THEME: PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE in EAST AFRICA: the ROLE of Nhris
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
EAST AFRICA COMMUNITY HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE
THEME: PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EAST AFRICA: THE ROLE OF NHRIs
Securing Democracy and the Rule of Law: NHRIs & Civil Society Organizations
December 7-11, 2015 Hilton Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya
Dr. Livingstone Sewanyana Executive Director Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) P.O. Box 11027 Kampala-Uganda Tel: 256-41-510263/510498/510276 Fax: 256-41-510498 E-mail: [email protected]
1 SECURING DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW: NHRIs & CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS Dr Livingstone Sewanyana†
OUTLINE
I. Situating National Human Rights Institutions II. Justification of CSOs-NHRIs Cooperation III. The Uganda Experience IV. CSOs-NHRIs Cooperation Experiences V. Opportunities for Engagement VI. Conclusion
INTRODUCTION Governmental support for democracy and human rights is on a steady decline across the African continent.1 Five African countries rank among the worst ten in political rights and civil liberties globally.2 This recession in democracy is not peculiar to Africa. The International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law reports a worldwide decline in democratic space.3 A growing number of governments are erecting barriers to rule of law, democracy and rights programs such as judicial independence, access to justice, free and fair elections and civic education, among others. More than ninety laws “constraining the freedoms of association or assembly” have been enacted since 2012.4 This trend explicates the interplay between local and global politics. By several accounts, two factors are at the core of anti-democracy sentiments: terrorist activity which has led to increased concerns about national security and mass uprisings such as the Arab Spring, 2011 and earlier revolutions (Rose, 2003 and Orange, 2004).5 These events marked a watershed in world affairs and spurred an epiphany among semi-authoritarian regimes: the transformative power of mass organization. This in turn precipitated a backlash against popular organizations such as NGOs, political parties, trade unions and think tanks, among others.6 There has been
†† Executive Director, Foundation for Human Rights Initiative, Uganda – Ph.D. (University of Cape Town), LL.M (University of Essex), LL.B (Makerere University School of Law). 1 States in this category include Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Central African Republic, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others. 2 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom- world/freedom-world-2014, last accessed October 16, 2015. The African countries among the worst ten are Central African Republic, Somalia, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan and Eritrea. 3 International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, A Mapping of Existing Initiatives to Address Legal Constraints on Foreign Funding of Civil Society, July 2014 available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/foreignfund/A%20Mapping%20of%20Existing%20Initiatives%20to %20Address%20Legal%20Constraints%20on%20Foreign%20Funding%20of%20Civil%20Society,%20July %202014.pdf, last accessed October 22, 2015. 4 Douglas Rutzen, Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism, International Journal of Not-For- Profit-Law 17, No. 1 (March 2015), pp. 5-44. 5 Id. 6 Id. 2 no exception to the pushback. Civil society as a whole – from humanitarian organizations to human rights advocacy groups has fallen victim.7 Detailed accounts of shrinking civic space are documented exhaustively elsewhere, and will not be reiterated.8 Instead, the paper draws attention to the difficulties born of these events and the role of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in safeguarding whatever liberties are left and expanding civic space for all. The role of NHRIs is examined in light of the Paris Principles on the Status of National Human Rights Institutions.9 The paper briefly recounts the history and legal framework of NHRIs to set the stage for an understanding of challenges faced by CSOs and opportunities for new and mutually beneficial forms of cooperation with NHRIs.
