Origin: Embassy Ankara

id: 187406 date: 1/15/2009 17:19 refid: 09ANKARA78 origin: Embassy Ankara classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 08ANKARA2075|08ATHENS966|09ATHENS18|09ATHENS19 header: VZCZCXYZ0002 OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0078/01 0151719 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 151719Z JAN 09 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8481 INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

------header ends ------

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000078

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/12/2019 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, NATO, GR, TU SUBJECT: KEEPING CALM IN THE AEGEAN

REF: A. 08 ATHENS 966 B. 08 ANKARA 2075 C. 08 ATHENS DAO 161642Z DEC 08 IIR 6-837-0184-09 D. ATHENS 18 E. ATHENS 19

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: The list of potential flashpoints between Turkey and Greece is long, and both sides have tried to drag the U.S. or NATO into these disputes, particularly on the status of demilitarization of islands in the eastern Aegean. To help ensure Greece -Turkey relations do not go off track, it is imperative that NATO stay out of Greece-Turkey bilateral disputes, and as in the past, apply vigorously the Luns Doctrine. This should include avoiding NATO participation in national exercises involving islands whose militarization status is in dispute. NATO's participation in Noble Archer by the overflight of Agios Efstratios, an island which Turkey argues is demilitarized, has increased Turkey-Greece tensions. A repeat of Noble Archer or a similar exercise scenario will exacerbate already elevated tension between Turkey and Greece, potentially to a dangerous level. We are cautioning Turkey against taking provocative steps in the Aegean that challenge the sovereignty of Greek islets in the Dodecanese.

2. (C) We disagree with two key Greek arguments in this regard:

-- That Turkey could apply "demilitarization" to a never-ending list of Aegean islands (See Para 8 "1914"), and

-- that a "dispute" that triggers NATO's Luns Doctrine requires ICJ involvement (particularly since a bilateral mechanism exists - see para 7).

Turkish retaliation for Noble Archer by overflight of two populated Dodecanese islets implicitly questions Greek sovereignty, and we have raised this problem with the Turks (para 9 and septel). END SUMMARY

State of Affairs in the Aegean Post "Noble Archer" ------

3. (C) Rapprochement between Turkey and Greece has been one of the policy successes of the last decade, and we have a keen interest in strengthening it. The list of potential Turkey-Greece flashpoints (and on-going disputes) is long -- including minorities in both countries, Balkan issues, and Cyprus -- the one area of direct potential conflict is the Aegean. Both sides have tried to drag us or NATO into their disputes over militarization of the islands. In the past few months we have seen an up-tick in tensions, including NATO inclusion of Agios Efstratios in a recent exercise, allegations of Turkish overflights in "retaliation," Russian exercises in the Aegean which apparently included FIR notification to Athens (a redline for Turkey), and recent Greek allegations of an increase in Turkish provocations in the Aegean (refs C and D).

4. (C) Our goal should be, first, to keep both sides from provoking the other. This may require specifically taking both sides to task when they do things that are politically foolish or legally or historically questionable. But, in addition, we need to ensure that neither we nor NATO (identified closely here with the U.S.) become involved in these bilateral disputes. Thus, our admonition that NATO and the U.S. need to apply vigorously the Luns Doctrine.

5. (C) We were not happy that NATO took its decision to participate in Noble Archer, although we did our best to dampen the initial Turkish response. The subsequent Greek media (Ref B) emphasis on the GoG's successful diplomacy and the lack of an immediate Turkish reaction, and the possible Turkish reaction to this reaction, however, illustrate how Aegean issues can spiral down even when both sides say they want to maintain calm.

6. (C) MFA Under Secretary Apakan made starkly clear to Ambassador on January 8 that Turkey views with real alarm NATO's moving forward with the Noble Archer exercise, violating a long tradition of neutrality in these disputes. A formal letter from the Turkish military representative to the NATO Military Committee Chairman in November should have indicated to NATO that this was a disputed issue. This would have a deleterious effect on the overall rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, he went on, and thus he just could not understand NATO's action. 7. (C) COMMENT: We do not believe the standard applied to the definition of a "dispute" between Turkey and Greece that triggers the Luns Doctrine should be as formal as submission to the ICJ. This has not been the standard in Greece-Turkey disputes for the last 20 years, and, as U/S Apakan made clear to Ambassador, the two countries have a bilateral mechanism to address such disputes formally recognized by the EU. When there is an openly stated dispute, NATO thus must apply the Luns Doctrine to avoid exacerbating tensions. The following paragraphs provide the legal and political underpinning of our conclusions. END COMMENT

