Degree Programme: Msc Violence, Conflict and Development

Degree programme: MSc Violence, Conflict and Development Course Title: Political Economy of Violence, Conflict and Development

Case study Presentation.

IN “CONFLICT CONUNDRUMS”:

YEMEN: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS

الجمهورية اليمنية

Date: May 5th 2010

2 الجمهورية اليمنية

MYTH 1 – “It’s just another religious war! The same old Sunni-Shiite divisions have resurfaced in Yemen this time, much like Iraq.”

The common "Shi'ite rebellion" (misleading) story: Yemen is not torn by Sunni-Shiite divisions, much like Iraq. The conflict between the Houthi rebels in the North and the government has been repeatedly portrayed as a religiously-motivated affair (Shiite resistance against a Sunni establishment) but this is misleading and oversimplified.

The religious factor is quite irrelevant as a root explanation of the conflict - Generally, there is no clear divide between Sunni Shafi’is and Shiite Zaydis in Yemen (Bonnefoy 2008): although the Shiites (members of the Yemeni Zaidi sect of Islam1) tend to live in the north and northwest while the Sunnis predominate in the south and southeast it has never been a major national divide according to sectarian lines. - The Houthis are Zaydis, who practise a form of Shi’a Islam prevalent in northern Yemen’s highlands. They are calling for freedom of worship and social justice. They develop a strong anti imperialist discourse, “shout against the powerful and arrogant”. They also accuse the government of corruption, and of meddling with the delicate religious balance between Zaydi Shi’as and Salafi Sunnis. They are notably alarmed by Saleh’s perceived support for Salafi groups aligned with Saudi-style Wahhabi Islam (growing influence over Zaydi tradition). - The religious factor is not however a direct cause of conflict. It has been mainly used as a rhetoric tool. Especially in the government narrative: to raise cash and munitions to prosecute his war, President Saleh internally depicts the conflict as being against Zaydi “revivalists” (to restore imamate against Republic); and regionally he cynically manipulates Saudi fears of Shi’a unrest on the Yemen–Saudi border, being manipulated by Iran. - The uprising did not started as a sectarian skirmish but originated with the arrest of hundreds of Hussein al-Houthi followers in 2002, after he made a lecture inciting his fellow Zaydis to fight the ‘U.S hegemony on the Arab and Muslim world’. The authorities, allied on the WOT since 2001, were pushed by the U.S made these arrests (See interview with Samy Dorlian, April 2010, Paris) [The war broke out in 2004 and developed thorough six ‘rounds’ until last February of 2010 when the last truce was signed. The military attacks (major operation in 2009) and the indiscriminate bombings caused heavy civilian casualties and an IDP crisis.]

The main grievances are political and economical -The rebellion is also (and mainly) fuelled by bitter local grievances over economic marginalization, market access and the lack of service infrastructure in the Sa’dah region, which was voluntarily left underdeveloped after 1970 (this ‘ostracism’ is due to the fact the region was the only part not militarily taken by the Republicans, only enter the Republic through “reconciliation”).2 In other words, the conflict is largely due to the failure of the government to take the issue of underdevelopment seriously and to engage and represent all citizens give them the chance of fair and equal representation thorough democratic process. -Political motivations: there is no (clear) major political demand from the Houthis (e.g no cessation claim like in the South) – conflict is more a reactionary process against attacks from Central power. Some argues that the conflict is also a proxy-war for Saleh’s succession.3

1 See Bonnefoy (2007, 2008); Weir (1997); Chatham House (2010). ‘Yemen’s Zaydi Shi’as take their name from Zayd ibn Ali, whom they recognize as the Fifth Imam in the Shi’a succession. They settled in Yemen’s highlands during the ninth century. Their doctrine is distinct from Twelver Shi’ism, the dominant branch of Shi’a Islam, found in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain. In 1962, the last Zaydi immam was overthrown and the Yemeni Arab Republic is delcared in Sanaa’. Zaydis are usually of either the Bakil or Hashid tribes (Paluch). 2 In 1962, the revolution toppled the Zaydi Shi’a Imam and established the modern Republic. Between 1962 and 1970, fights continued between the royalists supported by Saudi Arabia and the republicans backed by Egypt. 3 “The government’s military campaign is conducted by army commander and Salafi convert Ali Muhsin, a Sanhan kinsman of the president who is widely expected to play a powerful role as kingmaker during a future succession. Rumours abound of rivalry between Ali Muhsin and President Saleh’s son Ahmed, whose Republican Guard has also deployed in Sa’dah. Several Yemeni newspapers have claimed there is a proxy war between the two men’s forces, under the cover of quashing the Houthis.” (Chatham House, 2010).

