de- mocracy on a large scale in its most well-functioning forms. Surveying democ- racy’s state of health is a crucial responsibility for social scientists. Finally, when it comes to performing collective tasks on a large scale, the state is the most potentially effective organizing instrument across an almost limitless range of objectives. Security is among them. In short, the state is too central to the large-scale business of human life to be ignored or put aside, whether for ideological or idealistic reasons. Still, we need to recognize the historical dimension in this. It is not necessarily the state’s present form which makes it an important object of study; rather, it is its primary function of being the largest universal-purpose collective-action unit around. Such units require study in all civilizations and at all times in human history, regardless of their name or specific functions. The Westpha- lian preoccupation of IR is therefore somewhat overdrawn. There is no need to apologize for focusing on states or state-like units.

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Sovereignty Provides the Most Realistic Hope for Reconciling Competing Human Wills - The Alternative Results in Either International Exploitation or Renewed Ellitism

Jean Bethke Elshtain, Prof. of Social and Political Ethics @ U-Chicago, ‘5 [Ethics & International Affairs, “Against New Utopianism: Response to “Against the New Internationalism,” p. 94-5] Burke's prescriptive argument is not only improbable but also impossible as a course for a world of human beings organized presently within hundreds of entities called states. His indictment of the state is relentless. Indeed, reading Burke you would never know that states have carried human aspirations and hopes; that much of the dignity and purpose of human beings derives from their location in particular communities with particular histories and traditions and stories and languages. States, at their best, help to protect and to nourish certain goods . As the late, great Hannah Arendt put it, "No one can be a citizen of the world as he [and she] is a citizen of a particular country. " Burke wants "collective decision-making," a world beyond states. When one thinks of the challenges of representation and transparency in contemporary states—none of which is any longer monocultural—the notion that anything that would meaningfully count as representation could pertain in a world body defies common sense. One would likely wind up with a small group of elites, claiming to be something like a Hegelian class of disinterested persons, dictating policy . How could it be anything else in the absence of any concrete account by Burke of the principles of authority and legitimacy that are to characterize his proposed global order? Or without any compelling account of how politics is to be organized? What would be the principle of political organization? What, indeed, would be the purview of citizenship—conspicuous by its absence in his account? Burke criticizes my ethic as being allegedly based on a "narrow dialogue between government elites," ignoring thereby the "profound problem of accountability to citizens inherent in all security policy-making." I cotild not agree more that accountability is a "profound problem" and that to deal with it requires certain sorts of domestic institutional arrangements. And of course in endorsing democracy I thereby endorse citizen participation. The term "domestic" already signals a distinction between a particular set of arrangements culminating in states and arrangements beyond that level. It is states that can be pressured to take responsibility for aberrant behavior—for example, the U.S. mihtary courts-martial of the out-ofcontrol rogues who enacted their own sordid pornographic fantasies with prisoners in Abu Ghraib. One doesn't court-martial people for carrying out faithfully an official policy. There is most certainly fault to be found here—whether in ambiguous statements about what is permitted or in insufficient training of those guarding prisoners, admittedly in a difficult situation over which the U.S. military was just beginning to take control. We rightly judge a military by whether it indicts and punishes perpetrators of wrong: Why is nothing said about this by Burke? Surely Burke owes us an account of a coherent set of institutional arrangements to carry out such a role in a world characterized by ethnic revisionists, murderous jihadists, one party dictatorships , child soldiering, rape campaigns, human trafficking, genocides, corruption, exploitation, and all the rest. It is through states and through the national contingents of international bodies—whether of churches or the Red Cross or human rights groups or guilds of various professional organizations— that persons can try to act and to organize. Once they do, such entities based in one state connect up to other such entities to form international networks that can put pressure simultaneously on particular states and on relevant international or transnational bodies. T o assume a world beyond this sort of politics is to assume what never was and never will be—namely, that there will no longer be a need to "reconcile competing human wills." Defending, as Burke claims to be doing, a "liberal ethic of war and peace" (p. 82) means, surely, to think of rules and laws and responsibility and accountability. Liberalism is premised on a world of states and, depending on whether one is a Kantian or some other sort of liberal, a world in which the principle of state sovereignty can be overridden under some circumstances.