Aegean Islands Demilitarization Background ------

8. (SBU) A look at the basic issues between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean, especially demilitarized islands, may help in reviewing actions and options. The demilitarization provisions of various agreements are open to interpretation, but to the best of our knowledge, the following are the facts:

1914: Six Party Decision: The "Great Powers" at the time, following agreements between Greece and Turkey after the 1913 Balkan War, awarded the "islands occupied by Greece" without naming them to Greece, on the understanding that they would be demilitarized, specifically, "shall not be fortified or used for any naval or military purposes." These islands include six subsequently named in the Lausanne Treaty and the Straits Agreement (see below), two that went back to Turkey (Imbros and Tenedos), and three more, including Agios Efstratios, the subject of last month's tension, as well as Thassos and Psara.

1923: Endorsement of Six Party Decision in Lausanne: Article 12 of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, regulating the peace between Turkey and the Allied parties, including Greece, endorsed specifically the Six Party Decision. There is nothing in this language, or in the subsequent actions since then to confirm a frequent Greek assertion that Article 12 only confirms Greek sovereignty over the islands, not the condition of demilitarization.

1923: Lausanne Demilitarization Provisions: Article 13 of the Treaty specifically demilitarized four of the larger "Decision" islands -- Mytilene, Chios, Samos, and Ikaria -- allowing only limited local military and police forces, and no fortification or naval base.

1923: Lausanne Straits Agreement: This agreement, appended to the Lausanne Treaty, demilitarized both the straits and a number of islands close to the mouth of the Bosporus, including the Turkish islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and the Greek islands of Limnos and Samothrace. This demilitarization was more radical than that in the Lausanne Treaty or the Decision, specifically prohibiting any military forces whatsoever, and establishing specific small arms limits on police and gendarmerie.

1936: The Montreux Straits Agreement of 1936 replaced the Lausanne Straits Agreement. In the Protocol, the Agreement declared that Turkey had the right to militarize the straits, to include Imbros and Tenedos. Nowhere does the Agreement address the Greek islands. Supporters of the Greek view point out that, as the Preface to the Agreement notes that as this agreement replaces the Lausanne Straits Agreement, the demilitarization of the two Greek islands in Lausanne was thereby lifted. Here, they cite a statement by the then-Turkish foreign minister in the Turkish parliament supporting the Greek right to militarize the islands. The Turks, while understandably embarrassed by that statement, point out that if the various states parties had meant to lift the demilitarization of the Greek islands, they would have said so, as they did with the demilitarization provisions of Lausanne in reference to the Turkish islands (i.e. in the Protocol). Turks further argue that general statements in a preface carry less weight, that the 1914 original disarmament decision in any case still remains in effect, and that the logic of international agreements from 1914 through 1947 is to demilitarize Greeks islands close to Turkey (see below).

1947: The Paris Treaty, between the Allied powers including Greece (but not Turkey) and Italy, granted sovereignty of the Dodecanese islands (seized from the Ottoman Empire by Italy in 1912) to Greece, but on condition that they be demilitarized.

9. (C) One problem which the Turks appear to be exploiting with overflights is the status of small inhabited islets in the Dodecanese. These islets, including Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, were named neither in the 1914 agreements nor in Lausanne, which turned the Dodecanese over to Italy from the Ottoman Empire, nor in the Treaty of Paris of 1947. Lausanne listed the major Dodecanese islands and then added "the dependent islets." The Paris Treaty continued things by referring to "adjacent islets." Given that the islands are inhabited, their status and Greek sovereignty over them seems quite clear, and implicit Turkish raising of their sovereignty a highly questionable response.

The Political/Strategic Dimension ------

10. (SBU) Turks make three linked arguments on demilitarization. First, the geography of the Aegean is such that the string of Greek islands right off the coast of Turkey's largest ports, Istanbul and Izmir, and the entrance to the Bosporus, creates an unusual situation affecting Turkish security and world trade between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Second, in recognition of this fact, on each occasion (1914, 1923, 1936, 1947) that the international community addressed these islands by mention or omission (1936), it supported their demilitarization. Third, Turkey sees this issue through the focus of other Greek actions which, in Turkish eyes, have the cumulative effect of creating out of the Aegean a "Greek lake" and calling into question Turkey's rights of navigation, military operations, and exploitation of the seabed in "international waters and airspace" of the Aegean.

