Surrogate Representation: Forging New And Broader Constituencies In Japanese Politics

Surrogate Representation Forging new and broader constituencies in Japanese politics

Sherry L. Martin Department of Government Cornell University [DRAFT: Comments welcome. Please do not cite.]

Former Prime Minister Koizumi's strategic use of media outlets was a significant factor in explaining his rise to the premiership (Steel and Kabashima 2006).

Koizumi framed a reform agenda that won him widespread popularity, enabling him to circumnavigate traditional candidate selection processes that remain salient despite party reforms internal to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In short, he reached beyond his

Yokosuka constituency to appeal to rank-and-file party members nationally; he became a

"surrogate representative" for Japanese voters across a nation frustrated with patronage politics that appealed to narrowly defined local interests. Over the course of his premiership, Koizumi used resources at his disposal to adopt a more “presidential” style of leadership and assumed a degree of public visibility that was unprecedented for a

Japanese prime minister (Krauss and Nyblade, 2005). Electoral and administrative reforms were seen as important facilitators of the type of relationship Koizumi forged with national voters (ibid).

This paper weighs "surrogate representation" against the promissory, anticipatory, and gyroscopic models of representation (outlined by Mansbridge 2003) as conceptual tools that help us to think about how institutional changes shape Japanese politicians' strategic efforts to speak to audiences beyond the geographical boundaries of their constituencies, and voters’ response. Surrogate representation occurs when

1 politicians represent interests outside of their own district; they craft and/or appeal to a broader constituency (ibid; Tremblay 2007). This broader constituency may be regional, national, or supranational in scope. Four years into his term, Koizumi attempted to build constituencies for "assassin" candidates, hand-picked challengers to lower house seats occupied by postal rebels. Assassins became "surrogates," candidates who did not have a local support base, yet campaigned locally in the interest of a national level reform.

Koizumi modeled a form of representation that has not been dominant among prime ministers in Japanese politics, raising questions about what constitutes “better” representation and how normative ideals are achieved in the post-reform era. Increasing politicians’ responsiveness and accountability to voters were among the goals of electoral reform. Some might say that reformers sought to facilitate a transition in elected officials’ roles, from politicians (seijika) to representatives (daigishi) (Feldman 2000,

53), or from delegates to trustees (Wakata 1977). This paper uses Mansbridge’s

“Rethinking Representation” to explore assumptions and practices that define continuity and change in normative expectations about “representation” in Japan. Section 1 below outlines Mansbridge’s four ideal types of representation. Section 2 discusses the prevalence of each type within the pre-reform context, examining work on the congruence between politicians and voters in their expectations about the role and work of elected officials. Section 3 repeats this process for the post-reform era. Section 4 addresses the institutional incentives associated with the predominance of certain representative styles over others, with attention to institutional changes thought to facilitate changes in representative styles in post-reform Japan. Finally, Section 5 concludes with thoughts on future directions for this research.

2 1. Mansbridge on “Rethinking Representation”

Much of the debate on representation takes place within the normative framework of “promissory” representation which presents two alternative styles- mandate vs. trustee

(Mansbridge 2003). In the “mandate” version, representatives promise to follow constituents’ instructions; in the “trustee” version, representatives promise to further the constituency’s interests and those of the nation at large. Both versions assume that a promise is made by candidates during an initial authorizing election (T1), and re-election

(at T2) is contingent upon how satisfied voters are with representatives’ fulfillment of their promises. Interestingly, while politicians who keep promises can help to build public trust, the promissory model requires little trust because officials who do not keep their word can be easily kicked out; those who do keep promises build up a “reservoir” of trust. Promissory representation, in both forms, looms large in our imaginations as a normative ideal that is often unfulfilled, but always desirable.

In “Rethinking Representation,” Mansbridge (2003) notes that the promissory form of representation co-exists with and is often subordinate to three other forms of representation prominent in democratic systems- anticipatory representation, gyroscopic representation, and surrogate representation. Each is best suited to a different socio- political context, requires different types of electoral connections with voters and fosters different expectations of representatives, with different consequences for how voters evaluate politics (ibid., see pp. 525-526). Though these four models of representation are presented separately as “ideal types” for analytical clarity, they are not mutually exclusive. The four types operate simultaneously in any given system; Mansbridge sees the different forms as “cumulative” and “complementary, not oppositional (ibid., p.