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Desecuritization Cedes Security to the right - Political engagement is Necessary Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” p. 366]

A final danger in focusing on the state is that of building the illusion that states have impenetrable walls, that they have an inside and an outside, and that nothing ever passes through. Wolfers’s billiard balls have contributed to this misconception. But the state concepts we should use are in no need of such an illusion. Whoever criticizes the field for such sins in the past needs to go back to the literature. Of course, we must continue to be open to a frank and unbiased assessment of the transnational politics which significantly influence almost every issue on the domestic political agenda. The first decade of my own research was spent studying these phenomena – and I disavow none of my conclusions about the state’s limitations. Yet I am not ashamed to talk of a domestic political agenda. Anyone with a little knowledge of Euro- pean politics knows that Danish politics is not Swedish politics is not German politics is not British politics. Nor would I hesitate for a moment to talk of the role of the state in transnational politics, where it is an important actor, though only one among many other competing ones. In the world of transnational relations, the exploitation of states by interest groups – by their assumption of roles as representatives of states or by convincing state representatives to argue their case and defend their narrow interests – is a significant class of phenomena, today as much as yesterday. Towards a Renewal of the Empirical Foundation for Security Studies Fundamentally, the sum of the foregoing list of sins blamed on the Copen- hagen school amounts to a lack of attention paid to just that ‘reality’ of security which Ole Wæver consciously chose to leave aside a decade ago in order to pursue the politics of securitization instead. I cannot claim that he is void of interest in the empirical aspects of security because much of the 1997 book is devoted to empirical concerns. However, the attention to agenda-setting – confirmed in his most recent work – draws attention away from the important issues we need to work on more closely if we want to contribute to a better understanding of European security as it is currently developing . That inevitably requires a more consistent interest in security policy in the making – not just in the development of alternative security policies. The dan- ger here is that, as alternative policies are likely to fail grandly on the political arena, crucial decisions may be made in the ‘ traditional’ sector of security p olicymaking , unheeded by any but the most uncritical minds.

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Our Scenario Evaluations are Crucial For Ethically Responsible Politics - Purely Theoretical Kritik is Insufficient - We Need “As If” Stories to Offset the Worst International Violence Michael Williams, Professor of International Politics at the University of Wales—Aberystwyth, ‘5 [The Realist Tradition and the Limits of International Relations, p. 165-7]

Moreover, the links between skeptical realism and prevalent postmodern themes go more deeply than this, particularly as they apply to attempts by post-structural thinking to reopen questions of responsibility and ethics.8° In part, the goals of post-structural approaches can be usefully characterized, to borrow Stephen White's illuminating contrast, as expressions of 'responsibility to otherness' which question and challenge modernist equations of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'. A responsibility to otherness seeks to reveal and open the constitutive processes and claims of subjects and subjectivities that a foundational modernism has effaced in its narrow identification of responsibility with a 'responsibility to act'.81 Deconstruction can from this perspective be seen as a principled stance unwilling to succumb to modernist essentialism which in the name of responsibility assumes and reifies subjects and structures, obscures forms of power and violence which are constitutive of them, and at the same time forecloses a consideration of alternative possibilities and practices. Yet it is my claim that the wilful Realist tradition does not lack an understanding of the contingency of practice or a vision of responsibility to otherness. On the contrary, its strategy of objectification is precisely an attempt to bring together a responsibility to otherness and a responsibility to act within a willfully liberal vision. The construction of a realm of objectivity and calculations is not just a consequence of a need to act - the framing of an epistemic context for successful calculation. It is a form of responsibility to otherness, an attempt to allow for diversity and irreconcilability precisely by - at least initially - reducing the self and the other to a structure of material calculation in order to allow a structure of mutual intelligibility, mediation, and stability. It is, in short, a strategy of limitation: a willful attempt to construct a subject and a social world limited - both epistemically and politically - in the name of a politics of toleration: a liberal strategy that John Gray has recently characterized as one of mondus vivendi. If this is the case, then the deconstructive move that gains some of its weight by contrasting itself to a non- or apolitical objectivism must engage with the more complex contrast to skeptical Realist tradition that is itself a constructed, ethical practice. The issue becomes even more acute if one considers Iver Neumann’s incisive questions concerning postmodern construction of identity, action and responsibility. As Neumann points out, the insight that identities are inescapably contingent and relationally constructed, and even the claim that identities are indebted to otherness , do not in themselves provide a foundation for practice, particularly in situations where identities are ‘sediment’ and conflictually defined. In these cases, deconstruction alone will not suffice unless it can demonstrate a capacity to counter in practice (and not just philosophical practice) the essential dynamics it confronts. Here, a responsibility to act must go beyond deconstruction to consider viable alternatives and counter-practices. To take this critique seriously is not necessarily to be subject yet again to the straightforward ‘blackmail of the Enlightenment and a narrow ‘modernist’ vision of responsibility. While an unwillingness to move beyond a deconstructive ethic of responsibility to otherness for fear that an essential stance is the only (or most likely) alternative expresses legitimate concern, it should not license a retreat from such questions or their practical demands. Rather, such situations demand also an evaluation of the structures (of identity and institutions) that might viably be mobilised in order to offset the worst implications of violently exclusionary identities . It requires, as Neumann nicely puts it, the generation of compelling 'as if' stories around which counter-subjectivities and political practices can coalesce. Willful Realism, 1 submit, arises out of an appreciation of these issues, and comprises an attempt to craft precisely such 'stories' within a broader intellectual and sociological analysis of their conditions of production, possibilities of success, and likely consequences. The question is, to what extent are these limits capable of success, and to what extent might they he limits upon their own aspirations toward responsibility? These are crucial questions, but they will not be addressed by retreating yet again into further reversals of the same old dichotomies.