11. (SBU) These Greek actions include:

-- demanding that military operations within the Athens FIR request permission, although the ICAO states specifically that the FIR is for civilian aircraft;

-- the declaration of a 10-mile airspace around Greek territory including islands, when common international practice is to have national air and sea space contiguous (i.e., in the Aegean, six miles); -- the claim to the right to declare a 12-mile national waters;

-- a vague claim that various agreements in the 1930,s and in the Paris Treaty divided the Aegean between Greece and Turkey; and (from the Turkish point of view)

-- exaggerated claims of continental shelf arising from the Law of the Sea Treaty.

12. (SBU) Each of the Turkish assertions can be and has been challenged. The Turks (and Greeks) are on more solid ground on some than on others. But the key point is that these are true international disputes.

Why Aegean Demilitarization Dispute Matters to Turkey ------

13. (C) Turks today do not fear a stranglehold on the Turkish coast, sea trade, and key cities by Greek bases, nor do they fear an invasion like the British landing at Canakkale from Limnos in 1915. Nevertheless, the disputes remain important from several standpoints:

-- They represent an issue of "borders," albeit mainly sea, continental shelf, and airspace. Borders are of fundamental importance to the Turkish state's sense of self, from defending them in the 1920s against the Greeks, Italians, French, Russians, and English, to post-independence border issues, beginning with the Mosul Vilayet surrender decision, the 50-year dispute with Syria over Hatay province, and the (still latent) border "dispute" with Armenia. Turks fear that Greek assertions of rights not justified in international agreements could encourage others to advance their own claims.

-- The Continental Shelf dispute, particularly active in the 1980s, represents to the extent oil or gas is ever discovered there, a pragmatic reason for Turkey,s asserting its rights in the Aegean.

-- Finally, as we saw in U.S.-brokered discussions on the Aegean in the late 1990s, Turkey's yielding eventually on the island demilitarization question - on the assumption that this is the most sensitive for Greece and its sovereign interests - is about the only Aegean "quid" Turkey could easily deploy in return for the Greek "quo" of yielding on its various other claims noted above. If the international community starts taking the "Greek side" on these demilitarization issues (e.g. Noble Archer), the Turkish quid soon becomes worthless.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey

======CABLE ENDS==

id: 205948 date: 5/7/2009 12:58 refid: 09ANKARA666 origin: Embassy Ankara classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0012 OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #0666/01 1271258 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 071258Z MAY 09 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9606 INFO RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 0019 RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000666

SIPDIS

USEUCOM FOR POLAD AMB CANAVAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/05/2019 TAGS: PARM, PREL, MARR, TU SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES AEGEAN ISSUES WITH DCHOD AND MFA UNDERSECRETARY, TURKEY PRESSES FOR AEGEAN "CODE OF CONDUCT"

Classified By: Amb James F. Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b, d)

Demarches Registered ------

1. (C) The Ambassador raised Aegean issues during a May 5 meeting with General Hasan Igsiz, Deputy Chief of Turkey's General Staff. He pointed to the successful conduct of Exercise Egemen, an international exercise held in the Aegean in March 2009 which could serve as a strong first step toward safe operations in the Aegean. Turkey and Greece were able to avoid confrontation by sharing information and, to the extent possible, addressing each other's concerns. The Ambassador expressed hope that this could serve as a model for future exercises. Igsiz agreed that Egemen was a success, but said that much of this success was due to the engagement of Turkey's partners in the exercise, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK and the US.

2. (C) The Ambassador said that many of Turkey's arguments regarding the status of airspace and territorial waters in the Aegean had merit. But questioning the sovereignty of the two inhabited islands of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi did not serve Turkey well. Overflights by Turkish military aircraft of these two islands worked against Turkey's purposes, the Ambassador argued, giving support to Greek arguments that all of Turkey's objections to Greece's claims in the Aegean should be dismissed. The Ambassador repeatedly pressed Igsiz to stop these overflights and to continue to engage with Greece on issues in the Aegean. Igsiz took the points on board, but neither confirmed that such overflights had been taking place nor agreed to put a stop to such flights.