-The alleged regional dimension(s) of the conflict: a Shiia v.s Sunni proxy war? Despite the allegations that Iran has been funding the Al-Houthi group and the fact that Saudi Arabia has been militarily involved and supported the government in the war, and while the medias try to emphasise the regional dimension of the conflict, it is and remains primarily an internal issue.

The potential for religious cleavages to become salient This is not a religious conflict. As A. Sen and D. Turton reminds us, identity acts as a vehicle through which to mobilize people, yet differences between people's religious and ethnic ideologies are weak motivations in themselves to take violent action. Wedeen (2008) warns that caution is should be exercised regarding the “multiplicity of Yemeni identities and their availability for political mobilization”. -However, while Zaydi v.s Shafi’i (Shiia v.s Sunni) divide is not the main cause of conflict, this was increasingly used in both sides’ rhetoric in order to mobilise support. By bringing religious identity into their discourses to justify conflict (‘Sectarianisation of politics’), a reasonable fear exists that this could hinder the Republican religious compromise which, for the purpose of national unity, aimed at overrunning Zaydi/Shafii divide by promoting convergence of religious identity.4 -Also, the violence involved in the conflict exacerbates the resentment against its perpetrator and increases the propensity for further violent episode.

MYTH 2 – “Tribalism is what is undermining the State! Establishing a centralised form of authority never works when kinship ties are valued over all other loyalties. Tribes are nothing but traditional warriors and prevent the state-building project.”

Definition of ‘tribe’ Tribes constitute “territorial polities whose members share a common allegiance, which exist in a matrix of similar polities with which they have relations, and which have always been potentially or actually formally subordinate to some kind of state” (Weir, 2007:2).

Historical development of tribes in the North Despite imposition of ‘Dawlahs’ (units of governance) in the 9th century, established by the Zaydi Shi’ite colonists, tribes maintained substantial politico-judicial autonomy and were well armed (Weir, 2007). The dawlahs differed from the Weberian model of the state and failed to monopolize the means of violence and enlist society. The government has consistently had to bow down and adapt to their systems as a means to dominate and gain control through rather than against tribal networks. To recognize the complexity of tribe/state relations and to ask for both, the nature of tribal networks and the nature of the state when arguing one undermines the other is essential when thinking about a more peaceful future for Yemen.

The al-Huthi rebellion as a borderland conflict • peripheral status to the centre5; outward trading routes over the mountains to Saudi Arabia. • mountainous topography (see Scott, 2009, for a discussion on how topography can prevent making a society ‘legible’ to the state). • strong tribal networks (see Anderson and O’Downd, 1999, for a discussion on how social ties such as religion, ethnicity, language and other forms of social identity can prevent a society’s incorporation into the state project) and distrust of the state (Day, 2008). • low administrative intensity (Goodhand, 2008), which leads to few social services but does not preclude the presence/use of state force. Contrary, the state experiences a heightened need for repression and, coupled with few restraints, leaves borderlands particularly vulnerable for indiscriminate state violence 6 (Ron, 2003).

4 E.g the new school books ignored the theological differences, also the creation of Sunni scientific institutes influenced by Saudi (actually undermining religious diversity and some popular traditions) (Bonnefoy, 2008). 5 For North Western tribes the areas south were referred to as “al-yaman”, suggesting the perception that they do not reside in Yemen themselves (Weir, 2007) 6 The violent attack on the al-Huthi’s organization Believing Youth took place in the peripheral region of Sa’da, in 2004. In the next year the government undertook many on-the-spot executions in the mountains of Sa’da (Wedeen, 2008).

• emergence of al-Huthi as a politico – military formation (see Goodhand, 2008, for a discussion on the double diamond model) in a conflictual but ongoing conversation with the state7.

Yemeni Identities as a factor affecting conflict

Essentially identities, both tribal and religious are being politically-manipulated in the interests of the GPC government, however, certain cultural practices, tendencies and values rooted in tribalism do arguable influence the methods of governance employed by Saleh, which are leading to instability & conflict.