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The Aff is Necessary for Practical Reduction in Violence - Acting “As If” Policy Makers Threat Perceptions Are Correct Prevents Violence Without Naturalizing Security Vincent Pouliot, PhD Candidate in Political Science @ Univ. of Toronto, ‘8 [in Metaphors of Globalization, “Everything Takes Place as if Threats were going Global,” http://individual.utoronto.ca/nishashah/Drafts/Pouliot.pdf]

In his brilliant exposition of the normative dilemma of writing security, Huysmans (2002) concludes that there simply is no way out of it: social scientists, especially constructivists, must learn to live with the fact that their academic discourse necessarily securitizes certain issues and thus cannot but reinforce specific security practices to the detriment of others. Such a blunt admission certainly deserves credit for making the politics of academic life more transparent. Yet it may be overly pessimistic. The second part of the paper looks at two epistemological alternatives to positivism in the hope that they may offer a way out of the Huysmans’ dilemma. A subjectivist perspective, centered on what it is that international agents believe to be real, succeeds in escaping the dilemma; yet it remains embroiled in common sense and lacks the objectification that intertextualization and historicization allow. By contrast, an epistemology that can be labeled metaphorical objectivism entices social scientists to study social realities not in themselves, but metaphorically. This solution is certainly not perfect, and one should still bear in mind Huysmans’ warning. And yet, arguing that everything takes place as if threats were going global opens the possibility for a scientific study of the globalization/nexus without reifying new, global threats. Of course, social science remains fundamentally political—like any knowledge for that matter. But it is not only political. A) Subjectivism: Practitioners Believe That Threats Are Going Global A first epistemological alternative for the notion that threats are going global is subjectivism. In this scheme of things, the globalization of threats is not necessarily “real” or taking place “out there.” Instead, it is agents (e.g., international elites, security practitioners) who believe that threats are being globalized. Under such an epistemology, sociologists of globalization such as Beck (2000) conceive of globality as a form of consciousness which regards the earth as “one single place.” Globalization is a social construct which varies across time and space; it impacts people’s lives on the basis of the meanings that they hold about it. To use a much-rehearsed formula, globalization is what people make of it. While trying to define globalization, thus, what matters is how actors, as opposed to analysts, define the social space in which they act. In this connection, Robertson (1992: 8) contends that a crucial dimension of globalization is “the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole.” It is the subjective meanings attached by actors to world politics that matter, not a so-called objective reality. Polling data such as the World Values Survey provides interesting insights to that extent, for it focuses on how people from all over the world construe changes in their lives as well as in the meanings of globality (e.g., Diez-Nicolas, 2002). More interpretive and historical research is also of great scientific value: Robertson and Inglis (2004), for instance, look at historical documents to observe that a “global animus” was already present in the ancient Mediterranean world. This subjectivist take on the globalization of threat is in line with what I have called the “observation of essentialization” (Pouliot, 2004), that is, the interpretation of what agents interpret to be real. Instead of reifying the world as in positivism, this approach builds on the reifications already committed by social agents. In so doing, already essentialized realities provide scientists with “ epistemic foundations ” (Adler, 2005) on which to ground their analyses. In this postfoundationalist science (Pouliot, 2004), analysts remain ontologically agnostic as to what is real and what is not. As Guzzini (2000: 160) astutely explains: “constructivism claims either to be agnostic about the language independent real world out there, or simply uninterested—it often is irrelevant for the study of society .” Such a principled refusal to either assume reality a priori or deny it altogether avoids turning what the scientist believes to be real (based on her everyday knowledge or on scientific knowledge) into an unquestionable, scientific Reality. Of course, no one walks through closed doors. It is impossible to perfectly break with one’s taken for granted reality so there cannot be such a thing as pure agnosticism. Instead, the scientist finds herself in the aspiring position of temporarily de- reifying, for the purpose of doing science, the reality she needs to take for granted in her everyday life.8 Since agnosticism precludes ontological foundations on which to ascertain constructivist knowledge, the best way forward