3. (C) Ambassador raised the same issue with MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan on May 7. Apakan appeared a bit embarrassed by our raising the two islands' overflights and said he was looking into that specific allegation. He generally complained about Greece's failure to consult with Turkey using agreed mechanisms and also expressed anger at a Greek court's finding the Turkish pilot guilty in a trial in abesntia for the 2006 collision of Turkish and Greek aircraft resulting in the death of a Greek pilot. The Turks are absolutely sure -- and may well be correct -- that radar tracks and other indicators show that the Greek aircraft struck the Turkish F-16 from behind. The trial thus was nothing more than a kangaroo court.

Call For Aegean Code of Conduct ------

4. (C) We spoke on May 4 with MFA Deputy Director General for Maritime and Aviation Affairs Basat Ozturk. Ozturk was expecting us to contact him as the Greek FM had phoned now-former Minister Babacan and the Greek Ambassador had called on MFA Deputy Undersecretary U/S Haider Berk on May 1. Ozturk said that the Greek DefMin had called Secretary Gates. According to Ozturk, all had complained about low-level flights over islands in the Aegean. Berk and Ozturk had no information about such flights, but pledged to investigate. Ozturk said he would share the results of their investigation with us as soon as they are available.

5. (C) Ozturk then gave us a readout of both conversations, which he said took the traditional shape. While the Greeks complained about overflights, the Turks complained about interceptions. Practically every time a Turkish fighter flies over the Aegean, regardless of its track, it is intercepted by a Greek fighter. When the Turkish aircraft is intercepted, it breaks into combat maneuvering, and can at that point no longer be held responsible for whether it overflies mutually-agreed Greek territory. The accusation of low-level flights is different, Ozturk acknowledged, and pledged that the GOT would look into it. According to Ozturk, both Babacan and Berk repeated Turkey's call to agree to an "Aegean Code of Conduct" to regulate military flights. They've made this call before, but this time, Ozturk said, they insisted that agreeing to a code would not prejudice any existing political positions. Ozturk insisted that interceptions are far more dangerous than overflights, since interceptions have the pot ential to turn into dogfights which can, in turn, have unintended - sometimes tragic - consequences.

6. (C) Both Babacan and Berk urged that Greece should focus on the positive agenda, rather than consistently harping on the Aegean. Berk and Ozturk will attend on May 7 the latest iteration of the bilateral Turkey - Greece Steering Committee Meeting in Athens. Ozturk said that the Steering Committee covers a wide range of issues, but there is always a PolDir meeting on the margins to talk about the Aegean, and Berk expects such a meeting this time as well.

Comment ------

7. (C) The MFA's concern about the island overflights, and General Igsiz's appreciation for all-around cooperation including in the end by the Greeks on "Egemen," are a glimmer of hope in this long-running sad story. We will have more ideas on a way forward in septel.

Jeffrey

======CABLE ENDS= id: 211970 date: 6/12/2009 23:17 refid: 09STATE61209 origin: Secretary of State classification: CONFIDENTIAL destination: 09ATHENS971 header: O R 122317Z JUN 09 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE INFO PAGE 02 STATE 061209 122338Z NATO EU COLLECTIVE USEU BRUSSELS AMEMBASSY LONDON AMEMBASSY NICOSIA USMISSION USNATO SECDEF WASHINGTON DC NSC WASHINGTON DC 0000 JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC DIA WASHINGTON DC CIA WASHINGTON DC 0000

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 061209

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/12/2019 TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, TU, GR SUBJECT: MOVING GREEKS AND TURKS FORWARD ON AEGEAN ISSUES

REF: ATHENS 971

Classified By: EUR DAS Matthew Bryza for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. This is an Action Request. Please see para 5.

2. (C) The Department agrees with the joint assessment (Ref A) from Embassies Athens and Ankara that there is an urgent need to ease the recent uptick in provocations over the Aegean, diffuse tensions, and work towards resolving the underlying issues.

3. (C) As a first step, upcoming high-level visits (Turkish PM Erdogan to Athens June 20, Turkish FM Davutoglu to Corfu for the OSCE Ministerial June 28, and Greek FM Bakoyannis, pending visit to Ankara) may provide a new opportunity for the GOG and GOT to engage directly on these issues.