Tribes & the state: There is a strong preference for establishing economic relationships with member of the same tribe, because any disputes arising from transactions are more easily resolved within the tribe and this avoids inter-tribal conflict (Weir refers specifically to the tribes in the North-western Razih area). Tribes resolve conflicts internally and make efforts to minimize intra-tribal violence (Weir p.11). Hashid and Bakil tribes are particularly important strategically because of their influence, strong groups. Both are Northern. Securing their loyalty is a priority for leaders in Yemen. ‘ Segmentary theory’ in Anthropology explains how tribal organization can replace weak government institutions by maintaining order in society. Some tribes in Northern Yemen do display characteristics of ‘segmentary’ systems and provide another form of localized government at a community/ family-level (see Weir). - E.g. in Yemen during 1994 Civil war.

If kinship &patronage is valued as a means of economic growth, the imposition of Western models of governance will fail unless it accounts for and makes significant and visible attempts to integrates people’s core behavioral patterns and values as much as possible, rather than just condemning what is an inherent part of Yemeni culture. Besides, there is logic in the tribal methods of survival, as Weir points out in her studies of tribes in the Razih area:

“Everyday economic relations are governed by the idea of generosity and mutual aid which are among the primary ideals of ‘tribalism’. Every act and gift is noted and evaluated, and failure to reciprocate can weaken the relationship. It is preferable to carry-out economic transactions with members of the same tribe, because any disputes arising from transactions are more easily resolved and do not escalate into inter-tribal conflict” (Weir p.34).

It is arguable that this culture of ‘arah-wa-baddah’ (mutual exchanges) has infiltrated into Yemeni politics and governance. Perhaps the value placed on mutual assistance and favorable exchange in Yemeni culture is not simply compatible with western models of economic and political organization? Saleh has prized his nephews, brother and son with influential positions (notably the control of state security forces), throwing a “Sanhan ‘ring of steel’ around his palace” with “webs of personal loyalty” (Hill, 2010).

However, other scholars argue that the nepotism, clientelism & patronage networks which underpin Saleh’s current regime do not originate in tribal practice or affiliations (see Manea). In reality, tribal communities have witnessed the estrangement of their leaders as they became absorbed in state-level government and no longer feel represented by them. Consequently the entry of tribal leaders into government positions has arguably weakened tribal bonds.

It is true that Saleh’s “inclusive patronage system” clearly extends far beyond favoring his fellow- Sanhan or Hashid clan members, also including opposition politicians, businessmen and religious extremists (i.e. anyone who is influential and might potentially jeopardize his position of power). But nonetheless it is still possible that the very practice of utilizing ‘arah-wa-baddah’, mutual exchanges, as an acceptable way of interacting and meeting people’s needs, has stemmed from Yemeni tribal

7 Immediately after the self-identified Zaydi (Shi’i) cleric Badr al-Din al-Huthi’s was killed by the government, his father went to Sa’na and commenced negotiations with Saleh. He returned to Sa’da without an agreement (Weeden, 2008).

5 الجمهورية اليمنية culture and the common practice of paying stipends to tribal Shieiks. It cannot be expected for his rule to disregard the dominant ways of gaining cooperation in Yemen, which in undoubtedly influenced by tribal methods of progress.

MYTH 3 – “There is conflict because the country is poor: People are angry because they do not have their basic needs covered.”

It has been broadly discussed the nexus between poverty and conflict and there is not a consensus agreeing on poverty leading to conflict per se. At the same time it could be argued that it is precisely the continuum of conflict which can lead to poverty (Goodhand 2003).

Yemen context has specific singularities that aggravate poverty: 1. Food security The country is highly dependent on food imports, estimated around 80%. The consequence of increases in food prices is that household spending more than 65% of their incomes(irin news). 2. Water scarcity The use of water is about 10 times faster than it is being naturally replaced (DFID annual report). Water markets in Yemen are mostly privatized and poorly regulated; Water transfers between rural and urban areas are often a source of conflict between water corporations that supply water to urban areas and rural farmers.

Demography In addition to these two components, the demographic context of the country is perhaps the major concern when thinking about The country has doubled in 20 years 12.3 million 24.3 million (UNPD 2009)with an average demographic growth of 3 times the world average. As a result we have a country where the medium age of the population is around 16 years old, and the adult illiteracy arrives to 41% of the total(UNDP 2009). This could fit into Collier and Heoffler higher percentage of population between 15-24 along with scarce number of years of schooling lead to conflict. .

The expulsion of 1 million Yemeni workers from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait during the Gulf War worsened the unemployment rates and supposed a economic lost due to the consequent lack of remittances .

