What Changed the Ivory Coast from an Example of Economic Development Into a Bloodbath

What Changed the Ivory Coast from an Example of Economic Development into a Bloodbath, and how can Developing Countries everywhere Learn from their Example? By Nels Hansen For E297A, Fall 2003 I - Introduction

The Ivory Coast has gone from the model post-colonial African society to a country filled with turmoil, bloodshed, revolution, and poverty in little more than a decade. This report will detail that progression, the good times which now seem so far away as to be unimaginable, and a proposal to grant the country a renewed peace and stability, in a more permanent and sustainable fashion. This report contends that the source of the

Ivoirian conflict was ethnically divisive politics and economic policy, which created a vast rich-poor gap that Charles Taylor of Liberia exploited to further destabilize the region and get the United Nations off his back. II, A – The Precolonial History

The Ivory Coast, at least to western eyes and historians, doesn’t really have a history prior to the 17th century, when “France made its initial contact with Cote d'Ivoire in 1637 when missionaries landed at Assinie near the Gold Coast (now Ghana) border.” (1) Most histories consulted note that this initial contact was short-lived due to fear of the denizens of the area. These early ‘explorers’ were actually “French Capuchin monks”(3) who, upon arrival at Assinie, were engaged in combat, with the survivors fleeing to a Portugese settlement at Axim(3). Despite what one might think, “The Côte d'Ivoire lies too far west to have been significant in the 17th and 18th century development of the Guinea coast gold, and slave trade.” (2) Thus it was not really of much interest excepting the occasional trading vessel’s captain that happened by, such as one by the name of De

Bellefond in 1666(3) and one by the name of Du Casse in 1667, who signed a never- acted-upon treaty with the King of Komenda (3), and the interior remained largely untouched by Europeans until the 19th century; however, it was, in the 18th century,

“invaded by two related Akan groups – the Agnis who occupied the southeast and the

Baoules who settled in the central section.” (1) The only European settlement in this early time was a French fort built at Assinie in 1701, and successfully defended against a

Dutch attack in 1701 but was abandoned by 1704 (3), the fort likely having been built following a friendlier reception by two Dominican monks in 1687 than that received by the Capuchin 50 years prior (3).

There were, however, important states prior to this pre-colonial period itself. Ghana, a

Sudanic empire, was around from the 4th to the 13th century. The Sudanic empires were able to control trade routes using their military forces, and their great cities of Djenne,

Gao, and Timbuctu became centers of Koranic scholarship (4). That is, after their leaders converted to Islam in the 11th century or so, before which time they had followed various indigenous religions. Not all were happy with this transition of course; the successor to

Ghana, the Mali empire, collapsed in “factional warfare” (4) that led the non-Islamic elements of its society to flee southward into the present-day Ivory Coast as well, though most of the people who ended up in the north from this period were converted to Islam eventually anyways. The south of the country in the pre-European period was dominated by jungle, and the inhabitants lived off the land in small villages.

There were several important kingdoms in-between the first French visitors to the Ivory

Coast and the actual settlement and conquest of the Ivory Coast by the French. “The

Muslim empire of Kong was established by the Juula in the early eighteenth century in the north-central region inhabited by the Sénoufo, who had fled the Islamization under the Mali Empire.” (4) This empire fragmented, and its capital was destroyed by the

African resistance leader Samori Touré, who later was one of the most significant sources of resistance to French rule. “The Abron kingdom of Jaman was established in the seventeenth century by an Akan group, the Abron, who had fled the developing Asante confederation in what is present-day Ghana.” (4) And lastly, “other Akan groups fleeing the Asante established a Baoulé kingdom at Sakasso and two Agni kingdoms, Indénié and Sanwi.” (4) These groups were more resistant to the French occupation than most and maintained separatist desires even into the 1960’s, and perhaps beyond. II, B – the French control of the Ivory Coast

These political developments in the region were brought to their knees by the invasion of the French, who first maintained control over the coastal regions before extending their dominion inward to all of the present day territory. In the words of interKnowledge

Corporation, “Although a French protectorate was established over the coastal zone in

1842, the interior remained free from European control until the very end of the century.”