3 526).” Further, representatives change their styles over time and across different electoral and policy spaces. Throughout the electoral reform process in Japan and after, the importance of striking a balance between promises made by politicians and expectations held by the voting public was implicit in calls for greater responsiveness and accountability to voters. In our evaluations of how reforms have altered the representative-constituent relationship, perhaps we think more deeply about how institutional contexts generate multiple representative norms, or privilege one style over another.

Anticipatory representation is consistent with theories of retrospective voting as voters evaluate how the process of communication unfolded over the course of his/her term. The representative makes decisions over the course of his/her term in anticipation of how voters in a future election will reflect upon his/her performance. Successful anticipatory representation relies upon close and ongoing communication between representatives and constituents between election cycles with each trying to educate, persuade, and influence the other. Attitudes and positions of representatives and voters shift in tandem over time, with one tracking the other. Anticipatory representation requires little trust from the voting public because the relationship with representatives is one of “reciprocal power” and “continuing mutual influence.” Ongoing reciprocity makes anticipatory representation especially well-suited for periods of rapid change

(ibid., pp.516-520).

The gyroscopic model of representation has the following distinctive characteristics. First, voters use observable cues to select representatives who can be trusted to make choices that the voter would make for herself under similar conditions.

4 While this model can vary, “in all forms the representative looks within, for guidance in taking action, to a contextually derived understanding of interests, interpretive schemes

(“common sense”), conscience, and principle (ibid., p. 520-521).” This yields representatives who are assumed to be predictable; they act in expected ways even in the absence of external monitoring. Second, voters make decisions based on deliberative processes during the election but, having chosen candidates who presumably share similar internal motivations, allow representatives tremendous freedom between elections.

“Deep predictability” is an essential component of gyroscopic representation.

Voters support representatives who are already deemed predictable based on observable information such as personality and character, descriptive characteristics, and party identification. Voters use this information to judge how closely the representative’s personal ideals resonate with those of the community at large. This is akin to US voters supporting candidates who express a strong Christian faith and traditional family values.

Convergence in fundamental values and belief yields a “deep predictability” for voters who, for example, seek to install a certain “type” of representative who (re)produces systemic level outcomes in sustaining a particular type of gender regime. Conservative

Christians trust that like-minded candidates will follow an internal moral compass across important decision-making arenas.

In the gyroscopic model, all standards of traditional “promissory” accountability are not met. Representatives are “not expected to relate to their constituents as agents to principals (ibid., p.522).” Beyond deliberation in the authorizing election, representatives have a tremendous amount of freedom in decision-making because they have been

5 elected precisely because they are thought to act according to internal beliefs, principles, and cultural norms that resonate with the voters. Thus, voters use the ballot box not as a means of directly holding a representative accountable, but as a means of indirectly influencing systemic level outcomes through their selection of a certain “type” of representative. This model works best, according to Mansbridge, when interests are uncrystallized, but it requires a lot of trust. In short, gyroscopic representation works best when there is a public consensus around broad goals such as “progress” without specific programmatic goals for producing outcomes.

Finally, surrogate representatives give voice to interests that lie beyond their own electoral constituency. Surrogate representation “plays the normatively critical role of providing representation to voters who lose in their own district (ibid.; p. 523).” This is crucial because the experience of losing impacts voters’ attitudes about politics and political actors. If there are few alternative access points that give voice to under- represented interests in the system, losing can generate attitudinal orientations and behavioral outcomes that threaten regime legitimacy (Anderson et al. 2005). In giving voice to under-represented interests, surrogate representation can improve upon the proportionality of interests that achieve voice by presenting alternative perspectives relevant to decision-making processes (Mansbridge 2003). Because surrogate representatives voice interests beyond their own geographic constituency, there is no power relation between the voters who benefit and the representative in question.