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consists of building on the social facts9 that are reified by social agents in their everyday life. In this postfoundationalist view, social facts become a kind of “essence” on which to build knowledge (Pouliot, 2004). In the end, to know whether social reality is “really real” makes no analytical difference from a postfoundationalist perspective: the whole point is to observe whether agents take it to be real, and to draw the social and political implications that result . Interestingly, this turn to phenomenology (c.f. Schutz, 1967 [1932]) runs counter to dominant strands of IR theory, including constructivism. Indeed, over the last fifteen years constructivists have been almost exclusively c oncerned with “epistemically objective”10 realities such as norms, epistemes, institutions or collective identities. Such a focus is all good so long as it is supplemented with an equivalent consideration for agent-level ideations. After all, only practices and the subjective reasons that inform them can make the social construction of epistemically objective realities possible. There is a clear analytical gain in reaching at the level of “subjectivized intersubjectivity,” so to speak. A crucial reason why constructivist science needs to recover subjective knowledge is to avoid what Bourdieu calls the “scholastic fallacy ,” which consists of “the illusion of the absence of illusion, of the pure viewpoint, absolute, disinterested” (Bourdieu, 2001b: 183). Such a god-like posture carries huge epistemological implications , if only because social practices have a logic which is not that of scientific logic (Bourdieu, 2001a [1972]: 335). Indeed, the intellectualist bias “ entices us to construe the world as a spectacle, as a set of significations to be interpreted rather than as concrete problems to be solved practically” (Wacquant, 1992: 39). Take, for instance, the issue of time. For the scientist, time is almost eternal: the same Peloponnesian War can be restudied thousands of times over millennia by hundreds of scholars. But for the agents involved, be they Pericles or Spartan soldiers, time is the key to the war. Their understanding of the unfolding of the situation in time is what characterizes the practical urgency they face. By contrast, for the scientist being out of the flow of time is what allows her to comprehend the war. The theoretical relation to the world is fundamentally different from the practical one—if only in the distance from which action is played out (Bourdieu, 1990 [1980]: 14). The scientist is not engaged in actual action or invested in the social game like the agents that she observes are (c.f. Bourdieu, 2003 [1997]: 81-82). And Bourdieu (1990 [1980]: 81) to conclude: “Science has a time which is not that of practice.” It is fitting that the concept of globalization perfectly illustrates the dangers of the scholastic fallacy. As Scholte (2004: 103) concludes from his academic dialogue with observers from all over the world: “definitions of globalization depend very much on where the definer stands.” In such a context, the important thing researchers need to know is how different people across space and time interpret the meanings of globalization. It would be nonsense to “scientifically” define globalization and argue that it is happening just the same throughout the world. Imposing a universalistic (scientific) conceptualization would destroy the richness and diversity of meanings about globality across the globe. Globalization has no ontological essence that scientists could define in theoretical abstraction. As a social construct globalization is subjectivized intersubjectivity. Importantly, the point here is not only to fight against scientific ethnocentrism, that is, to relativize the meanings of globalization in terms of geo-cultural epistemologies. More largely, globalization scholars need to recognize that analyses of social and political action which do not recover the reasons why people act in certain ways (based on their subjective meanings) are fundamentally flawed: the theoretical relation to the world profoundly differs from the practical one .

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Strategic Planning and Predictions do not Naturalize War - Quasi Predictions are Practically and Humbly Used to Reduce Vioence Vincent Pouliot, PhD Candidate in Political Science @ Univ. of Toronto, ‘7 [International Studies Quarterly, “"Sobjectivism": Toward a Constructivist Methodology,” p. wiley]