(2) More specifically, “In 1843-44 Admiral Bouet-Williaumez signed treaties with the kings of the Grand Bassam and Assinie regions placing their territories under a French protectorate.” (1) The cause of this was probably the futility of expending the effort to control it at the time. However, later on, in order that French territorial claims to the region be recognized by the British and that the French exploitation of the land and its people be undisturbed by unruly locals, the French went ahead and invaded the inland regions and subjugated the people therein.

“Cote d'Ivoire officially became a French colony in 1893. Captain Binger who had explored the Gold Coast frontier was named the first governor.” (1) However, even before he showed up, “After 1870, France undertook a systematic conquest; although a protectorate over the entire country was proclaimed in 1893, strong resistance by the indigenous people delayed French occupation of the interior.” (6) One manifestation of this resistance was the previously mentioned Samori Touré, who, in “1871 - Samoury

Touré conquiert la vallée du Haut-Niger et fonde un empire malinké” (7), which this report translates as “Samori Touré conquered the upper-Niger valley and founded an empire based on his tribe, the Malinkes.” He remained a thorn in the side of the French until, in 1898, “French campaigns against Samori, which were met with fierce resistance, intensified … until he was captured.” (4) M. Touré’s empire at its peak “extended over large parts of present-day Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire” (4) and “[his] large, well-equipped army … could manufacture and repair its own firearms.” (4) The

French invasion really took off when, “In 1886, to support its claims of effective occupation, France again assumed direct control of its West African coastal trading posts and embarked on an accelerated program of exploration in the interior.” (4) As a result, the French achieved their goal when, “in 1889 Britain recognized French sovereignty in the area,” (4) and thus the French were assured of their rights to exploit the land and people in relative peace. “France named Treich-Laplène titular governor of the territory,”

(4) but he governed only until 1893 when the Ivory Coast became an official French colony and Captain Binger was given control.

“Agreements with Liberia in 1892 and with Britain in 1893 determined the eastern and western boundaries of the colony, but the northern boundary was not fixed until 1947 because of efforts by the French government to attach parts of Upper Volta (present-day Burkina Faso) and French Sudan (present-day Mali) to Côte d'Ivoire for economic and administrative reasons.” (4) (Refer to Appendix A for geographical information) Shortly thereafter, “In 1904, the French named [the Ivory Coast] part of French West

Africa.” (5) The French-appointed governer of the region, “Angoulvant, who had little prior experience in Africa, believed that the development of Côte d'Ivoire could proceed only after the forceful conquest, or so-called pacification, of the colony.” (4)

“However pacification was not accomplished until 1915.” (1) That pacification was somewhat exaggerated, as shall be seen later on. In the mean time, however, the first

World War was brewing in Europe. According to the Columbia University

Encyclopedia, however, “several thousand of its troops fought with the French during World War I, but effective French control over the area was not established until after the war.” (6) 1915 and the end of the War are pretty close, but this indecision about the exact date of ‘pacification’ underscores the fact that the native population was never entirely at rest, and was merely waiting for the appropriate moment to regain control over its independent destiny.

That moment came when, “During World War II, the Vichy government worked hard to quash the nascent nationalist movements in west Africa, but after the war, efforts redoubled to gain independence.” (5) To set the stage for this change, one must consider that “Assimilation was practiced in Côte d'Ivoire to the extent that after 1930 a small number of Westernized Ivoirians were granted the right to apply for French citizenship.