In this context, the arrival of Refugees from the Horn of Africa suppose another demographic pressure for Yemen. It is the only country in the Arab peninsula that ratified the 1951 refugee Convention, and its 1967 Protocol that gives Somalis refugee status on a prima facie basis. In 2008 the number of refugees from the Horn of Africa countries increased in 70%.According to UNHCR, there are 172.769 refugees registered (UNHCR February 2010), however government’s estimates only in 2008 were 300.000.

Inequalities Although the poverty rates, we should consider the unequal distribution of those scarce resources as one of the main driver for dissatisfaction: Among Yemeni governorates there are huge differences in poverty: from 5.4% to 71% (WB,UNDP and Yemen Government 2007). These huge differences among the different governorates, make these inequalities more visible and as a consequence of this perceived unfair situation, social relations deteriorate (Cramer 2003). This is accentuating the rural to urban migration as rural poverty accounts for 82% of the total poor in the country (UNDP, WB and Yemen government). Increasing population in urban areas looking for a better access to services and job opportunities: Urban population accounts for 31.8% of the total population and it is estimated to reach 45.3% in 2030 (estimated figures United Nations Popular Division, the 2009 Revision Population Database). At the same time as the same author suggests, although economic inequality is hugely important to explain civil conflict this is only if we accept that it is inseparable from the social, political, cultural and historical context (Cramer 2003). In this regard it is relevant the existing unequal political power in the parliament after the 2004 Civil War. Saleh’s government passed a series of constitutional reforms without popular referendum that has centered and broadened its own power and diminished the opposition (south).

MYTH 4 – “It is all about the oil!! – Yemen is suffering from the resource curse that is the reason why there is large-scale violence. Paul Collier is right. They are just being greedy!”

It is true that oil revenues do have a major influence on the political situation in Yemen. It is no coincidence that conflict has erupted just at the time that revenues from their limited oil reserves have started to dwindle. Crude oil production has declined from a peak of 460,000 barrels per day in 2002 falling by 12% in 2007 to the current rate of 300–350,000 barrels per day. Also Yemen’s economy is extremely fragile and it has been infected by the Dutch disease. Whereby it is highly dependent on its reserves both for domestic consumption and for export. Whilst Yemen’s oil sector provides 90% of export earnings and 75% of government revenue of which 35% of oil produced is consumed domestically.

How has Yemen fallen under the resource curse? For over 30 years President Saleh has been using a divide a rule strategy to govern Yemen by playing tribal sheikhs against one another and using the revenues to maintain loyalty. Now that oil revenues are falling the bargaining power of President Saleh has diminished.

But is the violence motivated by greed or are there grievances? It should be noted that Yemen has had a history of conflict, even before the discovery of oil reserves in 1984 and the Unification in 1989. There have been a number of outbreaks of violence not only between the North and the South but also internally within their own states.

In the South It could be argued that the South succession movement is due to greed, there has not been an even distribution of oil revenues – despite the 50-50 agreement during unification. However the secessionist Groups in the south have largely refrained from violent action. Whilst there have been violent protests but these have largely been due the excessive force used by state authorities.

With regard to the Al Houthis group in the North economic rent seeking would be the obvious answer. Their motivation is still unclear, the uprising began after the assassination of their leader. There are also a number of other grievances as mentioned earlier i.e. arms trade along the border / ideology which could provide incentives to continue maintaining stability.

Whilst the discovery of oil has only exacerbated the underlying struggle of exerting state control then it was inevitable there would be violence in unified Yemen due to the fragile nature of the sources of power and the strategy used to maintain that power.

MYTH 5 - “Yemen is a failed state, that’s why it’s attracting Al Qaeda terrorists and all those Islamic extremist!”

Failed states have become a critical issue in contemporary international relations. “The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS) famously suggested that the US was threatened more by failing than conquering states...” (Hehir, 2007). Proponents of the war on terror routinely identify failed states as causal variables in the threat posed by global terrorism.

