Democracy in Cuba: Seeking Common Initiatives

Democracy in Cuba: Seeking Common Initiatives Berlin Conference of the International Committee for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC)

Remarks by Maria Werlau, April 25, 2007

(Sent for publication by the ICDC).

The topic of our panel is “Cuba after Castro - What path will Cuba take?” We were asked to address questions such as: What steps can be taken at present in order to influence the future peaceful transition to democracy in Cuba? Is the Cuban society prepared for changes and what kind of change will the Cubans want?

For well over a decade, I have attended many events to analyze and discuss the Cuban transition; one thing I have learned is that, despite pressing circumstances, we cannot take a transition for granted.

Since Fidel Castro’s illness and his distance from power last July, we have seen Cuba’s the repressive apparatus working just fine and a Cuban leadership maintaining cohesiveness around its central goal, to remain in power. They are well positioned for a dynastic succession -one that does not require a Castro family member to take over when Fidel is gone. In fact, while internal repression has increased, the Cuban leadership has solidified ties with Venezuela, from which it receives massive subsidies to keep the economy afloat. It looks like they are working hand-in-hand with Hugo Chavez to expand on the Castro-Chavez radical neo-socialist model spiked with elements of captive capitalism and predicted on: 1.)a hemispheric alliance solidified with international partnerships with rogue countries with vast energy resources, 2.) renewed international legitimacy and influence through humanitarian brigades (doctors, teachers and others), and 3.) a re-energized campaign to attract foreign capital and business. This is and may continue to be so beneficial to Cuba’s rulers that we cannot assume a transition is down the road anytime soon.

Because to discuss the transition, we must first get there, I will focus on three factors that can help bring it about. Surprisingly, they tend to be absent from the typical discussion on Cuba. Yet, all Eastern and Central European countries emerging from the Communist period can prove that these issues pose critical challenges to affecting a successful emergence from the totalitarian period. Due to a lack of time, we cannot focus attention on their ample implications on the transition process. Fortunately, a vast literature exists that can help us along, particularly taking from the experience of the former Soviet bloc countries.

This conference marks an historic occasion full of symbolism. Berlin was a city divided by a wall and part of the German nation was repressed under a Communist police state. On both counts, this is what we still have in Cuba today. Cuba has its equivalent of a Berlin wall. Sadly, it is largely ignored and barely even mentioned. It is the area surrounding the U.S. Guantánamo Naval Base. By land, it is separated from Cuban territory by barbed wire and a mined field. Both by land and by sea, it is fortified by watch towers manned by Cuban border guards with orders to shoot to kill. Cuba Archive, has documented more than a dozen cases of people killed trying to escape through the base. Sadly, anecdotal accounts lead us to believe that hundreds may have died here.

As in the former GDR (German Democratic Republic or Communist East Germany), leaving Cuban territory without government permission is punishable by law. Article 216 of Cuba’s Penal Code calls for up to eight years of prison for people who attempt it and up to five years of prison for people who aid and abet others who do so. Article 117 calls for ten to twenty years of

1 prison or death for anyone who takes any sea vessel or aircraft or interferes in their normal operation. Because the Cuban state owns and controls all such vessels, citizens seeking to flee must steal able vessels or build rafts from any materials they can get a hold of, which is also punishable as theft, as most goods are government property.

The ocean surrounding the entire island is a huge barrier for Cubans trying to flee. Aside from countless thousands who may have drowned or been devoured by sharks at sea, Cuba Archive has documented 247 cases of assassinations in exit attempts. These are technically extrajudicial executions, as most reflect a state policy calling for the murder of anyone trying to escape. From the information we have, this appears to have been going on at least until the 1994 and 1995 Migration accords between Cuba and the United States. The accords followed a mass exodus, after which the Clinton Administration agreed to stop at sea and return asylum-seekers to Cuba.