Most Ivoirians, however, were classified as French subjects and were governed under the principle of association.” (4) This principle of association is that the Ivoirians were subject to the rule of French law by association with the French colonial government, but were not eligible to become French citizens or to participate in government. Eventually, though, “after the assimilation doctrine was implemented entirely, at least in principle, through the postwar reforms, Ivoirian leaders realized that even assimilation implied the superiority of the French over the Ivoirians and that discrimination and inequality would end only with independence.” (4) With regards to the second world war, “Although

Vichy forces held Côte d'Ivoire during World War II, many left to join the Free French forces in the Gold Coast (now Ghana).” (4) In the years after World War II, desire to gain independence grew among the Ivoirians, and one “Félix Houphouët-Boigny, a planter and founder of the federation-wide

Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), formed (1946) the nationalist Parti

Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI).” (6) The French eventually held a national referendum on autonomy, and the Ivoirians “In the French constitutional referendum of

1958 … chose autonomy within the French Community.” (6) II, C – The Rule of Félix Houphouët-Boigny

After independence, Félix Houphouët-Boigny was elected President, and remained in that position for over 30 years. “By the end of 1946, the PDCI achieved its political monopoly by bargaining with potential contenders, rather than through open competition.

In any event, the party received widespread support throughout the country. For example, an African could be elected in Côte d'Ivoire only with the endorsement of the PDCI.” (4)

“The organization of the PDCI, based on that of the French Communist Party, was determined during the party's First Territorial Congress in October 1947.” (4) The party itself held only a few of these Congresses, despite promises for annual change in leadership. The party actually discouraged independence and democracy, but, “In 1960,

Côte d'Ivoire withdrew from the French Community and declared itself independent. The new republic joined the Organization of African Unity in 1963.” (6) This change occurred because of the reformulation of the French Community after “In 1959 several

West African members of the French Community formed the Mali Federation” (4) and thence became independent, which led Houphouët-Boigny to try to convince these countries to remain in the French Community and eventually withdraw the Ivory Coast from that community in its new form.

“Côte d'Ivoire was one of the few African states to recognize Biafra during the Nigerian civil war (1967–70); this action, as well as Houphouët-Boigny's advocacy of dialogue with white-ruled South Africa, estranged the country somewhat from many other African states.” (6) This secret dialogue commenced in 1971, and “Other African leaders criticized the move,” but Houphouët-Boigny was so powerful, as head of the PDCI, that nobody in his own country would be successful in his overthrow, ever. Not that they didn’t try: “In 1980, high unemployment and a falling standard of living led to an attempted coup.” (6) The country’s dependence on agriculture and therefore the volatile commodities market would spark many conflicts throughout its modern history. “Student and labor unrest continued throughout the 1980s as the government cut wages and increased the privatization of industry.” (6) Houphouët-Boigny wasn’t necessarily the paragon of frugality and indulged a few times in waste, corruption, &c. “The capital was officially transferred to Yamoussoukro in 1983.” (6) This village was Houphouët-

Boigny's hometown, and he wanted to build it into a major center of commerce. He even built the world’s largest basilica there, consuming roughly a year of the country’s production in the effort. However, the period of Houphouët-Boigny's reign was a relatively prosperous one, and by 2002, “Ivory Coast's $10bn economy [was] more than four times the size of its neighbours of Mali and Burkina Faso.” (10)

Politically, however, “Côte d'Ivoire had been a de facto one-party state since its birth as a republic, but opposition parties were legalized in 1990 after widespread popular protests.” (6) These elections in 1990 resulted in the re-election of Houphouët-Boigny, but he died in 1993, leaving the country for the first time since its independence in the position of having a transfer of power from one leader to the next. This transfer of power happened smoothly, with Henri Konan Bedié, who had been re-elected as president of the national assembly in 1986 (9), assuming power in accordance with a 1970’s law stipulating that the president of the national assembly assume power and hold an election after the passing of the President. M. Bedié won that election in 1993, and proceeded to begin the ruin of the Republic and its economy, built up by over 30 years of benevolent, quasi-authoritarian quasi-democratic rule. II, D – Modern Times (Conflict)

The beginning of the end of the old Ivoirian political system is placed by this report at

September, 1998, when, “Pres. Henri Konan Bedié passed a constitutional revision that would increase substantially his powers as chief executive.” (9) Pres. Bedié had already created rifts in the country by attempting to draw his constituency in the Christian- dominated south and in doing so alienating those in the Muslim-dominated north. This effort destroyed the unity of the country, so it is somewhat ironic that the concept was called “Ivoirité” which referred to the distinction between the Northern and Southern halves of the Ivory Coast. The reason this led to the division is that Pres. Bedié used it to disqualify the most prominent political candidate for the North, M. Alassane D. Ouattara, from the presidential election on the grounds that he was born in Burkina Faso. M.