I. SITUATING NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS Obligations undertaken by states at the global level must evolve into concrete mechanisms of enforcement at the national level. African Union member states are under an obligation to respect democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance.10 The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union reiterated the duty to respect of the rule of law, human rights, the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law.11 In response, states have instituted structural frameworks to protect human rights at the sub-regional and national levels. The adoption of the Treaty Relating to the Establishment of the African Economic Community in 1991 saw the establishment of regional economic and integration bodies such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the East
7 International Human Rights Funders Group, Closing Space for Civil Society and Cross- Border Philanthropy, available at: https://ihrfg.wordpress.com/2014/10/20/closing-space-for-civil-society- and-cross-border-philanthropy/, last accessed October 22, 2015. 8 See e.g., Sarah E. Mendelson, Why Governments Target Civil Society and What Can Be Done in Response A New Agenda, Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015, available at: http://csis.org/files/publication/150422_Mendelson_GovTargetCivilSociety_Web.pdf, last accessed November 6, 2015; East Africa Civil Society Organizations Forum, Strengthening Civil Society in the Integration Process, Discussion Paper on the Environment for Civic Space in Uganda: Is Uganda a Militarized Operating Environment for CSOs?, available at: http://eacsof.net/upload/REPORTS/Analysis%20Civic%20Space/UGANDA%20Brief%20Discussion%20on %20Civic%20Space.pdf. Last accessed October 24, 2015; International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law, A Mapping of Existing Initiatives to Address Legal Constraints on Foreign Funding of Civil Society, July 2014 available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/resources/foreignfund/A%20Mapping%20of%20Existing%20Initiatives%20to %20Address%20Legal%20Constraints%20on%20Foreign%20Funding%20of%20Civil%20Society,%20July %202014.pdf, last accessed October 22, 2015. See also Thomas Carothers and Saskia Brechenmacher, Closing Space, Democracy and Human Rights Support under Fire, available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/closing_space.pdf, last accessed October 22, 2015. 9 Principles relating to the Status of National Human Rights Institutions (Paris Principles), GA Res. 48/134, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfNationalInstitutions.aspx, last accessed October 22, 2015. 10 Article 4 (m) Constitutive Act of the African Union, 2000/2001. 11 Article 4 (c) Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 2002/2003. 3 African Community (EAC) with courts/tribunals with jurisdiction over human rights violations. At the national level, states have established NHRIs. NHRIs bridge the global and the local, and while seemingly new, the UN first mooted the idea in 1946. This culminated in draft guidelines for their establishment in 1978, and later, the Principles relating to the Status of NHRIs (Paris Principles) in 1991.12 The importance of NHRIs has been emphasized over the years,13 and has led to recognition and privileges in UN structures.14 The mandate of NHRIs derives from either constitutions or statutes and varies from country to country. According to the Paris Principles, a NHRI should ideally possess the following traits: a broad mandate; independence, pluralism; adequate resources; and investigation powers.15 Overall, the mandate and powers of NHRIs include advising government on human rights matters; monitoring the implementation of regional and international obligations; investigating and adjudicating complaints of rights violations; research, publication and documentation; and civic education and/or mass sensitization on human rights. In line with these functions, NHRIs find themselves at the center of human rights protection. These functions, however, are not the sole reserve for NHRIs. Across the continent, CSOs have undertaken similar functions for decades and in some respects, predate NHRIs. The result is dual yet parallel functions, which warrant an investigation into opportunities for constructive forms of engagement.
II. JUSTIFICATION FOR CSOs - NHRIs COOPERATION There is a lack of congruity in the relationship between CSOs and NHRIs. While some CSOs and NHRIs work closely,16 others work independently and/or with minimal cooperation. Much like the nature of cooperation, the reasons for limited cooperation are varied. Some NHRIs are more inclined to building relationships with government institutions in order build trust and cooperate on specific human rights interventions. For these NHRIs, independence from the civil society, particularly the NGO sector is paramount.17 This is more likely the case where governments are hostile to CSOs and reticent to democratic reform. On the other end of the spectrum are NHRIs that are cautious about engagement with CSOs because of the large numbers and a perception that
12 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), National Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities, 2010 at 7, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/PTS-4Rev1-NHRI_en.pdf, last accessed October 28, 2015. 13 See e.g., UN Commission on Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/74: National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 20 April 2005, E/CN.4/RES/2005/74, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45377c883.html, accessed 12 November 2015. 14 In 2011 for instance, the United Nations Human Rights Council allowed “A” status NHRIs to formally participate in the nomination of country experts. For details see OHCHR, supra note 12 at 7. 15 See Paris Principles. 16 According to the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, the South Africa Human Rights Commission co-opts CSOs in its initiatives. The same source hails the Ghanaian Commission as one of the most progressive for establishing a quarterly NGO forum. (See, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, Civil Society and National Human Rights Institutions, available at: http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol13iss4/special_1.htm, last accessed October 30, 2015, p. 35). 17 OHCHR supra note 12 at 13. 4 they are ‘politically partisan, prone to inaccurate or exaggerated reporting of violations, too confrontational, lacking in adequate expertise themselves, and unrepresentative or driven by external/donor agendas.’18 On their part, CSO engagement with NHRIs is largely determined by the personalities in the governing body.19 The more progressive members of NHRIs appear, the higher the likelihood of cooperation.