4. (C) Objectives: Embassies should pursue the following objectives with GOG and GOT officials to urge them to increase diplomatic efforts and decrease military actions over the Aegean.

-Ending Turkey's overflight of the two Greek-inhabited islands in the Dodecanese, Agathonisi and Farmakonisi.

- Prevent an increased defensive posture by the Greek military which could be perceived as provocative and increase the likelihood of an incident

- Reduce bilateral tensions -- especially between the Greek and Turkish militaries -- and pave the way for increased cooperation.

5. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Embassy Athens and Ankara are instructed to make the following demarche, at an appropriately high level (Under Secretary or above), and follow up as appropriate with military and Prime Ministry senior officials. These points should be delivered prior to Turkish PM Erdogan,s June 20th visit to Athens.

(C) Ankara and Athens:

--The U.S. is very concerned about the rise in military activity and confrontations in the Aegean, both Turkish overflights and Greek intercepts, over the past six-seven months.

-- We fear such confrontations pose an unacceptable risk of an accident or other incident that will be in neither country's interest and could seriously damage bilateral relations. We see no advantage to their continuation, and are making parallel demarches in both capitals to express our grave concern.

--We continue to urge both sides to exercise restraint and to use the bilateral mechanisms established by you and Ankara/Athens, and are confident that doing so will reduce the current unnecessary tensions, as well as open the door to deeper bilateral understandings.

--Beyond this, a more concentrated effort could yield improvements in the specific issues underlying the current tensions, as well as open the door to deeper more substantial understandings.

--As you move beyond the current tensions, we urge both sides to review previous agreements and past suggestions to reduce tensions, including restrictions on armament and other operational aspects of air-to-air engagements, increased use of hotlines, and more willingness during political consultations to substantively address these issues.

--More generally, the U.S. believes that the time has come to consider resolving or better managing the suite of Aegean issues that divide you and give rise to repeated confrontations and risk of conflict.

--We welcome your thoughts on how best to reduce the immediate tensions, identify confidence building measures, and implement a more effective process to address outstanding Aegean issues.

--In our view, your two countries have made considerable progress in this regard in the late 1990s. As then, the U.S. remains ready to play a supporting role acceptable to both Greece and Turkey.

(C) For Athens Only:

--On your request, we have repeatedly engaged with senior Turkish officials, both military and civilians, on the Agathonisi and Farmakonisi over-flights.

--As part of this demarche, we are doing so again.

--At the same time, if you are to find a mutually acceptable outcome it is important to understand the Turkish concerns in response to Greek actions that challenge Turkish positions in the Aegean ) whether &aggressive8 flight information region (FIR) intercepts or unilateral militarization of areas that the Turks believe are treaty obligated to remain demilitarized.

--We cannot be as helpful in effecting Turkish restraint if Greece conducts itself in a provocatively aggressive manner, including selecting for military exercises islands whose militarization is disputed.

(C) For Ankara Only:

--As we have raised before, we urge you to cease your over-flights of the Greek islets of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi.

--As the two islands are inhabited, such overflights introduce a dangerous new element into the Aegean disputes between Greece and Turkey.

--This would be so under any circumstances, but in the specific case of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, the U.S., as a party to the 1947 Paris Treaty, accepts that these islands are sovereign Greek territory.

--While in many Aegean issues Turkey raises positions that we either agree with or can easily understand, we have no sympathy for your position on these islands.

--Were a tragedy to occur or were this issue to gain major public attention, it would be difficult for us to avoid stating this U.S. position.

--On the other hand, we are raising with the Greeks as part of our parallel demarche our concerns with Greek behavior and initiatives which challenge the de facto status and which Turkey understandably views as requiring a response.

--In this regard, we reiterate the commitments to consult which SACEUR Gen. Craddock provided the TGS in January.