Ouattara was not the only enemy of the President, though; he had several hundred members of another opposition movement arrested. This turmoil sparked the first successful military coup in Ivoirian history on December 24th, 1999, as General Robert

Guei overthrew the President, suspended the constitution, and violated the terms on which foreign aid was granted, thus bringing the Ivoirian economy to a screeching halt.

Gen. Guei then put in place a transitional government which he later disbanded in frustration. He held new elections the following October under a new constitution banning persons whose parents were not also Ivoirian from running for President. “In the

October elections Laurent Gbagbo of the socialist Ivorian Popular Front (PFI) won the presidency amid a low turnout—Ouattara was banned from running and his supporters boycotted the vote—but the army halted the vote count and Gueï claimed victory.” (6)

However, not very many people so much as knew anyone who had voted for the General, so his claim rang extremely hollow, and he was forced out of power by the desertion of his army and police, and Pres. Gbagbo was sworn in.

President Laurent Gbagbo’s legitimacy was then questioned by M. Ouattara, sparking the violent and bloody conflict between Northern Muslims and Southern Christians that has raged for the past 2 or 3 years, off and on. III – Speculation

The initial rebels were followers of Gen. Guei from the region bordering Liberia, but the

General was killed just as the rebellion began. In fact, in 2001, the rebel factions in that region, after the death of the General, were led by men nobody had heard of in the Ivory

Coast. “They come from Liberia and Sierra Leone, two countries which have both suffered from long, vicious and inter-related wars involving numerous rebel movements.”

(11) Basically, many of the ‘rebel’ forces are exploiting the Christian-Muslim divisions to loot and pillage the richest country in the region. Charles Taylor, former President of

Liberia, is regarded as one of those most responsible for the escalation of the conflict in the Ivory Coast, and was considered also to be responsible for much of the civil war in

Sierra Leone in 2001 or so.

This report agrees with the BBC when they say, “Perhaps the only thing now clear about

Ivory Coast's war is that it is confused” (11). However, it is clear from the fact that “The two new groups took advantage of a break in the ceasefire between the Ivory Coast

Government and the MPCI to announce their arrival with attacks on cities in the west of the country,” that the two new rebel groups are probably the constructs of Charles Taylor and similar regional rabble-rousers who need a conflict in the Ivory Coast to distract the international institutions from their own abuses of power. While the elections in which Pres. Gbagbo was elected in were boycotted by supporters of M. Ouattara, and were halted early, clearly he had no role in the wrong-doing since he was just a history professor and was running in opposition to the military junta ruling the country. This report speculates that, had Ouattara run, he would have won in a landslide, but the fact remains that, in the absence of these gangs of foreign West African troops, the cease-fire would probably have enabled some sort of power-sharing agreement to come to fruition. Pres. Gbagbo has angered elements in his own party significantly by the degree to which he compromised with the rebels, and should be given accolades for his willingness to compromise.

Also, the timing of revolution and trouble in this country has coincided exactly with fluctuations in the price of cocoa butter (Appendix C). The attempted coup d’état in

1980 coincides with the most precipitous drop in recent history. The declaration of independence in 1960 comes on the heels of a major drop in cocoa prices from when, in

1958, the president was advocating cooperation with the French and membership in the

French community. The protests that led to legalization of opposition parties in 1990 coincides with another valley in cocoa price, and most significantly in recent times, there was another valley in 1995, right before then-President Bedié launched his divisive re- election campaign and introduced the concept of “Ivoirité” to win the race, which ultimately led to all this conflict (along with the continued low prices of cocoa butter).