• The importance of cooperation between CSOs and NHRIs has been emphasized over the years. The Paris Principles specifically call for cooperation with civil society including human rights organizations, coalitions and networks, persons with disabilities, community based organizations, faith-based groups, unions, social movements, victims’ relatives and public or para-public institutions.
The Paris Principles state:
In view of the fundamental role played by the non-governmental organizations in expanding the work of the national institutions, develop relations with the non- governmental organizations devoted to promoting and protecting human rights, to economic and social development, to combating racism, to protecting particularly vulnerable groups (especially children, migrant workers, refugees, physically and mentally disabled persons) or to specialized areas.20
The justification for CSO-NHRI engagement includes improvement of NHRIs’ access to the grassroots where the most disenfranchised abode. Across the globe, NHRIs rely heavily on CSOs for information and access to vulnerable groups. CSOs tend to have wide networks of CBOs and other community groups in remote areas. In this respect, they bridge the gap between the rural/urban poor and governments/NHRIs. It is thus judicious from a strategic point of view for NHRIs to cooperate with CSOs.
The ever-growing human rights field combined with the limited capacity of NHRIs presents a unique opportunity for engagement with CSOs. Several CSOs are specialized and highly resourceful in their areas of specialty. In addition, the sheer number of CSOs allows for indepth examination of a wide range of human rights issues. In contrast, the limited capacity of NHRIs hinders consistent analysis and investigation of the whole range of human rights issues. Newer areas such as climate change, trafficking in persons, privacy in the digital age, social security, to mention but a few, tend to remain on the periphery. CSOs could potentially serve as information hubs for non-core protection areas.
18 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, supra note 16 at 28. 19 Id. 20 Supra note 9. See also, United Nations Centre for Human Rights, National Human Rights Institutions – A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: available at: http://www.hrea.org/erc/Library/display_doc.php?url=http%3A %2F%2Fwww.ohchr.org%2FDocuments%2FPublications%2Ftraining4en.pdf&external=N as on 11 July 2011 last accessed November 6, 2015. 5 As government institutions, NHRIs have access to institutions that are ordinarily opaque and hostile to CSOs.21 Cooperation could ease the work of CSOs in areas such as inspection of detention centres and access to information. In the past, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) and the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) conducted joint prison visits. This collaboration gave FHRI a pass to places to where torture and other human rights violations were rife.
As key players in the national human rights protection system, NHRIs occupy a unique position, complete with unparalleled access to highly placed sources and influence on matters relating to human rights. Yet NHRIs cannot, in and of themselves, protect human rights. In this respect, the success of NHRIs depends in part on the vibrancy of civil society and the level and nature of engagement the two maintain.
III. THE UGANDA EXPERIENCE Many will agree that the human rights record of a state mirrors the space accorded to civil society. The proposition that an independent and active civil society is the bedrock of a democratic society cannot be understated. Civil society plays an important role in holding the state accountable and steering civic participation in governance at all levels. In Uganda, there is a paradox between rights as asserted by the law and rights as experienced by civil society. To overcome this anomaly, the government embarked on a tactical alignment of the law with practice. There has been a string of highly restrictive legislation in recent years that reveals a systematic use of the law to constrain freedoms. The ostensible goal is to safeguard national interests and security but the real aim is to disempower CSOs and stymie scrutiny of sensitive issues such as lucrative oil deals, electoral malpractices, excessive government spending and corruption. The result has been crippling legal barriers buoyed by mendacious propaganda that depicts CSOs as foreign agents. The freedoms of assembly, association and expression articulated in Article 29 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995 (Constitution) are the most affected. The paragraphs that follow offer a glimpse into CSOs experiences in Uganda.