These alternative models of representation are significant, argues Mansbridge, because none meets the criteria for democratic accountability developed for promissory representation (ibid., p. 515) even though we commonly refer to promissory criteria in

6 our evaluations of how well democracy works, including how well democracy works in

Japan (Wakata 1977). Below I examine literature, pre and post electoral reform, that provides a sense of how closely representatives’ articulation of their roles matches voters’ expectations about representation. At present, this literature is the best means of looking at continuity and change over time, as there are no surveys that consistently sample representatives over time, or that ask voters questions about representation outside of the promissory mode.1 I think that this is important if institutions are designed to facilitate promissory representation, perhaps at the expense of the other forms. Similarly, if other forms are present, the focus on promissory representation means that we have an insufficient understanding of the connection between institutions, socio-political contexts, and the full range of modal forms of representation available to representatives and voters.

2. Representation in Japan prior to 1994 Electoral Reform

To date there are few empirical studies that explore Japanese politicians’ perceptions of their roles and obligations as elected officials, and none that examine change over time at the aggregate and individual level.2 While there is a tremendous amount of survey-driven research on voters’ attitudes about elected politicians, survey questions do not probe opinions about the full range of representative styles that might be

1 The phrasing of survey questions asked with relative frequency over time assumes a promissory ideal. Questions seek to understand how much voting matters, how much voters think politicians pay attention them after the election, and the importance attached to national vs. local level concerns. 2 See Curtis (1971). Forthcoming work by Dyron Dabney examines the impact of electoral reform on campaigns styles of a sample of individual candidates over their “political life course.” Campaigning, however, is an indirect measure at best of representation styles once elected. Campaign style and representation can operate independently of one another.

7 at work. Together, culturally-based and institutional factors account for politicians’ observed behavior and voters’ attitudes about elected officials and the political process.

Both cultural and institutional explanations support classification of the representative- constituent relationship in Japan as one between a patron and a client. Extensive work on the distribution of values and attitudes evident among citizens vs. subjects, participants vs. spectators, and liberals vs. authoritarians, weak vs. strong partisans cast voters as the primary sustaining force in this relationship (Miyake 1991; Flanagan 1991). It is expected that pressures for change in this traditional relationship will originate within the public as voter demands shift to reflect Japan’s progress along the post/modernization trajectory, and as older generations of voters are replaced with younger ones in the electorate (Flanagan 1991). That traditional patron-client relations have persisted has been attributed to electoral arrangements (specifically multi-member districts and the single non-transferable vote) and fiscal centralization, bothof which place the successful delivery of pork at the center of representative-constituent relations (Scheiner 2006).

We seek to understand, however incompletely, the decisions that underlie observed representative behavior because the judgments we make about observable behavior informs assessments of how well democracy works and democratic legitimacy.

What Japanese politicians generally think about their roles as elected officials is inferred from observable factors such as faction membership, composition of their candidate support organizations, campaign donations and behavior in their districts and in the legislature during and between elections. Yet, even this task is complicated due to low rates of parliamentary defections, the fact that Japanese politicians typically do not sponsor legislation, campaign loopholes that make the full range of funding sources and

8 amount donated opaque, and behind-the-scenes bargaining between politicians, bureaucrats, and interest groups. In truth, what politicians think about their role and obligations beyond the delivery of pork can be a black box. How did politicians in the pre-reform period talk about the form of democratic representation that they practiced between elections, how these practices were related to elections, and the distance between practice and the normative ideals that they expressed? How much did they think their behavior was constrained by cultural norms? To what extent did they attribute their behavior to their desire to be re-elected while accounting for the institutional constraints of the electoral system?