Also, the entire period from 1990 to the present has had nothing but historically low prices for the raw commodity, and that time period has been by far the bloodiest and most troublesome in Ivoirian history. This correlation is too strong to ignore; rarely has a valley in cocoa prices not sparked civil conflict and never has there been significant civil conflict in times of high cocoa prices. Clearly, without economic pressures the people of the Ivory Coast would be happy with nearly any sort of government. IV - Resolution

This correlation is no coincidence; given that the cocoa prices have fallen before each incident, and often those contesting authority have specifically referred to the low prices, this report claims that the cocoa prices are directly linked to war and revolution in the

Ivory Coast due to its dependence on the commodities market. Every revolutionary event or protest occurred in the wake of or during periods of low cocoa prices. Therefore, it would seem that the solution to the problem of war in the Ivory Coast would be to remove the dependence of the Ivory Coast on the commodities market. Also, it is almost certain that Charles Taylor and other regional powers have interfered with peace in the

Ivory Coast recently to deflect UN attention from their own corrupt regimes, and in

Charles Taylor’s case it bought him nearly a year. V - Solution

Now that Mr. Taylor has been removed from power, that immediate threat is gone, but the point remains that the Ivory Coast needs to maintain more control over its borders, which will require significant investment in defense, to prevent paramilitary groups claiming to be ‘rebels’ (roughly 2/3 of the rebel groups in recent times) from invading the country for plunder. This is probably going to be a prerequisite for some foreign donors and investors, or at least would be really helpful to show to those donors and investors to provide assurance of future stability.

Finally, this report proposes that the government of the Ivory Coast invest in a chocolate bar production facility and remove the Nestle monopoly (Nestle’s African headquarters lie in the Ivory Coast’s commercial capital, Abidjan) from power. This would allow the people of the Ivory Coast to benefit more from their production of cocoa butter, and in a more stable manner, since the retail price of a chocolate bar is much more stable than the price of a metric ton of cocoa butter. Also, it would provide even more employment for the country, and allow it to eventually exceed its former glory as the economic jewel of

West Africa.

This production could be accomplished cheaply and with great benefit both to the predominantly Muslim farmers in the north of the country and the predominantly

Christian banking center in the south, providing a new foundation for renewed national unity. To begin this project, this report recommends an investment in a small-scale chocolate production facility costing perhaps 10 million dollars initially. The profits from this factory could be used as seed money for a future, bigger process which this report will discuss in the following and subsequent paragraphs, but more importantly to prove that the model works and that it is a suitable candidate for foreign aid and investment. This report estimates that, with this initial investment, in perhaps 20 years the process modeled below could be paid for using entirely domestic funds.

The total investment required wouldn’t be too much at first, but the model I created was to utilize the Ivory Coast’s complete production capacity. The complete data set is available in Appendix D, but here are the highlights: The complete value of the initial investment is recovered in 2.09 years, the initial investment is 18.334 billion dollars, revenue would be 17.723 billion dollars per year, and the operating cost would be 5.8 billion dollars per year. All of that 5.8 billion dollars per year represents money going into the hands of Ivoirians, excepting that spent on milk and sugar from Louisiana beet farmers.

It should be noted that this model includes taxes and various other things which could be reduced by the government, or used to promote the national defense and keep out bands of pillagers from Liberia and other countries. Also, 2.1 billion dollars per year of the operating cost is raw materials, and since the cocoa beans are the most expensive item, most of that money will go into the hands of the Ivoirian farmers in the North. 248 million dollars per year is spent on shipping, which will help revitalize the Ivoirian shipping industry as well as that of the Mississippi River basin. Only 2 million dollars per year is allocated for labor in the model; however, if the government chooses to take the profits from the company and distribute it among new civil servants and the farmers, then a new middle class could emerge in the Ivory Coast and bring back the spirit of unity and the political process.