In October 2013, the Public Order Management Act, 2013 (POMA) was signed into law. Section 8 thereof grants the police powers to regulate public meetings while Section 9 confers powers on police to determine suitable venues for conducting public assemblies. Organizers of public meetings must give police at least three days’ notice.22 Police has cited the law on several occasions as a justification for unlawful arrests. In March 2015, Phil Wilmot, the founder of Solidarity Uganda – a human rights organization based in Northern Uganda, was charged with holding an illegal meeting at a guesthouse in Lira and ‘recruiting people into activism’ contrary to sections 5 (1) and (8) of POMA.23
21 Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, supra note 16 at 35. 22 Article 5 (1) Public Order and Management Act, 2013. 23 Bill Oketch & Elizabeth Alaba, American charged over illegal assembly, Daily Monitor, March 12, 2015, available at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/American-charged-over-illegal- assembly/-/688334/2649956/-/spl9nqz/-/index.html, last accessed November 6, 2015. 6 In February 2014, the now annulled Anti-Homosexuality Act (AHA) criminalized natural and legal persons who supported or failed to report ‘unnatural’ sexual activities thereby thrusting CSOs in a situation where they could face prosecution for not reporting gays, lesbians and transgender persons to authorities. The Prohibition of Unnatural Sexual Practices Bill, 2014 replicates several AHA provisions. Also in 2014, the Anti-Pornography Bill, 2014 was enacted into law. The definition of pornography is vague and susceptible to abuse.24 The law has come under severe criticism for infringing personal freedoms and perpetrating sexism in a society where the prevalence of violence against women is recurrent.
In April 2015, the government introduced the Non- Governmental Organizations (Amendment) Bill, 2015. The clauses of the bill are a far cry from the stated objective of providing an enabling environment for NGOs. What is apparent is a swathe of provisions accurately described by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peace Assembly and Association as likely to “severely restrict the right to freedom of association” and to “have a detrimental impact on the formation and work of associations.”25 In response to concerns raised by civil society, the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs recommended significant revisions to align the bill with human rights. Indeed, a much more progressive version was passed by Parliament on November 27, 2015. The bill awaits presidential assent and the final text is yet to be availed to the public. It is however widely believed that the final version retains the original form of clause 40 (special obligations). The clause requires organizations to sign an agreement with every local government of the area it intends to work. The clause further prohibits work that is contrary to national interests, security and dignity of the people of Uganda. The clause does not enumerate prohibited acts, lacks clarity and likely to abet abuse and misinterpretation by authorities.
The legislative torrent aside, the overall operating environment for CSOs is a matter of concern. State forces often engage in circuitous and violent attacks against journalists and opposition politicians. As players at the frontlines, journalists suffer the brunt of state excesses in form of assault, confiscation of equipment and trumped-up charges.26 On January 12, 2015 police inflicted grievous harm on journalists covering a demonstration of a handful of unemployed youth.27 In 2013, the Daily Monitor and other outlets were shut
24 See, Centre for Domestic Violence & Others vs. Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 13 of 2014. 25 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Uganda / NGO Bill: UN human rights expert calls for meaningful consultations with civil society, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx? NewsID=16145&LangID=E#sthash.YLo2TZcq.dpuf , last accessed November 4, 2015. 26 Amnesty International, Rule by Law, Discriminatory Legislation and Legitimized Abuses in Uganda, available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr59062014en.pdf, last accessed November 9, 2015, p. 13. 27 Lilian Namagembe, Journalists Assaulted as Police Arrest Members of Unemployed Youth Group, Daily Monitor, January 12, 2015, available at: http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/-/688334/2586744/-/72h622/-/index.html, last accessed, November 7 down for ten days after publication of reports that President Yoweri K. Museveni was grooming his son, Brigadier Muhoozi Kainerugaba to succeed him as President. 28 In another example, in 2012, CSOs launched the Black Monday Movement—a campaign to create awareness about the dangers of corruption following reports of massive corruption in the office of the Prime Minister. In an unexpected move, the government arrested and charged participants with treason in a case that has since been dismissed.29
It is commonplace for police to disperse public gatherings. There are numerous reports of disruptions of peaceful and lawful assemblies with excessive force. The incidence of such events tends to surge during elections. In 2011, police dispersed campaigners for free and fair elections in Mbale, Eastern Uganda, by shooting in the air and spraying tear gas.30 Still in 2011, HRDs were subjected to physical surveillance, arrest and harassment. In the current election cycle (2015-2016), the media is under immense pressure not to host critical voices. Sensitive topics such as presidential term limits, repressive legislation and competence of the Electoral Commission are generally perceived as off-limits. On October 10, 2015, police officers undressed and dragged a Forum for Democratic Change party official along the Masaka- Mbarara (South West Uganda) high way. The official had accompanied Dr Kizza Besigye, the party flag bearer, to Rukungiri, Western Uganda to mobilize supporters ahead of presidential nominations that took place in November 2015.31 State excesses are common and speak volumes of the levels of impunity.