To answer these questions, I draw upon graduate work by Kyoji Wakata (1977) because to my knowledge it is the only work on the 1955 System that samples a sizable number (N=110) of Diet members in the early 1970s for the specific purpose of measuring their attitudes across several dimensions to tell us something about role perception. Specifically, Wakata seeks to understand how the legislator perceives his relationship to the electorate and how he understands his mandate (p. 151). Working within the framework of promissory representation, Wakata examines how closely

Japanese Diet members conform to the delegate (i.e.mandate) or trustee styles. At the time of his writing, “the question of whether the legislator should be a trustee or delegate

[had] not been raised as an issue for controversy among opinion leaders nor been consciously recognized by politicians as a theme for philosophical consideration related to parliamentary democracy (p. 153).” These ideal types (delegate vs. trustee) as Wakata defines them do not cleanly fit into Mansbridge’s framework. Nonetheless, Wakata is working firmly within the promissory model as he assumes that representation is firmly

9 tied to the re-election incentive i.e. politicians’ fear that the jig will be up at the next election.

Wakata found that while there was a slightly higher proportion of “trustees” in his sample, they were not as prevalent as in the US case. In Japan, there were more

“delegates,” politicians who felt bound by outside constraints- by support groups, interest groups, their faction, and the party- in decision-making. Moreover, delegates tended to by more “machievellian” i.e. “tough-minded, cold-hearted, calculating, skilled in maneuvers with little respect for morality, and talented in manipulating others (124).”

Even as they outwardly conformed to the norms of a traditional political culture that values obligation (giri) and interpersonal relationships (ninjo), machievellians did so while thinly veiling “blunt negotiation and bargaining” that served the pragmatic goal of being re-elected (126-132). “Trustees” were evident in higher proportions within the

LDP. Trustees were reportedly more likely to say that they represented a national interest and were less likely to feel bound in decision-making to the same degree expressed by delegates. As members of the party in power, trustees had generally been re-elected more times than delegates, held memberships on committees that were salient to constituents back at home, and had risen higher within the party apparatus. Trustees, as former bureaucrats, political secretaries, and local politicians, had followed career paths that provided greater expertise in navigating the folkways of Japanese politics. Consequently, trustees’ greater sense of security explained a greater willingness to advocate in the long- term interests of their constituents and the nation as a whole.

Wakata’s Diet members of the early 1970s sound more like politicians who keep their promises than do accounts of Diet members of the 1990s. In response to a 1994

10 Yomiuri Shimbun poll asking respondents to evaluate whether Japanese politicians, over the previous 50-year period, had become reliable or unreliable, or had been (un)reliable the entire time, 44% responded that politicians had become unreliable and 28% responded that politicians had been unreliable the whole time (Yomiuiri Shimbun).3 If politicians indeed acted within the promissory model, has this become a less accurate assessment over time as the LDP and its representatives have became increasingly entrenched and insulated from the electorate? By 1998, Yomiuri polls found nearly half of dissatisfied voters attributed their dissatisfaction in part to a belief that “public opinion is not reflected in politics.” Later that same year, Yomiuri pollsters found that prior to upcoming House of Councilors elections, 74% of voters sampled did not think political parties and politicians would keep their public promises.

Studies of why and how the LDP managed to stay in power even when domestic conditions coupled with growing voter dissatisfaction would lead observers to predict otherwise, are suggestive of anticipatory representation at work. Best suited for rapid changing socio-economic and political environments, anticipatory representation is consistent with explanations of how the LDP was able to weather cycles of “crisis and compensation” (Calder 1991). Rapid economic growth of the 1960s and 1970s heightened income inequality and led to environmental degradation, problems that benefited progressive mayors who made headway in urban local politics. The LDP was able to forestall further opposition success at the polls during this period by co-opting their agenda and introducing a combination of social welfare and environmental legislation. That a grassroots environmental movement and the Big Four Pollution Cases

3 The data was obtained from the Japan Public Opinion Location Library, JPOLL, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. Neither the original collectors of the data, nor the Roper Center, bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

11 were also significant contributing factors in evoking a response from the dominant party

(see McKean 1981) hints at some limits of the ballot box for voters, and a miscalculation of the severity of grievances on the part of the party. By the 1990s, the LDP’s incrementalist political and economic reforms mirrored voters’ ambivalence about overhauling a system that had produced the postwar miracle (Curtis 1999).