This is just a model for the Ivory Coast, but could easily be applied to any developing country in Africa with a little bit of work. The idea of marketing this chocolate as “fair trade” chocolate and a break-up of the monopolies of Nestle and Cadbury would endear the brand to such countries as France, Germany, Russia, and China. Also, the use of

Louisiana sugar would make the chocolate attractive to buyers in the Southern US, and the Fair Trade aspect would make it attractive to buyers in coastal US cities who are more politically aware and active.

The brand itself would be marketed as “World’s Freshest Chocolate” in the US, thus preventing any possible claims by Nestle that the chocolate is of inferior grade. Also, the advertisements could include some footage of the actual factory floor inside the chocolate production facilities. Also the advertisements in the US would include mention of the fact that the sugar is being bought from Louisiana independent sugar beet farmers, just to drive the point home that just because it’s an African brand doesn’t mean that, in buying it, one is disadvantaging all Americans. Since most of the mass (though almost none of the cost) comes from that sugar, it could even claim to be “more American than Nestle”. In Europe and Asia, it could be marketed again under the label “World’s Freshest

Chocolate”, but the marketing strategy would have to be fine-tuned. In particular I would suggest that the chocolate be promoted as an anti-US-monopoly kind of chocolate. Also, it could be promoted in Europe as a form of reparations from the colonial era, and some percentage of the proceeds could be donated to anti-AIDS causes, and promoting safer sex with condoms.

In Asia the marketing strategy should first and foremost revolve around freshness, but also cost will be more of an issue, especially in places like China and Southeast Asia in general. So it should try to undercut the other major brands in price more aggressively in these markets.

In South America, the brand could be promoted as a way of developing a trans-Atlantic partnership between developing countries. Perhaps 5% of the net revenues in Latin

America could be donated to programs supporting youth involvement in athletics, or in investment into new, locally-owned industry, but also as a way of breaking the new

Nestle monopoly there.

This strategy should work as long as total ownership of the company remains in Ivoirian government hands and the government maintains a policy of not being bought out by foreign investors. Once this industry is on solid footing, all the financial business will return to the Ivory Coast, as well as other industries and manufacturing that is departing developed countries for lands where the labor is cheaper.

One other risk the Ivoirian chocolate companies may run is that, to protect Nestle and

Cadbury, the US and British governments will set up protective tariffs. To head this off, the Ivoirians must mount a massive public relations campaign in both the US and Britain demonstrating the enormous economic benefit coming to the Ivory Coast as a result.

This would be with the intent of shaming those governments into not enacting these trade barriers. VI – Conclusions

The source of violent revolution is most often economic hardship due to commodities price fluctuation, and the revolutions can swell to more staggering acts of brutality and mass-murder with the help of bands of armed thugs sent through porous borders to loot and pillage, at least in the Ivory Coast. Again, never in modern history has a revolution occurred in times of high cocoa prices in the Ivory Coast. However, it seems clear that this is most likely not isolated to the Ivory Coast, but an epidemic that affects nearly all developing countries, most especially those which might be labeled

“banana republics”, governments who depend on revenue from one or very few commodities. This economic set-up allows rapid expansion for a time, but ultimately these commodities markets will go through their bust cycle, destroying the economy and creating violence. In order that this vicious cycle of violence and poverty be brought to an end, it is necessary that, upon creating that solid foundation of commodity export, developing nations create factories or manufacturing facilities which utilize their own raw commodity and turn it into a finished product with a more stable price and a greater profit to the country. This requires investment, but it need not even be foreign. In the

Ivory Coast example I have just illustrated, it would take only a few months to pay for all the investment involved, which in turn is only a fraction of the GDP of the Ivory Coast even at its peak. Also, the factory need not start out at such a large scale; facilities can start at almost however small a facility the country can afford at the time, and the revenues from those can be used to create bigger facilities in turn. Eventually the new middle class created from ethical management of these facilities can invest in more development in their own and neighboring countries, creating a spiral of prosperity to counter and reverse the downward spiral of poverty, death, and disease that envelops

