Communication networks, externalities and the price of information Arnold Polanski∗ Abstract Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a com- munication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre-trade network formation stage. An application to citation graphs results in eigenvector-like measures of intellectual influence. ∗University of East Anglia;
[email protected] 1 1 Introduction Information plays an ever more important role in modern economies. The growing infor- mation industry (or sector) comprises not only companies that produce information goods (e.g., media products, software) and services (e.g., consulting, education) but also com- panies that process (e.g., banking, insurance) and disseminate (e.g., telephone, internet) information. Nowadays, information created in this sector is traded predominantly in elec- tronic form and appears in various manifestations, e.g., as music, e-books, patents or (fake) news. Following Shapiro and Varian (1999), we use the term information good (IG or in- formation for short) very broadly. Essentially, anything that can be digitized - encoded as a stream of bits - is information. Muto (1986) identified the following distinctive properties of IGs: free replication, indivisibility, irreversibility of trade and negative external effects.1 In this work, we assume the first three properties and generalize the last one to external effects of any sign (with no externalities as a special case).