Patterns of gyroscopic and surrogate representation warrant further attention in pre-reform politics if we presume that the representative-constituent relationship is not directly enforced through the ballot box. Displacing a specific representative within one’s multi-member district constituency not only required coordination, but was of little utility to Japanese voters if small order changes had little impact on LDP dominance in the aggregate and over the long-term. Mansbridge (2003) suggests that voters in the gyroscopic model seek to influence the nature of the system, while voters in the surrogate model do not have the opportunity to vote for the representatives who voice interests most related to their own. These models rely on fundamentally different relationships between the representative and constituent than the more direct relationships required by the promissory and anticipatory models. The prevalence of the gyroscopic model perhaps helps to explain the long-term maintenance of patronage politics while the decline of surrogate representation contributes to our understanding of declining faith in politics in Japanese politics.

For much of the postwar period, consensus around economic growth and forging a “middle class” Japan constituted the standard by which commonality between representatives and constituents was established. Voters supported LDP representatives who could be expected to pursue rapid economic growth. At the same time, there was an

12 awareness among voters that policies were made in the bureaucracy and the upper echelons of the party apparatus. Since non-elected officials made many major decisions, voting became a means of electing representatives best situated to gain proximity to decision-making and distributive channels. Japanese voters attain “deep predictability” in maintaining a system based on patronage politics by voting for second and third generation politicians, graduates from the University of Tokyo’s Law Faculty, and former bureaucrats- all of whom are over-represented in politics and in the LDP in particular.

These representatives are well-situated to provide ongoing access to distributive channels linking the central government to local constituencies that rely heavily upon government subsidies (Scheiner 2006).

Within this context, the traditional opposition parties played the part of surrogate for voters unaffiliated with the dominant LDP. A problem is that the steady erosion of the opposition presence in national level politics and co-optation at the subnational level was matched by a steady increase in the proportion of unaffiliated and dissatisfied voters

(Tanaka 2003). Even though traditional opposition parties (JCP, JSP, DSP…) held a minority of seats in the national Diet, for most of the postwar era they were able to effectively influence debate and enforce norms of accountablity through strategies of protest and legislative delay. By the 1990s, the opposition was unraveling. Patterns of depopulation and broad economic change frayed traditional social networks that linked voters and elites (Otake 1999). Effective surrogate representation, according to

Mansbridge (2003), rises in importance under these circumstances because voters retain some level of confidence in the democratic electoral process as long as their interests find voice somewhere.

13 Without surrogate representation, the gap between voters’ expectations and representational outcomes assumes a new saliency. This widening gap partially explains the rapid increase of unaffiliated voters. In contrast to politicians, at the time of his study

Wakata (1977) found that the public had already, however unconsciously, adopted the trustee style as a normative ideal. The voters sampled expressed the opinion that politicians should speak on behalf of the nation at large rather than catering to their own particular party or locality (153). Two decades later and following the passage of electoral reform, 79% of Japanese polled preferred politicians who thought about the country and its citizens as a whole rather than thinking more narrowly about local interests (NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute 1994). Akin to US voters’ high approval of their own representatives and criticism of the Congress, Japanese voters expected individual representatives to bring home their share of the bacon, but expected

Diet members on average to be broadly representative of the nation. At the same time that voters desire trusteeship in the promissory mold, candidate personality and hometown commitment continue to outweigh issues in vote choice, and voters widely respond that they hold little influence over political outcomes because politicians speak on behalf of special interests and pay little attention to voters after elections are over.

3. Representation in Post-reform Japanese Politics

Japan has had more than its share of perpetual outsiders to politics.4 Moreover, by the eve of electoral reform the utility of supporting opposition parties in Japan had eroded over time as their share of seats in national and subnational politics declined

4 By “political outsiders,” I refer to traditional opposition parties (Japan Sociality Party, Japan Communist Party, Komeito, Democractic Socialist League…) as well as to demographic groups also under-represented in politics (women, urban voters, consumers, ethnic minorities…).