Africa almost completely at this time. Countries like Ghana can implement this model almost directly (though at smaller scale), and countries dependent on other commodities could hire a consultant and do something similar. For example, countries which produce coffee beans could refine their own raw product, package and sell it themselves instead of

Starbucks, to achieve the same result. Perhaps even more simply, given that coffee beans require only roasting. Countries which export timber could manufacture cheap furniture and sell it to IKEA under national brand names. The possibilities are nearly limitless, and there are so few barriers preventing it from happening. Namely, the existence of large, powerful multinational corporations who bribe governments into giving them exclusive access to the raw materials market, which in turn forces the dependency of those economies on the unstable commodities market and yields the results detailed throughout this piece.

The solution to the problems of developing nations such as the Ivory Coast is simple: invest in the future instead of settling for a seemingly big payoff in the short-term. Bibliography:

(1) -- http://www.world66.com/africa/ivorycoast/history, World66 Beta

(2) -- http://www.geographia.com/ivory-coast/, interKnowledge Corp.

(3) -- http://www.zum.de/whkmla/region/westafrica/ivorycpre1842.html, Korean

Minjok Leadership Academy

(4) – Library of Congress Country Studies, Ivory Coast\

(5) -- http://www.nationbynation.com/Ivory%20Coast/History1.html, Nation by

Nation.com

(6) -- http://www.infoplease.com/ce6/world/A0857605.html, Columbia University

Electronic Encyclopedia

(7) -- http://gallica.bnf.fr/VoyagesEnAfrique/Chrono/T_Chrono3.htm, Chrono

Afrique Occidentale

(8) -- http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iv.html, CIA world factbook

(9) -- http://www.bartleby.com/67/4353.html, The Encyclopedia of World History, 6th

edition

(10) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2288938.stm, BBC

(11) http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2662655.stm, BBC

(12) “Booms and slumps in world commodity prices”, Paul Cashin, C John

McDermott and Alasdair Scott, Dec. 1999, Reserve Bank of New England

Discussion Paper Series

(13) -- http://www.candylandcrafts.com/whatischocolate.htm

(14) -- http://tfc-charts.w2d.com/, free commodities quotes Appendix A: Geography

The Ivory Coast is bordered by Liberia, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Guinea.

According to the CIA World Factbook, “although Yamoussoukro has been the official capital since 1983, Abidjan remains the commercial and administrative center; the US, like other countries, maintains its Embassy in Abidjan.” (8) Appendix B: Cocoa Calculations

The attached files include models for making milk chocolate using 100% of Ivoirian

Cocoa Production Capacity.

Milk Chocolate for our purposes will be, in accordance with FDA guidelines, 10% chocolate liquor, 12% milk, 30% cocoa butter, and 48% sugar

At 5 days per batch turnaround time, there will be 73 batches per year.

1.29 billion kg / 73 batches per year = 17671000 kg per batch of cocoa beans

7,000,000 kg cocoa butter and 2200000 kg liquor  12/10 * 2200000kg milk 

2,640,000 kg milk * 4  10,560,000 kg sugar per batch

.1 * .53 = .053 .1 * .47 = .047  rxn stoichiometry for milk chocolate:

.047cocoa + .353 cocoa butter + .48 sugar + .12 milk = milk chocolate

See Appendix D for the complete process data set. Appendix C: Economics

This graph is from source (12) and was modified in Photoshop for clarity from page 22 of the PDF.

The peaks occured in 1958, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1984, 1994, and 1998.

Valleys occurred in 1965, 1972, 1975, 1980-1983, 1990, and 1995. However, the prices have been extremely low since about 1986. Appendix D: The Example Process

The following are the analysis of the process I created using Superpro Designer software.

(See attached excel files)