There is a security dimension to civil society experiences in Uganda. NGOs, particularly human rights advocacy organizations have fallen prey to unexplained burglaries. The thefts have had ripple effects: Some NGOs, according to Amnesty International, have counterintuitively “stopped or significantly changed their work on “sensitive” areas because of this targeting, including by self-censoring for fear of closure”32 while others have scaled-back their activities to avert collision with the state.33
IV. CSOs/NHRIs COOPERATION – EXPERIENCES While there are largely no requirements in domestic laws for NHRIs to cooperate with CSOs, some NHRIs have proactively established partnerships with CSOs. In Uganda,
10, 2015. 28 Supra note 26 at 14. 29 Amnesty International, Rule by Law, Discriminatory Legislation and Legitimized Abuses in Uganda, available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr59062014en.pdf, last accessed November 9, 2015, p.13. 30 Id. 31 Sadab Kitatta Kaaya, How FDC Woman was Undressed, Weekly Observer Newspaper, October 14, 2015 available at: http://www.observer.ug/news-headlines/40441-how-fdc-woman-was-undressed, last accessed November 9, 2015. 32 See e.g., Amnesty International, Rule by Law, Discriminatory Legislation and Legitimized Abuses in Uganda, available at: https://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/afr59062014en.pdf, last accessed November 9, 2015. 33 Id. 8 the UHRC has partnered with CSOs to foster respect for human rights since its inception in 1997. The nature of partnership has varied over the years and ranges from consultation to joint missions.
In response to shrinking civic space, some NHRIs have advocated for a favorable working environment for CSOs. In 2014, the UHRC organized a forum on the rights of HRDs to gain insight into their experiences. The forum informed an action plan on how to improve the working environment of CSOs.34 In its 17th annual report to the Parliament of the Republic of Uganda, the Commission recommended that the Uganda Law Reform Commission review the POMA to conform offending provisions with the Constitution.
On the whole, the NHRIs have stood in solidarity with HRDs. The UHRC for instance released two press releases this year condemning the brutal arrests of journalists.35 The Commission stated that such acts contravene Articles 24 (freedom from torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment) and 44 (non-derogable rights) of the Constitution. In addition, the Commission published a report on media freedoms in December 2014 and established a Human Rights Defenders Desk to ease engagement with HRDs by tracking their complaints and monitoring their rights.
NHRIs in Kenya, South Africa, Ghana and Uganda, among others, have formed alliances with CSOs on numerous occasions over the years. In 2009, for instance, the UHRC partnered with the civil society Coalition against Torture (CAT) to advocate for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 (now the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture Act 2012). Following the enactment of the law, the Commission organized a workshop in partnership with the Association for the Prevention of Torture and the African Centre for Treatment and Rehabilitation of Torture Victims to develop an action plan to ensure effective implementation of the law. On June 26, 2015, the Commission and members of CAT commemorated the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture under the theme ‘Fight torture; implement the law.’36
NHRIs-CSOs cooperation covers a wide spectrum – from joint investigations to mass sensitization programs. In 2014, the UHRC collaborated with several CSOs across the country to sensitize the public on human rights on a range of issues including land rights, corruption, children’s rights, women’s rights, the right to health, rights of refugees and the Prevention and Prohibition of Torture Act, 2012.37 In February 2015, the Commission
34 Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC), 17th Annual Report, 2014 at 128. 35 UHRC, Statement on Police Brutality against some Journalists, January 13, 2015. See also, UHRC, Statement on Saturday’s incident on police use of unnecessary force on Fatuma Naigaga, October 15, 2015. 36 UHRC, Joint Press Release, Commemoration of the UN Day in Support of Torture Survivors, June 26, 2015. 37 See UHRC Annual Report, supra note 34. 9 partnered with members of the Civic Education Coalition in Uganda to implement civic engagement programs through civic education.38