14 (Tanaka 2003). More and more voters found themselves outside of the LDP’s distributive channels (Otake 1999). The proportion of unaffiliated voters began to exceed

50% of the electorate and cynicism about politics reached new depths among voters already predisposed toward cynicism (Tanaka 2003). These trends have not experienced a dramatic reversal since 1994, through support for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) suggests that the party is operating as an effective vehicle for some political outsiders seeking to influence politics. Still, the introduction of single member districts increases the likelihood that more voters will witness the loss of their preferred candidate or party in single-member districts, and increases the importance to these voters of their favored candidates and parties winning in proportional representation districts.

Proponents of reform envisioned regular alteration in power between two dominant parties and electoral competition based on policy alternatives that speak to contemporary issues.5 Increased party competition would help to lessen corruption and facilitate economic reform (Mishima 2005). Reformers also sought to engage a disaffected voting public by creating incentives for politicians and parties to appeal directly to voters while arming voters with the tools to hold politicians and parties accountable for their actions once in office. Arguably, reformers pursued the traditional

“promissory” form of representation wherein voters evaluate representatives based on their follow-through on promises made during the previous election cycle (Mansbridge

2003; 515). Japanese voters would finally be able to “kick the rascals out;” the principals

(voters) would be able to hold agents (elected representatives) accountable for violating the contract established during previous elections periods.

5 There is an extensive literature on the causes and consequences of electoral reform. See Christensen 1994; Cox et al. 1999; Curtis 1999; Horiuchi and Saito 2003; Krauss and Pekkenen 2004

15 Have there been significant shifts in how politicians think about representation in the aftermath of reform? In 1993, Feldman (2000) conducted a study of Diet members’

(N=87) motivations for becoming politicians that dovetails nicely with the earlier work by Wakata (1977). Though conducted immediately prior to electoral reform, Feldman argued that his findings remains valid seven years into the post-reform period. An important difference between these two studies is that Feldman does not limit himself to the promissory framework. Instead, he identifies four dominant types of Diet members- moral obligation participants, gamers, single-issue representatives, and status seekers who bear substantive similarities to (but again, do not cleanly overlap with) each of

Mansbridge’s four ideal types. There is a significant difference in tone between the

Wakata and Feldman studies that merits discussion, as it is this difference that makes the

Feldman study sit somewhat uneasily within the Mansbridge framework. Though this could be a by-product of the original research design, it is notable that none of representatives in the Feldman study saw their roles as in any way connected to constituents’needs. Representatives’ perceived roles were pure reflections of their own desires; voters were secondary at best. Representatives were devoted to “pet” issues that they educated themselves about purely as an enjoyable intellectual and moral exercise that they would have engaged in even if no one benefited from their efforts.

Representatives who were attentive to constituents viewed them as pawns that could be easily moved in one direction or another as they enacted new strategies to win.

On the surface, Feldman’s representatives bear some likenesses to our four modal representative types. With the exception of moral obligation participants, none seem to make any claims about the relation of their roles to the normative function of

16 representative democracy. Like gyroscopic representatives, Feldman’s moral obligation participants are predictable, in this case, in their adherence to a strong set of ethical principles. These are the advocates for clean, less corrupt politics. Moral obligation participants see their service as producing rewards (fair and ethical political standards) that are beneficial to the system at large. Gamers, like anticipatory representatives, are deeply invested in influencing voters but do so without strict regard for ideological positioning; they are purely in it for the competition. Like surrogates, some single-issue representatives advocate for national and international issues such as social welfare and environmental reform, issues of widespread importance beyond the geographic boundaries of their constituency- but, they would advocate for these issues even if they did not resonate broadly. Status politicians, over-represented in the sample and among conservative representatives, enjoyed the process of self-promotion and the attention and prestige that public office garnered. Again, if Feldman is believed, when overlap between representatives’ styles and constituents’ preferences occurs and mimics normative ideals, it is due more to serendipity than any deep philosophical commitment to producing better democratic outcomes.

Continuity in post-reform politics is most apparent in the cast of political characters. The LDP, in coalition with the New Komeito, retains a parliamentary majority. The DPJ constitutes a new opposition composed of LDP defectors and the remains the former opposition parties. Are these same actors expanding their representative styles in order to further their careers under a new electoral system?