CLINTON

id: 212621 date: 6/17/2009 15:44 refid: 09ATHENS1015 origin: Embassy Athens classification: SECRET destination: 09STATE61209 header: VZCZCXYZ0000 OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #1015/01 1681542 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 171544Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0300 INFO RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 0050 RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 0016 RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS

S E C R E T ATHENS 001015

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2034/06/17 TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, GR SUBJECT: (S) Bakoyannis: TUAF Overflights Must Stop Before Progress can be Made

REF: 09 STATE 61209

CLASSIFIED BY: Daniel Speckhard, Ambassador, State, U.S. Embassy Athens, Greece; REASON: 1.4(A), (B), (D)

1.(S) Ambassador met one-on-one June 17 with FM Dora Bakoyannis, to underscore USG concerns expressed reftel at the increase in Aegean tensions, and to reinforce the need for both Greece and Turkey to explore ways to de-escalate the military activity over the Aegean, including in the skies over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, and develop a dialogue that would ultimately resolve the two countries' outstanding differences in the Aegean. He highlighted the value of reviewing previous agreements and past suggestions on reducing tensions and noted that a number of Greek actions were perceived as provocative in nature, and if addressed, could greatly assist in engendering the response they were looking for from Turkey. Similarly, the U.S. had raised our concerns in Ankara over the repeated overflights of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, and was approaching the GOT with a similar message on our broader concerns for decreasing tensions and working toward a comprehensive solution to Aegean issues. The Ambassador highlighted that Ambassador Jeffrey had made this approach in Ankara, noted that we were ready to play a supporting role to Greece and Turkey in this effort, and asked the FM's assessment of prospects for progress in establishing a productive dialogue with the Turks.

2. (S) Dora said that the GOG senses new opportunities for cooperation with Davutoglu. They had welcomed his message of a desire for "zero problems" with Greece and had ignored reports of other remarks that have been labeled "neo-Ottaminism." On the Aegean, she felt that what was needed was a "new atmosphere" that could provide the context for a renewed push to resolve the outstanding issues and the flexibility on both sides needed to accomplish this. The overflights of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi were making it impossible for Greece to show flexibility. The exact opposite message was needed to create the political space to solve the outstanding disputes. She suggested, given that the two neighbors and their citizens had no desire ever to see war again, that the GOT consider rescind its "anachronistic causus belli" position vis-a-vis a Greek effort to extend its territorial waters. This would create an atmosphere that could be met with a similar show of flexibility on the Greek side.

3. (S) The Ambassador suggested that this may be overreaching as a first step and urged the FM to look carefully at a process that would lead to greater confidence between the two sides, starting with addressing the Turkish overflights and some of the Greek actions that were perceived by Turkey as being provocative. The FM rejected this sequence, saying "I won't fall into the trap" of Turks laying an additional chip on the table (the overflights) that required a substantial Greek concession for them to remove. The Ambassador noted Embassy Ankara's belief that this escalation was likely related to last year's NATO exercise that overflew the Aghios Efstratios. She was hard pressed to see how the continuing and repeated overflights over Greek inhabited Islands could be compared to the A.E. exercise.

4. (S) However, in coming back to the larger issue, she said the GoG wants a high level engagement that would permit progress to be made on the Aegean. She pointed out that she and the Karamanlis government are holding the line on Greek support for Turkish EU accession in Brussels and at home. It would be politically easier, and could mean the difference for their government in the next election, were they to reverse their support for Turkey's EU perspective. They have resisted because they understand it would not be good for Greece, Turkey or the EU. But Ankara needs to recognize that these overflights are making this attitude increasingly difficult to maintain and they threaten the relationship more broadly.

5. (S) The Ambassador pressed on the importance of engaging bilaterally with Turkey and ensuring that the process and method was adequate to the task. He highlighted the importance of addressing the immediate threat of an accident that could cause a serious altercation. She recognized this and said that she had tasked her military advisors to identify confidence building measures that the Greeks could offer at the appropriate time. However, "the overflights must stop" for there to be any progress in discussions on the Aegean and they threaten the relationship more broadly.

6. (S) Ambassador noted that Davutoglu will be in Athens for the Acropolis Museum opening this weekend, which would be a good opportunity to start changing the dynamic. The Minister welcomed the visit and looked forward to the opportunity.