Another traditional way to assess validity is generalizability: can the findings travel from one case to another? From a constructivist perspective, the time is ripe to abandon the old dream of discovering nomothetic laws in social sciences: human beings are reflexive and intentional creatures who do not simply obey to external laws. Nonetheless, there exist certain patterns and regularities in social life which constructivists are keen to analyze. As Price and Reus-Smit (1998:275) correctly point out, "rejecting the pursuit of law-like generalizations does not entail a simultaneous rejection of more contingent generalizations." Such contingent generalizations usually derive from the abstracting power of concepts: by simplifying reality through idealization, concepts such as constitutive mechanisms, for example, allow for analogies across cases. Weber (2004 [1904]) used to call this "idealtypes"—theoretical constructs that depart from social realities in order to gain explanatory spin across cases. Conceptual analogies are by definition underspecified as they cannot fully put up with contingency. Consequently, the crucial point while drawing contingent generalizations is to be explicit about their boundaries of applicability (Hopf 2002:30). Inside these boundaries, sobjectivism may even yield to some small-scale, quasi-predictions through one of two paths. On the one hand, "forward reasoning" and the development of plausible scenarios helps narrow down the set of future possibilities (Bernstein et al. 2000). On the other hand, by focusing on explaining change inside of a delimited social situation, one needs not predict every single development but only those that are likely to deviate from an observed pattern (cf. Welch 2005:28).Contrary to positivism, from a constructivist point of view there cannot be such a thing as the valid interpretation or theory. As there is no transcendental way to adjudicate among competing interpretations, validity never is a black-or-white matter; it is all shades of gray. Inside a style of reasoning, validation is a deliberative activity whereby judgments evolve in combination with their own criteria. In order to convey the historicity of scientific reason, the best criterion to assess the relative validity of an interpretation is its incisiveness, that is, its capacity to "see further" than previous interpretations. As Geertz (1973:25) explains: "A study is an advance if it is more incisive— whatever that may mean—than those that preceded it; but it less stands on their shoulders than, challenged and challenging, runs by their side." Obvious from this quote is that incisiveness is not a primordial and universal criterion; it is both space- and time-dependent. Indeed, the degree of incisiveness of an interpretation hinges not only on its substance but also on its audience. In this regard, this article argues that it is the appropriate combination of experience- near and experience-distant concepts that generates interpretations that not only " make sense" to people, scientists and laymen alike, but also " add sense " to already held interpretations. It is this supplementary meaning, due to the objectification of subjective meanings, which leads to an increased degree of incisiveness. A constructivist interpretation is all the more incisive (and thus valid) that it strikes a fine balance between subjective and objectified knowledge.Overall, the constructivist style of reasoning and sobjectivism in particular are animated by a quite similar logic of discovery as the one that drives positivistic methodologies. In Lakatos' (1970) famous argument, progressive research programs are those that lead to the discovery of "novel facts." Like a good positivist, Lakatos probably had in mind hard facts that lead to universal Truth. Constructivists adopt a more down-to-earth, low-key attitude with regards to scientific discovery. What a refined level of incisiveness and the methodical practice of sobjectivism help discover is, quite simply, a combination of subjective and objectified knowledge that makes more sense of international politics than previous interpretations. That incisiveness, however, is situated intersubjectively speaking. Social science is not as universal as eulogists of the Enlightenment would like it to be, but it is no less worth pursuing to better understand the pressing matters of world politics.

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Critique Alone is not adequate to alter the current security environment – Political Action is Necessary to Promote Emancipation Over Security Pinar Bilgin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent Univ, ‘5 [Regional Security in The Middle East, p. 60-1] Admittedly, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first step. In other words, from a critical security perspective, self-reflection, thinking and writing are not enough in themselves. They should be compounded by other forms of practice (that is, action taken on the ground). It is indeed crucial for students of critical approaches to re-think security in both theory and practice by pointing to possibilities for change immanent in world politics and suggesting emancipatory practices if it is going to fulfil the promise of becoming a 'force of change' in world politics. Cognisant of the need to find and suggest alternative practices to meet a broadened security agenda without adopting militarised or zero-sum thinking and practices, students of critical approaches to security have suggested the imagining, creation and nurturing of security communities as emancipatory practices (Booth 1994a; Booth and Vale 1997). Although Devetak's approach to the theory/practice relationship echoes critical approaches' conception of theory as a form of practice, the latter seeks to go further in shaping global practices. The distinction Booth makes between 'thinking about thinking' and 'thinking about doing' grasps the difference between the two. Booth (1997: 114) writes: Thinking about thinking is important, but, more urgently, so is thinking about doing .... Abstract ideas about emancipation will not suffice: it is important for Critical Security Studies to engage with the real by suggesting policies, agents, and sites of change, to help humankind, in whole and in part, to move away from its structural wrongs. In this sense, providing a critique of existing approaches to security, revealing those hidden assumptions and normative projects embedded in Cold War Security Studies, is only a first (albeit crucial) step. It is vital for the students of critical approaches to re- think security in both theory and practice.

Last printed 9/4/2009 07:00:00 PM 112 Security K DDW 10 Rahcel, Ula, Courtney, Noah, Nerali, Samantha, Drew, Ian 113 Perm

Permutation Wards off Criticism – Their “Seeminlgy Liberal” Policy Ensures Continued Eneminity and Power Politics. Anthony Burke, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, ‘7 [Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4]

These frameworks are interrogated at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and implementation in specific policy contexts and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of powerful political concepts cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they all have histories, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critique s - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts , forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security, the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises of national and cultural identity. As a result, political and intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically wards off critique.

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