Single member districts broaden and shake-up established geographical constituencies, and compel representatives seeking re-election to similarly broaden their appeals.

17 Subsequent to electoral reform, patterns in the distribution of public subsidies (pork) have shifted to reflect the changing geographical boundaries of representatives’ districts

(Hirano 2006). Resources (pork) are distributed in a more diffuse manner after reform.

But, this does not necessarily mean that an entirely different set of interests are being met. Diet members have seemingly put in just enough effort to grow their base of supporters, beyond that required for re-election in MMDs to meet the new threshold needed to survive in SMDs. There is seemingly little evidence that elected officials are changing the substantive style of representation.

4. Incentives for change

Feldman (2000) clearly found more continuity than change in representatives’ role perceptions, and was willing to stand by his findings. The 1996 Lower House elections, the first conducted under the new electoral system, did not significantly alter his reported findings based on his 1993 sample of Diet members (xxiii). Is this still true after the passage of another decade and the implementation of decentralization?

We are still trying to figure out how much and under what conditions the new electoral rules influence voters, candidates, and parties. Studies since have uncovered salient differences in vote choice in the 300 single-member districts (SMDs) and the 180 seats selected via proportional representation (PR) in 11 regional blocs the in the new mixed, side-by-side electoral system. Ticket-splitting between rounds has promoted debate about whether voters are making strategic decisions in SMDs while expressing their sincere preferences in the PR districts (Kohno 1997; Reed 1999). A loosening of partisanship and commensurate increase in voters unaffiliated with established parties

18 and support organizations has increased unpredictability at election time, making it imperative that parties and candidates appeal to the majority of voters who fall into this category (Tanaka 2003). Many politically engaged, but unaffiliated, voters are oriented toward international issues in addition to a deep concern with local politics. These concerns suggest that policy-oriented candidates (and programmatic parties) will be of greater interest to these voters (ibid.).

SMDs typically strengthen ties between the representative and constituent, allowing the former to act more independently of the party. PR districts may provide incentives for candidates (and parties) to appeal to a broader regional constituency to increase the appeal of the party’s list overall. It remains to be seen whether observed trends among voters will produced predicted changes among elected officials. Are party politicians changing their understanding of the business of representation beyond authorizing elections?

For more than a decade, has been considerable buzz about the emergence of a

“new style” or “new breed” of Japan politician (Crowell and Murakami 1996). “New” politicians have included Hashimoto Ryutaro, Hatoyama Yukio, Ota Masahide, Ishihara

Shintaro, Hashimoto Daijiro, Kitagawa Masayasu, Tanaka Yasuo, and Koizumi

Junichiro. Since many of these “new politicians” bear striking resemblances to old politicians in their paths to power (i.e. second, third, and fourth generation politicians; graduates of elite universities), one must wonder what is “new” about them and others who seek to follow in this same mold. Among the traits that have been use to identify elected officials as representative of a new breed are youth, partisan independence, isolation within mainstream parties, a “dynamic” and “strong” leadership style, and an

19 expressed commitment to listening to the public. Descriptively, they resemble the average politician while substantively the claim an interest in altering their relationship to the democratic process. These supposedly “new” candidates have on average been elected executives (prime ministers, governors, mayors) with very different electoral incentives. The prevalence and distribution of a “new breed” of elected official across different levels of politics is not independent of similarities and differences in how electoral and administrative reforms are experienced at the national, prefectural, and local level.

Koizumi modeled a new form of representation and might raise the stakes for politicians; voters expect more. How voters’ evaluations of the prime minister impacts their vote choices tells us something about how much commitments by indirectly elected politicians matter in selecting candidates and parties. Traditionally, there has been little connection between evaluations of the prime minister and voter support for parties and candidates under the multi-member district system (Kabashima and Imai, 2002). The

2000 represented a marked departure from the past. Former Prime Minister Mori’s unpopularity impacted voting behavior in the proportional representation districts; voters were more likely to vote for an opposition party even if they voted for the LDP candidate in the single-member districts, and tendency was even more pronounced among unaffiliated voters (ibid.). Other non-traditional and lower profile candidates –notably women- have been entering politics in higher numbers through PR races in national elections and by running for local assemblies (Ogai 2001).