SPECKHARD

======CABLE ENDS======

id: 213716 date: 6/24/2009 11:24 refid: 09ANKARA890 origin: Embassy Ankara classification: SECRET destination: 09ANKARA855|09STATE61209 header: O 241124Z JUN 09 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0015 INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE AMCONSUL ISTANBUL IMMEDIATE USDAO ANKARA TU IMMEDIATE JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE ODC ANKARA TU IMMEDIATE SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T ANKARA 000890

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2039 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, TU, GR SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RAISES AEGEAN ISSUES WITH FM DAVUTOGLU

REF: A. STATE 61209 B. ANKARA 855 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, Reasons 1.4 (b,d)

1. (S) Ambassador raised the Aegean demarche (ref a) with FONMIN Davutoglu late June 23, noting specifically the need to end the overflights of Agathonisi and Farmakonisi, and the commitment made in writing to maintain promises GEN Craddock gave TGS. Davutoglu pushed back initially, arguing that the sovereignty of these "rocks" were in question "like Kardak" (referring to the infamous 1996 Aegean incident) and the Greeks were cherry-picking specific issues to spin the U.S. up rather than dealing with the whole Aegean complex in a comprehensive manner. Ambassador said regardless of Greek tactics, he doubted the sovereignty argument of the Turks: the islands were inhabited, and making arguments about sovereignty by overflights of fighter aircraft at low altitude was not proper. Davutoglu argued that Greeks overfly Turkey more than Turks do Greece. Even so, the Ambassador retorted, the Greeks do not couple their overflights, deliberate or not, with claims of sovereignty over Turkish territory. At that point, Davutoglu changed his demeanor and said that, frankly, he had ordered and was waiting for a review of all overflights by Turkish aircraft in the Aegean.

2. (S) Davutoglu then launched into an extended critique of his relations with Greek FONMIN Dora Bakioyannis, saying he liked her a great deal but that she both went after individual complaints (see above) rather than targeting comprehensive solutions, and would not take bold steps. He had suggested that he travel to the Republic of Cyprus and she to northern Cyprus to jointly declare that Greece and Turkey were 100 percent behind a solution. She (not unexpectedly) turned him down. He then described at length talks he had had with her on the Patriarchate and Halki. When he pointed out that the Turks had allowed the Synod of the Patriarchate a few years ago to include three non-Turkish citizens, "despite the Lausanne Treaty", she had replied that the assumption in Greece was that the Turks were not aware of the three,s presence.

3. (S) Comment: We need to keep pressing the Turks on the overflights, while maintaining our parallel approach with the Greeks to avoid provoking the Turks in the first place and seek more comprehensive negotiations and solutions. That latter sells well with the Turks and allows us to at least make the points about the overflights without a big fight. End Comment.

JEFFREY

id: 190872 date: 2/6/2009 15:46 refid: 09ATHENS175 origin: Embassy Athens classification: SECRET destination: header: VZCZCXYZ0019 OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0175/01 0371546 ZNY SSSSS ZZH (CCY AD29B1B5 MSI3892-695) O 061546Z FEB 09 FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3165 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY RUEKJCS/SECEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFFWASHDC PRIORITY RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIRITY ------header ends ------

S E C R E T ATHENS 000175 QOFORN SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2019 TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, TU, AF, GR SUBJECT: CHOD GRAPSAS ON TURKEY AND AEGEAN, AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS, AND PROCUREMENTSQ Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d)

------SUMMARY ------

1. (C) In a February 4 lunch at the Ambassador's reQence, the Chief of the Hellenic National Defense General Staff, General of the Army Demitrios Grapsas, termed recent Turkish behavior in the Aegean "childish" and made clear that the perception of the Turkish threat drives Greek military procurement and organization. The Ambassador emphasized the need for calm and restraint in response to perceived provocations; Grapsas said he sought to keep tensions low, but questioned recent Turkish actions in the Aegean. On Afghanistan, he said the GOG was actively reviewing potential additional contributions and he hoped for a decision soon. Grapsas was accompanied by Brigadier General Alexandros Tsigaras, Director of the Defense Planning Directorate of the General Staff, and Executive Assistant Colonel Thomaidis. The Ambassador was accompanied by DATT, ODC Chief, A/Political Counselor, and Press Attache. End Summary.

------Turkey - "No Trust and No Real Dialogue" ------

2. (C) Grapsas said that Greece's defense procurement plans were predicated "threats in its neighborhood from immediate neighbors." Turkey was a "security threat" to Greece. This affects what Greece buys, how Greece organizes and deploys its forces, and whether Greece can make aditional forces available for peacekeeping missions. Ambassador Speckhard said that the United States did not share Greece's assessment of the Turkish threat.