V. NEW ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES • As constitutional bodies, NHRIs enjoy legitimacy and credibility in government circles. NHRIs have relatively easy access to government institutions, power players and policymakers. The reports and recommendations of UHRC are for instance, subject to analysis by Parliament and the Standing Committee on Human Rights Affairs. In this regard, UHRC wields influence in the realm of human rights standard setting. CSOs and NHRIs could cooperate in this respect by jointly scrutinizing bills, conducting research and reviewing existing laws to improve the regulatory framework for CSOs. • • NHRIs could consider establishing a CSO-government forum to foster regular dialogue between civil society and government entities such as security forces in order to find common ground on sticking points such as vandalism of NGO premises, physical surveillance of HRDs, disruption of lawful assemblies, harassment of journalists, the role of police and its legal character as a non-partisan force, among others. A neutral meeting point facilitated by a NHRI will go a long way in enhancing understanding of the rights of HRDs and the role of the broader civil society among state forces.39
The Paris Principles construe the main responsibilities of NHRIs in terms of protection and promotion. The responsibility to promote human rights essentially includes fostering a ‘national culture of human rights where tolerance, equality and mutual respect thrive.’40 The Paris Principles further require the composition of NHRIs to be representative of ‘social forces’. The forces in question specifically refer to human rights NGOs, faith based organizations, institutions of higher learning and government departments. The Sub-Committee on Accreditation interpreted this provision to mean that the governing bodies of NHRIs should include various segments of society— including CSOs.41 In line with this interpretation, the NHRIs could consider co-opting CSOs in all programmatic aspects. NHRIs could for instance co-opt representatives of CSOs during monitoring visits. As bodies accountable to both the state and the public (Paris Principles) NHRIs should ensure that CSO voices are taken into consideration and addressed during investigations and reporting. This intervention will enhance civic participation.
38 Members include several government institutions and CSOs such as Judicial Service Commission, Office of the Prime Minister, Uganda National NGO Forum, Abantu for Development Uganda, among others. 39 OHCHR supra note 12 at 20. 40 Id., at 21. 41Para 2.1. International Coordinating Committee, Sub-Committee on Accreditation: General Observations, 2009, available at: http://www.ihrec.ie/download/pdf/genera_observations_sca.pdf, last accessed November 12, 2015. 10 The protection role on the other hand includes prioritization of the rights and security of HRDs. The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders recognizes the vulnerability of HRDs and urges states to establish protection mechanisms.42 The UHRC has made commendable efforts towards this end by establishing a desk for defenders at risk and working closely with CSOs specializing in protection of HRDs. However, more could be done by NHRIs to ensure timely and appropriate responses to threats before they materialize. This could take the form of regular and high level meetings with coalitions of HRDs to continually assess the situation and devise strategies on how best to operate in the current environment.
• NHRIs could institutionalize cooperation with individual CSOs or CSO coalitions for consultation and advisory purposes. Potential areas of cooperation include joint research and publications, awareness campaigns, fact-finding and information sharing. Cooperation in these areas will limit duplicity of work and promote efficient utilization of limited resources. The advantage of formal partnerships over ad hoc and informal arrangements is that the former tend to delineate roles of individual players and are thus likely to be more effective.
VI. CONCLUSION As players with similar and overlapping mandates, cooperation between NHRIs and CSOs presents an opportunity for mutual benefit and coordinated protection of human rights, promotion of the rule of law and democracy. The success of NHRIs greatly depends on the vibrancy of civil society. CSOs have networks across the country and the ability to reach the most vulnerable. In this way, they create pathways to NHRIs by for instance, lodging complaints on behalf of those who cannot. On the other hand, it is much more difficult for CSOs to operate effectively in isolation. Monitoring and documentation of human rights violations requires access to information, unfettered mobility and a level of ‘legitimacy’ in government circles/institutions. Only a few CSOs meet this threshold. CSO-NHRI cooperation is therefore strategically important for both players and key to effective human rights protection.
42 United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders, G.A. Res. A/RES/53/144 available at: http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Declaration.aspx, last accessed, November 12, 2015. 11