This practice of killing civilians for attempting to leave their country is simply outrageous. But, what is perhaps more outrageous is that Cuba’s leaders are treated with the legitimacy afforded civilized and democratic governments. While Chilean dictator General Augusto Pinochet could not secure an invitation by even Ferdinand Marcos, the former Philippine dictator, Fidel Castro and top representatives of Cuba’s totalitarian government travel the world with impunity and are wined and dined without shame by figures of international prominence. And while Pinochet killed and disappeared 3,197 persons (2,095 extra-judicial executions and deaths under torture and 1,102 disappearances) we have already documented nearly three times that number executed, assassinated or disappeared by the Castro regime. These numbers, which climb as the investigation continues, supersede political, ideological, or populist justifications. They clearly expose the Castro regime as the criminal and murderous dictatorship it is.

One thing was always clear to me about the Pinochet regime -that there was near universal world awareness and condemnation of the atrocities of the Chilean military government. It is in that same light that the Cuban regime should be held accountable. Certainly, it ought to be isolated and pressured for change, just as the Pinochet regime and others of a similar nature have been, instead of afforded the legitimacy it gets from the international community.

The atrocities I outline provide us the most powerful tool to raise awareness of a moral imperative to help bring about freedom in Cuba. So, to be more effective advocates of freedom, we must familiarize ourselves with the names, faces, and stories of the victims. For example, we can take on the task of getting to know, and then showing others, the names and faces of the 37 civilians, including 11 children, victims of the 1994 massacre of the “13 de marzo” tugboat. It is also obvious that Cuba must prepare for a transition that will have to deal with the crimes of the Castro regime.

We should note, however, that presently the Cuban government does not kill in mass numbers as it did in the past. It does not need to. Just as in the GDR, Poland, the Czech Republic and others, the idea is not to kill, so as to preserve an international image. Once repression is institutionalized and the totalitarian state is put firmly in place, fear and more sophisticated means of control become entrenched.

This leads to our second point, the importance of looking at Cuba’s Security Apparatus in relation to the experience of former Soviet bloc countries. By examining their available archives, we can appreciate the shared methodology of repression and find hard evidence of the operational links between the secret police of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and other iron curtain states with Cuba’s State Security (MININT). This helps us understand Cuba today and exposes it for what it is -a Stalinist police state.

To give you an idea of what the Stasi archives in the hands of Federal Commission for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic reveal:

2 1. The Stasi provided Cuba training on torture and sophisticated methods of repression to avoid killing or executing opponents and political prisoners, similar to what they had accomplished in Germany. They also provided guidance on effective systems of control for the prisons and training, support, and materials to soften Cuban political prisoners.

2. The Stasi provided Cuba support with methods of internal repression, which included an agreement of 1980 for the two-year training in Germany of repressive police from Cuba.

3. In 1977 a MININT delegation from Cuba visited counterparts in East Germany and requested Stasi cooperation to infiltrate and monitor a large number of groups worldwide. This resulted in the establishment of a joint surveillance center in the United States to monitor the headquarters of Jehovas Witnesses. Collaboration was also agreed on for surveillance and penetration of a large number of groups and institutions, including Swedish NGO Pan para el Mundo, several religious organizations including the CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano) of the Catholic Church and the World Baptist Confederation in the U.K., and Jewish groups in Argentina and the United States, UNESCO, Friedrich Ebert Foundation of Germany, several publishing houses in France, academic institutions, Pen Club, international editorial groups, Voice of America, Radio Nederland, and Cuban exile groups.

Transition plans must include the recovery and uncovering of the secret police files and the dismantling the repressive apparatus, to be replaced by an intelligence service that answers to a democracy under the rule of law.

The third issue in this discussion has to do with the massive wealth illegally amassed by the Castro brothers in what amounts to perhaps the largest privatization of one country in private hands in modern times. There is compelling evidence that Fidel and Raúl control substantial hard currency bank accounts in Switzerland and other financial safe havens as well as a powerful and diversified conglomerate of companies all over the world, managed and officially owned by intelligence officers or paid intermediaries. This has allowed Cuba to finance a massive and effective global propaganda campaign and to exert and buy influence worldwide, in addition to financing international wars and subversion as well as internal repression. We need to pay attention to this issue, promoting measures that tighten spaces and close these doors to the Cuban leadership and examining the implications in the leadership’s succession plan. Needless to say, after a transition is in place, recovery efforts should be undertaken. This will prove quite a challenge, as this network is very sophisticated, has operated for many years, and is far along in the game.