3. (C) Grapsas said that he was committed to "keeping tensions down," with Turkey, but that the Turks made this difficult. He said the Turks were "acting like children" in the Aegean, displaying "patriotic exuberance." Grapsas said he had sought to take the high road, by ignoring some of Turkey's behavior -- such as when Turkish authorities contacted the pilot of a helicopter taking him to the island of Agathonisi in December and informing him that he had violated Turkish airspace. "We just continued on, and I went to the island without making this into an incident," Grapsas remarked, but he also intimated that the incident had rankled him. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of keeping tensions low, and that General Grapsas could best protect the security of his country by acting with restraint in response to perceived provocations. Grapsas responded that he and the Greek general staff were "mature, and we will act responsibly," but he added that "we also have some (unspecified) redlines, Q that there will be (unspecified) consequences for Turkey if they cross them."

4. (C) Grapsas said there was "no trust" between Greece and Turkey, stemming from "deep-rooted perceptions." When asked Qout mil-to-mil contacts, Grapsas said he had good contacts with former Turkish CHOD Buyukanit. However, he had not been able to established personal rapport with neQHOD Basbug, whom he characterized as aloof. That said, Grapsas and Tsigaras affirmed that extensive contacts take place between the Greek and Turkish militaries. Grapsas lamented, however, that these contacts did not have much impact, as the big issues dividing the two militaries were "national," and needed to be solved at the political level. He added, "all we can do is try to create conditions for politicians to solve these problems," adding that in Turkey the politicians appeared to be unwilling to confront the Turkish military on this agenda.

------Afghanistan: Considering More Contributions ------

5. (C) The Ambassador noted that Washington was considering how to advance stability in Afghanistan, adding that it would be a good time for Greece to make additional contributions as a symbol of the renewed strength in our relationship. Grapsas responded that he and his staff had been "looking at possibilities," and had met with Defense Minister Meimarakis the previous day on this subject. He said that he hoped Greece would "soon decide" on additional contributions (although he gave no hints as to what these additional contributions might be), and he emphasized that he understood the need for a stronger international presence in Afghanistan.

------Defense Procurement/Transformation ------

6. (S/NF) Grapsas confirmed that it was likely that some significant defense procurements would be announced in the not-too-distant future. These procurements were "the end of a multi-year process." He noted that former Finance Minister Alagoskoufis had done a "good job" in exercising fiscal discipline over the process, adding that planning is in place forQuture multi-year payments for these procurements. He also noted that the opposition was questioning the wisdom of major purchases in the context of the global economic crisis, but he affirmed that the governmenQould proceed with its plans -- highlighting Turkey's proximity to Greece as a factor in the need to conclude these purchases. The Ambassador emphasized that a number of goQ U.S. companies would be bidding on these contracts. The United States was not lobbying for a specific firm, but expected the process to be fair and transparent, and expected that price and quality should be the criteria. The United States did not believe it was in Greece's interest or the Alliance's interest for political criteria to enter into the mix. U.S. firms would be competitive if the criteria were the best equipment at the best price. Grapsas noted that political criteria were also relevant for policy-makers, later noting, " did not favor purchase of the (Russian) BMP-'s," stating that they were not well suite for the operations where he would likely need to deploy them.

7. (C) The Ambassador also raised the need for greater numbers of trained and equipped light, expeditionary forces, noting that Greek forces were seen by many in NATO as requiring further transformation. Even if Greece's central objective was defense against Turkey, the more likely scenario was the need to rapidly deploy in the Aegean, and not to defend against a frontal ground assault. Grapsas responded that some "middle ground" was needed, but agreed that it was a priority for the Greek military to develop additional expeditionary forces capable of being deployed rapidly.

------U.S./Greece Mil-to-Mil Contacts ------

8. (C) Grapsas made it a point to emphasize his satisfaction with the mil-to-mil contacts between the United States and Greece. He termed these relations "good" but called for "even more expanded contacts." He viewed favorably his August 2008 trip to Washington where he met Deputy Secretary of Defense England and Deputy CJCS General Cartwright and SAC-T Mattis. He also promised to look into reviewing current regulations precluding Greek cadets from attending U.S. service academies. He termed his cooperation with the Defense Attache's office "excellent."

9. (C) In a private pull-aside, the General told the Ambassador that he personally supported the United States and believed we shared the common values of democracy. He was personally supportive of U.S. military operations and would continue to do what he could to encourage Greece's support. SPECKHARD