Bureaucratic reforms and increasing fragmentation of the interest group universe has shifted more power into the legislative arena, providing opportunities for

20 representatives to assume more leadership in sponsoring policy. Similarly, circulation of manifestos provides an opportunity (as yet unfulfilled) for parties to present detailed policy alternatives to voters. Some argue that this process thus far has only served to expand the gap between voters’ expectations and promises that remain unfulfilled (Dolan

2003).

The process of administrative decentralization may also provide an impetus for changes at the local level that might hold implications for national politics. More of the fiscal responsibility of social welfare will be shouldered by local governments, altering incentives for voters to elect local politicians most closely aligned with the national party in power. Traditionally, local governments that have elected higher proportions of opposition party and nontraditional candidates have been in urban areas with larger tax bases to support local policy innovations (Scheiner 2006). As local governments assume increased responsibility for social welfare service provision, there are incentives to greater entrepreneurship and innovation at the local level. Greater citizen engagement with decision-making around and provision of social welfare services might open pathways to for new participants in this particular training ground for national level politics. Notably, the Seikatsu Network continues to make inroads into local level assemblies and independent governors have garnered significant attention from political spectators nationwide (Tanaka 2003).

5. Future Directions

My initial idea for this paper was to focus on practices of surrogate representation in Japanese politics after 1994. I was interested in whether Koizumi, a “maverick,” was

21 an anomaly, or a precursor of things to come. Is there evidence that individual politicians increasingly give voice to under-represented interests that extend beyond their local support bases in a strategic effort to advance their own careers? As I embarked on the enterprise of defining and locating evidence of “surrogate representation” in Japan, I concluded that our understanding of the range of styles that capture representative- constituent relationships in postwar Japanese politics is incomplete, making the task of examining continuity and change against the backdrop of socio-economic and institutional change a difficult one that is not altogether accomplished within the current paper. Instead of concentrating on surrogate representation, this paper quickly became an exercise in making sense of the ways in which Japan scholars talk about representatives’ role perceptions and voters’ evaluations of elected officials. I conclude with some thoughts about the future direction of work on representation in Japan.

First, there is a need to move beyond working within the rigid boundaries of the promissory model. The quality of the representative-constituent relationship in Japan has been measured against the normative criteria associated with promissory representation, and has been found lacking. One-party dominance violates basic assumptions about the control that voters exercise over candidates and parties through the ballot box. The threat of “kicking the rascals” out loses credibility if the competition is not perceived as viable.

At the same time, it is difficult to say that voters are definitely getting what they want if, again, there are no viable alternatives that can be rejected. While not arguing that the promissory model is inadequate, I suggest that it is worthwhile to think about other types of representative-constituent relationships that operate alongside the promissory model.

22 Doing so might help us to assess change in quality of representation over time, even in the absence of an alteration in power.

Second, there is pressing need and ample opportunity to compare the representative-constituent relationship across a) different types elections at different administrative levels, b) electoral systems (SMDs, MMDs, PR) with varying district sizes, c) policy arenas, and d) parties. While there has been extensive work on how institutional reforms have impacted candidates’ and parties’ electoral strategies with consequences for observed patterns of voting behavior, less work exists on stability and change in how representatives and constituents (re)negotiate their relationship to reflect evolving democratic norms such as commitments to giving the public more say.

Finally, better measurement and operationalization are needed. The Japanese case need not conform to any of the four types of representation that Mansbridge (2003) outlines. I have referenced them heavily within this paper to underscore the importance of thinking more broadly about how representation is evolving against the backdrop of electoral and administrative forms of the 1990s and beyond. Given that politicians do not keep promises and voting has not resulted in a change in political actors, it is essential that we think more substantively about what makes for “better” representation in politics.

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