Do failed states breed terrorism? The argument linking failed states to terrorism has been repeatedly made and widely endorsed, however there is a lack of any correlation between a state’s level of failure and the presence of terrorist groups and the states listed in the top 20 on the Failed State Index exhibit significant differences with respect to the incidence of terrorism. Certain ostensibly failed states have acted as the locus for terrorist groups but the motivation behind the decision to establish a base in these states does not equate with either a generic quality of state failure inherently attractive to terrorist organizations or the particular attractiveness associated with the breakdown of law and order. The fact that these states exhibited some of the indicators of failure is less important than the nature of the intra-state conflicts (e.g.: Islamic people involved in conflict do not suggest that Muslims are unusually

7 الجمهورية اليمنية prone to resorting to terrorism but rather to demonstrate that Islamic terrorist groups are attracted to states where their co-religious are engaged in a conflict). Many stable Western states exhibit features which actually attract terrorist cells. Giles Keppel notes how Scandinavia’s generous welfare system and efficient communication and trade network contrived to make Stockholm and Copenhagen ‘safe havens’... (Hehir, 2007).

Is Yemen a failed state? Yemen is not a failed state but a fragile state. The regime has central control of power and the primary means of violence (its administrative capacity might have weaken but its coercive one has been strength mostly by external military aid) There are political parties, multi-party elections, direct presidential vote, women suffrage, parliament in which there are (still) political debates and comparatively (to other arab countries) free press. There are presidential and parliamentary regular elections; although they are superficial due to the authoritarian regime There have been and there are development plans and several rounds of financing by the IMF (third five- year development plan adopted in 1988) The regime has legitimacy on the international and regional stage and is influenced by that outside world. Yemen takes very much into account the donors’ perceptions of its political and economic trajectory.

Should all violent acts in Yemen be seen as terrorism? Unrest in Yemen has taken the form of tribal clashes, kidnapping, military tribal confrontations, demonstrations and bomb attacks. Kidnapping has been a long-standing and more or less accepted feature of Yemeni society. Taking hostages was practiced both by tribes and by the Imam’s government, and kidnappings often occurred during tribal disputes. Deliberate kidnapping and attacks on foreigners is a recent phenomenon which violates traditional norms and have received the greatest international attention, but attacks on ministers, governors and other state employees are much more common. (ICG Report Yemen, n° 8, 2003) Although there is little doubt concerning the presence of al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen or the links between Yemeni and foreign militant Islamist organisations, the radicalisation of Yemen’s Islamists and the violence that continue to plague the country stem from a complex reality in which governmental policies and tribal conflicts play no small part. International intervention and war on terror rhetoric, play a big part on Yemen’s foreign perception and the international community has not recognised the Huthi potential for destabilising the country. This is partly related to the West’s single-minded focus on Yemen’s struggle with al-Qaeda and the regime’s portrayal of the Huthis as a subset of the so-called war on terror. (ICG, 2009) Yemen’s population, comprising both Shiites and Sunnis, has also been the target of proselytising by Saudi Arabia’s conservative Wahhabi Sunni strain of Islam. The Yemeni government may, like other states, use the cover of anti-terrorism efforts to pursue its own, unrelated political objectives and that it might bend the rule of law in ways that risk generating broader anti-government feeling, thus creating new recruitment opportunities for militant Islamist groups (as the involvement in counterterrorism operations). (ICG Report Yemen, n° 8, 2003)

Conclusion

Whilst the state capacity expanded during the transition period post-unification, the control of the state was still limited by its conflicting societal dynamics. To conclude the way in which Yemen’s problems have been framed has allowed for the emergence of a discourse which portrays the country as a soon to be failed state. Not only does this conceal the deep rooted and localized problems of the country, it also prescribes interventions which exacerbate its downward spiral.

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INTERVIEWS

-Interview with Samy Dorlian, Paris, April 6th 2010 -Interview with Laurent Bonnefoy, Paris, April 7th 2010 -Interview with Franck Mermier, Paris, April 14th 2010

VIDEOS

 Al Jazeera

Riz Khan: Can Yemen regain stability? [8/10/2009] Accessed 2/04/2010: Part one http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1k_AT95nls Part two http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xr68btS61ng&feature=channel

Riz Khan - Yemen; a failed state? - 4 Jan 2010 Part 1 [http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/rizkhan/2010/01/2010157245823603.html]

Ceasefire holds in Yemen UPDATED ON: FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2010 [http://english.aljazeera.net/news/middleeast/2010/02/201021232525667689.html]

Can the West save Yemen? UPDATED ON: WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2010 [http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2010/01/2010126141557664307.html]

Focus on Yemen's future UPDATED ON: WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 2010 [http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/insidestory/2009/08/2009813142456343526.html]

Samy Dorlian RFI: [http://sites.radiofrance.fr/chaines/france-culture2/emissions/enjeux_inter/fiche.php? diffusion_id=78499]